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.s Mr. Gregory J. Ogeka, Chief RRA8 Rdg f: Administrative Branch 9 Brookhaven Area Office ' 3
-f Building 464 i Upton, New York 11973
Dear Mr. Ogeka:
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Subject:
BNL Technical Assistance to the Division of Safety Technology, P HRR, NRC, " Review of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the '
Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant" (FIN A-3740) l '
i The enclosed NRC Form 1)3, Standard Order for 00E Work, is hereby submitted in accordance with Section III.B.2 of the DOE /NRC Memorandum of Understanding dated February 24, 1978.
if' Funding authorization in the amount of $50,000 to immediately begin work on
- the subject project was provided to you on September 6, 1983, $120,000 on i December 6, 1983, $100,000 on May 31, 1984, $14,000 was provided on
- j September 17, 1984, and $10,000 was provided on February 13, 1985. The 4 purpose of this letter is to accept your proposal, dated February 1,1985 i.. (Rev. 1), to transmit FY 85 funds in the amount of $G,000 and to transfer I, , ' $14,208.48 from FIN A3785.
! If you have any questions concerning the acceptance of this order, please
! contact Ms. J. Halvorsen on FTS 492-7932.
Sincerely, i
/
8507130450 850426
, PDR FOIA DELAIRBS-199 PDR Themis P. Speis, Director I Division of Safety Technology I - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation I
Enclosure:
NRC Form 173 i 1 cc: R. Barber, HQ-00E q H. C. Grahn, BNL T R ST RRAB:0ST _
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\ TSpeis s DST CHRON DDandois, ORM VZeoli, ORM Mr. Gregory J. Ogeka, Chief RRA8 Rdg j Administrative Branch Brookhaven Area Office +
Building 464 '
Upton, New York 11973 Oear Mr. Ogeka:
Subject:
BNL Technical Assistance to the Division of Safety Technology, NRR, NRC, " Review of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the
- Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant" (FIN A-3740)
The enclosed NRC Form 173, Standard Jrder for 00E Work, is hereby submitted in accordance with Section III.B.2 of the 00E/NRC Memorandum of Understanding dated February 24, 1978.
Funding authorization in the amount of $50,000 to immediately begin work on the subject project was provided to you on September 6, 1983, $120,000 on December 6, 1983, $100,000 on May 31, 1984, $14,000 was provided on September 17, 1984, and $10,000 was provided on February 13, 1985. The, purpose of this letter is to accept your proposal, dated February 1,1985 (Rev. 1), to transmit FY 85 funds in the amount of $G,000 and to transfer
$14,208.48 from FIN A3785. g, If you have any questions concerning the acceptance of this order, please '
contact Ms. J. Halvorsen on FTS 492-7932. <
Sincerely,
]
j 7 l' Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
NRC Form 173 cc: R. Barber, HQ-00E <
H. C. Grahn, BNL T RP.M:pS,T RRAB : DST q W vr Q
H. J. Rauch. 00E-CH00 .. a r ECg ABuslikf -
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NRC Fonu 173 u.S. NuCLEAn nEGULAfonY COMMISSON '
ORDER NUM8ER (16A) 20-85-336
^
STANDARD ORDER FOR DOE WORK
- MAR 2 51985 ISSUED TO: (00E Office) ISSUED BY: (NRC Office) ACCOUNTING CITATION Brookhaven Area Office Office of Nuclear Reactor APPROPRIATON SW80L Regulation DST 31X0200.205 84R NUMBER PERFORMING ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION 20-10-40-41-5 Brookhaven National Laboratory FIN NUM8EA Upton, New York A3740-5
]j FIN TITLE Review of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the WORK PERIOD - THIS ORDER FIXED E ESTlMATED .~.
Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant
([g[b/83 ID31/85 08 LIGATION AVAILABILITY PROVIDED BY:
,t A. THis Oa0Ea
.s 6,000 l
- 8. TOTAL OF ORDE AS PLACEO PRCA TO THIS DATE WITH THE PERFORMING ORGANIZATON UNCER THE SAME *APPROPRIATON SYM80L" AND THE FIAST FOUR OCITS OF THE "84R NUW8EA~8CITED 4.315,000 A80VE.
C. TOT 4t OADEa3 TO DATE (TOTAL A & 8) 5 4,321,000 D. AMOUNT INCLUDED IN "C
- APPLCA8LE TO THE " FIN NUM8ER" CITED IN THIS OACEA.
t16,000 FINANCIAL FLEXi8:UTY:
"X FVNOS WILL NOT BE REPAOGRAMMEO 8ETWEEN FINS. UNE D CONSTITUTES A bMITATON ON 08UGATCNS AUTHORIZE
- FUNOS MAY BE REPAOGRAMMEO NOT TO EXCEED 210% OF FIN LEVEL UP TO 5504. UNE C CONSTITUTES A UMITATCN ON 08LCATONS AUTHORIZE 0.
STA* 0AAD TERMS AND CONDITCNS (se. NRC Me. val C,ieptet t102. App.
- Part 4) ARE PART OF TH:S OADEA UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED ATTACHMENTS THE FOLLowiNG ATTACHMENTS AAE HEAE8Y MADE A PART OF THis SECURITY-OADER:
STATEMENT OF WOAg WOAK ON TH4S OADER INVOLVES CLASSIFIED
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INFOAMATON NRC FOAM 187 IS ATTACHED
' : ADDITONAL TEAMS AND CONoiTCNS WNK ON THIS CADEA INVOLVES UNCLASSIFIED X OTHER SAFEGUAAOS PROPAIETAAY. OA OTHER sensitive INFOAMATON i j Aasi#Ca^'s&a".OA,
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This order accepts the BNL proposal dated February 1,1985 (Rev.1), provides 4
$6,000 and transfers $14,208.48 from FIN A3785.
s After acceptance, d send to the NRC Office of Resource Management, ATTN: 0. Dandois ,
efs'e' a nd orovide a co y to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. ATTN: K. McGrath.
K 7l p. / DING AUTyORfTTI e r ACCEPTING ORGANIZATION 54WW /FA. t S 3yj y S GNArUaE Themis P. Speis, Director i I TITLE ftTLE Division of Safety Technology NAC FORM tF3 f e44) DATE i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR PEGULATORY COMMISSION .
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-4
) (Low Power)
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
)
TFSTIMONY OF ROBERT WEATHERW AX, ,
MOHAMED EL-GASSEIR AND GREGORY MINOR ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY O. Please state your names and professional affiliations,.
A. My name is Robert K. Weatherwax, Jr. I am the president of Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., of Sacramento, California. I have had 15 years experience in matters relating to nuclear safety analysis of commercial power generation, including work related to developing elements of fault tree, sequence tree, and event tree analyses. A statement of my qualifications and educational background I
is set forth in Attachment A. -
My name is Mohamed M. El-Gasseir.. I am a senior
, staff scientist with Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc. I hold a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from the University of California, Berkeley and a M.S. degree
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in the same field from the University of Rochester. I am .
a doctoral candidate of Berkeley in the field of energy and resources. My recent work at Sierra has focused on probabilistic assessments. A statement cf my qualifica-tions is set forth in Attachment B.
My name is Gregory Minor. I am founder and vice president of MHB Technical Associates. I have 24 years of experience in the nuclear industry, including 16 years with the General Electric Nuclear Energy Division and 8 years as a consultant with MHB. A copy of my qualifica-tions has been submitted with other testimony.
My educational background is in electrical engineer-ing in which I received a B.S. degree at the University of Califo rnia , Berkeley and a M.S. degree from Stanford.
My work with General Electric included the design, testing, qualification and pre-operational testing of safety eoulpment and control rooms for use in nuclear power plants.
As a consultant for MHB Technical Associates I have ,
participated in numerous technical reviews and analyses of nuclear plant safety for government, public interest, and e
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Y o private organizations. My work has included project ,
coordination for a'PRA study on the Barseback Uuclear Plant in Sweden, and involvement in the performance or analysis of several probabilistic consequence models re-lated to emergency planning for nuclear plants in the United States. In addition, I have participated through review, analyses, and testifying in many licensing hear-ings for nuclear power plants in the United States and 4
abroad.
O. What is the purpose of this testimony?
A. The purpose of this testimony is to address.the question whether operation of the Shoreham plant at up to 5 percent power, under the AC power system proposed by LILCO in its Supplemental Motion for Low Power Operating License (the
" alternate" system), would be as safe as operatiog at up to 5 percent power with three fully qualified.on-site
- emergency diesel generators, as described in the Shoreham FSAR (a " normal" sys, tem). In our opinion, operation with
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LILCO's alternate proposed system would not be as safe as operation with a normal system.
O. Generally, on what do you base your opinion?
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A. We have assembled and reviewed documentation.that enabled" us to compare the proposed LILCO alternate AC power system and its components, with the qualified on-site AC power system described in the Shoreham FSAP and its components, in particular, those systems which af fect their capability to deliver, and sustain the delivery of, AC power to essential emergency loads. A description of the two systems is contained in Attachment C hereto. We then perfonned a quantitative comparison of the probability of Shoreham reaching a state of core vulnerab'ility (as defined by LILCO's contractor Science Applications, Inc.
in Probabilistic Fisk Assessments for the Shoreham plant) due to lo'ss of of,fsite power, during operation at five cercent power, assuming operation with the alternate system and assuming operation with the originally proposed qualified on-site power system.
O. How does the quantitative comparison you just described relate to the relative safety of the two systems?
A. ,
The comparison of calculated frequencies of the Shoreham , ,
plant reaching a state of core vulnerability due to a loss of of fsite power, given each of the two AC power systems, provides a quantitative measure of the two systems'
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1 s relative safety in terms of the overall operation of the -
plant at up to five percent power. The fact that the cal-culated probability of core vulnerability given operation with the alternate system is substantially greater than the corresponding probability given the normal system dem-onstrates that operation with the alternate system is quantifiably less safe than operation with the normal system.
Q. Please describe briefly the two AC power systems you com-pared.
A. The proposed alternate system's major components include four General Motors EMD, mobile outdoor-type diesel.
repowered generators ( " FM Ds " ). , and a 20-MW refurbished Pratt and Whitney gas turbine. The EMDs as well as the gas turbine were used (prior to their relocation to Shoreham) as peaking units for several years. Technical details of this generation equipment and of the supporting electric devices can be found in Table Cl of Attachment C.
The proposed configuration is depicted by the line diagram in Figure C2 of Attachment C. The geographical layout of the major equipment is shown in Figure C1. The procedures for restoring power via the gas turbine and the EMDs are d escribed in Section 2.1.1. 2. of Attachment C.
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The normal system consists ,
of a set of three -
self-contained and operationally independent diesel gener-ators manufactured by Transamerica DeLaval Inc. ("TDIs").
Technical details of the TDIs can be found in Section 2.1.2.1 of Attachment C and in Testimony of G. Dennis Eley b
et al. on behalf of Su f folk County regarding EMD diesel generators and the 20 MW gas turbine. Specifications for other components related to operation of the TDIs are also listed in Table C1. The configuration of the normal system is shown in Figure C4 of Attachment'C. The operation of the TDIs is automatic.
O. Please describe the-process you used in analyzing the probability of Shoreham reaching a state of core vulnera-bility during operation at five percent power under each system.
A. Recently,, at LILCO's request, Science A'pplications, In-corporated ("SAI") and Delian Corporation , performed a Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Shoreham operation at 5 percent power. "Probabilistic Pisk Assessment, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Low Power Operation up to 5% of Full Power," by Delian Corporation and Science Applica-tions, Incorporated, Draft, May 1984 (hereinafter, "SAI
3 - O Low Power PRA"). Our basic approach in performing our .
quantitative analysis of core vulnerability probabilities was to use the structure and methodology used by SAI in .
performing its assessment for LILCo. We used that method-ology to produce two estimates of the probability of reaching core vulnerability due to a loss of offsite power transient at Shoreham for operation at 5 percent power. .
One estimate assumed that the TDIs, as described in the FSAR, were fully operational; and the other assumed that the EMDs and the gas turbine were operational in place of
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the TDIs. We decided to produce these two estimates for purposes of comparison, because the potential for reaching a state of core vulnerability is a key measure of whether operation of the Shoreham plant at 5 percent power with the alternate AC power configuration proposed by LILCO would be as safe as 5 percent power operation with fully qualified onsite diesel generators. ,
Our principal data sources in deriving these two estinates of core vulnerable probability Qere the SAI Low Power PRA and information from the Probabilistic Risk As- ,
sessment dated June 24, 1983, also performed by SAI for LILCO. " Final Re port, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," Science Application
Incorporated, June 24, 1984 (hereinafter, SAI 1983 PRA")..
The.latter source was used primarily to derive reliability figures relating to the operation of the TDIs.
We used the SAI data in performing our analysis for several reasons. First, we did not have sufficient time to derive all the necessary data independently. Second, the approach and methodology used by SAI in its PRAs seemed generally reasonable, and'in our professional judg-
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ment, the SAI analyses were competently performed and its results, in general, were reasonable and accurate. Third, we believe that since 6AI acauired much of the data it used in its analysis from LILCO, it is reasonable to as-sume that the underlying factual data are likely accept-able to LILCO, thus reducing the chance of controversy regarding such underlying data. We used the SAI data, however, recognizing that in our opinion, not all the as-sumptions incorporated into the SAI analyses were as con-servative or as appropriate as they should have been. At-tachment E sets forth certain adjustments that we believe
- would make SAI's estimates of core vulnerability probabilities at Shoreham more realistic.
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Core vulnerability can be produced by a number of -
initiating events. We limited our analysis to core vul-nerability following loss of offsite power because, in the ,
SAI analysis, that was the only source of core vulnerabil-ity affected by the differing AC power configurations now at issue.
In its Low Power PRA, SAI assumed that the EMDs and the gas turbine comprised the onsite emergency AC power system, and then investigated five types of, accident se-quences, each involving a unique time within which core vulnerability was ceached after a loss of offsite power.
