ML20065L486

10CFR50.59(b) Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments 920601-931022 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 & 2

ML20065L486
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Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/22/1993
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
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Download: ML20065L486 (182)

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{{#Wiki_filter:.. . .. 10 CFR 50.59(B) REPORT OF FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS & EXPERIMENTS. JUNE 1~,1992 THRU OCTOBER 22,1993 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 1 I DR ADO K O 000 24 l R PDR

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SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrrlON: THIS DCP INSTALLED PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION MONITORS, ACCESS CONTROL TERMINALS AND A ELECTRONIC POCKET DOSIMETER SYSTEM IN ROOMS 180 AND 141. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS MODIFICATION Wii.L IELP PREVENT THE SPREAD OF , CONTAMINATION. TIE EQUIPMENT ADDED IS NON-3AFETY RELATED. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR TIIE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS SPECIFIED IN Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRilrTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM 123 FOR liEALTil PHYSICS USE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGES MADE UNDER THIS DCP DID NOT INVOLVE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT DECREASE TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS SET FORTH IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DID NOT EFFECT ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AS SET FORTH IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0073, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TlilS DCP IMPLEMENTED 9 WESTINGHOUSE RECOMMENDATIONS, PRESENTED AS FCN'S, TO THE WASTE EVAPORATOR PACKAGE. THESE CHANGES IMPROVED TIIE RELIABILITY AND OPERABILITY OF THE WASTE EVAPORATOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE WASTE EVAPORATOR PACKAGE IS NOT A SAFETY RELATED PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, MODIFICATIONS TO THE WASTE EVAPORATOR PACKAGE NO NOT IMPACT ANY SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS SINCE TIE EQUIPMENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT, NOR IS IT REQUIRED TO BluNG THE PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION. TIE WASTE EVAPORATOR IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PER A REVIEW OF SEC110NS 3/4.7,3/4.11 AND 3/4.12.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0098, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: tills DCP CHANGED TIE PRESSURE GAUGE AND REMOTE DIAPHRAGM ASSEMBLY FOR THE BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER CRUD TANK LEVEL INDICATOR. THIS PROVIDES THE CORRECT RANGE FOR CRUD TANK PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE DETERMINATION AND BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER CRUD TANK LEVEL SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills CHANGE ALLOWS TIE SYSTEM TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED TIIEREBY COMPLYING WITH DESIGN AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS PER FSAR SECTION 11.4.2.3.2. 'IIIIS CHANGE HAS 'NO EFFECT ON ACCIDENTS AS DESCRIBED IN T1E FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0098, kEVISION O, SEQUENCE 2 1

DESCRIPTION: Tills CHANGE PROVIDED LOCAL INDICATION OF CRUD TANK LEVEL PRIOR )- TO STARTING THE CRUD TANK PUMP. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE HAS l'O AFFECT ON ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR SECTION I1.4.2, FSAR SECTION 15 AND 16. THIS ALLOWS THE SYSTEM PER DESIGN INTENT. TllERE BY COMPLYING WITH DESIGN AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS. THIS MODIFICATION HAS NO EFFECT ON EQUIPMENT USED IN THE FSAR ANALYSIS. FSAR SECTION 1.5 AND 16 ARE NOT EFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. BY INCREASING TIE RELIABILITY OF THE CRUD TANK LEVEL INDICATION TIE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCrlON NOT DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR IS DECREASED. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS SET FO.RTH IN ANY TECllNICAL BASES.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0135, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE i DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP INSTALL ACOUSTICAL PANEL IN CAS TO HELP MEET THE HVAC SOUND LEVEL REQUIREMENTS. THIS DCP CONTAINS S AFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. > IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR Tile PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. TIE M ARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0141. REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1,2, & 3 DESCRIPTION: PESB UPGPADE DCP WlIICH ADDED TURNSTILES AT PESB TO ELIMINATE TAILGATING AND PROVIDED CONTROLLED ACCESS INTO THE PROTECTED AREA. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMNTION. ~ I IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, ) SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN l I ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY IIAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 87-V1E0287. REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrrION: THIS DCP PROVIDES RE-ROUTING OF PIPE (LINE NO. 1-1225-003) DOWN STREAM OF NEUTRALIZING SUMP l-1225-F4-001 TO KEEP CONDUCTIVITY ELEMENT ICE-1749 CONTD4UOUSLY SUBMERGED. BY SUBMERGING THE ELEMENT IN A 6" PIPE, FILLED WITH WATER, THE NUISANCE ALARM WILL NOT COME IN. TIE LOW ALARM COMES IN l ONLY WHEN TIE ELEMENT IS DRY; WIIICH INDICATES THAT THE PIPE SHOULD BE FILLED l WITil WATER. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DCP INVOLVES NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPNENT. TilESE CHANGES ENHANCED TIE PERFORMANCE OF NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY SYSTEM, POSTULATED TO FUNCrlON IN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. FAILURE OF THE DRAIN SYSTEM WILL NOT INITIATE OR CONTRIBUTE TO TIE FAILURE OF SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED IN TIE FSAR. 2 1

l Tile DCP PROVIDES FOR CHANGES TO NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT / SYSTEM WHICH ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION THEREFORE, THERE IS NO REDUCTION IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED OR INFERRED BY THE BASES OF 'l ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87. VIE 0290, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRII'FION: PERIMETER GRAVEL UPGRADE, REVISE MICROWAVE, RESOLVE GLARE PROBLEMS, AND INSTALL CLIMB DETERRENT. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS i INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. l IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN l DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN TIE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIE 0361, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED MICRO SWITCHES ON CERTAIN SECURITY DOORS.  ; TIIIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. ] SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. 'l l DCP: 87-VIN 0420, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 -l

SUBJECT:

DESCRIITION: THIS CHANGE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE PORTION OF TIIE 1301 SYSTEM ANALYZED IN STRESS CALC NO. X4CP-7151 A. THE SPECIFIC LINES AFFECTED BY Tills DCP ARE FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR WET LAY-UP PORTION OF Tile MAIN STEAM SYSTEM. THIS DESIGN CllANGE WAS LIMITED TO MODIFICATIONS OF PIPE SUPPORTS ONLY AND DID NOT CHANGE PIPE ROUTING, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS. SAlEFY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPER ATION AND THEREFORE DID Not AFFECT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY i OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MAIN STEAM ACCIDENT AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY l MARGIN DEFINED BY TECli SPEC 3/4.7,3/4.7.8. TIE LIST OF SNUBBERS REFERRED TO IN THE BASES OF TECH SPEC 3/4.7.8 WILL CHANGE, BUT Tim MARGIN OF SAFETY IS NOT I AFFECTED. THIS IS BASED ON REVEWS OF FSAR SECTIONS 15.1 AND 15.2.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIN 0456, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 > DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALL A PERMANENT CATWALK STRUCTURE AND ASSOCIATED LADDERS BETWEEN AFW PUMP llOUSE SUMP PUMP ROOM 104 AND AFW PUMP HOUSE ROOM 105 ON UNIT 1 TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO ROOM 105 DURING 3

EMERGENCY AND NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS. THIS DESIGN ALSO IMPROVED THE SAFETY OF THE PREVIOUS LADDERS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ACCIDENTS POSTULATED IN FSAR SECTIONS 9.4.8, 10.4.9,15, AND APP.10A ARE NOT AFFECTED BY TIE ADDITION OF THE CATWALK STRUCTURE AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY ANALYZED IN THE FSAR FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION. TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.4.7 IS NOT AFFECTED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87. VIN 0467, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTION: UPGRADES TO MAIN PESB, EAST-SIDE ROOM BY ADDING A THIRD ENTRANCE SCREENING LANE. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP COtRAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, 1 SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-V1N0467, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 3 DESCRIPTION: UPGRADES TO MAIN PESB, BARRIER WALL INSTALLATION, INSTALL A NEW CAMERA, RELOCATE MICROWAVE TRANSMrITERS AND RECEIVERS, DELETE MICROWAVE TRANSCEIVER, AND REWORK RESTROOMS. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE TrlE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VIN 0467, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 4 DESCRIPTION: UPGRADES TO MAIN PESB, MODIFY MAIN ENTRANCE GATE X-RAY EQUIPMENT TlHS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VCE0250, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 4

r 1

                                                                                    ~l l

DESCRIlrTION: Tills DCP MODIFIED THE POTABLE WATER CHLORINATION SKID TO USE

. SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE RATIER THAN CIILORINE GAS FOR WATER PURIFICATION.

BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREhENTS FOR CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION ALL MAJOR SOURCES OF CHLORINE GAS WERE REMOVED FROM SITE. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 15 DOES NOT DISCUSS ACCIDENTS i INVOLVING THE CHLORINE SYSTEM. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN TIE CHEMICAL l l EVALUATIONS IN SECTION 2. 2 OF TIIE FSAR OR HABITABILITY SYSTEMS OF SECTION 6.4. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE TECH SPEC BASIS PER A REVIEW OF ' SECTION B3/4.3.3.7 AND 3/4.3-3.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 87-VCE0304, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 ) l DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE ADDRESSED THE INSTALLATION OF PIPING, VALVES, AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH ALLOW TIE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER l

                                                                                    ~J SYSTEM TO SUPPLY SEAL AND COOLING WATER TO THE UNIT 1 CIRCULATING WATER              '

PUMPS AND MOTORS AS A BACKUP SUPPLY IN THE EVENT UTILITY WATER IS NOT AVAILABLE. SEQUENCE 1 OF THE DCP ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF PIPING FROM TIE DISCHARGE OF TPCW PUMP l-1405-P4-501 TO TIE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE ON THE NEW LINE. IT ALSO COVERED MODIFICATIONS TO UTILITY WATER LINE l-2419-543-2" AND l THE NEW LINE WHICH TAPS INTO $43 UP TO TIE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE. THESE LINES WERE INSTALLED DURING A PLANT OUTAGE AND WERE CAPPED OFF. SEQUENCE 2 , OF TIE DCP REMOVED TIE CAPS AND JOINED THE TWO NEW LINES TO FORM ONE NEW ] LINE. TIE NEW PIPING IS LOCATED AT THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP STRUCTURE. i

                                                                                    -)

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS WAS PERFORMED ON NON SAFETY RELATED ) SYSTEMS, PROJECT CLASS 626. THE CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT AREAS COVERED IN THE l TECH. SPECS. INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.7, " TURBINE CYCLE."

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VIN 0037, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1 l DESCR!!7 TION: THIS DCP RE-CONFIGURES THE HIGH PRESSURE (REFERENCE LEG) SENSING l LINE FOR INSTRUMENTS ILT-461, ILT-462, IPT-457, AND IPT-458. THIS CHANGE CORRECTS LEAKAGE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS LEG AND PROVIDES A NEW CONDENSATE I POT ASSEMBLY WHICH REFILLS Tim REFERENCE LEG BETTER DURING POWER l OPERATIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile TRANSMITTERS RESPOND IDENTICALLY TO THEIR PREVIOUS RESPONSE SINCE T!E DESIGN CHANGE THUS TIIERE IS NO IMPACT ON TIE  ; ACCIDENT ANALYSES IN SECT.ON 15 AND 7.3.1 OF TIE FSAR. I

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VIN 0042, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: INVERTERS A-1807-Y3-SAS110, A-1807-Y3-CASil1 AND A-1807-Y3-CASil2 HAVE NEW STATIC TRANSFER SWITCHES ADDED TO TilEIR SCHEhE OF OPERATION. ALSO A NEW MAKE-BEFORE-BREAK MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCll REPLACED THE PREVIOUS BREAK-BEFORE-MAKE TRANSFER SWITCH IN EACH OF THESE INVERTERS. INCLUDED IN TIESE SWITCil ADDITIONS ARE SYNCHRONIZING CIRCUITS. ALL ADDITIONS AND REPLACEMENTS IS WITHIN TIE INVERTER CABINETS. THE PLANT ENTRY SECURITY BUILDING (PESB) BATTERY CllARGER ROOM EXHAUST FAN 5

(A-1583-B7-005) HAD ITS BLADE SETTING CHANGED TO INCREASE Tile FAN - CAPACITY FROM 3,500 CFM TO 3,800 CFM. THE SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY WAS - MADE MORE RELIABLE BY PROVIDING A NO-BREAK AUTOMATIC TRANSFER TO BYPASS POWER UPON LOSS OF INVERT ER OUTPUT AND TO ALLOW THE INVERTER TO BE SHUT DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE OR CALIBRATION BY PROVIDING A NO-BREAK MANUAL TRANSFER TO BYPASS POWER. TIE PESB BATTERY CHARGER ROOM EXHAUST FAN BLADE SETTING CHANGE INCREASES FLOW RATE FOR PROPER DISSIPATION OF HEAT GAIN DUE TO TIE ADDITION OF TIE STATIC TRANSFER SWITCII. SAFETY EVALUATION: A DESCRIITION OF THE PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM IS NOT PROVIDED IN TIE FSAR BUT IS DESCRIBED IN A SEPARATE DOCUMENT WlilCH IS CLASSIFIED AS " SAFEGUARDS" MATERIAL. REPLACEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS TRANSFER SWITCHES IN THE NON-lE SECURITY INVERTERS WITi{ STATIC TRANSFER AND MAKE-BEFORE BREAK MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCHES ENHANCED THE SECURITY POWER SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE AND OPERATION. OPERATION OF TIIE ON-SITE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS NOT AFFECTED. TifESE NEW SWITCilES ARE INSTALLED WITIIIN TIE EXISTING INVERTER CABINETS SO TIIE PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT OF TIE PLANT WAS NOT CIIANGED. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PESB BATTERY CHARGER ROOM llVAC IS NOT PROVIDED IN THE FSAR. THE EXilAUST FAN IN TIIIS ROOM HAD ITS BLADE SETTING CHANGED TO INCREASE AIR FLOW TO IIANDLE THE IIEAT GAIN ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADDITION OF TIIE STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH. HIE ONLY EFFECT IS INCREASED EXHAUST AIR FLOW. PREVIOUS AIR FLOW IN THE CONTROL BUILDING INVERTER ROOM IS ADEQUATE TO HANDLE DIE ADDITIONAL IIEAT LOAD OF ADDING STATIC TRAD iER SWITCHES. THE INVERTERS AND EXHAUST FAN DO NOT PROVIDE A PRIMAliY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION WHICH IS RELIED UPON TO BRING TIE PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION OR TO MITIGATE THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO TIE ATMOSPIERE. ALL EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN THE CONTROL BUILDING INVERTER ROOM IS SEISMIC CATEGORY 2. ADDITION OF STATIC SWITCil AND REPLACEMENT OF MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCH INSIDE EACH INVERTER DID NOT HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT CllANGE TO TIE OVERALL WEIGilT OF TFE INVERTER. THERE ARE NO FAILURE MODES OF THE SWITCIES OR ANY FAILURE MODES ASSOCIATED WITH CHANGING Tile EXHAUST FAN BLADE SETTING Til AT CAN LEAD TO ACCIDENTS. TilERE IS NO MARGIN OF SAFETY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SECURITY SYSTEM OR THE PESB BATTERY CHARGER ROOM EXHAUST FAN.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 88-VIN 0058, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS FILTER IIOLDER WITH A 110LDER THAT ALLOWS FOR USE OF A QUICK-DISCONNECT FITrlNG, ELIMINATING POSSIBLE AIR  ! LEAKAGE AND INSTALLATION / REMOVAL PROBLEMS WITH TIE PASSIVE SAMPLE FILTER IIOLDER. A FLEX 1BLE METAL llOSE IS PART OF Tills INSTALLATION TO ALLOW MOVEMENT WHILE CIIANGING Tile FILTER MEDIUM. ALSO A FLOW TOTALIZER WAS ADDFD TO IEDUCE ANY ERROR IN THE WEEKLY SAMPLE ANALYSIS BY PROVIDING MEA NS OF RECORDING ACTUAL TOTAL FLOW THRU TIE SKID VERSUS ESTIMATING TOT AL FLOW. THIS INCREASED THE ACCURACY OF THE SAMPLE ANALYSIS. SAT ETY EVALUATION: THERE WAS NO CilANGE TO ANY PROBABILITY OF OC CURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF ANY CHAPTER 15 ACCIDENT. THE DESIGN DID NOT A"FECT ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS OF ANY RADIATION MONITORS. THIS i CfIANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY EQUIPMENT ASSUMED TO l F UNCTION IN Tile FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THE FLEXilOSE DID NOT AFFECT THE i 6 )

PLATEOUT OF IODINE AND PARTICULATES IN THE SAMPL.E LINE SINCE IT IS LOCATED DOWNSTREAM FROM THE SAMPLE FILTERS. THIS REVIEW INCLUDED FSAR CHAPTER 9.4.3, 9.4.6,9.4.9,11.5,15. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY MALFUNCTION NOT ALREADY ANALYZED IN TIE FSAR. THIS INCLUDED A REVIEW OF CHAPTER 7,9, AND 15. TIIERE ARE NO CHANGES IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TIE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.3.2 3/4.3.3 3/4.11.2

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VIN 0076, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrrlON: THIS DCP DELETED THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE AUTO CLOSURE INTERLOCK (ACI) AND REPLACED IT WITH A CONTROL ROOM ALARM. IN ADDITION THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE OPEN PERMISSIVE INTERLOCK (OPI) PRESSURE SETPOINT WERE REDUCED FROM 377 PSIG TO 365 PSIO. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE RHR ACI FEATURE ENSURES THAT TIE RilR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES ARE FULLY CLOSED WHEN THE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE TIE INTERLOCK SET POINT. WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT TIE REPLACEMENT OF TIE ACI FEATURE WITH TIE COMBINATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM ALARM AND REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ENSURE THAT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS BE TAKEN BY THE OPERATORS SO THAT TIE RHR IS ISOLATED FR.OM TIE RCS WHEN THE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE TIE ALARM SET POINT. (THE INTERLOCK PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF TIE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES ON HIGH RCS PRESSURE, HOWEVER, RAPID OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION OF THE RHR SYSTEM IS AND ARE PROVIDED BY THE RHR SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES AND NOT BY THE SLOW ACTING SUCFION ISOLATION VALVES.) THIS COMBINATION RESULTS IN A REDUCED PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE (WCAP-12927). THE OPI SET POINT PREVENTS TIE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES FROM BEING OPENED WHILE TIE RCS PRESSURE IS POTENTIALLY ABOVE THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE RHR SYSTEM. TIE REDUCED OPI SET POINT FURTIER MINIMIZES THE POTENTIAL OF OPENING TIE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES WHILE TIE RCS PRESSURE IS ABOVE THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF TIE RHR SYSTEM. THE REMOVAL OF THE RHR ACI FEATURE AND TIE REDUCTION IN THE OPI  : SET PCINT W NOT RESULT IN A CONDITION WHERE THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, AND I CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS THAT WERE APPLICABLE PRIOR TO THE CHANGE ARE ALTERED. IN ADDITION, THE SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF TIE RHR SYSTEM HAVE NOT BEEN - ALTERED AND NO NEW SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88 VIN 0086, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIED TIE DETECTOR TUBES FOR RADI ATION MONITORS

lRE-1950, ARE-016, ARE-025, IRE-48000, IRE-0020A, IRE-00208, IRE-17A, IRE-17B, IRE-0848, IRE-0021, IRE-0019, IRE-0018, IRE-2565B, AND 1RE 12442B. THE MOD ADDED A STRAP TO  ;

TIIE DETECTOR TUBE TO BE USED IN liANDLING TIE DETECTOR ASSEMBLY. THE -l RADIATION MONITORS ARE EITHER 61J OR 62J PROJECT CLASS AND ARE NOT SAFETY RELATED. TIIESE MONITORS DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. l SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED TO TIESE MONITORS DID NOT EFFECT THEIR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO RADIATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OF FSAR CHAlYTERS 6 AND 15. IT DOES NOT RESULT IN AN 4 UNANALYZED ACCIDENT AS DETERMINED BY A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 6,9,11, AND

15. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS SECTIONS 3/4.3 AND 3/4.11.

I 7

l I

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VIN 0093, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDED TIE TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENTATION AND THE DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NRC BULLETIN 88-08. THIS DESIGN CHANGE INSTALLED THE FOLLOWING RTDS: TAG NUMBERS ITE-27734, ITE-27735, ITE-27736, ITE-27737, ITE-27738, ITE-27739, ITE 27740, ITE-27741, ITE-27742, ITE-27743, ITE-27744, ITE-27745, ITE-27746, AND ITE-27747. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 3,5.1,6.3 AND 15.0. THE DCP DID NOT INCREASE TIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF THE MALFUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPhENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN FSAR SECTIONS 5.1, 6.3 AND 15.0. "THE HARDWARE MOUNTED ON THE PIPE DID NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM DESIGN STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS DUE TO THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT ON THE PIPE." TFE TEMPERATURE ACQUISITION SYSTEM ADDED PROVIDED DATA FOR ENGINEERING ANALYSIS. THE SYSTEM DOES NOT PERFORM ANY CONTROL OR OPERATION FUNCTION. Tile DCP PROVIDED A NON-SAFETY RELATED NON-1E TEMPERATURE MONITORING AND DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM AS RECOMMENDED BY WESTINGHOUSE IN LETTER GP-13778 DATED 8/31/88. Tile DCP DID NOT IMPACT TIE OPERATION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM, NO DECREASE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES 3/4.5.2 AND 3/4.5.3 HAS OCCURRED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VCE0100, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REMOVED THE INTERIM BARRIER USED BETWEEN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TO CONTROL ACCESS DURING UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY ACCIDENT AS DESCPJBED IN TIE FSAR BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3.4,3.6 AND 9A. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THERE IS NO DECREASE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VCN0028, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDS A NEW BUILDING ADJACENT TO THE ARB THAT HOUSES TIIE ARB CONTROL ROOM AND DRESS OUT AREA. l SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WillCH HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE < THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ; THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED l SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VCN0028, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IMPLEhENTS THE ELECTRICAL, CIVIL / STRUCTURAL, ARCHITECTURAL, INSTRUMENTATION, MECHANICAL, RAD MONITORING AND SECURITY 8

LIGliTING NECESSARY FOR THE ADDITION OF A NEW BUILDING ADJACENT TO TiiE ARB THAT HOUSES THE ARB CONTROL ROOM AND DRESS OUT AREA. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIUS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICli HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY ; THEREFORE Tills DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VCN0057, REVISION 0. SEQUENCE 1 & 2 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED TWO 20,000 GALLON LIQUID RADWASTE MONITOR TANK AND THE ABILITY TO PROCESS TO AND FROM THESE TANKS (A-1901-T4-012 AND A-1901-T4-013). SAFETY EVALUATION: TIERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS INVOLVED WITIITHIS DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88 VCN0090, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIIrTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS UNIT 1 ERF UTILITY PRINTERS AND THE UNIT I AND UNIT 2 LINE PRINTERS WITH A MORE RELIABLE AND PROVEN TECHNOLOGY, SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ERF SYSTEM IS ASSUMED TO BE OPERATIONAL THROUGHOUT ALL OPERATING CONDITIONS INCLUDING ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. HOWEVER WHILE TIIE ERF COMPUTER IS DESIGNED TO BE lilGHLY RELIABLE AND QUANTITATIVELY COMPARABLE WITil REGARDS TO ACCURACY TO l-E SYSTEMS, IT IS NON-Q CLASS 62J AND PERFORMS NO SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THEREFORE NO IMPACTS ARE INVOLVED WITil THE FSAR SAFETY ANALYSIS OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON REVIEWS OF FSAR SECTIONS 15,7.5 AND EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION "H" ;TIIE ERF SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY IN TECH. SPECS,

SUBJECT:

DCP: 88-VCN0092, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED GROUND LOOP ISOLATION TRANSFORMERS FOR TIE PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS SAFEGUARDS. SAFETY EVALUATION: NO NEW POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR EVENTS ARE CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION, THEREFORE THE CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EQUIPhENT / COMPONENT MALFUNCTION NOT DESCRIBED AND ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0013, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: EACH OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR'S CONNECTING ROD BOLTS THAT SECURE THE CONNECTING RODS AROUND Tile CRANKSHAFT IS REQUIRED TO BE PRELOADED AND THE PRELOAD VERIFIED. TIIE PREVIOUS DIESEL ENGINE CONNECTING ROD BOLTS ARE TO BE REPLACED WITH NEW STUD / NUT ASSEMBLIES. THE 9

NEW ASSEMBLY LTrlLIZES A IIYDRAULIC PRESTRESSER, INSTEAD OF TORQUEING THE BOLTS, TO ACllIEVE A MORE ACCURATE PRELOAD. THIS CHANGE IS PROJECT CLASS 015. SAFETY EVALUATION: FAILURE OF TIE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR IS NOT AN INITIATING EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT NOR IS IT ANALYZED IN TIE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF THE DIESEL ENGINE IN THAT THE CONNECTING RODS ARE STILL SECURED TO THE CRANKSHAFT WITII Tile SAME PRELOAD. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE TIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE CHANGE IN THE EhERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS AND THE CIIANGE IN TIE METilOD FOR MEASUREMENT OF THE BOLT PRELOADING REDUCED THE PROBABILITY OF GALLING TIE THREADS AND DID NOT DECREASE Tile ENGINE RELIABILITY. THE NEW STUDS ARE MADE OF THE SAME MATERIAL AS TIE PREVIOUS BOLTS, AND THE PRELOAD REMAINS TIE SAME ALSO. TIIE METHOD OF APPLYING AND MEASURING TIE PRELOAD llAS BEEN IMPROVED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ALTER THE OPERATION OF THE DIESEL ENGINE NOR DOES IT CREATE OR INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY TYPE OF FAILURE THAT DOES NOT CURRENTLY EXIST. NEITHER THE RELIABILITY OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR NOR TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TiiE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES WAS DECREASED AS A RESULT OF THE CilANGE IN TIIE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 VIN 0014, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IMPROVED ACCESS TO Tile MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE AREA BY ADDING A DOOR BETWEEN ROOMS RA05 AND RA06 IN LEVEL A OF Tile AUX. BUILDING. IN ADDITION, BETTER llP CONTROL IS PROVIDED TO LIMIT ACCESS TO TIIE ROOMS IN Tile MSIV AREA AT LEVEL A BY COVERING TIE FLOOR OPENING IN ROOM R106 NOW USED FOR TIE ACCESS LADDER BETWEEN ROOMS RA06 AND R106. BY COVERING Tills OPENING, ACCESS TO RA06 IS LIMITED TO ONLY TilROUGli THE MAIN ENTRANCE OF TIIE CONTROL BUILDING ELIMINATION OF THIS OPENING ALSO PREVENTS Tile SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION FROM LEVEL A INTO TIIE MSIV ROOM AT LEVEL 1. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCPJBED IN Tile FSAR REMAIN UNCHANGED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0043, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS CIIANGE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS AND MODIFIED CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS FOR THAT PORTION OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ANALYZED IN PIPE STRESS CALCULATION NUMBERS: MALO2008; MIX 4CP-7072C; AND MIX 4CP-7072El. TIIIS DESIGN CilANGE REQUIRED PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS / DELETIONS (INCLUDING PIPE SNUBBER DELETIONS) AND DID NOT CllANGE PIPE ROUTING OR EQUIPMENT. Tile LONG TERM BENEFIT INCLUDED A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER THE LIFE OF TIIE PLANT DUE 'IO A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS REQUIRING TESTING AND MAINTENANCE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITII THE DESIGN CRITERIA IDENTIFIED IN Tile DESIGN INPUT RECORD AND TIIE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION. Tile CALCULATED DESIGN STRESSES ASSOCIATED WITil THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ARE STILL WITHIN THE CODE ALLOWABLES AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE 10

r q l I l l ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES FOR THIS SYSTEM. OTHER SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS DESIGN 1 MODIFICATION. REDISTRIBUTION OF PIPING LOADS WITHIN THE SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF j REDUCING THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND COMPENSATED I FOR, WIERE NECESSARY, WITH MODIFICATIONS TO THE PREVIOUS PIPE SUPPORT SYSTEM. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS ESTABLISHED BY TIIE ALLOWABLE STRESSES (ACCEPTANCE LIMITS) DEFINED IN TIE SPECIFIED CODES AND STANDARDS. TIESE CRITERIA AND FSAR TABLE 1.9-1(SIEET 5 OF 5) PERMIT THE USE OF ASME CODE CASE N-411 WHICil ALLOWS THE USE OF HIGIER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA IN THE SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF PIPING SYSTEMS. THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PIPING WAS REANALYZED UTILIZING TIIE HIGiiER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA PERMrITED BY ASME CODE CASE N-411 TO REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE PIPING SYSTEM AND MAINTAIN PIPE STRESSES WITHIN THE SAME CODE ALLOWABLES. ALTHOUGH TIERE HAS BEEN A REDUCrlON IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS IN TIE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM TIERE IIAS NOT BEEN A DECREASE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0044, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE REDUCED TIE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS AND MODIFIED CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS FOR THAT PORTION OF THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ANALYZED IN PIPE STRESS CALCULATION NUMBERS: MIX 4CP-7071C; MIX 4CP-707ZD; MIX 4CP-7071 A/B; AND MIX 4CP-7072B-1. TIIIS DESIGN CHANGE REQUIRED PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS / ADDITIONS / DELETIONS (INCLUDING PIPE SNUBBER dei ETIONS) AND DID NOT CHANGE PIPE ROUTING OR EQUIPMENT. THE LONG TERM BENEFIT INCLUDES A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER THE LIFE OF TIE PLANT DUE TO A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS REQUIRING TESTING AND MAINTENANCE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP INVOLVED TIE PIPING Ah D SUPPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. IT WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE CALCULATIONS IDENTIFIED IN TIE CALCULATION RECORD SECTION OF THIS DCP TilAT TIE CALCULATED DESIGN STRESSES ASSOCIATED WITilTHE AFOREMENTIONED SYSTEMS ARE WITHIN THE CODE ALLOWABLES AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH TIE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES FOR THESE SYSTEMS. THERE WAS NO INCREASE IN TIIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 15. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THIS REVIEW WAS DOCUhENTED IN TIE CALCULATIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE CALCULATION RECORD. TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY WAS ESTABLISIED BY TIE ALLOWABLE STRESSES (ACCEL'TANCE LIMITS) DEFINED IN THE SPECIFIED CODES AND STANDARDS. TIESE CRITERIA AND FSAR TABLE 1.9-1(SIEET 5 OF 5) PERMIT Tl!E USE OF ASME CODE CASE N-41I WHICH ALLOWS Tile USE OF HIGIER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA IN TIE SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF PIPING SYSTEMS. TIE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PIPING WERE REANALYZED UTILIZING THE HIGHER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA PERMrlTED BY ASME CODE CASE N-411 TO REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE < PIPING SYSTEM AND MAINTAIN PIPE STRESSES WITHIN TIE SAME CODE ALLOWABLES (ACCElrrANCE LIMITS) AS THE ORIGINAL PIPING AND SUPPORT SYSTEM DESIGN. l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0045, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil' TION: AS PART OF TIE PIPING SNUBBER REDUCTION PROGRAM, THIS DCP DELETES /C11ANGES/ ADDS CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS WITHIN THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM INSIDE TIE AUXILIARY BUILDING, CONTROL BUILDING, AND OUTSIDE AREAS. THERE 11 l

e ARE NO CHANGES TO SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENT S OTHER THAN Tile SPECIFIED PIPE , SUPPORTS SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPNENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH IIAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY . QUESTION. O

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0047, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 # DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE NSCW SYSTEM (OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT) ANALYZED IN STRESS CALCULATIONS M-EF-01-053, M-lX4CP-7158, M lX4CP-7159, M-X4CP-7160, AND M X4CP-7161. TIE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF TIE NSCW SYSTEM IS TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL COOLING TO SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT AND SOME NONSAFETY-RELATED AUXILIARY COMPONENTS. THIS SYSTEM FUNCTIONS DURING ALL NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS AND DURING ABNORMAL AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS LIMITED TO MODIFICATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS ONLY AND DOES NOT CHANGE SYSTEM FUNCTION, PIPE ROUTING, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS. NSCW IS A SAFETY-RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 1, MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEM. Tile LONG TERM EFFECT IS SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS IN INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS IN ADDITION TO A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER TIE LIFE OF TIE PLAhT. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIIS CilANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPAENT OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF THE MALFUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN TIE FSAR INCLUDING THOSE IN SECTION 3,6,9 OR 15 OF TIE FSAR AND BASED ON REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3,6,9 AND 15 DID NOT CREATE TIIE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNANALYZED OR UNDESCRIBED ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT / COMPONENT MALFUNCTION. NO NEW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS WERE CREATED AND THE APPLICABLE PIPE STRESSES WERE NOT EXCEEDED DUE TO TIE REMOVAL OF TIESE SNUBBERS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DID NOT AFFECT Tile SAFETY MARGIN DEFINED BY TECH SPEC 3/4.7.4 AND 3/4.7.8. THE LIST OF SNUBBERS REFERRED TO IN TIE BASES OF TECH SPEC 3/4.7.8 DID CHANGE, BUT TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY WAS NOT AFFECTED AND Tile BASES OF TIE TECil SPEC DID NOT REQUIRE A CllANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0079, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACES THE TURBINE BUILDING DRAIN SYSTEM RADIATION MONITORING SKID (1-1609-S$414) CRANE PUMP WITH A GOULDS PUMP. ASSOCIATED TUBING, VALVES, EQUIPMENT AND POWER SUPPLY CABLE IS ARE ALSO REPLACED. NO CHANGE TO THE RADIATION ELEMENT 1RE-848 WILL BE MADE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE GOULDS PUMP WHICil WILL REPLACE TIE EXISTING PUMP IS UTILIZED IN OTHER RADIATION MONITORING SKIDS WITHIN TIE PLANT AND ) HAS AN EXCELLENT OPERATING HISTORY. TIE PUMP WILL BE THROTTLED TO PRODUCE TIE 2 TO 8 GPM FLOW RATE WHICH TIE EXISTING PUMP PROVIDES THROUGli THE RADIATION MONITOR. THE RADIATION MONITOR SKID, REPLACEMENT PUMP AND ASSOCIATED PIPING, INSTRUMENTATION, AND VALVES ARE NON SAFETY RELATED, NON SEISMIC, DO NOT FUNCTION AS THE INITIATOR OF ANY ACCIDENT, AND ARE NOT ' 12

l t REQUIRED TO FUNCTION TO MITIGATE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS ANALYZED IN TIE FSAR. FSAR CHAPIER 15 DOES NOT IDENTIFY THIS MONITOR AS REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING OR AFTER AN EVENT.

SUBJECT:

+ cDCP: 89-VIN 0094, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTIdN: Tile PREVIOUS DESIGN CONFIGURATION HAD ONE ACKNOWLEdG8/RESETffEST PUSHBUTTONS SWITCH (HS-40057) AND ONE HORN (UA-40099) FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALBO9, ALB10, ALB11 & ALB12. Tills DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) ADDED SEPARATE ACKNOWLEDGE / RESET / TEST PUSIIBIIITONS (HS-40143) & A IlORN (UA 40145)

FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALBO9. SWITCH (IIS-40057) & IlORN (UA-40099) WERE USED FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB10 TIIROUGH ALB12. SWITCH (IIS-40143) WAS INSTALLED ON MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB) SECTION C AND i Tim IlORN (UA-40145) WAS INSTALLED BEllIND THE SOFFIT ABOVE SECTION C OF MCB. ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALBO9 PROVIDES PFIMARY INFORMATION TO TIIE OPERATORS ON TIIE OCCURRENCE OF A S AFETY INJECTION FOLLOWINO A REACTOR TRIP. PER THE PREVIOUS DESIGN, ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALBO9 (FIRST OUT) LOSES ITS DATA WHEN ANOTilER ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL SHARING Tile COMMON WINDOW WAS RESET. BY ADDING A SEPARATE ACKNOWLEDGE / RESET / TEST PUSHBUTTONS SWITCH FOR ALBO9 TIIE ABOVE PROBLEM IS ELIMINATED. I 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP INVOLVED THE NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM AND NON-SAFETY RELATED CHANGES TO TIE MCB. THIS CIIANGE ENilANCED TIIE PERFORMANCE OF NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR i EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY SAFETY SYSTEM, POSTULATED .l ' TO FUNCTION IN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. A REVIEW OF THE MODIFICATION HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY WESTINGHOUSE TO DETERMINE TIE EFFECT OF ADDING THE PUSHBUTTONS TO THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. TIIE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW j INDICATED TIIAT TIIE INSTALLATIONS OF THE PUSHBUTTONS DID NOT INVALIDATE TIE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF Tim MAIN CONTROL BOARD AND WILL REMAIN INTACT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. IN ADDITION, THE PUSHBUTTONS MEET THE QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF TIIE ORIGINAL CONTROL BOARD SWITCH MODULES (REFERENCE THE ATTACIIED WESTINGHOUSE SAFETY EVALUATION, SECL NO. 90-186). l l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0104, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TdlS CHANGE INVOLVES CllANGES TO VARIOUS PIPE SUPPORTS IN CVCS SUCH AS DELETING / REPLACING SNUBBERS AND/OR MODIFICATION TO PIPE SUPPORT STEEL. TIIERE ARE NO CHANGES TO Tim SYS'I EM PIPING OR COMPONENTS. j SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPhENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, TIIEREFORE THIS CilANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION. , I l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0105, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 l 13

                                                                                                       \

l DESCRIPITON: THIS CHANGE INVOLVES CHANGES TO VARIOUS PIPE SUPPORTS IN Tim RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM SUCH AS DELETING / REPLACING SNUBBERS AND /OR MODIFICATION TO PIPE SUPIORT STEEL. TIERE IS NO CllANGE TO TIIE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TlilS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, TIIEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0106, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPflON: AS PART OF THE UNIT ONE SNUBBER REDUCTION PROGRAM FOR TIE RCS PRESSURIZER SPRAY LINE, THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE SPECIFES THAT 9 OF THE 27 PREVIOUS SNUBBERS WERE DELETED WITH 6 SNUBBERS BEING REPLACED BY RIGID STRUTS. THERE ARE NO CIIANGES TO THE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS OTHER THAN TO THE PIPE SUPPORTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON THE EVALUATIONS AND SUPPORT ANALYSIS IN TIE DCP, PURSUANT TO THE CRITERI A SPECIFIED IN 10CFR50.59, THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VIN 0107, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrrION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVES CHANGES TO VARIOUS PIPE SUPPORTS IN THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM SUCH AS DELETING / REPLACING SNUBBERS AND /OR MODIFICATION TO PIPE SUPPORT STEEL. THERE IS NO CHANGE TO TIE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: tills CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPhENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN IOSTULATED, THEREFORE Tills CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 VIN 0238, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlvrION: THIS CHANGE ADDED A NEW FLOOR DRAIN TO AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06. THE NEW DRAIN PIPING WAS ROUTED TO AN EXISTING DRAIN LOCATED IN AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM B02. THE DRAIN DISCHARGES TO THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK FOR EVENTUAL PROCESSING IN THE RADWASTE SYSTEM. PREVIOUSLY, ROOM A06 HAD NO MEANS OF DRAINAGE AND ANY SOURCE OF WATER (CONDENSATION, LEAKAGE, ) ETC.) ACCUMULATED IN TIE ROOM AND REMAINED TIERE. ) I SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile ADDITION OF AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06 Fli)OR DRAIN REDUCED TIE STEADY STATE FLOOD LEVEL AND REDUCED THE LEAKAGE OF WATER INTO TIIE ADJOINING ROOMS A05 AND A07. THE TRANSFER OF WATER FROM A06 TO B02 VIA TIE NEW DRAIN LINE IS ENVELOPED BY THE EXISTING P.OOM B02 FLOODING ANALYSIS. THE DESIGN FLOOD LEVELS REMAIN UNCHANGED, ROOMS A06 AND B02 1 I 14

l CONTAIN ONLY SAFETY RELATED PIPING. NO EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR TIE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT ARE LOCATED IN TIESE SPACES. THE NEW PIPE AND SUPPORTS ADDED FOR THIS CIIANGE ARE DESIGNED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY I REQUIREMENTS WHICH PRECLUDE SEISMIC 2/1 INTERACTIONS. ALTHOUGH THE ADDITION OF THE DRAIN AND ITS ASSOCIATED PIPING PROVIDED A SMALL VENT PATH BETWEEN ROOMS A06 AIM B02, TIERE ARE NO HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS POSTULATED IN EITIER ROOM. TIERE i NO EFFECT ON TIE COMPARTNENTAL PRESSURUTEMPEPATIJu ANALYSIS. BOTil OF THESE ROOMS ARE OUTSIDE THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. A POSTULATED FIRE IN BOTH ZONES WOULD NOT PRECLUDE TIE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE SAFE SHUTDOWN. THIS REVIEW INCLUDED SECTIONS 9.3.3,9A.1,11.2, AND 15.0 OF TIE FSAR. THE ADDITION OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TO AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06 HAS NO EFFECT ON THE EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEMS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSES. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE LIQUIDS COLLECTED FROM ROOM A06 WILL BE NON-RADIOACTIVE AND THAT TIE VOLUhE OF THE LIQUIDS WILL BE SMALL. AND THAT THIS COLLECTION WILL OCCUR INFREQUENTLY. ULTIMATELY, THE LIQUIDS COLLECTED FROM ROOM A06 DRAIN ARE COLLECTED IN THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK. THE CONTENTS OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK ARE PROCESSED, SAMPLED, AND EVENTUALLY DISCHARGED EITIER TO TIE ENVIRONhENT OR THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM. TIE ADDITION OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TO AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06 HAS NO EFFECT ON TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TIE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. -

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VINO 297, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP PERMANENTLY DISABLED CHLORINE DETECTORS 1 AE-12110/12112 AND THE ALARM INPUT FROM RETURN AIR FANS 1-1531-B7-005/006 TO TIE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTROL BUILDING CONTROL ROOM ENERGENCY HVAC SYSTEM. > SAFETY EVALUATION. CHLORINE DETECTION FOR THE CONTROL ROOM IS NO LONGER REQUIRED SINCE PLANT VOGTLE HAS COMMITTED TO NOT STORE LIQUEFIED GASEOUS CHLORINE IN EXCESS OF 20 POUNDS ON SITE. DELETION OF CHLORINE DETECTION FROM TFE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM DESIGN HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN THE NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SUPPLEMENT NO. 8, SECTION 9.4. BASED ON THE NRC REVIEW OF TIE VOGTLE COMMITMENT TO LIMIT CHLORINE QUANTITIES, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT " AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF TIE CONTROL ROOM IF CHLORINE WAS DETECTED IS NO LONGER REQUIRED." IN ADDITION, LDCR 89-049 WHICH DELETES THE REQUIREMENT FOR CHLORINE DETECTION IN Tim CONTROL ROOM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRB FOR INCORPORATION INTO TIE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VINO 309, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE REMOVED THE PREVIOUS 4" 90 DEGREE ELBOW ON i TIE RIVER WATER MAKEUP LINES TO TIE NSCW TOWERS, UPSTREAM OF VALVES ' 11402U4013 AND 11402U4015 FOR TRAINS A AND B RESPECTIVELY AND REPLACED THEM , WITH A 4" TEE. A 4" GATE VALVE WAS ALSO ADDED TO THE TEE DOWN STIEAM OF TIE i VALVE WITH A FLANGE ON Tile END AND A THREADED CAP ON THE FLANGE. THIS CHANGE PROVIDED CHEMICAL INJECTION CAPABILITY USING PORTABLE EQUIPMENT. THE CIEMICALS ARE CHEMICALS PRESENTLY IN USE BY THE PLANT. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE RIVER WATER MAKEUP PIPE IS NON-SAFETY RELATED AND NO FAILURE OF THE MAKE-UP PIPE CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION OF ANY 15

s l EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUhED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN TIE FSAR. THIS INCLUDES A REVIEW OF SECTIONS 2.4.11,9.2.1,9.2.5,10.4.5, AND 15. THIS CIIANGE DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, THIS INCLUDES A REVIEW OF SECTIONS B 3/4. 7.4 AND B 3/4.7.5. I

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-V2E0002, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRil'rION: THIS DCP INSTALLED LADDERS IN CHASE 2-RC-37, A FIRE DOOR IN THE WEST END OF UC-A03, A WALKWAY IN RC-23, AND A LADDER, PLATFORM, AND WALKWAY IN RA-81. THIS WAS TO FACILITATE EASE OF ACCESS TO AREAS WHICH WERE DIFFICULT TO REACH. THE PREVIOUS ACCESS REQUIRED REMOVAL OF CONCRETE FLOOR PLUGS OR INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY SCAFFOLDING. SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3.4,3.6,3.8.4, AND 15 THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT TIE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. ALSO NO EQUIPhENT OR COMPONENTS IN THE SPECIFIED LOCATIONS WERE AFFECTED. FSAR SECTIONS 3.6,9.5, APP. 9A, AND 15 WERE REVIEWED. HERE IS NO DECREASE IN Tile SAFETY MARGIN OF PLANT SYSTEMS PER REVIEW OF THE BASES FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.7.10.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-V2N0095, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THE PRESENT DESIGN CONFIGURATION HAS ONE ACKNOWLEDGE / RESET / TEST PUSHBUTTONS SWITCll(HS-40057)-AND ONE HORN (UA-40099) FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09. ALB10. ALB11 & ALB12.THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) ADDED SEPARATE ACKNOWLEDGE / RESET / TEST PUSIIBUTTONS/SWITCIES (llS-40143) & A HORN (UA-40145) FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09. SWITCH (IIS-40057) & HORN (UA-40099) ARE USED FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB10 THROUGH ALB12. SWITCH (HS-40143) WAS INSTALLED ON MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB) SECTION C AND THE HORN (UA-40145) WAS INSTALLED BEHIND THE SOFFIT ABOVE SECTION C OF MCB. SAFETY EVALUATION: CHANGE IN TIE DCP INVOLVES NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM AND NON-SAFETY RELATED CHANGES TO THE MCB. THIS CHANGE ENHANCES THE PERFORMANCE OF NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR EQUIPhENT AND DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY SAFETY SYSTEM, POSTULATED TO FUNCTION IN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.'A REVIEW OF TIIE MODIFICATION HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY WESTINGHOUSE TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF ADDING THE PUSHBUTTONS TO TIIE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW INDICATED THAT THE INSTALLATION OF THE PUSHBUTTONS DID NOT INVALIDATE THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD AND WILL REMAIN INTACT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. IN ADDITION, TIIE PUSHBUTTONS MEET THE QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CONTROL BOARD SWITCH MODULES (REFERENCE THE ATTACHED WESTINGHOUSE SAFETY EVALUATION, SECL NO. 90-186).

