ML20098B042

10CFR50.59(B) Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Unit 1 & 2

ML20098B042
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	09/25/1995
From:	Mccoy C GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LCV-0658, LCV-658, NUDOCS 9510020074
Download: ML20098B042 (42)

Text

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- Georgia Power Company 40 inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 -

B,tmingham. Alatmia 35201 Telephone 205 677 7122 c.K.McCoy Georgia '

Power Vce Presdont. Nuclear tre souttem cloctic system Vogtle Project LCV-0658 Docket Nos. 50-424 50-425 U. S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document ControlDesk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT REPORT OF FACILITY CHANGES. TESTS & EXPERIMENTS In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 (b) (2), Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments.

This reflects changes through March 31,1995 which is consistent the current Revision 5 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

Sincerely, C. K. McCoy CKM/JLL

Enclosure:

Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments.

xc: Georgia Power Company Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.

Mr. M. Sheibani NORMS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR i Mr. C. R. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle l'IC(:gg, g 9510020074 950531 PDR A R _ _. DOCK 05000424 PDR _._

l 10 CFR 50.59(B) REPORT OF FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS & EXPERIMENTS. '

OCTOBER 21,1993 THRU MARCH 31,1995 1

1 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 m

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10 CFR 50.59(B) REPORT

! OF FACILITY CHANGES l OCTOBER 21,1993 THRU MARCH 31,1995

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT l' UNITS 1 & 2 m ,

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 V2E0052, nvision 1, sequence 1

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DESCRIPTION: De design change upgrades the instrumentation used during RCS mid-loop and drain down operations by providing two differential pressure transmitters located inside containment between the primary and the secondary shield walls.

SAFETY EVALUATION: De design change is physically dLwW from the reactor coolant system (RCS) in modes 1 through 4. De piping can be isolated to prevent a loss of RCS inventory during Mode 5 or 6 if a leak were to occur. He installation is seismically supported so as not to fall and damage other equipment during a seismic event. None of the piping or tubing penetrates the containment. Proper electrical separation is maintained in implementation of the design change. De margin of safety defined by the bases of Technical Specifications is not reduced because the design change assists in providing accurate level instrumentation for the operators.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-V2N0295, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: The design change makes several instrumentation changes in the turbine building to ,

auxiliary building Train A tunnel ventilation system. De change minimizes a dead-head operation of the turbine building electrical tunnel ventilation fan and allows for a more accurate assessment of tunnel temperature.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The change does not affect the ventilation system's capability to cool the tunnel. Failure of the ventilation fan to operate after implementation of the change has the same consequences as under the previous design. De penetration seals that were breached during implementation of the change were resealed per the plant procedures. De conduit, junction box and l temperature switch added by the design change are mounted to seismic category I requirements.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VAN 0108, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: The design change installs a portable skid mounted microfiltration subsystem in the liquid waste system, ne system interfaces with the existing waste processing equipstent. The system is located within the Ahernate Radwaste Building which meets the Regulatory Guide 1.143 criteria, and is classified as a seismic category 2 structure, ne process equipment for the subsystem is within a shielded vault to minimize exposure to operators.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Associated systems of the subsystem and the subsystem itself do not ,

perform safety functions and are not required to function to mitigate the ponsequences of an accident as  ;

I described in the FSAR. He failure of the system will not cause the malfunction of any equipment assumed to function in FSAR analyzed accidents. Per the system calculations, the offsite effects have been determined to be within the criteria of standard review plan (SRP) 15.7.3 and a small fraction of the dose criteria of f 0 CFR 100. De margin of safety defined by the bases for the Technical Specificat%

! has not been affected by the change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0003, revision 0, sequence 1

! DESCRIPTION: ne design change replaces Unit l's Proteus and Emergency Response Facility l (ERF) computer system with a new computer system named Integrated Plant Computer (IPC).

. SAFETY EVALUATION: De new system updates the monitoring functions of the plant. All of the design criteria, HVAC cooling, seismic, fire protection, and physical and electrical separation of safety-related and non-safety related equipment have been maintained. De system does not control any functions

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i of the plant. He design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 V2N0004, revision 0, sequence 1 -

DESCRIPTION: The design change replaces Unit 2's Proteus computer system with a new computer system named Integrated Plant Computer (IPC). ,

SAFETY EVALUATION: De new system updates the monitoring functions of the plant. All of  ;

the design enteria, HVAC cooling, seismic, fire protection, and physical and electrical separation of safety- l related and non safety related equipment have been maintained. He system does not control any functions  ;

of the plant. The design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical l Specifications.

SUBJECT:

' DCP 91-VIN 0022, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne design change replaces existing float type steam condensate drain pot level measuring instrumentation with an electronic system which monitors level by measuring the electrolytic .

conductivity differences between steam and water. He change will eliminate water entrapment in the instrument lines due to the modified pipe routing. He replacement level switch controls will also reduce  :

high temperature failure by locating the module away from the heat source. I SAFETY EVALUATION: He design change does not alter either the function or logic of the level instrumentation and controls, and will enable the steam condensatbn drain pot level controls to operate properly. De operation of the level switches and associated valves is not assumed by any accident analysis in the FSAR. All high energy piping being modified is one inch diameter or less and is not relocated beyond the area in which it is currently located. He design change meets the required seismic criteria. He margin of safety defined by the bases of Technical Specifications is not reduced since the design change assures that the steam drain pot system will operate properly.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0043, revision 1, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: The design change converts the reactor coolant system 25 micron backflushable filter to a 0.2 micron cartridge type filter so that a disposable cartridge filter can be used in the filter vessel.

Also, the filter closure head is modified to reduce the time required to replace the cartridge filter. In addition, an essential chilled water line was rerouted to allow for the filter cask to be transported from the area for proper disposal.

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SAFETY EVALUATION: No equipment or component required to mitigate an accident is located in the filter pit that could damage the filter vessel or associated piping located in the filter vessel pit. De pipe and pipe support stresses were determined to be within the appropnate design code allowable stresses. De design change does not adversely affect the operation or function of any component required to mitigate an accident, he margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced by

- this change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0072, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: De design change replaces the pump shaft packing with mechanical seals on the motor and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps. He associated seal water flush piping is also 4

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l. l 4 1 rerouted away from the packing stuffing box to the flushing inlet pipe connection on the new shaft seal l gland ring on each seal. The change eliminates a high leakoffin the existing packing shaA seals.

SAFETY EVALUATION

The replacement seals conform to the applicable requirements of 1

ASME codes. De change does not affect the pressure, temperature, seismic and environmental transients I j to which the pumps are qualified, nor it will cause the pumps not to perform their safety function when I required. Also, the seals will have no adverse affect on any other system required to mitigate an accident.

he mechanical type sealing device has the capability of providing a more consistent seal with a less likely chance of any damage to the pump shaft from improper adjustment.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0150, revision 0, sevence 1 DESCRIlrrlON: ne design change replaces certain level instruments which measure the RCS level, and modifies the mid-loop sight glass design with a single vertical flexible, clear plastic hose " sight glass",

SAFETY EVALUATION: The installation is seismically supported so as not to fall and damage other equipment during a seismic event. None of the piping or tubing added penetrates the containment.

. The change precludes sump blockage during a design basis accident. He margin of safety dermed by the )

. bases of Technical Specifications is not reduced because the design change assures that the operators have accurate level instrumentation.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0156, revision 1, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: The design change removes centrifugal charging pump (CCP) attemate miniflow relief valves IPSV-8510 A&B, and adds pressure control logic to the upstream motor operated valves IHV-8508 A&B for CCP protection. The design change improves system reliability while it simultaneously reduces the maintenance effoit.

SAFETY EVALUATION: None of the initiating events for accidents discussed in FSAR section 15.4.6 are affected by the design change. He change is of such a nature that the likelihood of CVCS malfunctions that could result in increased RCS inventory are not increased. The ECCS performance for the modified design change has been evaluated to ensure that the performance is acceptable and remains bounded by the current licensing basis. The motor operated valves (MOVs) affected by this design change were evaluated to ensure that the actuators are properly sized for the modified application. Safety-related  !

components that are added by the design change are seismically and environmentally qualified for the application. The p obability of a malfunction to equipment important to safety is not increased. He design changes vv.e evaluated to ensure that ECCS functions addressed in the Technical Specifications are i not affected, ao ' E margin of safety defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.  ;

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 VIN 0204, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: The design change improves performance of the terry turbine by rerouting high pressure and low pressure leakofflines separately. De high pressure line consists of the turbine case drain and the trip and throttle valve high pressure leakoff. He low pressure line consists ofleakage from turbine case glands, governor valve stem and trip and throttle valve low pressure leakoff.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The seismic design requirements are maintained for the modified lines. The safety function of the auxiliary feedwater system is not affected by the design changes. The affected penetration is resealed to its original criteria so that the flooding characteristics of rooms 104 and 106 are not impacted by the design change. The modification does not degrade the capability of the 5

4 turbine, ne margin of safety is not reduced because the change meets the same design, installation, i

inspection and testing requirements as the original design.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0216, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: His completed design change provides an option for certain HVAC filter exhaust systems to use the existing mist eliminator pack or to use a new model which is installed by removing the moisture eliminator pads and grids from their frame, and installing a slightly smaller frame inside the

!- existing frame to accommodate the new model of the moisture eliminator pad. His pad will be held in place by retainer rod].

]' - SAFETY EVALUATION: .

The function and operation of systems associated with the filtration units are not adversely affected. De design change has the same safety and seismic rating as originally - .

designed, and maintains the seismic qualification of the filtration units. De margin of safety is not reduced because the change meets the same rigid design, installation, and inspection and testing -

, requirements as set forth in the original design for the filtration systems.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VINO 219, revision 0, sequence 1

. DESCRIPTION

ne design change replaces the manual voltage regulator on the emergency diesel -

4 generators with a second automatic regulator similar to that currently installed in the system.

Interconnecting logic associated with the regulators is modifwd to accommodate the regulator changeout.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: Operation of the diesel generator is not affected by the change. All

components are manufactured and installed in accordance with appropriate regulations and criteria so that the original qualification of the panel is not degraded De change increases the availability of the diesel

generator by providing a means to quickly replace a faulty regulator in the generator control circuit, ne s consequences of an accident is reduced due to increased availability of standby power. De margin of I safety is not reduced because the manual regulator is not used or taken credit for and the two automatic regulators are independent and functionally equivalent.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 9l V2N0220, revision 0, sequence 1 .

l DESCRIPTION: The design change replaces one-out-of-one logic for pressure switch PSL-7070 with two-out-of-three logic for the turbine extraction valves closure on turbine trip. De setpoints for the new switches remain at 15 psig, similar to the PSL 7070.

SAFETI EVALUATION: None of the components added or modifwd by the design change are

safety-related. He change provides more reliable operation of the turbine extraction steam system.

1 Neither the turbine overspeed protection system, the reactor trip circuitry nor the reactor protection systems are affected by the design changes. Since the results of a turbine trip or turbine overspeed event are not

changed by the design change, the margin of safety is not reduced.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V!N0226, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: .

De design change removes the reactor cavity filter system skid, the intake strainer, t

. and the associated piping from the Unit I containment building. De system's supply and return piping embedded in concrete is abandoned. A replacement system is currently being used to provide reactor cavity filtration.

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! SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change meets the applicable design criteria and standards.

The change has no effect on the spent fuel cooling and purification system, its components, or the related l i systems. There is no change in the acceptable radiation limits for the plant as currently licensed De

- change does not initiate any new accidents. He change does not exceed any ree limits nor does it reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 V2N0227, revision 0, sequence 1 M

DESCRIPTION: ne design change addresses removal of the reactor cavity filtration system. The area is to be used as lay down area during refueling outages. A replacement system is currently being used to provide reactor cavity filtration.

- SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change meets all applicable design criteria and standards.

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. De change does not adversely affect the spent fuel cooling and purification system, its components or the i related systems. Any of the accidents or transients that may have radiological consequences are unaffected

by the change. The abandoned portions of pipe and supports meet seismic requirements. He change does

' not exceed any acceptance limits nor does it reduce the margin of safety identified in the basis for any i' Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0006, revision 0, sequence 1

DESCRIPTION

ne design change replaces the pump packing with mechanical . seals on the ,

auxiliary feedwater pumps. He associated seal water flush piping was rerouted away from the packing j stuffmg box to the flushing inlet pipe connection on the new shaA seal gland ring on each seal.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change conforms to the applicable ASME requirements.