The probabilities of core vulnerability derived by SAI are contained in Table 3.1. 3 of the SAI Low Power PRA. We performed a comparable analysis, using the same methodolo-gy as SAI, but assuming that the emergency onsite AC power system was comorised solely of operational TDIs. We ob-tained the necessary data to perform the TDI event tree analysis from the SAI 1983 PRA. The result of SAI's cal-cu.ations assuming the EMDs and the gas turbine provided emergency power, and of our calculations assuming the TDIs provided emergency power, are set forth in Table 1.1/ The
-1/ We believe, based on our review of the SAI Low Power PR A, that SAI did not consider the possibility of repairing the (Footnote cont'd next page)
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TABLE 1 .
COMPARISON OF CORE VULNERABILITY FREQUENCY FOR LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TRANSIENT FOR NORMAL AND ALTERNATE AC POWER SOURCES Frequency -
Loss of Off- (per Rx Yr); Frequency site Power Time to using EMD (per RX Yr. ) ;
Sequence Core diesels and using TDI Type Vulnerable gas turbine diesels 2 days 1.0E-7 5.lE-9 Type 1 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> 3.2E-7 2.3E-8 Type 2 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8.lE-7 1.3E-7 Type 3 .
10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 5.9E-7 7.0E-8 Type 4 ,
l Type 5 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> l'.5E-6 2.lE-7 TOTAL 3.3E-6 0.44E-6 l Note: Colu.n totals may not exactly equal.the sum of the figures in each column due to rounding.
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event trees' which form the bases for the frequencies in -
Table 1 are Attachment D.
O.- What were your conclusions?
A. As shown on Table 1, the calculated probability of core vulnerability due to loss of offsite power, assuming LILCO's alternate AC power configuration is' in place (EMDs and gas turbine) is 3.3 E-6; assuming the normal configu-ration (TDIs) .is in place, it is O.44 E-6. This means that assuming there is a loss of offsite power during operation of the Shoreham plant at 5 percent power, it is more than seven times as likely that such an event would
- lead to core vulnerability under the alternate system than under the normal system. It also means that the likeli-
' hood of the Shoreham plant reaching a core vulnerable
' condition due to loss of offsite power is over seven times greater under the alternate configuration than under the (Footnote cont'd from previous page)
EMDs or' gas turbine if they failed. Accordingly, in deriving the frequencies in Table 1, we used values for the TDIs that also assumed no repairs if they failed. Be-cause there is a possibility, however, that either the TDis_ or the EMDs and gas turbine could be repaired follow-ing a failure, we also performed a sensitivity study and.
compared calculated core vulnerable frequencies assuming such repairs. See Attachment E.
normal configuration. Furthermore, assuming the accuracy -
of SAI's estimate of 1.6 t*-6 for the annual frequency of core vulnerability from all other initiating events during 5 percent operation (SAI Low Power PRA at Table 4-4-1),
the likelihood that the Shoreham plant would experience an event leading to core vulnerability during 5 percent operation is approximately 2-1/2 times greater under the alternate configuration than it is under the normal con-figuration.
We recognize that uncertainties exist in each of the core vulnerability esbimates set forth in Table 1. How-ever, we believe that the uncertainties are comparable in the two estimates and that the existence of the uncertainties does not invalidate either the comparison or our conclusions. In our opinion the comparison set forth in Table 1 demonstrates that operation of the Shoreham plant with the alternate AC power configuration is not as safe as operation with a fully qualified source of emer-gency power.
3 O. Did you perform any additional analyses or sensitivity studies?
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A. Yes. We performed a sensitivity study to assess the re- -
duct' ion in core vulnerability attributable to the possi-bility of repairing the TDI diesels and the EMDs and gas turbine following their failure. We also analyzed the .
effect of certain adjustments to the SAI probabilities of of fsite power restoration and the frequency of loss of offsite power events at Shoreham, which we believe make those probabilities more realistic. These analyses are d escribe'd in Attachment E.
Q. Do the results of your sensitivity studies cause you to modify your conclusions regarding the relative probability of core vulnerability due to loss of offsite power given the alternate as compared to the normal Shoreham emergency power system?
A, No. Our sensitivity studies confirm our conclusion that the probability of core vulnerability due to loss of
. offsite power transient, assuming use of the alternate system, is higher than with'the use of the normal configu-
~ ration. The precise difference in probability, though uncertain, is sufficiently large to conclude that low
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power operation with the alternate configuration would not ,
be as safe as with the normal configuration.
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ROBERT K. EAllERWAX, J1.
EXPERIENCE:
i Jan.1981 - Present President, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment. Inc. I Sacramento, California July 1980 - June 1981 Visiting Scientist Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley July 1977 - December 1980 Chief Energy Forecaster, California Energy Comission, Sacamento, California Jan.1977 - June 1977 Staff Scientist, Science App 1ications, Inc.
Palo Alto, California May 1974 - Jan.1977 Staff Scientist, School of Engineering Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey Jan.1969 - April 1974 System Safety Supervisor, McDonnell Douglas Aeronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California As the founder and Chief Executive Officer of Sierra Energy & Risk Assessment, Inc. (SERA), Mr. Weatherwax is presently involved in the twin topics of (1) risk '
assessment and comparison, and associated cost benefit analysis, and (2) energy demand and supply assessment, and policy evaluation. -
He has had fifteen years of experience in nuclear safety analysis of commercial power generation and isotope power systems for space application , He has worked broadly in the area of nuclear fuel cycle risk assessment, and in reliability and failure mode assessment of complex systems. He has contributed to the original development of elements of fault tree, sequence tree (i.e., FAST), and event tree analyses; and has applied these methods to light-water nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel cycles, radiciosotope thermal generators, strategic weapons systems and launch vehicles. In an American Physical Society meeting, Mr.
Weatherwax debated Dr. Norman Rassmussin on the merits of the _ Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (to which he was the major contributor). He is an engineer by formal education with a minor in economics and has applied these disciplines in numerous systems engineering and ' evaluation efforts, particularly related to energy demand forecasting and policy assessment during the last several years.
As a McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) employee, Mr. Weatherwax was principal author of a PSAR for the NASA 50 kWe space station power system. He later was manager for Environmental Impact and Risk Assessment on the MDAC team selected by the Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL) to perform safety analyses of LES 8/9 and Viking missions. Af ter leaving MDAC he continued as a consultant to MDAC, and subsequently became a consultant to Teledyne Energy Systems in their support of the AFWL's space nuclear safety responsibilities.
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\ SERA immmmmmmum hi. j Sierro Energy and Risk Assessment.inc.
Robert K. Weatherwax, Jr. '
Resume Continued Mr. Weatherwax has perforTned energy and risk analysis of fusion systems and nuclear reactor designs. At Princeton University, he modeled performance and cost proper-ties of TOKAMAK fusion reactor concepts and associated power conversion technologies CIRCA 2000. Mr. Weatherwax managed the risk analysis of the Hanford (nuclear)
Reservation Purex plant. He also managed the initiation of the risk analysis of a Swedish PWR under Swedish Government sponsorship. More recently, he has reviewed and evaluated the probabilistic risk assessments of the Indian Point and proposed Limerick light-water reactor power plants for the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Limerick Ecology Action Comittee, respectively. In 198), Mr. Weatherwax testified before the Indian Point Atomic Safety and Licensing Board regarding the probabilistic risk assessment of the Indian Point power plant.
Mr. Weatherwax's current research an'd development interests in the area of probabi-listic risk assessment focus on the adequacy of existing fault-tree and event-tree
" methodologies for estimating low-probability events and representation of uncer-tainties in risk / benefit analysis. He is now involved in an AFWL project reviewing the probabil.istic risk assessment of the space shuttle / Galileo - International Solar Polar missions. A list of risk assessment studies authored or contributed to by Mr. Weatherwax is appended to this resume.
Mr. Weatherwax's experience in energy forecasting includes work done at Princeton University, UC Berkeley and as Chief Energy Forecaster for the CEC. During this time, he performed research involving end-use, microeconomic energy demand forecast-ing models and implementation of data bases to various end-use forecasting models.
He developed the first utility service area version of .a residential end-use energy demand forecasting iaodel and associated load shape forecasting model. As the Chief Energy Forecaster, he was responsible for forecasting electricity and natural gas requirements and peak loads for utility service areas for use in determining the need for power plants within California. Duties included technical direction of others in performing development and implementation of state-of-the-art microeconomic end-use models of energy consumption by fuel type and electric peak load by economic sector by utility service area. Other duties involved evaluation of cost effective-ness of conservation and alternative energy options and their potential energy impact, and management of twenty-five post-graduate level professionals.
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ROBERT K. WEATHERWAX BI BLIOGRAPHY_
Selected reports and analyses authored or coauthored by Mr. Weatherwax in the field of risk assessment include: ,
(With E. William Colglazier) Review of Shuttle / Centaur Failure Probability Estimates for Space Nuclear Mission Acolications, Sierra Energy and Risk Assess-ment, Inc., Draft Report for Telecyne Energy Systems, SERA No. 83-57, June 1983.
(With E. W. Colglazier) "The 236U92 Penalty for Recycled Uranium", under publi-cation review, Annals of Nuclear Eneroy.
Probabilistic Investment Decision Analysis Model, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report for the MCR Geothermal Corporation, SERA No. 82-13, April 1982.
" Comments on Assessment of Accidental Pathways, Subtask D Report (Draft), A. D. Litt!
Inc. dated February 1978", for Office of Radiation Programs, EPA, July 12, 1978.
Nuclear Safety Analysis Methodology for RTG Eouicoed Satellite launches, MDC~G6751, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California, May 1976.
Nuclear Fusion Systems Analysis Research, AMS Report No.1250, Princeton University, October 1975.
"Probabilistic Fission Power Plant Risk Analysis: Its Virtues and Limitations",
presented as an invited paper at the American Physical Society General Meeting, April 1975, and published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1975.
Probabilistic Risk Analysis of Nuclear Systems, Princeton University Seminar, May i 1975.
l (With'C. Wildon, et al.) Launch Vehicle Reliability Considerations for Nuclear Safety Assessment, MDC G5983, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Bez
[
California, April 1975.
l (With R. Luna, et al.) Site Defense Safety Analysis and Hazard Evaluation Re6ert, MDC G4885, McDonnel Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California, October 1973. ,
" Applications of Multi-Phase Fault Tree Analysis", presented as part of industry course entitled RISK ANALYSIS given at Flow Research, Inc., Kent, Washington, Febru.
1973.
f "A Comparison of Fault Tree Quantification Techniques", presented to System Safety Society Symposium, University of Southern California, April 1972.
(Wi th R. L. Gerva'i s , et al . ) Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Volumes 1, 3, and 5 (NASA Space Station 50 KW isotope and reactor power supplies), MDC G0744, McDonne Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California, January 1971.
l l
F#&O Rtreeta @ulte 19An Sacrarnento, Californla 95814. 9161447 5421
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EXPERIENCE Jan 1983 - Present Senior Staff Scientist / Engineer, Sierra Energy & Risk Assessment, Inc., Sacramento, California Oct 1980 - Oct 1981 Research Associate,, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory's Energy Analysis Program, Berkeley,, California Oct 1978 - 1980 Research Assistant, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory's Energy Analysis Program, Berkeley, California July 1977 - Oct 1977 Research Assistant on Project funded by the United States Council on Environmental Quality July 1976 - Oct 1976 Consultant, National Research Council Comittee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems Dec 1974 - July 1975 Assistant Lecturer, Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Tripoli, Libya ,
Oct 1972 - July 1975 Consultant to Libyan Government on the use of nuclear power for the generation of electricity Oct 1972 - Nov.1972 Comittee member investigating the feasibility of joint Egyptian-Libyan power projects June 1972 - July 1973 Teaching Assistant, Department of Chemical Engineering, ,
University of Tripoli, Libya Additional Experience: Design of hybrid cooling cycle for power plants capable !
of conserving both energy and water (Ph.D dissertation i project, current) l
. Constructed computer programs for the layout of heliostat i fields of a solar central-receiver power plant j Modeling of the inter- and intragenerational transfer of resources with the objective of evaluating the effects of the discount rates on equity )
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PDBTED M EL-(MSEIR Resume (continued)
At Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc. (SERA), Mr. El-Gasseir is currently engaged in an analysis of probabilistic failure studies conducted for NASA's Galileo and International Solar Polar missions. He is specifically evaluating the validity of the appr.oach and methodologies pursued in these studies and in the accuracy of the data and computations performed. Mr. El-Gasseir is the principal author of a recent SERA report critiquing probabilistic simulation techniques presently used by the utility inudstry in system planning.
Mr. El-Gasseir is a chemical / engineer power generation specialist by education.
His background and experience encompass areas as diverse as the dynamics of multi-phase flow systems, simulation of complex systems, numerical and analytic quantita-tive techniques and institutional analysis of utility related issues. Mr. El-Gasseir's current research interests in the field of prgbabilistic simulation and risk assessment include the development of efficient Monte. Carlo techniques for power generation applications and of effective representation of interdependent time series'and the search for p universal (non-monetary) yardstick for evaluating costs and comparing risks.
Mr. El-Gasseir has recently completed the design of a novel cooling cycle for a nuclear turbine / generator. The device combines two natural-draf t dry towers with a spray pond. The design offers operating flexibility so that both energy and water can be conserved. It is particularly suitable for water-scarce regions.
At the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) Mohamed M. El-Gasseir was in charge of investigating the water quantity and quality issues of' energy development in the Southwest. He developed the algorithms for computing
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the cooling water requirements associated with the various fuel cycles for generating electric power in California and Nevada. He was a member -
of a team designated by the Department of Energy (00E) for its Regional Issues Identification and Analysis Program. Mr. El-Gasseir represented LBL on a 00E National Laboratories comittee which was responsible for planning and funding water related energy research. He also conducted a study of the prospects for industrial water conserva_ tion.
As a consultant to the National Academy of Sciences Mr. El-Gasseir was a resource group member of the National Research Council Comittee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems. He carried out the study of the availability of water for synthetic fuel development in the U.S. and the impacts of this future industry on the nation's water resources. The results published in Science magazine heightened government and industry interest in the environmental problems of intensive development of syn-thetic fuels.
