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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M0721999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards NRC Rept Number 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Licensing Tracking Sys.Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exam for Operators & Record Pass Dates ML20217D8361999-10-11011 October 1999 Provides NRC with Summary of Activities at TMI-2 During 3rd Quarter of 1999 ML20217F8271999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Pmpr 99-13, CNWRA Program Manager Periodic Rept on Activities of CNWRA, for Fiscal Reporting Period 990828- 0924.Diskette Containing Pmpr in Wordperfect 8 Is Encl. All Variances Are Expressed with Regard to Current Plans ML20212L1831999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Wd Travers Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Millstone to Ensure Adequate Protection to Public Health ML20212L2081999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance ML20212K1241999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltrs to Chairman Jackson,Commissioners & Wd Travers,Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performace of Millstone to Ensure That Public Health & Safety,Adequately Protected ML20212L1971999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to Chairman Jackson & Commissioners Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Continues to Monitor Plant Performance to Ensure Public Health & Safety ML20212J9991999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Clinton,H Clinton, Chairman Jackson &/Or Wd Travers Expressing Concern Re Millstone Npps.Nrc Continues to Monitor Performance of Plant to Ensure That Public Health & Safety Adequately Protected ML20212L0061999-10-0101 October 1999 Discusses GL 97-06 Issued by NRC on 971231 & Gpu Response for Three Mile Island .Staff Reviewed Response & Found No New Concerns with Condition of SG Internals or with Insp Practices Used to Detect Degradation of SG Internals ML20212L2171999-10-0101 October 1999 Responds to Recent Ltr to President Wj Clinton,Chairman Jackson & Commissioners,Wd Travers & Ferc,Expressing Concerns Re Millstone NPPs & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island ML20212K8771999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Three Mile Island on 990913.No Areas Identified in Which Licensee Performance Warranted Addl Insp Beyond Core Insp Program.Provides Historical Listing of Plant Issues & Insp Schedule ML20212K8551999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs That During 990921 Telcon Between P Bissett & F Kacinko,Arrangements Were Made for Administration of Licensing Exams at Facility During Wk of 000214.Outlines Should Be Provided to NRC by 991122 ML20216J6581999-09-28028 September 1999 Provides Info as Requested of Licensees by NRC in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20212J0011999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-289/99-07 on 990828.No Violations Noted ML20212E1971999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Rev 11 of Gpu Nuclear Operational QAP, Reflecting Organizational Change in Which Functions & Responsibilities of Nuclear Safety & Technical Support Div Were Assigned to Other Divisions ML20212A2101999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Rev 3 of Gpu Nuclear Post-Defueling Monitored Storage QAP for Three Mile Island Unit 2, Including Changes Made During 1998.Description of Changes Provided on Page 2 ML20216G4151999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Pmpr 99-12, CNWRA Program Manager Periodic Rept on Activities of CNWRA, for Fiscal Reporting Period 990731- 0827.All Variances Expressed with Regard to Current Operations Plans ML20211M5861999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Response to NRC 990708 RAI Re TS Change Request 272,reactor Coolant Sys Coolant Activity.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20211M6591999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Errata Page to 990729 Suppl to TS Change Request 274,to Reflect Proposed Changes Requested by . Page Transmitted by Submitted in Error ML20211L2401999-09-0101 September 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operator Reactor Licensing Action Estimates ML20211H3731999-08-27027 August 1999 Responds to NRC 990810 RAI Re TMI LAR 285 & TMI-2 LAR 77 Re Changes Reflecting Storage of TMI-1 Radioactive Matls in TMI-2 Facility.Revised License Page mark-up,incorporating Response,Encl ML20211H4001999-08-27027 August 1999 Responds to NRC 990810 RAI Re TMI-1 LAR 285 & TMI-2 LAR 77 Re Changes to Clarify Authority to Possess Radioactive Matls Without Unit Distinction.Revised License Page mark-up, Incorporating Response Encl ML20211K2391999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data Repts for TMI, Oyster Creek & Corporate Headquarters Located in Parsippany, Nj ML20211H5041999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Rept MPR-1820,rev 1, TMI Nuclear Generating Station OTSG Kinetic Expansion Insp Criteria Analysis. Affidavit Encl.Proprietary Rept Wihheld 05000289/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-01 Re Increasing Failure Rate of ESAS Relays.Rept Supplements Preliminary Info Re Determination of Root Cause & Long Term Corrective Actions.Changes Made for Supplement Are Indicated in Bold Typeface1999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-01 Re Increasing Failure Rate of ESAS Relays.Rept Supplements Preliminary Info Re Determination of Root Cause & Long Term Corrective Actions.Changes Made for Supplement Are Indicated in Bold Typeface ML20211A4261999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-289/99-04 on 990606-0717.Two Severity Level 4 Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20211H3571999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Itemized Response to NRC 990712 RAI Re TS Change Request 248 Re Remote Shutdown Sys,Submitted on 981019 ML20211A3931999-08-12012 August 1999 Requests NRC Concurrence with Ongoing Analytical Approach as Described in Attachment,Which Is Being Utilized by Gpu Nuclear to Support Detailed License Amend Request to Revise Design Basis for TMI-1 Pressurizer Supports ML20210R4691999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Update 3 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage SAR, for TMI-2.Update 3 Revises SAR to Reflect Current Plant Configuration & Includes Minor Editorial Changes & Corrections.Revised Pages on List of Effective Pages ML20210N7601999-08-10010 August 1999 Informs That NRC Staff Reviewed Applications Dtd 990629, Which Requested Review & Approval to Allow Authority to Possess Radioactive Matl Without Unit Distinction Between Units 1 & 2.Forwards RAI Re License Amend Request 285 ML20210N7191999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Notice of Partial Denial of Amend to FOL & Opportunity for Hearing Re Proposed Change to TS 3.1.12.3 to Add LCO That Would Allow Continued HPI Operation ML20210L3831999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990617 RAI Re OTSG Kinetic Expansion Region Insp Acceptance Criteria That Was Used for Dispositioning Indications During Cycle 12 Refueling (12R) Outage ML20210K7371999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to 86-5002073-02, Summary Rept for Bwog 20% Tp LOCA, Which Corrects Evaluation Model for Mk-B9 non- Mixing Vane Grid Previously Reported in Util to Nrc,Per 10CFR50.46 