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-V2N0116, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 3 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDS TO ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIES TO UNIT TWO TURBINE BUILDING FOR USE DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 8.3 NO CHANGE TO THE FACILITY AS DESCRIBED OR IMPLIED IN THE FSAR IS REQUIRED. 16

ALSO Tile CilANGE DOES NOT INCREASE TIIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR EQUIPhENT FAILURE AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 V2NO305, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrTION: PROVIDES A BLOCKING FEATURE THAT WlEN INVOKED ESTABLISIES A  ; HARD BLOCK TO TIE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR RAD MONITORS 2RE-0002, 0003,2565A,2565B, AND 2565C. TrilS WILL INilIBIT CVI ACTUATION AND MAINTAIN TIE EXISTING MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALARMS AND INDICATIONS CURRENTLY PROVIDED. THIS ALSO ALLOWS LOCAL DEENERGlZATION OF TIE DPM FOR MAINTENANCE OR OTilER REQUIREMENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN ADDED ADDITIONAL CONDUIT AND CABLE TERMINATION'S TO SAFETY RELATED RELAY ENCLOSURES 2RY-0002 AND 2RY-0003. TIE NEW EQUIPMENT ADDED WERE HAND SWITCIES 2HS 13259,2HS-13260, AND 2HS-13261 WHICH WERE MOUNTED IN TIE CORRESPONDING ENCLOSURES 2 1609-P5-CB1,2-1609-PS-CD2, AND 2-1609-P5-CB3. TIE ABOVE ME?mONED CllANGES HAS NO AFFECT ON WATER SENSITIVITY OF TIE EXISTING EQUIPMENT, AND TIIE NEW SWITCH / ENCLOSURE , ASSEMBLIES WERE MOUNTED ABOVE TIE AREA FLOOD LEVELS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VAN 0050, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 1 , DESCR!!' TION: TIE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND SAFETY COMMFITEES ON SITE HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL AREAS FOR IMPROVING ACCESS AND SAFETY FOR PLANT PERSONNEL. THESE ADDITIONAL LADDERS AND PLATFORMS WERE INSTALLED USING SUPPORTS ATTACHED TO EXISTING EMBEDS OR STRUCTURAL STEEL. THE EXISTING STEEL HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR ACCEPTABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL LOADING OF TIE ADDED LADDERS AND PLATFORMS TO THE ORIGINAL DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS. LIGHTING FOR TIESE PLATFORMS WAS ADDED OR EXISTING LIGHTING WAS MODIFIED WIERE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE Tile PROPER ILLUMINATION LEVELS. THE SUPPORTS FOR TIIE PLATFORMS WERE ATTACHED TO EXISTING STEEL MEMBERS OR  ; EMBEDS. TIE EXISTING STEEL HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR ACCEPTABILITY OF TIE l ADDITIONAL LOADING FROM TIE ADDED PLATFORMS. THE ADDITION OF PLATFORMS AND LADDERS PROVIDED PERMANENT ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT AND AREAS THAT REQUIRED SCAFFOLDING AND EXTENSION LADDERS TO BE INSTAL. LED FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME. THE MODIFICATION OF PLATFORMS AND LADDERS PROVIDES IMPROVED ACCESS FOR EXISTING INSTALLATION. TIE ROUTING MODIFICATIONS OF PIPING PROVIDE REQUIRED ACCESS CLEARANCE FOR CURRENTLY INSTALLED LADDERS IMPROVING EXISTING ACCESS. THE ASSOCIATED LIGilTING CHANGES FOR TIIE PLATFORMS ADDED PROVIDED REQUIRED LEVELS OF ILLUMINATION FOR OPERATING ACTIVITIES. TIE ADDITION OF SUPPORTS FOR A STATIC SAFETY LINE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF SAFETY FOR WORK ASSOCIATED WITH THE POLAR CRANE. Tim MODIFICATION OF AUXILIARY BUILDING VALVE PIT COVERS PROVIDES THE MEANS FOR A SINGLE INDIVIDUAI. TO REMOVE THE PIT COVERS FOR VALVE LINE-UP/ VERIFICATIONS AND OTHER OPERATING ACTIVITIES FOR TiiE VALVES LOCATED IN THE PITS. SAFETY EVALUATION: MODIFICATIONS TO THE PIPING SYSTEMS 2301,1311,1322, 2401,2419, AND 2420 DID NOT CHANGE SYSTEM OPERATION. ADDITION OF, OR MODIFICATIONS TO, PLATFORMS AND LADDERS IN TIE TURBINE BUILDING, STEAM TUNNELS, DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING AND UNIT I NORTH MSIV VALVE ROOMS DO NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND ARE DESIGNED TO 2 OVER 1 SEISMIC CATEGORY l 17 1

                                    ._-_-_______.___-_____-____-_____-__-_____----_.____-_________-_-_______-__-_-___-__---____--__J

REQUIREMENTS. ADDITION OF THE STATIC SAFETY LINE SUPPORTS DID NOT CHANGE CRANE OPERATIONS AND TIIE SUPPORTS ARE DESIGNED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY l REQUIREMENTS. AUXILIARY BUILDING VALVE PIT COVER MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CilANGE SYSTEM OPERATIONS. ALL STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS ARE DESIGNED TO SEISMIC 1 CRITERIA TO PREVENT THEM FROM FALLING ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT. THE ADDITIONAL GRATING DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE HELB VENT PATH FOR THE MSIV PLATFORM ADDITION. THE DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT ADD EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. ALL MODIFICATIONS STATED ABOVE WERE REVIEWED FOR IMPACTS TO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT SAFETY AND APPROPRIATE CLEARANCES IIAVE BEEN . MAINTAINED. NO ADVERSE IMPACT TO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY HAS BEEN CREATED. TilERE IS NO REDUCTION IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION BASIS,

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VAN 0241, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRifrTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE MODIFIED THE TWO LADDERS DESCENDING INTO THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 NO.1 TENDON ACCESS SHAFTS AND ADDS A LADDER / PLATFORM TO PROVIDE IMPROVED ACCESS TO THE TOP OF THE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 OILY WASTE SEPARATORS. TilUS IMPROVING ACCESS IN TIESE AREAS AND ENIIANCING PERSONNEL SAFETY SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE ADDITION OF THE PLATFORMS AND MODIFICATIONS TO THE PREVIOUS LADDERS DID NOT INCREASE T11E PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VCEO112, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIIYTION: UPDATE VOGTLE PLANT SECURITY DRAWINGS TO SliOW THE FLUSHING WATER STORAGE TANK AS A PERMANENT PLANT EQUIPMENT AND Tile FLUSHING WATER STORAGE TANK PUMP ENCLOSURE AS A PERMANENT PLANT STRUCTURE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP WAS ISSUED AS A SUPPLEMENT TO SEQUENCE I FOR DRAWING CifANGES ONLY AND HAS NO IMPACT ON ANY SYSTEM OPERATION OR RESPONSE AND REQUIRES NO PHYSICAL CHANGES TO THE PLANT.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 VCN0024, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE TUBULAR DIAPHRAGM ACID AND CAUSTIC METERING PUMPS (A 1409-D4-001 Pl1 AND P12 AND A 1409-D4-001-P15 AND -P16) WERE REPLACED WITli MORE RELIABLE DISC DIAPHRAGM PUMPS. TIIE RUPTURE DISC PSE-3661 WERE REPLACED WITil TIIE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE A-PSV-27550. PRESSURE GAUGES A-PI-3650, A-PI-3651, A-PI-7539 AND A PI-7556 WERE REPLACED WITH HIGH-RELIABILITY PRESSURE GAUGES WITH PULSATION DAMPENERS. ADDITIONALLY, TIIE LEVEL SWITCH CABLES A-LS-7538 AND A-LS-7555 WAS CllANGED FROM STAINLESS STEEL TO A MORE CORROSION RESISTANT NICKEL ALLOY. THE SLOPE OF THE CHEMICAL FEED ROOM FLOOR WAS CORRECTED AND THE CONCRETE COATING REPAIRED. IN ADDITION, THE EQUIPMENT DRAIN INSIDE THE MIXING AREA BEHIND TIIE PLEXIGLAS SHIELD WAS CONVERTED TO A I FLOOR DRAIN AND Tile TEMPORARY LINE CONNECTING THE DEMINERALIZED WATER TANK TO THE SAMPLE SINK WAS REPLACED WITH A PERMANENT 3/8" DIA. SAMPLE LINE. 18

l SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS Tile PLANT MAKEUP WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM AND TIE DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM. THIS DCP REPLACED RUPTURE DISC PSE 3661 WITil PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE A-PSV-27550. TIIIS DCP INVOLVES CIIANGES TO Tile DEMINERALIZED WATER PORTION OF Tile PLANT MAKEUP WATER TREAThENT SYSTEM WHICil DOES NOT HAVE A SAFETY RELATED DESIGN BASIS AS INDICATED IN DESIGN CRITERIA DC-1409, PARA. 3.1 AND FSAR SECTION 9.2.3.1.1. FAILURE OF Tills SYSTEM DOES NOT RESULT IN THE INITIATION OF ANY ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN TIIE FSAR. THERE ARE NO SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS AFFECTED BY Tills DCP TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE PLANT MAKEUP WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM. Tim MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY Tills DLP DID NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. i

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 VCN0035, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 , i DESCRIPTION: INSTALL NEW DOOR LEAFS AND MAGNETIC LOCKING MECHANISMS. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEhENTATION OF Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIIE FSAR. TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY liAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VCN0038, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1,2,3, & 5 DESCRil' TION: Tills DCP CONSTRUCTED AN ALTERNATE PLANT ENTRANCE SECURITY BUILDING. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY llAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN Tile BASIS FOR ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 VCN0088, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: INSTALL REACli ROD OPERATORS, WITH REMOTE VALVE POSITION INDICATORS ON VALVES: 11901U4050,11902U4251,11205U6019,11508U4012 SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPhENT OR COMPONENT FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH llAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE TIIE MARGIN OF S AFETY ; THEREFORE Tills DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. 19

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89 VCN0109, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP SEQUENCE INSTALLS A PERMANENT OFFICE FOR G.E. PERSONNEL ON THE TURBINE DECK WITH A TOOUEQUIPMENT STORAGE AREA. THE OFFICE IS A IIENGES IN-PLANT OFFICE, SERIES 175 SUPPORTED ON A PLATFORM ON TIE TURBINE DECK. 4 SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3,8.3,9.5.2, & 15 '! AND A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3 AND 3/4.7 THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES, AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, CREATE NEW POSSIBILITIES OF EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS, INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, OR DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN Tile BASES OF TECH SPECS. l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VCN0109, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 2 l l DESCRilrrlON: Tills SEQUENCE PROVIDED NON-SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS, INTERNAL WIRING, TELEPilONE SERVICE, PAGE SERVICE, OFFICE GROUNDING, AND DOCUMENTATION OF CilANGES TO TIE PERMANENT OFFICE INSTALLED ON TIE TURBINE DECK FOR G.E. PERSONNEL. THIS BUILDING WAS PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED BY DCP 89 VCN0109-1-1 AS A PERMANENT OFFICE. SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3,8,9.5.2, & 15 AND A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3 AND 3/4.7 tills DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES, AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, CREATE NEW POSSIBILITIES OF EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS, INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, OR DECREASE TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VCN0120, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVED THE DELETION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) AREA RADIATION MONITORS ARE 50002A, ARE-50002B AND TIIE ASSOCIATED LOCAL ALARMS, INDICATORS, AND DPM'S. IT ALSO INCLUDED THE DELETION OF TIE AIRBORNE RADIATION MONITOR FROM WITilIN TIIE HVAC INTAKE (ARE 50003) AND ITS ASSOCIATED LOCAL ALARMS AND INDICATION. ALL INSTRUMENTS DELETED ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED PROJECT CLASS 62J COMPONENTS. AN ERROR IN THE FSAR CONCERNING TIE TSC EXIIAUST DUCT ISOLATION WAS ALSO CORRECTED. TIE TSC MUST BE MANNED POST-ACCIDENT. TIE DELETION OF THE AREA MONITORS (ARE 50002A AND B) WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE DEDICATION OF A PORTABLE AREA MONITOR TO BE PLACED IN THE TSC WHENEVER IT IS ACrlVATED. Tills MONITOR SilOULD BE PLACED IN A MANNED AREA THAT IS CLOSEST TO THE PRINCIPAL FILTRATION UNITS ADJACENT TO TIE TSC. A REVIEW OF THE TSC POST- ACCIDENT HABITABILITY CALCULATION REVEALS TilAT TIE MAXIMUM ANTICIPATED DOSE RATE IN THE TSC IS 70 MILLIREM PER HOUR. THUS, A PORTABLE INSTRUMENT WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO RELIABLY PROVIDE AN ALARM AT 5 MILLIREM PER HOUR WHILE PROVIDING DOSE RATE INDICATION UP TO 100 MILLIREM PER HOUR IS ADEQUATE. THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM RELIABILITY HAS BEEN LESS TIIAN EXPECTED CREATING TIIE NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE AND SIGNIFICANT MANPOWER TO MAINTAIN TIE SYSTEM. TIESE MONITORS ARE BEING DELETED AS PART OF VEGP'S PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE NONESSENTIAL 20

3 l 1 RADIATION MONITORS. ELIMINATION OF NONESSENTIAL MONITORS SIMPLIFY Tile SYSTEM, REDUCE O&M COSTS, AND TIE AMOUNT OF MANPOWER REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN TiiE SYSTEM. FSAR SECTION 9.4.1.8.2.3.2 INCORRECFLY STATES TilAT THE TOILET AND BA'ITERY ROOM EXIIAUST DAMPERS REMAIN OPEN. THE LOGIC DIAGRAM IS ALSO INCORRECT THESE DAMPERS CLOSE TO IELP MAINTAIN A POSITIVE PRESSURE IN TIIE TSC. THE FSAR AND TIIE LOGIC DIAGRAM ARE BEING CORRECTED TO REFLECT THE PROPER OPERATION OF TilESE DAMPERS. NO CHANGES TO THE PLANT OR OTHER DESIGN DRAWINGS ARE REQUIRED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTRUMENTATION INVOLVED IN THIS CllANGE DOES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT PLANT OPERATIONS. TIIE POST ACCIDENT ISOLATION AND ALARM FUNCrlONS OF THE REMOVED INSTRUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH , AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY WAS PERFORMED BY THE CONTROL ROOM INTAKE AIRBORNE RADIATION MONITOR. TIE REQUIRED PORTABLE AREA MONITOR WITH AN ALARM SET AT FIVE MILLIREM PER llOUR PROVIDES ADEQUATE WARNING OF AN INCREASE IN TSC GENERAL AREA RADIATION LEVELS. ISOLATION RELAYS ARE UTILIZED TO ESTABLISH THE ISOLATION REQUIREMENTS BETWEEN Tile s NON-SAFETY TSC CIRCUITS AND Tim SAFETY RELATED CRI CIRCUlTS. THIS IS 1 REQUIRED TO PRECLUDE ANY POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF THE CRI CIRCUITS IF A FAILURE WITHIN THE TSC CIRCUITS WAS TO OCCUR. SINCE THE FUNCTIONS OF TIIE INSTRUMENTS TO DE DELETED ARE ADEQUATELY PERFORMED BY ALTERNATE INSTRUMENTS, AND THE DESIGN PROPERLY ADDRESSES THE NEW INTERFACE BETWEEN SAFETY RELATED AND NON-SAFETY RELATED CIRCUITS, IT IS CONCLUDED TilAT Tills CIIANGE DID NOT INCREASE Tile PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. ALL RELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS DESIGN ARE QUALIFIED TO MEET THE SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS SERVICE. NEWLY INSTALLED CONDUITS AND CABLES CONTINUE TO MEET TIIE REQUIRED ELECTRICAL TRAIN SEPARATION AND TO MEET THE ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA AS SPECIFIED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3. NO PANEL MODIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED DUE TO THE UTILIZATION OF EXISTING SPARE RELAYS WITHIN THE AFFECTED PANELS. THE INSTRUMENTS TO DE REMOVED ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DO NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE PLANT. THESE INSTRUhENTS DO NOT AFFECT ANY INSTRUMENTS OR EQUIPMENT TilAT ARE MENTIONED IN THE BASES TO ANY TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION. Ti!E EMERGENCY FILTRATION OF THE TSC AND THE WARNING OF PERSONNEL IF HIGH RADIATION EXISTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EFFECTIVELY AS BEFORE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VCN0303, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIl7FION: THIS DCP DELETED RADIATION ARE-0007A, ARE-0009A, ARE-0009B, AND ARE-0009C. THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM RELIABILITY liAS BEEN LESS THAN EXPECTED CREATING TIIE NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE AND SIGNIFICANT MANPOWER TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM. THESE MONITORS ARE BEING DELETED AS PART OF VEGP'S PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE NON-ESSENTIAL RADIATION MONITORS . TIE MONITORS TO BE DELETED ARE LOCATED IN NON-ESSENTIAL AREAS WHERE ACCESS IS NOT REQUIRED TO SERVICE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR ACCESS TO AN AREA IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. ELIMINATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL MONITORS SIMPLIFY THE SYSTEM, REDUCE, O&M COST, AND THE AMOUNT OF MANPOWER REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM. 21

SAFETY EVALUATION: NO CREDIT WAS TAKEN FOR THESE DELETED MONITORS IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 15,11.5,12.3.1. AND 12.3.4. THESE MONITORS DO NOT PROVIDE ANY CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY FAILURE ANALYSIS OR LIMITING SINGLE FAILURE CONDITIONS. THEREFORE Tills CHANGE DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED COMMENTS EQUIPMENT, OR FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS B3/4.3.2, B3/4.3.3, B3/4.4, AND B3/4.ll TIERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 89-VCNO328, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrr10N: Tills DCP UPGRADED Tile SECURITY MULTIPLEXER DATA INPUT MODULES. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN , DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIE 0148, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP INSTALLED TWO SPLICE BOXES AND REPLACED THE DAMAGED , SECTION OF CONTROL CABLE IBA0308VB WITH A NEW SECTION OF CABLE. CABLE 1 IBA0308VB HAD AN OPEN CONDUCTOR WHICH DISABLED THE "B" TRAIN CCW DRAIN TANK LOW LOW LEVEL ALARM IN TIE MAIN CONTROL ROOM DUE TO TIE CLOSING OF A CONTACT IN SWITCll ILSLL-1853. I SAFETY EVALUATION: NO NEW POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR EVENTS ARE CREATED l AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION, TIEREFORE THE CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE TIE l POSSIBILITY OF AN EQUIPMENT / COMPONENT MALFUNCTION NOT DESCRIBED AND l ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0001, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP RELOCATED DOOR 1211ILI125 SECURITY ACAD. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIE PROBABILITI 3r' AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN TIE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIE 0007, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlrrlON: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO AIR HANDLING UNITS,1-1556-A7-001 AND l-1556-A7-002 ON THE ROOF OF THE UNIT 1 CONTROL BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0", 22

f- - ) l AND TWO AIR HANDLING UNITS,1-1556-A7403 AND l-1556-A7-004 ON THE ROOF OF THE UNIT I AUXILIARY BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0". EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100%

                                                                                       )

i OF TIIE CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE IN Tile VICINITY OF i MSIVS 1-HV-3016-A/B AND l-IIV-3026-A/B WITHIN THE DESIGN LIMITS. AUXILIARY BUILDING AIRllANDLING UNITS 1-1556-A7-003 AND l-1556-A7-004 ARE REDUNDANT UNITS, , EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100% OF THE CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE IN TIE VICINITY OF MSIVS 1-HV-3006-A/B AND l-HV 3036-A/B WITHIN TIE DESIGN LIMITS. AIR HANDLING UNITS SUPPLY OUTSIDE AIR AND DISTRIBUTE TIE AIR TO REGISTERS LOCATED NEAR EACH MSIV BONNET AND ACTUATOR. A BACKDRAFT DAMPER SEPARATES THE OPERATING SYSTEM FROM THE NONOPERATING SYSTEM. FAILURE OF TIE lEATER TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50 DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGIZES THE OPERATING FAN. THIS DCP ALSO REVERSES TIE ORIENTATION OF THE EXISTING UNIT 1 CONTROL BUILDING 5-WAY l RESTRAINT COOLING FANS FROM TIIE SUPPLY TO THE EXHAUST CONFIGURATION. THIS l PREVENTS THE lEATED AIR, WHICH IS DISSIPATED BY THE RESTRAINTS, FROM l IMPINGING ON THE MSIV ACTUATORS, AND FACILITATE THE REMOVAL OF llEATED AIR l FROM THE BUILDING BY NATURAL CONVECTION. A "HIGH TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACH BUILDING IN TIIE VICINITY OF THE MSIVS; A

• LOW TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACll BUILDING IN TIE AIR HANDLER DISCllARGE AIR STREAM NEAR ONE OF THE MSIVS.

THE HIGH AND LOW TEMPERATURE SENSORS ANNUNCIATE IN THE MAIN CONTROL  ; ROOM TO INFORM AN OPERATOR IF A TEMPERATURE ANOMALY EXISTS. THIS DCP ) INVOLVED PENETRATIONS TilROUGH PRESSURE, FIRE, AND FLOOD BOUNDARIES, WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF VEGP PENETRATION SEAL CONTROL PROCEDURE 00432-C. PENETRATIONS WERE RESEALED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFICATION XI AGII AFTER CONSTRUCTION. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY THIS DCP WERE j DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE TEMPERATURE OF TiiE MSIV ACTUATOk, AND THEREFORE, DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF INADVERTENT CLOSURE. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGIIT EXERTED ON THE ROOF BY THE AIR HANDLERS HAS BEEN EVALUATED, AS HAS TIIE DUCTWORK INSTALLED BY THIS DCP. THE DUCT SUPPORTS COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED BY DESIGN CRITERIA DC-2167 FOR DUCTWORK IN SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES, AND TIEIEFORE WILL NOT FALL ON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPhENT DURING A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTIlQUAKE (SSE). CIRCUITRY IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT TIE OPERATING FAN AUTOMATICALLY LOCKS OUT Tile REDUNDANT UNIT, AND TO ENSURE THAT THE HEATER CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT AIR FLOW. FAILURE OF THE IIEATER TO MAINTAIN Tile SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50  ; DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGlZE THE OPERATING FAN. THERE WERE NO CREDIBLE COMMON-MODE FA. LURES INTRODUCED BY TIE DESIGN CHANGE WHICH  : AFFECTS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE ROOFS OF THE CONTROL AND AUXILIARY l BUILDING MSIV ENCLOSURES IIAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING , THE AIR HANDLERS AND MAINTAINING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. ELECTRICAL SEPARATION FROM CLASS 1E WIRING IS MAINTAINED. FAILURE OF AN AIR HANDLER FAN COULD CAUSE A HIGH TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IN THE , VICINITY OF THE MSIVS, POTENTIALLY IMPACTING TilEIR ENVIRONhENTALLY j QUALIFIED LIFE. FAILURE OF THE IIEATING COIL COULD RESULT IN LOW HYDRAULIC FLUID TEMPERATURE AND INCREASED VISCOSITY, RESULTING IN DEGRADED OPERABILITY OF TIIE MSIVS. NOTIFICATION OF A HIGH TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS PROVIDED BY A "HIGil TEMP" ALARM, WHICH IS INSTALLED IN THE MAIN CONTROL l ROOM QlIVC PANEL AS PART OF TlilS DCP. NOTIFICATION OF A LOW TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS PROVIDED BY A " LOW TEMP" ALARM, WillCH IS INSTALLED ON THE CONTROL ROOM QHVC PANEL AS PART OF THIS DCP. ANNUNCIATION OF EITIER ALARM REQUIRE MITIGATING OPERATOR ACTION. AS AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION,THE AIR l HANDLER FAN IS DESIGNED TO TRIP ON LOW TEMPERATURE. TiiE SAFETY RELATED 23

I i 1 PORTIONS OF Tile MSIV SYSTEM ARE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION FOLLOWING POSTULATED IIAZARDS OF FIRE, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MISSILES, AND PIPE BREAK. NEW PENETRATIONS THROUGH THE PENTHOUSE WALLS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED TO DETERMINE TilAT THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM MISSILES. MSLB VENT PATHS TO ATMOSPHERE, WIIICH ARE PARTIALLY OBSTRUCTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF DUCT, llAVE BEEN ANALYZED. THE NET FREE AREA USED IN TIE CALCULATION IS NOT AFFECTED, NOR HAS THE ABILITY TO RELIEVE PRESSURE BEEN REDUCED. THE ADDITION OF COOLING AIR INTO THE MSIV ENCLOSURES DOES NOT INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVITY RELEASED FOLLOWING AN MSLB. THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES OR COMPONENTS AS SHOWN IN THE EVALUATIONS ABOVE. OPERABILITY AND BASIS FOR OPERABILITY DELINEATED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.7.1.1 FOR SAFETY VALVES, AND 3/4.7.1.5 FOR THE MSIVS, HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED. THEREFORE, TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP,

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0010, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIYTION: THE MAIN GENERATOR SHORTING BREAKER IS EQUIPPED WITH FIVE RC NETWORKS (SNUBBERS) TO SUPPRESS CONTACT ARCING DUE TO INDUCTIVE COUNTER ELECTROMOTIVE FORCE (EMF). THE NETWORKS ARE LOCATED ON TIE BREAKER AND ARE WIRED IN PARALLEL TO THE BREAKER RELAY COILS. THIS DESIGN CHANGE REMOVED THE SNUEBERS FROM TI-EIR PRESENT LOCATION ON THE MAIN GENERATOR'S FIELD SHORTING BREAKER AND RELOCATE TIEM IN THE EXCITER CUBICLE. THE RELOCATION OF THE SNUBBERS DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THEIR OPERATION OF THE NETWORKS. THIS CHANGE REQUIRED INTERNAL WIkING CHANGES TO THE MAIN GENERATOR'S FIELD SilORTING BREAKER SSCTION OF TIE EXCITER CUBICLE WHICH IS LOCATED IN TIE TURBINE BUILDING. THE SNUBBERS FIELD SHORTING BREAKER AND EXCITER CUBICLE,1-1328-P5-GEC, ARE PROJECT CLASS 621. THIS DESIGN CIIANGE WAS IMPLEMENTED ON UNIT 2. BY IMPLEMENTING THIS CHANGE ON UNIT 1, SPARE BREAKERS IN THE WAREHOUSE CAN BE USED INTERCHANGEABLY BETWEEN BOTH UNITS WITHOUT HAVING TO MAKE MODIFICATIONS TO THEM PRIOR TO INSTALLATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP RELOCATED THE SNUBBER NETWORKS ONLY, THE OPERATION OF THE NETWORKS AND THE MAIN GENERATOR SHORTING BREAKER ARE UNAFFECTED BY THIS CllANGE. THERE IS NO MENTION OF TIE SNUBBER NUTWORKS OR Tile MAIN GENERATOP SHORTING BREAKER IN THE FSAR. NEITIER THE MAIN GENERATOR NOR THE MAIN GENERATOR SilORTING BREAKER 'S DISCUSSED IN TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0017, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: AGASTAT TIME DELAY RELAYS WERE INSTALLED INSIDE PANEL 1NCQHVC3 (1-1500-QS-IIVC) TO ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR PRESSURE INSIDE THE PIPING PENETRATION FILTRATION EXHAUST UNIT ROOMS (AUX. BLDG R 209 AND R-210) TO STABILIZE TO NO LESS THAN HEGATIVE 0.25 INCH WG AFTER TIE DOORS ARE CYCLED OPEN AND CLOSED. DUE TO MINIMUM SPACE INSIDE THIS PANEL AT LAYOUT NO. I1, TERMINATION BLOCK TBIIP (TERMINATION'S 1-12) MUST BE REMOVED. THE SECOND HALF OF THIS TERMINATION BLOCK (TERMINATION'S 13-24) WAS RE-NUMBERED l 12.. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY CLASS-lE SYSTEM. THE EQUIPMENT PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MODIFICATION IS 61E. THE POWER SOURCE IS l 120VAC SUPPLIED FROM 120VAC DISTRIBUTION PANEL INYS11 BREAKER 30 TO TB17M.23, 24

1 r 24 LOCATED AT LAYOUT NO.17 OF PANEL INCQHVC4. EACH RELAY REQUIRES 13 AMP 12OVAC FUSE IN SERIES. IN ADDITION Tills DCP ALSO ADDED ANNUNCIATORS ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. THIS MODIFICATION REQUIRED CilANGING THE LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM SETPOINT (IPDIS-2550 AND IPDIS-2551) FROM NEGATIVE 0.26 INCH WATER GAUGE (WG) TO NEGATIVE 0.28 INCH WG DECREASING. CHANGING Tile ) SETPOINT REQUIRED THAT ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE 17052-1 AND 17053-1 BE REVISED. THE HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM WAS DELETED IN DCP 88-VIN 0051-0-1. SAFETY EVALUATION: THERE WAS NO CHANGE TO THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION 15. THIS MODIFICATION AFFECTED ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03 ONLY.THESE ANNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN, LEAKAGE FROM THE PIPING ' PENETRATION AREA IS FILTERED BY TIE PIPING PENETRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM. l BOTli TRAINS NORMALLY START ON A CVI SIGNAL AND FAILURE OF ONE TRAIN DOES l 4 NOT AFFECT OFFSITE DOSES. DEGRADATION OF THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY DURING NORMAL OPERATION WILL ALARM ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. THIS IS BASED ON REVIEW OF Tile FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 6,7,9 AND 15. TIIESE r

      ,tNNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE StIUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE AGASTAT RELAYS ALONG WITH PRESSURE SWITCIES IPDIS-2550 AND 1PDIS-2551 ARE DESIGNED AS FAIL SAFE DEVICES. THIS MEANS THAT IF EITHER DEVICE (RELAY OR PRESSURE SWITCH) FAIL, THE CONTACTS OF THESE DEVICES FAIL CLOSE ACTIVATING ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03.THE RELAYS ARE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY I PANEL IN THE CONTROL ROOM, ROOM 163. THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE MARGIN OF SAFLTY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING Tile BASES TO 3/4.3,3/4.7 OR 3/4.11. ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02.AND ALB52A03 HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SilUTDOWN.
                                                                                                     -l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 'I DESCRII* TION: IMPROVE U/1 PERIMETER & M!CROWAVE CONFIGURATION. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IIAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTION: IMPROVE U/1 PERIMETER & MICROWAVE CONFIGURATION. THIS DCP  ! CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLl / INTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN i ACCIDtNT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, l SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN j 25

1 ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. SUB.iECT: DCP: 90-VIN 0032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 3 l DESCRIPTION: IMPROVE U/1 PERihETER & MICROWAVE CONFIGURATION. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR Tile PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN , ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY llAS NOT BEEN l DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. 1

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0040, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ALLOWED THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS CROSBY / WATTS SAFETY VALVES WIT 11 CONSOLIDATED SAFETY VALVES, FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR . THE VALVES A.RE INSTALLED IN THE NON-SAFETY RELA'ED PORTION OF Tile STARTING AIR SYSTEM. Tile PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR THE VALVES IS 626. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills CllANGE INVOLVED A MODIFICATION OF Tile DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR WillCH IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE MAKES THE COMPRESSOR SAFETY VALVES MORE RELIABLE AND DOES NOT AFFECT Tile SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF Tile DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. THEREFORE IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY AFFECT ON TIE FSAR SAFETY EVALUATIONS. THIS CIIANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0040, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP ADDED A CRANKCASE lEATER WITH ASSOCIATED Tl!ERMOSTAT AND THE DELETED THE LOW LEVEL OIL SWITCH FROM EACH OF THE FOUR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START COMPRESSORS (SYSTEM NO. 2403). ALL OF TIE EQUIPMENT IS PROJECT CLASSIFICATION 626 OR 62E. TIE HEATER AND i TIIERMOSTAT PROBE WERE INSTALLED IN TIE COMPRESSOR'S CRANKCASE. TIIE LEVEL ' SWITCH AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL ACCESSORIES WERE DELETED. INSTALLING A j CRANKCASE OIL HEATER AND SUrlNG THE TIERMOSTAT TEMPERATURE TO MAINTAIN I TIE TEMPERATURE OF Tile OIL AND CRANKCASE SURFACE ABOVE THE DEW POINT OF l THE INTAKE AIR, PRECLUDES CONDENSATION OF WATER IN THE CRANKCASE AND OIL l CONTAMINATION IS AVOIDED. SAFETY EVALUATION: A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 9.5.6, AND A REVIEW OF CilAlrrER 15, CONFIRMED TIIAT THE AIR START COMPRESSORS ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS j AN ACCIDENTINITIATORIN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. Tile COMPRESSORS ARE I NON-SAFETY RELATED AND FAILURE OF A COMPRESSOR WILL NOT AFFECT THE S AFETY l RELATED PORTION OF TIIE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. THE ADDITION OF TIIE lEATER AND THERMOSTAT AND TIIE DELETION OF THE LOW LEVEL OIL SWITCH MADE T1E COMPRESSOR MORE RELI ABLE. Tills CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE MODIFICATIONS MADE BY THIS DCP WERE BE IMPLEMENTED 26

l l l IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT APPROVED SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES WlHCH l RESULTED IN A DESIGN WHICH IS IN COMPLIANCE WITII PLANT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. APPLICABLE TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8.1 INCLUDING THE CORRESPONDING BASIS l WAS REVIEWED AND IT WAS DETERMINED TilAT IT WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS I CHANGE. j SUBJELT: DCP: 90-VIN 0044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRII' TION: THIS DCP IS MOUNTED HOFFMAN BOXES ON ONE END OF THE WASTE GAS SYSTEM WASTE GAS ANALYZER RACKS A-1902-P5-GAC (ANCPGAC) AND l-1902-P5-GAP (INCPGAP). TilESE BOXES CONTAIN STATES CO. TYPE ZWM-250, SLIDING LINK TERMINAL BLOCKS AND BANANA TEST JACKS. SINCE TIE END PANEL OF TIESE RACKS WAS l REMOVED BY TIE PLANT PERSONNEL THE END PANEL IS ALSO BEING CHANGED TO A HINGED DOOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP MODIFIED THE WIIUNG OF THE WASTE GAS ANALYZER RACKS A1902-P5-GAC AND l-1902-PS-GAP TO ADD TEST POINTS SO THAT TIE PLANT PERSONNEL CAN PERFORM THEIR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE OR SURVEILLANCE TESTING WITHOUT DETERMINING WIRES. BASED ON TIE REVIEW OF TIE DESIGN CRITERIA DC-1902 AND TFE FSAR SECTION I1.3 IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS MODIFICATION DID NOT CHANGE THE DESIGN BASES, FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF Tile WASTE GAS ANALYZERS. THE WASTE GAS ANALYZER RACKS A 1902-P5-GAC AND l-1902-P5-GAP ARE NONSAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITION. THE GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM MONITORS ARE DESCRIBED IN TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTIONS 3/4.3.3.10 AND 3/4.11.2.5. THIS DCP DID NOT CHANGE ANY PARAMETERS OR SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NON SAFETY RELATED ANALYZERS NOR DID IT CHANGE TIE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE ANALYZERS AND THEREFORE, DID NOT AFFECT AUTOMATIC CONTROL FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH HYDROGEN / OXYGEN MONTTORS. HENCE THE DCP DID NOT DECREASE Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY TIIE BASES OF Tim TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SUBECT: DCP: 90 VIN 0063, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: PROVIDES A BLOCKING FEATURE TilAT WlEN INVOKED ESTABLISIES A l IIARD BLOCK TO THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR RAD MONITORS 1RE-0002, - 0003,2565A,2565B, AND 2565C. Tills INHIBITS CVI ACTUATION AND MAINTAIN TIE - EXISTING MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALARMS AND INDICATIONS CURRENTLY PROVIDED. Tills ALSO ALLOWS LOCAL DEENERGIZATION OF THE DPM FOR. MAINTENANCE OR OTHER REQUIREhENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN ADDED ADDITIONAL CONDUlT AND CABLE TERMINATION'S TO SAFETY RELATED RELAY ENCLOSURES 1RY-0002 AND 1RY-0003. THE NEW EQUIPMENT ADDED WAS HAND SWITCHES 1HS-13259,1HS-13260, AND IHS-13261 WHICH ARE MOUNTED IN THE CORRESPONDING ENCLOSURES 1-1609-P5-CB1,1-1609-P5-CB2, AND l-1609-P5-CB3. THE ABOVE MENTION CHANGES HAS NO AFFECT ON WATER SENSITIVITY OF TIE EXISTING EQUIPMENT, AND Tile NEW SWITCH / ENCLOSURE ASSEMBLIES ARE MOUNTED ABOVE TIE AREA FLOOD LEVELS. 27

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V1N0079, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO NON-SAFETY RELATED PUMPS IN TiiE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT TENDON GALLERY POWERED FROM EXISTING WELDING RECElrTACLES IN TIE TENDON GALLERY. TIE PUMPS DISCHARGE TO THE STORM DRAIN SYSTEM AND SATISFY SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 REQUIREMENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED UNDER Tills DCP IS NON-SAFETY RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 QUALIFIED, SERVES NO POST ACCIDENT FUNCTION, AND DOES NOT EFFECT TIE FUNCTION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT:

DCP 90-VIN 0104, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIIIS DCP MODIFIES TIIE VENTILATION SYSTEM ASSOCIATED WITH TIE CONTROL BUILDING GAS BOTTLE STORAGE ROOM R 133 TO CONFORM WITil THE APPLICABLE NFPA, CGA AND OSHA CODES AND STANDARDS WHICli GOVERN STRUCTURES IN THIS USE CATEGORY. A LOW POINT SUPPLY AIR INLET WILL BE PROVIDED VIA TIE GAP UNDER THE DOOR. THE EXISTING TRANSFER GRILLE WILL BE BLANKED OFF. A IIIGH POINT EXIIAUST WILL BE PROVIDED BY ADDING AN 8 FOOT CEILING AND A LOW POINT EXHAUST WILL ALSO BE ADDED. SAFETY EVALUATION TIIE NORMAL FUNCTION OF TIE EX11AUST SYSTEM IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED NOR IS THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR THE SYSTEM THE CliANGE WILL CONFORM TO THE CODES AND STANDARDS GOVERNING COMPRESSED GAS STORAGE AND DISPENSING AREAS. THE GAS BOTTLE ROOM DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND THE VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED. THERE ARE NO SEISMIC HAZARDS INTRODUCED SINCE THERE ARE NO SAFETY COMPONENTS IN THE ROOM. THE CEILING WILL DE COATED TO PREVENT GASES FROM PERMEATING.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0105, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP MODIFIES SEVERAL SECONDARY STEAM DUMP VALVES AND OTHER VALVES TO UTILIZE LIVE LOAD PACKING STEM PACKING SYSTEM. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS INVOLVED WITil THIS DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0106, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: 1111S DCP INVOLVED CllANGES TO LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: FEEDWATER IEATERS l A, IB, IC,2A,2B,2C,3A,3B,3C, SA,5B,6A AND 6B; HEATER DRAIN TANKS A AND B; REIEATER DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D; MOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D. IT INCLUDED REVISIONS TO SETPOINTS AND OPERATING RANGES FOR MANY OF Ti!E LEVEL SWITCIIES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATED WITH TIE ABOVE EQUIPMENT. SONE OF THE LEVEL SWITCIIES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS WERE PIIYSICALLY RELOCATED IN ELEVATION AS DESCRIBED BELOW. THE PHYSICAL CHANGES DID NOT REQUIRE RE-ROUTING OF PIPE TO TIE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS BUT DID REQUIRE CUTTING AND RE-WELDING IN ORDER TO CHANGE Tile ELEVATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS. 28

                    -                                           _  =             ,

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP REVISED MANY OF THE SETPOINTS FOR TiiE IIIGH-ilIGH LEVEL ALARM / ISOLATION SWITCllES; HOWEVER, THE SETPOINT ELEVATIONS WERE INCREASED TO PROVIDE GREATER SEPARATION FROM NORMAL WATER LEVELS AND DECREASE Tile CHANCE TilAT MINOR TRANSIENTS WOULD RESULT IN ISOLATIONS. OTHER CHANGES IN THIS DCP ALSO PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND RELIABILITY OF THE CONDENSATE / FEED WATER AND IEATER DRAIN SYSTEMS. TIE CHANGES PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND DO NOT INCREASE THE CilANCES OF LOSS OF NORMAL FEED WATER. THE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE CHANCES OF SECONDARY SYSTEMS FAILURES. TIE CliANGES IN THE DCP DID NOT INCREASE THE MAGNITUDE OF TIE THERMAL LOAD TilAT OCCURS UPON HEATER STRING ISOLATION OR IIEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP. THE DESIGN CilANGES EFFECTS ONLY NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH ARE NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ANALYSIS. SECTION 15.2.3 OF THE FSAR EVALUATES TURBINE TRIP. THE ANALYSIS IN THIS SECTION COMPLETELY ENVELOPS ANY IMPACT THAT THE CHANGES IN THIS DCP COULD HAVE ON THE EVENT. NONE OF THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY THE DCP IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN Tile ANALYSIS. THE COMPONENTS ARE LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND FAILURE WILL NOT DAMAGE SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS. THE CHANCES HAVE NOT INCREASED THAT INSTABILITIES IN TIE NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS WILL PROPAGATE AND HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS. OTHER POSSIBLE EFFECTS THAT THE CHANGES IN THE DCP COULD HAVE ON ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT FAILURE ARE ENVELOPED BY THE ANALYSES IN FSAR SECTIONS 15.1.1,15.2.7 AND 15.2.3. TIE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED WATER VOLUMES IN Tile HEATER SHELLS HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE BY TIIE TURBINE MANUFACTURER THE STORED ENERGY LEVELS ARE WITHIN THE LIMITS FOR OPERATION WITH THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION OF EXTRACTION LINE NON-RETURN VALVES. Tills ENSURES THAT TURBINE OVERSPEED DUE TO REVERSE FLOW IN THE EXTRACTION LINES DOES NOT OCCUR ON LOAD REJECTION OR TURBINE TRIP. TliUS, THE TURBINE MISSILE ANALYSIS AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 3.5.1.3 REMAINS VALID. THE EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION BASED ON A 4 REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES TIIERE ARE NO REDUCTIONS IN TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V1N0117, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIIrFION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE INVOLVES THE NEW DESIGN AND FABRICATION OF A REPLACEMENT FILTER ELEMENT FOR THE UNIT 1 SPENT RESIN SLUICE BACKFLUSilABLE FILTER (1-1901 F4-003). Tile ELEMENT WAS DESIGNED AND RETROFITTED BY PALL CORPORATION FOR USE IN THE EXISTING VACCO VESSEL llOUSING. THE NEW DESIGN WAS A COMPLETE REPLACEMENT FOR TliE PREVIOUS ELEMENT IN TIIE VACCO FILTER AND ALLOWS FOR THE CONTINUED UTILIZATION OF THE VACCO TUDESHEET WITilOUT MODIFICATION. IiOWEVER, THE OPTION OF USING TIIE CURRENT VACCO FILTER ELEMENT DESIGN STILL EXISTS. SAIEFY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. TIIIS FILTER DOES NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION THIS FILTER MEETS SEISMIC CATEGORY l STANDARDS. ITS FAILURE WILL NOT COMPROMISE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VINO 120, REVISION 0. SEQUENCE 1 29 w

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REMOUNTED SOME OF THE SECURITY CAMERAS FROM SIDE-BY-SIDE TO VERTICAL STACK. TIIIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VIN 0175, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP REROUTES THE LOWER SENSING LINES FOR STEAM GENERATOR NARROW RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS 1LT-517,518,519, $27,528,529,537,538,539,547, 548,549,551,552,553, AND 554 TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONTINUOUS DOWNWARD SLOPE ON THE SENSING LINE. THIS CHANGE PREVENTS THE POSSIBLE BUILDUP OF NON-CONDENSABLE GASES AND ENSURE A WATER SOLID SENSING LINE TO TIIE TRANSMITTER. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASETIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR OR DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE RELOCATION OF TIE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS AND THE ASSOCIATED CORE DRILLS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTS NOR DOES IT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OR FUNCTION OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM IT DOES NOT DEGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE STEAM GENERATOR NARROW RANGE LEVEL SYSTEM. HilS DESIGN IS AN ENHANCEMENT OVER THE PREVIOUS DESIGN DUE TO THE ELIMINATION OF GAS TRAPS IN THE INSTRUMENT TUBING.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2E0114, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2 DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE INSTALLED PIPING, VALVES, AND INSTRUMENTATION TO ALLOW THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM TO BE AN ALTERNATE SOURCE OF SEAL AND COOLING WATER TO THE UNIT 2 CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS AND MOTORS, WHEN UTILITY WATER IS UNAVAILABLE. SEQUENCE 1 OF THE DCP INSTALLED PIPING FROM THE DISCHARGE OF TPCW PUMP 7 1405-P4 501 TO THE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE ON THE NEW LINE (2-1405-L4-594). IT ALSO MODIFIED UTILITY WATER LINE 2-2419-L4-543 AND THE PORTION OF THE NEW LiNE (2-1405 L4-594) WillCH TAPS INTO LINE 543 UP TO THE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE. SEQUENCE 2 OF THE DCP REMOVED THE CAPS AND JOINED TIIE TWO NEW LINES TO FORM ONE NEW LINE. THE NEW PIPING IS LOCATED AT THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP STRUCTURE. Tills WORK IS BEING PERFORMED ON NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS, PROJECT CLASS 626. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE Tile PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 15 (ACCIDENT ANALYSES). CHANGES ARE TO PIPING IN THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM AND TIIE UTILITY WATER SYSTEM, BOTH OF WlIICll ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED AND WHOSE FAILURE WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT A SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE NEW PIPING IS , LOCATED AT THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP STRUCTURE AND hEETS THE SAME I DESIGN CRITERI A AS THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM, (1.E., PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, MATERIAL, i 1 30 l

SUPPORT, ETC.).THE MODIFICATIONS IN TIIIS DESIGN CllANGE DID NOT DECREASE TECH. SPECS. SAFETY MARGINS SINCE THE SYSTEMS AFFECTED, SYSTEMS 2419 AND 1405, HAVE NO SAFETY DESIGN BASES. Tills IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPEC. BASES, INCLUDING SECTION B 3/4.11.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2N0003, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: tills DCP REPLACED TIIE FOUR TURBINE BUILDING SUMP PUMPS WITH FOUR HIGliIIEAD SUBMERSIBLE SUMP PUMPS CAPABLE OF PUMPING 275 GPM AT 100 FT. OF 1IEAD PRESSURE. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile TURBINE BUILDING DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT RELIED UPON TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. Tile INCREASED FLOW RATE WILL NOT EFFECT TIIE ABILITY OF RADIATION MON 11DR RE-848 TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION, THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE Tim PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF TifE MALFUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN Tile FSAR. FSAR SECTIONS 9.3.3 AND 15.0 WERE REVIEWED. ALSO Tills SYSTEM IS NOT DESCRIBED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SUDJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0018, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: AGASTAT TIME DELAY RELAYS WERE INSTALLED INSIDE PANEL 2NCQHVC3 (2 1500-Q5-HVC) TO ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR PRESSURE INSIDE THE PIPING PENETRATION FILTRATION EXHAUST UNIT ROOMS (AUX. BLDG R-209 AND R-210) TO STABILIZE TO NO LESS THAN NEGATIVE 0.25 INCll WG AFTER THE DOORS ARE CYCLED OPEN AND CLOSED. DUE TO MINIMUM SPACE INSIDE TIIIS PANEL aT LAYOUT NO. I1, TERMINATION BLOCK TB1IP (TERMINATION'S 1-12) MUST BE REF.OVED. TIIE SECOND HALF OF THIS TERMINATION BLOCK (TERMINATION'S 13-24) WAS RE-NUMBERED l-12. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY CLASS lE SYSTEM. THE EQUIPMENT PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MODIFICATION IS 61E. THE POWER SOURCE IS 120VAC SUPPLIED FROM 120VAC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 2NYS1 BREAKER 30 TO TB17M.22, 23 LOCATED AT LAYOUT NO.16 OF PANEL 2NCQilVC3. EACli RELAY REQUIRES 1-3 AMP 12OVAC FUSE IN SERIES. IN ADDITION THIS DCP ALSO ADDED ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. Tills MODIFICATION REQUIRED CHANGING Tile LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM SETPOINT (2PDIS-2550 AND 2PDIS-2551) FROM NEGATIVE 0.26 INCH WATER GAUGE (WG) TO NEGATIVE 0.28 INCH WG DECREASING. CHANGING TIIE SETPOIN r REQUIRED THAT ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE 17052-2 BE REVISED. , SAFETY EVALUATION: THERE WAS NO CHANGE TO THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF ACC: DENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION 15. Tills MODIFICATION AFFECTED ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALD52A03 ONLY.THESE l ANNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SIIUTDOWN. LEAKAGE FROM THE PIPING PENETRATION AREA IS FILTERED BY THE PIPING PENETRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM.  ! BOTil TRAINS NORMALLY START ON A CVI SIGNAL AND FAILUP.E OF ONE TRAIN DOES l NOT AFFECT OFFSITE DOSES. DEGRADATION OF THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY l DURING NORMAL OPERATION WILL ALARM ANNUNCIATORS ALBJ2A02 AND ALB52A03. l THIS IS BASED ON REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 6,7,9 AND 15. TIIESE ANNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED G. SAE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE AGA's TA r RELAYS ALONG WITH PRESSURE SWITCHES 2PDIS-2550 AND 2PDIS-2551 ARE Ls'SIG1'JD AS FAIL l 31 1

l l SAFE DEVICES. TIIIS MEANS TilAT IF EITilER DEVICE (RELAY OR PRESSURE SWITCH) FAILS, Tile CONTACTS OF Ti!ESE DEVICES WILL FAIL CLOSE ACTIVATING ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. TIIE RELAYS AR:- SEISMICALLY MOUNTED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY I PANEL IN Tile CONTROL ROOM, ROOM 163. THERE IS NO CIIANGE i TO Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIIE BASES OF Tile TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING TIE DASES TO 3/4.3,3/4.7 OR 3/4.11. ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALD52 A03 liAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SilUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SIIUTDOWN.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2N0027, REVISION 1 SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrTION: Tills DCP ADDS PLATFORMS TO UNIT 2 TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO Tile STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS "A" AND "B" INSTRUMENT CONSOLES AND PLATFORMS TO PROVIDE ACCESS AROUND THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES. ALSO IT INSTALLS PLATFORMS TO PROVIDE ACCESS AROUND Tile NSCW PUMPS TRAIN "A" AND *B.* TI-ESE ARE TO ENilANCE PERSONNEL SAFETY AND EQUIPMENT ACCESSIBILITY. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE PLATFORM INSTALLATIONS DID NOT AFFECT ANY DESCRIIrTIONS IN Tile FSAR REGARDING TIIE MANNER IN WlilCII THE CONTROLLERS, VALVES, AND OTilER INSTRUMENTATION ARE OPERATED TO WHICli Tile PLATFORMS PROVIDE ACCESS NOR DOES IT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION OR SUPPORT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90.V2N0041, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP ALLOWED Tile REPLACEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS CROSBY / WATTS SAFETY VALVES WITil CONSOLIDATED SAFETY VALVES, FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR. THE VALVES ARE INSTALLED IN THE NON-SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE STA.RTING AIR SYSTEM. TIIE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR TIIE VALVES IS 626. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills CilANGE INVOLVED A MODIFICATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR WillCH IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. Tills DESIGN CHANGE MAKES Tile COMPRESSOR SAFETY VALVES MO.RE RELIABLE AND DOES NOT AFFECT TIIE SAFETY REL ATED PORTION OF TIIE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. TIIEREFORE IT DOES NOT }{ AVE ANY AFFECT ON TIIE FSAR SAFETY EVALUATIONS. THIS CilANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECll SPECS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2N0041, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRil' TION: Tills DCP INSTALLED llEATERS IN TIIE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR COMPRESSOR CRANKCASES TO ELIMINATE MOISTURE INTRUSION INTO TIIE COMPRESSOR OIL Ti!EREBY EXTENDING Tile COMPRESSOR LIFE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CIIANGE INVOLVED A MODIFICATION OF TIIE DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR WHICilIS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THIS DESIGN CilANGE MAKES THE COMPRESSOR MORE REL.lABLE AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. THEREFORE IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY AFFECT ON TIIE FSAR SAFETY EVALUATIONS. Tills CilANGE DOES NOT AITECT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECII SPECS. 32

SUBJECr: DCP: 90-V2N0078, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DESIGN CIIANGE MODIFIED TIIE UNIT 2 NATURAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER BY: (1) ADDING PIPE EXTENSIONS AT TIIE PERIMETER OF TIE TOWER, (2) ADDING ADDITIONAL NOZZLES (256 LOCATIONS) AT Tile PERIMETER OF TIE TOWER, (3) REPLACING NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES AT Ti!E FLUME BOTTOMS WITil FRENCil SPRAYERS,(4) REPLACING ALL REMAINING SINGLE SPLASil PLATE ASSEMBLIES (R-C TYPE), (5) REARRANGING NOZZLE SIZES TO PROVIDE MORE WATER AT TIIE OUTER PORTIONS OF Ti!E TOWER, REDUCED WATER LOADING IN Tile CENTER, (6) ADDING DIVERTERS (STAINLESS STEEL ANGLES) TO IMPROVE ENTERING FLOW TO TIIE DISTRIBUTION LATERALS IN TIIE FIRST SECrlON OF Tile FLUMES AT Ti!E SECOND AND THIRD RISERS, AND (7) ADDING PVC FILL AT TIIE PERIMETER AND CENTER OF TIIE TOWER. Tile NATURAL DRAIT COOLING TOWERS ARE PART OF TIE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM (1401) AND IIAVE A PROJECT CLASSIFICATION OF 626. Tills IS A NON-SAFLTY RELATED SYSTEM FAILURE OF Tills SYSTEM WILL NOT COMPROMISE TIE ABILITY OF THE PLANT TO ACCOMPLISII A SAFE Sl!UTDOWN. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE CIRCULATING WATER COOLING TOWERS ARE NOT ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE WilEN DETERMINING AND EVALUATING Tile LIMITING CASES DESCRIBED IN FSAR CIIAPTER 15 (ACCIDENT ANALYSIS). THIS DESIGN CilANGE IS ASSOCIATED WITil SYSTEM 1401 AND DOES NOT DECREASE TECII. SPEC. SAFETY MARGINS SINCE IT llAS NO SAFETY DESIGN BASES. Tills IS BASED ON REVIEW OF TIIE TECIL SPEC. BASES, INCLUDING SECTION B 3/4.7.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2N0080, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrr!ON: Tills DCP INSTALLED TWO NON-SAFETY RELATED PUMPS IN Tile UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT TENDON GALLERY POWERED FROM EXISTING WELDING RECEl'TACLES IN THE TENDON G ALLERY. TIIE PUMPS DISCIIARGE TO TIIE STORM DRAIN SYSTEM AND SATISFY SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 REQUIREMENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED UNDER TIIIS DCP IS NON-SAFETY RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 QUALIFIED, SERVES NO POST ACCIDENT FUNCTION, AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2N0090,11EVISION 0 SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP UPGRADES THE STEAM GENERATOR IIYDRAULIC SNUBBERS BY ADDING "TRUE TEST-IN-PLACE" FEATURE. THIS PERMITS IN-SERVICE TESTING OF TIIE IIYDRAULIC SNUBBERS WITilOUT TIIE RISK, COST, AND SCIIEDULE DURATION OF CLEVIS PIN REMOVAL OR SNUBBERliANDLING. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WillCilllAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY. TIIEREFORE, Tills DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. 33