EDUCATION:
B. Sc., Chemical Engineering, University of California, Berkeley M. Sc., Chemical Engineering, University of Rochester, New York Ph. D. candidate Energy and Resources. University of California, Berkeley, 0Xp0Cl0d June 84, 1779.0 Nrnal 10000 9W12rRromGnt@m @Dif fSrn0n M014n 9161447-9481
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BIBLIOGRAPHY El-Gasseir, M., et al., Analysis in Supoort of Assessment of BPA's Short Term Rates and Load Balances, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No.84-126, March 1984.
El-Gasseir, M. (with J. Kaiser), Documentation and Users Guide to EUGAP the SERA Electric Utility Generation and Pricing Model, SERA No.84-110, February 1984 El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Huscroft and R.K. Weatherwax), Electric Utility Demand Forecasting and Resource Planning in Nevada: A Review of State-of-the-Art Methods and Recomendations for Regulatory Oversight, SERA No.83-103, December 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Valenting Huscrof t and R.K. Weatherwax), The Legislative and Contractual Framework for Power Transactions in the Pacific Northwest, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-91, September 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Valentine Huscrof t and R.K. Weatherwax), An Analysis of WPPSS Delay Decision by the Bonneville Power Administration, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-85, August 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with S. Valentine Huscrof t and R.K. Weatherwax), A' Review of the Northwest Power Plannino Council Reaional Plan, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-82, August 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with R. K. Weatherwax), On The Bonneville Power Administration 1983 Proposed Wholesale Power Rates, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessnient, Inc.,
Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-67, July 1983.
El-Gasseir, M. (with R. K. Weatherwax), Pacific Northwest Electric Power Plannino:
Limitations & Opportunities, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment, Inc., Draf t Report to the Southern California Edison Company, SERA No. 83-51, May 1983.
El-Gasseir, M., in Energy and the Fate of Ecosystems, the Report of the Ecosystem Impacts Resource Group of the Risk / Impact Panel of the Comittee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, National Research Council (National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1980).
1722 J Street, Suite 19A, Sacramento, Cattfornia 9S814. 9101447-3421
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Bibliography (continued)
\.
4 El-Gasseir, M., Energy Water Issues, in Energy Analysis Program FY-1979, LBL 10320, April 1980.
College of Engineering Interdisciplinary Studies, California Power Plant Siting with Emohasis on Alternatives for Cooling, 9177-1978 (University of Calif ornia, Berkeley College of Engineering Report 78-2, 1978.
El-Gassei. , M., Solar vs. Non-Solar Energy: A case of Intergenerational Eouity (to be published).
Harte, J. and M. El-Gasseir, Eneroy'and Water, Science 199: 623-634, February 10, 1978.
- Harte, J., et al., Environmental Consecuences of Energy Technolocy: Bringina the tosses of Environmental Services into the Balance Sheets, Part 11: Services, Disruptions, Consecuences (Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley, ERG-WP-77-2, October 1977).
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ATTACHMENT C O
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Attachment C DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATE EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEM PROPOSED FOR LOW POWER OPERATION AND THE NORMAL QUALIFIED ONSITE EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEM
- 1. Introduction As requested on behalf of Suffolk County, New York, Sierra Energy and Risk Assessment (SERA), Inc. of Sacramento, California has conducted an analysis of whether operation of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) at up to a power level of 5 percent, would be as safe, under conditions proposed by LILCO in its Supplemental Motion for Low Power Operating License, as a fully qualified onsite AC power source. The alternate AC power system proposed by LILCO, and the normal system as set forth in the Shoreham FSAR, are described in this Attachment.
- 2. System Descriotions Section 2.1 provides a description of the systems to be compared. The LILCO proposed alternate system is specified first, emphasizing its unique, elements. The description of the normal system builds upon the information developed in the specification of the alternate system. A system is viewed as
- consisting of:
the hardware necessary for the generation and trans-mission of AC power to meet safety-related loads dur-ing emergency conditions accompanied by loss of offsite power, m m.- - a p g ._ e g3,y-g+ww,- we -ev- ~ v
the particular configuration in which the hardware components are integra'ted, and the operating procedures which must be implemented for the purpose of securing power supplies for safety-related loads during emergency conditions.
2.1 AC POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The AC power systems of concern consist of a particular configuration of hardware to be used during emergency operation accompanied by loss of offsite power and the operating proce-dures to be implemented under such conditions. -Detailed speci-fications and data for the LILCO-proposed system configuration can be found in Tables C1, C2 and C3, and Figures C1, C2 and C3. The normal system configuration is depicted by the line diagram of Figure C4. The proposed alternate system is discussed first. The normal system is then described.
2.1.1 The LILCO-Proposed Alternate System In its Supplemental Motion for Low Power Operating License, LILCO proposed to augment offsite power cources to support emergency loads by a combination of a gas turbine and a set of four mobile diesel generator units, in place' of a fully qualified NRC approved onsite source of AC power as described in the FSAR. Thus, the proposed configuration consists of newly introduced elements and pre-existing components.
C-2 O
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d i' The geographical layout of some of the key elements in the proposed configuration is depicted in Figure C1. Figure C2 provides a line diagram of the Shoreham plant, showing how the new components, the mobile diesels and the gas turbine, fit within the pre-existing configuration. Technical and function specifications of the elements relevant to the operation of the proposed configuration are listed in Table C1. In Table C1, components which did not exist in the SNPS FSAR line diagrams
- ' but which became associated with LILCO's alternate AC power system are classified as " proposed." This is to distinguish such components from the circuit and generation' elements installed prior to LILCO's proposal of the alternate AC power configuration. .
Procedures for restoring AC power after the onset of a ,
, LOCA condition and loss of offsite power are presented ,after the discussion characterizing the alternate configuration. The procedures apply to the 20 MW gas turbine (GT or GT-002) and the 4 General Motors EMD mobile diesel generators (EMDs) procured by LILCO. The comparison is based on the latest information-made available by the utility in response to dis-covery requests.
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7 The designations of the components in Figure C2 and the information compiled in Table C1 are used to characterize the hardware and circuitry of the proposed configuration. There-fore, the discussion to follow has been confined to the major elements of the alternate arrangement. Additional technical details can be found in Table Cl.
2.1.1.1.1 The Mobile Diesel Generators LILCO has installed a set of four General Motors EMD die- ,
sel generator (DG) units (see Tables C1 and C2 for technical details). Prior to being purchased by LILCO, the EMDs were in service for 15 years ~as Units 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Lynnway Die-l sel Plant of New England Power (NEP). While owned by NEP, the 1
4 units underwent an unusually high number of major repairs.
(See Table C3 for specifics).
LILCO staff estimates that the output of a single unit (approximately, 2.5 MW) is capable of meeting the minimum emer-gency load required during low-power operation. The apparent
[ redundancy is counteracted by the following features of the EMDs:
The output of all four diesels is conveyed to the load center (Bus 11) by way of a single power con-duit.
C-4
o 0 The EMD diesel system.is of the master unit type.
Accordingly, all four units share:
one starting battery and battery charger (housed with the master unit),
a common fuel system, including one long-term fuel source, one main supply pipe, and a single fuel transfer system (housed within the master unit).
The EMDs have a deadline start capability. Units start sequentially. Each generator is allowed 3 starting attempts.
The battery can support 12 starting attempts. In the absence of.AC power, the charger cannot power the battery. Thus, if the diesels fail to start after 12 attempts, another source of AC power would have to be found.
Units are synchronized automatically but connection to the safety load on Bus 11 is achieved manually. A single circuit breaker (No. ll.lB) can disconnect all four EMDs from Bus 11
- loads. Power generated by the EMDs has to be routed th* rough two more circuit breakers before it can reach emergency bus 101, 102 or 103. The EMDs are located outside the reactor building within the fenced security area. The enclosures and the foundation they rest on are not seismically designed.
The switchgear for the four EMDs is housed within a single outdoor-type control cubicle located adjacent to the EMDs.
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2.1.1.1.2 The Gas Turbine .
The unit, or GT-002, is a 20 MW Pratt & Whitney gas tur-bine (GT) with deadline black start capability. GT-002 has served as LILCO's West Babylon Unit 1, providing peaking service for 15 years before relocation to Shcreham early in 1984. Even though the unit is located within the 69 KV switch-yard of Shoreham and is connected with the SNPS 69 KV circuit, it is controlled by the System Operator in Hicksville, New York, rather than by the Control Room Operator at Shoreham, f
( The gas turbine shares a common bus and a 13.8 KV/69 KV step-up transformer with a 55 MW gas turbine (Unit GT-001; a shoreham peaking power facility) which does not have black start capability and cannot operate in an isclEted mode. .To prevent load hunting if and when off-site AC power is restored, GT-001 must be securely disconnected from the grid. LILCO l plans call for the 20 MW gas turbine to be a source of AC power to serve safety-related loads in the event that off-site power' and other on-site power become unavailable. However, LILCO officials have indicated that GT-00,2 could be used as a peaking unit. (See Testimony of William G. Schiffmacher, filed April 20, 1984). In addition to providing safety power and peaking service, the black-start 20 MW gas turbine' could be the primary source of start-up power for the Shoreham nuclear facility.
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2.1.1.2 Proposed Operating Procedures -
Final procedures for operating the alternate AC power system proposed by LILCO for the Shoreham facility have not t
been issued as of the end of the writing of this report. The interir procedures described herein are for restoring AC power with the proposed alternate configuration, first, using the 20 MW gas turbine (GT-002) and then using the EMDs, assuming fail-ure of Unit GT-002. In both cases, the following conditions j apply: ,
I l
- 1. Reactor operations at 5% power level,
- 2. Loss of of f-site power (leading to loss of both Normal and Reserve Station power),
( 3. System operator informs plant personnel that the loss of off-site power will be for an extended time period, and l
S. These losses of AC power occur in conjunction with a LOCA. .
h 2.1.1.2.1 Restoration of AC power with the 20-MW Gas Turbinel /
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l .The gas turbine can be started by one of the following methods:
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- 1. Local switchroom - Automatic or Manual.
l -
~1/ Extracted f rom Attachment 8 of the Testimony of W. G.
Schiffmacher, Docket No. 50-322-OL-4 (Low Power) and from
" Additional Responses to Staff Questions", (ibid),
SNRC-1036, April 11, 1984.
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- 2. EFB main Control. Room - Automatic or Manual.
- 3. EFB dead-line start - manual only - local or remote.
- 4. Hicksville supervisory - Automatic only.
Manual operation requires initiation and manual closing of Field Breaker, voltage and speed adjustment, manual synchroni-zation by closure of the main breaker, and manu'al loading by the operator. Automatic operation requires only initiation by
'the operator, local or remote. Sequential control causes the unit to be brought up to speed, phased in and loaded to a pre-determined value.
(i) Pre-Start Checks
- 1. Local Operation: ,
- a. Check all personnel clear of enclosures and all doors shut.
- b. Check all switches in proper positipn as follows:
- 1. 43-1 (Engine lockout - local - remote)
- 2. 43-2 (Engine idle -' manual - automat-ic)
- 3. 43-2A (Base - minimum)
- 4. 43-3 (Parallel - isolated)
- 5. GSS (Peak - Emerg. Peak)
, 6. 43-GL (Gas - Liquid)
- 7. FRS (Normal - Loss of Aux. Power)
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- 8. lL51 (Start.- Stop)
Operation of Switch 1L51 will initiate the starting sequence. The following will occur.
_ 2. Electric generator lube oil pump will start.
- 3. At.6 PSIG lube oil pressure (electric generator) air starter valve will open to accelerate N2 rotor. Failure to attain 1500 N2 within 30 seconds will
, initiate " incomplete sequence".
- 4. At approximately 1500 N2 ignition will be actuated and combustion should
-start. *
- 5. At 3400 N2 starter valve will close.
N2 will accelerate to high idle.
- 6. At above 5400 Nw, N3 should be above 900 RPM at which time Field Breaker switch may be closed. .
- 7. N2 will accelerate to high idel of ap-proximately 6200 RPM.
- 8. Operate Speed Control (Manual ,
Governor) to increase N2 speed, until N3 attains approximately 3600 RPM.
. 9. Activate Synchroscope and adjust volt-
. g age as necessary.
- 10. Close main ACB to " phase in" when scope is proper. Increase load imme-diately.
- 2. Automatic Operation - Local
. Set switch 43-2 in automatic: Other switches will be set as above. Operate start switch to
" Start" position. Unit will start as above.
However.at 900 N3, Field Breaker will close au- l
.tomatically.- Following " crossover" (from N2 to C-9 i=e .m ,e,w4 . - - . . = . .- *- e = s
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- N3 control, obsesved as a slight hesitation in T- N2 and N3 speeds) automatic-sequencing will ,
energize speed matching and_ synchronizing relays '
to permit automatic synchronization and automat-3; ic loading to predetermined setting.
II-
- 3. ' Remote Operation - Automatic Set' switch 43-1 (Engine lockout - local -
remote) to remote position. Set switch 43-2 (Engine idle - manual - automatic) to automatic position.
j All sequencing will be performed automatically, including breaker closure and loading to prede-termined setting. Remote base or peak operations will cause unit to increase load as required.
(ii) Automatic pick-up of Shoreham of RSS Bank 4 by GT-002: As .the 69-KV PT8 de-energizes , a 30-second timer is initiated, picking up auxil-iary MG-6 relays 62X and 62X1, and resulting in:
- 1. Tripping of oil Circuit Breaker (OCB) 640, Air Circuit Breakers'(ACB) 8Z-110 and SZ-120, and opening of motor operated dis-
- , connect switches MABS (Mechanical Air Break
-Switch) 616 and MABS 617.
- 2. The GT-002 " Mode Selector" Switch '4'3-3 will change to " Isolate" mode and prevent closing of ACB 8Z-110.
- 3. The GT-002 receives a start signal.
- 4. The GT-002 shifts to isolated precise mode and starts through its DC fuel pump.
- 5. ~ When CT-002 reaches 3550 RPM ACB 8Z-120 (its main breaker) will close to allow picking up of RSS Bank 4 load. When the unit reaches 3600 RPM, it begins powering the RSST through ABS 623.