ML20210L1151999-07-28028 July 1999 Confirms Two Senior Management Changes Made within Amergen Energy Co,Per Proposed License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amends for TMI-1 05000289/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re 990626 Event Involving Partial Loss of Offsite Power & Subsequent Automatic Start of EDG 1A.Commitments Made by Util Are Contained in long-term Corrective Actions Section1999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re 990626 Event Involving Partial Loss of Offsite Power & Subsequent Automatic Start of EDG 1A.Commitments Made by Util Are Contained in long-term Corrective Actions Section ML20216D4001999-07-22022 July 1999 Provides Summary of Activities at TMI-2 During 2nd Quarter of 1999 ML20210B8231999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 2 in Response to Licensee Application Dtd 990309,requesting Reduction in Amount of Insurance for Unit to Amount Listed ML20210G9471999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Pmpr 99-10, CNWRA Program Manager Periodic Rept on Activities of CNWRA, for Fiscal Reporting period,990605- 0702.Diskette Containing Pmpr in Wordperfect 8 Format Is Also Encl ML20209H9401999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Copy of Environ Assessment & Findings of No Significant Impact Re Application for Exemption Dtd 990309. Proposed Exemption Would Reduce Amount of Insurance for Onsite Property Damage Coverage as Listed ML20209G2451999-07-15015 July 1999 Advises That Suppl Info in Support of Proposed License Transfer & Conforming Adminstrative License Amends,Submitted in & Affidavit,Marked Proprietary,Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(5) ML20212K1701999-07-13013 July 1999 Submits Concerns Re Millstone & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Should Provide Adequate Emergency Planning in Case of Radiological Accident ML20216D9861999-07-12012 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re 981019 Application Request for Review & Approval of Operability & SRs for Remote Shutdown Sys. Response Requested within 30 Days of Receipt of Ltr ML20209G5861999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-289/99-05 on 990510-28.No Violations Noted ML20209F2571999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Staff Evaluation Rept of Individual Plant Exam of External Events Submittal on Three Mile Nuclear Station, Unit 1 ML20209D8451999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-289/99-06 on 990608-11.No Violations Noted.Overall Performance of ERO Very Good & Demonstrated, with Reasonable Assurance,That Onsite Emergency Plans Adequate & That Util Capable of Implementing Plan ML20209D6291999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal & Corrected TS Pages 3-21 & 4-9 for Amend 211 & 4-5a,4-38 & 6-3 for Amend 212,which Was Issued in Error.Amends Failed to Reflect Previously Changes Granted by Amends 203 & 204 ML20209D5141999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re 981019 Application & Suppl ,which Requested Review & Approval of Revised Rc Allowable Dose Equivalent I-131 Activity Limit with Max Dose Equivalent Limit of 1.0 Uci/Gram.Response Requested within 30 Days 05000289/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Discovery of Degraded But Operable Condition of RB Emergency Cooling Sys.Condition Did Not Adversely Affect Health & Safety of Public1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Discovery of Degraded But Operable Condition of RB Emergency Cooling Sys.Condition Did Not Adversely Affect Health & Safety of Public ML20196J3981999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for TMI-1 Encl ML20209C1131999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Signed Agreement as Proposed in NRC Requesting Gpu Nuclear Consent in Incorporate TMI-1 Thermo Lag Fire Barrier Final Corrective Action Completion Schedule Commitment of 000630 Into Co Modifying License 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217D8361999-10-11011 October 1999 Provides NRC with Summary of Activities at TMI-2 During 3rd Quarter of 1999 ML20217F8271999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Pmpr 99-13, CNWRA Program Manager Periodic Rept on Activities of CNWRA, for Fiscal Reporting Period 990828- 0924.Diskette Containing Pmpr in Wordperfect 8 Is Encl. All Variances Are Expressed with Regard to Current Plans ML20216J6581999-09-28028 September 1999 Provides Info as Requested of Licensees by NRC in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20212E1971999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Rev 11 of Gpu Nuclear Operational QAP, Reflecting Organizational Change in Which Functions & Responsibilities of Nuclear Safety & Technical Support Div Were Assigned to Other Divisions ML20212A2101999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Rev 3 of Gpu Nuclear Post-Defueling Monitored Storage QAP for Three Mile Island Unit 2, Including Changes Made During 1998.Description of Changes Provided on Page 2 ML20216G4151999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Pmpr 99-12, CNWRA Program Manager Periodic Rept on Activities of CNWRA, for Fiscal Reporting Period 990731- 0827.All Variances Expressed with Regard to Current Operations Plans ML20211M5861999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Response to NRC 990708 RAI Re TS Change Request 272,reactor Coolant Sys Coolant Activity.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20211M6591999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Errata Page to 990729 Suppl to TS Change Request 274,to Reflect Proposed Changes Requested by . Page Transmitted by Submitted in Error ML20211L2401999-09-0101 September 1999 Submits Response to NRC AL 99-02, Operator Reactor Licensing Action Estimates ML20211H3731999-08-27027 August 1999 Responds to NRC 990810 RAI Re TMI LAR 285 & TMI-2 LAR 77 Re Changes Reflecting Storage of TMI-1 Radioactive Matls in TMI-2 Facility.Revised License Page mark-up,incorporating Response,Encl ML20211H4001999-08-27027 August 1999 Responds to NRC 990810 RAI Re TMI-1 LAR 285 & TMI-2 LAR 77 Re Changes to Clarify Authority to Possess Radioactive Matls Without Unit Distinction.Revised License Page mark-up, Incorporating Response Encl ML20211K2391999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data Repts for TMI, Oyster Creek & Corporate Headquarters Located in Parsippany, Nj 05000289/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-01 Re Increasing Failure Rate of ESAS Relays.Rept Supplements Preliminary Info Re Determination of Root Cause & Long Term Corrective Actions.Changes Made for Supplement Are Indicated in Bold Typeface1999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-01 Re Increasing Failure Rate of ESAS Relays.Rept Supplements Preliminary Info Re Determination of Root Cause & Long Term Corrective Actions.Changes Made for Supplement Are Indicated in Bold Typeface ML20211H5041999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Rept MPR-1820,rev 1, TMI Nuclear Generating Station OTSG Kinetic Expansion Insp Criteria Analysis. Affidavit Encl.Proprietary Rept Wihheld ML20211H3571999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Itemized Response to NRC 990712 RAI Re TS Change Request 248 Re Remote Shutdown Sys,Submitted on 981019 ML20211A3931999-08-12012 August 1999 Requests NRC Concurrence with Ongoing Analytical Approach as Described in Attachment,Which Is Being Utilized by Gpu Nuclear to