ML20149G350
| ML20149G350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149G340 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-87-43, 50-325-87-42, NUDOCS 8802180235 | |
| Download: ML20149G350 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1987043
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MAHlETTA STRE ET. N.W.
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ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No. 50-325/87-42 and 50-324/87-43
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No. 50-325 and 50-324
Facility Name:
Brunswick 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
ecember 1 - 31, 1987
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Inspectors-
,
W. H. Rtland
Date Signed
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Date Signed
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Approved By: G
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P. E. Fredtickson, Section Chief
Dhte Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine safety inspection by the resident inspector involved the
areas of followup on previous enforcement matters, maintenance observation,
surveillance observation, operational
safety verification, cold weather
preparations, and onsite followup of events.
Results:
In the areas inspected, one violation was identified:
failure to
deactivate primary containment system isolation valves.
8802180235 880200
ADOCK 0500
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- E. Bishop, Manager - Operations
T. Cantebury, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
- G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
- C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project
- W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA
- R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support
- K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance
- R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction
- W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security
A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations
R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP
J. Holder, Manager - Outages
- P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)
R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
- J. Moyer, Manager - Training
- J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance
B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor
R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist
J. Smith, Manager - Administrative Support
R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
D. Warren, Acting Engineering Supervisor
B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force
members.
- Attended the exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 5, 1987, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The
licensee did not identify any information supplied to the inspector as
proprietary.
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Note: Acronyms and abbreviations used in the report are listed in para-
graph 9.
Item
Description / Reference Paragraph
325/87-42-01 &
VIOLATION - Failure to Deactivate Primary
324/87-43-01
Containment Isolation Valves (paragraph 3).
325/87-42-02 &
- URI - Wrong Unit Event Involving RHR Pump
Breakers
324/87-43-02
(paragraph 6.a).
324/87-43-03
URI - Reactor Coolant System Leakage in MSIV Pit
(paragraph 8.d).
325/87-42-04
URI - Dial Type Thermometar in SLC Tank
(paragraph 4.b).
325/87-42-05
URI - Vital Area Access To Service Water Valve
324/87-43-05
Pits (paragraph 8.b).
324/87-43-06
URI - RHR SW Gasket Leak (paragraph 8.c).
325/87-42-07
IFI - Lonegren SLC Relief Valve Plug Installed
with Incorrect Drain Plug (paragraph 4.a).
325/87-42-08 &
IFI - Submission of TS Amendment Request for RWCU
324/87-43-08
Isolation Response Time (paragraph 6.b).
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325/87-42-09 &
IFI - Diesel Generator Building Supply Fan "A"
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324/87-43-09
Failure (paragraph 8.a).
325/87-42-10
IFI - HPCI F001 Motor Failure (paragraph 4.c).
3.
Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item (325/87-39-04 and 324/87-40-04), Deactivation of
Primary Containment Isolation System Valves. Discussions with NRR on this
issue confirmed that "deactivate" as used in TS means that automatic
valves must be rendered incapable of operating, thus preventing both
inadvertent and spurious operation.
The licensee failed to properly
deactivate valves on three occasions:
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- An Unresolved Item is a matter aoout which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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a.
The gas sample return to suppression pool inboard valve, 2-RXS-SV-
4188, had dual indication during performance of PT-4.1.1, Reactor
Building Ventilation Exhaust Monitoring System Functional Test,
Revision 31. The licensee performed the test on October 6, 1987, and
declared the above valve inoperable at 4:30 a.m. the same day.
To
comply with TS 3.6.1 1, the licensee, under clearance 2-1044, red-
tagged closed 2-RXS-SV-4189 the same day.
The valve was still
capable of being opened by the control switch.
The clearance was
closed on December 25, 1988.
b.
The reactor water sample line isolation valve, 1-B32-F019, had failed
indication during performance of PT-3.1.22, Reactor Coolant Recir-
culation System Valve Operability Test, Revision 10. The licensee
had performed the test on September 22, 1987, and declared the above
valve inoperable at 10:44
p.m.
the same day.