The seals do not affect the pressure, temperature, seismic and environmental transients to which the pumps are qualified nor will they cause the pumps not to perform their safety function when required. De change

- has no adverse affect on any other system required to mitigate an accident. De new orientation of the seal i- water flush piping was evaluated per the seismic loads associated with the applicable pump. The design change does not reduce the margin of safety as dermed in the Technical Specifications.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0032, revision 0, sequence 1

DESCRIPTION

ne change provides design to reduce time required in installing the reactor cavity vent " banana" nuclear instrumentation and emergency refueling canal drain covers during an outage, ne ,

design involves use of toggle action-tightening bolts and nuts where appropriate, to compress new EPDM

! rubber seals underneath each cover. The toggle fastening method eliminates the individual torquing of bolts and the need for application of the RTV material.

SAFETY EVALUATION: De materials used either meet or exceed the requirements of the specifications for the existing equipment. He removal of the NIjunction boxes does not impact the ,

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) operation, response or qualification'of the instrumentation. No equipment important to safety is affected by the design change. De change employs the same design standards as does the system being replaced.  ;

, nerefore, the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0033, revision I, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: De change replaces the alternate B-train emergency boration solenoid operated flow conwol valve HV-8439 with a manually operated gate valve,1208-U4-505. De power and the control wiring is removed and spared. De position indication instrumentation found on the main control board (MCB) and the B-train remote shutdown panel is removed, covered with a plate and spared. Wiring previously routed to the valve is stowed and capped inside the existing conduit.

SAFETY EVALUATION: .. De replacement of solenoid valve HV-8439 with manual valve 1208 -

U4-505 does not impact the failure mechanism nor does it result in a new dilution flow path. His valve is in an alternate safety-grade boration path from the boric acid transfer pumps to the charging pump suction.

De modification meets all required design criteria for the system as well as seismic category I requirements. This modification has no adverse impact on any accidents analyzed in the FSAR. De ability to borate the RCS through the existing normal and emergency paths in response to a LOCA is not impacted by this change. Removal of the solenoid valve and its associated controls from the main control panel and the B-train safe shutdown panel has been evaluated for impact to the Fire Event Safe Shutdown  !

Evaluation and the Control Room Fire Alternate Shutdown Evaluation. De pressure rating, materials, project class and code requirements for the replacement valve meet the design requirements for the piping system. De Technical Specifications require two boration flow paths to be operable for modes I,2,3 and l 4, and one path be operable for modes 5 and 6. De r: placement of valve HV-8439 leaves three remaining safety grade cold shutdown paths available in addition to the normal boration path. Since the path through HV-8439 does not meet the flow requirements of 30 gpm, this path has not been relied upon in the operating procedures to meet the requirements of the Technical Specifications .

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VCN0065, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne design change provides several modifications to the HVAC system for the TSC facility to eliminate nuisance alarms and improve system operability.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne changes do not involve any safety related systems or components or other equipment used to mitigate any accidents evaluated in the FSAR. De operation of the emergency

, response team is not affected. Electrical cable separation is maintained. De changes to the affected systems do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0078, revision 0, sequence 1 1

DESCRIPTION: His design change provides a permanentjacket water chemical addition

system to both A and B trains of the Emergency Diesel Generator. Each system includes a mixing i tank, a chemical injection pump, a recirculation line with flow orifice, and connecting valves and piping. Also included in each system is a pump motor, motor starter with local start /stop push- ,

J buttons, a disconnect switch and a 120-volt power supply. Isolation of the safety-relatedjacket j water system is provided for each system by a normally closed, manually operated isolation valve. l i A valve is added to an existing plant demineralized water vent line in the diesel generator room )

associated with each tram.

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' SAFETY EVALUATION: Separation of safety-related circuits is maintained by this design change. De safety-related boundary of the Jacket water system is maintained by the addition of an isolation valve. De piping which transmits corrosion inhibitor into thejacket water system is seismically supported. De addition of a permanent chemical addition system to the diesel generatorjacket water rystem does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specifications.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V1NO100, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: De design change addresses addition oflockout relays (LOR) to 4KV and 13.8KV switchgear for motor loads which start by an automatic signal process. Also, wiring modifications are added to effect the necessary control circuitry to trip the circuit breaker, prevent reclosing of the breaker, and maintain " bypassed" status on the system status monitor panel until dehberate action is taken to reset the relay after the circuit breaker is opened due to a protective relay trip. All wiring changes are internal to the switchgear.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Nonnal operation of the relays provides the same tripping action as the present configuration. In case of an LOR failure, backup protection will prevent propagation of a fault beyond the problem bus. All changes meet the requirements for seismic category I and Class IE circuitry installation. No new accident condition is created by the change. Consequently, the margin of safety is not reduced by this change.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0134, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne design change replaces certain check valves with a combination of new locked closed globe valves and new check valves for containment isolation in the chemical feed lines utilized during steam generator wet lay-up periods. De condensate chemical injection system provides hydrazine and ammonia to the condensate and feedwater systems for corrosion control.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne change improves the operational functions of the system. By adding the globe valves, the structure is not degraded, redundancy is maintained and the reliability of the system is increased. De design change meets the seismic category I requirements. He margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced by the design change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VAN 0140, revision 0, sequence i DESCR!!" TION: De design change reworks room 120 in the Plant Entry and Security Building (PESB) for the installation of a new security computer system.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change is non-1E and non-safety related. No other safety related equipment is affected. Electrical separation is maintained. De security system is not included in the Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0141, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: De design change converts residual heat removal (RHR) pumps 1 1205 P6-001 and -002 from the existing close-coupled configuration to a removable flanged shaft configuration in order to decrease radiation exposure during pump maintenance and to improve overall reliability of the RHR Pumps.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change does not affect the assumptions used in the

, accident analyses or component evaluations, ne design performance of the RHR pumps and for the related systems is not changed. No new failure modes for the RHR pumps or the systems are created by the design change. He modification conforms to the seismic and environmental requirements. No new hazards are introduced by the change. ne margin of safety is not reduced because the design does not affect the availabinty, operability, or performance of the RHR system.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0142, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: De design change converts RHR pumps 2 1205-P6-001 and -002 from the existing cim-coupled configuration to a removable flanged shaft configuration in order to decrease rad:ation exposure during pump maintenance and to improve overall reliability of the RHR pumps.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The design change does not affect the assumptions used in the accident analyses or component evaluations. The design performance of the RHR pumps and for the related systems is not changed. No new failure modes for the RHR pumps or the systems are created by the design change, ne modification conforms to the seismic and environmental requirements. No new hazards are introduced by the change. De margin of safety is not reduced because the design does not affect the availability, operability, or performance of the RHR system.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0144, revision 0, sequence 2 DESCRIPTION: De design change reduces the KVA rating for transformer A'NBLilX from 30 KVA to 22.5 KVA in an efTort to make this transformer more reliable. (Certain modification drawings associated with the change are safeguard information).

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SAFETY EVALUATION: nis design change contains safeguard information. Implementation of the design change does not increase the consequences of an accident or the probability of an accident. It does not effect equipment, system, or components required to mitigate the consequences of an accident as described in the FSAR. De margin of safety has not been decreased as described in the basis for any

, Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0144, revision 0, sequence 4 DESCRIPTION: The design change replaces certain common Sola ferroresonant regulating transformers with distribution class treasformers with tapped primaries in an effort to make these power supplies more reliable. All of the replaced transformers are safety class non-lE and serve safety class non-IE loads.

SAFETY EVALUATION: De transformers and the loads supplied from the transformen are not required to function for accident mitigation or for safe shutdown. De loss of any non-lE transformer is bounded by the loss of non-emergency AC power to plant auxiliaries, ne transformers meet the seismic category 2 requirements. Calculations were performed to optimize the transformer tap settings. He margin of safety is not reduced because the transformers do not supply power to safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown or mitigation and control of accident conditions.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0145, revision 0, sequence 1 j-DESCRIPTION: De design change lowers the total KVA rating for certain Sola ferro resonant transformer banks by determination and removal of several transformers comprising the bank. Also, overload protection on the primary side transformers is decreased by the design change.

t SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change involves only non lE transformers which do not supply loads required for accident mitigation or for safe shutdown. De loss of the transformer is bounded by the loss of non-cmergency AC power to the plant auxiliaries, ne transformers are qualified to seismic

' category 2 requirements, ne margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specifications is not reduced 10 i

because the transformers do not supply loads for safe shutdown or mitigation and control of accident conditions.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V7N0145, revision 0, sequence 3 .

DESCRIPTION: ne design change lowers the total KVA rating for four specific Sola ferro resonant transformer banks by determination and removal of certain 7.5 KVA units. Furthermore, the primary side circuit breaker rating is reduced to maintain appropriate overcurrent protection Two class-lE primary side

- circuit breakers are replaced with breakers containing alarm switches.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change does not increase the probability of the loss of class IE transformers. Increasing the load on the remaining transformers improves reliability since the transformers perform best at unity power factor and full load conditions. De change does not alter the -

failure mode of any safety related equipment or system components, ne transformers are qualified to seismic category 2 requirements. He margin of safety as dermed in any Technical Specifications is not reduced because the design change does not affect the operation of safety related equipment required for safe shutdown or mitigation and control of accident conditions.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0156, revision 0, sequence 2 DESCRIITION: ne design modifies the containment cooling system by making available chilled water to cooling coils of the train B containment auxiliary air cooler and reactor cavity cooler during refueling outages. ne affected nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) and new chilled water lines are insulated. A small portion of the fire protection feed pipe is relocated to avoid interference, but the logic, spray pattern and the operation of the system remains unaffected.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne normal chilled water system is a non-safety related system, and is designed to the 2/1 seismic requirements, ne system is connected to the NSCW system only during refueling outages. De NSCW lines are designed to seismic I requirements. De design change does not degrade the capability for isolating the affected portion of the NSCW piping from the containment. De flooding sources and penetration seals were evaluated and found to be acceptable. He margin of safety is not reduced because the change meets the same design, installation, inspection and testing requirements as set forth in the original design of the NSCW and normal chilled water systems.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0157, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne design modifies the containment cooling system by making available chilled water to cooling coils of the train B containment auxiliary air cooler and reactor cavity cooler during i refueling outages, ne affected nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) and new chilled water lines are insulated. A small portion of the fire protection feed pipe is relocated to avoid interference, but the logic, spray pattern and the operation of the system remains unaffected.

SAFETY EVALUATION: De nonnal chilled water system is a non-safety related system, and is a

designed to the 2/1 seismic requirements, ne system is em-LM to the NSCW system only during refueling outages, ne NSCW lines are designed to seismic 1 requirements. De design change does not L degrade the capability for isolating the affected portion of the NSCW piping from the containment. The flooding sources and penetration seals were evaluated and found to be acceptable. De margin of safety is not reduced because the change meets the same design, installation, inspection and testing requirements as set fonh in the original design of the NSCW and normal chilled water systems, i

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VAN 0161, revision 0, sequence I l

DESCRIlrTION: ne design change standardizes the design and documentation associated with the alternate redwaste building (ARB) and associated systems, and removes components which are not utilized.

Also, tagging changes are made where needed to better identify the components and subsystems in use.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Neither the systems that interface with the ARB and its associated l systems nor the ARB itself perform a safety function, and are not required to function to mitigate the l consequences of an accident described in the FSAR. He physical clunges were evaluated and determined to have no effect on the operation of any equipment that remains, ne margin of safety is not reduced because the affected systems are not described in the Technical Specifications and their bases to the level of detail of what components are needed to accomplish the filtration and processing ofliquid radioactive wastes and spent resins.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0175, revision 0, sequence 1 ,

1 DESCRilrTION: ne design change adds corrosion product monitors to the turbine plant sampling system. De system collects, cools, analyzes, controls, alarms, and records water quality from various sampling points throughout the turbine building, yard and auxiliary building.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne portions of affected systems are not required to be functional following a design basis accident nor are they required to support the safe shutdown of the reactor under accident conditions. He margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications is not reduced because the operation and function of any safety-related equipment, component, or system is not adversely affected by the design change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0176, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne design change adds corrosion product monitors to the turbine plant sampling system. The system collects, cools, analyzes, controls, alarms, and records water quality from various sampling points throughout the turbine building, yard and auxiliary building.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne ponions of affected systems are not required to be functional following a design basis accident nor are they required to support the safe shutdown of the reactor under accident conditions, ne margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications is not reduced because the operation and function of any safety-related equipment, component, or system is not adversely affected by the design change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VAN 0182, revision 2, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne design change provides for additional electrical power receptacles in the control room, permanently installing two telephones and modifying the wall which separates room R-162 from the cor. trol room.