Support Detailed License Amend Request to Revise Design Basis for TMI-1 Pressurizer Supports ML20210R4691999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Update 3 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage SAR, for TMI-2.Update 3 Revises SAR to Reflect Current Plant Configuration & Includes Minor Editorial Changes & Corrections.Revised Pages on List of Effective Pages ML20210L3831999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990617 RAI Re OTSG Kinetic Expansion Region Insp Acceptance Criteria That Was Used for Dispositioning Indications During Cycle 12 Refueling (12R) Outage ML20210K7371999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to 86-5002073-02, Summary Rept for Bwog 20% Tp LOCA, Which Corrects Evaluation Model for Mk-B9 non- Mixing Vane Grid Previously Reported in Util to Nrc,Per 10CFR50.46 ML20210L1151999-07-28028 July 1999 Confirms Two Senior Management Changes Made within Amergen Energy Co,Per Proposed License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amends for TMI-1 05000289/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re 990626 Event Involving Partial Loss of Offsite Power & Subsequent Automatic Start of EDG 1A.Commitments Made by Util Are Contained in long-term Corrective Actions Section1999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 Re 990626 Event Involving Partial Loss of Offsite Power & Subsequent Automatic Start of EDG 1A.Commitments Made by Util Are Contained in long-term Corrective Actions Section ML20216D4001999-07-22022 July 1999 Provides Summary of Activities at TMI-2 During 2nd Quarter of 1999 ML20210G9471999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Pmpr 99-10, CNWRA Program Manager Periodic Rept on Activities of CNWRA, for Fiscal Reporting period,990605- 0702.Diskette Containing Pmpr in Wordperfect 8 Format Is Also Encl ML20212K1701999-07-13013 July 1999 Submits Concerns Re Millstone & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Nrc Should Provide Adequate Emergency Planning in Case of Radiological Accident 05000289/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Discovery of Degraded But Operable Condition of RB Emergency Cooling Sys.Condition Did Not Adversely Affect Health & Safety of Public1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00 Re Discovery of Degraded But Operable Condition of RB Emergency Cooling Sys.Condition Did Not Adversely Affect Health & Safety of Public ML20196J3981999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for TMI-1 Encl ML20209C1131999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Signed Agreement as Proposed in NRC Requesting Gpu Nuclear Consent in Incorporate TMI-1 Thermo Lag Fire Barrier Final Corrective Action Completion Schedule Commitment of 000630 Into Co Modifying License ML20196J7651999-06-29029 June 1999 Provides Updated Info Re Loss of Feedwater & Loss of Electric Power Accident Analyses to Support TS Change Request 279 Re Core Protection Safety Limit,As Discussed at 990616 Meeting ML20196J7701999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards LAR 285 for License DPR-50,clarifying Authority to Possess Radioactive Matls Without Unit Distinction,So That After Transfer of TMI-1 License to Amergen,Radioactive Matls May Continue to Be Moved Between TMI-1 & TMI-2 Units ML20209C0391999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards LAR 77 to License DPR-73,clarifying Authority to Possess Radioactive Matls Without Unit Distinction,So That After Transfer of TMI-2 License to Amergen,Radioactive Matl May Continue to Be Moved Between TMI-1 & TMI-2 Units ML20196G2061999-06-23023 June 1999 Requests That NRC Update Current Service Lists to Reflect Listed Personnel Changes That Occurred at TMI 05000289/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00,providing Complete Description,Extent of Condition & Actions Taken in Association with Determination of Inability of Pressurizer Support Bolts to Meet FSAR Requirements1999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00,providing Complete Description,Extent of Condition & Actions Taken in Association with Determination of Inability of Pressurizer Support Bolts to Meet FSAR Requirements ML20196D2171999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Pmpr 99-9, CNWRA Program Manager Periodic Rept on Activities of CNWRA, for Fiscal Reporting period,990508- 0604.New Summary Personnel Table Was Added to Rept Period.Matl Scientist Joined Staff Period ML20196A0431999-06-15015 June 1999 Providess Notification That Design Verification Activities Related to Calculations Supporting Analytical Values Identified in Gpu Nuclear Ltr to NRC Has Been Completed 05000289/LER-1999-004, Forwards LER 99-004-00,re Discovery of Emergency FW Pump Bearing Failure During Performance of Oil Change on 990510. Event Was Determined Reportable IAW 10CFR50.73,since Pump Was Determined to Be Inoperable Longer than TS AOT1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00,re Discovery of Emergency FW Pump Bearing Failure During Performance of Oil Change on 990510. Event Was Determined Reportable IAW 10CFR50.73,since Pump Was Determined to Be Inoperable Longer than TS AOT ML20212K2541999-06-0808 June 1999 Submits Concerns Re Millstone NPP & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Requests That NRC Provide Adequate Emergency Planning in Case of Radiological Accident ML20212K2671999-06-0808 June 1999 Submits Concerns Re Millstone NPP & Continued Lack of Emergency Mgt Plan for Eastern Long Island.Requests That NRC Provide Adequate Emergency Planning in Case of Radiological Accident ML20195E2751999-06-0404 June 1999 Informs That PCTs & LOCA Lhr Limits Submitted in Util Ltr for LOCA Reanalysis Performed in Support of TMI-1 20% Tube Plugging Amend Request Have Been Revised.Revised PCT & LOCA Lhr Limit Values Are Provided on Encl Table 1 ML20195E3281999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-50,modifying Conditions Which Allow Reduction in Number of Means for Maintaining Decay Heat Removal Capability During Shutdown Conditions ML20195C5721999-06-0202 June 1999 Forwards Description of Gpu Nuclear Plans for Corrective Actions for 1 H Fire Barriers in Fire Zones AB-FZ-3,AB-FZ-5, AB-FZ-7,FH-FZ-2 & Previous Commitments for Fire Zones CB-FA-1 & FH-FZ-6 ML20207E2561999-05-25025 May 1999 Submits 30-day Written Rept on Significant PCT Change in ECCS Analyses at TMI-1 ML20195B2461999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Itemized Response to NRC 990506 RAI for TS Change Request 279 Re Core Protection Safety Limit ML20206R6461999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Rev 39 of Modified Amended Physical Security Plan for TMI 05000289/LER-1999-003, Forwards LER 99-003-00, Discovery of Condition Outside UFSAR Design Basis for CR Habitability, Which Was Determined Reportable on 990310.Rept Is Being Submitted Four Weeks Later than Required,Per Discussion with NRC1999-05-0707 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00, Discovery of Condition Outside UFSAR Design Basis for CR Habitability, Which Was Determined Reportable on 990310.Rept Is Being Submitted Four Weeks Later than Required,Per Discussion with NRC ML20206K6301999-05-0707 May 1999 Provides Addl Info Re TMI-1 LOFW Accident re-analysis Assumptions for 20% Average SG Tube Plugging as Discussed on 990421 ML20206H0781999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to 1092, TMI Emergency Plan. Summary of Changes Encl