To comply with TS 3.6.3,
the licensee, under clearance 1-1809, red-tagged closed
1-B32-F020, the outboard valve, the same day.
Fuses were not pulled
and the valve was still capabla of being opened by the control
switch.
Corrective action was taken on December 9, 1987.
c.
The drywell head inboard purge exhaust valve, 1-CAC-V49, had no
position
indication during routine surveillance te sti ng .
The
licensee had performed the test on June 16, 1987, and declared the
above valve inoperable at 5:00 a.m. the same day. To comply with TS 3.6.3,
the licensee, under clearance 1-1618, red-tagged closed
1-CAC-V50, the outboard valve, the same day.
Circuit breakers were
not opened and the valve was still capable of being opened by the
control switch.
Corrective action was taken on December 9, 1987.
The above failures to deactivate the containment isolation valves is a
Violation:
Failure to Deactivate Primary Containment Isolation Valves
(325/87-42-01 and 324/87-43-01).
One violation and no deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and
reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with
approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry
codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that:
redundant
components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts
were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were
used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate;
quality cor. trol hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-
maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification require-
ments were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that
selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work .equests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave
priority to safety-related maintenance.
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The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the selected maintenance
activities throughout the month.
The matters below require followup,
a.
SLC Relief Valve Drain Plug
A drain plug on the 1A SLC pump discharge relief valve, 1-C41-F029A,
blew out while the system was idle on December 8, 1987, at 10:15 a.m.
The resulting leak from the 5/8 inch nole was due to the head from
the SLC tank. The tank was isolated at 10 : 19 a .m. , stopping the
leak.
The plug was replaced by 1:16 p.m. the same day.
The licensee found that the drain plug was not made of stainless
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steel as required, but appeared to be a carbon steel pipe plug. The
plug was not listed on the mechanical drawing for the valve.
The
relief valve was made by Lonegren with a stainless steel body and
internals.
The valve had been installed since April 1987. The pipe
plug was found with severely corroded threads, possibly from galvanic
corrosion.
A valve in stores also had a similar plug. The licensee
verified that the other 3 valves in the plant had the correct plugs.
The Harris E&E Center will examine the plugs to determine the exact
material. The inspector will follow the licensee's resolution of the
issue, particularly any reportability determination.
This is an
Inspector Followup Item: Lonegren SLC Relief Valve Plug Installed
with Incorrect Drain Plug (325/87-42-07).
b.
Thermometer in SLC Tank
A five inch dial type thermometer was removed from the Unit 1 SLC
tank at 1:15 p.m. on December 23, 1987. The licensee determined that
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the system operability would not be affected in that the thermometer
was underneath the sparger at the tank bottom and could not have
migrated to the tank outlet line.
The inspector will follow the
licensee's review of this event, including root cause determination.
This matter remains Unreselved pending the inspector's followup of
the licensee's root cause analysis:
Dial Type Thermometer in SLC
Tank (325/87-42-04).
c.
HPCI F001 Motor Failure
On December 31, 1987, at 1:00
a.m., the HPCI steam admission valve,
1-E41-F001, failed to open during performance of surveillance test
PT-9.2.
The licensee found the motor armature grounded, the shunt
field open and the motor internals blackened.
In,pection of the
motor control center, in situ testing of the torque switch and
actuation of the valve by application of a torque wrench to the hand
wheel drive has revealed no mechanical cause for the failure.
Portions of the initial investigation conducted under work request
87-BMTII, OSPP-BKR004 and MP-57, were observed by the inspector. The
inspector plans to continue to follow the licensee's efforts in this
area, specifically regarding root cause failure analysis. This is an
Inspector Followup Item: HPCI F001 Motor Failure (325/87-42-10).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical
Specifications.