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2NO107, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRII* TION: THIS DCP INVOLVED CHANGES TO LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS ASSOCIATED WITil TIIE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: FEEDWATER HEATERS 1 A, IB, IC,2A,2B,2C,3A,3B,3C,5A, SB,6A AND 6B; HEATER DRAIN TANKS A AND B; REIEATER DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D; MOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D. IT INCLUDED REVISIONS TO SETPOINTS AND OPERATING RANGES FOR MANY OF TIIE LEVEL SWITCHES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATED WIT 11 THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT. SOhE OF TIIE LEVEL SWITCHES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS WERE PilYSICALLY RELOCATED IN ELEVATION AS DESCRIBED BELOW. TIE PHYSICAL CHANGES DID NOT REQUIRE RE-ROUTING OF PIPE TO TIIE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS BUT DID REQUIRE CUTTING AND RE-WELDING IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE ELEVATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP REVISED MANY OF TIE SETPOINTS FOR THE HIGH-IIIGH LEVEL ALARM / ISOLATION SWITCIES; HOWEVER, THE SETPOINT ELEVATIONS WERE INCREASED TO PROVIDE GREATER SEPARATION FROM NORMAL WATER LEVELS AND DECREASE THE CHANCE THAT MINOR TRANSIENTS WOULD RESULT IN ISOLATIONS. OTIER CHANGES IN Tills DCP ALSO PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND RELIABILITY OF THE CONDENSATE / FEED WATER AND IEATER DRAIN SYSTEMS. THE CllANGES PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND DID NOT INCIEASE TIIE CHANCES OF LOSS OF NORMAL FEED WATER. THE CHANGES DID NOT INCREASE TIE CHANCES OF SECONDARY SYSTEMS FAILURES. THE CilANGES IN TIE DCP DID NOT INCREASE TIE MAGNITUDE OF THE TilERMAL LOAD THAT OCCURS UPON HEATER STRING ISOLATION OR IIEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP. TIE DESIGN CHANGES EFFECTS ONLY NON-SAIETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUNENTATION WHICH IS NOT ASSUhED TO FUNCTION IN THE ANALYSIS. SECTION 15.2.3 OF TIIE FSAR EVALUATES TURBINE TRIP. THE ANALYSIS IN Tills SECTION COMPLETELY ENVELOPS ANY IMPACT TilAT THE CHANGES IN THIS DCP COULD HAVE ON TIIE EVENT. NONE OF TIE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY TIE DCP IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ANALYSIS. THE COMPONENTS ARE LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND FAILURE WILL NOT DAMAGE SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS. TIE CHANCES IIAVE NOT INCREASED THAT INSTABILITIES l IN THE NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS WILL PROPAGATE AND HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON SAFETY ' RELATED COMPONENTS. OTHER POSSIBLE EFFECTS THAT TIIE CIIANGES IN Tile DCP COULD HAVE ON ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT FAILURE ARE ENVELOPED BY THE ANALYSES IN FSAR SECTIONS 15.1.1,15.2.7 AND 15.2.3. THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED WATER VOLUMES IN Tile lEATER SIELLS HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND l ACCEPTABLE BY THE TURBINE MANUFACTURER TIIE STORED ENERGY LEVELS ARE WITHIN TIIE LIMITS FOR OPERATION WITil THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION OF EXTRACTION LINE NON-RETURN VALVES. Tills ENSURES T11AT TURBINE OVERSPEED DUE TO REVERSE FLOW IN TIE EXTRACTION LINES DOES NOT OCCUR ON LOAD REJECTION OR TURBINE TRIP.; TIIUS, TIIE TURBINE MISSILE ANALYSIS AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 3.5.1.3 REMAINS VALID. THE EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. BASED ON A REVIEW OF TIIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES TIIERE ARE NO REDUCTIONS IN TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN TIE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL, SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 90-V2NO147, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLS A MORE RELIABLE IlOST FOR OPENING AND CLOSING TEE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT IIATCII. THIS CONSIST OF A 20-TON ELECTRIC HOIST , WHICll HAS A DRIVE CAPABLE OF BEING OPERATED BY AIR-OPERATED POWER WRENCH IF NECESSARY UPON LOSS OF POWER TO THE ELECTRIC MOTOR.. MPL TAG #2210lR4017 34

1 l SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE llOIST WILL ONLY BE OPERATED IN MODES 5 AND 6. FAILURE OF THE IlOIST MAY CREATE Tile POSSIBILITY OF Tile EQUIPMENT IIATCll FALLING ON TIIE STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CHECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECTLY BELOW. ALSO Tile IlOIST AND THE ASSOCIATED STRUCTURAL STEEL COULD DE J ACCIDENTALLY DROPPED ON TIIE STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CllECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECTLY BELOW DURING THE REPLACEMENT OF TIIE ilOIST, THE POSSIBILITY OF TilESE TWO DROPS IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IN TIIE FSAR; liOWEVER BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 9.1.5.3.1.1, EITHER OF THESE ACCIDENTS WILL NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO ANY SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED DURING MODES 5 AND 6, AND WILL NOT PRECLUDE DECAY lEAT REMOVAL OR Tile ABILITY TO MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. ALSO111E CONSEQUENCES OF THESE ACCIDENTS ARE Tile S AME OR LESS TilAN TiiE PREVIOUS liOIST SYSTEM. TilEREFORE, Tile MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CREATE TIIE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION NOT IMPLIED OR ANALYZED IN TIIE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-V2N0163, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2 DESCRIPTION: TIIIS DCP ADDED ADDITIONAL VALVES AND PIPING TO FACILITATE FASTER PREPARATION AND COMPLETION OF LOCAL LLRTS FOR TIE FOLLOWING ASSOCIATED PENETRATIONS: PEN. I1 A,12A,34,49,50,63,69A,69B AND PEN. 78 SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICllllAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY ; TiiEREFORE Tills DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. Tile NEW VALVES ADDED ARE LOCKED OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VAN 0108, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP PROVIDED Tile LEVEL SETPOlhTT AND SETPOINT DRAWINGS FOR Tile MICRO FILTRATION SYSTEM. Tills DESIGN INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED DURING THE MANUFACTURER (ABB IMPELL) AND ON SITE GPC PERSONNEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SPECIFICATION X4 AZ01. ALL DESIGN INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PERFORM INITI AL INSTALLATION OF Tile SYSTEM WAS PROVIDED BY DCP 90-VAN 0108-0-1. THE EQUIPMENT ADDRESSED BY Tills DCP IS PROJECT CLASS 427 AND NON-SAFETY RELATED. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DESIGN CllANGE PROVIDES THE BALANCE OF INSTRUMENT SETPOINTS AND TANK LEVEL SET DESIGN DOCUMENTATION FOR TIE RADWASTE MICRO FILTRATION SYSTEM AND ITS ASSOCIATED SYSTEM INTERFACES WITH TIIE DEMINERALIZER WATER SYSTEM (1418), LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM (1901), SERVICE AIR SYSTEM (2401), INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM (2420), AND AUX BUILDINC FILTER EXilAUST AND CONTINUOUS EXIIAUST SYSTEM (1553). l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90 VCN0070, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRllrrlON: Tills DCP MODIFIED TIIE PLANT MAKEUP WELL WATER SYSTEM (SYSTEM 1408). ALL MODIFICATIONS ARE TO NON-SAFETY RELATED, PROJECT CLASS 626 AND 62J j EQUIPMENT / INSTRUMENTATION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PANEL (1-1604-Q5-PCP) WlERE j TIIE NEW INDICATOR (CLI-17426A) AND SWITCil (CLS 17426) WAS MOUNTED IS PROJECT 35

i CLASS 11J. Ti!E SECTION OF PANEL WilERE TilESE INSTRUMENTS ARE BEING INSTALLED CONTAINS BOTil 61J AND 62J DEVICES. Tile DEVICES BEING ADDED, CLI 17426A AND CLS 17426, ARE NONSAFETY RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2, AND ARE MOUNTED AND PROTECTED BY BARRIERS TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT IN OTIIER PANEL SECTIONS DURING A SEISMIC CVENT. CLI 17426A PROVIDES MAKE UP WELL WATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL IN Ti!E MAIN CONTROL ROOM TO PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION TO Tile CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS ABOUT SYSTEM INVENTORY PROBLEMS IF TilEY ARISE. SAFETY EVALUATION: ALL PIIYSICAL CilANGES WERE TO PIPINO, CIRCUlTRY, INSTRUMENTATION AND ANNUNCIATION IN TIIE PLANT MAKEUP WATER WELL SYSTEM. TIIE DEVICES ADDED , CLI 17426A AND CLS 17426, ARE NONSAFETY-RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2, AND ARE MOUNTED AND PROTECTED BY BARRIERS TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT IN OTIIER PANEL SECTIONS DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. Tile IMPACT TO TIIE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM, TIIE POTABLE WATER SYSTEM, AND TIIE NSCW SYSTEM WAS CONSIDERED. OF TIIESE SYSTEMS, UNLY Tile NSCW SYSTEM IS SAFETY-RELATED. WillLE Ti!E NSCW'S PRIMARY SOURCE OF MAKEUP TO ITS BASIN WATER IS TIIE PLANT MAKEUP WELL WATER, Tills IS NOT ITS ONLY SOURCE OF WATER AND MAKEUP IS NOT REQUIRED FOR TIIE NSCW BASINS IN TIIE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT FOR A MINIMUM OF 24 DAYS. TIIIS IS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF WATER TO DE MADE AVAILABLE IF Tile MWWST IS INOPERABLE. TIIE FAILURE OF T11E MWWST WILL NOT IIAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. THE PIPING IS NOT LOCATED IN A SEISMIC 1, OR 2 OVER 1 AREA. TIIE TANK AND PIPING SIZE DID NOT CilANGE. TilEREFORE, Tile POTENTI AL FLOOD SOURCE WAS NOT CilANGED. TIIESE MODIFICATIONS CONFORM TO TIIE APPLICABLE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR TiiE MWWST AND ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM. Tile APPLICABLE DESIGN CRITERIA WAS MET, AND Tile MATERIALS UTILIZED ARE COMPATIBLE FOR TIIEIR INTENDED SERVICE. THE SYSTEM FUNCTION WAS NOT AFFECTED AND TilESE CilANGES SIIOULD INCREASE Ti!E RELIABILITY OF Tile SYSTEM AND QUALITY OF Tile WATER PROVIDED. Tills WAS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TIIE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 9.2.4,9.2.3,9.3.2,9.5.1,7.0,2.4.I1,10.3.5, 13.5, l~.1,9.A,1.2.10-8,2.4.12 AND 15. A FAILURE OF TIIE MWWST WILL NOT DECREASE TECil SPEC SAFETY MARGINS DEFINED BY Ti!E BASIS OF THE TECII SPECS. TlilS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECil SPEC BASIS, INCLUDING SECTION B3/4.7.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VCN0127, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP INVOLVED REPLACEMENT OF TIIE FUEL llANDLING MACillNE SOLID STATE CONTROLLER AND ITS ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS WITil A PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER (PLC) AND ITS ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS. TiiE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN Ti!E CONTROLLERS IS TIIAT Tile SOLID STATE CONTROL Wi!ICilIS ANALOG IS NOW CONTROLLED DIGITALLY THROUGil A PLC ALSO INCLUDED IN THIS CilANGE WERE Tile REPLACEMENT AND ADDITION OF CONTROL RELAYS ASSOCI ATED WITil TIIE NEW CONTROLLER PillLOSOPHY, Tile ORIGINAL SOLID STATE CONTROLLER WAS PROVEN TO DE INOPERABLE AND UNRELIABLE DURING UNIT REFUELING OUTAGES. Tile PLC IMPROVED SYSTEM OPERABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND MAINTAINABILITY. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE FUEL 11ANDLING MACilINE IS A SEISMIC CATEGORY l SYSTEM AS DISCUSSED IN DESIGN CRITERIA DC-1010, REV. 5 AND FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3. DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION WAS PERFORMED DURING OUTAGE ACTIVITIES AND DID NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED IN FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSES, OR SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE SUCH ACCIDENTS. ALL INTERLOCKS, PER SECL 90-348, TilAT EXISTED IN THE PREVIOUS 36

1 DESIGN ARE ALSO PROVIDED IN Tile PLC DESIGN. TiiE NEW CIRCUIT DESIGN WATCllES l PLC OPERATION AND SIIUTS DOWN Tile SYSTEM FOR ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. SilOULD LOSS OF POWER OCCUR, TIIE SYSTEM INillBITS CONTINUED OPERATION. THE PLC I IMPROVES TIIE RELIABILITY AND OPERABILITY OF Tile FUEL IIANDLING MACIIINE WITIIOUT AFFECTING ITS LOAD CAPACITY AS DEFINED IN TIIE FSAR. ANY LOAD llANDLING REQUIRED DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills CilANGE WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITil APPROVED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR A LOAD DROP. TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TIIE BASES OF TIIE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT DECREASED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VCN0152, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: REVISE FENCE OUTRIGGERS AND BARBED WIRE. Tills DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR Tile PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TiiE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIIE FSAR. Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. SUBJECr: DCP: 90-VCN0169, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIIIS DESIGN CilANGE PACKAGE PROVIDED TIIE DESIGN FOR THE INSTALLATION OF LIVE-LOAD PACKING ON Tile FOLLOWING UNIT 2 VALVES: 2PDV-6173 A, 2PDV-6174 A, 21IV-6015, 21IV-6179, 21IV-7603 A, 21IV-7603 C, 2FV-0510, 2 FV-0530, 2 LV-5242, 2LV-5244, 2 UV-41 12, 2 U V-41 14, 2 UV-4122 ,2 UV-4132, 2 UV-4134, 2TV-0500B, 2TV-0500D, 2TV-0500F, 2TV-0500H, 2PV-0507A, 2PV 0507C, 2LV-4285, 2HV 4303, 2PDV-6126B, 2PDV4127B, 2PDV4172 B, 2PDV-6174 B, 2 HV-6030, 211V-6181, 21IV-7603 D, 2HV-7603 D, 2FV-0520, 2FV-0540 2LV-5243,2LV-5245,2VV-4113,2UV-4115,2UV-4123,2UV-4133,2TV-0500A,  ! 2TV-0500C, 2TV-0500E, 2TV-05000, 2TV-0500J, 2PV-0507B, 2LV-4284, 2HV-4302, 2PD V-6126A, AND 2PDV-6127A. Tile ASME SECTION 111 CLASS 2 AND 3 VALVES INVOLVE Tile STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN, AND FEED WATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS, RESPECTIVELY. Tile 424 VALVES INVOLVE THE MAIN STEAM, EXTRACTION STIIAM, AND FEED WATER HEATER DRAIN SYSTEMS VALVE NUMBERS 211V-7603A, B, C, AND D ARE THE ONLY ACTIVE VALVES. THE PREVIOUS PACKING WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH GRAPillTE PACKING RINGS. Tile PREVIOUS GLAND STUDS WERE ALSO REPLACED. SPRINGS (BELLEVILLE WASilERS) WERE INSTALLED BETWEEN THE STUD NUT AND THE GLAND FOLLOWER. THE SPRINGS MAINTAIN A CONSTANT LOAD ON THE PACKING WHICH ASSIST IN PREVENTING THE VALVE FROM LEAKING. PER ASME SECrlON XI (1983 EDITION TilROUGli SUMMER 1983 ADDENDA), SUBSECTION IWA, ARTICLE 7000, SUBARTICLE 7400, Tile VALVE PACKING IS EXEMPT FROM TIIE ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, Tile LIVE-LOAD PACKING COMPONENTS IIAVE Tile SAME PROJECT CLASS AS THE VALVES. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE OPERABILITY OF TIIE VALVES IS NOT AFFECTED BY l I TIIE LIVE-LOAD PACKING. Tills WAS VERIFIED BY TEST PERFORMED ON A SAMPLE VALVE WITil LIVE-LOAD PACKING. TIIE TEST SIIOWED TIIAT THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING ., WILL NOT CAUSE Tile VALVE 10 BIND. Tile PACKING DOES NOT ADD ANY COMPONENT TIIAT WILL IIAVE AN EFFECT ON THE OPERABILITY OF TIIE VALVE OR HAVE ANY EFFECT ON Tile VALVE ITSELF TilAT WOULD AFFECT Tile VALVE OPERATION WHILE THE VALVE IS SUBJECTED TO A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE. ALSO, THE VALVE PACKING AND 37

COMPONENTS PROCURED FOR Tile LIVE-LOAD PACKING WERE QUALIFIED FOR THE APPLICABLE TEMPERATUIES THAT THE VALVE IS EXPOSED TO AND THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING DOES NOT AFFECT THE RELIADILITY OF T1E VALVE TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. TIE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM VISUAL EXAMINATION OF Tile VALVE PACKING FOR LEAKAGE IS ALSO NOT AFFECTED. Tile ADDITION OF TIIE LIVE-LOAD PACKING DlD NOT INCREASE TIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR. Tills EVALUATION INCLUDED A REVIEW OF FSAR CIIAirTERS 3,5,6,9,10, AND 15. TIE LIVE LOAD PACKING REDUCED Tile POTENTIAL FOR VALVE STEM LEAKAGE. TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT DECREASED. UllS EVALUATION INCLUDED A REVIEW OF THE BASES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 3/4.3,3/4.6, AND 3/4.7.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VCN0176, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIIrrION: THIS DCP MODIFIED THE SECURITY COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS CONSOLES. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR Tile PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. i

SUBJECT:

DCP: 90-VCN0178, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 ] DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP ADDED 3/8" TUBING FOR TESTING THE CONTROL ROOM I DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TO ITS ADJACENT ROOMS TO ENSURE ACCURATE l VERIFICATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEMS ABILITY TO l MAINTAIN POSITIVE PRESSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THIS IS TO SATISFY Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENT 4.7.6.E.3 TilAT STIPULATES THAT THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE BETWEEN TIE CONTROL ROOM AND ITS ADJACENT ROOM BE VERIFIE

D. PROCEDURE

540541 AND -2 ARE USED TO ACCOMPLISil THIS TASK. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE TESTING PORTS REMAIN CAPPED WIEN NOT IN USE. Tile PERMANENT TESTING PORT PENETRATIONS IIAVE NO EFFECT ON THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION UNITS TO PERFORM THERE SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. ALL'IUBING PENETRATIONS THAT WERE BREACIED FOR TUBING INSTALLATION WEIG RESEALED WITH THE REQUIRED MATERIAL PER SPECIFICATION AX1 AGI1. THIS DCP DOES NOT. DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES IN SECTION 3/4.7.6.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0009, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2 DESCRIPTION: tills DCP REMOVED THE UNIT I RTD BYPASS SYSTEM AND REPLACED IT WITil FAST ACTING, NARROW RANGE, DUAL-ELEMENT THERMOWELL-MOUNTED RTDS INSTALLED DIRECTLY INTO THE EXISTING REACTOR COOLANT PIPING PENETRATIONS (THREE MOUNTED IN Tile OLD llOT LEG SCOOP PENETRATION AND ONE MOUNTED IN TIIE OLD COLD LEG NOZZLE PENETRATION WITH THE CROSSOVER LINE 1101 E BEING CAPPED OFF, 38

1 ._ a SAFETY EVALUATION: REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. REACTOR COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE INPUTS FOR CONTROL AND PROTECTION FUNCTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUPPLIED ALSO OTHER EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS UNAFFECTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCrlON AS DESIGNED. TIE ARRANGEMENT OF Tile RTD MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT T1E FUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT USED IN THE MITIGATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT. THEREFORE, TlHS CllANGE DOES NOT CREATE TIE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT OR AN UNREVIEWED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0019, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TO PREVENT EXTRACTION STEAM FLOW FROM REVERSING AND CAUSING TURBINE OVER SPEED AFTER A TURBINE TRIP, A SPRING-ASSISTED NON RETURN VALVE IS LOCATED IN EACH EXTRACTION STEAM LINE TO THE NUMBERS 3,4,5, AND 6 HEATERS DURING NORMAL OPERATION, AIR PRESSURE COUNTERACTS TIE SPRING FORCE, PREVENTING THE SPRING FROM CLOSING TIE NON RETURN VALVE. ON A TURBINE TRIP, LOSS OF TIE EMERGENCY TRIP SYSTEM (ETS)liYDRAULIC FLUID PRESSURE ACTUATES TIE AIR RELAY DUMP VALVES (ARDV). THE ARDVS VENT THE CONTROL AIR FROM TIE NON RETURN VALVE ACTUATORS, WillCil ALLOWS THE SPRINGS TO ASSIST IN CLOSING THE VALVES. FOR OVER SPEED PROTECTION, THE EXTRACTION NON RETURN VALVES MUST CLOSE WITHIN TWO SECONDS. PRESSURE SWITCH PSL-7070 SENSES TIE LOSS OF CONTROL AIR PRESSURE IN LINE 12420-832-1" AND ACTUATES SOLENOID VALVES WHICH ALSO VENT TIE AIR FROM Tile NON RETURN VALVE ACTUATORS. PSL-7070 ALSO INITIATES THE CLOSING OF TIE EXTRACrlON STEAM ISOLATION VALVES AND TIE OPENING OF VARIOUS DRAIN VALVES. A PIPE SUPPORT WAS ALSO BE ADDED TO LINE l 2420-881-1" TO RESTRAIN HORIZONTAL MOVEMENT. THIS DCP REPLACED PRESSURE SWITCH PSL-7070, WillCH WAS LOCATED IN TIE TURBINE FRONT STANDARD, WITH TilREE PRESSURE SWITCIES WHICH ARE LOCATED ON INSTRUMENT RACK 21, 1-1624-PS-R21. TIE SET POINTS FOR TIIE NEW SWITCHES, PSL-7070A, B, AND C, REMAINED AT 15 PSIG, WillCH IS TIE SET POINT FOR PSL-7070. BECAUSE TIIERE WAS NOT ENOUGH ROOM FOR THREE PRESSURE SWITCIES IN Tile CURRENT LOCATION OF PSL-7070, THE PRESSURE TAP FOR THE NEW SWITCHES WAS ADDED TO LINE l-2420-881-1", WHICH IS PART OF Tile SAME AIR SYSTEM BUT IS FURTiiER FROM THE ARDVS. TIE PREVIOUS PRESSURE TAP FOR PSI 7070 WAS CAPPED. STAINLESS STEEL TUBING WAS INSTALLED FROM Tile NEW PRESSURE TAP TO THE INSTRUMENT RACK. THE PREVIOUS DESIGN USED A SINGLE PRESSURE SWITCll, PSL-7070, AND ONEOF-ONE LOGIC TO GENERATE TIE VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS. A MALFUNCTION OF TIE PRESSURE SWITCH WOULD CAUSE EITHER A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO IMPROPER ACTUATION OF THE EXTRACTION STEAM ISOLATION VALVES OR THE LACK OF ACTUATION OF THE NON RETURN VALVE SOLENOIDS, TIE EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES AND VARIOUS DRAIN VALVES. BY CHANGING THE TRIP LOGIC TO TWO4F-THREE LOGIC, THE PROBABILITY OF IMPROPER ACTUATION OR LACK OF ACTUATION OF Tile AFFECTED VALVES DUE TO PRESSURE SWITCH MALFUNCTION IS REDUCED. SAFETY EVALUATION: NONE OF THE COMPONENTS ADDED OR MODIFIED BY THIS DCP ARE SAFETY RELATED. THE ADDITION OF Tim PRESSURE TAP AND INSTRUMENT AIR LINE ilAD A NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT ON TIE CLOSING TIMES FOR TIE EXTRACTION STEAM NON RETURN VALVES. TIE VALVES STILL CLOSE WITHIN TWO SECONDS OF ACTUATION i OF THE ARDVS. THEREFORE TilERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE TURDINE OVER SPEED PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE NON RETURN VALVES. CHANGING THE ONE-OFONE LOGIC, WHICH CURRENTLY GENERATES VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS, TO A TWOOF-TilREE LOGIC WILL PROVIDE FOR MORE RELIABLE OPERATION OF THE TURBINE 1 39

EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. Tile POSSIBILITY OF A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO MALFUNCTION OF Tile EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES WAS REDUCED. THE REACTOR TRIP CIRCUlTRY AND REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS DCP. TIIE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN Tile TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT REFER TO Tile TURBINE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. TIIB EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM IS MORE RELIABLE DUE TO Tile CIIANGE IN VALVE ACTUATION LOGIC. SINCE Tile RESULTS OF A TURillNE TRIP OR TURBINE OVER SPEED EVENT ARE NOT CHANGED BY Tills DCP, Tile MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WAS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 VIN 0021, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP REPLACED TIIE PREVIOUS STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL MEASURING INSTRUMENTATION WITil AN ELECTRONIC SYSTEM WillCH MEASURES LEVEL BY TIIE CONDUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STEAM AND WATER INTERFACE TO CONTROL TIIE OPENING AND CLOSING OF Tile CONDENSATE DRAIN VALVES ON Tile SECONDARY SYSTEM. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT CHANGE Tile WAY Tile AFFECTED LEVEL SWITCllES AND TilERE DRAINAGE SYSTEM COMPONENTS OPERATE OR ANY OF TilERE FUNCTIONS. IT IS AN EN)lANCEMENT WHICil IMPROVES RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE. IT DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY EXCEL'T FOR l-LSH-5178.1-LSil 5178 AND ITS ASSOCIATED PIPING AND SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS MEET TIIE REQUIRED SEISMIC CRITERIA. ALL APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET BY Tills DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP 91-VIN 0070, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrTION: THIS DCP WILL ELIMINATE Tile REDUNDANT AND UNNiiT.SS ARY MAIN TURBINE TRIP PROVIDED VIA Tile 386M LOCKOUT RELAY. THIS CHANGE WiLL 13E MADE BY REMOVING CIRCUITS FROM Tile NON SAFETY RELATED PROTECTIVE RELAY PANEL LOCATED IN THE CONTROL ROOM. SAFETY EVALUATION: REMOVING Tile REDUNDANT TURBINE TRIP SIGNAL PROVIDED VIA Tile 386M LOCKOUT RELAY WILL NOT AFFECT THE INTENDED FUNCTION OR DECREASE RELIABILITY OF TIIE TURBINE PROTECTION SYSTEM. THE 386M TURBINE TRIP CONTACTS DO NOT TRIP THE TURBINE SINCE Tile TURBINE MUST ALREADY HAVE A TRIP SIGNAL IN ORDER TO ACTUATE THE 386M RELAY. TIIE CONTACTS ARE NOT NEEDED TO LOCK OUT Tile TURBINE AFTER IT TRIPS SINCE TIIE TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIP SYSTEM CONTAINS LOCK-UP CIRCUlTS AND A TRIP LATCil ROD WillCH MUST BE MANUALLY RESET. NEITIIER Tile TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM NOT Tile TURBINE TRIP LOGIC IS AFFECTED BY THIS CilANGE. THE SUBSEQUENT GENERATOR FIELD TRIP AND BUS TRANSFER INITIATED BY THE 386M RELAY OCCURS AFTER A TURBINE TRIP AND IS NOT AFFECTED. Tile REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND GENERATOR FIELD TRIP 30 SECOND DELAY FOLLOWING A TURBINE TRIP WITH NO ELECTRICAL FAULTS IS NOT AFFECTED. THE ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE WILL REQUIRE REVISION TO REFLECT THIS CilANGE. FSAR SECTIONS 1.9.22, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.7, 10.1, 10.2, 13.5, 15.2, 15.3.1 WERE REVIEWED AND ARE NOT AFFECTED BY Tills CHANGE OTHER TIIAN FOR EDITORIAL CORRECTIONS TO TWO DRAWINGS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I I 1 40 l l

DESCRIlrr!ON: Tills DCP INSTALLS A MORE RELIABLE IlOST FOR OPENING AND CLOSING Tile CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT liATCII. Tills CONSIST OF A 20-TON ELECTRIC llOIST WillCllllAS A DRIVE CAPABLE OF BEING OPERATED BY AIR-OPERATED POWER WRENC11 IF NECESSARY UPON LOSS OF POWER TO TIE ELECTRIC MOTOR. MPL TAG # 1210lR4017 SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile !!OIST WILL ONLY BE OPERATED IN MODES 5 AND 6. FAILURE OF Tile I!OIST M AY CREATE Tile POSSIBILITY OF Tile EQUIPMENT liATCII FALLING ON Tile STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CIIECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECFLY BELOW. ALSO Tile llOIST AND Tile ASSOCIATED STRUCTURAL STEEL COULD BE ACCIDENTALLY DROPPED ON Tile STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CIIECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECTLY BELOW DURING TIIE REPLACEMENT OF Tile ilOIST. Ti!E POSSIBILITY OF TIESE TWO DROPS IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR; ilOWEVER BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 9.1.5.3.1.1, EITilER OF TilESE ACCIDENTS WILL NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO ANY SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED DURING MODES 5 AND 6, AND WILL NOT PRECLUDE DECAY IEAT REMOVAL OR Tim ABILITY TO MAIN' RAIN COLD SIIUTDOWN CONDITIONS. ALSO TiiE CONSEQUENCES OF TilESE ACCIDENTS ARE Tile SAME OR LESS TilAN Tile PREVIOUS llOIST SYSTEM. TilEREFORE, Tile MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CREATE TIIE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION NOT IMPLIED OR ANALYZED IN Tile FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 9I VIN 0073, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: TIIE PREVIOUS SECONDARY PLANT DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZERS CONSISTING OF SAMPLE CABINETS AE-9521, AE-9528, AND AE-20187, AITS-9521, AITS-9528, AITS-20187 ARE NO LONGER MANUFACTURED OR SUPPORTED BY TIIE VENDOR, HAYS INSTRUMENT CO. Tills DCP REPLACED TIE TliREE PREVIOUS INDIVIDUAL llAYS OXYGEN ANALYZER ASSEMBLIES WITil A STATE OF TIIE ART MULTICilANNEL DISSOLVED OXYGEN AN ALYZER MANUFACTURED BY ORBISPilERE LABORATORES (MODEL 2620-5). Tile NEW UNIT IS CONFIGURED WITil TIIREE CilANNELS, WITli TIIE CAPABILITY TO BE EXPANDED TO FIVE CilANNELS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DESIGN CIIANGE IS CONSIDERED EQUIVALENT TO Tile PREVIOUS ACCElrrABLE CONDITIONS AND REPRESENTS NO POSSIBLE ADVERSE AFFECTS WillCH COULD INCREASE TIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN TIIE FSAR. l

                                                                                                           -)

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 VIN 0078, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2 l DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP ADDED ADDITIONAL VALVES AND PIPING TO FACILITATE FASTER PREPARATION AND COMPLETION OF LOCAL LLRTS FOR TiiE FOLLOWING ASSOCIATED PENETRATIONS: PEN. 34,49,50, AND PEN. 78 SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICilliAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY ; TilEREFORE Tills DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. TIIE NEW VALVES ADDED IS LOCKED OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION. 41 , l

1

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 VIN 0086, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: A 2" SERVICE AIR LINE,1-2401-L4-633, AND ISOLATION VALVE,1-2401 U4-682, WAS ADDED TO EXISTING SERVICE AIR LEADER, 12401-5214", LOCATED IN TIIE SOUTil MAIN STEAM TUNNEL,2TI. Tills ADDITIONAL LINE PROVIDES A COMPRESSED AIR SUPPLY FOR SLUDGE LANCING OF Tile STEAM GENERATORS DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. TiiE SERVICE AIR LINE, PIPING CLASS LLO, WAS ROLTTED TO AN AREA ABOVE Tile STEAM TUNNEL GRATING WilERE AN ISOLATION VALVE AND TilREADED END CAP CAN BE EASILY ACCESSED FOR CONNECTION TO TIIE SLUDGE LANCING EQUIPMENT. TIIREE PIPE SUPPORTS WERE ADDED FOR Ti!E 2" SERVICE AIR LINE TO MEET Tile IEQUIREMENTS OF SUPPORTING PROJECT CLASS 626 PIPE. SAFETY EVALUATION: INSTALLING AN ADDITIONAL SERVICE AIR CONNECTION ON AN EXISTING llEADER DID NOT IMPACT TIE OPERATION OR TIE RELIABILITY OF Tile COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM. TIIE MODIFICATION MEETS ALL ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA. USE OF THE AIR CONNECTION IS INTENDED TO DE DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. TIE ADDITIONAL DEMAND ON THE SERVICE AIR PORTION OF TIE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM WILL NOT AFFECT PLANT INSTRUhENT AIR. Tile COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM HAS ADEQUATE CAPACITY TO SUPPLY BOTilINSTRUMENT AIR TO INSTRUMENTS AND VALVE OPERATORS TIIROUGHOUT Tile UNIT AND SERVICE AIR FOR SLUDGE LANCING. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR Tile CONSERVATION OF COMPIESSED AIR IN THE EVENT OF EXCESSIVE SERVICE AIR DEMAND, Tile LEADER TO THE SERVICE AIR DRYERS IS AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATED WilEN A PRESSURE SWITCil SENSES SERVICE AIR PRESSURE DECREASE TO APPROXIMATELY 80 PSIG. TIIE PORTION OF Tile L.INE THAT IS ABOVE TlIE GRATING IS LOCATED APPROXIMA'IELY 3'-6" FROM TIIE AUXILIARY BUILDING AND IS NOT IN DANGER OF BEING DAMAGED BY VEHICLES OR EQUIPhENT IN THE AREA. Tile COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENTS. NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY RELIES ON COMPRESSED AIR IN ORDER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. SUPPLYING SERVICE AIR TO TIE SLUDGE LANCING TRAILER DURING OUTAGES liAS NO EFFECT ON PLANT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY BECAUSE Tile COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS SIZED ADEQUATELY TO SUPPLY INSTRUMENT AIR AND SERVICE AIR THROUGilOUT Tile PLANT FOR VARIOUS USES, INCLUDING SLUDGE LANCING. NEITIER THE CONFIGURATION NOR Tile OPERATION OF Tile SERVICE AIR SYSTEM ARE COVERED IN Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 VIN 0088, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 , DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP DELETED TFE NEG ATIVE FLUX RATE REACTOR TRIP (NFRT) TIIUS IMPROVING THE PLANTS RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY BY ELIMINATING INADVERTENT REACTOR TRIPS CAUSED BY lilGli NEGATIVE FLUX RATES. 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP DOES CREATE A CilANGE TO THE PLANT AS l DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR PER SECTIONS 7.2,15.0,15.4, AND 16.3 AND TABLES 7.2.1-1,7.2.1-3, 7.2.2-1,15.0.1 10,15.0.61,15.0.8-1, AND 16.31 WillCilllAVE BEEN CllANGED ACCORDINGLY. TIIE EVALUATION FOR Tile EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING Tile NFRT FUNCTION ON TIIE LOCA AND TIIE NON-LOCA TRANSIENTS HAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT Tile APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND HAS BOUNDED Tile CONDITIONS UNDER WillCH THE SPECIFICATIONS PERMIT SAFE OPERATION. TilESE EVALUATIONS DETERMINED THAT Tile APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DNB DESIGN BASES WITil Tile NFRT REMOVAL WERE MAINTAINED WITHIN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TECH. SPECS. 42 . 1

                                                                                            )

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0093, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: AS PART OF Tile PIPE SNUBBER REDUCTION PROGRAM, THIS DCP DELETED /CilANGED/ADDED CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS WITHIN Tile AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM INSIDE THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT BUILDING. T1ERE ARE NO CIIANGES TO TIE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS OTHER TilAN TO TIE SPECIFIED PIPE SUPPORTS. TWO WELDED LUGS ARE BEING ADDED TO THE PIPE FOR SUPPORT NO. VI-1217 073 II616. TECIL SPEC. 3/4.7.8 REQUIRES TilAT ALL APPLICABLE SNUBBERS BE VISUALLY INSPECTED AT LEAST ONCE EVERY 18 MONTHS. A HIGH FAILURE RATE COULD REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SNUBBERS TO BE TESTED, WIllCli COULD POTENTIALLY EXTEND TIE REFUELING OUTAGE. PIPING SYSTEM RE-ANALYSIS, WITil Tile INTENT TO OFTIMlZE TIE DESIGN AND REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS USING HIGHER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA PERMITTED BY ASME CODE CASE N-411 HAS RESULTED IN Tile ELIMINATION OF SNUBBERS FROM TIIE SYSTEM WHILE MAINTAINING STRESSES WITillN CODE ALLOWABLES. TiiE LONG TERM BENEFIT INCLUDES A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER Tile LIFE OF THE PLANT DUE TO A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS REQUIRING TESTING AND MALNTENANCE. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP INVOLVED TIIE PIPING AND SUPPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY TIE CALCULATIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE CALCULATION RECORD FOR Tills DCP THAT TIIE CALCULATED DESIGN STRESSES ASSOCIATED WITH TIE AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM ARE STILL WITHIN TIE CODE ALLOWABLES AND ARE CONSISTENT WITil TIE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES FOR THE SYSTEM. TilEREFORE, THERE WAS NO INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. Tile CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR WERE NOT AFFECTED BY Tills DCP SINCE THE PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS ARE DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN CRITERIA IDENTIFIED IN Tile DESIGN INPUT RECORD AND TIE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION. SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY Tills DESIGN MODIFICATION., Tile RESULTS OF THE PIPING REANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORT CALCULATIONS DEMONSTRATE TilAT Tile CHANGES MADE BY Tills DCP DO NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT-ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THE PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORT CALCULATIONS SUBSTANTIATE THAT Tim MODIFICATIONS MADE BY THIS DCP WERE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITli Tile DESIGN CRITERIA AND Tile CODES AND STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO VEGP (AND AS IDENTIFIED IN T11E DESIGN INPUT RECORD). TIESE CRITERI A ESTABLISH Tile DESIGN BASES (INCLUDING PIPE AND SUPPORT ALLOWABLE STRESSES) FOR TIIE PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORT CALCULATIONS. INHERENT IN THESE DESIGN BASES IS Tile SAME MARGIN OF SAFETY AS Tile ORIGINAL DESIGN. l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0111, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 l DESCRIIYTION: Tills DCP PROVIDED TiiE DOCUMENTATION NECESSARY TO CORRECT TIE l WIRING PROBLEM OF SEPARATION, OF Tile POWER FAILURE ALARM FROM Tile STEAM l GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROUINDICATION SIGNAL FOR L-552.. 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TIIE OPERATION OR CHANGE THE FUNCrlON OF Tile STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CIRCUlT. Tile CHANGE CORRECTS Tile WIRING PROBLEM SO TilAT Tile POWER FAILURE ALARM CIRCUIT AND Tile STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CIRCUlT WILL FUNCTION PER THEIR DESIGN INTENT. 1 43

TIIEREFORE TIIIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0119, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: TIE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (TPCWS), SYSTEM 1405, IS DESIGNED TO SUPPLY COOLING WATER TO VARIOUS HEAT EXCilANGERS THROUGilOUT TIIE TURBINE BUILDING, CONTROL BUILDING, AND AUXILIARY BUILDING DURING ALL MODES OF NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND POWER GENER ATION. THE SYSTEM CONSISTS OF TWO 100% CAPACITY TPCW PUMPS,1 1405-P4-501 AND 502 (ONE IS A BACKUP), AND ASSOCIATED PIPING, VALVES, CONTROLS, AND INSTRUMENTATION. TIE POWER SUPPLY FOR TPCW PUMP l 1405-P4 501 DISCHARGE VALVE IHV-6798 WAS CilANGED FROM MCC INDT (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR INA04) LOCATED IN THE CHEMICAL ELECTRICAL BUILDING TO MCC ANBK (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA01) LOCATED IN TIE DIESEL FIRE PUMP HOUSE NO,2. A DESIGN CHANGE OF Tills NATURE IIAS BEEN PERFORMED ON UNIT 2 (DCP 91-V2NO120-1-1). THE VALVE CONTINUES TO OPERATE AS BEFORE, OPENING AUTOMATICALLY WlEN PUMP 501 STARTS AND CLOSING WlEN PUMP 501 STOPS. CURRENTLY, MCC 1NBT (FED BY 4160V SWITCli GEAR INA04) SUPPLIES POWER TO TPCW PUMP l-1405-P4-502 DISCIIARGE VALVE IHV-6799, AS WELL AS TPCW PUMP l-1405-P4-501 (TlE ALTERNATE PUMP) DISCHARGE VALVE lilV-6798. IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF POWER AT INA04 (WHICil FEEDS PUMP $02), TPCW PUMP 501 WOULD BE STARTED; HOWEVER, ITS DISCHARGE VALVE WOULD REMAIN CLOSED. THE ONLY TPCW FLOW WOULD BE TilROUGH TIE MINIMUM FLOW LINE, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF COOLING TO THE VARIOUS EQUIPMENT THAT DEPEND ON TPCW FOR HEAT REMOVAL. MCC ANBK IS FED FROM 4160V SWITCII GEAR 2NA01, WHICil IS INDEPENDENT OF 1NA04. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE ONLY CHANGE MADE WAS Tile POWER SUPPLY TO TPCW PUMP l 1405-P4-501 DISCHARGE VALVE lHV-6798. FAILURE OF THE SUBJECT VALVE COULD AFFECT THE EQUIPMENT THAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW. NONE OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, IS SAFETY-RELATED. FAILURE OF TIE TPCW l DISCHARGE VALVE, WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT SAFE SliUTDOWN OF TIE PLANT. THE EQUIPMENT'AFFECTED BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN AN ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN CHAPTER 15 OF THE FSAR. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DESIGN CllANGE WILL NOT CAUSE THE MALFUNCTION OF , OTilER EQUIPMENT THAT IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION. THE TPCW SYSTEM IS NEITHER l REQUIRED FOR TIIE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT NOR DOES IT HAVE A SAFETY l DESIGN BASIS. CHANGING TIE POWER SUPPLY TO DISCliARGE VALVE lilV-6798 DID NOT ) CREATE TIE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY  ! EVALUATED IN THE FS AR. SHOULD THE CHANGE IN POWER SUPPLY TO THE AFFECTED VALVE RESULT IN FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO ACTUATE AND FAILURE OF TPCW TO DELIVER COOLING WATER TO ITS LOADS, TIERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOT ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR BECAUSE THE -1 EQUIPMENT THAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW IS NOT SAFETY-REL.ATED AND IS NOT .j RELIED UPON FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT l REDUCE TIE TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY MARGINS SINCE THE SYSTEM AFFECTED, SYSTEM 1405, DOES NOT llAVE A SAFETY DESIGN BASES, AND THIS MODIFICATION MEETS ALL OF TIE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0128, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 44

I l DESCRIPTION: Tills DESIGN CilANGE REPLACES TIIE MAIN FEED WATER ISOLATION VALVE (MFIV) IIYDRAULIC FLUID RESERVOIR FILLER /BREATIIER CAP WITil A DESICCANT TYPE FILTER /BREATilER. THE VALVE TAG NUMBERS ARE lilV 5227, IHV-5228, lilV 5229, AND lilV-5230. Tile PROJECT CLASS OF TIIE FILTER /BREATIIER WAS DOWNGRADED FROM 212 TO 62J. TIIE DESICCANT FILTER /BREATilER IELPS PREVENT Tile INTRUSION OF MOISTUIE AND AIRBORNE PARTICLES INTO TIIE HYDRAULIC FLUID RESERVOIR. INVESTIGATIONS OF ACTUATOR FAILURES IN SIMILAR VALVES HAVE FOUND TilAT HIGli MOISTURE CONTENTS IN Tim ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC FLUID RESULTED IN CHEMICAL AND PliYSICAL DEGRADATION OF Tile FLUID, CAUSING CORROSION AND FOULING OF TIIE ACTUATOR COMPONENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE DESICCANT FILTER /BREATIIER WAS A'ITACIIED TO TIE TOP OF TIIE HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR. A FAILURE OF Tl!E FILTER /BREATIIER WILL NOT PREVENT TiiE MFIV FROM CLOSING DURING AN ACCIDENT SINCE IT IS NOT PART OF TIIE FLOW PATil OF THE HYDRAULIC FLUID DURING CLOSURE. TIIERE WOULD STILL BE ADEQUATE VENTING. THE PREVIOUS FILLER /BREATilER IS A REMOVABLE METAL CAP WElGHING APPROXIMATELY ONE POUND. IT IS PROJECT CLASS 212 AND WAS SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED BY Tile VALVE SUPPLIER. THE NEW DESICCANT FILTER /BREATilER IS A COMMERCIAL GRADE REPLACEMENT AND liAS BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS PROJECT CLASS 62J BY CALCULATION THE STAINLESS STEEL SUPPORT ADAirrER BOLTS ONTO Tile EXISTING llYDRAULIC RESERVOIR COVER PLATE USING SIX MACHINE SCREWS. NO MODIFICATION OF TIIE RESERVOIR IS REQUIRED. Tile FUNCTION OF THE DESICCANT FILTER /BREATIIER WILL NOT IMPAIR TIE OPERATION OF TIE MFIV ACTUATOR. Tile IIYDRAULIC FLUID, OR TIIE FLUID RESERVOIR. SINCE IT ATTACHES TO THE TOP OF THE RESERVOIR, IT IS LOCATED ABOVE TIIE FLUID LEVEL DURING ALL MODES OF OPERATION AND WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OF Tile ACTUATOR OR VALVE AS ANALYZED IN TIIE FSAR. BASED ON REVIEW OF FMEA CALCULATION MX4 CPS.0075.377, REVISION B1, AND FSAR SECTIONS 6.2.4,7.3.8, AND 10.4.7, Tills DESIGN CilANGE WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT Tile OPERATION AND EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION OF TIE MFIVS. THEREFORE IT WILL NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE ACCIDENT, TIIE DESICCANT FILTER / BREATHER llELPS TO PREVENT DEGRADATION OF TIIE HYDRAULIC FLUID AND, THEREFORE, liELP TO PREVENT MALFUNCTION OF Tile MFIV ACTUATORS. AS STATED ABOVE, FAILURE OF TiiE FILTER /BREATilER HAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE FUNCTION OF THE MFIVS, NOR DOES IT REDUCE TIIE MARGIN OF S AFETY DEFINED IN TIIE BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. TIIIS INCLUDES REVIEW OF SECTION 3/4.3 2.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0138, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: WESTINGHOUSE HAS IDENTIFIED A PROBLEM WITil MODEL NUMBERS CA, CA16, CO, COMS, COO, COV, CFI, CV, CVE, CVQ, AND CW PROTECTIVE RELAYS THAT THEY MANUFACTURE. TIIE PROBLEM IS CRACKING OF Tile MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT INSIDE TilESE RELAYS. TiliS CRACKING IS CAUSED BY STRESS IN TiiE SUPPORT INTRODUCED IN THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS AND Tile ADDITION OF AMMONIA FROM SOME OTHER SOURCES. THE COMBINATION OF TIIE STRESS AND Tile AMMONIA WILL CAUSE Tile MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT TO FAIL. Tile RELAYS THAT HAVE THE NEW llOLDING CLAMP INSTALLED ARE PROJECT CLASS 1IE AND 62E. WESTINGHOUSE IIAS PROVIDED DESIGN (TECHNICAL BULLETIN NSD-TB-89-09-R3) TO ADD A NEW llOLDING CLAMP OVER THE MOVING CONTACT. SUPPORT TO PREVENT THE FAILURE OF Tile MOVING CONTACT TIIE RELAYS WERE REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR THE ADDITION OF Tile NEW HOLDING CLAMP AND RE-CALIBRATED. THE CURVES OF TilESE RELAYS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS NEW HOLDING CLAMP. THEREFORE A CI'ANGE IN TIIE RELAY SET POINTS WAS NOT REQUIRED. TIIE RE-CALIBRATION IS TO ENSURE THAT THE RELAY 45

IS SET CORRECTLY AND OPERATES PROPERLY AFTER MODIFICATION. Tile RELAYS LISTED IN WESTINGilOUSE TECilNICAL BULIETIN NDS-TB 89-09-lO IIAVE A KNOWN FAILURE MODE TIIAT CAN DE PREVENTED. Tile RELAYS MANUFACTURED AFTER JANUARY 1988 IIAVE A NEW MATERIAL FOR TIIE MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT TO PREVENT Tills FAILURE FROM OCCURRING. Tile PRE JANUARY 1988 RELAYS CAN HAVE A NEW IIOLDING CLAMP INSTALLED TO PREVENT Tills FAILURE OR MUST HAVE Tile MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT INSPECTED ANNUALLY, Tile INSPECTION IS TO ENSURE A FAILURE OF Tile MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT IS NOT IMMINENT, BY INSTALLING TIIE NEW 110LDING CLAMP IN TiiESE RELAYS, Tile PLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ANNUALLY INSPECT TIIESE RELAYS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE CilANGE TO TIESE RELAYS ENSURE Tile RELAYS WILL PERFORM TIE!R INTENDED FUNCTION TO ISOLATE ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS SUCll AS SilORT CIRCUITS, OVER CURRENTS, ETC. TIE SECURITY OF TilESE RELAYS (ABILITY TO AVOID MISOPERATION) REMAINS UNCHANGED BY Tile ADDITION OF THE NEW llOLDING CLAMPS. THE NEW llOLDING CLAMP PREVENTS FAILURE OF Tile MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT AND ENSURE TIIE MOVING CONTACT CAN PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION OF ISOLATING ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS. Tile PUlU'OSE OF PROTECTIVE RELAYS IS TO LIMIT TIIE DAMAGE TO Tile PROTECTED EQUIPMENT AND PROTECT TIE POWER SOURCE OF THE EQUIPMENT. TIE PROTECTION OF 'i HE POWER SOURCE IIELPS TO ENSURE THAT T1ERE IS ELECTRICAL POWER FOR TIE OTilER PLANT EQUIPMENT. ADDING THE NEW IIOLDING CLAMP TO TIESE RELAYS DOES NOT CIIANGE THE OPERATION, CAllDRATION, AND QUALIFICATION OF THE RELAY. Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIE BASES OF TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED. SUBJECT; DCP: 91-VIN 0140, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: A TRANSFER SWITCil WAS ADDED TO PROVIDE DIESEL-BACKED POWER FROM UNIT,2 TO POWER CONTROL ROOM LIGilTING IN CASE OF STATION BLACKOUT (SDO). Tile TRANSFER SWITCil ALLOWS TIIE CONTROL ROOM LIGliTING TO BE POWERED FROM EITilER UNIT AND PROVIDES CHARGING TO CONTROL ROOM LIGilTING BATTERY BACKUP. IN ADDITION EMERGENCY LIGIITING WAS ADDED TO AREAS TIIAT REQUIRE VALVE MANIPULATION UNDER LOSS OF RHR CONDITIONS. TilESE VALVES ARE lilV 8821 A

 & B, lHV-8812 A & B, lilV 8802A & B, AND IHV-8809A & B.