ML20206J4811999-04-30030 April 1999 Provides Summary of Activities at TMI-2 During First Quarter of 1999.TMI-2 RB Was Not Inspected During Quarter.Routine Radiological Surveys of Auxiliary & Fuel Handling Bldgs Did Not Identify Any Significant Adverse Trends ML20206E4121999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests That TS Change Request 257 Be Withdrawn ML20206C5211999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Mod to Encl Indemnity Agreement Number B-64,on Behalf of Gpu & Affiliates,Meed,Jcpl,Penelec & Amergen Energy Co,Llc.Ltr Supersedes & Withdraws 990405 Request Submitted to NRC ML20206C8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Submits Financial Info IAW Requirements of 10CFR50.71(b) & 10CFR140.21 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059H5351990-09-10010 September 1990 Forwards Encls 1-3 of Generic Ltr 90-07 Re Operator Licensing Exam Schedule ML20059G0641990-08-31031 August 1990 Advises That Util Agreed to Revised Frequency of Once Every 12 Months for Corrective Actions Audits Per Tech Spec Change Request 65 Based on 900718 & 19 Discussions ML20059F1691990-08-30030 August 1990 Requests Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App J, Section III.D.1(a) for Facility Re Schedule Requirements for Connecting Type a Testing w/10-yr Inservice Insp Interval, Per 10CFR50.12(a)(2) ML20064A4661990-08-30030 August 1990 Responds to 900803 SALP Rept 50-289/89-99.TMI Does Not Expect to Be Lead Plant for Installation of Advanced Control Sys.Maint Backlog Goals Established.Info on Emergency Preparedness & Engineering/Technical Support Encl ML20059C8791990-08-29029 August 1990 Forwards TMI-1 Semiannual Effluent & Release Rept for Jan - June 1990, Including Executive Summary of Effluent Release Rept,Disposal & Effluent Release Data & Assessment of Radiation Doses.No Changes to ODCM for Reporting Period ML20059D5491990-08-29029 August 1990 Responds to NRC Re Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Re Personnel Inattentiveness & Failure of Site Managers to Correct Condition.Shift & Immediate Supervisor Discharged ML20059C7851990-08-27027 August 1990 Forwards Rev 5 to Sys Description 3184-007, Solid Waste Staging Facility, Updating Minor Changes to Pages 6,8,9 & 13 ML20059C1091990-08-24024 August 1990 Forwards Rev 6 to Physical Security Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld ML20059B8251990-08-24024 August 1990 Forwards Payment of Civil Penalty in Amount of $50,000,per NRC ML20056B4651990-08-20020 August 1990 Corrects Statement Made in 900716 Response to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Rosemount Transmitters. Identified That Only Half of Operating Crews Provided W/ Briefing on Bulletin ML20058Q1851990-08-17017 August 1990 Requests That Distribution List for TMI-2 Correspondence Be Updated to Be Consistent W/Recently Implemented Organizational Changes.Ee Kintner,Mb Roche & Wj Marshall Should Be Deleted ML20058Q1721990-08-13013 August 1990 Forwards TMI-2 Effluent & Offsite Dose Rept,First Quarter 1990, Update ML20058Q1821990-08-13013 August 1990 Advises That Util Will No Longer Provide Annual Update to Dewatering Sys for Defueling Canisters Sys Description,Per NRC .W/Completion of Defueling & Shipment of All Defueling Canisters Offsite,Sys Has Been Deactivated ML20058M7201990-08-0303 August 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to TER 3232-019, Div Technical Evaluation Rept for Processed Water Disposal Sys. Mods Include Elimination of Pelletizer & Relocation of Druming Station to Discharge of Blender/Dryer ML20055J4581990-07-27027 July 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-289/90-10. Corrective Actions:Missing Support Brace on Cable Tray Support Found & Corrected ML20055J4561990-07-27027 July 1990 Advises That Info Contained in Generic Ltr 90-06,not Applicable to Current Nonoperating & Defueled Condition of Facility.Generic Ltr Will Be Reevaluated,If Decision Made to Restart Facility ML20055H6901990-07-20020 July 1990 Forwards Rev 25 to TMI-2 Organization Plan for NRC Review & Approval.Rev Proposes Consolidation of Plant Operations & Maint Sections Into Plant Operation & Maint Section ML20055G4431990-07-19019 July 1990 Forwards Rev 12 to 990-1745, TMI-1 Fire Hazards Analysis Rept & Update 9 to FSAR for TMI-1 ML20055G8781990-07-19019 July 1990 Discusses Compliance W/Reg Guide 1.97 Re Containment High Range Radiation Monitors,Per 900507-11 Insp.Physical Separation of Power Cables & Required Isolation Will Be Provided to Satisfy Reg Guide Category 1 Requirements ML20055F9601990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards, 1990 TMI Nuclear Station Annual Emergency Exercise Scenario to Be Conducted on 900912.W/o Encl ML20044A9531990-07-0909 July 1990 Forwards Util Response to Weaknesses Identified in Maint Team Insp Rept 50-289/89-82.Corrective Actions:Engineering Personnel Reminded to Assure Documented Approval Obtained Prior to Proceeding W/Work ML20055E0481990-07-0505 July 1990 Documents Action Taken by Util to Improve Heat Sink Protection Sys & Current Status of Sys.Main Feedwater Logic Circuits Modified Prior to Startup from 8R Outage to Eliminate Potential for Inadvertent Isolation ML20055E0011990-07-0202 July 1990 Forwards Revs 1 & 2 to Topical Rept 067, TMI-1 Cycle 8 Core Operating Limits Rept, Per Tech Spec 6.9.5.4 ML20055C9971990-06-28028 June 1990 Forwards Rev 27 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld ML20055D2071990-06-28028 June 1990 Forwards Certification of TMI-1 Simulation Facility,Per 10CFR55.45.b.5.Resumes of Personnel Involved Encl. Resumes Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a)(6)) ML20055D0861990-06-25025 June 1990 Documents Deviation from Requirements of Reg Guide 1.97,per Insp on 900507-11.Based on Most Limiting Analysis,Existing Range of 0-1,200 Psi Sufficient.Deviation Consistent W/B&W Owners Group Task Force Evaluation of Reg Guide ML20043H4851990-06-18018 June 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-50,consisting of Tech Spec Change Request 179 ML20043H4031990-06-18018 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issue Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. ML20043F9921990-06-11011 June 1990 Forwards Listing of Exam Ref Matl Sent on 900601 in Response to 900505 Ltr ML20043F0661990-06-0404 June 1990 Forwards Inservice Insp Data Rept for Period 880816-900304. Owner Rept for Repairs or Replacements Performed on ASME Section XI Class 1 & 2 Components,Also Encl ML20055C9041990-05-23023 May 1990 Advises That App a to Rept Is Set of Recommendations from Safety Advisory Board on Possible Research Opportunities ML20043B2391990-05-18018 May 1990 Revises Commitments in Encl Met Ed 800430 Ltr Re QA of Diesel Generator Fuel Oil.Requirement for QC Review for Acceptability Prior to Filling Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Deleted from Procedure ML20043A5441990-05-16016 May 1990 Discusses Status of Safety & Performance Improvement Program Portion of B&W Owners Group EOP Review Project ML20043A5311990-05-15015 May 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-289/89-82. Corrective Actions:Periodic Insp Program Established Utilizing Checklist for Stored Equipment & Existing Tool Rooms Will Be Purged of Controlled or Unneeded Matls ML20043A2321990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards TMI-1 Reactor Bldg 15-Yr Tendon Surveillance (Insp Period 5) Technical Rept 069.Evaluations Conclude That