SAFETY EVALUATION: All raceways and equipment mounting are per the seismic category 1 criteria, ne design change does not affect adversely the response to a control room fire for safe shutdown j of the plant. No equipment important to safety is addeNmodified by the design change. The margin of '

, safety is not reduced because no system or component described in the Technical Specifications is adversely affected by the design change.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VAN 0183, revision 0, sequence I DESCRIPTION: ne design changes the roofing system on the Auxiliary Building roof from a liquid applied elastomer to a " built up" system. The " built-up" system consists of asphalt, insulation board, i lightweight cellular concrete, and several mat sheets covered with a bitumen membrane seal sheet.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The design change does not adversely affect equipment deemed important to safety nor does it affect the results of the maximum flood evaluations. De calculations -

. determined that the roofis capable of withstanding the additional weight under the modification. m change does not modify the original operating characteristics of any Technical Specifications required j systems and the changes provided under the design change meet the requirements of plant design criteria.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0190, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne design change installs a containment penetration local leak rate test (LLRT) in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) and volume control system RCP seal water leak offline between the test vent containing valve 1-1208-U4-463 and the vent line containing valve 1-1208-X4-460.

He addition of the valve will reduce the probability of an inadvertent spill. Also, the change replaces a ~

blind flanged connection located at the end of the CVCS seal water leak offline test connection branches with a threaded test connection.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Addition of the valve by this design conforms to the same design i requirements as the system in where it is being added. De test connection maintains the requirements for i the single isolation criteria. De pipe stresses and pipe support stresses are within the appropriate design requirements. He design change reduces the possibility of a flooding accident. ne margin of safety is not reduced because no system or component is adversely affected by the design change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2NO196, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne design change adds a chilled water type cooling coil unit with fan and associated controls in the steam generator blowdown (SGBD) heat exchanger rooms CO2/Cl35. De change lowers the room temperature sufficiently to allow for normal operation of the steam generator blowdown system.

SAFETY EVALUATION: De room coolers and associated systems do not perform safety functions and are not required to safely shutdown the plant. Components added by this change are supported per the seismic category 2 over I criteria. Addition of the room coolers does not result in increased consequences. De design change does not introduce new types of accidents nor does it create any new type of failure. De margin of safety is not reduced because the blowdown system, piping penetration filtration and exhaust system and area temperature monitoring are not adversely affected by the design change.

SUBJECT:

.DCP: 92-VAN 0208, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne design change decommissions certain non-essential radiation monitor channels by removing radiation check sources, de-terminating and sparing power sources' signal and control wiring, disconnecting piping, and abandoning the monitor skids in place.

SAFETY EVALUATION: No changes are made to the design, function or operation of the NSCW system or the radiation monitoring system. Hey neither monitor effluent releases nor provide input to a safety-related system. No other systems are affected and the information provided by the subject I

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I monitors is redundant or unnecessary The affected monitors are not discussed in the Technical  !

Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VAN 0210, reviskm 0, sequence 1 l DESCRIPTION: . De design change replaces certain sampling system recorden in the turbine plant sampling and auxiliary steam systems, with digital data recorders.

SAFETY EVALUATION: . De change has no adverse affect on the ability of the systems to perform their required functions. All changes meet the requirements of design, material and construction standards specified in the appropriate design criteria. No new radiological release path is created by the ,

i change. De change results in more reliable and maintainable recorders No new types of failure modes are introduced by the change. De margin of safety is not reduced since the design change meets the requirements of plant design criteria. ,

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VAN 0211, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: De design change replaces the Waste Gas Analyzer panels (Units 1,2 and A) with two wall mounted floffman boxes, which will house all required electronics, valves and tubing.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change enhances the performance of the Gaseous Waste System and does not adversely affect any safety system postulated to function in any FSAR accident analysis. Failure of the hydrogen / oxygen analyzer does not initiate or contribute to the failure of systems or components postulated to function in the FSAR. He change does not introduce any interfaces or alter setpoints to any safety-related equipment or systems. De design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specifications. '

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 V1N0028, revision 0, sequence 1 l DESCRIPTION: De design change adds permanent shielding to the reactor vessel head, four access 2

doors in the middle of the cooling shroud of the reactor vessel integrated head package and a removable connection to the reactor vessel level instmmentation system (RVLIS).

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne change does not increase stresses in the reactor vessel and connected components beyond the ASME allowable. No new accidents are created by the design change.

ne hydrogen generation analysis is not affected by the change. The coating er shielding does not increase l- the possibility of the containment sump screen blockage during LOCA. De margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced by the design change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 VIN 0050, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: he design change replaces the Woodward Model EGA analog control governor

with a Woodward Model 701 digital control govemor in emergency diesel generator (EDG) .

SAFETY EVALUATION: The operability and function of the EDG and the governor are not adversely affected by the design change. No new failure modes are created / introduced by the change. No new penetrations were added. All breached penetrations were resealed per the plant procedures. He j EDGs are electrically isolated from each other and the associated power and control cables for each EDG are routed so that the requirements for separation and We are maintained. De replacement

. qualifies to the applicable requirements for use in safety-related applications and as applied in NUREG 14

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, CR 5057. De margin of safety is not reduced because the reliability of the EDGs is not reduced as a result ,

of the replacement. i i

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0051, revision 0, sequence 1 4 . DESCRIPTION: The design change replaces the Woodward Model EGA analog control governor.

. with a Woodward Model 701 digital control governor in emergency diesel generator (EDG) .

• SAFETY EVALUATION: The operability and function of the EDG and the govemor are not adversely alTected by the design change. No new failure modes are createdrmtroduced by the change. No ,

new penetrations were added. All breached penetrations were rescaled per the plant procedures ne ' '

. EDGs are electrically isolated from each other and the associated power and control cables for each EDO l, are routed so that the requirements for separation and inWe are maintained. The replacement qualifies to the applicable requirements fw use in safety-related applications and as applied in NUREG ,

4 CR-5057. De margin of safety is not reduced because the reliability of the EDGs is not reduced as a result i

of the replacement.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0060, revision 0, sequence 1 i DESCRIPTION: The design change replaces the Unit 2 Emergency Response Facility Computer system with the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) system.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design change updates the monitoring functions of the plant. All

of the design criteria, HVAC cooling, seismic, fire protection, and physical and electrical separation of safety related and non-safety related equipment have been maintained. De system does not control any functions of the plant. De design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Techdcal

Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0061, revision 0, sequence 1

. DESCRIPTION: The design change provides additional Class 1E circuit breakers in 4.16 kV electrical buses I AA02 and IBA03. De design change also provides a standby olisite power (SOP) j source to the Unit i Class IE electrical buses to help mitigate the unlikely loss of all preferred, offsite

. power. The SOP consists of a 13.8 kV power circuit from Plant Wilson, two switchgear breakers located i

in the Unit I low voltage switchyard, and cable bus with isolation switches to connect the transformer i output to the existing transformers (RATS) and the Class IE switchgear. These circuit breakers are placed in the empty cubicles that connect the alternate offsite power sources (the reserve auxiliary transformer of the other train) to the bus.

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SAFETY EVALUATION: De addition of RAT circuit breakers deletes the " missing breaker

( scheme" from the 4 kV safety related buses and provides an improved method of transferring loads to the alternate train RAT when maintenance is to be performed on the normal RAT. The new circuit breakers are qualified for use in their application and will not affect the seismic qualification of the Class 1E switchgear. Malfunction of the circuit breaker would result in a circuit breaker trip and automatic start of the EDG associated with the electrical bus per the design. The change does not affect the protective relaying and associated setpoints for both the nonnal and ahernate offsite source circuit breakers. The new circuit breakers are operated within the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0061, revision 0, sequence 3 DESCRIPTION: ne design change provides the electrical modifications and the switchyard foundation and steel design for the offsite power source emanating from the Plant Wilson switchyard.

Sequence one of this DCP provided the power cable pull design, including conduit needed from pullbox 2 to the new switchgear and transformer foundation locations. It also provided for the addition of new, Class .

IE circuit breakers in the empty cubicles on switchgear i AA02 and IBA03. Sequence two provided the l concrete foundations design for the new transformer, transformer neutral grounding resistor, and switchgear.

1 SAFETY EVALUATION: Dere is no single failure of the Class IE,4.16-kV circuit breakers that could result in both buses being connected to the same offsite soun:e. Physical separation of the offsite power so.arce cable buses is provided to the same degree as in the original plant design. A review determined that grid stability is not affected. He power cable from the Plant Wilson switcl yard to the standby auxiliary transformer (SA'f) is adequately sized for power flow, short circuit conditions, and voltage drop. ne connection of the SAT to the Class IE buses does not affect the fire event safe shutdown circuit analysis. Placing both Class IE,4160 VAC ,

. buses on the same power source during modes 5 or 6 and taking a reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) out of service is acceptable. No new penetrations were added. Replaced or added equipment was procured to comparable specifications as the RATS and the cable bus between the RAT and the Class IE buses. Neither the EDG capability to power the Class IE loads nor the sequencer's ability to sequence the load is affected by the SAT. He addition of disconnect switches in the cable bus between the RAT and its Class IE bus does not increase the likelihood of offsite source cable bus failure. Based on a review of Technical Specifications and the discussions above, the activity does not reduce the margin of safety as dermed in the basis of any Technical Specification.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 V2N0062, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne objective of this design change is to provide additional Class lE circuit breakers in 4.16-kV electrical buses 2AA02 and 2BA03. Dese circuit breakers are placed in the empty cubicles that connect the alternate offsite power sources (the reserve auxiliary transformer of the other

. train) to the bus.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne addition of RAT circuit breakers deletes the " missing breaker scheme" from the 4 kV safety related buses and provides an improved method of transferring loads to the j alternate train RAT when maintenance is to be performed on the normal RAT. De new circuit breakers

are qualified for use in their application and do not affect the seismic qualification of the Class IE switchgear. He new circuit breakers are identical in form, fit, and function to the circuit breakers originally supplied and will continue to trip per the original design. De new circuit breakers willbe 1 operated within the requirements of existing Technical Specifications. De activity does not reduce the j

- margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specificathm.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0062, revision 0, sequence 2 DESCRIPTION: His design change provides cable bus with the isolation switches to connect the standby auxiliary transformer (SAT) output to the existing cable bus between the reserve auxHiary transformers (RATS) and the Class IE switchgear, ne SAT is to be used to load a Class IE portion and a selected non-Class IE portion of a reserve auxiliary transformer during either a unit outage or during l

power operation. Also, the design change provides a route for the circuits between control room panel QEAB and the Class IE switchgear that were added in sequence one of this DCP.