SAFETY EVALUATION: LIGilTING IS NOT AN INITIATOR OF AN ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE TRANSFER SWITCil MEETS TIIE FIRE PROTECTION / SAFE SIIUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS OF ENSURING ONE SET OF CEILING FLXTURES IS AVAILABLE IN TiiE CONTROL ROOM EXCElvr DURING A FIRE REQUIRING CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION. THE LIGilTING SYSTEM IS NOT USED IN MITIGATING TIIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. TIIE NORMAL AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING, THAT WAS ADDED FOR VALVE MANIPULATION, IS POWERED FROM NON-SAFETY RELATED POWER AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION OF TIIE VALVES (lliV-8802A/B, liiV-8821 A/B, lHV-8812A/B, AND lilV-8809A/B). THE ADDED LOADING FROM Tile CONTROL ROOM LIGIITING ON Tile DIESEL GENERATOR WAS CALCULATED PER X3CE01 AND llAS NO IMPACT ON Tile DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING. ALL LIGilTING ADDITIONS WERE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED AS REQUIRED. THE CONTROL ROOM LIGIITING MAINTAINS SEPARATE TRAIN BACKED LIGilTING TO ENSURE A FIRE EVENT WILL NOT IMPAIR SAFE SHUTDOWN FORM T1E CONTROL ROOM. TIEREFORE Tills DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION, ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY ANY TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES. 46

SUDJECT: DCP: 91 V2N0141, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRil' TION: A TRANSFER SWITCll WAS ADDED TO PROVIDE DIESEL-DACKED POWER FROM UNIT I TO POWER CONTROL ROOM LIGilTING IN CASE OF STATION DLACKOUT (SDO). Tile TRANSFER SWITCil ALLOWS Tile CONTROL ROOM LIGilTING TO DE POWERED FROM EITilER UNIT AND PROVIDES CilARGING TO CONTROL ROOM LIGIITING DATTERY BACKUP IN ADDITION EMERGENCY LIGliTING WAS ADDED TO AREAS TilAT REQUIRE VALVE MANIPULATION UNDER LOSS OF Ri!R CONDITIONS. TilESE VALVES ARE 2ilV-8821 A

     & 13,211V-8812 A & D,211V-8802A & D, AND 211V 8809A & B; AND TO Tile DORIC ACID STORAGE TANK ROOM D09. TO FACILITATE PLACEMENT OF A TEMPORARY llEATER DURING LOSP. NORMAL LIGilTING IS ADDED TO CONTROL DUILDING ROOM 224 TO FACILITATE FUSE REMOVAL AND CABLE TERMINATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: LIGilTING IS NOT AN INITIATOR OF AN ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN Ti!E FS AR. Ti!E TRANSFER SWITCil MEETS THE FIRE PROTECTION / SAFE SilUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS OF ENSURING ONE SET OF CEILING FIXTURES IS AVAILABLE IN TIIE CONTROL ROOM EXCEPT DURING A FIRE REQUIRING CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION. TIIE LIGIITING SYSTEM IS NOT USED IN MITIGA11NG TIIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. Tile NORMAL AND EMERGENCY LIGifflNG,TilAT WAS ADDED FOR VALVE MANIPULATION, IS POWERED FROM NON-SAFETY RELATED POWER AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION OF Ti!E VALVES (211V-8802A/B,211V-8821 A/B,2HV-8812A/B, AND 2HV-8809A/B). Tile ADDED LOADING FROM Tile CONTROL ROOM LIGiiTING < ON Tile DIESEL GENERATOR WAS CALCULATED PER X3CE01 AND llAS NO IMPACT ON I Tile DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING. ALL LIGilTING ADDITIONS WERE SEISMICALLY  ! MOUNTED AS REQUIRED. THE CONTROL ROOM LIGilTING MAINTAINS SEPARATE TRAIN DACKED LIGilTING TO ENSURE A FIRE EVENT WILL NOT IMPAIR SAFE SilUTDOWN FROM Tile CONTROL ROOM. TilEREFORE tills DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED 1 EQUIPMENT OR ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION, ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR TiiE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DASES. DURING INSTALLATION PENETRATION SEALS WILL DE BREACllED WHICil FORM PART OF THE FIRE AREA DOUNDARY, DUT ARE ADOVE FLOOD LEVELS. A FIRE WATCli WILL DE POSTED WillLE Tile DARRIERS ARE DREACilED. SUHJECT: DCP: 91-VIN 0146, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: DUE TO Tile PREVIOUS FLOW SWITCllES, FOR MAIN GENERATOR STATOR COOLING lilGH VOLTAGE DUSillNG FLOW AND EXCITER RECTIFIER FLOW, NO LONGER DEING MANUFACTURED AND A SINGLE FAILURE 1 OUT OF 1 LOGIC TO TRIP CONFIGURATION; Tills DCP INSTALLED DIFFERENTIAL FLOW ORIFICES AND DIFFEIENTIAL INDICATING SWITCHES UTILlzlNG A 2 OUT O 3 TRIPPING LOGIC . SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills IS A CilANGE TO Tile PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR AND FIGUlWS 10.2.21 (SHEET 8 OF 9)(2XIDB193) AND 10.2.2-3 (2X5DN203-1) HAD TO DE REVISED. Tills DCP DOES NOT CREATE A CilANGE TO ANY PROCEDURE AS DESCRIDED IN Tile FSAR. IT DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PRODADILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIDED IN Tile FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIDED IN THE FSAR

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0149, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 47

l l DESCRIPTION: Tills DESIGN Cl!ANGE INSTALLED COOLING FANS IN Tile REFUELING MACllINE CONSOLE TO IMPROVE COOLING AIR FLOW. Tile REFUELING MACilINE POSITIONING SYSTEM WAS IMPROVED BY REPLACING Tile PREVIOUS ENCODER ClilP WITil A FUNCrlONALLY IDENTICAL ClilP WITII IMPROVED NOISE IMMUNITY AND REPLACEMENT OF CA.BLE AND CONNECTORS FOR Tile !!OIST POSITION ENCODER CIRCUITS. THE CABLE WAS REROUTED FOR BETTER NOISE PERFORMANCE. Tills CHANGE ALSO PROVIDED PERMANENT SOUND POWERED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ON 'nIE REFUELING MACIUNE. TiiE REFUELING MACHINE IS SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 EQUIPMENT WillCII WAS DESIGNED TO SATISFY SEISMIC 2/1 REQUIREMENTS. WESTINGilOUSE IIAS - EVALUATED Tile ADDITIONAL WEIGitT FROM THE COMMUNICATIONS AND POWER CIRCUIT AND DETERMINED THERE IS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON Tile STRUCTURAL ADEQUACY OF THE REFUELING MACIIINE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CIIANGE IMPROVED TIIE RELI ABILITY OF TIIE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE. Tile ADDITION OF TIIE COOLING FANS, REPLACEMENT OF TIIE ENCODER PULSE COUNTING CHIP, AND REPLACEMENT OF CABLE AND CONNECTORS WIT 11 IMPROVED CABLE ROUTING INCREASED THE ACCURACY OF FUEL PLACEMENT BY REDUCING THE HOIST POSITIONING ENCODER CIRCUIT'S SUSCEFilBILITY TO RADIATED NOISE. TilESE CHANGES DID NOT AFFECT TIE REFUELING MACHINE FUNCrlONAL DESIGN OR OPERATION. ALL REFUELING MACillNE SAFETY FEATURES AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR ARE PRESERVED WITH Tills DESIGN CHANGE. TlHS DESIGN CliANGE HAS NO IMPACT ON CONDITIONS ASSUMED IN Tile ACCIDENT ANALYSIS FOR A DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY SINCE THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT INVOLVE THE REFUELING MACHINE. Tills DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT Tile REFUELING MACli!NE'S ABILITY TO HOLD A FUEL ASSEMBLY. Tills DESIGN CHANGE RESULTED IN AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELI ABILITY OF TIIE REFUELING MACHINE DUE TO THE REDUCrlON IN HEAT RELATED CONSOLE SCREEN FAILURES AND THE IMPROVED NOISE RESISTANCE OF THE POSITIONING CIRCUITS. THE SEISMIC ANALYSIS AND ELECTRICA11MECliANICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE REFUELING MACillNE WERE UNAFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTIONAL OR OPERATIONAL CilARACTERISTICS OF Tile REFUELING MACIUNE. THE ADDITION OF THE SOUND POWERED TELEPHONE CIRCUIT TO THE REFUELING MACl!!NE DID NOT INTERFACE Wini OTIIER EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS. TIIE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY WAS NOT INCREASED. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9 SPECIFIES LOAD LIMITATIONS OF 3900 LBS. FOR Tile SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE. TIIESE LIMITATIONS WERE NOT AFFECTED BY Tills DESIGN CilANGE. Tile REFUELING MAClilNE CONTINUES TO BE CAPABLE OF COMPLYING WITH TiiE LCO AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS STATED IN TiiE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0162, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tills DESIGN CIIANGE INCREASED Tile PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION BLOCK PERMISSIVE P il SETPOINT FROM 1970 TO 2000 PSIG. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE P-11 SETPOINT CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE P 11 SETPOINT IS NOT USED IN ANY VEGP FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. TlHS CHANGE WIDENS TIIE BAND IN WillCilTHE LOW PRESSURE St ACTUATION MAY BE BLOCKED; AS A RESULT, Tile LIKELillOOD OF AN INADVERTENT LOW PRESSURE St ON COOLDOWN IS REDUCED. THEREFORE, Tile ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN Tile FSAR. 48

d l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 9l-V1No165, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCR!lYrlON: Tills DCP REPLACED Tile OLD IIEAT TRACING CABLE (PROJECT CLASS 62E) WITil CABLE RATED FOR ll!Gi!ER TEMPERATURE ON AUX. FEED WATER LINES 1 1302 29,30,31,32 LOCATED IN Tile AUX. FEED WATER  ! PENETRATION ROOMS # R A56 (CONTROL BUILDING) AND R All & R Al2 (AUX. BUILDING). Ti!E !! EAT TRACING, AS APPLIED TO Tile AUX FEED WATER PIPES, PROVIDES FREEZE PROTECTION BY MAINTAINING A MINIMUM TEMPERATUIE OF 43 DEG. F ON THE PIPE TilROUGil PIPE-SENSED Ti!ERMOSTATIC CONTROLS ON TIIE HEATER CABLE CIRCUlTS, Tile NEW CABLE IS LYING DIRECTLY ON TOP OF TIIE PIPE AND STRAPPED IN PLACE AT ONE FOOT INTERVALS USING STAINLESS STEEL BANDING, TiiEN COVElWD WITil ORIGINAL TYPE INSULATION. EXISTING JUNCrlON BOXES WERE USED TO TERMINATE CABLE ENDS. Tile NEW IIEATER CIRCUITS IIAVE A TOTAL HEAT OUTPUT APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO TilAT OF THE ORIGINAL CIRCUITS. Ti!E TOTAL LOAD ON ANY CIRCUlT IS WITilIN +/ ONE AMP OF THE ORIGINAL CIRCUIT LOADS, AND IN NO CASE IS Tile TOTAL LOAD FOR ANY CIRCUIT GREATER TilAN 5 AMPS. Tile IIEAT TRACING CABLE REPLACED WAS APPLIED TO APPROXIMATELY TIIE FIRST FIFTY FEET OF AUX. FEED WATER PIPE FROM Tile POINT AT WillCil' DIE AUX. FEED WATER LINE ATTACilES TO TIIE MAIN FEED WATER LINE. Tile OLD CABLE WAS BEING DAMAGED BY lilGli TEMPERATURE IMPOSED BY Ti!E MAIN FEED WATER LINE, WillCll OPERATES AT UP TO 440 DEG. F. Ti!E OLD TEFZEL IIEATER CABLE WAS RATED FOR A MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE OF 302 DEG. F. Tile NEW CABLE CAN OPERATE APOVE 450 DEG. F. SAFETY EVALUATION: CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS OF Tile NEW HEAT TRACING ARE LESS COMBUSTIBLE TIIAN TIIE ORIGINAL (STAINLESS STEEL AND MINERAL INSULATION). Tile NEW TRACE FUNCTIONS IN A MANNER IDENTICAL TO Tile ORIGINAL TRACE. AUTOMATIC CONTROLS SHUT OFF Ti!E HEAT TRACING WilEN SENSED PIPE TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS TIIE 43 DEG. F SET POINT OF Tile TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER (FREEZE PROTECTION). CURRENT IN THE ilEAT TRACING CIRCUIT IS SENSED AND FAILI;'RE OF TIIE CIRCUIT IS ALARMED. FAILURE ALARMS IN TIIE NEW CIRCUITS ARE . LESS AMBIGUOUS TIIAN Tile ORIGINAL SINCE ANY FAILURE ON THE NEW SERIES CABLE WILL CAUSE ALL CURRENT FLOW IN Tile CIRCUlT TO CEASE. NO INCREASE IN CORROSION ACTIVrlY IS ANTICIPATED AS A RESULT OF THE APPLICATION OF Ti!E 304L STAINLESS STEEL llEATER CABLE TO TIIE SA106 GRADE B CARBON STEEL PIPE. HEAT TRACING DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO TIIE CONSEQUENCES AS EVALUATED INCLUDES REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 15.1 & 15.2. SINCE Tile NEW llEAT TRACING IS ABLE TO WITIISTAND IIIGilER TEMPERATURES TIIAN Tile ORIGINAL TRACE, THE NEW TRACE IS MORE RELIABLE, TilEREFORE MALFUNCTION DUE TO FREEZING IS LESS-PROBABLE. HEAT TRACING DOES NOT AFFECT CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF PIPING EQUIPMENT AS EVALUATED INCLUDES REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 15.1,15.2. NO PIPING, EQUIPMENT, OR INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH Tile PIPING EXCElYT Tile IIEAT TRACING WAS MODIFIED OR ITS OPERATION CilANGED AS A RESULT OF Tills CilANGE OUT NO PIPING, EQUIPMENT, OR INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCI ATED WITil THE PIPING EXCE!Yr Ti!E ilEAT TRACING WAS MODIFIED OR ITS OPERATION CilANGED AS A RESULT OF Tills CilANGE OUT. NO NEW TYPES OF ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED.

SUBJECT:

DCP 91 VIN 0166, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP MAKES SEVERAL CIIANGES TO THE TURBINE BUILDING TO AUXILIARY BUILDING TRAIN A TUNNEL VENTILATION SYSTEM. THESE CHANGES ARE TO ADD A NEW TEMPERATURE SWITCil WITil A 111G11 TEMPERATURE ALARM IN TIIE AUXILI ARY BUILDING END, DELETE THE LOW TEMPERATURE SETPOINT CONTROL OF Tilf 49

1 i EXISTING SWITCil, Tile EXISTING TIIREE POSITION VENTILAllON FAN CONTROL SWITCH WILL BE REPLACED WITH A TWO POSITION SWITCil AND WILL BE NORMALLY IN TIIE i 'STOP' POSITION. TIERE WILL NO LONGER BE AN INDICATION ON THE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL TIIAT Tile CONTROL SWITCil IIAS BEEN PLACED IN THE 'STOP' POSITION. TilESE CilANGES ARE SAFETY RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1. SAITTY EVALUATION: Tills CilANGE CORRECTS TWO CONCERNS. A FIRE DOOR BLOCKS TiiE FLOW OF AIR FROM ONE END OF TIIE TUNNEL TO Ti!E OTilER, AND THE FAN IS CURRENTLY DESIGNED TO START AT A LOW TEMPERATURE OF 17 DEGREES F. THE DESIRED OPERATION, AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.9.2.2.3, IS FOR Tile FAN TO BE MANUALLY STARTED AFTER RECE!PT OF A filGil-TEMPERATURE ALARM (100 DEGREES F) IN Tile CONTROL ROOM, TIIE RESPONSE TO THE ALARM AS DESCRIBED IN PROCEDURE 17051-1 WILL BE TO OPEN TIE FIRE DOOR, ESTABLISH A FIRE WATCil AND MANUALLY I START Tile VENTILATION FAN FROM THE CONTROL ROOM. THE ADDITION OF TIIE NEW TEMPERATURE SWITCH WILL BE AN AID IN DETERMINING A TRUE HIGil-TEMPERATURE CONDITION IN THE TUNNEL. CHANGING TIE CONTROL SWITCil FRC'M THREE POSITION TO TWO POSITION WILL PROVIDE Tile DESIRED, MANUAL " START-STOP" OPERATION. Tills C11ANGE WILL MINIMIZE DEAD-IIEAD OPERATION OF TIE FAN AND WILL ALLOW FOR A MORE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF TUNNEL TEMPERATURE FAILURE OF TIIE VENTILATION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN A DECREASE IN THE ELECTRICAL CABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY, BUT WOULD NOT CAUSE AN ACCIDENT. TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT OR BELOW 120 DEGIEES F DUE TO Tile EFFECTS OF ELEVATED TEMPERATURE ON CABLE IMPEDANCE AND CABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY. WITH Tile TUNNEL TEMPERATURE AT 120 DEGREES F, CABLES IN THE TRAIN A TUNNEL ARE SIZED ADEQUATELY TO PROVIDE TIE NEEDED VOLTAGE. WIT 11 NORMAL (NON-SAFETY RELATED VENTILATION) TIIE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE WILL NOT EXCEED THE lilGH TEMPERATUIE SETPOINT. WITilOUT NORMAL VENTILATION,IT REQUIRES MORE THAT THREE DAYS FOR TIIE TEMPERATUIE TO EXCEED TIE SETPOINT (BASED ON ANALYSIS AND ACTUAL TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS). SINCE TlilS IS AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES VENTILATION SYSTEM TilAT WILL NOT RECEIVE AN AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL, THE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE WILL BE MONITORED AS REQUIRED BY RITE PROCEDURES, IN Tile EVENT THE NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT AVAILABLE. ALTHOUGH BYPASS OF Tile TUNNEL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NO LONGER ANNUNCIATED ON THE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL, LOSS OF POWER TO TIIE FAN IS ANNUNCIATED. Tills CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEMS COOLING CAPABILITIES. PENETRATION SEALS, WHEN BREACilED Wil.L BE RESEALED PER PLANT PROCEDURES. ELECTRICAL SEPARATION IS MAINTAINED. EQUIPMENT ADDED TO SUPPORT Tile PROPOSED CilANGE HAS Tile NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS TO SUPPORT Tile SAFETY RELATED CLASSIFICATION OF TIIE VENTILATION SYSTEM.

SUBJECT:

DCP 91-VIN 0170, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE I DESCRIl7 TION: TIIE PREVIOUS FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP, TAG NUMBER l-1901 P6-008, WAS REPLACED WITH AN IDENTICAL PUMP AND MOTOR. THE NEW PUis!P AND MOTOR ARE IDENTICAL TO Tile PREVIOUS EQUIPMENT, Tile SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS DID NOT CHANGE. THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP IS PROJECT CLASSIFICATION 427. THE REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT WAS PROCURED IN ACCORDANCE WITil Tile REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.143 AND ' DIE IlYDRAULIC INSTITUTE STANDARDS. Tile PREVIOUS FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP WAS DAMAGED AND NOT CAPABLE OF OPERATING AT Tile DESIGN CONDITIONS. AS A RESULT, Tile OUTPUT AT THE ALTERNATE RADWASTE BUILDING WAS LESS TilAN THE REQUIRED FLOW. VALUABLE TIME WAS LOST IN THE PROCESSING OF LIQUID WASTES. 50

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. TIIE PORTION OF THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM WHIC11 CONTAINS Tile FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP PERFORMS NO SAFETY FUNCTION. WITli THE EXCEPTION OF THE PROCUREMENT DESIGN CODE, TIE NEW PUMP IS AN IDENTICAL REPLACEMENT FOR THE PREVIOUS PUMP. IN ADDITION, TIE NEW PUMP hEETS ALL OPERATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM NO.1901, INCLUDING REGULATORY GUIDE 1.143. THE OPERATION AND RESPONSE OF THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM WILL NOT CHANGE DUE TO REPLACEMENT OF THE FLOOR DRAIN PUMP. TIE EQUIPhENT DESIGN PARAMETERS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE FLOW RATES AND ISOTOPIC CONCENTRATIONS IN LIQUID WASTES AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR HAVE NOT CllANGED. Tile FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP IS NONSAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCrlON IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR (REFERENCE FSAR SECTION 15.7.1 THROUGH 15.7.3). FURTIERMORE, SINCE Tills IS AN IDENTICAL REPLACEMENT (WITil TIIE EXCEPTION OF TIE PROCUREMENT DESIGN CODE), TiiERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT TO TIIE OPERATION OF T1IE SYSTEM. TIE DESIGN PARAMETERS AND ISOTOPIC CONCENTRATIONS IN TIE LIQUID WASTES ARE UNAFFECTED BY THIS ClIANGE. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.11.1 ADDRESSES THE IIANDLING OF LIQUID EFFLUENTS. REPLACEhENT OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP DID NOT CHANGE THE OPERATION OF Tile LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0172, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIIrTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A 3" VENT LINE ON WASTE MONITOR TANKS 11901T6-009 & 010 TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM VIA TIE EXIIAUST BUILDING REGISTER LOCATED IN EACH WASTE MONITOR TANK ROOM. (C-81 & C-82) NO EXISTING OPENING COULD BE USED FOR THIS MODIFICATION SO A NEW THREE INCH NOZZLE WAS ADDED. TO FACILITATE FLOW THROUGH TIIE VENT LINE, THE PREVIOUS ONE INCH OVERFLOW / VENT LINE ON EACH TANK WAS REMOVED AND THE NOZZLE CAPPED. AN ADDITIONAL NEW THREE INCH NOZZLE AND PIPING WAS INSTALLED ADJACENT TO TiiE PREVIOUS ONE INCH OVERFLOW / VENT LINE TO SERVE AS TIE TANK OVERFLOW AND TIE SOURCE OF PURCE AIR. SAFETY EVALUATION: BIIS CilANGE DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE POSTULATED FAILURE OF ANY TANKS, TIEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF Tile OCCURRENCE OF SUCH ACCIDENTS AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. TIE WASTE MONITOR TANKS ARE NOT USED TO MITIGATE ' IRE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. WilILE BEING A MORE DIRECT PATH, IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE TOTAL RADIOACTIVITY THAT IS EXHAUSTED BY THE VENTILATION SYSTEM. THE PIPING ANALYSIS FOR THE WASTE MONITOR TANK ROOMS HAS NOT . CHANGED TIIE NEW PIPING IS DESIGNED TO THE SAME SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS (CATEGORY 2) AS Tile OLD SYSTEM. THIS DESIGN DOES NOT CIIANGE THE FUNCTION OF THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM OR THE WASTE MONITOR TANKS, TIE , EXISTING FAILURE ANALYSIS STILL APPLIES. THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY l COMPONENT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF TIIE PLANT. Tills DESIGN CHANGE  ; WILL NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIIE BASES OF TEClINICAL _j SPECIFICATIONS. TilIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF T.S. SECTION 3/4.11.1. ALSO REVIEWS OF , FSAR SECTIONS 2.2,2.3,9.4,11.2, AND 15.7. j

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0174, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrTION: TWO (2) TIME DELAY PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS WERE INSTALLED IN SPARE SLOTS OF TIIE NIS CABINET N50 DRAWER. THESE BOARDS 51 I

PROVIDE AN ADJUSTABLE INHIBIT CONTROL OVER TIE FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO-(QPTR) DEVIATION RELAY ALARM OUTPUTS. THIS CHANGE WAS MADE TO PREVENT QPTR NUISANCE ALARMS WillCH ARE GENERATED FROM THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER. TIESE ALARMS WERE ACTIVATED WHEN THE INSTANTANEOUS QPTR WAS CALCULATED BY Tile NIS EXCORE DETECTORS AND EXCEEDS 2% OF THE STEADY STATE CONDITION. AT PLANT VOGTLE THERE IS A REACTOR VESSEL LOWER PLENUM VORTEX FLOW ANOMALY, THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH NORMAL NIS CALIBRATION TOLERANCES, CAUSES A QPTR NUISANCE ALARhL SAFETY EVALUATION: ONLY ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS WERE ADDED TO TIIE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER. Tills DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECrlVE FUNCTION. THERE WERE NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGES MADE TO TIE SAFETY-RELATED PORTION OF TIIE NIS. THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT MOVE OR CHANGE TIE PilYSICAL SEPARATION BARRIER BETWEEN THE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER AND TIIE SAFETY RELATED POWER RANGE DRAWERS. WESTINGIIOUSE SUPPORTS THE USE OF QPTR VALUES GENERATED BY PROTEUS TO SOUND AN ALARM BASED ON ONE MINUTE AVERAGED NIS SIGNALS. THE FUNCTION PROVIDED BY THE DELAY CARDS CAN PERFORM A TlhE DELAY ALARM INDEPENDENTLY OF THE AVERAGING FUNCTION CURRENTLY BEING GENERATED BY Tile PROTEUS. ACCORDING TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 4.2.4.1.B WIEN THE QPTR ALARM IS INOPERABLE, PRIOR TO USING THE PROTEUS PLANT COMPUTER, TIE QPTR WAS DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN ITS LIMITS BY " CALCULATING THE RATIO AT LEAST ONCE PER 12 IlOURS DURING STEADY STATE OPERATION." THIS STATEMENT ALLOWS THE USE OF UP TO A SIX MINUTE DELAY IN TIE INSTANTANEOUS NIS GENERATED QPTR ALARM. REAL EVENTS, SUCH AS DROPPED RODS OR LOCAL FUEL ASSEMBLY FLOW BLOCKAGE, WILL LAST LONGER THAN TIE TIME DELAY AND WOULD PRODUCE AN ALARM SOONER THAN THE ACCEPTABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CALCULATION METiiOD. THIS DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION WillCH IS RELIED UPON TO BRING THE PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION OR TO MITIGATE THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE NIS IS MAINTAINED. NONE OF THE LIMITS OR ACTION STATEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.2.4 ARE , AFFECTED BY THIS DCP. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED. SUDIECT: DCP: 91-VIN 0194, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: RADIATION MONITOR 2562 MONITORS CONTAINMENT i ATMOSPHERE. WESTINGHOUSE CALLS Tile COMPUTER PART OF THE I I RADIATION MONITORS A DPM. IRX 2562 IS THE DPM FOR RADIATION MONITOR 2562. IRX-2562 IS NOW LOCATED IN THE AUX BUILDING ROOM B08. TIE HVAC FOR THIS ROOM IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A TEMPERATURE OF 100 DEGREES OR BELOW UNDER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS THE TEMPERATURE COULD BE 120 l DEGREES. THE COMPUTER PART OF RADIATION MONITOR, PANEL 1RX 2562, IS IN THIS HOT ENVIRONMENT AND IS BELIEVED TO HAVE A REDUCED LIFE SPAN BECAUSE OF THE lEMPERATURE. THE DPM WAS MOVED TO AUX BUILDING ROOM B13 WHICH IS MUCil COOLER. TIIE DPM WAS REMOVED FROM ITS EXISTING LOCATION AND SEISMICALLY MOUN'IT.D IN AUX BUILDING ROOM l 52 )

B13. A NEW JUNCrlON BOX WAS SEISMICALLY MOUNTED WIIERE TIE DPM WAS MOUNTED. ALL INSTRUMENT SECTIONS OF Tills RADIATION MONITOR ARE PROJECT CLASS 61J. TIIE CONDUlTS, CABLES, CONNECTORS, AND JUNCrlON BOX ARE PROJECT CLASS 62E BUT ARE SE!SMICALLY MOUNTED. Tile PENETRATION SEALS ARE PROJECT CLASS 62C. TIE COMPUTER FOR RADIATION MONITOR WAS LOCATED IN AUX BUILDING ROOM RB08. Tills ROOM NORMALLY RUNS AT A TEMPERATURE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 DEGREES. AUX BUILDING ROOM RBl3 IS SIGNIFICANTLY COOLER DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATION, TIIE COMPUTER PART FOR RADI ATION MONITOR 2562 WAS MOVED TO THIS COOLER ROOM TO INCREASE Tile LIFE OF Tile COMPUTER AND IMPROVE WORKING CONDITIONS FOR TIIE PERSONNEL TilAT WORK ON THIS RADIATION MONITOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE COMPUTER, JUNCTION BOX, AND ALL NEW CONDUITS ARE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED TO PREVENT THEM FROM AFFECTING ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THIS DESIGN CilANGE MAINTAINS TIE ELECTRICAL ISOLATION AND SEPARATION OF THE SAFETY AND NON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. TIE RADIATION MONITOR 16 NOT REQUIRED FOR Tile MITIGATION OF ANY ACCIDENTS. IT CAN DE AND IS USED TO MON 1 TOR FOR RCS LEAKAGE AS REQUIRED BY TifE TECH SPEC BUT DOES NOT CAUSE ANY EQUIPMENT TO ACTUATE FOR PROTECTION OF THE REACTOR. IT IS ALSO NOT REQUIRED FOR MONITORING ANT PLANT PARAMETER IN A POST-EVENT CONDITION. THIS EQUIPhENT IS USED TO MONITOR CONTAINMENT FOR AllEORNE RADIATION, IT DOES NOTllAVE A CONTROL FUNCTION, AND CAN NOT CAUSE RADIATION ACCIDENTS. TIE COMPUTER IS ALREADY ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED ANT, TRAIN SEPARATED FROM Tile SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCE AND CAN NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPhENT ELECTRICALLY. THE IMPROVEMENT TO THE l OPERATING CONDITION OF RADIATION MONITOR 2562 COMPUTER IMPROVES ITS ABILITY TO MEET Tile OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS PLACED ON Tills RADIATION MONITOR BY TECll SPECS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0199, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tile CilANGE ACrlVATED THE TURBINE-GENERATOR POWER SYSTEM STABILIZER (PSS) WillCII WAS PROVIDED WITil Tile GENERATOR VOLTAGE-REGULATOR CONTROLS (A PORTION OF THE EXCITATION SYSTEM). ACTIVATION OF Tile PSS REQUIRED INITIAL SLTUP OF THE PSS AS OUTLINED IN Tile INSTRUCTION MANUAL (GEK-83807) AND ON-LINE CALIBRATION OF THE PSS CIRCUIT BOARDS. THE CONSTANTS NECESSARY FOR ON-LINE CALIBRATION WERE PROVIDED AS A SET POINT DRAWING IN THE DCP. Tile CHANGE ALSO REVISED TIIE TERMINATION OF WIRE NUMBER 26 WHICH IS CONNECTED BETWEEN THE CEILING SENSING AND WASHOUT AND OUTPLIT BOARDS OF TIIE PSS. Tile WIPJNG TERMINATION BETWEEN TIIE WASHOUT AND OUTPlTT BOARD AND TIE CEILING SENSING BOARD WERE MADE AT TIIE MANUFACTURER'S (GE) SUGGESTION.- BY MOVING WIRE NUMBER 26, THE CEILING SENSING BOARD IS NOW ABLE TO SUPERVISE T11E LAST STAGE OF THE WASHOUT AND OUTPUT BOARD, THEREBY PROVIDING A MORE COMPLETE PROTECTION FOR TIIE PSS AGAINST INTERNAL FAILURES U A PSS FAILURE IS ANNUNCIATED ON ANNUNCIATOR ALB31 SAFETY EVALUATION: (IX5DM207, SilEET 23), WINDOW D03 (GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR ALARM) AND INDICATED BY A FLASHING LIGliT EMITTING DIODE (LED) IN THE REGULATOR CUBICLE. ALTIIOUGil NOT DESIRABLE DURING NORMAL PSS OPERATION, THE FAILURE ALARM CAN BE DISABLED AT TILE PSS USING TiiE ALARM LOCKOUT SWITCH. IF TIIIS IIAPPENS TiiE ALARM LOCKOUT IS ANNUNCIATED ON ALB31, WINDOW D04 (GENERATOR VOLTAGE 53 l

l 1 I J REGULATOR ALARM LOCKOUT). ANNUNCIATOR ALB31 IS LOCATED ON Tile ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BOARD (QEAB). CllANGING TIIE TERMINATION OF WIRE 26 BETWEEN Tile CEILING SENSING AND WASilOUT AND OUTPUT CIRCUIT BOARDS PROVIDES AN ENIIANCED SUPERVISION OF Tile WASilOUT OUTPUT CIRCUIT BOARD SUCil TilAT A FAILURE OF Tile FINAL STAGE OF Tile WASilOUT AND OUTPUT CIRCUIT BOARD WILL DE DETECTED. ACTIVATION OF Tile PSS DOES NOT AFFECT OVER SPEED PROTECrlON. TilEREFORE, Tile TURBINE MISSILE EVALUATION EVALUATED IN FSAR SECTION 3.5.1.3 IS NOT AFFECTED. NEIT:lER OPERATION NOR FAILURE OF Tile PSS WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT TURBINE-GENERATOR OPERATION OR ITS INTERACTION WITil Tile REACTOR. Tile TURBINE-GENERATOR IS NOT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AND NEITIIER OPERATION NOR FAILURE OF TIIE PSS WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT TURBINE-GENERATOR OPERATION, INCLUDING OVER SPEED PROTECTION. ALSO, AS STATED IN FSAR SECrlONS 10.1.2 AND 10.2.1.2, Tile TURBINE-GENERATOR llAS LOAD-FOLLOWING CilARACTERISTICS CONSISTENT WITil Tile REQUIREMENTS OF Tile NSSS AND Tile TURBINE-GENERATOR SYSTEM IS DESIGNED IN CONCERT WITil Tile INTERFACE AND SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF Tile NSSS. TURBINE OVER SPEED, DISCUSSED IN TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.3.4, IS NOT AFFECTED BY OPERATION OF Tile PSS. Tile ACTIVITY DID NOT REDUCE Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN Tile BASIS FOR ANY TECifNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 VIN 0202, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFFION: TIIIS DCP INSTALLED A FULLY REDUNDANT COMPUTER SYSTEM WillCil, WilEN ACrlVATED, RETRIEVES INFORMATION FROM Tile EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES COMPUTERS SYSTEM FOR Tile AFFECTED UNIT AND TRANSMIT IT OVER Tile DEDICATED ERDS TELEPilONE LINE TO TILE NRC. TIIE DEDICATED TELEPIIONE LINES ARE PART OF Tile FTS 2000 TELEPIIONE SYSTEM WillCII IS ALREADY INSTALLED IN Tile TSC. Tills MODIFICATION MEETS Tile NEW REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTil BY Tile CilANGES TO 10CFR50 APPENDIX E SECTION VI WillCil STATED TilAT NUCLEAR FACILITIES MUST TRANSMIT REAL-TIME DATA TO Ti!E NRC OPERATIONS CENTER WITi!IN ONE ilOUR AFTER Ti!E DECLARATION OF AN ALERT OR llIGIIER CLASSIFICATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DCP IMPLEMENTED A CilANGE TO Tile PLANT TIIAT WILL DE INCORPORATED TO TiiE FSAR AND EMERGENCY PLAN WITil DCP 91 V2N0203 0-1. Tills SYSTEM PROVIDES NO MECllANISMS BY WillCII AN INCREASE IN Tile PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT COULD OCCUR AS IT IS ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED AND NOT LOCATED NEAR ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT USED IN Tile FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. IT IS NOT USED OR ASSUMED FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION. ADDITIONAL IIEAT LOADS FOR Tile TSC IIAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO BE WITilIN TilERE LIMITS SO AS NOT TO EFFECT TSC IIABITABILITY. TlilS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DIRECFLY INTERFACE WITH ANY SYSTEM IDENTIFIED IN Tile TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0228, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRilrrION: Tills DCP INSTALLED SEALS, TO PREVENT MOISTURE INTRUSION FROM STEAM, ON ASCO SOLENOIDS 1 ITY 8888,1-ilY-8964,1 FY-510A., IFY 520A, IFY-530A, IFY-540A, ILY 5242A., ILY 5243 A, ILY-5244 A, ILY-5245 A, IIIY-15196A,1 IIY 15197A, llIY-15198A, lHY 15199A, AND IIIY-8145. TilESE VALVE SOLENOIDS WERE DISCOVERED TO DE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOISTURE INTRUSION WillCl! COULD ELECTRICALLY SilORT OUT TIIE CONTROL POWER TO TIIESE VALVES AS FOUND IN TIIE " MOISTURE INTRUSION BROADNESS REVIEW PER REA VG-680 54

SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT CilANGED BY Tile ADDITION OF Tile SEALS TO Tile SOLENOIDS. Tills IMPROVES TIIE RELIABILITY OF Tile PAMS INDICATION DUE TO Tile INCREASE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY. THIS CilANGE DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VIN 0233, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrrlON: REDUCE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) AVERAGE TEMPLRATURE (TAVG) FROM 588.4 'F TO 586.4 'F. Tile REDUCTION IN TAVG WAS ACCOMPLISilED BY ADJUSTING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DORON CONCENTRATION. THiS DESIGN ClIANGE PACKAGE DID NOT REQUIRE PIIYSICAL PLANT MODIFICATIONS BUT REQUIRED SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS WITillN Tile 7300 CONTROL SYSTEM CABINETS '9fE CHANGE TO TAVG RESULTED IN CilANGES TO THE STEAM GENERATOR OUTIR CONDTDONS AS FOLLOWS: STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET STEAM PRESSURE (AT THE NOZZLE): 982 PSIA. STEAM FLOW RATE AT TIIE STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET: 15.13 X !O6 LDSillOUR (TOTAL FOR FOUR STEAM GENERATORS) RECURRING OTDT/OPDT TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS IIAVE RESULTED AT VOGTLE UNIT 1, AFTER LOADING OF VANTAGE 5 TRANSITION CORE AND REMOVAL OF Tile RTD BYPASS SYSTEM, COMPLETED DURING Tile THIRD REFUELING OUTAGE. IN AN ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE Tile TURfilNE RUN DACK ALARMS, Tile SET POINT MARGIN BETWEEN ALARM AND TIIE OPDT/OTDT REACTOR TIUPS WAS REDUCED TO 1% BY DCR 91-VINO 225. TO REG AIN MARGIN TO REACTOR TRIP, IT HAS DEEN TO MAINTAIN Ti!E NOMINAL TAVG FOR PROTECTION FUNCTIONS AT TIIE CURRENT NOMINAL VALUE OF 588.4 F AND RE-CONFIGURE Tile CONTROL SYSTEMS TO OPERATE Tile PLANT AT A TAVG OF 586.4 'F. THIS 2 DEGREE DIFFERENCE IN PROTECTION VERSUS CONTROL TAVG SHOULD ACillEVE TIIE EQUIVALENT MARGIN TO TRIP WillCil EXISTED PRIOR TO CilANGING Tile OPDT/OTDT TURBINE RUN BACK ALARM SET POINTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: SET POINT VALUES OR CHA.NGES TO SET POINTS TO ACCOMMODATE TIIE CIIANGE TO TAVG DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN TiiE FSAR. NO NEW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE BEING IMPOSED ON ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENTS SUCil THAT Tile DESI'GN CRITERIA WILL DE EXCEEDED. THE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DOES NOT CREATE A CONDITION WilERE TIIE DESIGN, MATERIAL OR CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS TIIAT WERE APPLICABLE TO TIIE ORIGINAL DESIGN ARE ALTERED. THE REVISED VALUE FOR TAVG IS BOUNDED BY Tile ACCIDENT ANALYSES PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. TIIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A STEAM GENERATOR TUDE RUPTURE IIAVE BEEN ADDRESSED (REFERENCE SECL 91-448) FOR A BOUNDING TEMPERATURE REDUCTION WillCll DEMONSTRATES TilAT DOSE CRITERIA ARE NOT EXCEEDED. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTIIER TRANSIENTS ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON INITIAL RCS TEMPERATURES AND Ti!E CURRENT ANALYSES OF RECORD REMAIN VALID. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON Tile REACTOR PROTTICTION SYSTEM HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF TIIIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY ARE MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. IN ADDITION, AS SPECIFIED IN SECL 91-448, TIIE TAVG REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOR WillCil IT IIAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED. EVALUATIONS OF EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY PRESENTED IN SECL 91-448 IIAVE CONCLUDED TilAT Ti!EIR ROLE IN TIIE CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES IS NOT ALTERED. NO NEW EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS IIAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TilAT WILL AFFECT FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER INTEGRITY. Tile 55

1 i 1 TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DID NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DOES IT CREATE FAILURE MODES TIIAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT  ; CHANGES ARE REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THIS TEMPERATURE REDUCTION AND WILL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL HPECIFICATION SECrlON 6.8.1.6. TiiEREFORE. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINEl'IN TIE BASIS OF TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION llAS NOT BEEN REDUCED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0008, REVISION 0, SEQUFNCE 1 DESCRilrTION: Tills DCP REMOVED TIE UNIT 2 RTD BYPASS SYSTEM AND REPLACED IT WITil FAST ACrlNG, NARROW RANGE, DUAL-ELEMENT THERMOWELL-MOUNTED RTDS INSTALLED DIRECTLY INTO THE EXISTING REACTOR COOLANT PIPING PENETRATIONS (TilREE MOUNTED IN TIIE OLD llOT LEG SCOOP PENETRATION AND ONE MOUNTED IN TIE OLD COLD LEG NOZZLE PENETRATION WITH THE CROSSOVER LINE IIOLE BEING CAPPED OFF. SAFETY EVALUATION: REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOU'NDARY INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. REACTOR COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE INPUTS FOR CONTROL AND PROTECTION FUNCTIONS CONTINUE TO BE SUPPLIED. ALSO OTIER EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS UNAFFECTED AND CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. THE ARRANGEMENT OF TIE RTD MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT USED IN TIE MITIGATION OF TIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT. TIEREFORE, THIS CilANGE DOES NOT CREATE TIE l POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCrlON OF EQUIPMENT OR AN UNREVIEWED ACCIDENT NOT I DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. I

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0020, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIYTION: TO PREVENT EXTRACTION STEAM FLOW FROM REVERSING AND CAUSING TURBINE OVER SPEED AFTER A TURBINE TRIP, A SPRING-ASSISTED NON RETURN VALVE l IS LOCATED IN EACH EXTRACTION STEAM LINE TO TIE NUMBERS 3,4,5, AND 6 HEATERS. > DURING NORMAL OPERATION, AIR PRESSURE COUNTERACTS TIE SPRING FORCE, PREVENTING THE SPRING FROM CLOSING THE NON RETURN VALVE. ON A TURBINE TRIP, LOSS OF THE EMERGENCY TRIP SYSTEM (ETS) HYDRAULIC FLUID PRESSURE ACTUATES THE AIR RELAY DUMP VALVES (ARDV). TIE ARDVS VENT TIE CONTROL AIR FROM THE NON RETURN VALVE ACTUATORS, WHICH ALLOWS THE SPRINGS TO ASSIST IN CLOSING TIE VALVES. FOR OVER SPEED PROTECTION, THE EXTRACTION NON RETURN VALVES MUST CLOSE WITillN TWO SECONDS. PRESSURE SWITCH PSL-7070 SENSES TIIE LOSS OF CONTROL AIR PRESSURE IN LINE 2 2420-832-1" AND ACTUATES SOLENOID VALVES WHICH ALSO VENT THE AIR FROM Tim NON RETURN VALVE ACTUATORS. PSL-7070 ALSO INITIATES THE CLOSING OF THE EXTRACTION STEAM ISOLATION VALVES AND TIE OPENING OF VARIOUS DRAIN VALVES. THIS DCP REPLACED PRESSURE SWITCH PSL-7070, WHICH WAS LOCATED IN THE TURBINE FRONT STANDARD, WITH THREE PRESSURE SWITCIES WHICH ARE LOCATED ON INSTRUMENT RACK 21,2-1624-P5-R21. Tile SET POINTS FOR TIE NEW SWITCIES, PSL-7070A, B, AND C, REMAINED AT 15 PSIG, WHICH IS Tile SET POINT FOR PSL-7070. BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH ROOM FOR THREE PRESSURE SWITCIES IN TIE CURRENT LOCATION OF PSL-7070, THE PRESSURE TAP FOR Tile NEW SWITCHES WAS ADDED TO LINE 2-2420-881-1", WHICH IS PART OF TIE SAME AIR SYSTEM BUT IS FURTHER FROM THE ARDVS. THE PREVIOUS PRESSURE TAP FOR PSL-7070 l WAZ CAPPED. STAINLESS STEEL TUBING WAS INSTALLED FROM THE NEW PRESSURE TAP TO THE INSTRUMENT RACK. Tile PREVIOUS DES!GN USED A SINGLE PRESSURE SWITCH, 56 I

PSL-7070, AND ONE-OF-ONE LOGIC TO GENERATE THE VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS. A MALFUNCTION OF TIE PRESSURE SWITCII WOULD CAUSE EITIER A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO IMPROPER ACTUATION OF THE EXTRACTION STEAM ISOLATION VALVES OR THE LACK OF ACTUATION OF TIE NON RETURN VALVE SOLENOIDS, THE EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES AND VARIOUS DRAIN VALVES. BY CIIANGING THE TRIP LOGIC TO TWO-OF 711REE LOGIC,' DIE PROBABILITY OF IMPROPER ACTUATION OR LACK OF ACTUATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES DUE TO PRESSURE SWITCII MALFUNCTION IS REDUCED. SAFETY EVALUATION: NONE OF THE COMPONENTS ADDED OR MODIFIED BY Tills DCP ARE SAFETY RELATED. THE ADDITION OF THE PRESSURE TAP AND INSTRUMENT AIR LINE HAD A NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT ON TIE CLOSING TIMES FOR TIE EXTRACTION STEAM NON RETURN VALVES. THE VALVES STILL CLOSE WITlHN TWO SECONDS OF ACTUATION OF TIIE ARDVS. TIIEREFORE THERE IS NO EFFECT ON TIE TURBINE OVER SPEED PROTECTION PROVIDED BY TIE NON RETURN VALVES. CHANGING THE ONE-OF-ONE LOGIC, WHICil CURRENTLY GENERATES VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS, TO A TWO-OF-TIIREE LOGIC PROVIDE FOR MORE RELIABLE OPERATION OF TIIE TURBINE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. TIE POSSIBILITY OF A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO . MALFUNCTION OF THE EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES WAS REDUCED. THE REACTOR i TRIP CIRCUITRY AND REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY TlHS DCP. THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN TIIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT REFER TO TIE TURBINE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. TIE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM 15 MORE RELIABLE DUE TO TIIE CH ANGE IN VALVE ACTUATION LOGIC. SINCE TIIE RESULTS OF A TURBINE TRIP OR TURBINE OVER SPEED EVENT ARE NOT CilANGED BY THIS DCP, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WAS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0023, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL MEASURING INSTRUMENTATION (MANUFACTURER-MAGNETROL) WITil AN ELECTRONIC SYSTEM THAT MEASURES LEVEL BY DETECTING THE ELECTROLYTIC CONDUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TIE STEAM AND WATER INTERFACE. THE LEVEL SWITCH CONTROLS THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF TIIE CONDENSATE DRAIN VALVES. THE NEW YARWAY/ AQUARIAN 1000 LEVEL SWITCHES, CONSISTING OF A MODULE AND TWO LEVEL PROBES. SAFETY EVALU ATION: THIS DCP ALLOWS THE STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL SYSTEM TO OPERATE PROPERLY PER ITS DESIGN FUNCTION. TIUS CilANGE DOES NOT ADD ANY NEW ACCIDENT SOURCES NOR DOES IT ALTER TIIE OPERATION OR DESIGN OF ANY EQUIPMENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN AN ACCIDENT. THE OPERATION OF TIESE LEVEL SWITCHES AND TIIEIR COMPANION VALVES IS NOT ASSUMED BY ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IN TIIE FSAR. TIIESE LEVEL SWITCHES DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. T1ESE VALVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATE DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THE LEVEL SWITCil AND ASSOCIATED CONTROL AND POWER FOR THE DRAIN VALVE ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED. A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 10.2 AND CHAPTERS 7 AND 15 SIIOWS TIIAT THE CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITil THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCrlON OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THIS DESIGN CIIANGE ENHANCES THE RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM. FAILURE EFFECTS OF MAJOR COMPONENTS IN TIIE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED IN FSAR TABLE 10.3.3 1. TIESE EFFECTS ARE UNCHANGED BY THIS DCP. TIE LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION 57

l l IN Tile TURBINE BUILDING AND ITS ASSOCIATED PIPING AND SUPPORT MODIFICATION PER TIIIS DCP WILL NOT CREATE Tile POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. ALL APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA IIAVE BEEN MET BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE. TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF TECIINICAL I SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING TIIE BASES TO 3/4.3 AND 3/4.7 IS NOT DECREASED SINCE THE DESIGN CllANGES ASSURE THAT THE STEAM DRAIN POT SYSTEM OPERATES CORRECTLY. TIIE LEVEL SWITCHES ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED AND THEIR FAILURE DID NOT COMPROMISE ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR PREVENT A SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0024, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE OLD STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL MEASURING INSTRUMENTATION WITli ELECTRONIC SYSTEM WillCH MEASURES LEVEL BY DETECTING TIIE ELECTROLYTIC CONDUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STEAM AND TIIE WATER INTERFACE. THE LEVEL SWITCH CONTROLS Tile OPENING AND CLOSING OF Tile CONDENSATE DRAIN VALVES FOR Tile FOLLOWING LEVEL SWITCHES: 2LS-3145, 2 LS-3147, 2 LS4271, 2LS4273, 2LS4276, 2 LS-6287, 2LS4281, 2LS4288, 2LSH-5178,

• AND 2LSif-5179.

SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE LEVEL SWITCIIES ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED AND DO NOT COMPROMISE ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR PREVENT A SAFE SIIUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. ,

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0044, REVISION 0. SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DESIGN CHANGE MODIFIED THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) BACKFLUSilABLE FILTER (2-1208-F4-001) IN TIIE LETDOWN LINE TO ALLOW INSTALL OF AN ADAI'TER PLATE IN Tile FILTER llOUSING TO ALLOW A PALL FILTER CO. CARTRIDGE FILTER TO BE INSTALLED AND MODIFIED THE VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD TO UTILIZE A IIINGED IIEAD WITH SWING BOLTS. A CARTRIDGE FILTER ELEMENT CAN NOW BE USED IN Ti!E RCS FILTER TO ALLOW REMOVAL OF SMALLER PARTICLES FROM THE RCS WHICH REDUCE TIIE OVERALL RADI ATION DOSE FROM THE RCS. Tile PROJECT CLASS OF THE FILTER AND APPLICABLE FILTER PIPING / VALVES BEING MODIFIED IS 212 AND THE NITROGEN PIPING REMOVED, TilAT WAS USED FOR BACKFLUSillNG WAS PROJECT CLASS 424. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MODIFICATIONS WERE PERFORMED TO COMPLY WITH ALL APPLICABLE ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA AND CODES. THE OPERATION OF T!!E VALVES WAS CHANGED SO TIIE RCS INLET AND OUTLET VALVES FAIL CLOSED AND THE BYPASS VALVE FAILS OPEN. THIS PREVENTS THE INLET AND OUTLET VALVES FROM OPENING WHILE THE FILTER IIEAD IS OPEN WillCil COULD CAUSE RCS FLUID TO SPILL INTO TIIE AREA. NO EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT ARE LOCATED IN THE FILTER PIT TIIAT COULD AFFECT THE SAFE SliUTDOWN OF Tile REACTOR SIIOULD A FAILURE OCCUR DURING THE FILTER CARTRIDGE REPLACEMENT TIIAT COULD DAMAGE TIIE FILTER VESSEL OR ASSOCIATED PIPING LOCATED IN THE FILTER VESSEL PIT. THIS DESIGN C11ANGE DID NOT MODIFY OR CHANGE ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT NOR IT ADVERSELY AFFECT Tile OPERATION OR FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT. Tile IIOIST LOAD PATli HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND A DROP FROM Tile MAXIMUM HEIGilT DID NOT RESULT IN Ti!E LOSS OF , REDUNDANT TRAINS OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. Tile RCS FILTER IS NOT 58

REQUIRED TO PERFORM ANY FUNCTION OTILER TilAN MAINTAIN PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT. TIE MODIFICATION TO Tile RCS FILTER COMPLIES WITli TIE ORIGINAL APPLICABLE DESIGN CRITERIA AND CODES. Tills DESIGN CllANGE DOES NOTIIAVE ANY ADVERSE EFFECT ON ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT NOR DOES IT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT EITHER NOT IDENTIFIED OR IDENTIFIED IN THE DESIGN BASIS OF Tile PLANT THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE Tile SAFETY OF Tile PUBLIC. TIIEREFORE, THIS DESIGN CilANGE DOES NOT REDUCE TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 V2N0055, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCR!lrrlON: Tills CIIANGE REPLACED FIVE CllEMICAL AND VOLUlvE CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS-SYSTEM NO.1208) ROCKWELL DIAPHRAGM VALVES WITH GATE VALVES. TIIE VALVES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH TIE CilEMICAL MIXING TANK (2-1208T6-005), SEE P&lD 2X4DB116-1. Tills FIVE GALLON TANK, DEPENDING ON PLANT MODE, IS USED IN TIIE PREPARATION OF CAUSTIC SOLUTIONS FOR PH CONTROL, ilYDRAZINE SOLUTION FOR OXYGEN SCAVENGING, AND CHEMICALS FOR CORROSION PRODUCT OX1DATION DURING A REFUELING SliUTDOWN. TIIE VALVE TAG NUMBERS, SIZES AND PROJECT CLASSIFICATIONS ARE: VALVES TAG # 2-1208-U4176,2-1208-U4178, 2-1208-U4-179, 2-1208-U4 180, 2-1208-U4-181. THE PREVIOUS INSTALLED DIAPIIRAGM VALVES HAVE EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE PASS THEIR SEATS. FURTIERMORE, BASED ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1.4.2 AND 3.9.1, IN PLANT MODE 5 WITil TIE REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS NOT FILLED, AND IN MODE 6, VALVE 2-1208-U4-176 IS REQUIRED TO BE CLOSED AND SECURED IN POSITION IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE A BORON DILUTION EVENT. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MEET THE INTENT OF THE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WITH EXCESSIVE VALVE LEAKAGE. THE REPLACEMENT VALVE FOR 2-1208-U4-176 IS PROVIDED WITH A LOCKING DEVICE WillCII CAN DE USED TO SECURE TIE l VALVE POSITION.

                                                                                      ]
                                                                                      )

SAFETY EVALUATION: Tim NEW GATE VALVES MEET THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, QUALITY AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE CVCS. Tile NEW GATE VALVES ARE FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT TO TIIE DIAPHRAGM VALVES. TIE ADDITIONAL WEIGitT (2.5 TO 5 POUNDS) FOR EACH GATE VALVE HAS BEEN EVALUATED FOR IMPACT ON PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT LOADING AND IIAS BEEN FOUND ACCElrrABLE. Ti!E NEW VALVES MINIMIZE SEAT LEAKAGE TIIE GATE VALVES ARE EXPOSED TO CliEMICALS MIXED WITH WATER FROM TIE RMWST. TIIE VALVE MATERIALS ARE COMPATIBLE WIT 11 TIE CIEMICAL SOLUTIONS - BEING USED. TIE RMWST RECEIVES ITS WATER FROM THE PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (SYSTEM NO.1418) AND FROM THE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM (SYSTEM NO 1901). BASED ON FSAR SECTION 12.2, TiiE RMWST IS EXPECTED TO CONTAIN LOW LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY. TIIEREFORE, ANY RADIOACTIVITY WITHIN THE RMWST COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO Tile CIIEMICAL MIXING TANK. FSAR SECTION 9.3.4.1.2.5.25 INDICATES WlERE PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE CONDrrIONS PERMIT, DIAPHRAGM TYPE VALVES ARE USED TO ESSENrlALLY ELIMINATE LEAKAGE TO THE ATMOSPIIEPE. REPLACEMENT OF THE DIAPIIRAGM VALVES WITH GATE VALVES IS ACCElrrABLE SINCE TIE CIEMICAL MIXING TANK CONTAINS LOW LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY ONLY, AND EXTERNAL (STEM) LEAKAGE, IF ANY, WILL BE COLLECTED BY Tile FLOOR DRAIN SYSTEM AND TIEN PROCESSED BY TiiE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM. TIIE REPLACEMENT OF 59 4

DIAPHRAGM VALVES WITil GATE VALVES DID NOT ALTER OR INTERFERE WITH THE SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS OF Tile CVCS. NO NEW ACCIDENT INITIATION OR FAILURE MECIIANISM llAS BEEN ADDED AS A RESULT OF Tile DESIGN CliANGE. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY Tills DCP HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITli PLANT APPROVED SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES WHICII RESULT IN A DESIGN TilAT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITil EXISTING PLANT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. FURTilERMORE, APPLICABLE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS,3.4.1.4.2 AND 3.9.1, INCLUDING Tile CORRESPONDING BASIS, HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND IT IIAS BEEN DETERMINED TilAT TilEY ARE NOT AFFECTED BY TlilS CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0074, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIl7 TION: TIIE PREVIOUS SECONDARY PLANT DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZERS CONSISTING OF SAMPLE CABINETS AE-9521, AE-9528, AND AE-20187, AITS-9521, AITS-9528, AITS-20187 ARE NO LONGER MANUFACTURED OR SUPPORTED BY THE VENDOR, HAYS INSTRUMENT CO. Tills DCP REPLACED TiiE TilREE PREVIOUS INDIVIDUAL HAYS OXYGEN ANALYZER ASSEMBLIES WITil A STATE OF Tile ART MULTICHANNEL DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZER MANUFACTURED BY ORBISPilERE LABORATORIES (MODEL 2620-5). TIIE NEW UNIT IS CONFIGURED %Tfli TIIREE CHANNELS, WITil THE CAPABILITY TO BE EXPANDED TO FIVE CHANNELS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills DESIGN CilANGE IS CONSIDERED EQUIVALENT TO Tile PREVIOUS ACCElvrABLE CONDITIONS AND REPRESENTS NO POSSIBLE ADVERSE AFFECTS WillCil COULD INCREASE Tile RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN Tile FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 91-V2N0087, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: A 2" SERVICE AIR LINE,2-2401-L4450, AND ISOLATION VALVE, 2 2401-U4-682, WAS ADDED TO EXISTING SERVICE AIR HEADER,2-2401-5214", LOCATED IN Tile SOUTil MAIN STEAM TUNNEL,2T1. Tills ADDITIONAL LIN". PROVIDES A COMPRESSED AIR SUPPLY FOR SLUDGE LANCING OF THE STEAM GENERATORS DURING REFUELING OUTAGES.TIIE SERVICE AIR LINE, PIPING CLASS LLO, WAS ROUTED TO AN AREA ABOVE 1 TIIE STEAM TUNNEL GRATING WHERE AN ISOLATION VALVE AND TilREADED END CAP i CAN DE EASILY ACCESSED FOR CONNECTION TO THE SLUDGE LANCING EQUIPMENT. THREE PIPE SUPPORTS WERE ADDED FOR Tile 2" SERVICE AIR LINE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUPPORTING PROJECT CLASS 626 PIPE. SAFETY EVALUATION: INSTALLING AN ADDITIONAL SERVICE AIR CONNECTION ON AN EXISTING HEADER DID NOT IMPACT Tile OPERATION OR THE RELI ABILITY OF THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM. Tile MODIFICATION MEETS ALL ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA. USE OF THE AIR CONNECTION IS INTENDED TO BE DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE i ADDITIONAL DEMAND ON TIIE SERVICE AIR PORTION OF Tile COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM  ! WILL NOT AFFECT PLANT INSTRUMENT AIR. TIIE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM llAS I ADEQUATE CAPACITY TO SUPPLY BOTil INSTRUMENT AIR TO INSTRUMENTS AND VALVE OPERATORS TilROUGHOUT Tile UNIT AND SERVICE AIR FOR SLUDGE LANCING. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR Tile CONSERVATION OF COMPRESSED AIR IN TifE EVENT OF EXCESSIVE SERVICE AIR DEMAND, THE IIEADER TO Tile SERVICE AIR DRYERS IS AlfrOMATICALLY ISOLATED WIIEN A PRESSURE SWITCil SENSES SERVICE AIR PRESSURE DECREASE TO APPROXIMATELY 80 PSIO. THE PORTION OF Tile LINE THAT IS ABOVE Tile GRATING IS . i LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 3'-6" FROM Tile AUXILIARY BUILDING AND IS NOT IN DANGER OF BEING DAMAGED BY VElllCLES OR EQUIPMENT IN Tile AREA. Tile 60 l l

COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENTS. NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY RELIES ON COMPRESSED AIR IN ORDER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. SUPPLYING SERVICE AIR TO THE SLUDGE LANCING TRAILER DURING OUTAGES HAS NO EFFECT ON PLANT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY BECAUSE THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS SIZED ADEQUATELY TO SUPPLY INSTRUMENT AIR AND SERVICE AIR TilROUGilOUT Tile PLANT FOR VARIOUS USES, INCLUDING SLUDGE LANCING. NEITilER TIE CONFIGURATION NOR TiiE OPERATION OF Tim SERVICE AIR SYSTEM ARE COVERED IN THE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 V2N0114, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlrTION: DCP 90-V2N0166-0-1 ADDED NORMALLY CLOSED MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES IN THE PNEUMATIC LINES OF THE JACKET WATER SENSORS TO DISABLE TIIESE SENSORS DURING EMERGENCY STARTS. DURING NON-EMERGENCY STARTS, THESE VALVES CAN BE MANUALLY OPENED TO ENABLE THE lilGH TEMPERATURE JACKET WATER TRIPS. TIE CIIANGE OF CONVERTING THE JACKET WATER SENSORS TO GROUP II AUTOMATICALLY DISABLES THE TRIPS DURING EMERGENCY STARTS, AND ENABLE THE TRIPS DURING NORMAL STARTS. Tills CilANGE ALSO PLACES Tile SENSORS IN TIE TEST BYPASS CIRCUITRY. THIS CHANGE MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF REG. GUIDE 1.9. ABNORMAL VALUES OF JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE (190 F AND 200 F) ARE ALARMED LOCALLY AND IN TIE MAIN CONTROL ROOM. THE FIRST-OUT CONNECTION TO THE LOW PRESSURE JACKET WATER ANNUNCIATOP.ON BOTH D/GS IS BEING DISCONNECTED BECAUSE IT IS NOT A TRIP ALARM AND ONLY TRIP ALARMS SilOULD DE INPUT TO THE FIRST-OUT CIRCUITRY. TIE VALVES ISOLATE EACH LINE FROM TIIE CENTRAL AIR SUPPLY LINE, AND THE VALVED TEST TEES ALLOW FOR AN EASY CONNECTION OF TIE TEST EQUIPMENT. SINCE TIIE JACKET WATER SENSORS ARE BEING ADDED TO GROUP II, A MAKE-UP AIR LINE WITli A 0.006" ORIFICE WAS ADDED TO LINE E16-B. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile CONVERSION OF TIIE HIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE SENSORS TO A GROUP 11 TRIP DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF ANY ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR, INCLUDING THOSE DISCUSSED IN CHAIrTERS 8,9, OR 15. THESE CHANGES ONLY ENHANCED Tile PERFORMANCE OF TIE DIESEL GENERATOR BY DECREASING THE PROBABILITY OF AN INADVERTENT DIESEL GENERATOR TRIP DURING AN EMERGENCY START. THE OPERATOR CAN STILL MANUALLY TRIP Tile DIESEL UPON RECEllrr OF A IIIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE ALARM, AND THUS PROTECTING THE ENGINE FROM DAMAGE > WHILE THE CAUSE OF Tile HIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE ALARM IS BEING INVESTIGATED. TI!E DISCONNECTION OF TIIE FIRST OUT CIRCUITRY FROM THE LOW PRESSURE JACKET WATER ANNUNCIATOR DID NOT AFFECT TIIE PERFORMANCE OR OPERATION OF THE D/G. THE LOW PRESSUIE JACKET WATER TRIP ANNUNCIATOR INPUT TO TIIE FIRST-OUT CIRCUITRY REMAINS. Tim ADDITION OF THE VALVED TEST TEES AND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES IN Tile AIR SUPPLY LINES ONLY AFFECTS THE LEAK TESTING OF Tile ASSOCIATED LINES AND SENSORS. DURING NORMAL D/G OPERKTION, TilESE COMPONENTS ARE NOT ACTIVE. ALL OF Tile CIIANGES MADE TO CONVERT THE HIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE SENSORS TO GROUP 11 SENSORS ARE SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR ENVIRONMENT AND THE D/G CONTROL PANEL'S OPERABILITY DURING AND AITER A SEISMIC EVENT IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. Tills CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF Tile DIESEL ENGINE OR ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS AS ANALYZED IN Tile FSAR. THIS CllANGE DECREASED THE PROBABILITY OF THE D/G TRIPPING ON EMERGENCY START. Tile HIGH TEMPERATURE JACKET WATER SENSOR DESIGN CIIANGE DID NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY T1E BASIS OF Tile TECH SPECS INCLUDING THE BASES FOR 3/4.4,3/4.5,3/4.8,3/4.9, OR THE BASES FOR 61

1 l l l i Tile SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT IN 3/4.8.1. TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY OF TIE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, EhERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM AND REFUELING OPERATION IS , RELATED TO TIIE AVAILABILITY OF TIE SITE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT POWER TO TIE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPhENT REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE FACILITY AND THE MITIGATION AND CONTROL OF ACCIDENT CONDITIONS WITIllN THE FACILITY. A LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER IS A CONTRIBUTING EVENT DURING OTIIER POSTULATED ACCIDENTS. TIIE OPERABILITY OF TIE ON SITE A.C. POWER SOURCE WAS NOT DEGRADED BY IMPLEMENTING THIS DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0120, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (TPCWS), SYSTEM 1405, IS DESIGNED TO SUPPLY COOLING WATER TO VARIOUS lEAT EXCHANGERS TilROUGHOUT TIE TURBINE BUILDING, CONTROL BUILDING, AND AUXILIARY BUILDING DURING ALL MODES OF NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND POWER GENERATION. THE SYSTEM. CONSISTS OF TWO 100% CAPACITY TPCW PUMPS,2 1405-P4-501 AND 502 (ONE IS A BACKUP), AND ASSOCIATED PIPING, VALVES, CONTROLS, AND INSTRUMENTATION, Tile POWER SUPPLY FOR T/CW PUMP 2 1405-P4-501 DISCIIARGE VALVE 211V-6798 WAS CHANGED FROM MCC 2NBT (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA04) LOCATED IN Tim CHEMICAL ELECTRICAL B'UILDING TO MCC ANBK (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA01) LOCATED IN THE DIESEL FIRE PUMP llOUSE NO. 2. A DESIGN CllANGE OF THIS NATURE IIAS BEEN PERFORMED ON UNIT I (DCP 91-VINOl19-1-1). TIE VALVE CONTINUES TO OPERATE AS BEFORE, OPENING AUTOMATICALLY WHEN PUMP 501 STARTS AND CLOSING WHEN PUMP 501 STOPS CURRENTLY, MCC 2NBT (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA04) SUPPLIES POWER TO TPCW PUMP 21405-P4-502 DISCHARGE VALVE 2HV-6799, AS WELL AS TPCW PUMP 2-1405-P4-501 (THE ALTERNATE PUMP) DISCHARGE VALVE 2HV-6798. IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF POWER AT 2NA04 (WillCII FEEDS PUMP 502), TPCW PUMP 501 WOULD BE STARTED; HOWEVER, ITS DISCIIARGE VALVE WOULD REMAIN CLOSED. TIE ONLY TPCW FLOW WOULD BE THROUGli TIE MINIMUM FLOW LINE, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF COOLING TO Tile VARIOUS EQUIPMENT THAT DEPEND ON TPCW FOR lEAT REMOVAL. MCC ANBK IS FED FROM 4160V SWITCII GEAR 2NA01, WlilCH IS INDEPENDENT OF 2NA04. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ONLY CHANGE MADE WAS THE POWER SUPPLY TO TPCW PUMP 2-1405-P4-501 DISCIIARGE VALVE 2HV-6798. FAILURE OF THE SUBJECT VALVE COULD AFFECT T1E EQUIPMENT THAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW. NONE OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, IS SAFETY-RELATED. FAILURE OF THE TPCW - DISCllARGE VALVE, WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN OF TIE PLANT. THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY Tills DESIGN CIIANGE IS NOT ASSUhED TO FUNCTION IN AN ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN CllAPTER 15 OF THE FSAR. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DESIGN CHANGE WILL NOT CAUSE THE MALFUNCTION OF OTIER EQUIPMENT THAT IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION. THE TPCW SYSTEM IS NEITIER REQUIRED FOR TIE SAFE SilUTDOWN OF THE PLANT NOR DOES IT IIAVE A SAFETY DESIGN BASIS. CHANGING Tile POWER SUPPLY TO DISCliARGE VALVE 2HV-6798 DID NOT CREATE Tile POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE TilAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. SHOULD THE CilANGE IN POWER SUPPLY TO THE AFFECTED VALVE RESULT IN FAILURE OF TIE VALVE TO ACTUATE AND FAILURE OF TPCW TO DELIVER COOLING WATER TO ITS LOADS, TIIERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOT ADDRESSED IN TIE FSAR BECAUSE THE EQUIPMENT TilAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW IS NOT SAFETY-RELATED AND IS NOT RELIED UPON FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF Tile PLANT. THIS DESIGN Cl{ANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY MARGINS SINCE THE SYSTEM AFFECTED, SYSTEM 1405, DOES NOT llAVE A SAFETY DESIGN BASES, AND THIS MODIFICATION MEETS ALL OF TIE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA. 62

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0143, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlrrION: THIS DESIGN CIIANGE PACKAGE MODIFIED THE BRACKET (llANGER) FOR TIIE SPENT FUEL IIANDLING TOOL (TAG NO. 2-2204-A6-001) IN TIE UNIT 2 TRANSFER CANAL. IN ITS OLD CONFIGURATION THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL HANGER REQUIRED THAT AN OPERATOR LEAN OVER TIE IIAND RAIL AND TRANSFER CANAL TO TAKE TIE TOOL ON AND OFF THE HANGER. THIS WAS AN UNSAFE CONDITION FOR PLANT PERSONNEL. THE PROJECT CLASS FOR TIE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL liANGER IS 62C. TIE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL 11 ANGER IS A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 OVER I COMPONENT. SAFETY EVALUATION: TiiE ATTACHAENT LOCATION OF THE HANGER TO TIE FUEL HANDLING BUILDING FLOOR DID NOT CHANGE. Tills IIANGER WAS ADDED DURING CONSTRUCTION AND THE IMPACT ON TIIE ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN Tim FSAR WERE ADDRESSED DURING DESIGN. THE REVISED STORAGE HEIGHT OF TIE SPENT FUEL llANDLING TOOL WAS VERIFIED TO BE LESS THAN THE STORAGE IIEIGHTS OF TIE THIMBLE PLUG TOOL, THE RCCA TOOL, AND TIIE BPRA TOOL. AS A RESULT, THE MODIFICATION BY THIS DCP IS ENVELOPED BY THE OTIIER EXISTING TOOL STORAGE HEIGilTS AND TIIEREFORE IS WITHIN THE MAXIMUM DROP IIEIGHT CRITERIA AS STATED IN SECTION 9.1.4.6 OF THE FSAR. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE SPENT FUEL IIANDLING TOOL OR ITS HANGER. SUBJEcr: DCP: 91-V2N0157, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: TIIE DESIGN CilANGE REMOVED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES 2PSV-8510A AND 2PSV-8510B FROM THE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP (CCP) ALTERNATE MINIFLOW LINES TO TIIE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST). THE PIPING BETWEEN THE RELIEF VALVES AND UPSTREAM MOVS 211V 8509A AND 2HV-8509B WAS DOWNGRADED FROM PROJECT CLASS 212 TO PROJECT CLASS 414. LOGIC WAS ADDED TO THE OPERATION OF MOVS 211V-8508A AND 2HV-8508B SUCH THAT THESE MOV'S OPERATE IN A PRESSURE CONTROL MODE FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION (SI) ACTUATION; IN THIS MODE THE MOVS OPEN AND CLOSE BASED ON CCP DISCHARGE PRESSURE. A PRESSURE . SWITCil,2PS-8508A(B), WAS ADDED AT TIE CCP DISCHARGE HEADER OF EACH TRAIN TO ] CONTROL OPERATION OF Tile ASSOCIATED MOV. HANDSWITCHES 2HS-8508A AND 2HS-8508B WERE REPLACED WITH SWITCHES WillCli HAVE AN ADDITIONAL A PULL TO  : LOCK FUNCTION THE PULL TO LOCK POSITION IS USED TO MANUALLY ENABLE THE l OPERATION OF 211V-8508A AND 2HV-8508B IN Tile PRESSURE CONTROL MODE. A WHITE j LIGilT WAS ALSO BE ADDED AT EACil HANDSWITCH TO INDICATE WlEN TIIE PRESSURE l CONTROL MODE IS ENABLED. TiiE HANDSWITCIES ARE PROJECT CLASS 1IE. I SAFETY EVALUATION: CVCS MALFUNCrlONS THAT RESULT IN A DECREASE IN THE BORON CONCENTRATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT, ANALYZED IN FSAR SUBSECTION 15.4.6, .WERE NOT AFFECTED BY TIE DESIGN CHANGE. THE DESIGN CIIANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE CONCENTRATION OF BORON IN THE REACTOR MAKEUP COOLANT AND DID NOT AFFECT THE LIKELillOOD OF A BORON DILUTION EVENT. TIIE DESIGN CHANGE INVOLVES COMPONENTS WlilCH FORM A PART OF TIE ECCS BUT DID NOT INVOLVE INPUT TO THE ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM. THE LIKELillOOD OF INADVERTENT ECCS ACTUATION liAS NOT BEEN INCREASED. SIMILARLY, THE CHANGE IS OF SUCH A NATURE TilAT THE LIKELlHOOD OF CVCS MALFUNCTIONS THAT COULD RESULT IN INCREASED RCS INVENTORY WERE NOT INCREASED. DURING NORMAL OPERATION, CHARGING PUMP FLOW IS UNAFFECTED BY THE DESIGN CHANGE; MOVS 63

211V-8508A/B WERE CLOSED AND UNAFFECTED BY CCP DISCHARGE PRESSURE. THE PULL TO LOCK POSITION WAS ADDED BY Tile DESIGN CHANGE BUT IS ONLY USED DURING ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS DESIGN, TIIE PULL TO LOCK POSITION COULD ALLOW A MOV TO OPEN WHILE IN A NORMAL CilARGING CONFIGURATION. l llOWEVER, MOVEMENT OF Tile HANDSWITCli TO THIS POSITION WOULD REQUIRE A i DELIBERATE ACTION; FURTHERMORE, Tills ACTION WOULD DE IMhEDIATELY ANNUNCIATED BY TIIE MONITOR LIGHT DISPLAY FOR THIS VALVE, AND WOULD BE DETECTABLE BY Tile ILLUMINATION OF THE WlilTE LIGHT AT TIE HANDSWITCH. THE HANDSWITCH ALLOWS CLOSURE OF TIE MOV AND DISABLING OF TIE PRESSUPE CONTROL MODE (WITH NO SI PRESENT ). THE CIIANGE AFFECTS TIE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE CCP ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATil FOR EACH TRAIN. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ECCS WAS NOT REDUCED COMPARED TO TIE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION, HOWEVER. TIE FLOW RATE THROUGH TIIE ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATII IS REGULATED BY FLOW ORIFICE 2FO-10120(10121) AND IS LESS THAN THE FLOW WIIICil PREVIOUSLY PASSED TIIROUGH RELIEF VALVE 2PSV-8510A(B) AND ALLOWS A SLIGHTLY GREATER ECCS FLOW TO TIIE RCS THAN TIE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION. TIE MODIFIED DESIGN ECCS PERFORMANCE IS BETTER THAN TIE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION. TIE MODIFIED DESIGN DID NOT DEGRADE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE i CVCS DURING OTIER ABNORMAL EVENTS FOR WlilCH ALTERNATE MINIFLOW MAY BE NEEDED, SUCH AS SAFETY GRADE CHARGING FOLLOWING LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR OR A SAFETY GRADE COLD SliUTDOWN. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY TIIE CHANGE. IN TIE PREVIOUS DESIGN, FLOW THROUGH THE ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATH WAS REGULATED BY TIE RELIEF VALVE AND EXCEEDS THE REQUIRED FLOW. WITH TIIE MODIFIED DESIGN, Tile FLOW IS LESS THAN TIE FLOW PREVIOUSLY OBTAINABLE THROUGli THE RELIEF VALVE, BUT EASILY SATISFIES PUMP REQUIREhENTS. THESE MOVS ARE NOT SUBJECTED TO TIE POSSIBILITY OF MOTOR DAMAGE FROM SUSTAINED OPERATION. THE MOVS HAVE ALSO BEEN EVALUATED TO ENSURE TilAT TIIE ACTUATORS WERE PROPERLY SIZED FOR THE MODIFIED APPLICATION. PIPING CHANGES TO SAFETY RELATED PIPING HAVE BEEN ANALYZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AShE CODE. SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS THAT WERE ADDED BY THE CIIANGE WERE SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED FOR TIIE APPLICATION. TIE MODIFIED DESIGN PROVIDES A MORE POSITIVE INDICATION OF ACTUAL FLOW THROUGH THE ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATli DUE TO THE FACT THAT TIIE PREVIOUS DESIGN DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INDICATION OF RELIEF VALVE POSITION. A SINGLE FAILURE OF ANY OF TIE ISOLATION MOVS OR A SINGLE OPERATOR ERROR DOES NOT LEAD TO RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE FLUID TO TIIE RWST. TIIE FAILURE EFFECTS OF OTIER COMPONENTS SUCH AS ELECTRICAL RELAYS AND HANDSWITCllES USED IN Tile MOV CIRCUITRY WERE ENVELOPED BY TIIE PREVIOUS FMEA ANALYSIS AND DID NOT LEAD TO NEW TYPES OF FAILURE. THE DESIGN CllANGES WERE TRAIN ORIENTED SUCli TilAT MALFUNCTIONS OF THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS IN ONE TRAIN CANNOT DEGRADE Tile OTIER TRAIN. TIE DESIGN CHANGES IMPROVES SYSTEM RELIABILITY. THE CHANGES HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR HAZARDS EFFECTS AND FAILURE EFFECTS; THE CONSEQUENCES WERE BOUNDED BY PREVIOUS ANALYSES AND WERE OF SUCH A NATURE TilAT NO NEW TYPE  ! OF FAILURES WERE CREATED. THESE BASES ULTIMATELY REQUIRE THAT SUFFICIENT CORE COOLING CAPABILITY IS AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT TO LIMIT PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES TO ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. THE CCP ALTERNATE ) MINIMUM FLOW LINES AND COMPONENTS MUST FUNCTION TO PROVIDE PROTECTION  ! WilEN REQUIRED TO THE CCPS AGAINST DEADHEADING CONDITIONS; Tile MINIMUM l FLOW LINES AND COMPONENTS MUST ALSO FUNCTION TO LIMIT PUMP RUNOUT AND TO ENSURE TilERE IS SUFFICIENT ECCS INJECTION FLOW TO THE RCS WHEN REQUIRED. TIIE DESIGN CilANGES IIAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO PERFORM TilESE FUNCTIONS AS INTENDED AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE ANY REDUCTION IN Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. I 64 i

1 l l l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0173. REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 i DESCRIPTION: tills DCP INSTALLED A TIIREE INCH VENT LINE FOR WASTE MONITOR TANKS 2190lT6009,2190lT6010, A190lT4012, AND A190lT4013;THE VENT LINE WAS CONNECTED TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING llVAC EXHAUST REGISTER LOCATED IN EACH ROOM. NO OPENING EXISTED FOR THE 5000 GALLON UNIT 2 TANKS SO A NEW THREE INCil NOZZLE HAD TO BE ADDED TO BOTH OF THESE TANKS. THE COMMON 20000 GALLON TANKS liAD TIERE EXISTING 3 INCil VENT LINES ROUTED TO THE EXHAUST REGISTER IN THERE ASSOCIATED ROOMS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDED VENTS ARE OF A PASSIVE TYPE AND DO NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON TIE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF TIE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM OR THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM (LWPS). THE NORMAL AUX 1LIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT TIE SOURCE OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN TIIE FSAR. FSAR SECTIONS 15.7.2 AND 15. 7.3 POSTULATE A TANK FAILURE WITHIN TIE LWPS. TIIE TANK THAT IS ASSUhED TO FAIL IS THE RECYCLE IIOLDUP TANK; THIS WAS CliOSEN BECAUSE IT liAS THE IIIGHEST RADIOACTIVE INVENTORY, AND ITS FAILURE WOULD BE TIE WORSE CASE SCENARIO. SINCE THIS CHANGE WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO TIIE POSTULATED FAILURE OF ANY TANKS, IT WILL NOT AFFECT THE BASES FOR THE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN TIE FSAR AND THEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROB ABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF SUCil ACCIDENTS. FSAR SECTIONS 2.2,2.4,9.4,11.2, AND 15.7 WERE REVIEWED. IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AND DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0191, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CilANGE REPLACID THE FOUR (4) PREVIOUS THREE-WAY VALVES ASSOCIATED WITilTHE FUEL POOL GATE SEALS SERVICE AIR SUPPLY WITH EIGilT (8) INDIVIDUAL VALVES FOR ISOLATION AND VENT / BLEED. THE EW VALVES ARE WHITEY (SWAGELOK) 1/4", SS, NEEDLE TYPE, WITH A BALL TIP STEM, AND NFF INLET / OUTLET CONNECTIONS. T:IESE VALVES PROVIDE POSITIVE VENT / BLEED AND POSITIVE ISOLATION CAPABILITY FOR THE AIR SUPPLY TO Tile GATE Sl'ALS. IN ADDITION, THESE VALVES HAVE LOCKING IIANDLES FOR USE WITil EITIGIR A LANYARD TYPE RETAINING PIN OR A PADLOCK. VALVES WHICH ARE REPLACED BY TIIIS DCP ARE 2-2401-U4-046, -047, -240, AND -242. SAFETY EVALUATION: NO CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR THE OPERATION OF TiiESE VALVES IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IN THE FSAR. TIIE VALVES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEM 2401 AND ARE NOT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY, OR REQUIRED TO FUNCTION TO SUPPORT ANY SAFETY RELATED COMPONENT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE CAPABILITY OF ANY VALVE TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION. TIIIS DESIGN CilANGE IS CONSIDERED AN ENHANCEMENT TO RELIABILITY IN TIIAT INADVERTENT SEAL DEFLATION WOULD BE LESS PROBABLE. FSAR SECTION 9.1.3.5.B EVALUATES ACCIDENTAL OPENING OF THE GATE BETWEEN THE SPENT FUEL POOL AND THE TkANSFER CANAL. THIS EVENT WOULD ENVELOP THE CONSEQUENCES OF GATE SEAL DEFLATION, llOWEVER, Tile VALVE CHANGE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF EITHER EVENT. TIE VALVES WHICH Tills DESIGN CllANGE PACKAGE REPLACED ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED. THE REPLACEMENT VALVES ARE NO MORE LIKEL'( TO FAIL OR IMPACT S AFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT TIIAN THE ORIGINAL VALVES. THIS DESIGN 65

I i l CIIANGE UPGRADES THE SPENT FUEL POOL GATE SEAL SUPPLY AIR RELIABILITY BY REMOVING TIE POSSIBILITY OF A LOSS OF SUPPLY AIR DUE TO INADVERTENT OPERATION OF THE CONTROL VALVE. TIE NEW VALVES ARE SUITABLE FOR TIE  ; SERVICE AND NO RELIANCE IS MADE ON TIEIR POST-ACCIDENT OPERATIONS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY OF TIIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, INCLUDING THE BASIS FOR 3/4.9.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0200, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIITION: THIS DCP DEVELOPS TIE SETPOINTS FOR AND PLACES INSERVICE TIE MAIN GENERATOR POWER SYSTEM STABILIZER.(PSS) SAFETY EVALUATION: DURING ABNORMAL TRANSMISSION SYSTEM CONDITIONS IN WHICH DYNAMIC OSCILLATIONS COULD OCCUR ON THE VEGP 230KV ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS TIE PSS IS AN AID IN REDUCING TilESE OSCILLATIONS AND ASSIST IN MAINTAINING POWER SYSTEM STABILITY. TIE ACTIVATION OF THE l SS DOES NOT AFFECT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OF TIIE FSAR, TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION, OR ANY PROTECTIVE FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE GENERATOR EXCITATION SYSTEM.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0203, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCR11rrION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A FULLY REDUNDANT COMPUTER SYSTEM WHICH, WHEN ACTIVATED, WILL RETRIEVE INFORMATION FROM THE EhERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES COMPUTERS SYSTEM FOR TIE AFFECTED UNIT AND TRANSMIT IT OVER TIE DEDICATED ERDS TELEPHONE LINE TO THE NRC. TIE DEDICATED TELEPHONE LINES ARE PART OF THE FTS-2000 TELEPIIONE SYSTEM WHICH IS ALREADY INSTALLED IN THE TSC. THIS MODIFICATION MEETS THE NEW REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH BY THE CHANGES TO 10CFR$0 APPENDIX E SECTION V1 WillCH STATED TilAT NUCLEAR FACILITIES MUST TRANSMIT REAL-TIME DATA TO THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER WITHIN ONE HOUR AFTER TIE DECLARATION OF AN ALERT OR HIGHER CLASSIFICATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES IMPLEMENT A CHANGE TO THE PLANT THAT WILL BE INCORPORATED TO Tile FSAR AND EMERGENCY PLAN WITH DCP 91-VIN 0202 0-1. THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES NO MECHANISMS BY WHICH AN INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT COULD OCCUR AS IT IS ELELTRICALLY ISOLATED AND NOT LOCATED NEAR ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT USED IN TIE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. IT IS NOT USED OR ASSUMED FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION. ADDITIONAL HEAT LOADS FOR THE TSC HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO BE WITHIN THERE LIMITS SO AS NOT TO EFFECT TSC HABITABILITY, THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DIRECTLY INTERFACE WITH ANY SYSTEM IDENTIFIED IN THE TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. i

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-V2N0205, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDED IMPROVED PERFORMANCE OF TIE TERRY TURBINE. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY REROUTING THE HIGH PRESSURE LEAK OIT LINE (2 1302-L4-126-1") AND LOW PRESSURE LEAK OFF LINE (2-1302-L4-1251 1/2") SEPARATELY, AS RECOMMENDED BY DRESSER RAND IN THEIR INSTRUCTION MANUAL 1X4 AF03-224. Tile LOW PRESSURE DRAIN LINE WAS DISCONNECTED FROM LINE 126-2" AND ROlTTED SEPARATELY TO TIE BUILDING WAS RELOCATED TO ACCOMMODATE TIIE NEW DRAIN LINE (125-1 1/2") THROUGH THE EXISTING PENETRATION. IMPLEhENTATION , 1 66 l

1 OF Tills MODIFICATIONS SATISFIES DRESSER RAND'S RECOMMENDATION FOR DRAINING TIIESE LEAK OF? LINES SEPARATELY. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SEISMIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 11 AVE BEEN MAINTAINED FOR THE MODIFIED LINES. TIE PIPING AND FITTINGS 11 AVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE, AND TEMPERATURE RATING PREVIOUSLY USED FOR TIE SYSTEM. T1E DRAIN LINES MODIFIED HAVE NO FUNCTION EXCEPT IELPING TO MAINTAIN TIE TERRY TURBINE IN GOOD OPERATIONAL CONDITION BY DRAINING TIIE STEAM LEAKOFFS ADEQUATELY AND TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN TIE ROOM BY ROUTING TIE STEAM LEAK OFF OUTSIDE TIE ROOM. TIIIS MODIFICATION ALLOWS TIE DRAIN LINES TO BETTER PERFORM TIEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. TIE PENETRATION WAS RE-SEALED TO ITS ORIGINAL CRITERIA SO T11AT TIE FLOODING CHARACTERISTICS OF ROOMS 104 AND 106 WERE NOT IMPACTED BY Tile MODIFICATION. TIE DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES A BETTER DRAINAGE SYSTEM AS RECOMMENDED BY TIE SUPPLIER OF THE TERRY TURBINE. Tile DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT DEGRADE TIIE CAPABILITY OF T1E *111RBINE. THE DRAIN LINE IS SLOPED FOR CONTINUOUS DRAIN. Tile SEPARATE DRAIN LINES RESULT IN REDUCED BACK PRESSURE AND REDUCED VALVE PACKING LEAKS AND STEAM SEAL LEAKS. THE REDUCTION IN BACK PRESSURE ALSO REDUCES TIIE CORROSION PROBLEM WITH THE TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE STEM. EACH DRAIN LINE HAS A 1/4" HOLE DRILLED JUST ABOVE TIE IllGIEST WATER LEVEL IN Tile SUMP TO PREVENT ANY BACK FLOW DUE TO TIE SIPilONING EFFECT TilAT MAY BE CAUSED BY STEAM CONDENSING IN THE DRAIN LINES. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY WHICH HAS NOT BEEN EVALUATED BEFORE. THE NEW DRAIN LINE WAS INSULATED FOR PERSONNEL PROTECTION. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DES.CRIBED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE THE CHANGE MEETS THE SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS AS THE ORIGINAL DESIGN.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91-VAN 0148, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A SECURITY ACAT AND TIE ACCOMPANYING SECURITY ALARM DEVICES TO PROVIDE CONTROLLED ACCESS THROUGH DOOR C-102. SAFETY EVALUATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 91 VAN 0181, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTION: CCTV SWITCHER UPGRADE AND CAMERA ADDITION. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR TIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. 67

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0023, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrrlON: THIS DCP INSTALLED AN ISOLATION TRANSFORMER AND POWER CONDITIONER IN TIIE DMIMS PANEL, TAG NO.1-1610-Q5-LPM AND GROUNDED TIE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE ISOLATION TRANSFORMER. TIE POWER TO Tile DMIMS PANEL IS DERIVED FROM TIE NEW ISOLATION TRANSFORMER / POWER CONDITIONER. TIE DMIMS PANEL IS LOCATED IN TiiE MAIN CONTROL ROOM. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM (DMIMS) IS A PASSIVE PROJECT CLASS 62E SYSTEM DESIGNED TO LISTEN FOR TIIE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL LOOSE PARTS MOVING ABOUT WITHIN TIE REACTOR COOIANT SYSTEM. TIERE ARE NO INTERACTIONS BETWEEN Tile DMIMS COMPONENTS AND ANY ACTIVE EQUIPAENT OR COMPONENTS OF SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. FAILURE OR DETERIORATION OF DMIMS COMPONENTS DID NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS OR STRUCTURES IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THIS DCP ADDED COMPONENTS, WillCH ARE PifYSICALLY AND FUNCTIONALLY CONTAINED ENTIRELY WITillN THE DMIMS PANEL, AND ARE ISOLATED FROM ANY INTERACTION WITII SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. TIIE DCP ACIlJALLY INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF THE DMIMS BY REDUCING THE HARMONIC DISTORTION SEEN AT THE DMIMS POWER SUPPLY. IN TIE PAST THIS DISTORTION WAS Tile ROOT CAUSE OF DMIMS MICROPROCESSOR FAILURE. BASED ON TIIE ISOLATED NATURE OF TIIE CHANGES AND THE PASSIVE FUNCTION OF THE DMIMS THERE ARE NO REDUCTIONS IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIE BASIS FOR ANY TECil SPEC.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0043, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCR11'rION: TilIS DCP CHANGED Tile NON-lE TRANSFORhER IN THE FO.LLOWING GENERAL ELECTRIC (G.E.) DRY TYPE TRANSFORMERS: 1NB03X,1NB10X, AND INBlIX. TilEY WERE REPLACED WITH ABB SUPPLIED DRVeTYPE CORE AND CORE ASSEMBLIES DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN TIE OLD G.E. TRANSFORMER CASES. ALSO A TEMPERATURE MONITOR WAS ADDED TO EACH TRANSFORMER WHICil CAN MONITOR ALL TIIREE CORE WINDING TEMPERATURES. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CRITICAL TRANSFORMERS AND Tile LOADS SUPPLIED FROM THESE TRANSFORMERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION OR FOR SAFE SliUTDOWN. TIIE LOSS OF ANY NON lE TRANSFORMER IS BOUNDED BY THE LOSS OF NONEMERGENCY AC POWER TO TIE PLANT AUXILIARIES ANALYSES. Tile REPLACEMENT CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS ELECTRICALLY EQUIVALENT TO TIE PREVIOUS CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. Tile NEW TRANSFORMEPS CANNOT Fall IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM THE PREVIOUS TRANSFORMERS. TIIE NEW TRANSFORMERS GIVE OFF LESS IIEAT AND HAVE HEAVIER WINDINGS AND ARE i EXPECTED TO BE MORE RELI ABLE. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY; IT DOES NOT INCREASE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPhENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. Tills DCP DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILrrY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF ACCIDENT. THIS DCP l DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND IT DOES NOT DECREASE THE l MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY Tile BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. l 68 l l

SUBJECT:

DCP; 92-VIN 0043, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTIO:h TIIIS DESIGN CHANGE AFFECTED A NON-lE TRANSFORMER ONLY. TIE DESIGN CHAl'GE REPLACED Tile G.E. SUPPLIED CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY FOR DRY TYPE TRANSFORMER INBL2XI WITH A DRY TYPE CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY SUPPLED BY ABB. TI'd ABB SUPPLIED DRY TYPE CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS DESIGNED TO BE INSTALII.D IN TIE EXISTING G.E. TRANSFORMER CASE. THE NEW CORE AND COIL ASUMBLY IS APPROXIMATELY 55% HEAVIER THAN THE G.E. CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. TdE NEW EQUIPMENT LOAD (WEIGHT) WAS COMPARED TO THE DESIGN ALLOWABLES ( ONTAINED IN THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA AND WAS FOUND ACCEPTABLE. TIE I ROJECT CLASS OF TIIE TRANSFORMER IS 62E, AND IS LOCATED IN A CATEGORY 2 AREA.

 ! 'O CilANGES TO THE TRANSFORMER MOUNTING OR FOUNDATION WERE REQUIRED. THE E4 CLOSURE WAS MODIFIED TO ACCEPT TIIE NEW TEMPERATURE MONITOR FURNISIED t/ITli Tile ABB TRANSFORMER. THE MONITOR ALSO PROVIDES CONTROL FOR OPERATION OF TIIE TRANSFORMER FANS, A IIIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM, AND A TRIP CIRCUlT. TIE FAN AND HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM CIRCUITS WERE CONNECTED TO FUNCTION IN THE SAME WAY AS Tile G.E. TEMPERATURE MONITOR. THE TRIP CIRCUlT WAS NOT WIRED.