Through observation, interviews, and record review, the
inspectors verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification
requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were
qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and
complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and
proper return to service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activi-
ties:
Main Steamline High Radiation Channel Functional Test.
RWCU High Differential Flow Trip Unit Channel Calibration.
PT-01.11
Core Performance Parameter Check.
PT-14.1
Control Rod Operability Check (Unit 1).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance
with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements by direct
observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,
reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control operator, shift
supervisor, clearance, STA, daily and standing iastructions, and jumper /
bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating
trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no
conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Opera-
tions.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels,
instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify oper-
ability and that operating parameters were within Technical Specification
limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity
of system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of
selected control room annunciators.
Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified
weekly by insuring that:
each accessible valve in the flow path was in
its correct position; each power supply and breaker was closed for compon-
ents that must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR subsystem cross-
tie valve for each unit was closed with the power removed from the valve
operator; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper
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lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist
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which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
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Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified
operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve
lineup, if accessible.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /
procedures were followed. This included observation of HP practices and a
review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument
calibration.
The inspectors verified that:
the cecurity organization was properly
manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned
functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the
protected area; vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted
within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification
badges; perscnnel in vital areas were authorized; effective coinpensatory
measures were employed when required; and security's response to threats
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or alarms was adequate.
The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified
position of certain containment isolation valves, checked clearances at
random, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power
sources,
a.
Wrong RHR Pump Breaker Cleared
On December 21, 1987, at about 4:00 a.m. an operator racked out the
wrong RHR pump breaker while hanging a clearance.
The operator had
intended to rack out the 2A RHR pump breaker on 4160 V emergency bus
E-3.
Instead, the operator racked out the 1A RHR pump breaker on the
same bus.
The operator discovered his mistake when he returned to
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the control room and found the 2A pump's control room light still
energized.
The licensee immediately declared the Unit 1 Division I
RHR system inoperable and racked in the 1A pump breaker, cancelling
the LCO. Both units were in Operational Condition One at the time of
the event.
The inspector's final resolution of this issue will be
made pending the licensee's completion of their OER.
This matter
remains Unresolved:
Wrong Unit Event Involving RHR Pump Breakers
(325/87-42-02 and 324/87-43-02).
b.
Technical Specification Discrepancy
The licensee identified, in June 1985, that the isolation system
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instrumentation response time for the RWCV high flow isolation was
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inaccurate.
Table 3.3.2-3, item 3.a, listed the response time as 5
13 seconds. However, this does not include the 45 second timers in
the circuit. The instrumentation compares the inlet and outlet f",ows
to determine possible leakage. The licensee stated that the total
time for the instrument response (45 + 13 = 58 seconds) is below the
time used in the GE analysis for a break in the RWCV line.
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Based on discussions with Region 'II, the li;ensee was asked to submit
the TS amendment that was planned over two years ago.
During the
exit interview, the licensee committed to submit the amendment
request by March 31, 1987.
This matter is an Inspector Followup
Item: Submission of TS Amendment Request for RWCU Isolation Response
Time (325/87-42-08 and 324/87-43-08).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
The inspector verified that the licensee had implemented 01-43, Freeze
Protection and Cold Weather Bill, Rev. 1, on December 29, 1987.
The
inspector verified that the freeze protection circuit lights were
energized for the RCIC/HPCI condensate storage tank low level switches.
The inspector noted that the thermometer used to measure ambient tempera-
ture in the service water building was missing.
The shift foreman
directed an auxiliary operator to replace the thermometer.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Onsite Followup of Events (93702)
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a.
Diesel Generator Building Supply Fan Failure
A diesel generator building supply fan failed catastrophically on
December 13, 1987. The fan was made by Joy Manufacturing Company and
has an airfoil blade design.
The fan is one of four fans that
supplies ventilation to the four site emergency DGs. Only three fans
are needed, per FSAR section 9.4.7.2, to maintain adequate ventila-
tion during worst case conditions.