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SAFETY EVALUATION: Electrical separation is maintained through the Class IE l

circuit breakers on each bus which serve as RG 1.75 separation devices. De connection of the SAT to the Class IE buses does not affect the fire event safe shutdown circuit analysis. He fault contribution of the SAT is enveloped by the emergency diesel generator's fault current capacity j which is used in the calculation. In the event of an accident the new power supply will have

- adequate capacity and capability to power the affected Class IE,4.16-kV bus. No new l penetrations are added as a result of the implementation of this DCP. All breached penetration

seals were rescaled per plant procedure after cable routing was completed. Addition of the SAT i does not affect breaker or protective relay coordination on the Class IE bus. De protection

, scheme will continue to function as designed. Because each bus is connected to the offsite source by an incoming circuit breaker, no single failure can be postulated which would result in a scenario where power to both busca was lost and could not be restored. De activity does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 VAN 0067, revision 0, sequence 1 I4 DESCRIPTION: His design change package implements addition of Dionex Series 8200 l Process Analyzers to the existing instrumentation of the Units 1 and 2 Turbine Plant Sampling j Systems (TPPSs). The Dionex process analyzers allow a more accurate measurement oflow level contaminants in the turbine plant water inventory.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne installation of the Dionex Series 8200 Process Analyzers does not have an adverse impact on the ability of the TPSS to perform its required functions. All changes meet the requirements of design criteria. Since no new radiological release path is being created by this l modification, the radiological release is unaltered and remains in compliance with 10 CFR 100. Failure of the TPSS does not compromise other safety related systems and prevent a safe shutdown. As a result, there are no types of failure modes of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR affected

! by the design change, ne design chacge does not modify the original operating characteristics of any Technical Specification required systems, and the changes meet the requirements of plant design criteria.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VAN 0068, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: De design change removes certain heat trace panels, and relocates the cross braces on pipe braces on pipe racks located on level B of the auxiliary building to allow for transportation of the 4

spent RCS filter cartridges folloviing a filter replacement on Unit 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Removal of the heat tracing from the affected piping has no affect on the operation of the systems with which the piping is associated. Following the modification, the pipe racks continue to meet their original design requirements including seismic qualification. No systems required to mitigate an accident are affected by the design change. De margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced because the safety of the plant is not affected by the design change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0070, revision 0, sequence 1 i DESCRIPTION: He design change eliminates the spray additive portion of the containment spray .

system and adds a new passive pH control system. The passive system is composed of trisodium {

phosphate (TSP) stored in baskets located in the post-LOCA flooded sump region of the containment  !

building. j SAFETY EVALUATION

The design change functions in response to, and not as precursors to, an accident. All applicable design criteria standards are met by the design change. The containment spray 17 i

system, the ECCS or any of the accidents or transients that may have radiological consequences are not adversely affected by the change. De loads on the baskets were reviewed and were found to be acceptable. He baskets are designed to meet the requirements for seismic category 1. De change has no adverse impact on the possibility of equipment important to safety, ne change does not exceed any acceptance limits nor does it reduce the margin of safety identified in the basis for any Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 V2N0072, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne design change relocates relay UL in switchgcar 2AB15 to allow sufficient room for adding the new relay, ne design change installs for each % one Agastat .

time delay relay to be mounted in the rear compartment of the switchgear, adds internal wiring for the relay, re-terminates the CVI signal cable in the switchgear cubicle and relocates a certain relay.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne addition of the interposing time delay relays climinates a relay race which affects the proper operation of the system during sequmcer initided operations. The failure modes and effects for the system remain unaffected by the change, ne 5 second delay of the fan start will not cause an increase in radioactivity released to the atmosphere, nor will the concentration of airbome radioactive material in the auxiliary building be increased due to the short time delay. De margin of safety is not reduced by the design change.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 VIN 0078, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: nis design change implements the addition of resistance temperature detectors (RTDs), ITE27798-1TE27813, to the Pressurizer (1-1201-V6-002) shell, lower head, spray nozzle, and surge line to monitor the thermal gradient of the pressurizer.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This DCP has no adverse effect on the system, structure, or components. There is no change in the acceptable radiation lim N the plant as currently licensed. This DCP does not adversely affect the ability of the reactor coolant system, the pressurizer, or its components to perform its safety related function. De change does not result in the initiation of any new accidents, nere is no impact on the credibility of any previously evaluated accident. De design change does not exceed any acceptance limits nor does it reduce the margin of safety identified in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0079, revision 1, sequence i DESCRIPTION: De design change installs view ports on the encapsulation vessels to support MOV testing, removes the monorail between the encapsulation vessels in the Auxiliary Building, and adds platforms to support the vessel heads after removal in the Fuel Handling Building.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design of the lifting lugs, and platforms meet seismic requirements and are constructed from materials acceptable for the application. De monorail is secured so that during a seismic event it will not adversely affect any equipment important to safety ne view port has no adverse efrect on the encapsulation vessels or any other system required to mitigate an accident. De heavy loads analysis is not affected by the addition of the new trolley, the removal of the existing monorail or the uldition of the platform, nis design

, , change meets all design criteria and code requirements for the affected systems and no new failures are created as a result of the change. No equipment important to safety as required by the 15 sr- y w ,- e--m -- - m-,- y

4 Technical Specifications is impacted by the design change, therefore, the margin c /etyas dermed in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0080, revision 1, sequence 1 -

DESCRIPTION: The design change installs view ports on the encapsulation vessels to_ support MOV

- testing, removes the monorail between the encapsulation vessels in the Auxiliary Building, and adds platforms to support the vessel heads after removal in the Fuel Handling Building.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne design of the lifting lugs and platforme meet seismic requirements

. and am constructed from materials acceptable for the application. He mono all is secured so that during a seismic event it will not adversely affect any equipment important to safety. De view port has no adverse effect on the encapsulation vessels or any other system required to mitigate an weident. De heavy loads analysis is not affected by the addition of the new trolley, the removal of the existing monorail or the

.- addition of the platform. His design change meets all design criteria and code requirements for the affected systems and no new failures are created as a result of the change. No equipment important to safety as required by the Technical Specifications is impacted by the design change, therefore, the margin .

, of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced .

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 VIN 0084, revision 1, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: The design change replaces the CAD model LCY-37 cells for Unit I trains A and B with higher capacity C&D model LCY-39 cells to provide a minimum 10% design margin above the

Station Blackout (SBO) and Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Coolant Accident (LOOP /LOCA) load profiles.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne construction of the LCY-39 cell is similar to the . existing LCY-37

! cell. He failure modes and effects listed in FSAR table 8.3.2 5 remain valid for the new cells. He existing seismic Category I racks (including the anchorage) are adequate for supporting the additional weight of the batteries without any additional modifications. De cells provide the necessary current and voltage for all equipment required to operate during a SBO or LOOP /LOCA. De new cells will perform

in the same manner as the existing cells, therefore, the activity does not reduce the margin of safety as

defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 94-VIN 0006, revision 0, sequence 1 L DESCRIPTION: his design change replaces pressurizer pressure transmitter, IPT-457, with a Rosemount 1154 H series pressure transmitter, which has better accuracy, less drift and improved reliability as compared to the existing Veritrak/Tober transmitter, 1 l

. SAFETY EVALUATION: On the basis of a review of FSAR chapters 6 and 15, there is no increase in probability of occurrence of an accident. De transmitters have the same set point settings, and ere seismically and environmentally qualified for the location in which they are used.

i The design change meets the applicable standards, and has no adverse effect on the system, structure, or components. De Rosemount transnaitter has been seismically and environmentally l qualified for this application. The change does not result in the initiation of any new accidents.

L Since the value of Z+S for the Rosemount transmitter is enveloped by Z+S value in the Tech.

! Spec., the trip set point information in Table 2.2-1 for the pressurizer pressure reactor trip remains i unchanged. Moreover, since the Channel Statistical Accuracy (CSA) for the Rosemount I transmitter is enveloped by the CSA for the existing Tobar transmitter, the value of TA also remains unchanged, nerefore, this change does not reduce the margin of safety identified in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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DCP: 94-V2N0008, revision 0, sequence I

SUBJECT:

l DESCRIIrTION: ne design change addresses replacement of the control system for the refueling J machine with a reliable control console capable of semi-automatic operation via interface with an IBM compatible PC.  ;

I SAFETY EVALUATION: De design change retains all the safety interlocks and functions of the -

original control console. De new components are installed to the seismic 2 over I cnteria. He design <

change has no adverse affect on the systems or any other safety-related systems used to mitigate or respond to an accident as stated in the FSAR. No new failure modes are introduced /creatert by the design change.

De design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 94 VIN 0010, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne design change connects Individual Cell Equalizer (ICE) 'devices to the plant's batteries listed in the design package. ICE devices help ensure proper cell float voltages and a uniform cell voltage distribution across the battery banks with each cell floating very close to the optimum voltage.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The failure of an ICE device does not affect the operation of the batteries nor the battery chargers. The testing and surveillance requirements for the battenes 1

. are not changed. The ICE devices fail open and have no effect on the battery cells. Herefore, the battery cell will be effectively returned to its original configuration. A short in the ICE device j will fail to an open state. De margin of safety as defined in the basis to Technical Specification I 3/4.8.2 is not reduced with the addition of the ICE devices to the plant's battenes.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 94-V2N00ll, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne design change connects Individual Cell Equalizer (ICE) devices to the plant's )

batteries listed in the design package. ICE devices help ensure proper cell float voltages and a uniform cell l voltage distribution across the battery banks with each cell floating very close to the optimum voltage. I SAFETY EVALUATION: The failure of an ICE device does not affect the operation of the batteries nor the battery chargers. De testing and surveillance requirements for the batteries are not changed. De ICE devices fail open and have no effect on the battery cells. Therefore, the battery cell will be effectively returned to its original configuration. A short in the ICE device will fail to an open state. De margin of safety as defined in the basis to Technical Specification 3/4.8.2 is not reduced with the addition of the ICE devices to the plant's batteries.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 94-VAN 0020, revision 0, sequence 20 DESCRIPTION: ne design change relocates the 2 electro-hydraulic controi (EHC) pumps from the top of the hydraulic power units to the floor. De change places the suction line below the normal fluid level in the tank thereby providing a flooded suction and increasing the net positiv: suction head.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The change improves the reliability of the system so as to make the probability of an inadvertent pressure reduction negligibly small. The change has no affect on the operation of the EHC system nor it has any affect on other safety systems. No new interface points with 20

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 94-VAN 0026, revision 0, sequence 20 )

DESCRIPTION: The design change implements several changes as detailed in the design package, to i

various components associated with the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP). These i

, changes improve the operation and reliability of the turbine and provide for future monitoring of the turbine performance.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: ne piping and valves are safety related and seismically l designed through the last isolation valve and piping to the tubing adapter, ne piping to tubing 1 adapter also serves as the safety related flow limiting device. De changes to the systems do not a 1

cause, or increase the probability of, an accident evaluated in the FSAR. He Turbine Dciven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump performs as required during any accident. Here are no new nuclear or radiation accidents created by this design changc. The TDAFWP still performs its required ]

Technical Specification functions. De steam line drains are designed to maintain the steam line j pressure boundary while allowing the condensate to drain. Herefore, the design change does not 1 i- reduce the margin of safety as dermed in the basis for any Technical Specification. l s

SUBJECT:

DCP: 95-VIN 0005, revision 0, sequence 1 1 DESCRIPTION: The design change provides Class IE fuses in the Class IE main turbine stop valve

! limit switch electrical signals in the Control Building before they enter the Turbine Building. He fuse and

- fuse holders we suitable for use in Class IE circuits.

SAFETY EVALUATION: De solid state protection system (SSPS) was susceptible to a single failure u a result of a turbine building instrumentation short-to-ground when the SSPS power supply was already alarmed and operating with a single ground in the turbine building. His design change provides a 4

fuse coordination aah==c==sent to avoid a potential single failure (such as a HELB in the turbine building) to result in a loss of SSPS function if a ground fault already existed in the SSPS power supply system.

Failure of the fuses will now place the associated channel to trip, allowing SSPS to operate as described in the FSAR. De seismic qualification of thejunction boxes is not adversely affected by the addition of the fuse holders. The design change adds assurance that turbine building faults cannot propagate into the SSPS.

The bases for the reactor protection and emergency safety features actuation specifications continue to be satisfied, herefore, the margin of safety as dermed in the Technical Specifications is not reduced by the design change. 1

SUBJECT:

DCP: 95-V2N0006, revision 0, sequence 1 i

DESCRIPTION: De design change provides Class !E fuses in the Class IE main turbine stop valve I

limit switch electrical signals in the Control Building before they enter the Turbine Building. The fuse and 4

fuse holders are suitable for use in Class IE circuits.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: The solid state protection system (SSPS) was susceptible to a single  ;

failure as a result of a turbine building instrumentation short-to-ground when the SSPS power supply was already alarmed and operating with a single ground in the turbine building. His design change provides a j fuse coordination " -- =ent to avoid a potential single falh: (such as a HELB in the turbine building) i

to result in a loss of SSPS function if a ground fault already existed ir the SSPS power supply system.