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automatically as the pressure builds up on ' ,!
the discharge side of the AC fuel pumps.
1 (iii) Normal positions of.the GT-002 controls:
- 1. Voltage Regulator Transfer Switch Auto
- 2. Engine Mode Selector 43-2 Auto
- 3. Engine Mode Selector 43-2A Base / Peak
- 4. Mode Selector 43-3 Parallel
- 5. Governor Selector Base
- 6. Synch Scope Switch off
- 7. 86 CX Breaker Failure lockout Reset
- 8. Field Ground Relay Test Switch Normal
- 9. Lockout Relay 86 G 1 Reset
- 10. , Lockout Relay 86 G 2 Reset
- 11. Control Switches A/W:
e
- a. Gen Oil Cooler Fan Auto
- b. Gen Oil Exhaust Fan , Auto
- d. FT Lube Oil Cooler Fan Auto
- e. AC Fuel Delivery Pump Auto
- f. DC Lube Pump Auto
- g. . Inverter Auto
- h. DC Fuel Forward Pump Auto
- 12. ACB 9 a/w Air - PAC Closed 2.1.1.2.2 Restoration of AC Power With the Four 2.5 MW Mobile Diesel Unitsd/
2/ Extracted from " Restoration of AC Power With On-Site Mo-bile Generators, Interim Emergency Procedure", SP Ka.
TP29.015.03.
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1 In addition to the five co$ditions listed earlier, it is assumed that the 20-MW gas turbine has failed to auto-start and power the RSST.
(i). Automatic actions upon loss of all AC power:
- 1. EMDs' supply breaker No. 1R22-ACB-ll-1.B to Bus 11 trips.
- 2. EMDs undergo automatic start.
- 3. EMDs' local Generator Breakers ACB-1, 2, 3 and 4 close. ,
(ii)~ Immediate actions:
- 1. The 4-KV Normal Bus supply breakers No.
1R23ACB-1A-3, 11-11, Ib-2 and 12-1 are placed to pull-to-lock (PTL).
- 2. Verify the 3 NSST supply breakers 1R22ACB-101-1, 102-1 and 103-1 are open and that Bus Program 27/86 devices are tripped
- 3. Verify that main generator breakers OCB
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1310 and 1330 are open.
- 4. Check with System Operator to determine status of'off-site power restoration.
(iii) Subsequent actions:
(Note, the RSST may be restored at any time.)
- 1. Change the 4-KV Emergency Bus supply -
breakers No. 1R22*ACB-101-1, 101-2, 101-8, 102-2, 102-8, 103-1 and 103-8 to PTL. (Caution,-no auto sequencing of 4-KV loads from the bus sequencing program will occur. Note, Control Room personnel can monitor power res-toration to the NSST or RSST by system operations by closing Breakers lA-3 or 1B-2 (NSST) or Breakers lA-4 or 1B-1 (RSST) and monitoring bus indicating lights on MCB-0. )
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i . .
- 2. An openator is dispatched to perform .
the following:
- a. Remov'al of undervoltage bus pro-gram (UBP) fuses FU-71A located in Reactor Building Service Water Pump B,' Cubicle 3 1R22ACB- 102.
- b. Removal of UPB fuses FU-101A lo-cated in Reactor Building Service Water Pump C, Cubicle #3 1R22ACB-103.
- c. Removal of UBP fuses (FU-42) lo-cated in Reactor Building Service Water Pump A, Cubicle #3 1R22ACB-101.
e
- d. Verifying that EMDs' feeder breaker 1R22-ACB-11-1B is open (located in 1R23-SWG-ll).
- e. Opening the GT-002 feeder breaker 1R23-ACB- ll-1A with the Local Control Switch (located in normal switchgear 1R22-SWG-11).
- f. Opening Screen Wash pumps feeder breaker 1R22-ACB-ll-2 with the local Control Switch (in , normal switchgear 1R22-SWG-ll).
- g. Opening the 480-V Substation feeder breaker 1R23-ACB-11-10 with the local Control Switch (in normal switchgear 1R22-SWG-ll).
- h. Checking the number of closed EMD breakers by returning to the normal switchgear room and observing (ir.dicated by red-light cubicle) (lR22-ACB-ll-1B).
- i. Notifying Contr'ol Room of the status of the DGs from normal switchgear room.
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- j. Notifying Control Room 6f the re-moval of the UBP fuses from the emergency switchgear cubicles.
- 4. Inform System operator of intention to line
, up the DGs- to meet emergency loads.
- 5. Request from System Operator to open OC3 1350 and 1360.
- 6. If Actions 4 and 5 not accomplished pro.ceed to Step 8.
- 7. If-there is a fault in the NSST, as experi-enced by annunciators 0218 "NSS X XFMR PRI PROT TRIP" or 0219 "NSS XFRM BACKUP PROT TRIP" on panels 209H, A-1 and A-2, proceed to Step 8.
- 9. Directed by the Control Room, the operator in the Normal Switchgear Room puts.the control switch in the closed position at ll-1B until the breakers closes (as indi-cated by illumination of white light on Main Control' Board of Bus'll).
- 10. Close the NSST Supply Breaker 11-11.
(After re-energizing the Emergency Buses refer to SP 29.015.01 " Loss of Offsite Power" for more instructions on equipment restoration.)
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- 11. Reset bus program lockout Emergency Bus 101.
- 12. Close Emergency Bus /NSST Supply Breaker 101-1.
- 13. Verify that the 4-KV Emergency Bus 101 is
, energized.
- - , . ..__2 .m , _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _
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-. - - . . . . _ . . ~ .
. 14. Verify that the 480-V Emergency Bus 111 is energized.
- 15. Reset bus program lockout Emergency Bus 103.
I 16. Close Emergency Bus /NSST Supply Breaker 103-1.
- 17. Verify that the 4-KV Emergency Bus 103 is energized.
- 18. Verify that the 480-V Emergency Bus 113 is energized.
, 19. Reset bus program lockout Emergency Bus 102.
- 20. Close Emergency Bus /NSST Supply Breaker 102-1.
- 21. Verify that the'4-KV Emergency Bus 10 2 - i s -
energized.
- 22. Verify that the 480-V Emergency Bus 112 is energized.
(Ensure that maximum current rating does not exceed 434 amps per DG unit and 1200 amps at Breaker ll-1B.) ,
- control.
- 24. Power the ECCS pumps to recover to required level, using only the emergency buses.
2.1.2 The Normal System Figure C4 contains a line diagram of the Shoreham station, showing the onsite (auxiliary) AC power system configuration.
With the exception of the three diesel generators marked G-101, C-15
1___ _. .
I
- 102, and 103, all components which bear upon the comparative -
i
! assessment of the safety the two AC power systems are described in Table C1. The following discussion will, therefore, focus i
! on the three emergency diesel generators, which are the most important element in the auxiliary power system for providing AC power to safety functions.
Before we proceed further, two observations must be made.
First, the description to be given and ( for that matter) Figure 4 have been extracted from the SNPS FSAR, dated 1979. Second, in spite of the technical difficulties LILCO has encountered i
-! with the-diesels identified in the FSAR, we have assumed that the requirements of GDC 17 and of other pertinent regulations l will.have to be eventually satisfied if the plant is to oper-ate. Hence, we have considered the PSAR information to be ge-nerically applicable where safety requirements are concerned.
2.1.2.1 Onsite Emergency Diesel Generators The onsite emergency diesel generators are described in the Shorehas. FSAR as follows:
The Shoreham plant is provided with three' independent standby diesel generators with buses arranged so that any two generators, operating independently, can provide power to all C-16
- i V .
p 9 .
the loads that are deemed 'essen ial for the design basis accident. The emergency diesel generators are not used for the purpose of supplying additional power to the utility power system _(peaking). It is assumed that the onsite power system satisfies GDC 17 and 18, IEEE 308-1971, and Regulatory Guide
~
1.9. The rating of each diesel generator set is as follows:
Continuous (8,760 hr) 3,500 KW 2 hr per 24 hr period 3,900 KW e
The criteria used to size the emergency diesel generators
'are: * *
- 1. The capacity of any two diesels is adequate to meet the safety features demand caused by a loss of coolant accident. The established demand is ,shown in FSAR Table 8.3.1-1.
- 2. The maximum conti'nuous load imposed on the diesel is less than the continuous rating of the machine, defined as the output the unit is expected to maintain for a minimum of 8,700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />. The maximum intermittent load in the first 60 seconds -( approxi-mately) during the operation of the motor-operated C-17
s
.:- . ~ . . . . . . . .
~
valves is less than t e.2-hour rating of the machine.'
These loads are given in FSAR Table 8.3.1-1.
- 3. Each generator is capable of starting and accelerating to rated speed, and then in the required sequence, meeting all of its emergency shutdown loads, as shown in FSAR Table 8.3.1-2.
Sizing of the emergency diesel generators is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9.
e The emergency diesel generators are automatically started on: , ,
- 1. Loss of voltage to the respective 4,160 V bus to which each generator is connected.
- 2. High drywell pressure. .
- 3. Low reactor coolant level signal.
If the preferred (offsite) power source is not available, the emergency diesel generators are automatically connected to the 4,160 V emergency buses and sequentially loaded. The capacity of any two emergency diesel generators is sufficient to meet the safety related load required by a loss of coolant accident during a loss of offsite AC power. The required loads and C-18
~ .. -- - - -
~
maximum coincident demand is shown in FSAR Table 8.3.1-1. Only one emergency diesel generator is needed for low power
. operation. The emergency diesel generator loading sequence for the above ^ shutdown conditions is shown in FSAR Table 8. 3.1-2.
The loading sequence prevents system instability during -motor
. starting. A fast responding exciter and a voltage regulator ensure quick voltage buildup during the starting sequence.
Each diesel generator has independent start control circuits.
The emergency diesel generator units are housed in separate e
rooms designed to Seismic Category I.
Each diesel generator is equipped with protective relays
.which shut the unit down automatically in the event of unit faults. During operation under emergency conditions, trip conditions are limited to those, which if allowed to continue, muld. rapidly result in the loss of the emergency diese,1 gener-ator. Surveillance. instrumentation is provided to monitor the status of the diesel generator. Conditions which can adversely -
affect performance of.the emergency diesel generators are annunciated locally and in the main control room. The follow-ing list shows the important functions that are annunciated:
Alarm Control Function Local Room
- 1. Low Pressure Lube Oil X X C-19
--~ * . _ _ _
i
~
- 2. Overspeed Shutdown X X
- 3. Main Board Control Disabled X X Except for the control rod drive pumps, all t
nonsafety-related loads are connected to the diesel generator bus through two series connected breakers (for those 480 V
. loads that are disconnected on LOCA, one of these breakers is the molded ;ase shunt-trip or switchgear breaker). The magnet-
- ic breakers have been installed to limit detrimental effects on the emergency buses due to f aults and overloads on nonsafety related equipment. The power and control circuits for the
{ control rod drive pumps are treated as Class IE circuits, and I the power circuits to 480 V nonsafety loads fed through two series connected breakers are treated as Class IE circuits up to the second breaker.
l The three diesel engines operate on No. 2 fuel oil. Each engine is supplied by a separate diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system design to allow for 7 days continuous operation of the diesel engine at rated load. All safety-related portions of the diesel generator fuel oil stor-age and transfer systems are designed to ASME III, Code Class 3, and Seismic Category I requirements. The system design in-i corporates sufficient redundancy to prevent a malfunction or C-20
_. f
.s .
failure of any single active or passive component from impairing the capability of the system to supply fuel oil to at least two of the diesel engines. The diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer systems are designed so that makeup fuel oil may be transferred from the auxil'iary boiler fuel oil stor-age tanks to the fill piping for the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. Auxiliary boiler fuel will be compatible with diesel generator fuel requirements. Missile protection is pro-vided for the fuel oil storage and transfer systems in accor-dance with General Design Criterion 4 of.10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
The diesel generator fuel oil storage and transfer system located in the area adjacent to the diesel generator rooms consists of:
- l. Three buried diesel fuel oil storage tanks - one for each diesel en'gine. Each storage tank has a' capacity
~
of 42,000 gallons, providing suf ficient fuel oil for continuous operation of the associated diesel at rated load for 7 days. Each tank is vented to the atmosphere. ,
- 2. Six 10 gpm full-capacity, electric motor driven rota-ry positive displacement fuel oil transfer pumps ( two C-21
.- .- . ~
F pumps for each diesel, generator fuel oil storage tank) are provided. Each pump is provided with a re-lief valve discharging back to its associated suction line. Each diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump is mounted directly above its associated fuel oil storage tank.
- 3. A diesel generator fuel oil day tank for each diesel
~
engine is situated in the associated diesel generator room. Each diesel generator fuel oil. day tank is sized to store 550 gallons of fuel oil. Each diesel generator fuel oil day tank is supplied with a flame arrestor on the vent. -
- 4. Two 13 gpm, full capacity, positive displacement fuel oil booster pumps per diesel engine. The shaft-driven and d-c motor driven booster pumps are piped in parallel and mounted on the diesel engine skid.
Each pump discharge is equipped with a relief valve back to the pump suction. A large mesh Y type fuel ,
oil strainer is located upstream of each booster pump.
As a result of the redundancy incorporated in the system des ig n , the diesel generator fuel oil system provides its C-22
~
minimum required safety'functiog under any of the following conditions:
- 1. Loss of offsite power coincident with failure of one diesel generator.
- 2. Loss of offsite power coincident with maintenance outage or failure of one diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump or one diesel generator fuel oil boost-er pump associated with each diesel generator.
e The fuel oil storage tanks ate buried 2 1/2 feet below grade, with a 4 foot separbtion between the sides of each tank.
The tanks rest on, and are covered by compacted sand. Six
'nches i above the top of the tanks, supported by the compacted soil, is a 2 foot thick concrete slab, designed to Seismic Cat-egory I requirements. The fuel oil transfer pumps are, mounted above this slab, and take suction through the top of the tanks.