The eight blades of the 66 inch
fan broke up into hand sized pieces. The pieces were sent to CP&Ls
laboratories. Preliminary findings indicate that six of eight blades
had undergone significant fatigue failure.
Microscopic cracks were
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found at the blade base on the opposite side of the fatigue failure.
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The licensee has about 60 Joy fans onsite of the same design. This
is the first failure of this type.
The OG fan had had its first
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hand-held vibration readings taken on December 1,
1987, with no
readings above the manufacturer's shutdown limit.
No vibration
signature analysis had been done on this fan or any other diesel
supply or exhaust fan.
The licensee also found a bent nickel (five
cents) in the fan housing.
The licensee is repairing the damaged fan. Once the fan is repaired,
the licensee plans to perform dye penetrant testing on the other
diesel supply fans as well as continue their metallurgical analysis.
Cracks were also found in the air flow straightening vanes adjacent
to the hub in DG fan
"A".
The licensee made weld repairs on two
vanes and removed the crack tip by drilling on the remaining cracks.
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A monthly inspection program has been established for the "A" fan,
which includes a full spectrum analysis.
An inspection of the
remaining fans is also scheduled for completion by March 18, 1988, as
part of an action item in EER 87-0549.
In the exit interview, the
licensee committed to the inspector to complete the inspections by
the above date and to provide a date for completion of the metallur-
gical analysis ir one week.
This is an Inspector Followup Item:
Diesel Generator Building Supply Fan "A" Failure (325/87-42-09 and
324/87-43-09).
b.
Vital Area Access
The inspector reviewed a security event with the licensee's security
supervisor.
The event involved an individual previously approved for
unescorted access to the Central Alarm Station who entered the CAS
while not on the current access list.
Further discussions with the
security supervisor raised questions concerning access controls for
other vital areas. The licensee put administrative controls in place
on December 28, 1987, that resolved the inspector's immediate
concerns.
Region II security inspectors will resolve this matter
during subsequent inspections.
This matter is Unresolved:
Vital
Area Access.
(325/87-42-05 and 324/87-43-05).
c.
During operation of the Division I Residual Heat Removal Service
Water system, a gasket failed on 2-E11-F014A, the RHR HX SW inlet
valve.
The failure occurred at 9:30 a.m. on December 24, 1987, with
the unit at 70% power coasting down to refueling.
The licensee was
making preparations to run RCIC by starting the Division I RHR SW and
RHR system in the torus cooling mode.
The RHR pump had been started
shortly before the gasket failed.
The control operator imnediately
stopped the RHR pump when he received the report of the leak from the
Auxiliary Operator.
The A0 then determined the exact source of the
leak and the control operator secured the RHR SW pump.
An upstream
valve was torqued shut to completely stop all leakage.
The RHR 2A and 2C pumps were sprayed with salt water and about 2,000
gallons (six inches) of water remained in the Division I RHR -17 foot
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area.
The leak had occurred on the 20 foot level, near the top of
the HX.
The licensee declared Division I of LPCI, RHR SW, and
Suppression Pool Cooling inoperable.
The licensee's reco/ery actions
included leak repair, inspection and testing of wetted equipment, and
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removal of the water by pumping to 55 gallon drums.
The drums were
then emptied into the salt water release tank and released through
the service water effluent line,
All affected systems were declared
operable by 7:54 p.m. on December 27, 1987.
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RHR Division II was unaffected.
The senior resident inspector was
outside the RHR HX room when the gasket failed.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee's actions during the event were appro-
priatt. The licensee plans to followup the event with an OER.
Final
resolution of this matter awaits inspector review of the OER. This
matter remains Unretolved:
RHR SW Gasket Leak (324/87-43-06).
d.
Unit 2 MSIV Pit Leak
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The licensee discovered, on December 13, 1987, a five to 10 GPM leak
coming from between the concrete encased torus roof and the floor of
the MSIV pit tunnel. The licensee found the leak rate by recording
the pump run time in the reactor building south core spray sump.