Test & Insp Results Demonstrate TMI-1 Reactor Bldg post- Tensioning Sys in Good Condition ML20042G2741990-05-0404 May 1990 Forwards Semiannual Update of Projects Listed in Categories A,B & C of long-range Planning Program Integrated Schedule ML20012F2621990-04-0202 April 1990 Responds to Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-289/89-26. Corrective Actions:Util Policy of Shift Supervisor Involvement in Bypassing & Resetting Safety Sys Expanded to Include Shutdown Conditions & Technicians Briefed ML20012F2611990-04-0202 April 1990 Provides Supplemental Response to Station Blackout Rule. Target Reliability of 0.975 Chosen for Emergency Diesel Generators.Diesel Generator Reliability Program May Change Based on Final Resolution of Generic Issue B-56 ML20012F2731990-03-30030 March 1990 Confirms 900328 Conversations & Provides Technical Basis for Planned Actions to Correct Present Power Limitation Due to High Steam Generator Secondary Side Differential Pressure. Main Turbine Will Be Tripped from 80% Power ML20042D8281990-03-23023 March 1990 Fulfills Requirements of Tech Spec Section 4.19.5.a Re once-through Steam Generator Tubes post-inservice Insp Rept for Unscheduled Outage 8U-1 ML20012D7001990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Util Response to Generic Ltr 90-01 Re NRC Regulatory Impact Survey.Site Mgt & Staff Hour Categories Added to Response ML20012D7121990-03-21021 March 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to TMI-1 Cycle 8 Core Operating Limits Rept. ML20012C4771990-03-12012 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants,' Per 10CFR50.54(f). Current Design Adequate W/O Addl Tech Specs ML20012B8241990-03-12012 March 1990 Forwards Application for Tech Spec Change Request 199 to License DPR-50,revising Tech Specs Re Steam Generator Tube Insp Requirements ML20055C3931990-02-23023 February 1990 Documents Interpretation of Tech Spec 4.19.5.a Re once- Through Steam Generator Tube post-inservice Insp Rept for Refueling Interval 8R.Total of Eight Tubes Removed from Svc by Plugging ML20011F5251990-02-23023 February 1990 Documents Interpretation of Tech Spec 5.3.1.1 Re Design Features of Fuel Assemblies in Light of Issuance of Generic Ltr 90-02.Tech Spec Change Request Re Utilization of Dummy Fuel Rods or Open Water Channels Will Be Filed by 900420 ML20011F6651990-02-22022 February 1990 Forwards Updated Status Summary of Consideration of TMI-1 PRA Recommendations as of 891231.Changes to Torque Switch Settings for DH-V-4A & B Will Be Implemented in Refueling Outage 8 Re Closing Against High Differential Pressure ML20006C2901990-01-26026 January 1990 Provides Addl Info Supporting Deferral of Seismic Qualification Util Group Walkdowns to 10R Outage.Performance of Walkdowns Provide Proper Scheduling & Priority for Resolution of USI A-46 for TMI-1 ML20011E1221990-01-26026 January 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-13, Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Audit Rept Determined That Operation of Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Sys Consistent W/Design Basis Documents ML19354E8601990-01-25025 January 1990 Requests Approval for Use of B&W Steam Generator Plugs Mfg W/Alternate Matl (nickel-base Alloy/Alloy 600).Alloy 600 Has Superior Corrosion Resistance to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking 1990-09-10
[Table view] |
Text
2 o
- GPU Nuclear Corporation Nuclear :::,omgreo Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Nurnber:
November 30, 1984 5211-84-2291 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Stolz:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Error Analysis - Subcooling Margin Indication This is in response to your request for additional information dated September 28, regarding the Saturation Margin Monitor Loop Error Analysis for THI-1 as modified and clarified as a result of our meeting of October 30, 1984.
Enclosed as Attachment 1 is our " Summary Description of Tsat Margin Monitoring and Alarm Capability" which was requested by Dr. P. Kadambi of your staff in a telephone conversation on November 2,1984 Attachment 2 provides GPUN's response to (7) of the (11) questio.1s. Our response to questions 2, 5, 7, and 11 will be provided by December 14, 1984 along with a set of the revised instrument loop diagrams as discussed with Dr. Kadambi.
Sincerely,
{J f . D. kill Director, THI-1 HDH/SK/MRK/kds Attachments cc: R. Conte J. Van Vliet Dr. P. Kadambi D D 0 000 89 \
g P PDR GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the Gonoral Public Utilities Corporation
g <
ATTACHMENT I Sumary Description of Tsat Margin Monitoring and Alarm Capability The temperature saturation.(Tsat) margin monitoring system is a redundant system consisting of an A and a 8 loop.- Each loop provides a continuous control room display of the margin between the actual reactor coolant system temperature and the saturation temperature based upon the existing pressure of the reactor coolant system. Tsat provides alarm annunciation in the control room when either loop indicates insufficient margin. Detailed discussion of the Tsat margin monitoring system is provided in the following paragraphs.
In each of the redundant loops, reactor coolant temperature and pressure inputs are brought into signal conditioning cabinets. Signal conditioning circuits convert the RC pressure to a signal that is proportional to the saturation temperature for that pressure. The signal is compared with a ,
signal proportional to the actual RC temperature, and the difference represents the temperature margin to saturation. Tsat margin monitor information is displayed on digital indicators on the control room back panel. The indicators display Tsat margin in degrees fahrenheit for RC Loop "A" and Loop "8". The Tsat margin monitor also provides an isolated output to the plant computer and an isolated, low Tsat margin to the annunciation system for control room alarm annunciation, should Tsat margin be less than set point. The outputs to the plant computer provide trending and status monitoring information.
The individual components that comprise the Tsat system, with the exception of the digital indicators, are IE qualified (Digital indicators will be qualified by January 1985). The system consists of the following components:
5 l
a) RTO's (TE 958, TE 960), Weed Instrument Co. Model 1030/6110 h
b) Pressure Transmitters (PT 963, PT 949), Rosemount Model 11530 c) Signal Conditioning Modules, Foxboro Model Spec. 200.
l d) DigitalIndicators(TI-977,TI-978),WestonModel2470.
All Tsat equipment in the A loop is powered from the Al signal i conditioning cabinet (Red), and the B loop from the B1 signal conditioning cabinet (Green).
, Pressure transmitter PT 963 and temperature sensor TE 958 are located in the hot leg associated with OTSG A. Pressure transmitter PT 949 and temperature sensor TE 960 are located in the hot leg associated with OTSG B. The pressure input range is 0 to 2500 psig. The digital display meter will indicate -100* to +400'F Tsat margin. During normal operation of the
( plant, the set point for alarm for each loop shall be whenever the Tsat margin is less than 25'F or at the value determined by plant operating procedures and technical specification. Signal conditioning circuits for
, the Tsat A loop are located at elevation 338 ft. in the control tower, and for Tsat 8 loop at elevation 322 ft. The temperature inputs have a range of 120* to 920'F.