Failure of the fuses places the associated channel in trip, allowing SSPS to operate as described in the FSAR. De seismic qualification of the junction boxes is not adversely affected by the addition of the fuse 21 l

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holders. The design change adds assurance that tubine building faults cannot propagate into the SSPS.  ;

The bases for the reactor protection and emergency safety features actuation specificatio e continue to be satisfied.' Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifwations is t ;t reduced by the design change.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 9l VCM006, revision 0, sequence I i

l DESCRIPTION: Control building room R-110 was remodeled to provide an addshonal area hr P ALARA briefings and to replace an existing gumey shower with a better shower facility for personnel 4 decontamination.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 12.5.2.1 discusses the use of the gurney shower to decontaminate accident victims on stretchers it has been decennir.ed that victims on samtchers would most I. likely be transported to a medical facility for treatment and later decontamindad his change also required a 4 revision to FSAR figure 1.2.2-6 which depicts the gumey shower. His equipment is not addressed in the j Technical Specifwdiana nor does it impact any other system's funcuan as required by Technical

, Specifications.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 9l-VIM 027, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne wire mesh door to auxiliary building room RD-58 (weste monitor tank and

- pumps) contacted the reach rod handwheel for valve A 1210-U4-048 (RHT#001 drain to rad drain sump).

nis condition limited door travel to approximately 50% and created the possibility of an inadvertent valve actuation. He existing door was mmoved and relocated to the corridor entrance (room RD 60) for the l* a4acent pump rooms, RD 58 and RD-59. His provides one access control point for both rooms.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Cage doors D57 and D58 are not specifically addressed h the FSAR,  !

i but were originally installed to maintain access control into the high radiation areas. Deleting door D58 and relocating door D57 still provide a positive means of controlling access into high radiation areas and fully complies with the plant's radiation protection design enteria. As a result of this change, FSAR figures 9A-1,

, 12.3.1 1 (sheet 1 of 40) and 12.3.1-3 (sheet I of 35) require revision. System function was not altered by this 2

change. Technical Specifbstion 3/4.11 addresses redwaste. De change does not impact any requirement contained within the Technical Specifications.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 91-VI M074, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: FSAR chapter 9B section C.6.C(2) states that all interior valves in the fire water l system are supervised either by being locked in the proper position or electrically supervised. He fue water supply header valves for the unit 2 containment building are locked open per design. De unit I counterpart

t. valves are also locked open. However, design documents indicated poshion control was provided via l electrical supervision. De change implemented by this MDC is a drawing change only, ne existing locked open status for these valves meets the design intent as described in the FSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR chapter 9B section C.6.C describes the requirements for interior i

fire water supply valves. De requirement states that these valves must either be locked open or electrically

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supervised. He change implemented by this MDC was necessary to show the proper method of control (locked open versus electrically supervised) being utilized for the unit I containment building supply valves.

His change conforms to the criteria as stated in the FSAR. FSAR figure 9.5.1-1 (sheet 10 of 13) requires revision as a resuk of the change Fire suppression position control devices are not a part of the Technical Specification.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 92-VAM056, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne diaphragm valve which isolates an RMWST header line from the boric acid i storage tank was replaced with a globe valve designed to be operated more frequently, t-23

SAFETY EVALUATION: No text revision to the FSAR was required as the detail given in the FSAR does not include a description of the suction piping associated with this sampling skid. FSAR section 93 was reviewed for impact. A revision was required to figure 93.4-1 which will be processed through routine FSAR reviews, i

SUBJECT:

MDC 92-VAM079, revision 0, sequence 1.

DESCRFilON: The existing water treatment plant silica analyzer (HACH company model 651-b) ,

- had not proved to be very reliable and was becoming increasingly more difficult to obtain replacement parts.

Based on this informatio 1, the analyzers were replaced with a Scientific Instnaments model CFA series 1000 silica monitor. He replacement model provides increased reliability and performance. De change also alleviated the parts issue associated with the original analyzers.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 9.23 and 103.5 discusses the domineralized water makeup system and water chemistry requirements, respectively. De MDC changed out the type of analyzer only and did not alter the function of the analyzer. His change did not impact any discussion contained in either of the FSAR sections listed above but did require revision to FSAR figure 9.23-1 (sheet 4 of 4) to illustrate the difference in configuration between the two components. he change did not affect system operation nor did it affect the way in which the system is operated. De domineralized water makeup system is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

MDC 92-VIM 119, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: Expanded stainless steel screens were installed over the intemal (floor) basin drains in the main and auxiliary containment coolers to prevent trash, debris and tools from entering the drain system piping and subsequently blocking the flow of condensate to LT17090 and LT17904. Additionally, stainless steel screens were installed at open drain line funnels / cups to also prevent trash from entering the containment drain system.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne containment coolers, preoccess filter units and the containment drain systems are discussed in FSAR sections 6.2.2, containment heat removal systems, and 9.4.6, containment building ventilation systems, ne installation of the drain screens does not affect system operation or operability as discussed in these sections. De systems continue to function as designed. Figures 9.4.6-1,9.4.6-2 (sheet 3 of 3) and 6.2.2 1 were updated to reflect the addition of the screens. De modification does not affect any safety limits, limiting safety system settings, limiting conditions for operation or surveillance requirements associated with these systems

SUBJECT:

MDC 92-VAM140, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: A 40'x80' prefabncated metal building and support slab was erected at a locationjust north of the existing maintenance building. The building is designated as a maintenance storage facility and is being used for storage of bulk materials and temporary equipment. De building is a non safety related structure and contains no permanently installed plant equipment.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR figures 1.2.2-1, sheet 1 of 3 (site plan),1.2.2-1, sheet 2 of 3 (location and orientation of buildings) and 1.2.2-2 (plot plan) required revision to illustra*; te addition of the new maintenance storage facility. De addition of the building and its intended function da i<ot impact operation of the facility or any ofits associated systems. De building has been designed and located so as not to impact any component or system required for safe shutdown of the plant or any fue protection system features.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 92-V2M156, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIFTION: A new fiher was installed to prevent the accumulation ofparticulate on the needle valve seats associated with the seal injection lines.

SAFETY EVALUATION: His was a change to the plant as depicted on FSAR figure 11.4.2 3.

While the unit 2 P & I diagram 2X4DB148 is not an FSAR figure, the unit 1 P & ID IX4DB148 is located as figure 11.4.2-3 in the FSAR. His change to the unit 2 P & ID was not considered to be of such significance l that 2X4 dbl 48 was required to be added to the FSAR as a new figure. Because the design of the auxiliary gas system is not discussed to a level of detail that would point out the existence of an addemaal fiker on unit 2 that does not exist on unit 1, there was no revision necessary to the text of the FSAR. No change to the FSAR, i including sections 3.2.2,9.1.3,9.l.5,9.3.4,9.3.5,9.5.1,11.2.1,11.4.2,12.2.1,12.3.1,14.2.8, was required.

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-V1M017, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne steam generator feed pump turbine lube oil reservoir vapor extractor was maintaining a vacuum in the reservoir in excess of that ra==maadd by General Electric. Reservoir vacuum  ;

was controlled by adjusting the vapor extractor discharge valve which did not allow operation in an acceptable  !

range, his resulted in a loss of few from the reservoirs to the lobe oil conditioning unit. To provide a means l

- of controlling vacuum in the reservoir, a bypass line and valve were installed around the vapor extractor. His allows a controlled recirculation of the vapor extractor discharge, thereby controlling vacuum levels at a desirable value.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 10.4.7, condensate and feedwater system, discusses the operation of the steam generator feed pump turbine lube oil systems, ne adddum of the bypass line and valve provides a means to control vacuum to an acceptable level to ensure the proper operation of the lube oil systems as dermed in the FSAR section. De function of the lube oil system was not impacted Operating procedures have been revised to reflect this new method of controlling vacuum. De change does not impact any function of the feedwater system as defined in Technical Specification 3/4.7, plant systems.

SUBJECT:

MDC 93 VAM021, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: Several louvers associated with the diesel generator building HVAC system have been susceptible to a failure mechanism involving the method of connection between the damper and operating shaft. The existing loose fitting spring-pin has become dislodged on occasion causing the damper to fall. To prevent recurrence of similar events, the current damper mounting scheme has been augmented by welding the louver crank arm to the shaft. Additionally, while maintaining the attributes of the original design,

temperature switches associated with the control of the fans and dampers were replaced with a temperature j switch having a larger deadband in an effort to reduce cycling of the ventilation dampers and actuator and damper wear. He replacement temperature switches are not equipped with the same indication as the origmal switches, but they provide the same function.

SAFETY EVALUATION: he diesel generator building ventilation system is discussed in FSAR section 10.4.7. De augmented mounting scheme does not affect the operational characteristics of the ventilation dampers and therefore does not impact any desenption presented in this section. De replacement temperature switches retain the same attributes as desenbod in this section. Temperature control settings for

. the switches did not change. As stated earlier, the new switches do not provide for local indication. However, l a requirement for such was not dia==M in the FSAR section. He changes did not impact any Technical

, Specification regarding operability requirements of the diesel generators.. j l

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SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VAM057, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: De existing 1500 gallon liquid nitrogen storage tank was replaced with a 6000 gallon tank. De capacity of the nitrogen storage system was insufficient and required maintenance of a rental tube trailer as a backup supply. De new tank contains suitable pressure controls to adapt to the .

present system configuration. De hydrogen storage facility cryogenic system was also abandoned per this MDC, and future hydrogen needs will be met via a portable tube trailer.  ;

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 2.2.3, 3.2.2, and 9.3.5 <lacunaea the auxiliary gas systems which includes the nitrogen and hydrogen systems. Dese sections will be revised to reflect the changes. FSAR figures 6.4.2-2 and 9.3.5-1 sheet 2 also required revision. n,canae the nitrogen and hydrogen systems have no safety design bases, this change does not affect the operation or increase the probability of an accident.

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-V2M070, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: Valves 2-1215-U4-283, which isolates drainage water from the reactor makeup water storage tank (RMWST) trench to the storm drain system, and 2-1215-U4-282, which isolates drainage water from the RMWST trench to the spent fuel pool purification, are located in the RMWST moat. Operation of these valves required the removal of trench grating and entry into this area to manipulate the valves. To remedy this situation, reach rods were installed on each valve to allow manipulation from outside of the pit area.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 9.3.3 describes the function and operation of the reactor i

makeup water storage system. Addition of reach rods to these valves to allow for remote operation did not I

alter the design function of these valves nor did it affect the manner in which the valves are manipulated.

FSAR figure 9.3.3-3 (sheet 10 of I 1) required updating to reflect the addition of the reach rods. He system is not the subject of any Technical Specification.

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VlM071, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: A manually operated isolation valve was installed in the discharge line of each of the main turbine electro-hydraulic control (EHC) fluid high pressure pumps, ne valves were normally open and did not affect the operation of the system. De ball valves were added to eliminate the use of an existing check valve in the discharge line as an isolation boundary during pump maintenance while the unit is at power.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The main turbine and generator are described in FSAR section 10.2. A discussion of the EHC system is contained within this description, ne addition of the valves did not impact system operations as described in this discussion. However, FSAR figure 10.2.2-4 required updating to reflect

. the addition of the valves. He EHC system is not the topic of any Technical Specification.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 93 VAM072, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIFilON: ne original design for the backflushable filter systems specified a programmable logic controller (PLC) so that the systems could be operated in automatic mode. De nitrogen accumulator tank had high and low pressure alarm switches interlocked with a demineralized water isolation valve and a nitrogen supply inlet valve so that the demin. water header would not become contaminated when a backflush occurred. This automatic design function was deleted / abandoned and operated in the manual mode. With the system in manual, the accumulator tank was not filled, which resuhs in a low nitrogen pressure annunciator.

Additionally, the demin. header is kept isolated to prevent contamination under current operating procedures.

De high and low pressure alarms are no longer required and have been abandoned.

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SAFETY EVALUATION: The solid waste management system and components are desenhed in  !

I FSAR section 11.4.' he abandonment of the high and low pressure annunciators does not affect the operation of the backflushable fiher system as discussed in this description. De backflushable fiher system i

continues to operate as designed. The change did require an update to FSAR figure 11.4.2-3. De change does not affect any requirements set forth in the Technical Specifications or the environmental protection plan.