Tile SET POINT TEMPERATURES FOR THE FAN CONTROL AND ALARM ARE 120'C AND 200 C, RESPECTIVELY, IN ACCORDANCE WITil Tile VENDOR'S RECOMMENDATION FOR 80*C RISE TRANSFORMERS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TRANSFORMER INBL2XI, AND THE LOADS SUPPLIED FROM TIIIS TRANSFORMER ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION OR FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE LOSS OF ANY NON-lE TRANSFORMER IS BOUNDED BY THE LOSS OF NON-EMERGENCY AC POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES. THIS ACCIDENT IS EVALUATED IN FSAR SECTION 15.2.6. THE CHANGES MADE BY Tills DCP DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF THE LOSS OF NON-lE POWER AND MAKES TIE LIGilTING TRANSFORMER MORE RELIABLE. THE ABB CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS ELECTRICALLY EQUIVALENT TO TIE G.E. CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. BREAKER AND FUSE COORDINATION WAS UNAFFECTED BY THIS REPLACEMENT. THE TRANSFORMER IS SEISMIC CATEGORY 2, PROJECT CLASS 62E, AND LOCATED IN SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 AREA. THE NEW TRANSFORMER CANNOT FAIL IN A DIFFERENT WAY THAN TIIE G.E. TRANSFORMER. THE ABB TRANSFORMER PERFORMS THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE G.E. TRANSFORMER, BUT IS EXPECTED TO BE MORE RELIABLE SINCE IT GIVES OFF LESS IIEAT AND IIAS IMPROVED INSULATION. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT OF THE TRANSFORMER WAS EVALUATED ON TIE BUILDING STRUCTURE AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. TRANSFORMER INBL2XI DOES NOT SUPPLY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED  ! FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR MITIGATION AND CONTROL OF ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, AND IT l REMAINS ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED FROM SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0058, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRII* TION: THIS DCP REVISES Tile AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF THE SPRAY VALVE AND THE RESPECTIVE NORTilWEST CELL FAN IN THE TRAIN "A" AND "B" NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING TOWERS. THE NORTIlWEST CELL FAN WILL NOW START SIIORTLY AFTER TIE SPRAY VALVE STARTS TO OPEN AND STOPS WITH TIIE CLOSING OF TIIE VALVE. IT ALSO REVISES THE AMBER LIGIIT AND SWITCilGEAR TROUBLE ALARM  ; CIRCUITRY ASSOCIATED WITil EACil NSCT FAN MOTOR. AS A FINAL CHANGE Tills DCP l ADDS TELLUS 68 TO THE LIST OF VENDOR RECOMMENDED LUBRICATING OILS FOR THE ' l NSCT FAN GEAR REDUCERS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIESE CilANGES DID NOT INTRODUCE A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE PATil NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR, AND THE NSCW SYSTEM'S l 69 l l t j

l l FUNCTION AS Tile ULTIMATE lEAT SINK IS NOT ADVERSELY .AFFECTED. Tile NEW OPERATIONAL SCIEME WILL NEITi!ER CAUSE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT TO l OPERATE OUTSIDE DESIGN LIMITS NOR DEGRADE SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT REDUND ANCY. CONTROL OF Tile NEW LUBRICANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH Tile SITE QA PROGRAM ENSURES APPROVED AND QUALIFIED LUBRICANT IS USED.  ;

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0077, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DESIGN CllANGE ADDED A PERMANENT JACKET WATER CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM TO EACH EMERGENCY DIESEL-GENERATOR (D/G) TRAIN, SYSTEM 2403. EACll SYSTEM INCLUDES A MIXING TANK, AN INJECTION PUMP, A RECIRCULATION LINE WITl! FLOW ORIFICE AND CONNECTING VALVES AND PIPING, ALL PROJECT CLASS 626. ALSO INCLUDED IN EACil SYSTEM IS A PUMP MOTOR, MOTOR STARTER WITH START /STOP PUSH-BUTTONS, DISCONNECT SWITCH AND A 120-VOLT POWER SUPPLY, ALL l PROJECT CLASS 62E. A NORMALLY CLOSED, MANUAL JACKET WATER ISOLATION VALVE, ' PROJECT CLASS 013, WAS ADDED TO MAINTAIN THE BOUNDARY OF THE SAFETY RELATED JACKET WATER SYSTEM. A VALVE WAS ADDED TO AN EXISTING PLANT i DEMINERALIZED WATER VENT LINE, SYSTEM 1418, PROJECT CLASS 626, IN TIE D/G ROOM ASSOCIATED WITH EACH TRAIN. TIESE LINES PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO THE DEMINERALIZED WATER IF NEEDED TO AfD IN THE CHEMICAL MIXING OPERATION. THE NEW SYSTEM PUMPS CORROSION INIIIBITING CllEMICALS INTO Tile ASSOCIATED D/G  ; JACKET WATER CROSSOVER PIPING. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF TIE JACKET WATER CIIEMICAL ADDITION CONNECTING PIPING, POWER SUPPLY AND ACCESS TO PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILrTY OF THE OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. Tile SAFETY RELATED BOUNDARY OF THE JACKET WATER SYSTEM IS MAINTAINED BY A NEW CLASS 013 ISOLATION VALVE. BEYOND Tills VALVE TIE COMPONENTS ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED. TIIE SEPARATION OF ALL SAFETY RELATED CIRCUITS IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF Tile NEW SYSTEM. ALTilOUGH THE NEW SYSTEM IS IN PROXIMITY TO A SAFETY RELATED SUPPORT FOR THE D/G EXIIAUST SYSTEM THE NEW SYSTEM IS SUPPORTED SUCH THAT IT WILL NOT FALL ON OR DAMAGE THE SAFETY RELATED SUPPORT DURING A S AFE SHUTDOWN EVENT (SSE). EVEN IF AN SSE OCCURRED DURING TIIE INJECTION OPERATION WITH Tile TANK FILLED WITil CORROSION INiilBITOR, NEITHER Tile TANK SKID NOR ITS CIIEMICAL CONTENTS WILL DAMAGE THE D/G EXHAUST SYSTEM SUPPORT NEAR Ti!E TANK OR ANY OTHER SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OR COMPONENT. THE NEW i CHEMICAL ADDITION PUMP TO Ti!E JACKET WATER SYSTEM IS SEISMICALLY SUPPORTED. THE SYSTEM DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN Tile BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. Tile D/G'S ARE REQUIRED TO REMAIN OPERABLE IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND THEIR ABILITY TO REMAIN OPERABLE IS NOT REDUCED BY Tills DESIGN CIIANGE. THE DESIGN CilANGE INCORPORATES A NIPPLE AND AN ISOLATION VALVE WillCII ARE PROJECT CLASS 013 AND WHICil MAINTAIN THE BOUNDARY OF Tile SAFETY RELATED JACKET WATER SYSTEM.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0131 REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlrrlON: Tills DCP REPLACED A PORTION OF TIIE SUCTION PIPING TO Tile CCW RADIATION MONITOR SKIDS 11609S5008 AND ll609S5009. THE NEW DESIGN IS CONFIGURED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY TO TIIE PROCESS RADIATION 70 l

MONITOR PUMPS. Tills CHANGE ALSO ADDED ONE VENT VALVE TO EACH OF THE 20" DIAMETER CCW TRAIN A AND B HEADER. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile FUNCTION OF THE CCW RADIATION MONITOR SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE SAME RIGID STANDARDS USED FOR CONSTRUCTION ORIGINALLY WERE ALSO USED FOR Tills DESIGN CilANGE. THE REROUTING OF THE SUCTION PIPING HAS IMPROVED THE RELI ABILITY OF Tile RAI]IATION MONITOR SYSTEM TO DETECT RADIATION IN TIE CCW SYSTEMS. WITli A CONTINUOS SUPPLY OF WATER THESE RADIATION MONITORS WILL PERFORM THERE INTENDED FUNCTION WITH GREATER RELIABILITY. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE NEW PIPING AND VALVES IS 313. PER A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THERE BASES, INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.7.3, THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0132, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED A BYPASS LINE ON TIIE UNIT 1 TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER (TPCW) SYSTEM PIPING TO THE NORMAL CHILLERS. THE TPCW SYSTEM IS SYSTEM 1405, PROJECT CLASS 626. TIIE BYPASS LINE TAKES OFF FROM THE 24" TPCW IEADER (LINE l 1405-L4-526) JUST UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE l-1405 U4-508, AND TIES BACK INTO THE 24" TPCW RETURN FROM Tile NORMAL CHILLERS HEADER (LINE l-1405-L4-524) DOWNSTREAM OF CilECK VALVE l-1405-U4 507. TIIE AFFECTED PIPING IS LOCATED ON LEVEL A OF THE UNIT 1 TURBINE BUILDING NEAR TIE UNIT 1/2 BOUNDARY. TIE 24" BYPASS LINE INCLUDED A MANUALLY OPERATED 10" THRO 1TLING VALVE. THE NEW PIPING IS PROJECT CLASSIFICATION 626. ALSO UNDER TlilS DCP, P&lD IX4DB151-1 WAS CORRECTED TO SilOW THAT LINE NUMBER A-1405-L4-525, WHICII IS TIIE COMMON HEADER TIIROUGH WHICH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TPCW FLOWS TO THE NORMAL CHILLERS, EXTENDS TO VALVE A-HV-6712 AND NOT TO CIIECK VALVE l-1405-U4-508. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE TIIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR INCLUDING CHAPTER 15 (ACCIDENT ANALYSES). CHANGES WERE TO PIPING IN THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM, WHICilIS A NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. FAILURE OF TIE TPCW PIPING COULD AFFECT ALL OF THE SYSTEMS WHICH DEPEND ON TPCW FOR COOLING WATER, INCLUDING THE NORMAL CHILLERS. NONE OF THESE SYSTEMS ARE SAFETY-RELATED. TIIUS, FAILURE OF TIE TPCW PIPING WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT SAFE SilUTDOWN OF TIE PLANT. TIIE NEW PIPING, WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING, MEETS THE SAME DESICW CRITERIA AS THE EXISTING SYSTEM (LE. PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, MATERIALS AND SUPPORTS). THE DCP DID NOT DECREASE TECli SPEC SAFETY MARGINS SlNCE TIIE SYSTEMS AFFECTED, SYSTEMS 1405 AND 1407, llAVE NO SAFETY DESIGN BASES. THE NEW VALVE AND PIPING MEET ALL TIE ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THESE SYSTEMS. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPEC BASES, INCLUDING B3/4.7.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V1N0138, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP DETERMINES AND ISSUES THE NEW MINIMUM REQUIRED AND MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE THRUST VALUES FOR VALVES IHV-870l A & B, lHV-8702A & B, TO ASSIST IN TIE SETUP OF THESE VALVES WITil THE MOVATS DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT. THERE IS NO CllANGE IN SYSTEM OPERATION OR RESPONSE AS A RESULT OF TIIE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP.. 71

n SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIIS CHANGE DOES NOT MODIFY Tile FUNCTION OF THE VALVES, ONLY TIE REQUIRED ALLOWABLE TIIRUST VALUES. TFE NEW VALUES ARE ADEQUATE TO ENSURE THE VALVES WILL OPERATE AS REQUIRED THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0143, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIYTION: THIS DESIGN CIIANGE PACKAGE ADDS SIX (6) CONICAL-SHAPED RESTRICTION FLOW ORIFICES (THREE PER TRAIN) TO TIE SLOW FILL LINES OF 'llE UNIT I NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER (NSCW) SYSTEM. THE LINES TO WHICH TIESE ORIFICES WERE ADDED ARE LOCATED IN TIE NSCW COOLING TOWER STRUCTURE AND ARE LISTED BELOW: TRAIN "A": IFO-5725, IFO-5726, IFO-5727, TRAIN "B": IFO-5728, IFO-5729, IFO-5730. THE ADDITION OF TIESE ORIFICES LESSEN THE HYDRAULIC TRANSIENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN TIESE LINES. CURRENTLY, WHEN ONE NSCW PUMP TRIPS, AND ANOTIER PUMP STARTS, WATER HAMhER IS EXPERIENCED IN TIE SLOW FILL LINES DUE TO FLOW REVERSAL AND FAST CLOSURE OF Tile CHECK VALVES. TIIE INSTALLATION OF THESE CONICAL ORIFICES REDUCE TFE MAGNITUDE OF TIE WATER HAMhER BY LIMITING THE RATE OF REVERSE FLOW. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE HAD NO EFFECT ON THE HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSES. IN THE EVENT OF A MODERATE ENERGY LINE CRACK WillCH, IN THE WORST CASE, WOULD DISABLE AN ENTIRE TRAIN, THE ALTERNATE TRAIN j WOULD BE CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING SAFE SHUTDOWN BASED ON THE DESIGN CRITERIA l (DC 1202). IN ADDITION, TIE MODIFICATION MEETS THE SEISMIC CATEGORY l DESIGN j REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO'HE NSCW SYSTEM. SECTIONS 9.2.1,9.2.5 AND 15.0 WERE REVIEWED. IT DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT USED TO MONITOR OR MITIGATE THE < EFFECTS OF RADIATION LEAKAGE. POST-ACCIDENT PERFORMANCE OF TIE SYSTEM WAS l NOT AFFECTED. IN ADDITION, NO NEW FAILURE MODES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WHICH ' COULD RESULT IN MORE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES THAN ASSUMED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS. TIE RELIABILITY OF TIE NSCW SYSTEM TO PERFORM IN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPACITY WAS NOT IMPAIRED AS A RESULT OF THIS CHANGE. THE FLANGE ASSEMBLY l AND ITS INSTALLATION ADIERES TO ASME CODE SECTION III(CLASS 3) AS DEFINED IN l TIE PIPING SPECIFICATIONS. THE INTENDED FUNCTION OF TIE SLOW FILL LINES IN TIE l NSCW SYSTEM WAS MAINTAINED AITER THIS MODIFICATION IS PERFORMED. TIERE ARE i NO MARGINS OF SAFLTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SLOW FILL LINES. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 3/4.7.4 AND 3/4.7.5 WERE REVIEWED.. l 1

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0144, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRII' TION: Tills DCP LOWERS THE TOTAL KVA RATING OF THREE SOLA FERRO RESONANT TRANSFORMER BANKS INDS18X, INBS21X, AND INBR2LX, ANBUO4X, ANDUO8X, AND ANDL1IX BY DECREASING THE NUMBER OF TRANSFORMERS IN EACil BANK. THIS INCREASES TIE LOAD ON EACH TRANSFORMER WillCil ATTRIBUTES TO A MORE STABLE OPERATION AND INCREASES TIE RELIABILITY OF TIE TRANSPORhER BANK, SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE FACILITY PER FSAR FIGURE 8.3.1-2 BUT DOES NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO ANY PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR. IT DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE 72

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0151, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE EXISTING UNIT I PERMS PLANT VENT FLOW MONITOR 1FT-12442, PROJECT CLASS 621, DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE READING OF AIR FLOW IN Tile PLANT VENT STACK PROJECT CLASS 616, AS REQUIRED BY CIEMISTRY. THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS FLOW TRANSMITTER AND ELEMENT WITH A FLUID COMPONENTS, INC. (FCl) MODEL MT86 TIERMAL MASS FLOW METER. TO ENSURE A MORE ACCURATE READING, THE SINGLE PROBE, SINGLE ELEMENT ARRANGEMENT OF Tile ORIGINAL DESIGN WAS REPLACED BY A TWO PROBE DESIGN WITil EACil PROBE CONTAINING FOUR ELEMENTS. THE MULTIPLE READINGS ARE AVERAGED TO PROVIDE A SINGLE 4-20 MA SIGNAL TO TIIE RADI ATION MONITOR 1RX-12442, PROJECT CLASS 62J. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN INVOLVED TIE PLANT VElff FLOW TRANSMITTER AND FLOW ELEMENT IFT/FE 12442 WillCH ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS DESCRIBED IN TIIE FSAR. TIIE PAMS . RADIATION MONITOR 12444 USES A DIFFERENT FLOW MONITOR IS NOT AFFECTED BY Tills CllANGE. Tile DESIGN DOES NOT AFFECT TIIE OPERABILrrY OF THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM. THE MATRIX CONFIGURATION IS AN ENHANCEhENT OVER THE SINGLE ELEMENT DESIGN DUE TO Tile GREATER NUMBER OF SENSING POINTS IN THE PLANT VENT DUCT. TIIE LOCATION OF Tile NEW SENSING PROBES IN RELATION TO Tile ISOKINETIC NOZZLES WAS REVIEWFD AND FOUND TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF TIIE ISOKINETIC NOZZLES. TIIE NEW SENSING PROBES ARE MOUNTED TO SEISMIC 2 OVER I CRITERIA AND WILL NOT FALL DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. TIESE PROBES ARE LOCATED BELOW THE ISOKINETIC NOZZLES. Tile INSTRUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH TlilS CHANGE DO NOT PROVIDE ANY CONTROL FUNCrlONS WillCH MAY AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS ASSUMED TO FUNCrlON IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN TiiE FSAR. TIIE NEW RANGE ENCOMPASSES TIE DESIGN MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM DESIGN FLOW. FLOW MONITOR 12835 IS THE PAMS INSTRUMENT FOR THE PLANT VENT. UPON REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 3/4.3.3,10 AND 3/4.11.2 THIS DESIGN HAS NO IMPACT ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY Tile BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. THE EXPECTED FLOW RATE IS WITHIN TIE NEW RANGE AND TEE NEW INSTRUMENT PROVIDES A MORE ACCURATE FLOW MEASUREMENT.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V1NO156. REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: SEQUENCE I OF THIS DESIGN CliANGE PACKAGE ADDED AN 8" BUTTERFLY VALVE IN EACH SUPPLY AND RETURN LINE OF THE NSCW SYSTEM. IN ADDITION, A TEE CONNECTION WITH A BLIND FLANGE WAS ADDED TO EACH LINE FOR FUTURE USE. THE BUTTERFLY VALVES ARE USED TO ISOLATE TIIE NSCW SUPPLY AND RETURN LINES AND I TIIE TEE CONNECrlONS AIE USED TO CONNECT THE NORMAL CillLLED WATER LINES. l THE DESIGN OF THE NORMAL CHILLED WATER LINES IS PROVIDED IN SEQUENCE 2 OF l THE DCP. SEQUENCE 3 WILL ADD INSULATION OF THE NSCW LINES INSIDE TIE i CONTAINMENT BUILDING, IF REQUIRED. Tile SCOPE OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS I LIMITED TO SEQUENCE 1. ALL CHANGES ARE PROJECT CLASS 313. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIESE VALVES ARE USED ONLY DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. TIE CHANGE WAS PERFORMED USING TIE SAhE DESIGN STANDARDS, CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES AND SITE PROCEDURES AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR THE SYSTEM. THE VALVES AND FITTINGS HAVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE AND 73

l 1 l TEMPERATURE RATING AS USED FOR Tile EXISTING SYSTEM. IF A NON-SAFETY RELATED SPOOL PIECE WERE TO FAIL, Tile AFFECTED LINE CAN BE ISOLATED USING ISOLATION VALVES 1 HV-11689 AND l HV 11690 AND TIE REMAINDER OF TIIE NSCW SYSTEM TRAIN B STILL FUNCTIONAL. CLOSING TIESE ISOLATION VALVES ISOLATES COOLING WATER TO TIE TRAIN B CONTAINMENT COOLERS WillCH ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE FUNCTIONAL DURING MODES 5 AND 6, WlIILE ALLOWING FLOW TO CONTINUE TilROUGi!OUT Tile REMAINDER OF TIE NSCW SYSTEM. THE INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY SPOOL PIECES AS DESCRIBED ABOVE DURING MODES 5 AND 6 DID NOT IMPACT TIE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE REQUIRED PORTIONS OF TIIE NSCW TRAIN B. TIE BUTTERFLY VALVES BEING ADDED PER TIUS DESIGN PACKAGE MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASME SECTION 111 CLASS 3. THE VALVES AND TIE FITTINGS MEET Tile DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE NSCW SYSTEM. THE VALVES ARE LOCKED OPEN. Tile ADDITIONAL WEIG11T AND CilANGE IN CENTER OF GRAVITY DUE TO TIIE NEW COMPONENTS IIAS BEEN EVALUATED, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY MODIFICATIONS TO Tile EXISTING SUPPORTS. ALL STRESSES ARE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. TIE DESIGN DID NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE TIIE CliANGE MEETS Tile SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTilIN Tile ORIGINAL DESIGN OF Tile NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER (NSCW) SYSTEM. TIIE PERFORMANCE OF Tile NSCW SYSTEM AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM IS NOT BE AFFECTED BY Tills CilANGE. TIIIS CONCLUSION IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND TIIEIR BASES, INCL,UDING SECTIONS 3/4.6.2,3/4.6.3, AND 3/4.7.4

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0159, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIIE DESIGN CHANGE AFFECTS THE FOUR AUXILIARY FEED WATER (AFW) 4" STOP CllECK VALVES,1-1302-U4-113,114,115, AND 116. THESE VALVES ARE LOCATED IN LINE NUMBERS 1-1302-L4 030,031,032, AND 029, RESPECTIVELY. THE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION OF Tile VALVES IS 212. Tile PHYSICAL CHANGE CONSISTS OF REPLACING Tile PREVIOUS VALVES OF SINGLE SEAT DESIGN WITH VALVES OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN. Tile SUBJECT AFW CIECK VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED LEAKAGE EVEN AFTER MAINTENANCE REWORK IIAS BEEN PERFORMED. TilESE VALVES ARE SINGLE SEAT, GLOBE LIFT-CHECK VALVES. TIIE NEW VALVES HAVE DUAL SEATS WillCll REDUCE THE LEAKAGE PROBLEM. THIS WILL ALSO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF AFW PUMP STEAM BINDING DUE TO THE LEAKING CIECK VALVES. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM IS NOT BEING ADVERSELY AFFECTED. TIE CIIANGE WAS PERFORMED USING THE SAME STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR TIIE SYSTEM. Tile NEW VALVES l IIAVE Tile SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RATING, AND ' MATERIALS AS Tile PREVIOUS VALVES EXCEPT TIEY ALSO HAVE ADDITIONAL SOFT SEATS. Tile SOIT SEAT MATERI AL IS QUALIFIED FOR THIS APPLICATION, BUT REQUIRES PERIODIC REPLACEMENT. THE SOFT SFAT IS HELD IN PLACE BY A RETAINER TilAT IS SCREWED TO TIIE DISC AND LOCK WELDED. TIIE NEW VALVES IIAVE TIIE SAME SAFETY AND SEISMIC RATING AS TIIE ORIGINAL VALVES. Tile MODIFICATION INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF Tile SYSTEM. TIIE FLOW RESISTANCE OF THE NEW VALVES IS TIIE SAME j AS THE PREVIOUS VALVES, SO SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IS NOT AFFECTED. EPRI REPORT NP-5479 DESCRIBES THE USE OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN IN SECTION 2.4.2. Tile NEW CilECK  ; VALVES MEET Tile REQUIREMENTS OF ASME SECTION 111 CLASS 2. TiiE ACrlVirY DOES l NOT INVOLVE ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY TilAT HAS NOT BEEN EVALUATED BEFOlG. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVES TO PROVIDE DUAL SEAT DESIGN DOES NOT AFFECT TifE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIIE BASES FOR ANY 74 l

                                                                                             )

l TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE Tile CilANGE MEETS Tile SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION, AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTil IN Tile ORIGINAL DESIGN OF Tile AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM. Tile PERFORMANCE OF Tile AFW SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED BY Tills CHANGE. THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR BASES, INCLUDING SECTIONS 3/4.6.3,3/4.7.1.2, AND 3/4.9.4.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0163, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tile SCOPE OF Tills DCP IS TO PROVIDE SAFETY CAGES FOR Tile FOLLOWING LADDERS INSIDE TIIE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT BUILDING: 1.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO REACTOR COOL ANT PUMP (RCP) NO.1. 2.) LADDER FROM EL. 220' 0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 3. 3.) LADDER FROM EL. 220*-0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 4. 4.) LADDER FROM EL.193'-71/4" DOWN TO STE AM GENERATOR NO.1. 5.) LADDER FROM EL. 193'-71/4" DOWN TO STEAM GENERATOR NO. 2. THE SAFETY CAGES FOR Tile LADDERS LISTED UNDER ITEMS 3,4, AND 5 REPLACED THE PREVIOUS SAFETY DEVICES INSTALLED ON Tile LADDERS. Tile PROJECT CLASS OF THE L ADDERS IS 62C. TiiE PROJECT CLASS OF TIIE NEW SAFETY CAGES IS 62C. SAFETY CAGES WERE DESIGNED AND MOUNTED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY l REQUIREMENTS. Tile ADDITION OF SAFETY CAGES IMPROVED SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR PERSONNEL INSIDE TIIE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SAFETY CAGES ARE OF A DESIGN THAT IS EQUlVALENT TO EXISTING ACCEPTABLE SAFETY CAGES INSTALLED IN THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. ALSO, THE SAFETY CAGES HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY I REQUIREMENTS TO INSURE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ARE POSSIBLE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V1N0165, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: CERTAIN VALVE MOTOR OPERATORS DID NOT llAVE SUFFICIENT OUTPUT CAPACITY MARGIN WilEN TIIE REQUIREMENTS OF GENERIC LETTER 89 10 WERE CONSIDERED. THE CHANGES INCREASED THE MOTOR OPERATORS' OUTPUT AND TIIEREFORE Tile AVAILABLE MARGIN. Tile INCREASED MARGIN ALLOWS FOR Tile VALVES TO BE SET UP IN TiiE REQUIRED TIIRUST RANGE, ABOVE TIIE MINIMUM REQUIRED TilRUST TO STROKE THE VALVE AND BELOW Tile MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TilRUST TO PREVENT DAMAGE. PROVIDlNG Tile INCREASED MARGIN AND UTILIZING - DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT SUCil AS MOVATS OR VOTES ALLOWS FOR ACCOUNTING, IN THE THRUST RANGE, FOR Tile INHERENT INACCURACIES OF THE TESTING EQUIPMENT, TORQUE SWITCli REPEATABILITY, AND THE RATE-OF-LOADING (ROL) PHENOMENA. Tills PIIENOMENA IIAS BEEN S!!OWN, IN SOME INSTANCES, TO RESULT IN LESS TilRUST DELIVERED TO THE VALVE STEM UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS THAN STATIC CONDITIONS, WITH THE MOST PRONOUNCED EFFECT ON G ATE VALVES UNDER HIGli ENERGY BLOWDOWN CONDITIONS. SEVERAL TIIEORIES EXIST AS TO THE CAUSE OF THIS ROL EFFECT, BUT NONE HAVE BEEN DEFINTrlVELY QUANTIFIED. WHEN INDUSTRY PROGRAMS AND TIIE DP TESTING PLANNED AT VEGP YIELD QUANTIFIABLE DATA ON THE ROL PHENOMENA, Tills INFORMATION WAS REVIEWED FOR ITS IMPACT ON Tile MOV DESIGN CALCULATIONS. TIIE EFFECTED VALVES ARE IHV-8806, IllV-8801 A & B, IllV-8807A & B, llIV-8821 A & B, lilV-8923 A & B, lHV-8924, IHV-8716A & B, llIV-8804 A & B, lilV-8471 A & B, ILV-0112D & E, lHV 19051,1HV-19053, lilV-19055, lHV-19057,1HV-2041, IHV-3009, IllV-3019, llIV-5106. BYPASSING THE OPEN TORQUE SWITCli ELIMINATED THE NEED TO DIAGNOSTICALLY SETUP Tills SWITCH. BYPASSING THIS SWITCH ENABLES THE MOTOR OPERATOR TO DEVELOP THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TORQUE REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE OPENING STROKE OF THE VALVE. 75 3

o SAFETY EVALUATION: THE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTIONS AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN Tile FSAR. THE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN BEING PROVIDED BETWEEN TIIE REQUIRED AND TIE ALLOWABLE TilRUST ALLOWS DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT TO BE USED TO SET-UP TiiE VALVES, VERIFYING TilAT ADEQUATE THRUST, PER CALCULATION X4CLOOOUO2, IS AVAILABLE WlEN Tim VALVES ARE REQUIRED AND THAT THE VALVES WAS NOT OVER STRESSED. TIE CHANGE IN MOV STROKE TIMES DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT Tile ABILITY TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PER THE EXISTING SAFETY ANALYSIS. TIIE NEW STROKE TIhES DID NOT EFFECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN TIE FSAR. ALL OF THE SUBJECT MOVS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR STRESS, SEISMIC AND ENVIRONNENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE APPROPRI ATE TORQUE /rHRUST LIMITS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THESE EVALUATIONS INCLUDED A VALVE STRESS AND SEISMIC REANALYSIS BASED ON THE MAXIMUM EXPECTED THRUST USING TIE APPROPRIATE LOAD CONSIDERATIONS AS DOCUMENTED IN FSAR SECTION 3.9.B.3, AND AN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REVIEW TO VERIFY TIIAT THE NEW COMPONENTS WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR THE SPECIFIC POST-ACCIDENT LOCATIONS. PIPING STRESS PACKAGES WERE ANALYZED FOR Tile INCREASED PIPING STRESS AND SUPPORT LOADS DUE TO TIE NEW OPERATORS ADDITIONAL WEIGIIT AND CHANGE IN CENTER OF GRAVITY. NO PIPING SUPPORTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRING MODIFICATION BASED ON THE INCREASED LOADS DUE TO THE HIGHER WEIGHTS AND CHANGES IN CENTER OF GRAVITY OF TIE NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. TWO CATEGORY l PIPING SUPPORTS REQUIRED MODIFICATION TO ACCOMMODATE TIE INSTALLATION OF TWO NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. NO NEW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS WERE CREATED NOR WERE EXISTING PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS CHANGED BY THESE MODIFICATIONS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT HAVE ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON ANY OTHER PLANT SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMMON MODE FAILURE OF THESE VALVES IS INTRODUCED BY THE CHANGE IN THE THRUST VALUES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DEFINE THE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION FOR THE DIFFERENT OPERATING MODES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CHANGE TIE SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION OF THE VALVES. DIAGNOSTIC TESTING OF THE VALVES VERIFIED TilAT THE VALVES HAVE ADEQUATE THRUST, AS DOCUhENTED IN CALCULATION X4CLOOOUO2, TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCrlON WITHOUT OVER STRESSING Tile VALVES OR THE OPERATORS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0167, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP ADDED A NEW GROUND TO Tile AUXILIARY HOIST ON THE REFUELING MACllINE BY' MOUNTING AN ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR BY TIE EXISTING AUX 1LIARY llOIST POWER COLLECTORS. TIE DIAGNOSTIC CAPABILITIES OF THE CONSOLE AND FREE WATER SPEED OF TIE REFUELING MACil1NE liAVE BEEN ENilANCED BY A SOFTWARE UPGRADE. THIS UPGRADE WAS PERFORMED BY REPLACING EPROMS i AND EAROMS WITlilN THE SIGMA CONTROL CONSOLE. POWER RECEPTACLES WERE l ADDED TO THE TROLLEY WITH AN ADDITIONAL TRANSFORMER MOUNTED ON THE l TROLLEY PROVIDING THE ADDITIONAL POWER REQUIREMENTS. THE SOUND POWERED l PiiONE CABLE WERE REROUTED TO USE THE POWER CONDUlT AND CATRAC ASSEMBLY. A COMPUTER RESET SWITCII WAS MOUNTED ON THE CONSOLE TO PROVIDE A RESTART OF TIIE CONTROL PROGRAM WITIIOUT CYCLING POWER ON TIE BRIDGE. INSIDE TIE CONSOLE, A SINGLE POINT GROUND WAS ADDED TO ELIMINATE GROUND POTENTIAL 76

I I DIFFERENCES WITHIN Tile CONSOLE. A LOW IMPEDANCE, BRAIDED GROUND CABLE WAS ADDED TO A GROUND POINT WrfHIN THE CONSOLE. THE BRIDGE AXLE WillCH DRIVES THE ENCODER WAS MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE SLIPPAGE BY PROVIDING FLATS ON TIE AXLE SHAFT FOR SET SCREW SEATING PREVENTING TIIE MOVEMENT OF TIIE AXLE SilAFT OUT OF Tile BEARING ASSEMBLY. TiiE SOFTWARE UPGRADE ALLOWS TIIE BRIDGE AND TROLLEY SPEED TO DE ADJUSTED SEPARATELY, INCREASING JOG AND AUTO POSITIONING CAPABILITY, IN ADDITION, THE FREE WATER SPEED liAS DEEN INCREASED BY INTRODUCING DRAG COMPENSATION FACTORS DURING lilGIIER SPEED OPERATION. DIAGNOSTIC IMPROVEMENTS FOR FAULTY COMPONENTS AND ERRANT CONDITIONS, AND ADDITIONAL PARAMETERS FOR Tile DIAGNOSTICS DISPLAY HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED BY Tills UPGRADE. TIE COMPUTER RESET SWITCil ALLOWS RESTARTING OF TIIE CONTROL PROGRAM WITilOtJT CYCLING TIE POWER SUPPLY VIA THE DISCONNECT SWITCll. ENCODER PERFORMANCE WAS IMPROVED BY ELIMINATING SLIPPAGE OF THE BRIDGE AXLE TliAT DRIVES TIE ENCODER. THE NOISE PERFORMANCE OF Tile SIGMA CONSOLE WAS IMPROVED WITH THE ADDITION OF THE SINGLE POINT GROUND. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE SOFTWAIE CHANGES DO NOT IMPACT TIIE REFUELING MACHINE SAFETY FEATURES LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. SOFTWARE CilANGES DO NOT AFFECT Tile REFUELING MAClilNE'S ABILITY TO HOLD FUEL ASSUMirrlONS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT AS PRESENTED IN TiiE FSAR REMAIN UNCilANGED. THE CONTROL SOFTWARE CilANGES DO NOT AFFECT TiiE SEISMIC INTEGRITY OF THE REFUELING MACilINE. TIIE SIGMA REFUELING MACllINE IS NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE CONTROL SYSTEM DOES NOT INTERFACE-WITH PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. FURTHER, SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A REFUELING ACCIDENT. TIIE CONTROL SYSTEM SOFTWARE CilANGES ENilANCE MACHINE MOVEMENT AND DIAGNOSTICS. ALSO, SOFTWARE Cl!ANGES ADilERING TO FUEL liANDLING INSTRUCTION REVISIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED. Tim FUNCTIONAL CilARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUELING MACIIINE REMAIN UNCHANGED. TIIE MACIIINE CONTINUES TO MEET ALL OPERATION AND SAFETY INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS OF TIIE FSAIL TIIE SIGMA RLFUELING MACHINE HAS NO DIRECT ELECTRICAL INTERFACE WITH PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. TIIE REFUELING MAClilNE CONTINUES TO MEET ALL PROVISIONS TO ENSURE SAFE HANDLING OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES AS . LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. 'IllE WORKING LOAD CAPACITY OF THE FUEL ASSEMBLY GRIPPER REMAINS UNCHANGED FROM THAT DEFINED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9.6. THIS DESIGN CllANGE IMPROVES RELIABILITY AND ENHANCE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REFUELING MAClllNE. CONSOLE MODIFICATIONS REDUCE NOISE AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN RESETTING Ti!E CONTROL PROGRAM. PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS TO TIIE REFUELING MACl!!NE PROVIDE A NEW GROUND FOR TIIE AUXILIARY llOIST, PROVIDE POWER RECEI'TACLES FOR ADDITIONAL LIGHTING, REROUTE EXISTING SOUND POWERED PHONE CABLE, AND ELIMINATE BRIDGE AXLE SLIPPAGE TO IMPROVE ENCODER PERFORMANCE. TIIESE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE FUNLTIONAL DESIGN OR OPERATION OF THE REFUELING MACIIINE. ALL SAFETY FEATURES AND INTERLOCKS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR HAVE BEEN PRESERVED, ALL NEW EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN MOUNTED TO 2 OVER 1 REQUIREMENTS. FURTilERMORE, THESE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY ACCIDENT SINCE TIESE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE REFUELING MACHINE'S ABILITY TO IIOLD A FUEL ASSEMBLY. MODIFICATIONS MADE TO Tim SOFTWARE DO NOT ALTER THE MAXIMUM VERTICAL POSITION REQUIRED TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE WATER SHIELD DElrTH FOR RADIATION PROTECTION OF OPERATING PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, CALCULATION MX6CHE.04.7 REV. Ji HAS BEEN PERFORMED TO ACCOUNT FOr, Tile ADDITION OF ZINC INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THE HYDROGEN GENERATION RESULTING FROM THE ZINC ADDITION REMAINS BELOW TIE HYDROGEN DESIGN FLAMMABILITY LIMIT. NO NEW 77

INTERFACES WITH OTHER PLANT EQUIPMENT ARE INTRODUCED WITil THIS DESIGN -l C11ANGE, THEREFORE, NO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS ARE AFFECTED Tile REFUELING MAClilNE'S SEISMIC ANALYSIS BOUNDS THE AFFECTS OF THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT AND EQUIPMENT MOUNTING ASSOCIATED WITH Tills DESIGN CIIANGE. THIS MODIFICATION TO TIE REFUELING MACHINE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9 FOR REFUELING OPERATIONS. SUB;ECT: DCP: 92-VIN 0171, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRilrTION: THE CHANGES ARE: 1) ADJUST TIE PULSE WIDTli OF THE " TEST U/V" PUSIIBUTTON LATCH TIMER TO REDUCE THE PULSE WIDTH BY 20 MILLISECONDS (MS). TIIE CURRENT NOMINAL TIMER SETTING IS 200MS. ALSO, TIIE RESET CIRCUITRY OF TIIE I TEST SI, TEST U/V, TEST BLOCK D-G ENGINE. AND TEST D-G BREAKER CLOSE PUSilBUTTON LATCIIES IIAVE BEEN MODIFIED. TIIE CIRCUlTRY IS MODIFED TO ELIMINATE ONE OF TWO PATHS BY WHICil AN SI OR U/V SIGNAL CANCELS TIE SEQUENCER TEST MODE. TIE OTHER OF THE TWO PATHS HAVE BEEN LEFT UNCHANGED. TiiESE CHANGES WERE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE LOGIC RACE CONDITIONS WlilCH CAUSE THE SEQUENCER TO MALFUNCTION WillLE IN TEST MODE. TIE NORMAL MODE OPERATION OF THE SEQUENCER HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY TIIESE CHANGES. THE SEQUENCER'S TEST SWITCH INPUT MODULE (BOARD # 6N366) RECEIVED MINOR WIRING CHANGES TO EFFECT TIE NECESSARY CHANGES. 2) REWIRE THE CONTROLLER A MODULE TO ELIMINATE A LOGIC RACE CONDITION. A RACE CONDITION EXISTS WHICli RESULTS IN TIIE BLOCK OLTTPUT RELAYS BEING HELD IN FOR APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE EXPECTED TIME. TilESE RELAYS PREVENT (BLOCK) CERTAIN LOADS FROM BEING  ; LOADED ONTO TliF DIESEL UNTIL A SPECIFIED TIME. Tills CHANGE WAS MADE BY REWIRING A GATE INPUT SUCll TilAT IT RECEIVES A DELAYED SIGNAL. TIESE CilANGES ARE PROJECT CLASS 1IE AND AFFECT TIE TRAIN A AND B SEQUENCERS,1-1821-U3-001 AND -002. TIIESE CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE FOR EFFICIENTLY TESTING THE SEQUENCER. THE CIIANGE ONLY AFFECTS TIE MANUAL TEST PANEL PORTION OF THE SEQUENCER. TIE SEQUENCER'S RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS REMAINS UNCIIANGED. 2) Tills CilANGE IS NECESSARY FOR THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS DESIGNED SAFETY FUNCTION. CURRENTLY, THE DESIGNED RELAY BLOCK TIME IS APPROX. 36 SECONDS. DURING ESFAS TESTING (IR4), THE RELAY BLOCK TIME WAS FOUND TO BE APPROX. 67 SECONDS. TIIE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING TABLES SilOW Tile LOADS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING BLOCK TIMES. TIE VENDOR ADDITION OF FILTERS UNDER THE ORIGINAL DCP RESULTED IN SHIFTING A GATE OUTPUT JUST ENOUGli TO CREATE tills LOGIC RACE. THIS RACE DID NOT EXIST ON TIE CONTROLLER A MODULES PRIOR TO VENDOR MODIFICATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIESE CilANGES DO NOT CllANGE TIE SEQUENCER OPERATION FROM THAT DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN THE FSAR AND DESIGN CRITERIA, AND DO NOT AFFECT TIIE PROBABILITY OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN TIE FSAR. TIE SEQUENCER CONTINUES TO RESPOND TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS AS DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN TIE FSAR AND DESIGN CRITERI A. THE CHANGES ENSURE TIIAT TIIE SEQUENCER IESPONDS AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED; IIENCE THE OVERALL FUNCrlON OF Tile SEQUENCER REMAINS UNCHANGED. TIIESE CllANGES WERE MADE TO THE UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT BY QUALIFIED TECHNICIANS UNDER Tile SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION OF TIIE SEQUENCER MANUFACTURER'S FIELD REPRESENTATIVE. TIIE ONLY MATERIAL REQUIRED TO EFFECT TIIE CHANGES WAS TIE WIRE NECESSARY TO REWIRE Tile BOARD.  ; THE SEOUENCERS ARE LOCATED IN A MILD ENVIRONMENT. TIIE BOARDS WERE i' RE-WIRED USING QUALIFIED MATERIAL (WIRE) AND THE SAME METilOD (WIRE WRAPPING) AS WAS ORIGINALLY USED. TIIE REWIRING DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY 78

INCREASE Tile WEIGHT OF THE BOARD, SO TIE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE BOARD IS NOT IMPACTED. TIESE BOARDS WERE TESTED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THAT USED FOR UNIT I MODIFICATION. THIS INCLUDES SEQUENCER AND SYSTEM LEVEL TESTS TO ENSURE THAT TIE MODIFICATIONS FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. SIMILAR CHANGES WERE MADE TO TIE UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT AND ARE EFFECTIVE IN ELIMINATING THE ANOMALIES AND RESTORING PROPER SEQUENCER OPERATION. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY Tile BASES OF Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE THE CHANGES ENilANCE OPERATION OF TIE SEQUENCER. TIE NET EFFECT OF THE CHANGES HAS BEEN TO CORRECT. TIE DESIGN OF THE SEQUENCER SO THAT IT OPERATES AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0174, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: TIE CHANGES REPRESENTED BY THIS DCP ARE THE ADDITION OF TIE-BACK SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE PROCESS LINES AND 1" DIAMETER DRAIN / VENT LINES FOR TIE FOLLOWING VALVES :ll20lX4072, ll20lX4084, ll204X4306, ll204X4307, 11204X4055, AND 11204X4056. THE SUPPORT llANGERS TIE TIIE DRAIN / VENT LINES TO TIE PROCESS LINES FROM WillCll TIEY ORIGINATE. THE TIE-BACK SUPPORTS DO NOT PERFORM ANY LOAD CARRYING FUNCTION BETWEEN THE Pf? LNG AND THE BUILDING STRUCTURE, BUT SIMPLY IMPROVE THE LOCAL STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF TIIE DRAIN / VENT LINES. THE TIE-BACK SUPPORTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PRESSURE RETAINING BOUNDARY. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DRAIN / VENT LINES AND Tim PROCESS LINES FROM WHICH THEY ORIGINATE, HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL TIE-BACK SUPPORTS. THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ANTICIPATED BASED ON THIS REVIEW. TIE SUPPORTS THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH  ; ASME SECTION III CLASS 1 CRITERIA TO INSURE SUPPORT INTEGRITY AND PERFORMANCE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V1N0187, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP CHANGED THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILI ARY FEEDWATER PUMP i (TDAFWP) CONTROL POWER VOLTAGE DROPPING RESISTOR WITH ONE OF SIMILAR OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS AND SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER RATINGS. I sal ~ETY EVALUATION: TIIE OPERATION OF TIE TDAFW PUMP WAS NOT ALTERED l BY TIE CIIANGE. TIE PANEL HAS BEEN MODIFIED WITH A VENT OPENING FOR HIGIIER HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY. THE NEW VENT OPENING HAS BEEN COVERED WITH SCREEN WIRE TO PREVENT INSECT INTRUSION AND LOUVERED TO PREVENT FALLING WATER OR DEBRIS INTRUSION. ALL MODIFICATIONS MEET SEISMIC QUALIFICATIONS AS REQUIRED. THEREFORE TIE CHANGE DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT j OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION MARGIN TO SAFETY. i

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VIN 0195, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE DCP INVOLVED THE ADDITION OF A CHILLED WATER-TYPE COOLING . COIL UNIT WITH FAN (UNIT EQUIPMENT NUMBER l-1551-A7004) IN THE STEAM I GENERATOR BLOWDOWN (SGBD) HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM (AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM Cl25 ABOVE ELEVATION 153'6", AND ROOM C108 BELOW ELEVATION 153'6"). THESE , AFFECTED COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS ARE CONSIDERED NON-SAFETY RELATED, AND 79

SEISMIC CATEGORY 2. TIE AUXILIARY BUILDING MISCELLANEOUS NON-RADIOACTIVE DRAIN SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED NON SAFETY RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1. SUPPORTS FOR COMPONENTS WITHIN TIE SGBD HEAT EXCilANGER ROOM ARE DEZGNED TO MEET SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 OVER I CRITERIA. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE AFFECFED COMPONENTS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN TiiE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSES, NOR ARE TIIEY RELATED TO ANY OF TIE ACCIDENTS POSTULATED TIERE. BASED ON REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 9.2.9,9.3.3, 9.4.3, AND 10.4.8, AND DESIGN CRITERIA SECTIONS DC-1215, DC-1551, DC-1561, DC-1591, AND DC-2401, TIE ROOM COOLERS AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS DO NOT PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS AND ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN TIE PLANT. TIE ADDITION OF A ROOM COOLER IN SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM Cl25 DOES NOT CHANGE, DEGRADE, OR PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN Tim ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THIS ROOM COOLER PROVIDES ADDITIONAL COOLING CAPABILITY TO THE ROOM, DECREASING THE SPURIOUS ACTION OF TIE SGBD ISOLATION SYSTEht THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS USED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. IN ADDITION, THE OPENING OF VALVE l 1215-U4-250 BY 3 TURNS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT SINCE Tills ROOM IS STILL MAINTAINED AT NEGATIVE PRESSURE WITH RESPECT TO OUTSIDE ATMOSPHERE. THE EFFECT OF OPERATION OF TIE SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM COOLERS ON THE IELB SENSORS IS TO ALLOW THE SENSORS TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED BY LOWERING ROOM TEMPERATURE SUCH TIIAT SPURIOUS SIGNALS DO NOT LEAD TO FALSE INDICATIONS OF HELB SITUATIONS. ASSUMING MALFUNCFION OF Tile HELB SENSORS, ADDITION OF TIE SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM COOLER WILL NOT RESULT IN INCREASED RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. BASED ON REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3.3.11,3/4.7.7, AND 3/4.7.10, THE BLOWDOWN SYSTEM, PIPING PENETRATION AREA FILTRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM, AND AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY OPERATION OF THE SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM COOLERS. ACCORDINGLY, THE DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 92-VIN 0197, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DID NOT MAKE ANY PIlYSICAL CIIANGES TO Tile PLANT EQUIPMENT. THE K4 TERM IN TIE OPDT SET POINT EQUATION AND TIIE TAU 3 TERM IN THE OPDT AND OTDT SET POINT EQUATIONS WAS CHANGED. K4 WAS CilANGED FROM 1.08 TO 1.095 AND THE TN s "RMS WAS CHANGED FROM O TO 2 SECONDS BY ADJUSTING POTENTIOMETER SE'ITINW !.a TiiE 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT WHICil IS PROJECF CLASS l 11J. WESTINGilOUSE IIAS IDENTIFIED A POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL ISSUE RELATED TO A l PIENOMENON DISCOVERED IN THE REACTOR VESSEL UPPER PLENUM WHICil IS CHARACTERIZED BY TEMPERATURE INCREASES IN ONE IlOT LEG. THE LOOP REMAINS AT THE HIGHER TEMPERATURE FOR SEVERAL SECONDS TifEN RETURNS TO THE ORIGINAL j TEMPERATURE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ADJACENT HOT LEG TEMPERATURE DECREASES BY ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT FOR TIE SAME TIME PERIOD. PREDICTIONS BASED ON CHARACTER!ZATION OF Tills TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATION INDICATE THAT SUFFICIENT MARGIN BETWEEN THE OPERATING AND TURBINE RUN BACK AND REACTOR TRIP SET POINTS MAY NOT EXIST TO PERMIT PLANT OPERATION AT UP RATED POWER WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTUATING OPDT AND OTDT TRIPS AND TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS IN A SINGLE CHANNEL. TIIE CilANGES IN TIIE K4 AND TAU 3 TERMS PROVIDE 80

ADDITIONAL MARGIN DETWEEN OPERATING CONDITIONS AND REACTOR TRIP SET POINTS FOR THE OPDT AND OTDT EQUATIONS. SAFFTY EVALUATION: THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCflONS ARE PART OF Tim ACCIDENT MmGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT THEMSELVES INITIATORS FOR ANY TRANSIENT. TIEREFORE, TIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT AFFECTED. THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCrlONAL INTEGRITY OF ANY PLANT SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED BY TIIE CllANGES TO TIE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. T1E CHANGES TO THE REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT TIIE INTEGRITY OF THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED FOR MmOATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH THE MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED Wmi THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECrlVELY. IN ADDITION, TIE OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DO SO CALCULATIONS ARE UNCllANGED FROM THOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THEREFORE, TIE OFFSITE DOSE PREDICTIONS REMAIN WITHIN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR EACH , OF TIE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. NO NEW OPERATING CONFIGURATION IS BEING IMPOSED BY THE SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS TIIAT WOULD CREATE A NEW FAILURE SCENARIO. IN ADDmON, NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, THE ACCIDENTS DEFINED IN THE FSAR CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE CREDIBLE SPECTRUM OF EVENTS TO BE ANALYZED WHICll DETERMINE SAFE PLANT OPERATION. THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS DO NOT EFFECT Tile FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY ASSUMED TO OPERATE DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS CHANGE DO A NOT DEGRADE TiiE DESIGN BASIS PERFORMANCE OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN TiiE ACCIDriNT ANALYSES. TIE CHANGES RISES TO TIIE RECTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT TIE INTEGRITY OF TIE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER UTILIZED FOR MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH TIIE MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL TEMPERATURE LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED WITH THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDmON, TIE OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DOSE CALCULATIONS ARE UNCHANGED FROM TIIOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. TIEREFORE, THE OFF SITE DOSE PREDICrlONS REMAIN WmIIN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR EAC11 OF TIIE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. TIE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCrlONS ARE PART OF TIE ACCIDENT MmGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT TilEMSELVES INmATORS FOR ANY EQUIPMENT FAILURE. TIE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ASSOCIATED Wml THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS IS DESCRIBED BY THE EVALUATIONS PERFORMED FOR TOE ACCIDENT ANALYSES DOCUMENTED IN SECTION 3.0 ANALYSES AND EVALUATIONS IIAVE BEEN PERFORMED TO DETERMINED THE EFFECT ON PLANT RESPONSE TO AFFECTED TRANSIENTS DUE TO THE NEW REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. THIS EFFORT IIAS CONFIRMED THAT Ti!E ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CRITERIA ARE MET AND TIE REQUIRED MARGIN OF SAFETY REGULATED FOR EACH AFFECTED SAFETY ANALYSIS IS MAINTAINED. TIE ACCEL'TANCE CRITERIA FOR THE ANALYZED EVENTS ARE UNCIIANGED. TIIUS, THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SET POINTS DO NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN A MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIE I TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-VIN 0199, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCR11rflON: Tills DCP IMPLEMENTS Tile WESTINGIIOUSE REVISED T-ilOT AVERAGE SCALING (RTAS) SCHEME. THE RCS IIOT LEG TEMPERATURES ARE MEASURED USING  ; I FAST-RESPONSE RTDS LOCATED 120 DEGREES APART IN TIIE SAME PLANE. RTAS ASSIGNS DLFFERENT WElGimNG FACTORS TO THE THREE HOT LEG RTDS TO MINIMIZE Tile EFFECT OF TIE TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS FROM THE RTD WHICH HAS THE MOST 81

PROCESS NOISE. RTAS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED BY MODIFYING TIIE NSA CARDS, WHICFI ARE LOCATED IN THE 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT, PROJECT CLASS 11J, FOR Tile AFFECTED LOOPS. Tim NSA CARDS, WHICH RECEIVE TIE ilOT LEO RTD SIGNALS, WILL HAVE TIIE INPUT AND BALANCING RESISTORS CHANGED. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE PLANT CHANGE IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THE FSAR ACCIDENTS ANALYSES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR TlilS PLANT CIIANGE AND IT HAS BEEN SHOWN TilAT THE ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED NOR IS THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE INCREASED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED TIIAT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. TilUS, TIIERE IS NO CilANGE IN TIE DOSES AS A RESULT OF RTAS. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT RTAS DO NOT RESULT IN ANY NEW LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES WillCH COULD CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A CREDIBLE ACCIDENT. THE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT INVOLVE AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. TilUS, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE TilAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN TIIE FSAR. VPO4-92 TIERE IS NO INCREASE IN THE PROBADILITY OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO S AFETY. TIIERE IS NO ADDITIONAL HARDWARE INTRODUCED TO TIIE CONTROL OR PROTECTION SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF Tills MODIFICATION. Ti!E INTRODUCTION OF TIIE PROCESS CALCULATION CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT HARDWARE OPERATION, IT ONLY DIMINISIES Tile MAGNITUDE OF TIIE EFFECT OF SilORT TERM PROCESS NOISE VARIATION ON A SINGLE, SPECIFIC RTD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF TIE AVERAGE THE VALUE FOR A LOOP. FOR ACTUAL HEAT UP EVENTS, ALL THREE RTDS IN A IlOT LEG WILL RESPOND THUS PROVIDING THE NEEDED PROTECrlON FUNCrlON ACTUATION, TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED WAS NOT INCREASED. Tills IS DUE TO THE CONCLUSION TliAT THE CURRENT FAILURE MODES AS ANALYZED ARE UNCHANGED DUE TO THIS CALCULATION PROCESS MODIFICATION. WlEN A HOT LEG RTD IS DETERMINED TO BE INOPERABLE, RTAS IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE AND THE PROCEDURE FOR OPERATION WITH A IlOT LEG RTD OUT OF SERVICE GIVEN IN REFERENCE 2 SilOULD BE FOLLOWED. THE PLANT MODIFICATION WILL NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED. TIERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CilANGE TO HARDWARE AS A RESULT OF THIS CALCULATION PROCESS MODIFICATION. THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH TIE OTDT AND OPDT PROTECrlON SYSTEM IS NOT CHANGED. TIE PLANT OPERATING STAFF WILL CONFIRM THAT THE INDICATED T-ilOT IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO ACTUAL T-IIOT AND CONFIRM THAT Tile ACTUAL TAVG STAYS WITH TIIE ALLOWABLE RANGE, TO MAINTAIN CONSERVATIVE OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO TiiE SAFETY ANALYSES ASSUMirrIONS. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WAS NOT REDUCED. ALL INITIAL CONDITIONS OF THE SAFETY ANALYSES WITil RESPECT TO TEMPERATURE WILL BE MAINTAINED. THE RESULTS OF SUCH ANALYSES AS NOTED IN TIIE FSAR ARE STILL VALID. THUS, TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIIE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 92-V2N0031, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO AIRIIANDLING UNITS,21556-A7-001 AND 2-1556-A7-002 ON TIIE ROOF OF TIIE UNIT 2 CONTROL BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0", AND TWO AIR llANDLING UNITS,2-1556-A7-003 AND 2-1556-A7-004 ON THE ROOF OF TIE UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0". EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100% OF Tile CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE IN Tile VICINITY OF MSIVS 2-HV-3016-A/B AND 2-HV-3026-A/B WITil!N TIE DESIGN LIMITS. AUXILIARY 82