Tsat margin information is provided as an aid to the operator to promote safe operation and shutdown of the plant. The Tsat margin monitor performs no initiation or actuation of safety devices. The plant procedures stress that other plant parameters such as RC pressure and temperature should not be ignored, and constant surveillance of these
, other variables is a requirement. The margin to saturation computed by the Saturation Margin Monitoring System can be verified by manual cal-colations using alternate instrument readouts.
i
ATTACHMENT 2 GPUN RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS ON TMI-1 SATURATION MARGIN MONITOR LOOP ERROR ANALYSIS Question 1 ,
Sheet 2 of the loop error analysis discusses the error allowance for the steam line break and small break LOCA conditions. For the purpose of determining the error allowance, the manufacturer's test results for more severe accident conditions were divided by a factor of three. It is the staff's concern that this may be nonconservative. Manufacturer's tests are typically one time tests that yield a single curve or data point. In lieu of requiring that several tests be performed with a statistical evaluation of the results, the staff has accepted a single curve or data point provided there is conservatism in the temperature and radiation levels. Accordingly, we request that additional information be provided to support this method of estimating the environmental error allowance.
Response
Based on LOCA/HELB tests, the manufacturer specified the 3o LOCA/HELB error as follows:
LOCA/HELB Error - 1 (4.5% URL + 3.5 % span) where URL = Upper Range Limit
= the highest value that the transmitter can be adjusted to measure Span - the algebraic difference between the highest and lowest values that the transmitter is calibrated to measure. When determining error at measured pressures below the upper limit of the calibrated span, span is defined as the algebraic difference between the measured pressure and the lowest value that the transmitter is calibrated to measure.
To express the entire equation in terms of % span:
= .,
LOCA/HELB Error - 2 (4.5%)( URL ) + 3.5% (applied pressure)
, (transmitter span) (transmitter span)
=f 4.5%)(3000) + 3.5% (applied pressure)
. (2500) ( 2500 )
Since *he LOCA/HELB conditions (420*F/85 psig) far exceed the SBLOCA conditions (245'F/30 psig), a conservative SBLOCA error can be estimated as follows:
SBLOCA 2a error = 1/3 (LOCA/HELB 3e error)
. + (4.5/3 % URL + 3.5/3 % span)
-i(1.5%URL+1.17% span)
Subsequently, we evaluated the validity of the assumed SBLOCA equation by analyzing actual test data taken at 240*F and comparing it with the SBLOCA error equation.
1-1
The manufactu'rer's tests involved ramping the test chamber, containing five transmitters. Test data was provided for the following times and temperatures:
Eme Temperature 30 minutes 320*F 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> '-
240*F 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 180*F The test was conducted by running each transmitter, up to full scale, and back to 0, recording data at 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent of scale. Since the 240*F condition is very close to the SBLOCA temperature of 245*F, it provides a-basis for evaluating the validity of the SBLOCA error assumed in the loop error analysis.
The test data for the five transmitters has been plotted on Figure 1 (vertical lines at 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent of span). The line of regression was then determined by the method of least squares.
Error)tso = [(-0.2084% URL) + (-0.0088% URL)(% span)]
where 89 - -0.2084 y-intercept 81 = -0.0088 slope 59 - 0.2685 Standard deviation of 89 S1 - 0.0044 Standard deviation of B1
% span - (Measured Pressure) x 100
( Calibrated Span)
Since five transmitters were tested and this equation has two coefficients, the degrees of freedoa are (5-2) - 3. At 95% confidence limits, the percentage point of a t-distribution with 3 degrees of freedom is 3.182.
The 2a values of 89 and 81 were calculated as follows:
- 89) o - 3.182 59 - 2 0.8544% URL 81):o - 3.182 S1 = i 0.0140% URL 4
Therefore:
Error)3 , = [(-0.2084% URL i 0.8544% URL) +
(-0.0088% URL i 0.0140% URL)(% span)]
The error of interest is the +2o, since it would Indicate a higher subcooling margin than the actual margin. .The +2a values have been plotted on Figure 1, demonstrating that the values used in the loop error analysis were indeed conservative.
1-2
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Question 3 Sheet 13 of the loop error analysis provides the calculations for alarm loop error under accident conditions. In considering the loop error associated with the harsh environment, the accuracy, stability, and temperature effect allowances were subtracted and a new term representing the error associated with the harsh environment's temperature was statistically added to the alarm loop error. It is the staff's concern that this may be a nonconservative method. Statistical methods of summing errors may not be appropriate when the errors are induced by harsh environmental conditions.
These errors are not random in nature as, for example are stability errors.
They represent a bias (systematic error) that should be treated algebraically in the error equations. Further, the errors induced by the harsh environment are typically considered in addition, to those random errors associated with accuracy, stability, temperature effects, and calibration. Accordingly, we request that you provide the basis for statistically summing the accident induced errors and subtracting the random errors.
Response
4- A review of the Rosemount LOCA/HELB qualification test data and the resulting harsh environment published error value confirm that the error is not systematic and varies in both the positive and negative directions, and should be treated statistically as random.
Rosemount has confirmed that under harsh environment accident conditions, the published data for harsh environment errors are intended to replace the normal environment errors. These values include the errors associated with accuracy and stability.
Attachments 1 and 2 are copies of GPUN/Rosemount correspondence confirming the appilcation of harsh environmental error data.
Also, as discussed during our meeting of October 30, 1984, we would like to provide the following discussion of error classifications:
i I
l l
I 3-1 L
, x ERROR CLASSIFICATIONS Error may be classified in the following ways:
- a. Variability of an Individual Error
- 1) Systematic
- 2) Random
- b. Relationship Between Random Errors~~
- 1) Independent
- 2) Nonindependent
- c. Determination of Error Value
- 1) Determinate
- 2) Indeterminatet Systematic Error--With repeated measurements, the measured value is always in error by the same amount. Some causes of systematic error are:
- a. Parsenal error which is consistently repeated,
- b. Deviation of a process from the analytical model.
Random Error--With repeated measurements, the measured value is in error by varying amounts. Some causes of random error are:
- a. Observer's estimation of the fraction of the smallest division of an instrument. 1
- b. Fluctuating conditions such as temperature, pressure or supply voltage.
- c. Small disturbances such as vibrations from nearby machinery.
- d. Imprecise definition of exactly what is to be measured. For example, the measured diameter of an object can vary if taken at slightly different locations.
Independent Random Errors--For a given random error, there is a certain probability of occurrence associated with each value that it may assume.
Two random errors are independent if fixing the value of one has no effect on the probability of' occurrence of each value of the other. This means that for independent errors in measurements x and y, the probability that tbs error in x will have a value of dx while the error in y has a value of l dy can be expressed as follows:
! P (Ax = dx, Ay = dy) = P(Ax = dx) P(Ay = dy) l ,
l Nontndependent Random Errors--If fixing the value of one random error has an effect on the probability of occurrence of each value of the other, then the two errors are said to be nonindependent.
q l
l l
l l
l l s l , 3-2 .
The degree of dependence of one random error upon the other is expressed in terms of the coefficient of correlation (p) which has limits of zero and one. A coefficient of one means that two random errors are perfectly correlated such that one error is single valued when the other is fixed. On the other hand, a coefficient of zero means that the two random' errors are independent, since by definition there is no correlation between independent random errors. Values between zero and one mean that the nonindependent random errors are really composed of both independent and dependert elements which cannot be separated.