A Seismic Category I concrete block house is provided above each tank to enclose the two fuel oil transfer pumps, associ-ated discharge piping, instrumentation, and manhole into the tank. The blockhouse and slab together provide the fuel oil storage and transfer system with adequate protection against potential missiles due to tornadoes or hurricanes. This ar-rangement meets the intent of General Design Criterion 4.
C-23
- Each of-the diesel generatar fuel oil day tanks is sized to store a maximum 550 gallons of diesel fuel oil, as allowed
.by National-Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards, Vol.
1, 1971-1972. This storage capacity provides for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of continuous operation of the diesel generator at rated load.
Each of the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks is provided with a connection -for manual determination of the die-1 sel fuel oil level. A level transmitter is also provided to '
, give a continuous computer monitored reading of the tank level in t;v n control room. On low fuel level, a low level alarm, .itiated by a level switch independent from the level transmitter, is annunciated in the diesel generator room, and a
~ diesel trouble alarm is annunciated in the main control room.
Each diesel generator fuel oil day tank is provided with local indication of the day tank level. A level switch-is pr,ovided to alarm high and low diesel generator fuel oil day tank level on the standby diesel generator panel, and to indicate diesel trouble in the main control room. The level of the fuel oil day tanks is controlled by the automatic starting and stopping of the corresponding preferred diesel generator fuel oil
. transfer pump. Should the preferred pump fail to start, a re-dundant level switch will automatically start the second fuel oil transfer pump. Manual pump control is also provided on the C-24 i
. -. -. . . . . . - . . - . ,..--.n..-,..-,.,, . . - , ~ . , . , - . . - , - - , - - . - - ,
~
.i standby diesel generator panel for starting or stopping either .
the preferred or secondary fuel oil transfer pumps. In the event that the pumps fail to stop, a gravity drain overflow is provided from the day tank back to the diesel fuel oil storage tank. An interlock is provided to automatically shut off the fuel oil transfer pumps when the carbon dioxide fire protection system is actuated in the associated diesel generator room. A high differential pressure alarm across each of the booster pump Y strainers is provided on the diesel generator panel and annunciated as a diesel trouble alarm in the main cont.rol room.
Each diesel generator set has a separate air starting system designed to be capable of starting the diesel engine
~
without external power and also to meet the single failure cri-terion. The air storage tanks and piping between tanks and the air start distributors are designed to ASME Boiler and , Pressure vessel Code Section III, Class 3. All other portions of this
, system are designed to manuf acturer's standards and 3eismic Category I reouirements. Each diesel generator is provided with two independent, redundant starting systems (Figure 9.5.6-1). Each independent starting ' system includes the fol-lowing: '
4 C-25 l
a#
f N 4*mue+e**e ,aesaW.+, 3% ,,,. , 4,,,,
- ,
- t
- 1. One ac motor driven abr compressor with intake filter
- 2. One air compressor after cooler
' 3. One refrigerant air drier with moisture trap ,
- 4. Two. check valves
- 5. Two air storage tanks with relief valves and drain
. valves
- 6. One manual shutoff valve
- 7. One strainer
- 8. Instrumentation and control systems
- 9. Air stater' distributor system Each independent redundant air starting system is of suf-ficient volume to be capable of cranking the engine for a mini-mum of five starts, without recharging the tanks. Each motor driven air compressor has the' capacity to recharge the air storage system in 30 minutes to provide for a minimum of five starts. Its motor is furnished with automatic start and stop control on pressure signals from the air st' orage tanks.
C-26 g _.
1 Because of the-independenca and redundancy incorporated in the system design, the diesel generator starting system provides its minimum required = safety function under the follow-ing conditions:
- 1. Design basis accident with loss of offsite power, by putting into operation the standby diesel generator.
- 2. Maintenance outage or failure of one of the two air starting systems associated with the diesel engine.
Procurement of components is governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B.
'Each diesel generator has its own lubrication system.
Each lubrication system includes the following equipment:
- 1. One direct engine driven lubricating oil pump,
- 2. One a-c motor driven lubricating oil circulating pump to supply warm lubricating oil to the engine sump and other necessary components when the engine is not running, as well as supply pressurized oil to the engine block until the shaf t driven pump reaches ef-fective speed. -
, C-27
F
.l .
r The lubricating oil cooler.is designed to ASME Boiler and
}.
Pressure Vessels Code,Section III, Class 3. The lubricating oil cooler itself is serviced with the engine jacket water.
All the other equipment is designed to manufacturer's i standards, and Seismic Category I requirements. Each diesel l
generator lubrication system is an independent system, thereby satisfying the single failure criterion by assuring operation of at least two of the three diesel generators.
Each of the three diesel generators has its own jacket cooling water system. The engine jacket cooling water heat ex-changer is designed to ASME Section III code Class 3. The engine jacket cooling water pumps and piping are designed according to manufacturer's standards. All components of the diesel generator cooling water system are designed and quali-fled to Seismic Category I requirements. The diesel co,oling water system is furnished as a part of the diesel generator package, pre-piped by the manufacturer. Procurement of compo-nents is governed by the requiremente of 10 CFR 30, Appendix B.
Each of the emergency diesel generator units is located in its own separate room within the control building. The control building is a Seismic Category I structure and is capable of withstanding tornado missiles.
C-28
. o 4
i .
{. Each emergency diesel genenator room is provided with fixed CO2 total flooding system. These systems are provided with-temperature detection for automatic actuation. A smoke
, detection system is provided in these areas for actuation of alarms. Manual operation is provided at a local station near the protected area. There is a time delay between system actuation and system CO2 release, with signals provided to warn personnel. The fuel transfer area consists of a concrete pit with individual cubicles to house the fuel tanks and transfer o pumps. Due to their remote location and segregation from each other, only yard fire hydrant protection is provided with fire detection devices from the fire detection a'nd plant security system. Fire detection systems using smoke detectors of the
! ionization combustion products type are monitored on an annun-clator panel in the main control room to alert personnel of a possible fire situation in the DG rooms. The plant des'ign iso-lates each emergency generator room from the adjacent diesel generator room by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire wall. The day tank is located in the room with the engine it supplies. Fuel oil storage tanks are buried. Provisions are made to confine the spread of oil to the immediate fire area. Fire de'tection systems are provided for early warning. A detection and' fire protection system as described previously is provided. Fuel oil tanks for C-29
~
i I
i the auxiliary boilers and the emergency diesel generators are buried. In addition, the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tanks are covered with a two-foot concrete slab with their as-sociated fuel oil pumps located in individual concrete cu-bicles. Adequate fire protection is supplied from yard fire hose houses in close proximity of all oil tanks. The gas tur-
[ bine oil tank is an above ground tank, located approximately 450 feet frota the nearest safety related structure, surrounded by a steel dyke sized to hold 110 percent of the volume of the gas turbine oil tank. Therefore, the tank presents no fire
, hazard to safety related structures. On flash oil fires around diesel generators, the time between detection and the opening of the CO2 valve could be almost simultaneous.
2.1.3 Common Elements There are several components common to both the al*terna-tive and the normal systems which have not been described in
~
detail here. They include the 480 volt systems fed from the safety buses (e.g., from Bus ll) and the loads used for specific safety functions. Because they are common to both systems, these components do not impact a comparative evalua -
tion of the alternative and normal systems.-
O C-30 1
.n 9 '.
TABLE C-1
..L COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM Af.3 f! ELATED ELEMENTS
- l Item No. Pro po sed'-
Speci fica tion Standby Diesel Generators:
Mobile Diesel Generator EMD- Yes 4 General Motors EMO units, previously Units 5, 6,' 7 and 8. ,
DG-
- at Lynnway Diesel Plant of New England Power; each 2.5 MW, 401 4.16 kV, 20 cyl'inder EMD series 645 turbo-charged engine, t hru deadline start capability (automatic start on loss of 4 04 offsite power on the 4.16 kV bus from the NSS transformer),
independent weather-resistant enclosure, two 125-V de motors for starting, 15 seconds per starting cycle, 3 attempts at starter motor engagement before lockout; units start sequentially, share one single battery, automatically synchronize after reaching rated speed and volthge. connected
.. to load as one unit in parallel operation, connection done manually; EMDs are mounted outdoors near the reactor building within fence-protected area, not in a seismic structure nor on a foundation designed to withstand.
a DBE; have no defined quality specifications for design, fabrication, and installation; are not classified as safety-related; are not seismically qualified, nor is
. their installation and foundation seismic Category 1; no fire p.otection or design basis fire has been defined; are not independent 'and will not meet the single failure criterion due to common reliance on one starting tattery, one lure term feel !.upply, and a single .
bus feeding power to the 1.16 kV switchgear roma; are not classified as a vital area but are inside ,
the main security area of the plant, thus are assured of only nominal protection per Part 73 requirementsi associated:
components (such as the cable carrying power to safety loads) also are not qualified, thus do not meet GDC 2 or 4 or Part 100 of Appendix A; power from EMDs is-directed to the 4.16 kV switchgear room via a single nonsafety-related above-ground conduit; cable from EMDs is.in exposed cable tray, minimal Part 73 Protection.
~
l
TABLE C-1 ,
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SMPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POLER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued) .
Item '10 . Propo sed Specification Starting Motors XSMD Yes Dual independent, battery-powered starting motors for crankihg an engine; when starting circuit is energized a stepping switch moves from one DG to another at 1/4 second a intervals in search of a ready-to-start unit; if such unit is found a relay energizes its starting motors for a 15-seconds
, attempt (maximum) and if it fails it locks out: if starter pinions do not engage the ring gear in 2 seconds, stepping switch moves to the next r,eady-to-start unit; switch bypasses running units until all units have started; a unit failing to start after 3 attempts will be locked out; after an engine has started a speed-sensing device deenergizes its starting circuit; starting motors are not to operate more than 20 seconds at a time; allow a 2-minute cooling ;
period b'efore repeating starting procedure.
Starting Battery XSBD Yes 420-amp hour,125-volt dc, lead acid battery, provides start-ing power sequentially to all 4 mobile DGs; housed with DG #2; ,
charged by charger powered from auxiliary transformer that l is powered from the 4-KV system during standby, and from the DGs otherwise; battery rated for 12 starting attempts, poten-tial source of single failure.that could prevent operation of DGs.
Battery C harger* XBCD Yes Located in the master unit (DG #2), within the generator compartment; automatic, solid state, constant voltage device, capable of AC-voltage compensation, DC-voltage regulation and current limiting; has relay device for disconnecting automatic charging control from the battery (to prevent drainage) in case of AC power loss; automatic resumption of charging with return of AC power; fused AC input-line; fused DE output-line.
2
TABLE'C-1 .
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)' .
Rem I:o . ' Pro po sed ' Speci fica tion _ _ __
Fuel Oil System .XF00 Yes. Consists of a DG's fuel oil system, .the fuel oil transfer sj tem for all - four units, and a piping network.
DG's Fuel Oil System XDFSD Yes for each DG, it consists of a day tank, pump, suction strais -
filter, sight glasses,. pressure gauge, intake manifolds,
, injectors, and associated plumbing (Figure 3-A).
Day Tank XDTD Yes 130 gallon capacity; supplies fuel and reservoir for unused!
fuel returned from the engine injectors.
Sight Glasses XSGD Yes A fuel return sight glass (FRSG) and a fuel bypass sight glass (FBSG); provide visual indication of fuel status; FRSC contains a 10-lb. relief valve which opens if fuel pressurel exceeds 101bs to return excess fuel to day tank; FBSG (mount'ed between pump and fuel filter) houses a 60-1b reliei valve which opens (at pressure higher than 60 lbs) i f. filter becomes clogged, so that oil is diverted from engine mani-folds towards day tank.
Pump XPD Yes Engine-driven pump draws fuel from day tank through suction strainer,10-lb check valve, and f'ilter '(there is a pressure gauge between the valve and filter).
Fuel Transfer System XFTSD Yes System toused within master unit; consists of 2 transfer
. pumps, suction strainer for each pump, check valves, waste i type filter (s), and float level gauges and switches; j . system transfers fuel from main storage source to the day i tanks of the units; fuel level is controlled by float j switches in the day tank of the master unit (Unit 2);
fuel levels in day tanks are equalized by equalizer lines; Fuel Transfer Switch Normal activates first pump ,
to maintain normal fuel 1evel; Fuel Transfer Switch Low
! activates second pump for fuel levels below normal; Fuel '
Transfer. Switch High de-activates the circuit to both pumps for levels above normal; deviations from normal j fuel level trigger the fuel Transfer light on the unit's ;
} annunciator-(but fault indication would not cause a shut- l
]
down) (Figure 3-B).
f 3
TABLE C-1 ,
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
,ftem No. Proposed Specification fuel Piping System XFPSD Ye s Consists of a main supply pipe extending from an existing diesel-oil fill station to the master unit (EMD-DG-402),
a number of joints on the pipe, equalizer pipe-network, ar d valves.
Main Supply Pipe XMSPD Yes Consists of 8 sections of 2" Schedule 40 carbo'n steel ending with a section of flexible pipe (Flexonics #PCS-200-MMT, 2"
' Screwed ends), three valves, and' at least 10 joints.
Equalizer Pipe Network XEPD Yes A 2" steel line made up of 3 main sections and an end (held together by 4 joints), and four flexible pipes (Flexonics) each ending with a valve at each enoine.
Valves XLV1 Yes Manually operated lever-type valve, located at the diesel oil fill station; normally open.
XLV2 Yes As above but located just ahead of the fuel transfer system in the master unit.
XtV3 Yes Manually operated lever-type valve located befoi e t he mout h of the emergency truck-fill connect next to the master unit; normally closed.
XGV1 Yes 4 gate (screwed)-type valves, each at the entry point of a thru generating unit fuel oil system; normally open.
XGV4 Fuel Tanker Trucks XFTD Yes 2 tanker trucks; each, 9,000 gallons of fuel oil capacity capable of sustaining all 4 diesels for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> or one diesel for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> at full load; will' be stationed in the vicinity of the Auxiliary Boiler fueling statiota which is outside the Reactor Building near the EMDs; one tanker can feed the diesels by gravity feed' into the lines while the other is being replenished from off-site sources or from the onsite 972,t31-gallons gas turbine storage tank by pump or gravity feed if fuel is appropriate; no fire protection or design basis fire has been defined.