BUILDING AIR liANDLING UNITS 2-1556-A7 003 AND 21556-A7 004 ARE REDUNDANT UNITS, EACil CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100% OF THE CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN Tile TEMPERA 1URE IN Tile VICINFTY OF MSIVS 2-IIV-3006-A/B AND 2 liv 3036-A/B WITillN Tile DESIGN LIMITS. AIR IIANDLING UNITS SUPPLY OITTSIDE AIR AND DISTTt!BlTTE TIIE AIR TO REGISTERS LOCATED NEAR EACil MSIV BONNET AND ACTUATOR. A BACKDRAFT DAMPER SEPARATES Tile OPERATING SYSTEM FROM THE NONOPERATING SYSTEM. FAILURE OF Ti!E IIEATER TO MAINTAIN Ti!E SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50 DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGIZES Tile OPERATING FAN. Tills DCP ALSO REVERSES TIIE ORIENTATION OF Tile EXISTING UNIT 2 CONTROL BUILDING 5 WAY RESTRAINT COOLING FANS FROM Tile SUPPLY TO THE EXHAUST CONFIGURATION. Tills PREVENTS THE IIEATED AIR, WillCil IS DISSIPATED BY Tile RESTRAINTS, FROM IMPINGING ON illE MSIV ACTUATORS, AND FACILITATE THE REMOVAL OF IIEATED AIR FROM TIIE BUILDING BY NATURAL CONVECTION. A "ll!Gli TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACll BUILDING IN Tile VICINITY OF Tile MSIVS; A " LOW TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACll BUILDING IN THE AIR llANDLER DISCilARGE AIR STREAM NEAR ONE OF Tile MSIVS. Tile 111G11 AND LOW TEMPERATURE SENSORS ANNUNCIATE IN TIIE MAIN CONTROL ROOM TO INFORM AN OPERATOR IF A TEMPERATURE ANOMALY EXISTS. Tills DCP INVOLVED PENETRATIONS TilROUGli PRESSURE, FIRE, AND FLOOD BOUNDARIES, WillCil WERE SUBJECT TO TIIE RESTRICTIONS OF VEGP PENETRATION SEAL CONTROL PROCEDURE 00432-C. PENETRATIONS WERE RESEALED IN ACCORDANCE Wrill SPECIFICATION XI AGil AFTER CONSTRUCrlON. , i SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile CllANGES IMPLEMENTED BY Tills DCP WERE DESIGNED TO REDUCE Tile TEMPERATURE OF Tile MSIV ACTUATOR, AND TiiEREFORE, DID NOT INCREASE TIIE PROBABILITY OF INADVERTENT CLOSURE. Tile ADDITIONAL WElGilT EXERTED ON Tile ROOF BY THE AIR liANDLERS IIAS BEEN EVALUATED, AS !!AS Tile DUCrWORK INSTALLED BY Tills DCP. THE DUCT SUPPORTS COMPLY Wrril Ti!E REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED BY DESIGN CRITERIA DC-2167 FOR DUCTWORK IN SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT FALL ON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING A SAFE S1RTfDOWN EARTilQUAKE (SSE). CIRCUITRY IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE TilAT Tile OPERATING FAN AITTOMATICALLY LOCKS OUT T11E REDUNDANT UNIT, AND TO ENSURE TilAT THE ilEATER CANNOT OPERATE WITilOUT AIR FLOW. FAILURE OF TIIE IIEATER TO MAINTAIN Tile SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50 ) DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGlZE Tile OPERATING FAN. TIIERE WERE NO CREDIBI,E COMMON-MODE FAILURES INTRODUCED BY TiiE DESIGN CHANGE WlilCil AFFECTS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. Tile ROOFS OF Tile CONTROL AND AUXILIARY j BUILDING MSIV ENCLOSURES IIAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING j Tile AIR liANDLERS AND MAINTAINING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY DURING A SEISMIC I EVENT. ELECTRICAL SEPARATION FROM CLASS IE WIRING IS MAINTAINED. FAILURE OF AN AIR }{ANDLER FAN COULD CAUSE A lilGli TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IN Tile  ; VICINITY OF THE MSIVS, POTENTIALLY IMPACTING THEIR ENVIRONMENTALLY J QUALIFIED LIFE. FAILURE OF THE IIEATING COIL COULD RESULT IN LOW HYDRAULIC l FLUID TEMPERATURE AND INCREASED VISCOSITY, RESULTING IN DEGRADED j OPERABILITY OF Tile MSIVS. NOTIFICATION OF A IIIGli TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS I PROVIDED BY A "111011 TEMP" ALARM, WillCli IS INSTALLED IN Tile MAIN CONTROL l ROOM QllVC PANEL AS PART OF Tl!IS DCP. NOTIFICATION OF A LOW TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS PROVIDED BY A " LOW TEMP" ALARM, WlilCH IS INSTALLED ON THE CONTROL ROOM QilVC PANEL AS PART OF Tills DCP. ANNUNCIATION OF EITilER ALARM REQUIRE MITIGATING OPERATOR ACTION. AS AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION, Tile AIR liANDLER FAN IS DESIGNED TO TRIP ON LOW TEMPERATURE. Ti!E SAFETY RELA 1ED PORTIONS OF Tile MSIV SYSTEM ARE CAPABLE OF WITilSTANDING Tile EFFECTS OF { NATURAL PilENOMENA, AND OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION FOLLOWING POSTULATED liAZARDS OF FIRE, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MISSILES, AND PIPE BREAK. NEW PENETRATIONS TilROUGil Tile PEN 1110USE WALLS IIAVE BEEN ANALYZED TO n 1 ___ _ _ - - - - - - a

DETERMINE THAT THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM MISSILES. MSLB VENT PATHS TO ATMOSPHERE, WillCll ARE PARTIALLY OBSTRUCTED BY TIE INSTALLATION OF DUCT, llAVE BEEN ANALYZED. THE NET FREE AREA USED IN THE CALCULATION IS NOT AFFECTED, NOR IIAS THE ABILITY TO RELIEVE PRESSURE BEEN REDUCED. Tile ADDITION OF COOLING AIR INTO THE MSIV ENCLOSURES DOES NOT INCREASE TIIE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVITY RELEA3ED FOLLOWING AN MSLB. THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES OR COMPONENTS AS SilOWN IN THE EVALUATIONS ABOVE. OPERABILITY AND BASIS FOR OPERABILITY DELINEATED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.7.1.1 FOR SAFETY VALVES, AND 3/4.7.1.5 FOR THE MSIVS. IIAS NOT BEEN REDUCED. TIIEREFORE, TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills DCP.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0040, REVISION 1 SEQUENCE 1 DESCRll' TION: Tills DCP ADDED AN EHHANCEMENT TO THE AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUITRY THAT RESETS THE SEQUENGR IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS WillLE LOADS ARE BEING SEQUENCED ONTO TIE BUS TIIIS DCP ADDED AN ENIIANCEMENT TO Tile AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUITRY WillCH RESETS TIIE UNDER VOLTAGE (U/V) LATCli IN APPROXIMATELY 60 SECONDS. THIS SENDS A SECOND U/V SIGNAL, WillCH OPENS TiiE CLOSED FEEDER BREAKERS AND SEND A SIGNAL TO RE-CLOSE Tile DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER. IF Tile DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER RE-CLOSES, THE LOADS ARE AUTOMATICALLY SEQUENCED ON. ALL OF THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE SAFETY CLASS 1, SEISMIC CLASS 1, EXCEPT FOR Tile CABLES AND INTERNAL WIRES THAT ARE SEISMIC CLASS 2. THE PURPOSE OF Tile ADDITIONAL RESET FEATURES IS TO PREVENT AN INADVERTElff RE-CLOSURE OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER ON A PARTIALLY LOADED BUS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile DESIGN CliANGE FULLY MEETS TIIE DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS OF TFE EQUIPMENT THAT IS BEING MODIFIED. TIIE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF Tile SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED TO CAUSE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN TIE FSAR. TIIE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY LIMITS OR SETTINGS. THIS IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF TIIE FSAR EIAT INCLUDED SECTIONS 1.9.9,7.3,8.3.1,16.3 AND CHAPTER 15. Tile ENHANCED AUTOMATIC SEQUENCER RESET FEATURE IS ONLY FUNCTIONAL IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS DURING SEQUENCING. TilUS. Tills NEW RESET FEATURE RESULTS IN AN IMPROVEMENT IN TIIE RELIABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM. Tile DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT Tile ABILITY OF Tile EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS ROLE IN TIIE MITIGATION OF T*lE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN TIIE FSAR. Tile DESIGN CIIANGE ENilANCED TIIE ABILITY TO RECOVER FROM A MALFUNCTION OF THE EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM. THE RISK OF AN INADVERTENT FEEDER BREAKER CLOSING ONTO A DEAD, BUT PARTIALLY LOADED BUS, HAS BEEN REDUCED. THE ABILITY TO RE-INSTATE THE EMERGENCY LOADS AND RESTORE THE STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM HAS BEEN ENHANCED. TIE DESIGN CIIANGE FULLY hEETS TIIE DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS OF TIIE EQUIPMENT THAT IS BEING MODIFIED. TIE DESIGN WAS EVALUATED AND IT WAS DETERMINED TilAT ALL SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIFICATIONS, ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA AND OTilER DESIGN CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET. Tile MODIFICATIONS ARE ELECFRICALLY ISOLATED FROM OTHER CIRCUITS BY COORDINATED FUSES AND ARE PliYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS. Tile NEW CIRCUlTS ONLY BECOME ACTIVE IF AN U/V SIGNAL IS PRESENT AND THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER TRIPS WHEN IT SilOULD DE CLOSED. Tile DESIGN CllANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TiiE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN Tile 84

{ BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ANY SAFETY LIMIT OR ANY SAFETY l LIMIT SETTING. IT DOES NOT AFFECT TIE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION OR TifE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - AC SOURCES, SECrlON 3/4.8.1. THE CilANGE MEETS Tile APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA AND DOES NOT AFFECT TIIE TIMING OR SEQUENCE TilAT LOADS WOULD DE STARTED IN Tile EVENT OF A LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT. Tills IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF Ti!E FSAR AND THE TECliNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.8.1.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCR!lrTION: THIS DCP CilANGED THE NON lE TRANSFORMER IN TIE FOLLOWING GENERAL ELECTRIC (G.E.) DRY TYPE TRANSFORMERS: 2NB03X,2NB10X, AND 2NBilX. TIIEY WERE REPLACED WITil ABB SUPPLIED DRY TYPE CORE AND CORE ASSEMBLIES DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN Tile OLD G.E. TRANSFORMER CASES. ALSO A TEMPERATURE MONITOR WAS ADDED TO EACll TRANSFORMER WillCil CAN MONITOR ALL THREE CORE WINDING TEMPERATURES. SAFL'TY EVALUATION: Tile CRITICAL TRANSFORMERS AND Tile LOADS SUPPLIED l FROM THESE TRANSFORMERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION OR FOR SAFE SilUTDOWN. TiiE LOSS OF ANY NON lE TRANSFORMER IS BOUNDED BY TIIE LOSS OF NON EMERGENCY AC POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES ANALYSES. Tile REPLACEMENT CORE AND COLL ASSEMBLY IS ELECTRICALLY EQUIVALENT TO THE PREVIOUS CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. Tile NEW TRANSFORMERS CANNOT FAIL IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM Tile PREVIOUS TRANSFORMERS. Tile NEW TRANSFORMERS GIVE OFF LESS HEAT AND IIAVE HEAVIER WINDINGS AND ARE EXPECTED TO BE MORE RELIABLE. THEREFORE Tills DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY; IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. T1BS DCP DOES NOT CREATE TIIE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF ACCIDENT, Tills DCP DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND IT DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY Tile BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0046, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRWFION: THIS DESIGN CllANGE PROVIDED NE'V COVERS FOR Tile "BANAN A" REACTOR SUPPORT VENTS, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) PORTS AND EMERGENCY I REFUELING CANAL DRAINS (ERCDS) FOR THE REFUELING CANAL, SYSTEM 2148. ALSO INCLUDED IN THE DESIGN CHANGE WERE TIE NEW FASTENING BOLTS AND REQUIRED NUTS AND WASHERS FOR THE COVERS. THE NEW SEALS PROVIDED, WHICII IN COMBINATION WITil THE NEW BOLTS, NUTS AND WASIERS ALLEVIATE THE NEED FOR USING RTV TYPE ADHESIVE IN SEALING TilESE COVERS DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE PROJECT CLASS OF TiiE REFUELING CANAL LINER AND ALL COVERS AND RELATED l MATERIALS IS OIC. THE OLD BANANA SHAPED REACTOR SUPPORT VENT COVERS, NI COVERS AND EMERGENCY REFUELING CANAL DRAIN (ERCD) COVERS WERE SEALED AGAINST WATER LEAKAGE USING RTV TYPE ADIESIVE. THE CURE TIME FOR APPLICATION OF Tile RTV WAS 24 IlOURS AND THE TIME TO REMOVE Tile ADHESIVE IN ! CONJUNCTION WITH TIE GASKET AFTER THE REFUELING OPERATION IS COMPLETED WAS 8 HOURS. Tills TIME FOR APPLICATION AND REMOVAL DOES NOT INCLUDE Tim TIME REQUIRED TO TORQUE THE FASTENING BOLTS AND TIEN TO UNFASTEN TilEM l AFTER 111E REFUELING OPERATION IS COMPLETED. l 85

i l 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE COVERS, SEALS AND BOLTING MATERIALS USED l EITHER MEET OR EXCEED THE REQUIREMENTS OF Tile SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COVERS, SEALS AND BOLTING, AND Tile DIMENSIONS OF Tile BOLTING AND COVERS ARE ] ESSENTIALLY TIIE SAME AS Tile PREVIOUS ONES. A COMPRESSED HEIGHT GAGE WAS  ! PROVIDED BY THE VENDOR TO TEST WilETIER Tile SEALS IIAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY COMPRESSED BEFORE FLOODING THE REFUELING CANAL. THEREFORE, APPLYING A SPECIFIED TORQUE VALUE TO EACil BOLT OR STUD IS NO LONGER REQUIRED. TIIE NEW COMPONENTS liAVE BEEN EVALUATED UNDER Tile MOST SEVERE LOADS (SEISMIC, HYDRAULIC. TilERMAL, ETC.) EXPECTED DURING A REFUELING OUTAGE AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. ALSO, TIE SEALS ARE INSPECTED BEFORE AND AFTER EACli USE TO ASSURE TIIEIR CONDITION IS APPROPRIATE FOR USE IN THE REFUELING CANAL. DAMAGED COMPONENTS ARE REPLACED. THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR EXPECTING ANY A"CIDENTAL IMPACTS ON THE COVERS AND SEALS FROM BENEATH. Tile SEALS ARE PROTECTED FROM IMPACTS FROM ABOVE BY THE COVER EXCEPT AT'111E EDGES. NO ANALYZED IMPACTS TO THE COVER OR SEAL ARE EXPECTED TO BE SEVERE ENOUGH TO DISLODGE THE SEALS. THE SEALS ARE REPLACED AFTER SEVEN YEARS, ACCORDING TO THE MANUFACTURER'S RECOMMENDATIONS. TlHS REPLACEMENT SCllEDULE ASSURES TIIAT A QUALIFIED SEAL IS ALWAYS USED. NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO > SAFETY IS AFFECTED BY TIIE DESIGN CHANGE. TlHS DESIGN CllANGE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0051, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRII' TION: BEGIN IMPLEMENTATION OF Tile UPGRADE OF T11E UNIT 2 FUEL TO val %TAGE 5 LOPAR FUEL ASSEMBLIES. IT ALSO INCORPORATES THE CllANGES TO TIIE FOLLOWING: 1) REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMITS AND DNB PARAMETERS. 2) INCREASE IN SilUTDOWN AND CONTROL ROD DROP TIME 3) AX1AL FLUX DIFFERENCE AND PEAKING FACTOR SURVEILLANCE 4) WIDENED ACCUMULATOR WATER LEVEL RANGE 5) MINIMUM RWST SOLUTION TEMPERATURE . THE LAST TWO OF TilESE CIIANGES ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE VANTAGE 5 SAFETY ANALYSES. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP REQUIRES CHANGES TO TIIE FOLLOWING FSAR SECTIONS : 4.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.3.1, 4.3.* , 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, CilAPTER 4 REFERENCES, 5.3, 6.2.1, 9.1.1, 15.0.3, 15.0.4, 15.0.1.15.0.6, 15.0.9, 15.0.11, 15.1, 15.1.1, 15.1.2, 15.1.3, 15.2, 15.2.2, 15.2.3, 15.2.4, 15.3, 15.3.1, 15.3.2. 15.3.3, 15.3.4, 15.4, 15.4.1, 15.4.2, 15.4.3,

15. 4.4, 15.4.6, 15.4.8, 15. 4,9, 15.5, 15.5.1, 15.6.1, 15 /,.3, 15.6. 5, 15.7.4, 15 A.1, 15 A.2, 15 A.3, 15 A.4, CllAPTER 15 REFERENCES AND FSAR FIGURES 4.2-1 TliROUGil 4.2-11,4.214,4.2-15,4.3-1, 4.3 3 TIIROUGil 4.3-17,4.3 21,4.3-22,4.3 23,4.3 27 TilROUGli 4.3-35,4.3-38,4.3-39,4.4 1,4.4-8, 4.4-9, 6.2.1-35 TilROUGli 6.2.1-37, 15.0.3 1, 15.0.3-2, 15.0.4-1, 15.0.4-2, 15.0.5-1 THROUGli 15.0.5-3,15.0.6-1, 15.1.2 1, 15.1.2-2, 15.1.3-1 THROUGli 15.1.3-8, 15.2.3-1 TIIROUGH 15.2.38,15.3.11 TilROUGH 15.3.1-4, 15.3.2 1 TilROUGH 15.3.2-4, 15.3.3 1 TIIROUGli 15.3.3-4B,15.4.1 1 TilROUGH 15.4.1-3, 15.4.2 1 TilROUGil 15.4.2-9, 15.4.3 2, 15.4.3-3, 15.4.4-1 TilROUGli 15.4.4-5, 15.4.8-1 TilROUGli 15.4.8-4, 15.4.9 1 THROUGH 15.4.9-3, 15.5.1 1, 15.5.1-2, 15.5.1-3, 15.6.1 1, 15.6.1-2, 15.6.3-1 TIIROUGH 15.6.3-11, 15.6.3-13 THROUGli 15.6.3 15,15.6.5 2 TIIROUGli 15.6.5-

48. AND ASSOCIATED TABLES. THIS CilANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN A CilANGE TO TIIE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN. Tills DCP DOES NOT CREATE A CHANGE TO ANY PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR. IT DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR.

i 86 i l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0054, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRilrrlON: THIS DCP DELETED THE RIIR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE AUTO CLOSURE INTERLOCK (ACI) AND REPLACED IT WITH A CONTROL ROOM ALARM. IN ADDITION TIE RIIR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE OPEN PERMISSIVE INTERLOCK (OPI) PRESSURE SETPOINT WAS REDUCED FROM 377 PSIG TO 365 PSIG. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE RilR ACI FEATURE ENSURES TIIAT THE RIIR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES ARE FULLY CLOSED WIIEN TIE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE THE INTERLOCK SET POINT, WESTINGIIOUSE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF TIIE ACI FEATURE WITH Tile COMBINATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM ALARM AND REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ENSURES THAT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS DE TAKEN BY TIIE OPERATORS SO TilAT Tile RilR IS ISOLATED FROM Tile RCS WilEN TIIE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE TIE ALARM SET POINT, (TiiE INTERLOCK PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF THE RHR SUCrlON ISOLATION VALVES ON HIGil RCS PRESSURE, llOWEVER, RAPID OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION OF TIE RHR SYSTEM IS AND IS PROVIDED BY THE RHR SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES AND NOT BY TIIE SLOW ACTING SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES.) THIS COMBINATION RESULTS IN A REDUCED PROBABILrrY OF AN ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE (WCAP-12927). Tile OPI SET POINT PREVENTS THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES FROM BEING OPENED WillLE THE RCS PRESSURE IS POTENTIALLY ABOVE THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE REDUCED OPI SET POINT FURTIER MINIMIZES Tile POTENTIAL OF OPENING THE Ri!R SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES WillLE TIE RCS PRESSURE IS ABOVE TIE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE REMOVAL OF THE RHR ACI FEATURE AND THE REDUCTION IN THE OPI SET POINT W NOT RESULT IN A CONDITION WHERE Tile DESIGN, MATERIAL, AND CONSTRUCrlON STANDARDS THAT WERE APPLICABLE PRIOR TO THE CHANGE ARE ALTERED. IN ADDITION, THE SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF TIIE RHR SYSTEM IIAVE NOT BEEN ALTERED AND NO NEW SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0059 REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: TIIIS DCP REVISES THE AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF TIE NORTilEAST (NE) CELL FAN AND SPRAY VALVE IN TIIE TRAIN A AND B NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING TOWERS (NSCT). ADDITIONALLY, Tile START AND STOP SET POINTS OF Tile NORTilWEST (NW) CELL FAN OF EACil TRAIN WERE REVISED. THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED IS: TRAIN A: 2-1IV 1668A,2-HV 1668B,2-1202-W4-001-F01,2-1202-W4-001-F03 , 2-TE-11641, 2-TE 11643 TRAIN B: 2-HV-1669A,2-HV 1669B,21202-W4-002-F01,21202-W4-002-F03, 2 TE ll648. AN AX5 RELAY WAS ADDED TO THE AUTOMATIC START AND STOP CIRCUIT OF EACll NE CELL FAN (MOTORS 2 1202 W4-001-M03 AND 2 1202-W4-002-M03). Tills RELAY HAS A NORMALLY CLOSED CONTACT WIRED TO THE START CIRCUIT AND A NORMALLY OPEN CONTACT WIRED TO THE STOP CIRCUlT OF THE FAN. ONE AX5 RELAY WAS INSTALLED INSIDE MCC 2 ABB AND TIE OTHER RELAY WAS INSTALLED INSIDE MCC 2BBB. TilESE RELAYS ARE ENERGlZED WilEN Tile RESPECrlVE SPRAY VALVE FOR EACH NSCT REACHES Tile FULLY CLOSED POSITION. NEW CABLES WERE PULLED FROM Tim 480V SWITCH GEAR 2AB15 (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL D) TO THE 480V MCC 2ABB (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL 1) AND FROM TIIE 480V SWITCH GEAR 2 bbl 6 (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL 2) TO THE 480V MCC 2BBB (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL 1). NEW CABLES WERE ALSO PULLED FROM VALVES 2BRHV-1668A AND 2BRiiV-1669A TO TIE MCCS 2ABB AND 2BBB, RESPECTIVELY. THE NEW AX5 RELAYS ARE PROJECT CLASS 11E, AND TIE CONTROL CABLES FOR THESE RELAYS ARS PROJECT CLASS 12E. TEMPERATURE SENSORS 2 TE-Il643 AND 2-TE-11648, PREVIOUSLY USED IN THE AlfrOMATIC START AND STOP CIRCUITRY OF THE NE CELL FANS, ARE NO LONGER NEEDED AND WERE ABANDONED IN PLACE ALONG WrrH TIIElR ASSOCIATED CABLING. THE SET POINTS FOR THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS 2-TE-Il641 87

AND 2 TE-11646 FOR Tile NW CELL FANS WERE REVISED FROM 75'F TO 83'F FOR STARTING AND 68'F TO 74'F FOR STOPPING OF Ti!E FANS. Tile SET POINT FOR AUTOMATIC OPENING OF EACll SPRAY VALVE WAS CilANGED FROM 70 F TO 75'F. Tile RESET POINT OF 65'F REMAINS UNCilANGED FOR EACll SPRAY VALVE. Tills DCP ALSO REVISES Tile AMBER LIGitT AND Ti!E SWITCli GEAR TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUlTRY ASSOCIATED WITil EACil NSCT FAN. EQUIPMENT AFFECTED IS LISTED AS FOLLOWS: TRAIN A: 480V SWGR BREAKER,2AB1505,2AB1506,2ABl513,2AB1508. TRAIN B: 480V SWGR BREAKER: 2BB1605,2BB1606,2BB1613,2BB1608. FOUR NEW 74-1 RELAYS, ONE PER AFFECTED BREAKER, WERE INSTALLED IN TIIE INSTRUMENT PANELS OF TIIE ASSOCIATED 480V SWITCil GEAR BUSSES. SPARE DELL ALARM CONTACTS ($2B A) WERE WIRED TO ACIUATE Tile 741 RELAYS. EACil RELAY llAS A NORMALLY CLOSED (NC) CONTACT WIRED TO Tile AMBER LIGHT CIRCUIT AND A SECOND NC CONTACT WIRED TO Tile SWITCil GEAR TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUIT. A SPARE BREAKER POSITION CONTACT IS ALSO WIRED INTO Tile TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUIT TO PREVENT NUISANCE ALARMS. Tile NSCT'S NE CELL FAN IS STARTED WilEN THE SPRAY VALVE OPENS, TO IIELP ALLEVIATE Ti!E ACCUMULATION OF MOISTURE ON ELECTRICAL AND MECilANICAL COMIONENTS LOCATED IN Tile NSCT PUMP ROOMS, OUTSIDE AIR IS PULLED TilROUGil Tile PUMP ROOMS BY TIIE FAN WilEN Ti!E SPRAY VALVE OPENS. Tile FAN CONTINUES TO OPERATE UNTIL Tile SPRAY VALVE CLOSES. MOISTURE ACCUMULATION IN Tile PUMP ROOMS OF Tile NSCPS IIAS CAUSED CORROSION, COMPONENT MALFUNCTION, AND INCREASED MAINTENANCE TO Tile EQUIPMENT IN Tile PUMP ROOMS. BY TYING TIIE OPERATION OF Tile NE CELL FAN TO Tile OPERATION OF Tile SPRAY VALVE, A GREATER STEP CHANGE IN TIIE TOWER'S COOLING RESPONSE WILL OCCUR Wi!EN Tile SET POINT OF Tile SPRAY VALVE IS REACi!ED. Ti!EREFORE, Tile SET POINT OF Tile SPRAY VALVE AND BYPASS VALVE IS INCREASED TO 75'F ON RISING NSCW RETURN HEADER TEMPERATURE TO PROVIDE AN INCREASED DEAD BAND BETWEEN Tile SPRAY AND BYPASS MODES OF Tile I TOWER'S OPERATION; Tills IS DONE TO MINIMlZE Tile CYCLING OF TIIESE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES. Tile TEMPERATURE SET POINT CllANGE FOR Tile AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF Tile NSCTS NW QUADRANT CELL FAN WILL ALLOW TIIE SEQUENCING OF j Tile FANS TO BE PROPERLY MAINTAINED. PRESENTLY, Tile FAN CONTROLS OPERATE SO 4 A SWITCil GEAR BREAKER TRIP INDICATION IS DEACTIVATED WilENEVER Tile NSCW RETURN TEMPERATURE IS BELOW Ti!E LOW TEMPERATURE SET POINT. Tills MAY ALLOW A BREAKER TRIP TO GO UNNOTICED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. Tills CONDITION IS APPLICABLE TO ANY NSCT FAN NOT IN OPERATION. MODIFICATION OF Tile FAN AMBER LIGitT AND TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUITRY WILL ENSURE A FAN AMBER LIGIIT IS NOT DEFEATED BY A LOW TEMPERATURE CONDITION IN Tile NSCW RETURN llEADER. Ti!E DESIGN Cl!ANGES TO DE IMPLEMENTED TO Tile AMBER LIGllT CIRCUITRY WILL ALLOW . IT TO BE FUNCTIONAL AND INDEPENDENT OF TIIE NSCW RETURN TEMPERATURE. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile CilANGES TO TIIE NSCT SPRAY VALVE AND FAN l CIRCUITRY IN EACil TRAIN llAVE NO IMPACT ON Tile ABILITY OF Tile NSCT TO PERFORM i ITS FUNCTION DURING Tile MITIGATION OF DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN TIIE I FSAR. ALL CilANGES MEET TIIE REQUIREMENTS OF DESIGN MATERIAL, AND

                                                                                    ]

CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS SPECIFIED IN THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITEIUA. Tile EXISTING SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES NECESSARY TO PRESERVE Tile INTEGRITY OF THE NSCW SYSTEM ARE UNAFFECTED, ENSURING SYSTEM INTERFACES REMAIN FUNCTIONAL. Tile ELECTRICAL LOADING IMPOSED ON Tile DIESEL, AS DOCUMENTED IN 'I ' CALCULATION X3CEOL, ilAS NOT INCREASE. Tills CALCULATION ASSUMED Ti!E ELECTRICAL LOAD l~ ROM Tile SPRAY VALVE WOULD BE LOADED ONTO Tile DIESEL GENERATOR IN O.5 SECONDS, AND Tile FANS WOULD BE STARTED SIMULTANEOUSLY . l AFTER Tile SEQUENCER BLOCK SIGNAL IS REMOVED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS ACCOMPANIED BY A LOSS OF AC POWER. Ti!E TilERMAL RESPONSE OF Tile NSCT FOR CONDITIONS ASSUMED IN DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT ANALYSES IS l UNCilANGED. Tile IWSULTS OF Tile FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR TIIE 88 i

NSCW EQUIPMENT CREDITED FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION ARE UNCilANGED. Tile VEGP RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IS UNALTERED AND REMAINS IN COMPLIANCE WITilIN 10 CFR 100 LIMITS. Tile OPERABILITY AND BASIS FOR OPERABILITY DELINEATED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.7.4 AND 3/4.7.5 FOR TIE NSCW EQUIPMENT ARE NOT IMPACTED

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0064, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilYrlON: EACll OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR'S CONNECTING ROD BOLTS TilAT SECURE TIE CONNECTING RODS AROUND TIE CRANKSIIAFT ARE REQUIRED TO BE PRELOADED AND Tile PRELOAD VERIFIED. TIE PREVIOUS DIESEL ENGINE CONNECTING ROD BOLTS ARE TO DE REPLACED WITH NEW STUD /NITT ASSEMBLIES. THE NEW ASSEMBLY UTILIZES A HYDRAULIC PRESTRESSER, IN LIEU OF TORQUEING Tile BOLTS, TO ACHIEVE A MORE ACCURATE PRELOAD. Tills CHANGE IS PROJECT CLASS 015. i SAFETY EVALUATION: FAILURE OF THE EMERGENCY DLESEL GENERATOR IS NOT AN INITIATING EVENT OF A.N ACCIDENT NOR IS IT ANALYZED IN TIE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. Tills DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF TIIE DIESEL ENGINE IN THAT THE CONNECTING RODS WILL STILL BE SECURED TO Tile CRANKSilAFT WITH Tile SAME PRELOAD. THIS DESIGN CllANGE DID NOT INCREASE TIIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. Tile CHANGE IN TIE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS AND THE CHANGE IN TIE METilOD FOR MEASUREMENT OF THE BOLT PRELOADING REDUCED THE PROBABILITY OF GALLING TIE THREADS AND DID NOT DECREASE TIE ENGINE RELIABILITY. THE NEW STUDS ARE MADE OF TIE SAME MATERIAL AS THE PREVIOUS BOLTS, AND TIE PRELOAD REMAINS Ti!E SAME ALSO. TIE METiiOD OF APPLYING AND MEASURING TIIE PRELOAD liAS BEEN IMPROVED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ALTER THE OPERATION OF TIIE DESEL ENGINE NOR DOES IT CREATE OR INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY TYPE OF FAILURE TilAT DOES NOT CURRENTLY EXIST. NEITIER TIE RELIABILITY OF TIIE DIESEL GENERATOR NOR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES WERE DECREASED AS A RESULT OF TIE CHANGE IN THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0070, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: Tills DCP REPLACED Tile PREVIOUS GEAR TYPE COUPLINGS WHICH CONNECTED THE PUMP SHAFTS WITil THE TURBINE DRIVERS OF TIIE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS WITH DRY DIAPHRAGM COUPLING. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, TilEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0072, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: IN ROOM R147 OF THE UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING, A 120 VAC INVERTER UNIT (TAG NO. 2 1807-Y3-IB12) NEEDED TO BE PROTECTED FROM WATER ENTRY THROUGH THE OPEN (SCREEN) TOP OF TIIE INVERTEIL FOR THIS PROTECTION, A DRIP SHIELD WAS INSTALLED ABOVE TIE INVERTER AND SUPPORTED BY THE CONCRETE WALL BEHIND THE UNIT; THE SHIELD IS NOT ATTACHED TO THE INVERTER. TIIE DRIP 89

1 J l l l SillELD STRUCTURE CONSISTS OF TWO P1001 UNISTRUT SECrlONS; EACH IS WELDED TO A BASE PLATE THAT IS BOLTED TO THE CONCRETE WALL ABOVE AND BEHIND TIE INVERTER UNIT. THE UNISTRUT MEMBERS ARE CANTILEVERED OVER Tile INVERTER l UNIT, AND SUPPORT A SPAN OF METAL DECKING. THE DECKING VEILS TIIE ENTIRE UNIT, j THUS SHIELDING IT FROM ANY OVERIIEAD DRIPPING. A SIEET METAL GUTTER IS ATTACHED TO THE DECKING ON ONE SIDE. THE SHIELD STRUCTURE IS SLOPED SLIGHTLY TO FACILITATE WATER RUN-OFF FROM DECKING TO TIIE FLOOR THROUGli TIE GUTTER. THE 120 VAC INVERTER (TAG NO. 21807 Y3-IB12) HAS CHILLED WATER AND FIRE WATER LINES RUNNING OVERHEAD. WATER AND CONDENSATION FROM THESE LINES DRIPS ONTO TIIE INVERTER AND CAN ENTER THE UNIT THROUGH ITS OPEN (SCREEN) TOP. TIE SLOPED DRIP SHIELD DEFLECTS ANY DRIPPING WATER AWAY FROM THE INVERTER. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DRIP SHIELD IS A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 STRUCTURE THAT liAS BEEN DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND SSE LOADS; THEREFORE, TIE DRIP SHIELD  ! STRUCTURE SATISFIES SEISMIC 2 OVER 1 DESIGN CRITERIA. THE ADDITION OF SPARE l CABLES, PULLED BACK FROM CONDUITS 2BE445RL368 AND 2BE445RQ367, TO CABLE TRAYS 2BE445TLCP AND 2BE445TQCP DOES NOT OVERLOAD OR OVERFILL THESE TRAYS. TIIE ADDITION OF TIIE DRIP SHIELD AND REMOVAL OF TWO SPARE CONDUITS FROM THE TOP THE INVERTER 2-1807-Y3-1B12 DID NOT HAVE AN IMPACT ON EXISTING PLANT SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND STRUCTURES. TIE SHIELD DOES NOT IIAMPER AIR FLOW INTO OR OUT OF THE INVERTER SINCE TIERE IS A MINIMUM CLEARANCE OF 12 INCHES BETWEEN THE TOP OF TI-E INVERTER AND DPJP SlilELD. THIS IS MORE THAN THE 6" MINIMUM CLEARANCE SPECIFIED ON VENDOR DRAWING (REF.: DECllTEL DWG. LOG NO. 2X3AQO3-43-5) FOR TIIE NATURAL CONVECTION VENT IN THE TOP OF TIIE UNIT. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS A PASSIVE SHIELD STRUCTURE SUCH AS TIIIS. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY TlilS DCP DO NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF , SAFETY DEFINED IN THE BASIS OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0084, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: '?lIIS DCP PERFORMED SEVERAL MODIFICATIONS TO INTERNAL COMPONENT 6 OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS, TAG NUMBERS 2-1305-P4-004 AND 005. THE MAJOR MODIFICATION WAS A CHANGE TO THE "A" AND "B" GAP DIMENSIONS. TIIE "A" GAP WAS MODIFIED BY DECREASING THE INNER DIAMETER OF TIE DIFFUSER SIDE PLATES AND BY TRIMMING THE OUTER DIAMETER OF THE IMPELLER. THE "B" GAP IS MODIFIED BY TRIMMING BACK Tile VANES OF TIE DIFFUSER IN CONJUNCTION WITil TRIMMING THE IMPELLER OD. THE *B" GAP IS THE RADIAL , DIMENSION BETWEEN 'nIE OD OF THE IMPELLER VANE AND THE ID OF Tile DIFFUSER VANE INLET. Tile "A" GAP IS THE RADIAL DIMENSION BETWEEN Tile OD OF TIIE IMPELLER VANE AND Tile ID OF THE DIFFUSER SIDE PLATES. SAFETY EVALUATION: TlilS DESIGN CHANGE PERFORMED MODIFICATIONS TO TIIE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS THAT LESSEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF DEGRADATION OF COMPONENTS OF THE PUMP DUE TO HIGH VIBRATION AT LOW FLOW CONDITIONS, AND TilUS IMPROVED THE PUMPS' RELIABILITY. AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR TABLE 10.4.7-1, LOSS OF A SINGLE FEEDPUMP MAY RESULT IN PLANT OPERATION AT REDUCED CAPACITY OR MAY RESULT IN A REACTOR TRIP. LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 15.2.7 AND 15.1.2. BECAUSE THE DESIGN CHANGE MEETS ORIGINAL I EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND INCORPORATES DESIGN FEATURES THAT SilOULD l IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF PUMP COMPONENTS, THE PROBABILITY OF A LOSS OF j FEEDWATER IS NOT INCREASED. THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS ARE NOT SAFETY j RELATED. BECAUSE TIIE ANALYSIS OF A LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW IS UNCHANGED, Tile CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW ARE ALSO UNCHANGED. TIIIS 90 l

ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TIIE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 10.1, 10.2, 10.4, - 15.2.7, AND CilAPTER 3. SilOULD THE PUMPS FAIL TO DELIVER FEEDWATER, Tile SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE PLANT ARE NOT COMPROMISED. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 10.1,10.2,10.4,15.2.7, AND CIIAPTER 3. Tim FEEDWATER PUMPS ARE LOCATED IN Tile TURBINE BUILDING AND TiiEIR FAILURE WILL NOT IMPACT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURES OR SYSTEMS BEYOND TilAT ALREADY ANALYZED IN Tile FSAR. BECAUSE TIE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, AND TIE PROBABILITY OF A FAILURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS WAS NOT INCREASED BY THIS CIIANGE TO THE PUMP'S INTERNALS, THE TECH SPECS SAFETY MARGINS DEFINED BY THE BASIS OF TIE TECH SPECS IIAVE NOT BEEN DECREASED. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF Tile TECH SPECS < AND BASES INCLUDING SECTION B3/4.7.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0091, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) IMPLEMENTED BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) FOR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS,7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP SYSTEM REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS,7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS SYSTEM REACTOR TIUP (RT) FUNCTIONS AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) FUNCTIONS. IIARDWAIE MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE PER WESTINGHOUSE FCN'S FOR INSTALLING BTI PANELS IN THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: A) NIS CABINET (2 1602-QS-NIR) B) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS CABINETS (2-1604-Q5-PSI /PS2/PS3/PS4) C) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP CABINETS (2-1604-Q5-PPl/PP2/PP3) VISUAL INDICATION ON TIIE MAIN CONTROL BOARD IS PROVIDED BY THE ADDITION OF i1 NEW ANNUNCIATOR WINDOWS FOR BTI TEST PANELS STATUS. ADDITIONALLY, LOCAL INDICATION IS PROVIDED ON EACH BTI TEST PANEL FOR CilANNEL STATUS. Tile REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) UTILIZE l-OUT-OF-2,2-OUT-OF-3, AND 2-OUT-OF-4 COINCIDENCE LOGIC FROM REDUNDANT CHANNELS TO INITIATE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. WITilIN THESE SYSTEMS, ANALOG CHANNEL COMPARATORS, WITil THE EXCElrTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) 1-OUT-OF-2 FUNCTIONS, ARE CURRENTLY PLACED IN THE TRIPPED STATE FOR CHANNEL TESTING OR IN RESPONSE TO A CHANNEL BEING OUT OF SERVICE. WITH AN INOPERABLE CHANNEL IN THE TRIPPED STATE, A REDUNDANT CHANNEL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED OR TESTED WITilOUT CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION. WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF TiiE BYPASS TEST INSTRUhENTATION (BTI), A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION IS AVOIDED SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT IS ELIMINATED AMD THE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED BY REQUIRING SIGNALS FROM ADDITIONAL CHANNELS TO ACTUATE TIE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIGNS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERABILITY OF THE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEMS (NSSS & BOP) OR THE NIS. THE ACTIVITY DID NOT CHANGE THE CHANNEL REDUNDANCY OR SEPARATION REQUIREhENT PROVIDED BY TIIE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM OR THE NIS. WITil IMPLEMENTATION OF Tile BTI, A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION, DURING TESTING, IS LESS LIKELY SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT IS ELIMINATED WHILE THE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE NO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES OF THE BTI TOGGLE SWITCHES THAT CAN CAUSE A PLANT TRIP. IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIE BTI DOES NOT AFFECT Tile INTEGRITY OF ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED IN THE MITIGATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES OF AN 91

I I l ACCIDENT. THE INSTALLATION OF Tilf BYPASS PANELS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIIE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION (cF TIE NIS OR 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS AND BOP RACKS (REFERENCES 2,3 & 4). FAULT TEST / EVALUATIONS IIAVE BEEN PERFORMED FOR THE BTI SYSTEk TO DETERMINE THAT A CREDIBLE FAULT DID NOT PROPAGATE TO OR FROM TiiE DTI AS IT INTERFACES WITil ASSOCIATED PROTECTION SYSTEM FUNCrlONS (REFEltENCE 1). TIE BTI SYSTEM IS NOT SUBJECT TO COMMON MODE FAILURES. Tile BTI SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PERFORM ITS ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE FUNCTION (1.E., TESTINGfrROUBLESHOOTING IN THE BYPASSED CONDITION) AND NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT EQUIPMENT UTILIZED IN TIE MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES. INSTALLATION OF TIE BTI SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT INITIATION SEQUENCES OR RESPONSE SCENARIOS. NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. ALTilOUGli THE FSAR DOES NOT EVALUATE ACCIDENTS WilJCII ARE THE RESULT OF Tile PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILING TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCrlON, A COMMON MODE FAILURE OF MORE THAN ONE PROCESS PROTECTION CHANNEL COULD LEAD TO TIE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT BEING CREATED TilAT IS DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN Tile FSAR. MEASURES TO ENSURE SYSTEM RELI ABILITY, HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ENSUP.E THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCrlON OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED IN TIIE FSAR WAS NOT CREATED BY Tim INSTALLATION OF TiiE BTI SYSTEM (REFERENCE 1). TIESE MEASURES INCLUDE: RELI ABILITY EVALUATION, ISOLATION CAPABILITY EVALUATION, SEISMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPhENT QUALIFICATION EVALUATIONS AND TESTING, AND DESIGN CONSTRAINTS GOVERNED BY WCAP-11368 AND SERS FOR APPLICATION OF ROUTINE TEST IN BYPASS. NO FUNCTIONS CREDITED IN SAFETY ANALYSES ARE ALTERED OR AFFECTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI. TIUS DCP DOES NOT REDUCE Tile MARGIN OF SAFLTY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0092, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrrlON: TWO (2) TIME DELAY PRINTED CIRCUlT BOARDS WERE INSTALLED IN SPARE SLOTS OF TIE NIS CABINET N50 DRAWER. THESE BOARDS PROVIDE AN ADJUSTABLE INHIBIT CONTROL OVER TIIE FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO-(QIYTR) DEVIATION RELAY ALARM OUTPUTS. THIS CilANGE WAS MADE TO PREVENT QFrrR NUISANCE ALARMS WillCll ARE GENERATED FROM TIE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER. THESE ALARMS WERE ACrlVATED WHEN THE INSTANTANEOUS QirTR WAS CALCULATED BY Tile NIS EXCORE DETECTORS AND EXCEEDS 2% OF Tile STEADY STATE CONDITION. AT PLANT VOGTLE THERE IS A REACTOR VESSEL LOWER PLENUM VORTEX FLOW ANOMALY, THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH NORMAL NIS CAllBRATION TOLERANCES, CAUSES A QPTR NUISANCE ALARM. SAFETY EVALUATION: ONLY ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS WERE ADDED TO THE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER. THIS DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION. THERE WERE NO FUNCTIONAL CilANGES MADE TO THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE NIS. THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT MOVE OR CHANGE THE PIIYSICAL SEPARATION BARRIER BETWEEN THE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER AND TIE SAFETY-RELATED POWER RANGE DRAWERS. WESTINGilOUSE SUPPORTS THE USE OF QIrrR VALUES GENERATED BY PROTEUS TO SOUND AN ALARM BASED ON ONE MINUTE AVERAGED NIS SIGNALS. THE FUNCTION PROVIDED BY THE 92

l DELAY CARDS CAN PERFORM A TIME DELAY ALARM INDEPENDENTLY OF TIIE AVERAGING FUNCTION CURRENTLY BEING GENERATED BY Tile PROTEUS. ACCORDING TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 4.2.4.1.B WHEN Tile Ql'TR ALARM IS INOPERABLE, PRIOR TO USING TiiE PROTEUS PLANT COMPUTER, Tile QPTR WAS DETERMINED TO BE WIT 111N ITS LIMITS BY " CALCULATING THE RATIO AT LEAST ONCE PER 12 ilOURS DURING STEADY STATE OPERATION," Tills STATEMENT ALLOWS THE USE OF UP TO A SIX MINUTE DELAY IN Tile INSTANTANEOUS NIS GENERATED Ql'TR ALARM. REAL EVENTS, SUCil AS DROPPED RODS OR L,0 CAL FUEL ASSEMBLY FLOW BLOCKAGE, LAST LONGER TIIAN Tile TIME DELAY AND WOULD PRODUCE AN ALARM SOONER THAN TIIE ACCEL' TABLE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION CALCULATION METiiOD. Tills DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECrlVE FUNCTION Wil!Cil IS RELIED UPON TO BRING Tile PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION OR TO MITIGATE TIE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO Tile ATMOSPIERE. TIE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF TiiE NIS IS MAINTAINED. NONE OF THE LIMITS OR ACrlON STATEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN TEC11NICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.2.4 ARE AFFECTED BY Tills DCP. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN Tile BASES TO ANY TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS liAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0101, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrrlON: Tills DCP ADDED MANUAL-RESET PROTECTIVE RELA'Y TRIP LOCKOUT RELAYS TO THE 4160 VOLT SWITCil GEAR COMPARTMENTS OF TIIE FOLLOWING MOTOR LOADS: CLASS lE LOADS: NSCW PUMP MOTORS, CCW PUMP MOTORS, ACCW PUMP MOTORS, AFW PUMP MOTORS, ESF CillLLER COMP MOTORS NON-CLASS lE LOADS: TPCW PUMP MOTORS, NORM ClllLLER MOTORS, COND PUMP MOTORS, MPL TAG NUMBERS ARE: 2-1202 P4-001 M01, 2-1202-P4 002-M01,21202-P4-003-M01,21202-P4-004 M01,21202-P4-005-M01, 2-1202-P4-006-M01, 2-1203-P4 001-M01 2 1203-P4-002-M01, 2 1203-P4-003-M01, 21203 P4 004-M01,21203-P4-005-M01,2-1203-P4-006-M01,2-1217-P4-001-M01, 21217-P4-002-M01,2-1302-P4-003-M01,2-1302-P4-002 M01,21592-C7-001 M01, 2-1592-C7-002-M01,21405 P5 501-M01,21405-P5 502-M01, A 1591-C7 003 M01, . EXISTING LOCK-OUT RELAYS WERE USED ON 2 1305-P4-001-M01, 2-1305-P4 002-M01, AND 2-1305-P4-003-M01, Tile ADDED WIRING MODIFICATIONS EFFECT Tile NECESSARY CON'rROL CIRCUITRY TO TRIP Tile CIRCUIT BREAKER, PREVENT RECLOSING OF Tile BREAKER, AND (FOR CLASS lE LOADS ONLY) MAINTAIN " BYPASSED" STATUS ON TIIE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL UNTIL DELIBERATE ACTION IS TAKEN TO RESET TIE LOCKOUT RELAY AFTER THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED DUE TO A PROTECrlVE RELAY TRIP. A RED MONITOR LIGIIT WAS ADDED TO THE FRONT OF TIIE SWITCH GEAR TO INDICATE CIRCUIT CONTINUITY TIIROUGli Tile LOCKOUT RELAY COIL WilEN NOT ENERG12ED. THIS NEON LIGIIT ADDED A NEGLIGIBLE LOAD TO TIE BATTERY, REVISION OF CALCULATIONS X3CF01 AND X3CF02 WAS NOT BE REQUIRED. A TIERMISTOR IS INSTALLED ACROSS TIE LOCKOUT RELAY COIL TO ENSURE PROPER OPERATION OF Tile PROTECTIVE RELAY TARGET COIL. ALL WIRING CilANGES ARE INTERNAL TO Tile SWITCH GEAR. THE FRONT OF THE SWITCll GEAR COMPARTMENT WAS DRILLED FOR MOUNTING THE LOCKOUT RELAY AND MONITOR LIGilT, AS REQUIRED. TIE EXISTING PROTECTIVE BAR ACROSS Tile BACK OF TIIE LOCAL BRFAKER CONTROL SWITCH WAS REPLACED Wrril A LONGER BAR TO PROTECT BOTH THE CONTROL SWITCil AND Tile LOCKOUT RELAY ASSEMBLY. THE LOADS SELECTED FOR ADDITION OF TRIP LOCKOUT CAN DE STARTED BY AN AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL WlIEN Tile CONTROLS ARE SET TO TIIE " AUTO" POSITION. UNDER Tills CONDITION, IF AN AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL IS 93 _j