Combining Random Errors Let: V - V(x, y)
Where:
V - quantity to be C'mputed x - measured quantity y - measured quantity The probable error in v is expressed as follows:
e, = y e Z + eyZ + 2p., e. ey Where:
e, - total probable random error in y
- e. = probable random error in v due to error in x ey - probable random error in v due to error in y p., - coefficient of correlation If the errors e and ey are independent, then:
p.y -o e, - y e. Z + ey Z This reflects the fact that there is clearly a probability of compensation.
When the error in x causes the computed value of V to be larger, the error l In y may cause it to be smaller. Thus, on average, the total error in V i
will be algebraically less than the sum of the separate contributions of
- e. and ey.
If e. and ey are nonindependent and are perfectly correlated, then i
p.y 8 l ev =
y e ' + ey 2 + 2e, ey ev = e. + e y l
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l 3-3 L
This reflects the fact that there is no possibility of compensation for perfectly correlated errors.
If e, and e, are nonindependent but not perfectly correlated, then 0 < p.y < 1 e= y e.2 + e,2 + 2p.y e, e, This reflects the fact that some compensation is possible when the tw) errors are not perfectly correlated. This compensation is due to the independent elements of the errors. In actual practice, it may be difficult to evaluate the coefficient of correlation for nonindependent errors. In this case, it is conservative to treat them as perfectly correlated with a coefficient of one.
Determination of Error Value Errors which may be evaluated by some logical procedure, either theoretical or experimental, are called determinate, and the others are called indeterminate. Random errors are determinate, while systematic errors may be either determinate or indeterminate.
Determinate systematic errors can fall in two categories:
- a. Those whose sign and magnitude at a particular time are known.
- b. Those whose sign and magnitude at a particular time are unknown.
When the sign and magnitude of a systematic error are known, the systematic error is combined with the total probable random error by adding them algebraically. An example of this would be an instrument with a known calibration error.
In many cases, it is impossible to know'the sign and magnitude of a systematic error. For example, it is impossible to predict the sign and magnitude of an instrument calibration when one is evaluating potential errors in an instrument at some future time. The error may be of either sign and the magnitude may be anywhere within the range permitted by the calibration procedure. In these cases, what would be a systematic error at a particular point in time becomes a random error when evaluated prior to calibration. This is due to the fact that the error from this source is evaluated on the basis of the probability of inducing a given systematic calibration error at the time the instrument is calibrated. Thus, it is a random error and is treated as such when combined with other errors.
Furthermore, it is usually independent of other errors.
Reference:
Beers, Yardley, Introduction to the Theory of Error, Addison Wesley, 2nd Eddition, 1962.
3-4
=
Appendix A GPU Nuclear Corporation NU IN 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany New Jersey 070541149 (201)263-6500 TELEX 136-482 Wnter's Direct Dial Number:
October 31, 1984 EP&I/84/1861-0632M ROSEMOUNT INC.
12001 W. 78 Street Eden Prairie, Minn. 55344 Attn: Mr. Grieg Romanchuk
Dear Mr. Romanchuk:
It is our understanding, from previous conversations with your office, that the proper application of the ' error' values published for the Rosemount Pressure Transmitter Model 11536D9 is as follows:
a) Under normal operating co.1ditions, use the applicable data published under ' Performance Specifications - Zero Based Ranges, Reference Conditions'.
b) Under Harsh Environment Accident Conditions, use the applicable data published under ' Nuclear Specifications', and that these values include the errors associated Accuracy and Stability.
I l Grieg, we would appreciate a written confirmation or comments, for our j records, regarding the above.
l Thank you.
l l Very 1y yours, n
8 s. .
l Le er 1 stein l Engineer - EP&I cc:
- Engfaepr - S..Koukabany Manager Instrumentation - G. J. Sadauskas
! EDCC - B/A 123072 GPU Nuclear Corporat.cn is a subscary cf Genera; Pubhc Utiht,et Corpor:. tion l
. . . _ ___ 3 5 _ _ __, _ __ ,__ __
Appendix B nosamouwT me.
12001 West 78th Street Erden Prairie, Minnesou 55344 U.S.A.
Tel. (612) 941-5560 TWX 910-576-3103 TEi EX 29-0183 November 6, 1984 RemM-GPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, NJ 07054-1149 Attention: Mr. Lester Goldstein Engineer - EP & I
Subject:
Your letter dated October 31, 1984 EP & I/84/1861-0632M
Dear Mr. Goldstein:
Rosemount has received and reviewed the subject letter and find the information contained therein to be correct.
Should you have any further questions, feel free to call me.
Very truly yours,
[ % (Nc i Gregory M. Romanchuk Marketing Engineer
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3-6
- Question 4 Table 3 on sheet 5 of the loop error analysis provides the total alarm loop uncertainty. The discussion preceeding Table 5 states that the total positive (nonconservative) error is the positive random error alone. He request that you provide the basis for neglecting the systematic error associated with the characterizer curve, and provide the equations for calculating the values shown on the Table.
Response
- 1. Figure 2 shows a representative characterizer curve.
l The actual characterizer is designed with eight linear segments. These eight linear segments which approximate the temperature-pressure saturation curve were plotted on the concave side of the curve, and provide a saturation temperature lower than actual (conservative). As calculated, the line segments intersect adjacent line segments at or slightly above the curve. However, according to the manufacturer (Foxboro product specifica-tion TI 2AP-140) "the transition from segment to segment is a smooth curve which follows the characteristics of a diode junction."
The positive values shown on sheet 26 of the calculation were calculated to determine their magnitude if smoothing did not occur, and do not represent the actual output of the characterizer.
!' Positive values of systenatic characterizer curve errors were not included in the calculation because:
I a) They occur at only,seven very narrow regions of pressure.
b) Their calculated positive values before smoothing are all less than l'F, and this value is smoothed in the negative direction.
- 2. The following equations were used to calculate the values shown in Table 3:
i Total Error (-) - Random (-) + Systematic (-)
Total Error (+) - Random (+) + Systematic (+)
i For non-accident conditions, Random (+) and (-) errors are calculated on sheets 13 and 14 and tabulated in Table 2. Systematic (-) errors are calculated on sheet 26 and tabulated in Table 1. Systematic (+) error equals zero (see discussion in Paragraph 4-1 above).
For accident conditions, Random (+) and (-) errors are calculated on sheets
- 16 and 17, and tabulated in Table 2. Systematic (-) error is the sum of the negative characterizer curve error and containment pressure error as tabulated in Table 1. Systematic (+) error equals zero.
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l 4-1 l
._ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ ____w
Riortsentative Charact3rizer Curva AREA Of CONCERN
/
/
TEMP.
/
f
/
4 PRESSURE Figure g 4-2
. . . . . ~ . . . - - . - . - - - ..