Reactor building humidity increased as shown by condensation on HVAC
ducts and the RBCCW heat exchangers. No radioactive airborne problem
was noted. The licensee reported that' chemistry sampl's of the water
indicated, at that time, that the leak was from main steam.
The licensee commenced valve isolations on December 15 to locate the
leak.
Per SP-87-100, each main steamline was isolated, one at a
time, with no change in leakage, which had increased to 15 GPM by
then.
The licensee isolated the MSL drains also with no change ir,
leakage.
On December 17, 1987, the licensee electrically bacKseated
the outboard feedwater system stop-check isolation valves, 2-B21-
F032A and B, stopping the leak.
The inspector questioned how primary containment integrity was being
maintained with the valve operators electrically backseated.
The
licensee modified the valve logic, initiated procedure controls, and
computed potential leakage during valve ycling under those controls
to show that containment integrity was maintained.
The licensee temporarily modified the valve logic, providing long
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term containment isolation capability.
The F032 check valves will
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automatically shut on a feedwater line break outside containment.
For long term isolation, the operator may be required to shut the
valves using the operator, maintaining the penetrations shut.
With the current packing leak, the licensee would be required to shut
the check valves firmly by driving the disk into the seat.
Once
again the valves would have to be backseated.
To electrically
backseat the valves, the open limit switches must be bypassed.
The
licensee, in EER 87-0550, December 18, 1987, bypassed the open limit
switches, to permit electrically backseating the F032 valves from the
control room if the reactor building was inaccessible during an
accident.
Standing instructions were provided to the operators on
how to operate these valves under those conditions.
The licensee concluded that the packing leakage that would occur
during valve cycling was acceptable.
The supporting analysis was
performed in EER 87-0551, Revision 1, December 23, 1987. The deter-
mination of acceptability was based on:
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The . oquivalent air leakage rate + previous ILRT results +
backseated leakage rate was less than the allowable leakage rate
for containment for one hour.
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Standing instructions to operators for valve operations.
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Continued monitoring of south core spray pump room sump with an
established maximum leakage rate.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's above actions were
acceptable.
The inspector further questioned compliance with TS 3.4.3.2, Reactor
Coolant System Operational Leakage.
Part of the TS limits RCS
leakage to five GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE averaged over any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
period.
Before the leakage was identified on December 17, the
,
licensee operated several days with a leak that was unidentified and
may have been coming from the RCS.
FSAR page 3.1.2-27 lists the
boundary of the RCS as the P032 valves.
However, the surveillance
requirements for this TS only list drywell related equipment to
monitor for leakage. The leakage was shown to be from the pack'ng of
the F032 valves, part of the reactor coolant system boundary.
Therefore, TS 3.4.3.2 should apply. The licensee had not considered
whether the TS had applied prior to tha inspector's question. This
matter remains Unresolved pending further Region II/NRR review:
Reactor Coolant System Leakage in MSIV Pit (324/87-43-03).
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
List of Aobreviations for Unit 1 and 2
A0
Auxiliary Operator
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
Central Alarm Station
Diesel Generator
Engineering Evaluation Report
ERFIS
Emergency Response Facility Information System
Engineered Safety Feature
F
Degrees Fahrenheit
Final Safety Analysis Report
General Electric Company
GPM
Gallons Der Minute
Health Physics
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning System
Heat Exchanger
Instrumentation and Control
NRC Inspection and Enforcement
IFI
Inspector Followup Item
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LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
Licensee Event Report
Low Pressure Coolant Injection
Maintenance Procedure
Main Steamline
NFC
Nutt.ar Regulatory Commission
N,;R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Operating Experience Report
01
Operating Instruction
PA.
Protected Area
PNSC
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Periodic Test
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
Resctor Core Isolation Cooling
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Special Procedure
TS
Technical Specification
Unresolved Item
V
Volt
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