Cooling System XCSD Yes Includes coolant sources, any int'ake or discharge fac-ilities, and pumping equipment and power sources.
Circuit Breakers EMD- Yes Air circuit breaker between each DG and the bus shared SWG- by the DGs,1200A; all housed in the diesels' control 400-1 cubicle (EMD-SWG-400). .
TABLE C-1 t
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL ~ AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued) ,
item flo . Propo sed Speci fica tion ___
L i
DG's Switchgear EMD- Yes l SWG-located in the control cubicle' adjacent to the diesels, inclu' des the DGs' circuit breal.ers; to load TGs to emte .
400
! gency buses requires manual operations which is expectec t
. to take 30 minutes.
Circuit Breaker 11.18 Yes Mobile diesel supply breaker between DGs' bus and Bus #11 i
i in the' normal switchgear room, air break type,12004 Power Line XPLD Yes Single power line from the DGs enters via nonsafety-related' switchgear rooc , routed in an above ground covered raceway, -
except where near RSST where it is to be burried. .
l S
d I
J I
I
't l
5
l TABLE C-I .
l COMP 0NENT SPECIFICATION Of SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continu 1
Item- [2 Proposed St eci fica tion Flormal Station Service .
Transformer:
1 operating and I spare; spare storea in 138- KV Normal Station Service NSST- No switchyard requires several days to be installed f Tra n s fori..er 003 and could be source of spare parts; each 24/32/4 0 (44.8) 1:VA OA/ FA/F0A, 55/65C,131.73 ( A)-4.16 (Y)-4.16 (Y) KV; provided with. split secondary l
windings [one winding powers normal station ser- '
l vice (NSS) Buses IA and 18 and the other flSS Buses 11 and 12 and the emerge.cy Buses 101, 102-(
l an.d 103). During normal operation reactor and l
turbine-generator systems' loads are shared be-tween NSST-003 and Reserve Station Service
. . Transforn.or (RSST-004 ).
Switch 1R21- Yes Disconnecting switch between NSST-003 and Bus #11; 7.2 KV DISC- 4000 A; stk. oper. -
400A 1R21- Yes Disconnecting grounding switch between Switch 1R21-DISC-400A DISC- and NSST-003; 15 KV, 600A,11&S Code 185095; normally open; 4008 stk. Oper.
4-KV System: -
Circuit Breakers (CBs) All CBs No Three-pole air break type,125 V-DC powered, 250 MVA listed nominal 3-phase interrupting class, 78,000 ri.p closing ,
with and latching capability stored energy operating n.ech- .
t he 4-KV a n'e sm.
systeu -
l 6
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TABLE C-1 -
~
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PR0 POSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Conti l
Item No. Proposed Speci fica tion .
CBs between NSST/RSST 400, No In ad,dition to the above, can automatically and immediutely and Buses 1A, IB, 410, ll, and 12 420, transfer auxiliaries from NSST to RSST and vice versa through auto tripping, if fast transfer is completed 430, '
within 10 cycles from time protective relays initiate 440, the trip, or for system faults not cleared by high 450, -
speed relays; al so identi fied as No.18-1, I A-3, I A-4,18-2. >
460, 12-11,11-11,11-1 and 12-1, respectively; No. 400, 410, 440 470 and 450 are normally closed, rei.aining CBs are normally open. l CBs between Buses 11 and 415 No .
In addition to properties common to all 4KV breakers, these !
12, and Buses 101, 424, CBs possess dual trip coils; one coil is connected to the 102 and 103 435, safety related circuit while the other is connected to non- ;
444, safety Yelated circuits; coil s are separated by metal barrier 455, and udring is separated' within the switchgear design limit- ,
l *- 464, ations; breakers must be tripped by safety related signals ;
or special to the bus and from common nonsafety related trans-101-1, former signals; CBs allow fast trensfer of auxiliaries from 101-2, NSST to RSST only, for auto and manual tripping of NSS CBs; ;
l 103-1, with an accident CBs trip if under voltage is sensed on the l~ 103-2, emergency buses; linking of a DG to an emergency bus will not 102-1, be interferred with by a nonsignificant trip on the nonsafet)
, 102-2 related trip coil; if open circuits in nonsafety related circuits prevent tripping of CB in response to a fault undervoltage will eventually be sensed on the bus; No. 415, 435 and 455 are normally closed, the rest are normally open.
Switch Breakers 411 No Between the 4 KV-480 V transformers and the 4-KV emer-thru gency buses (101,102 & 103); al so identified as No.102-3, 417 102-3,103-3,103-5,101-3, and 101-4, respectively; 411, 413, and 416 are normally closed, the rest are normally open.
Others 11- 10 No Two circuit breakers, one betwecn Bus 11 and one end of 12-3 the 480V switchgear and the other between Bus 12 and the other end of the same switchgear;.both nonnally closed.
f TABLE C-1 -
.c y
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PRdPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED dELE ,
t I
Item No. Proposed . Speci fica tion ' ;
Normal targe Motor IA & No , Two metal-clad indoor type bust s; , supply power to the con - .
Buses 18 densate booster pump motors, the driver motors for. the vari-:
, able frequency motor generator sets for the reactor coolant.
recirculation pump motors, and 2 of the 4 circulating water:
pump motors; auxiliaries can be transferred automaticalla and immediately from NSST to RSST and vice versa.
Normal Small Motor 'll & No Two metal-clad indoor type buses; power all 4-KV NSS motor '
Buses 12 loads not covered by Buses IA& IB and, through step-dowm -
transformers and voltage r'egulators; the 480V Bus 11 & 12 loads can be transferred quickly as in the case of 1A & IB
- bus loads. ;
Emergency Station 1 01, No Three metal-clad indoor type buses; power the 4-KV emer- ,
Service Buses 1 02, gency core cooling system (ECCS) loads, control rod drive i
, & 103 water pumps and, through step-down transformers, provide .
power to 480V , emergency buses Ill, 112 & 113. '
Double-Ended 480-V -
Load Centers:
~
General System XGS480 No Four double-ended load centers for normal 480-V station auxiliaries; each consists of a 4-KV current-limiting fused disconnect shntch, a 4 KV-480 V step-dowm transformer and a metal-enclosed switchgear section with incoming main -
bus tie circuit breakers.
NSST-Side Buses
~
llA No f60rmal load buses fed by NSST or the mobile dieseis.
thru 11D .
RSST-Side Buses 12A No Normal load centers' buses fed by RSST.
thru '
12D
. 8
1 TABLE C-1
Item No. Propor.eJ Specification l Interrupter Switches XSilA fio Four on each side of the double-ended load centers; each thru with current limiting fuse; 5 KV, 600 amp continuous, l
X511D & 61,000 amp momentary, 96,000 amp fault closing.
X512A thru o XS12D Transformers T-001A ' fio -
. For stepping down voltage; 4 KV-480 V,1000/1333 KVa.
thro T-0110 ~
and T-012A thru T-0120 Voltage Regulators IND-IIA feo thru Four inductrols on each side of the double-ended load center
,, . regulate voltage to the 480-V normal load centers; 150C IND-11D & KVa, 480 VI 20%.
IND-12A thru II:D-120 Circuit Breakers XCBTA !!3 Bus ties between Buses 11A and 12A through 110 and 120; t hru 1600 amp continuous, 50,000 amp syn. metrical interruptir.g
. ACBTD capacity; air-magnetic drawout type; normally open.
XCBilA Do Incoming main CBs between buses 11A through 110 and incuctr thru IND-IIA through IND-IID, and between buses 12A through 12:
XCB110 & and inductrols IND-12A through IND-12D; rated as above; air.
, XCB12A magnetic drawout type; normally closed, thru
)CB120 -
X0CB No Other feeder breakers; 600 amp continuous, interrupting capacity of 30,000 ami. symmetrical (with instantaneots trips) and 22,000 amp symmetrical (without instantaneous trips); air-magnetic drawout type.
9
- - - . - - - - - - - . - . - _ . . - - - - - ~ - _ - . - - - - - - _
j i n u t. r. i. - .
COMPONENT.SPEClf! CATI 0ft 0F SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continu:d)- ,
Ei Item No. Proposed ,, __
Specification _
b, Single-Ended 480-V .
(Emergency) Load .
-Centers:
Transformers T-101, No -
Between each of the 4-KV emergency buses and each of the 102, 480 V emergency buses; 1000/1333 KVa, 4160-480 V (step-103 , down); grounded.
Emergency Buses 111 No 480-V physically isolated and electrically independent 112 buses; metal-enclocsed switch3 ear; power safety-related and loads; feed motor control centers supporting 100 hp and. :
113 smaller power requirements; support ~essentiai: nonsa fety i related 480-V loads; some ' nonsafety loads are tripped of f. '
, of these buses during a LOCA. "
Circuit Breakers XCBill, No Between each of the 4 KV-480 V transformers (T-101.102 XCBil2, & 103) and each of the 480 V emergency buses (Ill,112 XCBil3 ~
& 113); 1500 A continuous, 50,000 A syimnetrical inter- -3 rupting capacity, air-magnetic draw-out type; all nornally ,
. clo sed. ,
Reserve Station Service Transformer: '
Reserve Station Service RSST- No 1 operating and 1 spare; spare stored in 138-KV switchyard Transformer .
004 requires several days to be installed and could be source of spare parts; each 24/32/40 (44.8) MVA 0A/fA/f0A, 55-65 65.86 (Y)-4.16 (Y)-4.16 KV provided with split. secondary -
-windings (one winding powers normal station service (NSS) ;
Buses IA and 18 and the other supplies NSS Buses 11 and 12 and emergency Buses 101,102 and 103). During normal operation reactor and turbine-generator systems'. loads are shared between RSST-004 and NSST-003.
69-KV/4-KV System tircuit Breakers 64 0 No Oil circuit breaker; 69 KV 600A, Westinghouse GO-48'; can disconnect the Shoreham gas turbines from the 1:SST-004 '
(and safety - and nonsafety-related 4-KV and 480-V plant ' '
loads) and from the Wildwood substation (offsite loads),if Switch 623 is open. - ;
- I M _ - -
TABLE C-1 . .
l '
l COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued) ,
J Item No. Pro po scd Specification l
44F No Fused switches for disconnecting various nonsafety load s l
thru (including construction) from 4-KV bus fed by transforner 47F , Banks No. 6 and 7.
63F, No Fused switches capable of isolating the 69-KV system from 66F, , miscellaneous nonsafety loads (in addition to switches 616 67F & 617.
4 04 , yes Manually operated switches for disconnecting various 4-Kt 4 07, loads from transformer banks No. 6 and 7.
455 613 No Motor operated air-break switch; 69KV, 600A, Joslyn, by ITE; can isolate gas turbines GT-001 and GT-002 from the 69-r.V system'.
. . 616 No Motor operated air-break switches 69KV, 600A, Joslyn; f anc-617 tion similar to switches 63F, 66F and 67F.
623 No Motor operated air-break switch; 69KV, 600A; can, isolate RSST-004 from the 69-KV system; manually o[erated; sr.u.id t.
open when 69-KV by-p: ss bus is used to dispatch ga s turbir:
power.
.- 633 No
- 69KV, 600A, Joslyn switch isolates gas turb.ine start-ing transformer (66.4-4.33 KV) and c<.nstruction power and gas turbine auxiliary power from 69-KV system; manuall) operated.
643 No Motor operated 69KV, 600A, Joslyn RF-2 switch for isolating the 69-KV system from outside AC iower source s (backs up CB 640) (provided the 69-rV by-pass is not ir. use or switch 623 is open).
Potential Transformers XPT1 Yes Branches off 69-KV line betw2en CB 640 and Wildwood; lead to XPT1 is to be disconnected when 69-r.V by-pass is used.
XPT2 -- Three potentiel transformers (pts) off 69-KV b.us.
Transformers Bank 3 No Gas turbine starting transfor.aer; supplies 2.4 KV pr;wer fo<
construction and starting gas turbine; 66.4-4. 33 r.V .
11
j . TABLE C-1 -
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AllD RELATED ELEMErlTS (Continued) ,
Item f.o . Proposed Specification
! Bank 5 No for stepping up gas turbinet (GT-001 & GT-002) output vol tage; 33/44/55 MVA 0A/FA/f0A, 66-13 KV; G.E., fl.P. #525 Banks 6' No Two 66-4 KV transformers provide 4-KV voltage power to
&7 miscellaneous nonsafety loads; #6 is 516.25 FMVA, Westir.g-house N.P. 272; #7 is 515.6,FMVA, G.E. N.P. 414 Lightning Arrestersf. XLAl New Three lightning arresters (LAs) off line between 69-XV switchyard and RSST-004; each with arrester and 60-EV G.E. Allugard II.
g XLA2 New Three LAs off line between CB 640 and Wildwood; each with arrester.
.. . XLA3 --
Three LAs off line linking Shoreham gas turtines with 69-Ki
. . system; each with arrester.
Cable Lines XL1 Yes Buried 69-KV line between RSST-004 and Switch 623; cor.- ,
stitutes normal route to RSST-034 XL2 Yes Buried 69-KV line between RSST-004 (prior to the normally open contact) and CB 640 (after PTI).
, XL3 Yes Buried 69-LV line between RSST-004 and the nonna'11y open contact on the line to CB 640.
XL4 Yes Portable cable taps (stored on-site) for linking CB 640 with an alternate route to RSST-004 when the normal route is faulted.
XL5 Yes Cable leads to be disconnected when the 69-KV by-pass '
is used.
XL6 Yes 69-KV by-pa ss bus.
12
TARI.F r. - l .
~
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
Item No. Proposed . Specification XL7 Yes Same,as for XL4; note that XL7 can link CB 640 with RSST-00'
. through either XL4 or through XL6.
XL7A Yes -
Portable taps (stored on-site) for connecting the by-pass XL6 with the normal route to RSST-004.