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-V2M077, revision 0, sequence 1 -

DESCRIPTION:' Flow indicating switches associated with the circulating water pump beanng j lubrication and motor cooling from the utility water system have required frequent cleaning and calibration. ,

in addition, setpoints for the ahemas supply from turbine plant cooling water (TPCW) and utility water were  !

set close enough that the alternate supply at times became the source The flow indicating switches and interlocks were removed from the system supply and the TPCW setpoint lowered for a greater span between setpoints.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 10.4.5 addresses the function and operation of the circulating water system. De discussion does not contain any reference to the flow devices or the pressure regulating valves. De change did not require a revision to FSAR figure 10.4.5-1 which will be part of the 18-month update. De circulating water system is not the topic of any Technical Specification System operation was notimpacted by the change.

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-V1M084, revision 0, sequence 1 l

DESCRIPTION: Several modifications west made to the electro-hydraulic control (EHC) hydraulic I power unit to improve the operation and maintainability of the equipment. Differential pressure indicators were added to the high pressure hydraulic pump discharge filters to allow operators to monitor the condition of the filters. De temperature at which the heaters operate to maintain EHC fluid reservoir temperature was increased as a result of a recommendation by the fluid supplier. Additionally, a flow indicator and drain valve  ;

were added to the Fullers earth filter to enhance filter operation. l l

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 10.2 describes the function and operation of the turbine generator including the EllC system. De addition of the drain valve and instruments does not impact the discussion contained within this section. De system continues to be operated as before. De additions required an update to FSAR figure 10.2.2-4. De addition of the instruments and drain valve does not alter the design function of the system nor does it affect the manner in which the system is operated. De EHC system i is not the subject of any Technical Specification.

l SUBJECf: MDC 93-V2M085, revision 0, sequence 1 ,

l DESCRIPTION: Several modifications were made to the electro-hydraulic control (EHC) hydraulic power unit to improve the operation and maintainability of the equipment. Differential pressure indicators were added to the high pressure hydaulic pump discharge fihers to allow operators to monitor the condition of the filters. ne temperature at which the heaters operate to maintain EHC fluid reservoir temperature was increased as a resuk of a recommendation by the fluid supplier. Additionally, a flow indicator and drain valve were added to the Fullers carth filter to enhance filter operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 10.2 describes the function and operation of the t, 5ine generator including the EHC system. He addition of the drain valve and instruments does not impact the

. discussion contained within this section, ne system continues to be operated as before. De additions required an update to FSAR figure 10.2.2-4. De addition of the instruments and drain valve does not alter the l

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design Ametion of the system nor does it affect the manner in which the system is operated. De EHC system is not the subject of any Technical Specification.

SUBJECT:

- MDC 93-V2M091, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: . His MDC provides TPCW cooling water taps, isolation valves and caps located i inside the steam generator blowdown (SGBD) trim heat exchanger room that will eventually provide cooling water for monitors sampling SGBD. A pipe extension and cap has also been added to provide sampling upstream of the condensate domineralizers.

. He TPCW system as described in secten 9.2.11 of the FSAR and SAFETY EVALUATION:

5 figure 9.2.11 1 has been changed in order to reflect the addition of these tap conpardane, ne addition of a pipe extension and cap upstream of the condensate demineralizers has been reflected in FSAR sections 10.4.6

- and figure 10.4.6.6-1. His change did not involve a change to Technical Specifications based on a review of j section 3/4.7 (plant systems) nor to the environmental protection plan.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VAM095, revision 0, sequence 1

DESCRIFI1ON

The existing domineralizer beds were unable to reduce sodium concentrations in the make-up water to newly established levels. In order to attain the desired levels, it was necessary to bring a j vendor supplied domin. vessel with the capability of reducing sodium concentrations to the lower levels. De

$ change implemented by this modification provides the necessary connections including valves to allow the vendor supplied skid to be placed in the existing demineralizer system to assist in reducing sodium concentrations.

l. SAFETY EVALUATION: The domineralized water make-up system is discussed in FSAR section i 9.2.3. The addition of connections to allow a vendor supplied skid to be installed for sodium removal does not affect function or operation of the system as described in this FSAR section. FSAR figure 9.2.3-1 was updated to reflect the addition of these connections. He plant domineralized water make-up system is not addressed by Technical Specifications.

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VAM096, revision 0, sequence 1

$ DESCRIPTION: ne location at which the pressure compensator on the main turbine electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system high pressure hydraulic pumps sense the system pressure was changed, ne original location was at the pump discharge prior to the discharge filters. his location was not acceptable as an increase in filter differential pressure would result in a decrease in overall system pressure. The sensing point J- for pump pressure control was relocated downstream of the discharge filters, thereby allowing pumps to i maintain the system prestwe constant over time compensating for the increase in filter differential pressure i- SAFETY EVALUATION: De turbine generator including the EHC system is described in FSAR sections 10.2. He FSAR does not pmvide specific details for the location of the pressure compensator. De i system continues to be operated as before. System pressure is maintained as discussed in this section. FSAR l figure 10.2.2-4 required updatmg to properly reflect the new location of the pressure transmitter. He main turbine EHC system is not the subject of any Technical Specification

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-V2M102, revision 0, sequence I

!' DESCRIFilON: Several features [ rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) and thimble plug gripper, mast rotation, and stop plate limit switches) associated with the sigma refueling machine were not being used to 5

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I monitor position changes of the respective components. As all insert shuming is performed in the spent fuel pool, the RCCA/ thimble plug gnpper and the stop plate are not required to function as they would during an

incore shume. Additionally, the mast rotation limit switch was not used for mast orientation. De functions associated with these switches have been disabled.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Design, function and operation of the equipment used to perform

refueling operations are diamanad in FSAR section 9.1.4. De ability of the refueling machine to manipulate RCCAsfrPs is specifically addressed Since current plant refueling operations do not involve shuming inserts

, with the refueling machine, the ability to manipulate RCCAsffPs with the sigma machine has been disabled.

Dese components were disabled in such a manner that they may be reconnected in the future ifnecessary.

Accordingly, the FSAR section required updating to reflect the most current configuration of these components. The changes have also been evaluated against refueling accidents described in chapter 15 and were determined to have no impact on the existing evaluations

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VIM 129, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: ne originally installed Leeds and Northrop on-line pH monitors used in the balance of plant sampling system were obsolete. Dealer service was inadequate and replacement parts were unavailable. Additionally, chemistiy sampling requirements changed such that not all of the points that were contained in the original sampling program required continued monitoring Monitoring points associated with caadaa=* pump discharge, feedwater to steam generators and steam generator blowdown were maintained using a more reliable on-line pH probe, while points associated with circulating water, domin. total emuent and main steam from the steam generators were eliminated.

SAFETY EVALUATION: he turbine plant sampling system is discussed in FSAR sections 9.3.2.

De points that are being monitored by the sampling system are listed in table 9.3.2 3. De table required updating to reflect the elimination of these points. De remaining points that are being monitored have been detennined to provide sumcient data to ensure that requirements set forth in FSAR section 10.3.5, water chemistry, are being maintained. De $=mmt on-line pH monitors function in the same manner as those originally installed and therefore do not impact the description contained within these sections nor is there an impact on the function provided by this equipment. .

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VAM130, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne charging pumps located in the CVCS charging pump rooms have a continuous leakoff source which causes the locked closed drain lines associated with the equipment drains to overflow onto the floor, his results in an area contamination problem. In order to rectify this condition, it was determined that the status of the locked closed drain valves be evaluated to permit partial opening of the valves to establish a flowpath for this continuous leakoff to the waste hold up tank. As a result of this evaluation, it was determined that the valves could be opened approximately two tums and that this degree of opening would not adversely impact the negative pressure boundary.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 9.3.3 discusses design, function and operation of the equipment and floor dramage systems. His section sets forth the requimments associated with these systems with relation to the maintainability ofnegative pressure boundaries and the auxiliary building flood retaining rooms, alarms and drains (FRRAD) system. It was determined that partial opening WN valves would not impact the negative pressure boundary, ne FSAR section indicates that rooms housing ESF equipment which are subject to flooding via backflow through the drainage piping should be protected by a normally closed manual valve. De evaluation determined that the effect on the flooding analysis for this room would be insignificant based on the ch-whiLGcs of the restncted flow provided by the partially open valves. His change required updating of this FSAR section to reflect the position of these valves, ne negative pressure boundary required by Tiechnical Specification section 3/4.7.7 has been preserved.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VAMl34, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne existing design of the water treatment plant includes isolation of emuent flow ,

J from the demin, plant to the demin. storage tank (DST) on high conductivity only. Only routine sampling was available to detect if emuent sodium concentrations were above administrative limits. With increased focus on sodium limits, it was determined that an on-line sodium analyzer be installed to provide continuous j monitoring of demin. plant emuent sodium concentrations and an isolation function when levels approach administrative limits.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 9.23 and 103.5 discusses the domineralized water i makeup system and water chemistry requirements, respectively. De addition of an on-line emuent sodium  !

concentration monitor with isolation functions does not impact the discussions contained within these sections  !

nis change enhances chemistry control. De addition of the analyzer required an update to figure 9.23-1 to l illustrate the added component. De demin. water treatment system is not the subject of any Technical  ;

Specification.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 93 VAM136, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: ne no charge alarm on the central alarm station (CAS), secondary alarm station (SAS) and the technical support center (TSC) battery chargers should only actuate on a loss of charger output.

But due to the light loads on these chargers, this alarm stayed illuminated, thereby masking all other alarms.

Deletion of this alarm allows all other inputs to the annunciators to actuate and be addressed by the operators.

Loss of the charger output for these chargers resulted in an undervoltage condition which will be annunciated by the undervoltage relays. De no charge alarm was defeated by adjusting it to zero.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 83.2 (de power systems) was reviewed for impact.

Section 83.2.2 describes the battery charger loss ofoutput alarm commonly referred to as the no charge alarm. Deletion of the no charge alann on the CAS, SAS and TSC battery chargers eliminated the nuisance no charge alarms that are inherent with the current system loads. A loss of output of one of the chcgers would be detected by the undervoltage relays which are set to actuate when the system voltage drops below 125 Vdc.

Operator action is required to place the alternate battery charger into service. Operations procedures have  ;

been revised to reflect these changes. Additionally, the changes required an update of this FSAR section i

SUBJECT:

MDC 93 V1M137, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: Rework of the mechanical seals associated with the crud tank pumps required removing the pump casing drain lines. The lines had to be cut and rewelded each time this evolution was perfoimed. In order to better facilitate this repetitive evolution, flanged connections were added to the drain lines.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne solid waste management system is discussed in FSAR section 11.4.

De addition of flanged connections to pump casing drain lines does not impact the design function or operation as described in this section. De system continues to function as before. Figure 11.4.2-3 required an update to illustrate the new method of connection. De solid waste management is not the subject of any Technical Specification.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VIM 143, revision 0, sequence 1

. DESCRilrflON: At certain flow rates in the nuclear service cooling tower make-up operations, the i- non-operstmg pump had a tendency to rotate backwards as a result of backflow through the non-operstmg pump mini-flow line. In order to prevent this occurrence, check valves were installed in the mini-flow lines associated with the NSCW make-up pumps.

i i SAFETY EVALUATION: De NSCW make up pumps are desenbed in FSAR section 9.2.4, which l addresses the plant make-up well water system. De addition of the check valve in the make-up pump's mini-flow lines does not affect system operation as desenbod in this section. System operation is not impacted as a sesult of this change. De addition of the check valve prevents future damage and excessive wear to the non-j operating pump. ne check valve has been illustrated on FSAR figure 9.2.4-L i

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SUBJECT:

MDC 93-V2M144, revision 0, sequence I a

DESCRIPTION: ne originally installed Leeds and Northrop on-line pH monitors used in the balance

]: of plant sampling system were obsolete. Dealer service was inadequate and replacement parts were i unavailable. Additionally, chemistry sampling requirements changed such that not all of the points that were j . contained in the original sampling program required continued monitoring. Monitoring points associated with condensate pump discharge, feedwater to steam generators and steam generator blowdown were maintained i using a more reliable on-line pH probe, while points associated with circulating water, domin. total effluent and main steam from the steam generators was eliminated.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: The turbine plant sampling system is discussed in FSAR sections 93.2.