T' Question 6 Notes l_and 2 on Sheet 6 of the loop error analysis provide qualitative basis.for the use of statistically less conservative error allowances for temperature effects and power supply effects. He request that you provide test results or analyses to confirm the linear relationship between error and power supply / temperature variation.
Response
- 1. With regard to Note 1 on Sheet 6, the qualitative basis for derating the temperature effect error is that the equipment (Foxboro 200 modules) are located in the Control Building, which has redundant safety grade HVAC systems. A controlled environment of 2 5*F will always be available.
Foxboro published error data is based on a 50*F heat rise of the modules. During the testing, temperature was changed in Icege increments-(23*C, then smaller increments until limit was reached), and an error limit (less than 2 5%) was established that enveloped the worst case test data. The test data indicates that temperature effect error increases as temperature deviates further from the reference temperature of calibration to some function with a power greater than one. Thus a linear interpolation is conservative. (See Figure 3, below)
The first step in establishing the temperature effect error used in the loop error analysis involved converting the manufacturer's 3e error value for a 50*F temperature rise to a 2a value by multiplying by 2/3 (See Sheet 2 of the loop error analysis).
Assuming a linear relationship, one half of the 2a error value for 50*F would be the 2a error value for 25'F rise in temperature:
3o Enveloping error limit 2e (50*F rise) 2e (25'F rise) 2 0.5% 2 0.333% 2 0.166%
A temperature variation of f 250F is assumed in determining the temperature effect error, errort
/-
Temp +
Figure 3 6-1
- 2. Note 2 on Sheet 6 specifies that power supply / vital bus regulation is very much better than 5%; therefore a value equivalent to la is considered conservative.
The supply voltage error effect values provided by the manufacturer, Foxboro, are based on test data where the input voltage to the modules was changed in discrete increments of i 5%. This data is provided primarily for users who use unregulated power supplies.
In the THI-1 application modules are powered from Foxboro 2ARPS power supply, with output regulation of i 0.2% for a -15 to 10 V change of input voltage. The input voltage is provided by a plant vital bus, which is also regulated to.less than 0.2%.
The use in the calculation of a supply voltage error effect of lo, or 1/3 the 3a value of a 5% variation for an application that is representing a 2a value of a 0.2% variation is considered very conservative, as shown by the following:
Module 2 11 12 15 Hanufacturer's 3o 1 0.25% 1 0.25% 1 0.5% 1 0.51 Supply Voltage Error for 5% '
Change in Voltage
-2o Supply Voltage 1 0.167% 1 0.167% i 0.333% 2 0.333%
Error - 2/3 (3o error) for 5% Change in Voltage 2o Supply Voltage 2 0.007% 1 0.007% 0.013% 1 0.013%
Error for 0.2% Change in Voltage, using
- Linear Approximation -
'0.2/5 (2o supply voltage error for 5% change in voltage lo value (used in 1 0.083% 1 0.083% 2 0.167% 2 0.167%
analysis)
N.B. Voltage variations are within the normal range for the instrument; they already are accounted for in normal accuracy factors. In any future revisions of this calculation, these error terms should be eliminated.
6-2
Question 8 Sheet 21 of the loop error analysis states that calibration error associated with the RTD was considered negligible and, therefore, excluded from consideration. He request that you provide the quantitative basis for excluding the calibration error associated with the RTD, the alarm module (setpoint), and the indicator.
Response
In the revised loop error analysis, the error associated with RTD (module 1) will be included. Results of the revised loop error analysis will be provided by December 14, 1984, as response to Question 5.
The alarm module was not excluded from the calculation. Values for the module (Ai,, T , and Vir) were included in the loop error calculation (sheet 12), and were not subtracted in the 'calbration' calculation (sheet 21).
The alarm loop and indicator loop error values were within 0.2% of each other over the entire range. The calibration calculation was for the alarm loop which has the greater error; it applies equally for the indicator loop.
1 8-1
Question 9 Sheet 10 of the loop error analysis states that the error for modules 9 and 10 must be multiplied by the slope of the saturation temperature / pressure curve (dT/dp). Over the pressure range of interest, the multiplication factor is less than one, reducing the error associated with modules 9 and 10 by a factor of 14 at the upper range. As discussed in Enclosure 1 to the letter dated August 31, 1984, from H. D. Hukill (GPU) to J. F. Stolz (NRC),
this multiplication factor is necessary to correct for the amplifier gain in the function generator. From a review of the infwnation provided, it is not clear why the uncorrected value for modules 9 and 10 are nonconservative and how you determined that dT/dp was the appropriate correction factor.
Accordingly, we request that you provide additional information to suppprt the use of the dT/dp correction factor in computing error.
Response
The problem at hand is to express an individual component error, given as a percent of a 2500 psi span, as a percent of a 500*F span (the final elements of the loop), in order that it may be added as part of the overall loop error.
As shown in Figure 4, the following steps are followed:
- 1. Convert the individual component error value (a percent of the 2500 psi span) to an absolute value in terms of psi, by multiplying by (2500 psi /100% span 1).
- 2. Convert the error (psi) to an error (*F) by multiplying by dT/dp
(*F/ psi).
- 3. Convert the error value in F to a percent of span for the final components by dividing by (the span in *F/100 % span 2), or (500*F/100%
span 2).
In addition, the manufacturer, Foxboro, has provided a technique called normalized equations which has been used to verify the above relationships.
- The omission of dT/dp was equivalent to the assumption of dT/dp = 1. As 1
, discussed in Enclosure 1 to the August 31, 1984 letter and as shown on page 11 of the loop error analysis, the use of dT/dp = 1 resulted in calculated error values which were nonconservative by a factor of 1.264 in the 0-100 psig range, and overly conservative in the ranges above 100 psig.
l l
l l
l 9-1
f i
l l
l i
O To 2500 PSIG -100 T. + 400 'F l SPAN = 2500 PSI S PAN = 500 F
! l 2 :
- i. O- 10 VDC. O-10 V Dc
!^
l
( Ps I) 2500 S**P 2 E i = E (7. SPANI) = N (7.3PAdl) = too C. (PSI) u ( v) 2soo sLt e, (g)
' Step 2 Q,= 1soo100 s (P33) , d P (Pss)
~ l oo d P g = 2500 dr d (p) ,_500 loo laLF) N 2) = 2500 dr l
Step 3 g gg-- p e Soo dP -e'(7. SPA 42)
I l
i Figure 4 l
7 Question 10 Sheet 10 of the loop error analysis includes a discussion on the methods used to normalize the range of each loop component to the range of the final elements of the loop. For example, the range of modules 9 and 10, 2500 psi (corrected for gain errors), was divided by 500*F to provide a 5.0 psi /*F correction factor. It is the staff's concern that this method may not be appropriate. Typically normalization is achieved by summing the sig1al.
errors (mA or mV) rather than creating a psi /*F unit in an equation that sums error in percent span. Accordingly, we request that you supply additional information to support the use of this method.
Response
See the response to Questloh 9.
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_O-Y 10-1
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