Contacts XNOC1 Yes Normally open contact on the alternate 69-KV line to RSST-0(
13.8-KV Systen:
The 55-MW Gas Turbine GT-001 No 55-MW,13.8-KV, 0.8 PF, 0.5 SCR; shares a common bus with the 20-MW unit (GT-002); houses the 125 V-DC battery supply-the control power for the 69-KV oil CB; G.E.
Switches -
11F No 3 fused switches between potential transformer XPT4 and GT-001 circuit.
13F No Fused switch between potential transformer XPT3 and GT-001 circuit.
. XF1, Yes Fused switches between GT-002 circuit and potential trans-XF2, formers XPT5, XPT6, and XPT7, respectively.
XF3 112 Yes 13-KV,1200A manually operated switch for isolating the 20-F gas turbine (GT-002). .
Circuit creakers 8Z-110 ~ No CE bett;cen GT-001 and bus shared with GT-002; AM 13.8,1000 MVA, 300A; formerly CS 52C.
8Z-120 Yes CB between GT-002 and bus shared with GT-001; AM 13.8,1000 MVA. 3000 A, formerly CB 52.
Potential Transfonners XPT3 --
Sevdral pts'off GT-001 line. .
XPT4 --
Three pts; each G.E., JVM-5,14400-120 V; off bus linked with GT-001 line.
XPTS ~ New PT off GT-002 line after CB 82-120; 112.5 KVA, 13.8 KV-230V, XPT6 New Three pts off GT-002 line before CB 8Z-120.
Il
TABLE C-1 - *
~
~
COMP 0t*ENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SY', TEM AND kELATED ELEMENTS (Continued) ,
I l Iten t:o. Proposed _
Speci fica tion 4
l XPT7 New PT off GT-002 line before CB 8Z-120.
XPT8 -- PT off GT-001 line; G.E.-HT,112.5 KVA,13.8 LV-240/480 V . .;
Transformers .XT1 No ' Grounded transformer for GT-001.10 KVA,12KV-240 Y. ;
1 Grounded transfor.ner for GT-002; 25 KVA,13.8 KV-120/240 V. t j XT2 ,Yes j Lightning Arre'ters XLA4 New Three LAs off-line linking GT-002 with transformer Bank af, i (after CB 8Z-120); with arrester.
! XLAS -- Three LAs off-line linking GT-001 with transformer Bank PS (before CB 8Z-110); with arrester.
{
l Capacitor XC1 . Yes Grounded capacitor of f GT-002 af ter CB 82-120.
l Cable Lines XL8 Yes Buried 13.8-KV line between CB 8Z-120 and Switch 112. !
I . . XL9 Yes Buried 13.8-KV line between CB 8Z-120 and Switch 112 (by-pass portion).
)
Bus --
Yes 13-KV bus serving both gas turbines (GT-001 and GT-002).
I ;
i -
~
)
I t ,
j .
i .
4 14
TABLE C-1 - '
~
C011P0fiEriT SPECIflCAT10tl 0F Sf1PS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEit AFID RELAl[D ELEMEt4TS (Centinuad) l -
Item %c . Proposed Spec i fi ca tion The 20-MW Gas Turbine Gas Turbine Gl-002 Yes A single Pratt & Whitney Model #fT 4A-8 Power Pack 20-1;W gas turbine with deadline start capabil'ity; generator, gas turbine, and all electrical and mechanical controls ccntained in a weather-resistant enclosure which
, is outside security fence; GT-002 is mounted on a pad in the 69 KV switchyard, separate from the main plant without protection against missiles by a structure nor is it designed to withstand earthquakes, thus does not meet GDC 2 or 4 Part 100 of AppendixA; the unit feeds the same 69 KV line that supplies power through the RSS transformer to the 4.16 KV buses 18 and 12 but does not normally feed the emer-gency huses; manual operation is required to load the gas turbine to emergency buses, loading is expected to take
~
10 minutes; gas turbine has no defined quality specification for design, fabrication and installation, is not seisnically qualified and is not classified safety-related; no fire pro-tection or design basis fire has been defined for the gas tu bine; has not been designed to r..eet the single failure criterion.
Starting Systea XSS2 --
-Consists of an air starter, pressure regulators, air cylinde and a compressor; capable of 3 starting attempts, represents a point of single failure.
Air Starter XA52 --
tiewly installed ACE-507 Series Air Starting System; drives the high pressure compressor rotor from standstill; driven by ccmpressed air; below a certain minimum system pressure a starting lockout prevents starting the unit.
Air Cylinder XACY2 --
Store air at 400-500 psig; capacity allows 3 starting attemp without recharging (275 cu. ft.).
Pressure Pegulators XPR2 --
Located downstream from high pressure air cylintler; reduce pressure of air supply 'to the air starter over two stages.
,e
TABLE C-1 -
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AND RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
Item Mo. Propc sed Specification Air Compressor XAC2 --
1000 PSI 3-stage Ingersoll-Rand compressor, driven b/ 20-HP, 230 V motor; maintains compressed air supply; automatically controlled; cycled on/off; housed within the gas turbine
. enclo'sure; powered by auxiliary transformer.
Ba ttery XB2 --
Provides control power for the sequencer, breakers, and the DC fuel pump; 150 amp / hour,125-V DC.
Charger XC2 --
Hew 50-amp charger; maintains distribution system battery charge; powered from same auxiliary transformer supplying compressor. * -
Power Line XPL2 --
69 KV line from the gas turbine connects to the RSS transformer via a buried cable and then enters the non-safety-related switchgear room which is not protected in accordance with Appendix R.
Auxiliary Transformer XA?2 --
Supplies power to battery charger, air compressor and AC-powered fuel pump; powered fr.om the 69-KV system during standby and from the gas turbine (GT-00,2) during latter's operation.
Fuel System XFSG --
Consists of a main fuel oil tank, fuel booster pumps, gen-erator-driven fuel pump, fuel-pressurizing and dump valve, throttle valve and actuator, solenoid-generated bypass, fuel manifold and nozzles.
~
Fuel Tank XFTG2 --
Above ground storage tank located outside the main security fence and near the 69 KV switchyard; 972, 931 gallon capa-city; can sustain the gas turbine at full load for 50C hours; no fire protection or design basis fire has been l defined for the fuel tank.
l Fuel Booster Pamps XFPG2 -- Two fuel pumps; take fuel from the fuel tank; supply fuel under pressure to GT-002 generator-driven pump suction through filters; one pump is powered by same 125-V DC bat-I l
tery supplying power to distribution system; other pump is A l
powered and takes over from DC-pump af ter GT-002 starts; /C i pump receives power from above-mentioned auxiliary transforu.
l a bypass and check valve is provided around the AC pump; dur l
ing dead-bus starting the bypass supplies fuel under tank-lead pressure to the DC-driven pump suction until the AC pump is energized.
~
TABLE C-1 ,
COMPONE!T SPECIFICATION OF SNPS PROPOSED LOCAL AC POWER SYSTEM AfD RELATED ELEMENTS (Continued)
Item No. , Pro po sed Speci fica tion '
Generator-Drive fuel XGP2 --
Receives fuel oil from the operating booster pump at 35-50 Puap PSI; delivers fuel to the throttle valve and actuator; a relief valve limits pressure rise to 835-845 PSI . ,
Throttle-Valve and XTVA2 -- A constant-pressure, metering-type shutof f valve, controlled Actuator by the SPC2 fuel control; disclerges to the fuel-pressuriz in and dump valve through the fuel bypass valve.
SPC-2 Fuel Control XSPC2 --
A newly installed Hamilton Standard SPC-2A electronic sta-tionary servo-system fuel con, troller; monitors operation r f the throttle valve.
l Fuel Bypass Valve XBV2 -- A solenoid-operated 3-way valve; permits fuel flow in the
. energized position and bypasses fuel back to the main fuel pump inlet when de-energized. i i . +
j G. . .
l l .
I i i
I l
4
I , ,
TABLE C-2 t
DATA SPECIFIC TO THE MOBILE -
EMD DIESEL GENERATOR UNITS i
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4
, Unit i 9 NEP ** 5 6 7 8 Year Installed 1968 1968 1968 1908 Serial f, Engine 67-F101031 67-F1-1051 67-F101071 67-F1-1058 Serial #, Generator 67 -F1-1004 67 -F1-1003 G7 -F1 -1106 67-F1-1005 Model # or Type 20-645-C4 2d-645-E4 2 0-645-EA 20-645-E4 Rated KW 2750 2750 2750 2750 -
RPM 900 900 900 900 Volts 2400/4160 2400/4160 2400/4160 2400/4160 Amps / Terminal 826/477 826/477 826/477 826/477 Rated P.F. ' O.80 O.80 0.80 0.80 Rated KVA -
3440 3440 , 3440 3440 Rated HP 3600 3600 3600 3600 No of Cylinders 20 20 20 20 Bore & Stroke 91/16x10 91/16x10 91/16x10 91/16x10 Cycle 2 2 2 2
EMD # 63610 63609 63612 63611 UTEX 0 Hour 6,030 6,55? 6,163 8,07 0 -
Repower 9 Hour 12.932 -
13,153 -
Oper. Hours After '
UTEX or Repower + 345 6,281 '120 4, %5 Lube Oil Consumption (gal /hr.)+ f 0.95 0.92 1.14 1.02' i
.
- Source: Discovery Request #3.
! ** New England Power.
+ Over a time period between 1968 and 1903.
- This figure is based upon 1968-1983 data. However, the lube oil l consumption rate of Unit 4 just before relocation to Shoreham amounted
"' 1 to 1.7 Gal /hr.
F
_~.,
. - - . . _ _ _ _ ~ . . . _ . _ . __
TABLE C-3 1
ENGINE MAINTENANCE
SUMMARY
FOR THE FOUR MOBIL 5
~
DIESEL GEAERATOR UNITS WHII.,E IN SERVICE AT NEW
, ENGLAND POWER LYNNWAY STATION PLANT NO.1: 1974-1983*
Engine Operating Average tube Number Hours Item 011 Consumption 5 6,030 4 3/72 UTEX Engine Installed .95 gal /hr 11,601 New Radiator (Rear) 11,618 New Cylinder Head (9) 12,242 New Cylinder Head (8, ?8)
. 12,274 New Cylinder Head (2) 12,498 New Clock
~
12,932 Repower. .
12,938 New Starters '
13,019 New Cylinder (#11) 6 6.552 UTEX Engine Installed .92 gal /hr 10,834 New' Rear Radiator Core 11.279 New Batteries 11,727 New Cylinder Head (6) 12,471 New Clock -
12,667 New Stack 12,697 New Stack 7 6,163 3/72 UTEX Engine Installed 1.14 gal /hr 11,062 New Cylinder Head (2) 11.306 New Cylinder Head (9) 11,632 New Cylinder Head (14) 11,695 New Cylinder Head (14) -
11.868 New Cylinder Head (4) 11,910 New Cylinder Head (12) 12.170 New Cylinder Head (6, 3) 12,551 New Cylinder Head (20) 12,694 New Starting Motors 12,952 New Starting Motors 13,153 Repower 13,177 New Stack ,
8 8,07 0 1/73 UTEX Engine Installed 1.02 gal /hr 9,4 07 New Generator 10.962 New Turbo-Charger 11,617 New Startin3 Motors -
l 11,617 New Cylinder (11,13) i 11,696 New Cylinder (10, 9), New Turbo-Charger 12,667 New Rear Radiator 12,781 New Governor
- Source: Discovery Request Nn. 3.
r LEGEND
-- -- LONG ISL AND LIGHTING CO. 7.T.7 PROPERTY BOUNDARY 138 KV OVERHEADLINES f SHORE I 69 KV OVERHEAD LINES
- - :. -- 69 KV UNDERGROUND CABLE NOCLEAR l
(Tm O
TR ANSFORMER CIRCUlT BR EAKER
.MAQN
% E
<a) L3 KV CIRCulT BREAKER y NSS
-/- 69 KV - 138 KV SWITCHES I
TR ANSFORuC.R -
l '
\ MN R ANSFOR M ER ,
TRANSFORMERS
.E ,
L "
4-25 MW G.M. DIESELS -
- l 138 KV OVERHEAD SS WW GAS TURBINE
~"
/% '
' ::::::e Higher Voltoge Circuit j ,
Alwoys Crosses Over Lower e s 1 Valtoge Circuit s g
~ t f
~ ~
\ ,/ '
138 KV N
- SUBSTATION e 138KV CO vy %
j 138 KV OVER HE AD ~ "
OVERHEAD S.9 KV OVERHE AD
. {
" $$r"?"'
Shore Common R O W. For Appros.l.6 M les l
WIL0woOO Riverheoc 69 KV TO " " $ h 0 No.SMORE BEACH C SUBST ION L '
Common R O' PC'1T JEFTERSON '
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' l.0
.062 l 1.0 .27E-ll.
. 0.3
, 0.03 '
1.0 I I
l 0.1 .23E-8 o
.999 ,
99 .04 '
l
.25
.3 1,o O.4 .
l 1.0 .74E-7
.01 0.03 ,
' 1.0
.lE-2 l 0.1 .22E-9 0.7 r '
.15E-3 l
.04 ,
- 25 ' '
0.7 i l.0 l 1.0 6 .18 E- 1 s.
0.3 *
. 0.03 '
1.0 ,
g 1 , .16E -
I Total Cumulative Value = 1.0E-7 Entry Conditions Sequence Type 1: LOSP; Isolation: Reactor Scrammed: l Primary System Intact: Coolant Injection Available through 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> via HPCI/nCIC; reactor may be depressurized to 150 psia.
I EVENT TREE D-1 (Table 1, Column 3)
I I
w..v mete a. .
c < w.a o e""v n m' n8 o"c-e>" 6 "ou'd' c tu ** *sa .'.us a cto e,a e.ec.,w<.,
Salt Ptwwgm mavae eu, si a.:=:i g avaer aptg avastng t p tsa g.as t pees t geg enest chose
-a.t a et e ..aetmeta i , ,, u, s. o. o- ** *
- i ,
l r A
I I i i
l i I
t i
I ,
1
.99 -
0.04
's i 0.3 i 1,o '
I
.21E-2 ' lO S'-'
e
.01
.03 i
^
0.13 '
O.7 i . '
i.15E-3 l 0.04 i
.25 ,
0.7 t 1.0 l
l1.0 I .201--
.03 i i 1.0 i
,; ,4c ,9 Total Ctmulative Value = 1.3Ec En:ry Conditions for Sequence Type 5: LOSP; Isolation; no initial Coolant Makeup; Procedural Depressurization f
EVENT TREE D-5 (Table 1, Column 3) f a
e . - < - - .