De points that are being monitored by the sampling system are listed in table 93.2 3. De table required updating to reficct the elimination of these points. De remaining points that are being monitored have been

determined to provide sufficient data to ensure that requirements set forth in FSAR section 103.5, water

chemistry, are being maintained. De replacement on-line pH monitors function in the same manner as those originally installed and therefore does not impact the description contained within these sections, nor is there an impact on the function provided by this equipment. j I

SUBJECT:

MDC 93-VAM145, revision 0, sequence 1

! DESCRIPTION: De main control board (GMCB) monitor light box (MLB) system's primary function f is to provide an on-offindication of ESF systems or auxiliary support systems status to the operator. Ac group alarm inputs into both the plant annunciator system to alert the operator ofimpendmg trouble of i essential components and to the respective MLB group light display box for visual observation by the l operator, ne original plant design was for a" dark board concept" meaning that MLB windows and plant 1 i annunciator windows should not be illuminated or in alarm status during normal plant operations. Several i

exceptions to this concept have resulted in annunciators being illuminated during normal plant operations.

His inhibits the annunciator from performing its function as it remains on at all times. To eliminate this

! nuisance annunciator, the inputs from various MLB group alarms were defeated. The inputs to the MLBs were not affected.

! SAFETY EVALUATION: ne emergency core cooling system's engirmered safety features operating status indication for pumps and valves are primarily described in FSAR sections 6J.5.5,73.2.1.1.4 and 7.5.5. De deletion of the input into the various QMBC alarms associated with the MLB lights creates no l safety impact since the operator still has the safety related MLB status monitoring system. He existing safety design features necessary to preserve the integrity of the ECCS system was not affected by this change. De change does not impact ECCS system or equipment operability requirements set forth in the Technical Specifications section 3/4.7.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VAM073, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: De boric acid transfer pump suction pressure indicators have a stainless steel diaphragm on their inlet. His internal, relatively rigid, stainless steel diaphragm was not sufficiently sensitive ,

to the low operating pressure found at this system location and subsequently did not allow proper pressure indication to be mechanically transmitted to the indicator's Bourdon tube for accurate indication. To rectify )

this condition, the diaphragm seal has been removed.  ;

3 SAFETY EVALUATION: De chemical and volume control system is desenbod in FSAR section  !

93.4 ai,d depicted on figure 93.4-1 (sheet 7 of 7). De subject diaphys are not addressed in this FSAR section. The change resulted in a more reliable and accurate means ofmonik ring the suction pressure to these pumps which will enhance all operations involving the operation of these pure ps. He system components 4

continue to operate as previously "r'd Although there are several sec%:s of the Technical i

Specifications that address boric acid flow paths and reactivity contrcSA change implemer'.ed on the suction pressure indicators defined by this evaluation did not impact any of these requh uts. ]

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SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VAM077, revision 0, sequence 1 I l

4 DESCRIPTION: ne vacuum degasifier transfer pump discharge relief valve onginally relieved back into the degasifier bottoms (under the liquid space of the degasifier column). Any leakage with the valve was drawn  ;

into this section of the degasifier resulting in out-of-spec dissolved oxygen levels. To alleviate this condition, the discharge relief valve was rerouted to an existing floor drain.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The plant domin. water system is described in FSAR section 9.23 and deoicted on figure 9.23-1. He design function of the safety valve is to prevent overpressure of the discharge p!pir.g in the event the discharge path is lost during pump operation ne location at which the relief valve discharges does not affect operation of the system or afTect the ability of the relief valve to perform its

< intended function, t

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VIM 079, revision 0, sequence 1 l DESCRIPTION: To reduce the probability of experiencing an i==: ==y trip of the main turbine as a result of a momentary reduction of EHC hydraulic pressure, the main turbine trip on low hydraulic fluid l pressure has been delayed until the condition has existed continuously for three seconds. His change was desired because the fluid pressure can, on occasion, and particularly dunng control valve stroke testing, i

apprrach the trip setpoint.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ne main turbine trip on low hydraulic pressure is de en' bed in FSAR i

section 10.2, steam and power conversion. De addition of the three second time delay to the trip circuitry does not require any modification to the FSAR text. However, figure 10.2.2-3, which depicts the logic diagram for the main turbine trip circuitry, required updating, ne main turbine trip and overspeed functions j as stated in the Technical Specifications are not affected by this change.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-V2M080, revision 0, gm I I

DESCRIPTION

To reduce the probability of experiencing an ua.-y trip of the main turbine as a result of a momentary reduction of EHC hydraulic pressure, the main turbine trip on low hydraulic fluid pressure was being delayed until the condition had existed continuously for three seconds nis change was

~ desired because the fluid pressure can, on occasion and particularly during control valve stroke testmg, approach the trip setpoint.

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SAFETY EVALUATION: The main turbine trip on low hydraulic pressure is described in FSAR section 10.2, steam and power conversion. De addition of the three second time delay to the trip circuitry does not require any modification to the FSAR text. However, figure 10.2.2 3, which depicts the logic diagram for the main turbine trip circuitry, required ui A sting. Le main turbine trip and overspeed functions as stated in the Technical Specifications is not affected by this change.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VIM 088, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: De automatic acn= ring of the TSC halon fire supptession system was deleted per this MDC. This change allows the smoke detection feature to still function in the TSC, but prevents an automatic actuation as a result of smoke detection. Only mmm1 actuation of this system remains functional.

SAFETY EVALUATION: his change will require a revision to FSAR section 9.5.1.2.2.11 to r

describe the manual only actuation of the TSC halon system. He TSC halon suppression system is not required by the FSAR.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VAM093, revision 0, sequence I f

[~

DESCRilrflON: ne existing hydrazine analyzers and cells located in the secondary chemistry labs have been replaced by the more reliable polymetron series 50 hydrazme analyzers and cells, i

SAFETY EVALUATION

There will be no change to the plant as described in the FSAR. FSAR figure 9.3.2 3 (drawing 1X4DB171 3) was automatically updated due to a drawing change associated with j this MDC. This change only replaces the existing hydrazine monitors and cells used in the unit I and unit 2

. turbine plant water sampling analyzer and recorder panels. There is no change to the operation or

fimetionality of the new hydrazme cells and analyzers. FSAR sections 1.2.10.7,3.2.2-1,9.3.2,10.3.5, 10.4.7.2.1 and 10.4.10 were reviewed for impact.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VAM101, revision 0, sequence 1 i

DESCRIPTION: ne discharge associated with the demineralized water treatment ,

! facility was routed through a vendor (lonics) skid in order to increase sodium removal efficiency. A vendor sidd " tap" was provided as an inlet to the Ionics skid at an unused flow indicator, AFQI 7s12, and the return from the Ionics skid was at a flanged connection associated with the effluent resin trap A-1409-D4 001-207.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR figure 9.2.3-1 (sh. 4 of 4) is the P & ID associated with the plant demin. water system and includes the depiction of this ducharge line and its associated piping. His P

& ID wu revised to show the modification arxt, as such, the FSAR figure requires revision. Additionally, 1 the text of section 9.2.3.2.2.1 will be changed to reflect this modification No existing design, material or )

], construction standards applicable to the demin. water system were cou,ymudisi by this change.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-V1Mi 11, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: To improve the reliability, operability and maintainability of the main turbine EHC

. system, several modifications were made to the hydraulic power unit. He changes were as follows: 1) 4-additica of a second filter in parallel with each of the existing pump discharge filters complete with isolation valves to allow filter replacement during pump operation,2) replacement of the existing i/2 micron fines filter

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1 downstream of the Fullers earth filter with a one micron absolute filter, and 3) modification of the high filter s dP indicating lights to be illuminated when the filter is clean which will permit Ad-tim of a burned out light 1 bulbin addition to high DP.

, SAFETY EVALUATION: De main turbine EHC system is generally discussed in FSAR section

! 10.2. The level of detail provided in this discussion is such that the changes implemented by this modification did not necessitate a text revision. Figure 10.2.2-4 required revision to depict the added equipment. Operation of the EllC system as described in the FSAR section was not impacted by these changes Operational r procedures required revision to reflect the additional equipment. However, system operation is as before. De i modification does not impact any requirements stated in Technical Specifications concerning the main turbine trip or overspeed functions.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94 VAMi16, revision 0, sequence 1

]

~ DESCRIPTION

ne auxiliary building non-radioactive drain system included floor drains that were i either plugged or equipped with normally closed valves in the drain lines to maintain the integrity of the

. auxiliary building negative pressure boundary, in order to provide miscellaneous drainage under normal plant j operations, several rooms that are subject to collecting leakage from equipment sources have been provided with a one-inch diameter hole in the drain plug to allow restricted drainage without a loss ofintegrity of the 4

negative pressure boundary.

I SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR section 9.3.3 discusses design, function and operation of the

. equipment and floor drainage systems. De section sets forth the requirements associated with negative

! pressure boundaries and flood retaining rooms. %e addition of one inch holes in the drain plugs for auxiliary i building rooms r-d01/r-d74 (spray additive tank room) and r-dO6/r-d75 [componer.1 cooling water (CCW)

) drain tank and pump room] does not adversely affect the integrity of the negative pressure boundary. De auxiliary building rooms in the negative pressure bounday are not balanced to a specific negative pressure with the exception of the piping penetration area filtration & exhaust system (PPAFES) 1561 filter unit rooms )

which are maintained at a negative pressure of 1/4" wg. The change did not increase the air leakage through I the negative pressure boundary or result in a bypass of the PPAFES. Additionally, the subject rooms do not I house any ECCS recirculation components that could leak into the drains and bypass the area served by the i PPAFES. De postulated flood will not be increased as a result of the chmige. FSAR figure 9.3.3-3, sheet 2 of I 11 required updating to reflect the addition of the holes in the drain plugs. De negative pressure boundary required by Technical Specification section 3/4.7.7 was preserved.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VAM12v, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIIFTION: De response of the waste gas recombiner to a high temperature

! condition in the catalyst bed was to limit O2 addition, but allow waste gas flow, his change termmated I waste gas flow and O2 addition on a high temperature condition.

SAFETY EVALUATION

FSAR section 11.3.2.2.2 lists the automatic responses of the waste gas

recombiner. Item I will change to reflect the new response of the waste gas recombiner to a catalyst bed i

, high temperature condition. This change further limits the quantity of explosive gases in the system durmg 1 abnormal operations.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-V1M122, revision 0, sequence ! '

DESCRIPTION: Oxygen ingress in PWR generators can increase the electrochemical potential (ECP) of tubing materials thereby increasing the tendency ofintergranular attek/ stress corrosion cracking (IGA / SCC) in acidic or basic crevices. It is therefore desirable to directly monitor tubing ECP in crevice regions where corrosion occurs to assure ECP remains very low. Since it was not feasible to install ECP 34

electrodes in steam generators, it was detennined that feedwater responded similarly to ' changes in feedwater

, oxidant and redundant concentrations With this in mind, appropriate connection points for a single supply

and return of feedwater were provided to support the future ECP monitoring system.

SAFE 1'lEVALUATION: The feedwater and condensate system is described in FSAR section 10.4.7 and depicted on figure 10.4.1. The addition ofconnections to the feedwater system to support installation of an ECP monitoring system does not impact the discussion contained within the description but

required updatmg of this figure. The change does not affect the method by which the condensate and j feedwater system is operated. Once the ECP monitoring system was installed, a negligible amount of feedwater has to be removed from the system, monitored and returned back into the system. The addition of

}

the connections does not impact any feedwater system function as defined in section 3/4.7 of the Technical Specifications

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VAM123, revision 0, sequence 1 4

! DESCRIPTION: The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbines were originally provided with l redundant overspeed trips, with the electrical trip set lower than the mechanical trip. The original concept of l using two trips was that the electrical trip, which does not require local operator action to reset, would trip the turbine before the mechanical trip occurred. Industry operating experience indicates that most trips occur

j. upon turbine startup when acceleration is rapid and that the electncal trip does not occur fast enough to prevent operation of the mechanical trip device. By eliminating this redundant trip, the reliability of the i system was improved. The annunciator indicating an overspeed condition has been retained as a waming to i the potential for an overspeed condition.