=
0 8 e
. e e
e . <
. 1
, e o
e m
- p C3sf88m40 S Q(i,Py esasse ope.gfg ge g ggg,3 ' ping agafyA gg ggggg j
- amas, os cas. pet >w smurst,K,WDlaC. sassurv sowsm evassa e63 % see om, j 6
- =4 *e trre acwen amu e63 amesa464 sesspegg aan.secas 640kg aos coag j
., vttse tmaa63
. .99G2 ,
I 9.8 8 1 f.9
.?ff=1 9' . e 13.L9
- .1 .99999 9, .9942 112 1 0t
.edt ,3,y.g ,
9* 91 .10 8.L2 1 1
.9942 9.3 g,3
.385-2 0,1 . 30E*9 .
u
.9ee 9'
.9942 ee *
- 9.9
.385 3 9.1 .298-4
...., ....., I .
l l .133 1 l,,9m 9,3 i, I.3ta=3
, 9.' 91 .59E-12 I
.9947
... .., I
.30 sat
. 0.1 .20E=0
. I -
i Total Ctmulative Value = 5.lE-9 -
.i Entry Conditions Sequence Type 1: IOSP, Isolation; Reactor' Scra'.med; Primary System Intact; Coolant Injection Available through 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> via HPCI/RCIC; reactor may be depressurized to 150 psia.
- Does not reflect repair.
EVDTI TREE D-6 (Table 1, Column 4) 6
=
w e,-- % , .- w ., r -y. -- - - . . . - . , - .
. o s l
l l
l LOSP6 RECOvtRY WasN BACKUP Of f -Salt NsGM Pets. Det 5t t S
- sing WAttsa stoufNcr Or OF f - SWi1CMrAAD S WITCM YA RD 69MV POWE R AVAIL A BL[ IN 8( C IION F Rf OUL M. T
)
INJECisON $lif POWER AVAIL A SL L AVAIL ABLE 4m AVAIL ABL E AVAILABL( ,
FOR CQAf 1 vutNtRABsl l PU R W Ss Os D F
.995
.9962
,1SE-1 0.3 .8
.38E-2
.2 .17E-7
.5E-2
.99995
- 0.7 .99E2 15E-3
.8
.38E-2
. 0.7 .2 .42E-11
.9962 0.3
.8
.38E-2
.2 .11E 7 .
Total Cumulative Value = 2.8E-8 Entry Conditions Sequence' Type 2: LOSP; Isolation; Reactor Scrammed; Reactor Integrity Intact; Coolant Makeup Available 0-4 Hours; Reactor may be depressurized to 150 psia. -
0 Does not reflect repair .
EVENT TREE D-7 (Table 1, Column 4)
D 8 LosP* MO ' R E COVE Ry M AIN SACKUP Of f-Slif Of f SE LS
.9962
.52E-3 0.3 . 0.5
.38E-2 0.5 .74E-7 0.25 . 99985 0.7 .9962
. 15E-3 O.5
.38E-2 0.7 . , 0.5 .16E-10
.9962 0.3 0.5
.38E-2 0.5 .52E-7 Total Cumulative Value = 1.3E-7 Entry Conditions Sequence Type 3: LOSP; Isolation; Reactor Scrammed; SORV, LOCA or ADS; no coolant Makeup Available; Reactor Depressurized to -
Less than 65 psia. .
O Does not reflect repair' EVENT TREE D-8 (Table 1, Colu:nn 4) '
d t e - , , - ,- ,~-.,w ,- , - . - - - . - , -
e e W AtN SACKUP Off-Sitt Di( SL LS ' f tRL Walt R $(OutNCE LO6P* RLCovtmy SenvPOwtR AVAIL A BL E INJE CION .FR OUENCY MCr$ M S- OF OFr a Swi1CHvaAD Switch T ARD AVAIL ABLE ,AVAtLABLE AVAf L ABL( FOR CORE IN ACI C" Sale POWER AVAIL A BL E VULNERABLE w M 4 88 has 8s Os D F 4U R 0.94
.9962 0.9
.7
.20E-2
.38E-2
.3 41E-7 0.06
.99985
- 0. 7
.9962
.15E-3 .7
~* .38E-2 3 .10E-10 0.1
. .9962 7
0.3
.38E-2
.3 .29E-7 Total Cumulative Value = 7.0E-8 Entry Conditions Sequence Type 4: LOSP; Isolation; SORV; Coolant Injection Available Initially.
- Does not reflect repair ,
EVENT TREE D-9
. (Table 1, Column 4)
' e e
W AIN 8ACKUP OFF-$31E DIE SE LS FIRE WATER SEOtitP8C.E LOSP*NO R E COVE RY INJECi SON FRC jut t C f OF OF F - SwiTCMfARD SwitCHVARD eenv POWER AV AIL A BLE NOH PRES. AvAsL A BLE AVAIL ABLE AVAIL AB L E AvalL AB LE IN JE Ci SON Sa1E PQw(R .
- F Su R Ms Os Os D 0.87
.9967
.21E*2
.6
.0038
.4 .12E-6 0.13 #
.99985 0.7 .9962
.15E-3
.6
.'0038 n.7 . 4' .31E-10
.9962 0.3
.6
.0038
.4- .87E-7 Total Cumulative Value = 2.lE-7 Entry Conditions for Sequence Type 5: LOSP; Isolation; no initial
. Coolant Makeup; Procedural
- Depressurization.
'* Does not reflect repair ,
EVENT TREE D-10
5
~
Q O O
e i
e o
I ATTACHMENT E o
Y
, . . , , . ~ . --n,. . - . ~ . - - - , . , , - . . , - - . - - - - - . . , -, n. - . . - . -- ,
(b. .
.; _ --,__- _ _ . ~ . _ . . - _ . - . ._
g a ;,
.s. .s Attachment B
- i. . .
SENSITIV[TY STUDIES AND ADJUSTMENTS TO SAI METHODOLOGY AND DATA Some of the data and assumptions used by SAI in per-forming its Low Power PPA for LILCO could be improved or made more accurate. The two most significant items are (1) the frequency of occurrence of the loss of offsite power transient at the Shoreham facility, a,nd (2) the as-sumed means of restoring offsite power-via the 69 KV switchyard. It also ap) ears that slight changes are nec-essary in the probability of restoring power following a loss of offsite power and in the conditional. availability
. ,I of the 138 KV switchyard following the occurrence of a
.; loss of offsite power. We have recalculated the
' frequencies of core vulnerable conditions due to loss of offsite power, as set - forth in Table 1 of our testimony, -
j _using corrected data as described below.
First, we used a loss of offsite power frequency cf ,
O.25 events per year instead of .nR2 events per year as was used by SAI in both the Low Power PRA and its 1993 E-1
._~
h 2 e PRA. SAI's loss of offsite power frequency value is. based-a on data concerning only the LILCO grid. (SAI 19A3 PRA, page 3-102). Thus, its value of .082/ year does not take into account the probability of failures within the Shoreham switchyard resulting in loss of offsite power.
In our opinion, the failure to account for such failures makes the SAI value unrealistically low.
The .25/ year frequency of loss of offsite power, which we believe is more realistic, is from,a Brookhaven National Laboratory assessment of the frequency of loss of of fsite power for the nuclear reactors found in the Reliability Council region to which LILCO belongs. See l
Table E-1. We consider this figure to be conseevative, but more realistic than SAI's, because it takes into account the contribution to losses of offsite power from failures in the switchyards of nuclear power plants. Such failures are a major contributor to loss of offsite power -
events. Although we believe that a value even higher than the .25 figure might be appropriate for a plant such as Shoreham which will be operated at low power by relatively ~
inexperienced operating sta f f using equipment subject to break-in type' failures, we did not increase the Brookhaven frequency in performing our calculation.
E-2 l
l
' ,' u _ -. , - -- - .-. -
- - - - ~ ~~
7.
9s ,wegweu+ris -q,a Sis.mamk.* =-N'ssm.
% 4.
e 4 $
e
- o Second, our recalculation also corrected what we -
= .
believe to be an error in the SAI model for of fsite power availability. The SAI low power event tree for the loss of offsite power transient takes into account the possi-bility that offsite power will be restored at different times after the transient, with varying probabilities.
SAI also assumes, however, availability of offsite 60 KV power with a probability of 0.99985, after the occurrence of the loss of off site power transient. We believe this second assumptio.n is improper, and amounts to double counting, because the probability of restoring offsite 69 KV power is already included in the event-tree in the time varying probabilities for restoring offsite power. ,
We ,
have eliminated this double counting in our recalculation.
The final major change we made was to consider,the possibility of repairing the gas turbine and the EMDs fol-lowing a failure. The SAI Low Power PRA did not discuss the possibility of repairing the EMDs and gas turbine.
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the values.in Table 1 of our testimony reflect comparable assumptions of no repairs for both the EMDs and gas turbine, and the TDIs.
If the SAI Low Power PRA did include repairs of the EMDs and gas turbine, then the difference between the core E-3
e =
e
- 4 s
'l vulnerable frequencies for the TDIs and the EMDs and gas
- i . -
turbine is understated in Table 1 to our testimony, be-cause adding the repairability assumption to the TDI values would further reduce the probability of reaching a core vulnerable condition.
We took values from the SAI 1993 PRA to determine the core vulnerable frequencies assuming the TDIs could be repaired. To be conservative, we used the same TDI repair values used by SAI in our EMD and gas turbice event trees to determine core vulnerable frequencies for the alternate system.
The results of our recalculations are summarized in Table E-2. Increasing the frequency of loss of offsite power increases the estimated frequency of core vulneca-bility due to loss of offsite power by an equal fac' tor of about 3 for both the alternate and the normal AC power systems. Thus, the impact of this adjustment is only in the overall core vulnerable frequency, and the adjustment does not affect the frequency for one system relative to the other. The elimination of redundant consideration of offsite power restoration results in a greater increase in the probability of core vulnerability for the alternate configuration than for the normal configuration. This l
E-4
, -a x -
.would. reflect the greater' dependency of the alternative -
. . .=
system on the 69 KV switchyard availability.
Explicitly considering repair of the gas turbine and EMDs reduces the estimated probability of core vulnerabil-ity due to' loss of of fsite power for the alternate system.
The TDI analysis showed a comparable reduction in core vulnerable frequency when repairability was included.
This is expected because the system components might be returned to operation even though they may have initially e
failed to operate.
Combining the corrections in data and methodology de-scribed above, and assuming the possibility of repair for
.both the alternate and normal systems, the probability of
, core vulnerability due to loss of offsite power, is still about a factor of 4 higher for the alternate system *. Fur-
,l thermore, assuming the accuracy of SAI's estimate of 1.6 i
- E-6 for the annual frequency of core vulnerability from all other initiating events during 5 percent operation (SAI 1983 PRA at Table 4-4-1), the likelihood that the I
Shoreham plant would experience an event leading to core vulnerability during 5 percent operation-is approximately 2.8 times greater under the alternate configuration than l it is under the normal configuration.
l l ;
E-5 l
l i- - -
}
1 i
TABLE E-1 PLANT-SPECIFIC POSTERIOR PROBADILITY \,
FOR Tile FREQUENCY OF TIIE LOOP ~
(Events Per Year)
RELIABILITY COUNCIL = NPCC .
PLANTS IN SITE N *T HEAN 5 PERC 55 PERC 95 PERC
- 1. Fitzpatrick 2 5.55 2.0E401 9.6E-02 2 *. 4 E4 0 i 5.4EL01
- 2. Cinna 3 10.57 2.6ELO1 1.0E-01 2*.2E-01' 4.6EE01
- 3. itaddam neck 5 13.72 3.0Ea01 1.3E-01 5.0E-01 2'.7E101
- 4. Indian Point 2 & 3' 4 7.94 3.5E-01 i.4E-01 3'.6E1 0i 6.2E-Oi j
- 5. Main Yankee 7.62 2.0E-0'1 5.3E-02 1 l'.7E10i 3.8E-01
- 6. H111 stone 1&2 1 10.47 1.7E-01 4.5E-02 1*.5E101 3.2E101
- 7. Nine Mile Point 1 11.32 l'.6E-01 4.3E-02 l'.4E 101 3.1E401
- 8. Pilgrim 3.5E-01 4 7.96 1.4E-01 3'.6EE01 6.2E-01
- 9. vermont Yankee 1 8.19 1.9EiO'1 5.1E-02 l'.6Eloi 3.7E101
- 10. Yankee Howe 20.70 1.2ELO1 2.9E-02 1
l'.0E101 2.2E-01 1
AGGREGATE 23 104.04 2.5E-01 4.4E-02 l'.9E101 5.8E-01 Source: I. A. Papazoglou et al, Bayes Analysis Under Population Variability With An Application to the Fregaency of Loss of Offsite Power in Nuclear Plants, DNL Report, Feb., 1983.
-- j
.A TABLE E-2 REQUANTIFICATION OF SAI EVENT -
TREE FOR CORE VULNERABILITY DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TRANSIENT (Frequency Per Reactor Year) l Gas Turbine /EMD Diesels TDI Diesels Type Non-Repairable Repairable Non-Repairable Repairable 1 2.3E-5 1.0E-6 1.4E-6 6.4E-8 2 1.9E-5 1.7E-6 1.2E-5 1.lE-6 3 4.0E-6 2.0E-6 7.0E-7 , 3.5E-7 4 5.6E-6 1.3E-6 6.8E-7 1.6E-7 5 8.7E-6 2.6E-6 1.2E-6 3.6E-7 Sum 6.0E-5 .87E-5 1.6E-5 .21E-5
-m. _)
Note: Column totals may not exactly equal the sum of the. figures in each column due to rounding.
f k
k
. _ . . __