)

SAFETY EVALUATION: The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine is described in FSAR sections 7.3.7,10.4.9 and 10a. The FSAR text does not describe the overspeed trips of the turbine drive pump, and therefore did not require revision. FSAR figure 7.3.7 1 (sheet 5 of 12) which depicts the turbine logic required updatmg to reflect these changes. The elimination of the electrical overspeed trip has been reflected in plant operating procedures. The system continues to perform its intended function. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine operability required by Technical Specifications is not affected by the elimination of the overspeed trip.

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VAM130, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: With the current technology of electronic direct readmg dosimeters (EDRDs) and the health physics coverage that is =miatala~l during evolutions that could create a high alarm )

from these area monitors, there is no need for the *=*ian/ alarm in containment, and thus, the local j indicator and alarm associated with RE-0002 and RE-0003 have been deleted. The leads for each of the j affected indicators and alarms were lifted and removed at the appropnate outside containment points.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR sections 3.11.N.1,12.3.4.1.3,12.3.4.1.5,12.3.4.1.9, and 12.5.3.2.5 will require revision to delete reference to local alarms and hviratina associated with RE 0002  !

and RE-0003. FSAR sections 12.1.3 and 12.5.3.6 will be revised to discuss the alarming function of the EDRD. FSAR figure 9.4.6-2 (IX4DB213-2) was changed as part of the normal update process.

1

SUBJECT:

MDC 94-V2M135, revision 0, sequence 1

' DESCRIPTION: To improve the reliability, operability and maintainability of the main turbine EHC 1 system, several modifications were made to the hydraulic power unit. The changes were as follows: 1) addition of a second Alter in parallel with each of the existing pump discharge filters complete with isolation valves to allow filter replacement during pump operation,2) replacement of the existing 1/2 micron fines filter downstream of the Fullers earth fiker with a one micron absolute fiher, and 3) modification of the high filter l

35

dP indicating lights to be illuminated when the filter is clean which will permit detection of a burned out light j bulb in addition to high DP.'

3 SAFETY EVALUATION: ne main tuibine EHC system is generally discussed in FSAR section 4

10.2. The level of detail provided in this discussion is such that the changes implemented by this modification 3

do not necessitate a text revision. Figure 10.2.2-4 required revision to depict the added equipment. Operation j 4

of the EHC systam as described in the FSAR section is not impacted by these changes. Operational l i procedures require revision to reflect the additional equipment. However, system operation is as before. The i modification does not impact any requirements stated in Technical Specifications concerning the main turbine 1

trip or overspeed functions.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 94-V2M145, revision 0, sequence 1 DESCRIPTION: The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump turbine was supplied with  ;

2 two devices to locally indicate the exhaust pressure inside the turbine, a pressure indicator and a small spring l

loaded valve. De pressure indicator, mounted on the local control panel, has a range of 0 -to 15 psig. De i

valve, which discharges steam into the turbine room as an indication of excess pressure opens at ]

approximately 22 psig. Since the turbine exhaust is piped to atmosphere without any isolation valves, the  ;

exhaust pressure is only a function of the steam flow and piping restriction. The exhaust pressure has been ati=*ad o be t above 15 psig and less than the sentinel valve settmg when the turbme is operated at full speed l injecting to the steam generators at full power, his exceeds the pressure gauge range and results in the

frequent opening of the sentinel valve spraying water / steam into the room. This condition is not desirable, j With this change, the sentinel valve was removed and the pressure gauge was replaced with a 0 to 60 psig gauge.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine is discussed in FSAR sections 7.3.7,10.4.9 and 10a. The range of the pressure indicator is not provided and therefore did not necessitate a text revision. Figure 10.4.91 (sheet 2 of 2) required revision to depict the deleted sentinel valve.

Operation of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine as described in the FSAR section is not

impacted by these changes. Operational procedures required revision to reflect the changes associated with this modification. However, system operation is as before. The modification does not impact any requirements stated in Technical Specifications conceming the TDAFW pump tuibine operability.

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SUBJECT:

MDC 94-VIM 161, revision 0, sequence i DESCRIPTION: Mechanical seals installed on the TPCW pumps were expenencing shoit service lives.

A modification had already been implemented to improve the cleanliness of the water at the seal face.

Additionally, a change in the valve alignment improved pressure in the seal housing well above process pressure. Following implementation of a change to increase flow to the circulating water pumps, it was again

, noted that seal injection pressure was again below process pressure. nrough investigation it was observed that the branch line to the TPCW pumps from the utility water system was located downstream of the strainer in the supply line. It was determined that this, coupled with the increased flow to the circulating water pumps, hindered flow to the TPCW pump seals. The location of the branch connection to the TPCW pumps was relocated to upstream of the strainer which increased supply pressure to the TPCW seals to an acceptable value.

SAFETY EVALUAT10N: Changing the turbine plant cooling water system is described in FSAR 4 section 9.2.11. The circulating water system is described in FSAR section 10.4.5. He utility water system is not specifically addressed in the FSAR. The discussions contained within these sections do not address the location of the branch line in relation to the strainer. FSAR figure 10.4.5-1 required updating to reflect the e current system configuration The utility water system, the turbine plant cooling water system and the 36 4

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. circulating water symem are not a#ected by this change. 'Ihe symems affected by this change are not the subject of any Technical Specification.

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l 10 CFR 50.59(B) REPORT OF TESTS & EXPERIMENTS.

OCTOBER 21,1993 THRU MARCH 31,1995 l i

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\ l l VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT l UNITS 1 & 2 I

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SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST-(T-ENG 94-08) unit 1 DESCRIPTION: De test required the removal of the internals of the safety injection (SI) pump suction check valve 1-1204.U6-090 to allow reverse flow through the SI suction line, ne interlocks for valve 1 HV 8804B were temporarily defeated to allow the valve to be opened to provide flow to the tested valves from RHR Tra!n B. His test was required to coordinate dynamic (flow and pressure) testing as required by the NRC Generic Letter 89 10 program, ne testing modified the plant and manipulated j components as necessary to simulate design basis pressures and flows.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This procedure reqaired the removal of the internals of the SI pump suction check valve 1-1204-06-090, and the temporary bypassing of the interlocks of valve 1-HV-8804B j and was therefore considered a test not described in FSAR. His change to the plant was shown in FSAR '

figure 6.3.2-1, sheet 4 of 4, and the description of the ECCS valve interlocks described in FSAR section 7.6.2. Due to the temporary nature of this change, no change to the FSAR was warranted. This was based  ;

on a review of FSAR sections 3.0,4.0,5.4.7,6.3,7.3,7.6,15.0, and 16.0.  !

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST-(T-ENG-94-17) unit 1 DESCRIPTION: De test required the removal of the internals of the SI pump suction check valve l-1204-U6-090 to allow reverse flow through the SI suction line. He interlocks for valve 1-HV-8804A were temporarily defeated to allow the valve to be opened to provide flow to the tested valves from RHR Train A. His test was required to coordinate dynamic (flow and pressure) testing as required by the NRC Generic Letter 89-10 program. The testing modified the plant and manipulated components as necessary to simulate design basis pressures and flows.

SAFETY EVALUATION: nis procedure required the removal of the internals of the SI pump j suction check valve 1 1204-U6-090, and the temporary bypassing of the interlocks of valve 1-HV-8804 A i

and was therefore considered a test not described in FSAR. His change to the plant was shown in FSAR ,

- figure 6.3.2 1, sheet 4 of 4, and the description of the ECCS valve interlocks described in FSAR section  ;

7.6.2. Due to the temporary nature of this change, no change to the FSAR was warranted. This was based on a review of FSAR sections 3.0,4.0,5.4.7,6.3,7.3,7.6,15.0, and 16.0.  !

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST-(T ENG-94 23) unit I

DESCRIPTION

his special test provided the functional test instructions for Train A of DCP 93-VIN 0061. This test provided the instructions to functionally test an additional standby ofTsite power source

and the parallel transfer capability for the class IE 4160v buses between offsite sources. During this test, )

the interlocks between the normal and alternate sources for switchgear I AA02 were defeated requiring i both breakers to remain closed. His allowed phasing verification between RAT 1 A, RAT IB, and the  !

SAT at disconnect switches A4211 and A4213.

J SAFETY EVALUATION: nis special test was considered to be a test not described in the FSAR

, because the interlocks between the normal and attemate sources for switchgear I AA02 were defeated,

allowing both breakers to remain closed. His was an abnormal configuration, and was only done to allow phasing verification between RAT 1 A, RAT IB, and the SAT. De test also required bus l AA02 to be unloaded and considered out of service. However, if there were a fault on bus I AA02 or disconnect

. switches A4211 or A4213 during that time, the normal bus protection was in service and would have

)

isolated bus I AA02 and disconnect switches A4211 and A4213 from RAT IB. This was based on a review of FSAR sections 1.9, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 9.3.

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SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST-(T-ENG-94-24) unit 1 DESCRIPTION: This special test provided the functional test instructions for Train B of DCP 93-VIN 0061. His test provided the instructions to functionally test an additional standby offsite power source

and the parallel transfer capability for the class IE 4160v buses between offsite sources. During this test, .

l the interlocks between the normal and alternate sources for switchgear IBA03 were defeated requiring i both breakers to remain closed. This allowed phasing verification between RAT I A, RAT IB, and the SAT at disconnect switches A4221 and A4223.

l l SAFETY EVALUATION: his special test was considered to be a test not described in the FSAR i because the interlocks between the normal and alternate sources for switchgear IBA03 were defeated, i allowing both breakers to remain closed. His was an abnormal configuration, and was only done to allow

phasing verification between RAT I A, RAT IB, and the SAT. He test also required bus IBA03 to be

! unloaded and considered out of service. However, if there were a fault on bus IBA03 or disconnect switches A4221 or A4223 during that time, the normal bus protection was in service, and would have isolated bus IBA03 and disconnect switches A4221 and A4223 from RAT 1 A. His was based on a review of FSAR sections 1.9,8.1,8.2,8.3, and 9.3.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST-(T-ENG-95-0l) unit 2 1

l DESCRIPTION: This special test provided the functional test instructions for Train A of DCP 93-V2N0062. His test provided the instructions to functionally test an additional standby offsite power source and the parallel transfer capability for the class IE 4160V buses between offsite sources During this test, i the interlocks between the normal and alternate sources for switchgear 2AA02 were defeated requiring l both breakers to remain closed, nis allowed phasing verification between RAT 2A, RAT 2B, and the SAT at disconnect switches A4231 and A4233. l i

SAFETY EVALUATION: his special test was considered to be a test not described in the FSAR because the interlocks between the normal and alternate sources for switchgear 2AA02 were defeated, i allowing both breakers to remain closed. His was an abnormal configuration and was only done to allow phasing verification between RAT 2A, RAT 2B, and the SAT. He test also required bus 2AA02 to be ,

, unloaded and considered out of service. However, if there were a fault on bus 2AA02 or disconnect switches A4231 or A4233 during that time, the normal bus protection was in service, and would have isolated bus 2AA02 and disconnect switches A4231 and A4233 from RAT 2B His was based on a l review of FSAR sections 1.9,8.1,8.2,8.3, and 9.3.

i

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST-(T.ENG-95-02) unit 2 DESCRIPTION: This special test provided the functional test instructions for Train B of DCP 93- l V2N0062. His test provided the instructions to functionally test an additional standby offsite power source and the parallel transfer capability for the class IE 4160V buses between offsite sources. During this test, the interlocks between the normal and alternate sources for switchgear 2BA03 were defeated requiring both breakers to remain closed, nis allowed phasing verification between RAT 2A, RAT 2B, and the SAT at disconnect switches A4241 and A4243.

, SAFETY EVALUATION: This special test was considered to be a test not described in the FSAR because the interlocks between the normal and alternate sources for switchgear 2BA03 were defeated, allowing both breakers to remain closed. His was an abnormal configuration, and was only done to allow phasing verification between RAT 2A, RAT 2B, and the SAT. De test also required bus 2BA03 to be

- unloaded and considered out of service. However, if there were a fault on bus 2BA03 or disconnect switches A4241 or A4243 during that time, the normal bus protection was in service, and would have l l

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