                                                                               -l

1 l PRESENT COINCIDENTAL WITil A PROTECTIVE RELAY TRIP, THE BREAKER WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY PREVENTED FROM RECLOSING AND COULD RECLOSE ONTO A FAULT. RECLOSING COULD OCCUR SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE Tile OPERATOR COULD RESPOND TO LOCK THE BREAKER CIRCUIT OUT MANUALLY. REPEATED i RECLOSING O?RO A FAULT CAN RESULT IN DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR, DAMAGE TO THE BREAKER AND ITS POWER CIRCUITRY, AND COULD JEOPARDIZE TIE INTEGRITY OF Tile POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM UPSTREAM OF TIE BREAKER INVOLVED, INCLUDING LOSS OF Tile BUS SUPPLYING TIIE BREAKER. Tile PLANT llAS EXPERIENCED MOTOR DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF SUCil RECLOSINC. TILE ADDITION OF THE LOCKOUT RELAY PREVENTS RECLOSING TILE BLEAKER AFTER A PROTECTIVE RELAY TRIP UNTIL THE LOCKOUT RELAY IS RESET. Tills ALLOWS Tile OPERATOR TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE OF THE TRIP AND TAKE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BEFORE RE-ENERGlZING TiiE LOAD. SAFETY EVALUATION: NORMAL OPERATION OF TIE RELAYS PROVIDES TIE SAME l TRIPPING ACTION AS TIE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION. FAILURE OF TIE LOCKOUT RELAY COULD PREVENT BREAKER TRIPPING ON OVER CURRENT CONDITION. IlOWEVER, TIE SWITCH GEAR BUS FEEDER OVER CURREN'T PROTECTION IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE BACKUP TRIPPING OF Tile ENTIRE BUS IN THE EVENT THAT Tile MOTOR FEEDER BREAKER FAILS TO CLEAR A FAULT CONDITION. IN THIS CASE THE BACKUP TRAIN IS AVAILABLE FOR THE CLASS 1E LOADS. THE THERMISTOR, WHICH WAS ADDED IN SERIES WITil TIE PROTECTIVE RELAY TO ENHANCE THE OPERATION OF ITS TARGET COIL AND IS ACTIVE ONLY AFTER THE LOCKOUT RELAY TRIPS, COULD FAIL EITHER OPEN CIRCUIT OR SHORT CIRCUlT. NEITIER FAILURE PREVENTS TRIPPING OF TIE BREAKER OR INTERFERE WITil TiiE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE BREAKER. IN ALL CASES, AN ALTERNATE SYSTEM 15 AVAILABLE AND THE CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO TIE NEW LOGIC ARE COVERED BY T1E CURRENT EVALUATIONS IN TIE FSAR. PROPER OPERATOR RESPONSE TO AN OVER CURRENT TRIP INCLUDES RESETTING TIE LOCKOUT RELAY AFTER EVALUATION OF TifE CAUSE OF THE TRIP AND DETERMINATION THAT THE MOTOR MAY BE RETURNED TO SERVICE. PLANT OPERATIONS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO INCLUDE TIIIS RESPONSE. ALSO, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT TIE COIL MONITOR LIGHT MAY REMAIN DIMLY LIT AFTER A LOCKOUT RELAY TRIP DUE TO THE 1 PRESENCE OF A THERMISTOR IN TIE CIRCUIT. THIS DOES NOT AFFECT OPERATION OF TIIE BREAKER OR OPERATOR RESPONSE, SINCE TIE MONITOR LIGilT IS USED ONLY WilEN THE LOCKOUT RELAY IS RESET. A REVIEW OF NUCLEAR PLANT RELI ABILITY DATA i SYSTEM RECORDS REVEALS NO REPORTED FAILURES OF TIE SPECIFIC ELECTRO SWITCH l LOCKOUT RELAY USED DOCUMENTED FAILURES OF SIMILAR ELECTRO SWITCli RELAYS AND SWITCHES INCLUDE COIL AND CONTACT MALFUNCTIONS WHICH WOULD CAUSE TIIE RELAY TO FAIL TO PROVIDE PROPER CONTACT OPERATION WlIEN REQUIRED. SIMILAR FAILURES, WIIEN APPLIED TO THE SPECIFIC LOCKOUT RELAY USED, WOULD CAUSE Tile LOCKOUT RELAY TO FAIL TO TRIP TIE MOTOR FEEDER BREAKER ON OVERLOAD CONDITION. TIIE SWITCil GEAR BUS FEEDER OVER CURRENT PROTECTION IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE BACKUP TRIPPING OF THE ENTIRE BUS IN TIE EVENT THAT THE MOTOR FEEDER BREAKER FAILS TO CLEAR A FAULT CONDITION. CERTAIN LOW-LEVEL . FAULT (OR OVERLOAD) CONDITIONS MAY NOT BE SENSED BY THE BACKUP PROTECTION. IN Tills EVENT, LOCALIZED DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR AND/OR ITS POWER CIRCUITRY MAY BE EXPECTED BEFORE THE FAULT REACIES A LEVEL AT WHICH TIE BACKUP PROTECTION OPERATES. IN THIS EVENT HOWEVER, TIE BACKUP PROTECTION WILL OPERATE BEFORE METASTATIC DAMAGE OCCURS. OTHER FAILURES, l.E., FAILURE TO RESET OR FAILURE OF Tile THERMISTOR, WILL NOT AFFECT TIE CIRCUITRY UNLESS A TRIP HAS OCCURRED AND Tile EQUIPMENT IS ALREADY REMOVED FROM SERVICE. TilEREFORE, THESE FAILURES ARE OF NO SAFETY CONCERN. IN ANY CASE, A BACKUP 4 TRAIN IS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE PROPER EQUIPMENT OPERATION. ALL CilANGES MEET 94

l Tile REQ'UIREMENTS FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY I AND CLASS lE CIRCUITRY INSTALLATION. OTilER FAILURES,1.E., FAILURE TO RESET OR FAILURE OF T1E TilERMISTOR, WILL NOT AFFECT Tile CIRCUITRY UNLESS A TRIP HAS OCCURIED AND THE EQUIPMENT IS ALREADY REMOVED FROM SERVICE. TIIEREFORE, TIIESE FAILURES ARE OF NO SAFETY CONCERN. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS NOT REDUCED BY TIIIS CilANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0105, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE HIGH VOLTAGE TAP SETTING ON RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS (RATS) 2NXRA AND 2NXRB WAS CHANGED FROM 98.75% TO 100% AS EVALUATED IN CALCULATION X3CA22 (UNIT 2 LOAD STUDY). THIS CALCULATION WAS PERFORMED UNDER REA VG-1071. THE CHANGE IN TRANSFORMER TAP POSITION FROM 98.75% TO 100% CAUSES LOWER VOLTAGE ON THE SECONDARY SIDE OF T1E TRANSFORMER FOR A GIVEN VOLTAGE ON TIE PRIMARY SIDE OF TIE TRANSFORMER. THIS REDUCES TIIE POTENTIAL OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION IN THE STATION AUXILIARY SYSTEM. , SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NET EFFECT OF THIS DCP WAS TO REDUCE A POTENTIAL OVERVOLTAGE SITUATION. THE LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER (LOSP) ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN SECTION 15.6 AND ASSUMED IN OTIIER ACCIDENTS IS BASED ON ACCEL' TABLE DEGRADED GRID RELAY SETPOINTS. Tills DCP DID NOT AFFECT TIIE DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE RELAY SETPOINTS. THE RELAYS CONTINUE TO SENSE VOLTAGE LEVEL ON Tile 4160 VOLT AC, CLASS lE BUSES AND OPERATE IF Ti!E BUS VOLTAGE FALLS BELOW THE RELAY SETICINT. CALCULATION X3CA22 ANALYZED TIIE VOLTAGE CONDITIONS AT CLASS lE 4160 VOLT,480 VOLT AND 120 VOLT SYSTEMS ASSUMING TIE 4160 VOLT AC BUS VOLTAGE TO BE JUST ABOVE THE DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE RELAY SETPOINTS (88.53% OF 4160 VOLTS). TIIE ANALYSIS CONCLUDED TIIAT VOLTAGE AT TIE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT TERMINALS WAS ADEQUATE TO START TIIE EQUIPMENT. CHANGING THE HIGli VOLTAGE TAP ON 2NXRA AND 2NXRB FROM 98.75% TO 100% WILL NOT PREVENT SAFLTY-RELATED MOTORS FROM PERFORMING AS EXPECTED DURING AN ; ACCIDENT , THE DCP DOES NOT AFFECT Tile DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) OUTPUT DURING A LOSS OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT. DURING A LOSP EVENT, ELECTRICAL INTERLOCKS ON THE CLASS lE BUS CIRCUIT BREAKERS PREVENT TIE DG AND THE RATS FROM BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY CONNECTED TO TIE BUSES. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 3/4.8.1 AND 3/4.8.3 AND TIEIR BASES ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THE RAT TAP SETTING CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0106, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlYTION: PREVIOUS FEEDWATER FLOW ELEMENTS 2FE-0510,0520,0530, & 0540 WERE REMOVED' AND IEPLACED WITH FLOW ELEMENTS EQUIPPED Wrril INSPECrlON/ CLEANOUT PORTS. Tile INSPECTION / CLEANOUT PORTS ARE 5" IN DIAMETER, AND DURING NORMAL OPERATION ARE PLUGGED WITH A CARBON STEEL PLUG SECURED WITH A 900 LB BLIND FLANGE CONNECTION. THIS INSPECTION / CLEANOUT PORT DESIGN MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASME PTC 6.1-1984. TWO PIPE SUPPORTS WERE MODIFIED SLIGIITLY. Tile ALIGNMENT ANGLE OF TIE STRUTS ON ONE SUPPORT WERE ADJUSTED. A SPRING COLD SET POSITION ADJUSTMENT WAS MADE ON ONE OTIIER SUPPORT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE APPLIES TO THE PORTION OF THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM (1305) THAT IS PROJECT CLASS 424. HOWEVER, THIS REGION IS ANALYZED AS PROJECT CLASS 212 TO ENSURE TilAT Tile PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY IS t 95

                                                                                   ~

i l MAINTAINED FOR TIIE SAFETY RELATED REGION. RE-ANALYSIS OF PIPE STRESS VERIFIED TilAT PROJECT CLASS 212 PIPE STRESS LIMITS ARE NOT EXCEEDED. 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: TiiE FLOW ELEMENTS WITH THE INSPECrlON/ CLEANOUT PORT WERE DESIGNED TO MEET THE ORIGINAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE PREVIOUS FLOW ELEMENTS AND WERE IlYDROSTATICALLY TESTED AND QUALIFIED PER ANSI B31.1 SECTION 137.4. Tile TAP SETS ON EACH FLOW ELEMENT WERE CALIBRATED. TIIE CORRESPONDING FLOW TRANSMITTERS WERE RECALIBRATED TO ENSURE FEEDWATER FLOW IS MEASURED ACCURATELY. NEITilER Tile FUNCrlON NOR TIIE RELIABILITY OF TiiE FLOW ELEMENTS WAS CllANGED. Ti!E PLUG IN THE INSPECTION / CLEANOUT PORT WAS DESIGNED SO THAT IT DOES NOT DISRUlrr Tile FLOW PATTERN IN THE FLOW Elf. MENT. THE FLANGE / PLUG ASSEMBLY IS KEYED TO INSURE PROPER REINSTALLATION OF THE PLUG WilENEVER IT IS REMOVED. SINCE Tile OPERATION OF TIE FEEDWATER FLOW ELEMENT IS NOT CHANGING, THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE OF THE FLOW ELEMENT WAS NOT CHANGED. THE ADDED INSPECTION / CLEANOUT PORT IS ONLY USED TO FACILITATE CLEANING AND INSPECrlON OF Tile FLOW ELEMENT DURING OUTAGES OR WHEN A PROBLEM IS SUSPECTED. TiiE NEW FLOW ELEMENT IS DESIGNED TO THE SAME DESIGN PARAMETERS AS TIIE PREVIOUS FLOW ELEMENT. THE DESIGN CilANGE WAS A DIRECT EXCIIANGE OF TIIE TWO FLOW ELEMENTS. TIIIS DID NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF TIIE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM. Tile DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT DECREASE TiiE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE BASIS OF THE TECH SPECS, INCLUDING TIIE BASES FOR 3/4.7.1 AND 3/4.7.2.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 92-V2N0125, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrION: TlilS DCP ELIMINATED VALVE 2-1301 U4-405 AND A PORTION OF LINE 2 1301-L4-010-2" IN Tile MAIN STEAM SYSTEM (1301). Tile VALVE AND LINE WERE LOCATED IN Tile AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP llOUSE. Tile VALVE AND 2" LINE FORMED A BYPASS AROUND 4" CHECK VALVE 21301-U4404. THE PROJECT CLASS OF TIIE VALVE AND 2" PIPE WAS 313. THE PORTION OF THE 2" PIPE TilAT REMAINED WAS CAPPED. VALVES 21301-U4 405 AND 21301 U4-404 WERE IN A PORTION OF Tile MAIN STEAM SYSTEM WillCII SUPPLIED STEAM TO TIIE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP (AFWP) TURBINE 21302 P4-001 K01. THE TAKE-OFFS FOR TIIE STEAM SUPPLY LINE TO THE AFWP TURBINE LIE UPSTREAM OF THE MSIV'S IN THE MAIN STEAM LINES FROM STEAM GENERATORS 2-1201 B6-001 (SG 1) AND 2-1201-B6-002 (SG-2). TIIE TWO LINES TilEN COMBINE INTO ONE HEADER WillCil CARRIES TIIE STEAM TO Tile AFWP TURBINE. SINCE THE BYPASS VALVE HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF STEAM LEAKAGE AND NO LONGER PERFORMS A USEFUL FUNCTION IT WAS ELIMINATED AND TIIE PORTION OF THE BYPASS LINE WillCil REMAINED WAS CAPPED. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE DESIGN CHANGE ELIMINATED VALVE 2 1301-U4-405 AND A PORTION OF THE 2" BYPASS LINE WHICH CONTAINED THE VALVE. THE VALVE HAD INSTANCES OF STEAM LEAKAGE. ELIMINATION OF Tile VALVE REDUCED TIIE PROBABILITY OF STEAM LEAKS. THE VALVE AND 2" BYPASS LINE WERE REPLACED BY 2" PIPE CAPS WELDED TO Tile TWO ENDS WHERE Tile BYPASS LINE WAS CONNECTED TO Tile 4" MAIN STEAM LINE. TIIEREFORE, BASED ON A REVIEW THE FSAR, INCLUDING SECTIONS 15.2,10.4.9,10.3 AND 7.3.111E PIPE CAPS HAS TiiE SAME SAFETY AND SEISMIC RATINGS TilAT Tile VALVE AND PIPE HAD. BASED ON A REVIEW OF TifE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 15.2,10.4.9,10.3. AND 7.3 THERE WAS NO INCREASE IN TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. Tile PROPOSED CHANGE REDUCED Tile PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF Tile TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DUE TO INADEQUATE STEAM FLOW, THUS IMPROVING RELI ABILITY, 96 l

i l NO CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR A BYPASS LINE AROUND ANY CIECK VALVE IN TIIE STEAM SUPPLY LINE TO Ti!E AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE IN ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION OR BASIS. ADDITIONALLY, Tile VALVE AND LINE CONTAINING THE VALVE WAS REPLACED BY PIPE CAPS WlilCH MEET TIIE SAME SEISMIC AND SAFETY CRITERIA. Ti!ESE CONCLUSIONS WERE BASED UPON A REVIEW OF Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND TilEIR BASES INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.7.1.2.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 92-V2N0135, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: TiiE CONDENSATE CilEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM, SYSTEM 1411, PROVIDES IlYDRAZINE AND AMMONIA TO TIE CONDENSATE AND FEED WATER SYSTEMS FOR CORROSION CONTROL. THIS SYSTEM IS OPERATED DURING MODES 5 AND 6 WIIILE Tile STEAM GENERATORS (S/G) ARE IN WET LAY UP. CilECK VALVES 214Il U4429,031, 043 AND 044 ARE LOCATED INSIDE REACTOR CONTAINMENT, IN Tile Cl!EMICAL INJECTION LINES (214Il-L4-046,045,027, AND 028) TO Tim ASSOCIATED S/G WET LAY UP RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE LINES (21301-L4148,149,146, AND 147). TilESE VALVES SERVE AS TIIE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BOUNDARY TO CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS 12A,11 A,69A, AND 69B AND ALSO SERVE TO LIMIT ANY POSSIBLE BACK FLOW OF S/G WET LAY UP RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE WATER THROUGH Tile S/G LAY UP PUMPS (2-1411 P4-508-Pol AND P02). TIE CHECK VALVES WERE REPLACED BY NEW LOCKED CLOSED GLOBE VALVES (21411-U4476,677,678,679) AS TIIE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BOUNDARY AND WERE MOVED FURTHER DOWNSTREAM IN Ti!E CllEMICAL INJECTION LINES TO LIMIT POSSIBLE BACK FLOW, THE CilECK VALVES WERE RETAGGED AS 2-1301-U4-029,031,043, & 044. THE NEW GLOBE VALVES ARE IDENTICAL TO GLOBE VALVES 21411-U4-081,084,087, AND 090, EXCEPT TIIAT THEY INCLUDE A LOCK AND CHAIN. THE NEW VALVES ARE PROJECT CLASS 212 AND Tile PREVIOUS CliECK VALVES WERE DOWNGRADED TO PROJECT CLASS 424. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION WAS IMPROVED AND TIIE OPERATIONAL FUNCTION OF Tile CONDENSATE CIIEMICAL INJECrlON SYSTEM WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. Tile NEW VALVES IIAVE THE SAME PROJECT' CLASS, MATERIALS AND ARE DESIGNED TO THE SAME STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR THE CIECK VALVES. TIIEREFORE, THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS CONSIDERED TO BE A DESIGN IMPROVEMENT WillCil INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF TIIE SYSTEM BY IJrlLIZING A GLOBE VALVE RATiiER TilAN A CHECK VALVE FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION. TIE LOCKED CLOSED GLOBE VALVE STILL PROVIDES CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. IT WOULD TAKE A SECOND FAILURE - THAT OF THE GLOBE VALVE - FOR INSIDE CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY TO BE BREACHED. THEREFORE, Tills DESIGN CHANGE MEETS TIE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION. P!PE STRESS CALCULATIONS HAVE VERIFIED THAT THE EXISTING PIPING SYSTEM AND SUPPORTS ARE ACCElvrABLE WITilOUT MODIFICATION. BY ADDING TIIE GLOBE VALVE, THE STRUCTURE IS NOT DEGRADED, REDUNDANCY IS MAINTAINED, AND RELIABILITY IS INCREASED, AS PER PLANT EXPERIENCE, GLOBE VALVES PROVIDE RELIABLE ISOLATION WITHOlJr Tim NEED FOR EXTENSIVE REWORKING. THE PROJECT CLASS 424 SECTION OF PIPING TIIAT THE CIECK VALVE WAS RELOCATED TO IIAS ALSO BEEN EVALUATED PER THE APPROPRIATE CRITERIA I AND IS ACCEPTABLE. IF IT IS ASSUMED TilAT A MALFUNCTION OF Ti!E CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE OCCURS, THIS DESIGN WILL NOT INCREASE TIIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. SINCE Tile FAILURE MODE FOR EITHER VALVE IS IN Tile OPEN POSITION, TIIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EITHER VALVE 1 FAILING WOULD BE EQUIVALENT. TIIE REPLACEMENT OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CllECK VALVES WITli MANUAL GLOBE VALVES DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS. 97 l

I CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ARE REQUIRED TO REMAIN OPERABLE, AND TO PERFORM A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION PER 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX J. Tile GLOBE VALVES ARE DESIGNED TO REMAIN OPERABLE AND TO AID IN KEEPING LEAKAGE BELOW TIIE LEVELS SPECIFIED IN 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX J. SUBIECT: DCP: 92 V2N0136, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFTION: REDUCE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (TAVG) FROM 588.4 'F TO $86.4 "F. THE REDUCTION IN TAVG WAS ACCOMPLISIIED BY ADJUSTING TiiE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BORON CONCENTRATION. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE DID NOT REQUIRE PHYSICAL PLANT MODIFICATIONS BUT REQUIRED SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN THE 7300 CONTROL SYSTEM CABINETS. TIIIS CIIANGE WAS MADE TO ENSURE TIIAT UNIT 2 COULD REACH 100% POWER AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIE VANTAGE 5 FUEL TRANSITION. BASED ON UNIT 1 EXPERIENCE RECURRING OTDT/OPDTTURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS HAVE RESULTED AT VOGTLE UNIT 1, AFTER LOADING OF VANTAGE 5 TRANSITION CORE AND REMOVAL OF Tile RTD BYPASS SYSTEM, COMPLETED DURING THE TIIIRD REFUELING OUTAGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: SET POINT VALUES OR CHANGES TO SET POINTS TO ACCOMMODATE THE CHANGE TO TAVG DO NOT INCREASE TIE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. NO NEW PERFORMANCE REQUUEMENTS ARE BEING IMPOSED ON ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENTS SUCil TilAT THE DESIGN CRITERIA WAS EXCEEDED. TIIE TEMPERATURE REDUCrlON DOES NOT CREATE A CONDITION WHERE Tile DESIGN, MATERIAL OR CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS TilAT WERE APPLICABLE TO THE ORIGINAL DESIGN ARE ALTERED. TIIE REVISED VALUE FOR TAVG IS BOUNDED BY THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. TIIE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A STEAM GENERATOR TUDE RUPTURE IIAVE BEEN ADDRESSED (REFERENCE SECL 91-448) FOR A BOUNDING TEMPERATURE REDUCTION WHICH DEMONSTRATES TIIAT DOSE CRITERIA ARE NOT EXCEEDED. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTilER TRANSIENTS ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON INITIAL RCS TEMPERATURES AND Tile CURRENT ANALYSES OF RECORD REMAIN VALID. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE REACTOR PROTECrlON SYSTEM IIAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY ARE MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AITECTED. IN ADDrTION, AS SPECIFIED IN SECL 91-448, THE TAVG REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOR WHICil IT IIAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED. EVALUATIONS OF EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY PRESENTED IN SECL 91-448 IIAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEIR ROLE IN THE CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES IS NOT ALTERED. NO NEW EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS IIAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT EFFECT FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER INTEGRITY. THE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DOES NOT AFFECT TIIE ABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DOES IT CREATE FAILURE MODES TilAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT CilANGES ARE REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF Tills TEMPERATURE REDUCTION AND WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITl! TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 6.8.1.6. THEREFORE, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0137, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP RAISED THE OTDT ROD STOP AND AUTO TURBINE RUNDACK SETPOINT TO 1 PERCENT BELOW THE OTDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT. THIS CIIANGE WAS 98

I MADE TO ENSURE TIIAT UNIT 2 COULD REACli 100% POWEA AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIE VANTAGE 5 FUEL TRANSITION. BASED ON UNIT I EXPEIGNCE RECURRING OTDT/OPDT TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS liAVE RESULTED AT VOGTLE UNIT 1, AFTER LOADING OF VANTAGE 5 TRANSITION CORE AND REMOVAL OF TIIE RTD BYPASS SYSTEM, COMPLETED DURING THE THIRD REFUELING OUTAGE. l l SAFETY EVALUATION: Tim FUNCTION OF Tile TURBINE RUNDACK ON OTDT IS TO l IMPROVE PLANT AVAILABILITY BY ASSISTING Tile OPERATORS IN MITIGATING TRANSIENTS WHICli CAUSE UNNECESSARY REACTOR TRIPS. SETPOINT VALUES OR CIIANGES TO THE SETPOINT DID NOT INCREASE Tile PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. TIEREFORE Tills CIIANGE DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE , FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0145, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIPTION: TIIIS DESIGN CilANGE REMOVED THE DOOR LEAF AND TRANSOM PANEL FROM DOOR V2211ILI A65. TIIE DOOR PROVIDED ACCESS TO ROOM A63 FROM ROOM A32 IN THE CONTROL BUILDING. ROOM A63 IIOUSES TIE 30KVA SOLA TRANSFORMERS THAT WERE THE SUBJECT OF SEQUENCE 1 OF Tills DCP. TIE FRAME OF THE DOOR REMAINS IN PLACE. TIE PROJECT CLASS OF THE DOOR LEAF, TRANSOM PANEL AND FRAME IS 62C. BY REMOVING THE DOOR LEAF AND TRANSOM PANEL FROM DOOR A65, ROOM A63 BENEFITED FROM Tile SURPLUS COOLING CAPACITY IN TiiE ADJACENT ROOM, ROOM A32, AND EXPERIENCES COOLER TEMPERATURES. A COOLER ENVIRONMENT IN ROOM A63 IMPROVES THE PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY OF THE SOLA TRANSFORMERS IN THE ROOM. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ACCIDENT DISCUSSED IN SECTION 15 OF THE FSAR NOR IS IT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY SYSTEM FOR WHICH AN ACCIDENT IS EVALUATED. THE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT DISCUSSED IN THE FSAR NOR IS IT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY SYSTEM REQUIRED TO DO SO. THE DOOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROTECT Tile EQUIPMENT IN ONE ROOM FROM HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS IN TIE OTHER ROOM. SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IN ONE ROOM WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE OTHER ROOM WITH THE SUBJECT DOOR REMOVED. ALSO, FLOOD CALCULATIONS WERE REVIEWED AND CONFIRM THAT THE FLOOD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO ROOMS ARE NOT ADVERSELY EFFECTED WITH TIE DOOR REMOVED. TFE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT A PART OF Tile NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. NOR IS IT REQUIRED TO PROTECT EQUIPMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A RADIOLOGICAL EVENT. THE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT A PRESSURE RATED DOOR, AN AIRTIGHT DOOR, A WATERTIGHT DOOR, A MISSILE DOOR, OR A FIRE RATED DOOR. IT DID NOT PERFORM ANY FUNCTION IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AND WAS NOT DESIGNED TO PROTECT ANY EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. BASED ON THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, REMOVAL OF THE DOOR A65 OF THE CONTROL BUILDING DID NOT CREATE ANY ADVERSE EFFECTS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0155, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP ADDRESSED THE REMOVAL OF THE RAISED FACES FROM THE UPPER FLANGES OF THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CS) ENCAPSULATION VESSELS. THE VESSELS ARE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION OIC, AND l 1 l 99 j

I

                                                                                                                                                                           )

l TIIEIR TAG NUMBERS ARE Tile FOLLOWING: 21205-V4-001,21205 V4-002,21206 V4001, AND 2 1206-V4-002. Tile REMOVAL OF Tile RAISED FACES CONVERTED Tile UPPER FLANGES OF TIIE RilR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS INTO FLAT FACl! FLANGES. THE PREVIOUS COMPRESSED ASBESTOS GASKETS WERE DISCARDED AND REPLACED WITli EPDM GASKETS. TIE REMOVAL OF THE RAISED FACES FROM THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS IMPROVED TIE LEAK TIGilTNESS FOR Tile UPPER FLANGES OF Tile ENCAPSULATION VESSELS. Tills CllANGE PROVIDES AN EFFECTIVE SEAL AND TilEREBY ELIMINATED Tim USE OF RTV SEALANT OR EXCESSIVE BOLT TORQUE WlEN TRYING TO OBTAIN AN ACCEPTABLE SEAL. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CONVERSION OF TiiE FLANGES FROM RAISED FACE TO FLAT FACE, MEETS TIE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS. Ti!E RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS ARE PROVIDED TO CONTAIN POTENTIAL LEAKAGE FROM THE ISOLATION VALVES WIT 111N TiiE VESSELS; TIIE VESSELS SERVE AS AN EXTENSION OF Tile CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY AT PENETRATIONS 36,37,38, AND 39. TIE ENCAPSULATION VESSELS ARE NOT INITIATORS OF ANY ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN TIIE FSAR. Tile RilR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS ARE DESIGNED TO CONTAIN LEAKAGE FROM A POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THE ISOLATION VALVES CONTAINED WITillN Tile VESSELS UNDER POSTULATED POST-LOCA CONDITIONS. THE CONVERSION OF THE RilR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS UPPER FLANGES FROM RAISED FACE TO FLAT FACE FLANGES PROVIDES A MORE EFFECTIVE SEAL AND TIIUS IMPROVED Tile OVERALL LEAK TIGHTNESS OF Tile VESSELS. REMOVAL OF THE RAISED FACES FROM THE UPPER FLANGES OF TIE RilR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS MEETS Tile ORIGINAL DESIGN, ] MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARD.i UTILIZED FOR Tile RESIDUAL llEAT l REMOVAL AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SWTEMS. THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION DID NOT AFFECT Tile SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF Tile VESSEL. Tile RELIABILITY OF TIIE RHR AND CS SYSTEMS HAVE NOT BEEN DEGRADED. Tile RilR AND CS SYSTEM DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE AND TIIE SYSTEMS CONTINUES TO FUNCTION ) AS DESCRIBED IN TIIE FS AR. Tile NEW GASKET MATERIAL, ETIIYLENE PROPYLENE (EPDM)IS AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE EXISTING COMPRESSED ASBESTOS G ASKET. THE MODIFIED VESSELS WAS LEAK TESTED TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF Tile COMPONENT WAS MAINTAINED. TlilS MODIFICATION llAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON TIIE CAPABILITY OF THE RHR AND CS SYSTEMS TO PERFORM TIEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. AS A RESULT OF THIS CllANGE, THE DESIGN PRESSURE RATING OF , THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS DID NOT CHANGE AND TilEREFORE Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINED TIIE SAME. SINCE Tile El'FECTIVENESS OF THE UPPER GASKET SEAL IMPROVES AS A RESULT OF Tills DESIGN CllANGE, TilEN TIIE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF Tile VESSELS ALSO IMPROVES. TilEREFOlm, Tills MODIFICATION DID NOT REDUCE Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 92-V2N0160, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE 1 l l DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CilANGE AFFECTS THE FOUR AUXILIARY FEED WATER (AFW) 4" STOP CilECK VALVES,2-1302-U4-113,114,115, AND 116. THESE VALVES ARE LOCATED IN I LINE NUMBERS 2-1302-L4-030,031,032, AND 029, RESPECTIVELY. THE PROJECT I CLASSIFICATION OF THE VALVES IS 212. Tile PHYSICAL CHANGE CONSISTS OF REPLACING Tile PREVIOUS VALVES OF SINGLE SEAT DESIGN WITil VALVES OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN. THE SUBJECT AFW CHECK VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED LEAKAGE EVEN AFTER MAINTENANCE REWORK liAS BEEN PERFORMED. THESE VALVES ARE SINGLE SEAT, GLOBE LIFT-CHECK VALVES. TiiE NEW VALVES HAVE DUAL SEATS WHICil REDUCE Tile LEAKAGE PROBLEM. Tills ALSO REDUCED Tile POSSIBILITY OF AFW PUMP STEAM BINDING DUE TO Tile LEAKING CliECK VALVES. 100

l

                                                                                 .l SAFETY EVALUATION:              THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF'lllE AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM IS NOT BEING ADVERSELY AFFECTED. Tl!E CilANGE WAS PERFORMED USING TIE SAME STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR Tile SYSTEM. TIIE NEW VALVES IIAVE Tile SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RATING, AND MATERIALS AS Tile PREVIOUS VALVES EXCEfrT TilEY ALSO llAVE ADDITIONAL SOFT SEATS. Ti!E SOFT SEAT MATERIAL IS QUALIFIED FOR Tills APPLICATION, BUT REQUIRES PERIODIC REPLACEhENT, THE SOFT SEAT IS IIELD IN PLACE BY A RETAINER TilAT IS SCREWED TO TIE DISC AND LOCK WELDED. Tile NEW VALVES IIAVE TIIE SAME SAFETY AND SEISMIC RATING AS TIE ORIGINAL VALVES. THE MODIFICATION INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF TIIE SYSTEhL Tile FLOW RESISTANCE OF TIE NEW VALVES IS Tile SANE AS TIIE PREVIOUS VALVES, SO SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IS NOT AFFECTED. EPRI REPORT NP-5479 DESCRIBES THE USE OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN IN SECTION 2.4.2. TIE NEW CIECK       i VALVES MEET TIIE REQUIREMENTS OF ASME SECrlON III CLASS 2. Tile ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO S AFETY THAT HAS NOT BEEN EVALUATED BEFORE. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVES TO PROVIDE DUAL SEAT DESIGN DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE Tile CIIANGE MEETS Tile SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION, AND TESTING REQUIREhENTS AS SET FORTil IN TIIE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AFW SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CilANGE. Tills CONCLUSION IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE TECIENICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND TilEIR BASES, INCLUDING SECTIONS 3/4.6.3,3/4.7.1.2, AND 3/4.9.4.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0164, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE SCOPE OF Tills DCP IS TO PROVIDE SAFETY CAGES FOR Tim FOLLOWING LADDERS INSIDE TiiE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING: 1.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO IEACTOR COOL ANT PUMP (RCP) NO 1. 2.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 3. 3.) LADDER FROM EL 220'-0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 4. 4.) LADDER FROM EL.193'-71/4" DOWN TO STEAM GENERATOR NO.1. 5.) LADDER FROM EL. 193'-71/4" DOWN TO STEAM GENERATOR NO. 2. THE' SAFETY CAGES FOR TiiE LADDERS LISTED UNDER ITEMS 3,4, AND 5 REPLACED Tile PREVIOUS SAFETY DEVICES INSTALLED ON THE LADDERS. THE PROJECT CLASS OF TIIE L ADDERS IS 62C. Tim PROJECT CLASS-S OF THE NEW SAFETY CAGES ARE 62C SAFETY CAGES ARE DESIGNED AND MOUNTED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY l REQUIREMENTS. TIIE ADDITION OF SAFETY CAGES IMPROVED SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR PERSONNEL INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. SAFETY EVALUATION: TiiE SAFETY CAGES ARE OF A DESIGN TilAT IS EQUIVALENT TO EXISTING ACCEPTABLE SAFETY CAGES INSTALLED IN TIIE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. ALSO, Tile SAFETY CAGES IIAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY l REQUIREMENTS TO INSURE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ARE POSSIBLE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0166, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFTiON: CERTAIN VALVE MOTOR OPERATORS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT OUTPUT CAPACITY MARGIN WilEN TIIE REQUIREMENTS OF GENERIC LETTER 8910 WERE CONSIDERED. Tile CIIANGES INCREASED TIIE MOTOR-OPERATORS' OUTPUT AND TIEREFORE THE AVAILABLE MARGIN. Tile INCREASED MARGIN ALLOWS FOR THE VALVES TO BE SET UP IN THE REQUIRED THRUST RANGE, ABOVE TIIE MINIMUM ' REQUIRED THRUST TO STROKE THE VALVE AND BELOW TIE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TIIRUST TO PREVENT DAMAGE. PROVIDING THE INCREASED MARGIN AND UTILIZING 101

l DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT SUCli AS MOVATS OR VOTES ALLOWS FOR I , ACCOUNTING, IN THE TilRUST RANGE, FOR THE IN!!ERENT INACCURACIES OF THE l TESTING EQUIPMENT, TORQUE SWITCH REPEATABILITY, AND THE RATE-OF LOADING l (ROL) PiiENOMENA. TIIIS PHENOMENA HAS BEEN SiiOWN, IN SOME INSTANCES, TO ' RESULT IN LESS THRUST DELIVERED TO THE VALVE STEM UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS THAN STATIC CONDITIONS, WITH Tile MOST PRONOUNCED EFFECT ON GATE VALVES UNDER HIGli ENERGY BLOWDOWN CONDITIONS. SEVERAL TIEORIES EXIST AS TO TIIE CAUSE OF Tills ROL EFFECT, BUT NONE HAVE BEEN DEFINITIVELY QUANTIFIED WlIEN INDUSTRY PROGRAMS AND THE DP TESTING PLANNED AT VEGP YIELD QUANTIFIABLE DATA ON THE ROL PIENOMENA, Tills INFORMATION WAS REVIEWED FOR ITS IMPACT ON THE MOV DESIGN CALCULATIONS. TIIE EFFECTED VALVES ARE 2HV 8806,2HV-8801 A & B, 2HV-8807A & B,211V-8821 A & B,2HV-8923A & B,2HV-8924,2HV-8716A & B,2HV-8804A & B, 2HV 8111B,2}iV-8471 A & B,2LV-0112D & E,2ilV-19051,211V 19053,211V 19055,211V 19057, l 2ilV-2041,2HV-3009,211V-3019,2HV-5106. BYPASSING Tile OPEN TORQUE SWITCH l ELIMINATED Tile NEED TO DIAGNOSTICALLY SETUP Tills SWITCH. BYPASSING THIS SWITCII ENABLES Ti!E MOTOR OPERATOR TO DEVELOP TIE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TORQUE REQUIRED THROUGHOUT TiiE ENTIRE OPENING STROKE OF THE VALVE. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTIONS AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN Tile FSAR. TIIE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED i FUNCTION AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN TIIE  : FSAR. TIE MARGIN BEING PROVIDED BETWEEN Tile REQUIRED AND Tile ALLOWABLE I THRUST ALLOW DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT TO BE USED TO SET-UP THE VALVES, l VERIFYING TilAT ADEQUATE THRUST, PER CALCULATION X4CLOOOUO2, IS AVAILABLE 1 WlEN THE VALVES ARE REQUIRED AND THAT TIE VALVES WAS NOT OVER STRESSED. Tim CilANGE IN MOV STROKE TIMES DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT Tile ABILITY TO MITIGATE TIE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PER TIE EXISTING SAFETY ANALYSIS. THE NEW STROKE TIMES NOT EFFECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. ALL OF THE SUBJECT MOVS IIAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR STRESS, SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE APPROPRIATE TORQUEfrHRUST LIMITS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. TilESE EVALUATIONS l INCLUDED A VALVE STRESS AND SEISMIC REANALYSIS BASED ON TIIE MAXIMUM  : EXPECTED TilRUST USING TIE APPROPRIATE LOAD CONSIDERATIONS AS DOCUMENTED IN FSAR SECTION 3.9.B.3, AND AN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REVIEW TO VERIFY l TIIAT TIE NEW COMPONENTS WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR Tile SPECIFIC POST-ACCIDENT l LOCATIONS. PIPING STRESS PACKAGES WERE ANALYZED FOR THE INCREASED PIPING STRESS AND SUPPORT LOADS DUE TO TIE NEW OPERATORS ADDITIONAL WEIGilT AND CHANGE IN CENTER OF GRAVITY, NO PIPING SUPPORTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRING MODIFICATION BASED ON Tile INCREASED LOADS DUE TO THE HIGHER WEIGilTS AND CHANGES IN CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. TWO CATEGORY l PIPING SUPPORTS REQUIRED MODIFICATION TO ACCOMMODATE THE INSTALLATION OF TWO NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. NO NEW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS WERE CREATED NOR WERE EXISTING PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS CilANGED BY TIESE MODIFICATIONS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT IIAVE ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON ANY OTIER PLANT SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMMON MODE FAILURE OF TilESE VALVES IS INTRODUCED BY TIIE CHANGE IN Tile TilRUST VALUES. Tills DESIGN CliANGE DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN TilOSE PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DEFINE Tile LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION FOR THE DIFFERENT OPERATING MODES. Tills DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CHANGE TiiE SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION OF THE VALVES. DIAGNOSTIC TESTING OF THE VALVES VERIFIED THAT TIIE VALVES HAVE ADEQUATE THRUST, AS DOCUMENTED IN 102

CALCULATION X4CLOOOUO2, TO PERFORM TIIEIR INTENDED FUNCTION WITiiOUT OVER STRESSING Tile VALVES OR Tile OPERATORS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0168, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: Tills DCP ADDED A NEW GROUND TO Tile AU'XILIARY llOIST ON Tim REFUELING MACillNE BY MOUNTING AN ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR BY Ti!E EXISTING AUXILI ARY llOIST POWER COLLECTORS. Tile DIAGNOSTIC CAPABILITIES OF Tile CONSOLE AND FREE WATER SPEED OF THE REFUELING MACHINE IIAVE BEEN ENilANCED BY A SOFTWARE UPGRADE. Tills UPGRADE WAS PERFORMED BY REPLACING EPROMS AND EAROMS WITil!N THE SIGMA COlfrROL CONSOLE. POWER RECEPTACLES WERE ADDED TO TiiE TROLLEY WITil AN ADDITIONAL TRANSFORMER MOUNTED ON TIIE TROLLEY PROVIDING Tile ADDITIONAL POWER REQUIREMENTS. Tile SOUND POWERED PIIONE CABLE WERE IEROUTED TO USE Tile POWER CONDUlT AND CATRAC ASSEMBLY. A COMPUTER RESET SWITCil WAS MOUNTED ON THE CONSOLE TO PROVIDE A RESTART OF 'niE CONTROL PROGRAM WITilOUT CYCLING POWER ON Tile BRIDGE. INSIDE Tile CONSOLE, A SINGLE POINT GROUND WAS ADDED TO ELIMINATE GROUND POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES WrnIIN Tile CONSOLE. A LOW IMPEDANCE, BRAIDED GROUND CABLE WAS ADDED TO A GROUND POINT WITillN TIIE CONSOLE. Tile BRIDGE AXLE WHICH DRIVES TIIE ENCODER WAS MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE SLIPPAGE BY PROVIDING FLATS ON THE AXLE SIIAFT FOR SET SCREW SEATING PREVENTING Tile MOVEMENT OF THE AXLE SilAFT OUT OF TiiE BEARING ASSEMBLY. THE SOFTWARE UPGRADE ALLOWS TIIE BRIDGE AND TROLLEY SPEED TO BE ADJUSTED SEPARATELY, INCREASING JOG AND AUTO POSITIONING CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, TIIE FREE WATER SPEED IIAS BEEN INCREASED BY INTRODUCING DRAG COMPENSATION FACTORS DURING ll!GHER SPEED OPERATION. l DIAGNOSTIC IMPROVEMENTS FOR FAULTY COMPONENTS AND ERRANT CONDITIONS, 1 AND ADDITIONAL PARAMETERS FORTHE DIAGNOSTICS DISPLAY IIAVE BEEN INCORPORATED BY Tills UPGRADE. THE COMPtTTER RESET SWITCII ALLOWS RESTARTING OF THE CONTROL PROGRAM WirilOUT CYCLING Tl!E POWER SUPPLY VIA TIIE , DISCONNECT SWfrCil. ENCODER PERFORMANCE WAS IMPROVED BY ELIMINATING I SLIPPAGE OF THE BRIDGE AXLE TIIAT DRIVES TiiE ENCODER. THE NOISE PERFORMANCE j OF TifE SIGMA CONSOLE WAS IMPROVED WITH THE ADDITION OF THE SINGLE POINT l GROUND. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE SOFTWARE CIIANGES DO NOT IMPACT TIIE i REFUELING MACllINE SAFETY FEATURES LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. SOFTWARE .I CilANGES DO NOT AFFECT TIIE REFUELING MACilINE'S ABILITY TO IIOLD FUEL. ASSUMPTIONS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT AS i PRESENTED IN TIIE FSAR REMAIN UNCilANGED. TIIE CONTROL SOFTWARE CilANGES DO NOT AFFECT Tile SEISMIC INTEGRITY OF TIIE REFUELING MACillNE. THE SIGMA  ; REFUELING MACHINE IS NON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE CONTROL SYSTEM l DOES NOT INTERFACE-WITH PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. FURTilER, SOlrrWARE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A REFUELING ACCIDENT. THE CONTROL SYSTEM SOFTWARE CilANGES ENilANCE MACillNE MOVEMENT AND DIAGNOSTICS. ALSO, SOFTWARE CilANGES ADHERING TO FUEL HANDLING INSTRUCTION REVISIONS IIAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED. THE FUNCTIONAL CilARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUELING MACl!!NE REMAIN UNCHANGED. Tile MAClilNE CObTINUES TO MEET ALL I OPERATION AND SAFETY INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS OF THE FSAR. TIIE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE IIAS NO DIRECT ELECTRICAL INTERFACE WITil PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. TIIE REFUELING MACHINE CONTINUES TO MEET ALL PROVISIONS TO ENSURE SAFE HANDLING OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES AS LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. TiiE WORKING LOAD CAPACITY OF TIIE FUEL ASSEMBLY GRIPPER REMAINS UNCilANGED FROM TIIAT DEFINED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9.6. Tills 103

DESIGN CHANGE IMPROVES REl. LABILITY AND ENHANCE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REFUELING MACllINE. CONSOLE MODIFICATIONS REDUCE NOISE AND PROVIDE FLEX 1BILITY IN RESETTING Tile CONTROL PROGRAM. PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS TO Tile REFUELING MAClilNE PROVIDE A NEW GROUND FOR Tile AUXILIARY llOIST, PROVIDE POWER RECEPTACLES FOR ADDITIONAL LIGHTING, REROUTE EXISTING SO'ND POWERED PilONE CABLE, AND ELIMINATE BRIDGE AXLE SLIPPAGE TO IMPROVE ENCODER PERFORMANCE. TIESE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OR OPERATION OF Tile REFUELING MACHINE. ALL SAFETY FEATURES AND INTERLOCKS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR HAVE BEEN PRESERVED. ALL NEW EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN MOUNTED TO 2 OVER 1 REQUIREMENTS. FURTilERMORE, THESE CllANGES DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY ACCIDENT SINCE TIESE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT AFFECT Tile REFUELING MACHINE'S ABILITY TO IIOLD A FUEL ASSEMBLY. MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THE SOFTWARE DO NOT ALTER TIE MAXIMUM VERTICAL POSITION REQUIRED TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE WATER SillELD DEPril FOR RADIATION PROTECTION OF OPERATING PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, CALCULATION MX6CIE.04.7 REV. J1 IIAS BEEN PERFORMED TO ACCOUNT FOR Tile ADDITION OF ZINC INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THE HYDROGEN GENERATION RESULTING FROM TIE ZINC ADDITION REMAINS BELOW TIIE liYDROGEN DESIGN FLAMMABILITY LIMIT NO NEW INTERFACES WITH OTHER PLANT EQUIPhENT ARE INTRODUCED WITH THIS DESIGN CilANGE, TIEREFORE, NO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPfvENT OR FUNCTIONS ARE AFFECTED. THE REFUELING MAClllNE'S SEISMIC ANALYSIS BOUNDS TIE AFFECTS OF THE ADDITIONAL WEIGilT AND EQUIPMENT MOUNTING ASSOCIATED WITH TIIIS DESIGN CHANGE. THIS MODIFICATION TO THE PIFUELING MACHINE DOES NOT REDUCE Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9 FOR REFUELING OPERATIONS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0172, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2 DESCRIFTION: Tile SCOPE OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION INCLUDES FCR 92 V2N0172-0 2-F001. THE CHANGES ARE: 1) ADJUST THE PULSE WIDTH OF THE " TEST U/V" PUSilBUTTON LATCH TIMER TO REDUCE THE PULSE WIDTil BY 20 MILLISECONDS (MS). THE CURRENT NOMINAL TIMER SETTING IS 200MS. ALSO, THE RESET CIRCUITRY OF Tile TEST SI, TEST U/V, TEST BLOCK D-G ENGINE, AND TEST D-G BREAKER CLOSE PUSilBITITON LATCIIES IIAVE BEEN MODIFIED. TIE CIRCUITRY IS MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE ONE OF TWO PATHS BY WHICH AN S1 OR U/V SIGNAL CANCELS TIE SEQUENCER TEST MODE. TIIE OTilER OF THE TWO PATilS HAVE BEEN LEFT UNCilANGED. TilESE CllANGES WERE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE LOGIC RACE CONDITIONS WillCH CAUSE TIE SEQUENCER TO MALFUNCTION WillLE IN TEST MODE. TIE NORMAL MODE OPERATION OF Tim SEQUENCER HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THESE CilANGES. THE SEQUENCER'S TEST SWITCH INPUT MODULE (BOARD # 6N366) RECEIVED MINOR WIRING CllANGES TO EFFECT TIIE NECESSARY CHANGES. 2) REWIRE Tile CONTROLLER A MODULE TO ELIMINATE A LOGIC RACE CONDITION. A RACE CONDITION EXISTS WHICII RESULTS IN THE BLOCK OUTPUT RELAYS BEING HELD IN FOR APPROXIMATFLY TWICE THE EXPECTED TIME. THESE RELAYS PREVENT (BLOCK) CERTAIN LOADS FROM BEING l LOADED ONTO TiiE DIESEL UNTIL A SPECIFIED TIME. tills CHANGE WAS MADE BY REWIRING A GATE INPUT SUCli THAT IT RECEIVES A DELAYED SIGNAL. THESE CHANGES ARE PROJECT CLASS 1IE AND AFFECTTHE TRAIN A AND B SEQUENCERS,21821-U3-001 AND 002. TilEY ARE BEING MADE TO INCORPORATE FIELD CHANGES MADE TO THE UNIT I SEQUENCERS DURING TIIE 1R4 OLTTAGE.1) THESE CilANGES ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE FOR EFFICIENTLY TESTING THE SEQUENCER. THE CHANGE ONLY AFFECTS ' HIE MANUAL TEST PANEL PORTION OF THE SEQUENCER. THE SEQUENCER'S RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS REMAINS UNCHANGED. 2) THIS CilANGE IS NECESSARY FOR THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS DESIGNED SAIT!TY FUNCTION. CURRENTLY, THE DESIGNED RELAY BLOCK 104

l 1 1 TIME IS APPROX. 36 SECONDS. DURING ESFAS TESTING (IR4), TIIE RELAY BLOCK TIME l WAS FOUND TO BE APPROX. 67 SECONDS. Tile DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING TABLES SilOW Tim LOADS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING BLOCK TIMES. TIE VENDOR ADDITION OF FILTERS UNDER Tile ORIGINAL DCP RESULTED IN SilIFTING A GATE OUTPUT JUST ENOUGil TO CREATE Tills LOGIC RACE. T111S RACE DID NOT EXIST ON TIIE CONTROLLER A MODULES PRIOR TO VENDOR MODIFICATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIESE CilANGES DID NOT CllANGE Tile SEQUENCER OPERATION FROM THAT DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN THE FSAR AND DESIGN CRITERIA, AND DO NOT AFFECT Tile PROBABILITY OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN TIE FSAR. Tile SEQUENCER CONTINUES TO RESPOND TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS AS DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN Tile FSAR AND DESIGN CRITEIUA. Tile CllANGES ENSURE THAT Tile SEQUENCER RESPONDS AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED; HENCE, Tile OVERALL FUNCTION OF THE SEQUENCER REMAINS UNCilANGED. THESE CilANGES WERE MADE TO Tile UNIT 1  ! EQUIPMENT BY QUALIFIED TECHNICIANS UNDER Ti!E SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION OF i Ti!E SEQUENCER MANUFACTURER'S FIELD REPRESENTATIVE. THE ONLY MATERIAL  ! REQUIRED TO EFFECT THE CilANGES WAS Tile WIRE NECESSARY TO REWIRE TIIE BOARD. TIIE SEQUENCERS ARE LOCATED IN A MILD ENVIRONMENT. THE BOARDS WERE RE-WIRED USING QUALIFIED MATERI AL (WIRE) AND TIE SAME METilOD (WIRE WRAPPING) AS WAS ORIGINALLY USED. Tile REWIRING DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE Tile WEIGilT OF THE BOARD SO TIIE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF Tile BOARD IS NOT IMPACTED. THESE BOARDS WERE TESTED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO TilAT USED FOR UNIT 1 MODIFICATION. Tills INCLUDES SEQUENCER AND SYSTEM LEVEL TESTS TO l ENSURE TilAT THE MODIFICATIONS FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. SIMILAR CHANGES MADE TO TIE UNIT I EQUIPMENT WERE TESTED AND SilOWN TO BE EFFECTIVE IN ELIMINATING TIIE ANOMALIES AND RESTORING PROPER SEQUENCER OPERATION.11E MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY TIE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE Tile CHANGES ENilANCE OPERATION OF TIIE SEQUENCER. Tile NET EFFECT OF TIIE CllANGES HAS BEEN TO CORRECT THE DESIGN OF TIIE SEQUENCER SO TIIAT IT OPERATES AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0188, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS DROPPING RESISTOR USED TO REDUCE TIIE 125VDC PANEL SUPPLY TO 48VDC FOR TIIE TURBINE SPEED CONTROL, WAS REPLACED WITli A RESISTOR j OF TIIE SAME OllM VALVE BUT HAVING A HIGHER WATTAGE RATING (250 WATT). ALSO PANEL VENTILATION WAS INCREASED TO PROVIDE COOLING FOR Tile lilGilER WATTAGE RESISTOR. THE PREVIOUS RESISTOR liAS A HISTORY OF FAILING AS REPORTED IN Tile  ! NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 90 51 (REF.1) i SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills CllANGE DOES NOT ALTER THE OPERATION OF Tile TDAFW' PUMP AND Tile NEW VENT IS SCREENED TO PREVENT INSECT INTRUSION. TIE NEW RESISTOR WAS EVALUATED PRIOR TO INSTALLATION TO ENSURE PROPER l TOLERANCES. TIIEREFORE Tills DCP DOES NOT CREATE OR INCREASE Ti!E, i l CONSEQUENCES, EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION PROBABILTTY, OR PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A ACCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE OF A ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE. 1

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 V2N0189, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIIE CHANGES REPRESENTED BY Tills DCP ARE Ti!E ADDITION OF TIE-BACK SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE PROCESS LINES AND 1" DIAMETER DRAIN / VENT LINES FOR Tile FOLLOWING VALVES :21201U4220,21201U4240,21201U4114,21201U4244, 1 l 105 l

                                                                               -1

I i l 21204X4055,21204X4056,21204X4306,21204X4307. THE SUPPORT liANGERS TIE TIE DRAIN / VENT LINES TO THE PROCESS LINES FROM WHICH THEY ORIGINATE. TIE TIE-B ACK SUPPORTS DO NOT PERFORM ANY LOAD CARRYING FUNCTION BETWEEN TIE PIPING AND THE BUILDING STRUCTURE, BUT SIMPLY IMPROVE THE LOCAL STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF TIE DRAIN / VENT LINES. Tile TIE-BACK SUPPORTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PRESSURE RETAINING BOUNDARY. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DRAIN / VENT LINES AND Tile PROCESS LINES FROM WHICH THEY ORIGINATE, llAVE BEEN REVEWED FOR THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL TE-BACK SUPPORTS. TilERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ANTICIPATED BASED ON THIS REVIEW. Tile SUPPORTS THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION 111 CLASS 1 CRITERIA TO INSURE SUPPORT INTEGRITY AND PERFORMANCE.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0191, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: A LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT) ISOLATION VALVE, VALVE TAG NUMBER 2-1208-U4-504, A 2" 600 LB GATE VALVE WITH MK NO. I15L, WAS INSTALLED IN TIE CHEMICAL AND VOLUhE CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE 2 1208-L4-020, BETWEEN TIE TEST VENT CONTAINING VALVE 2-1208-U4-463 AND TIE DRAIN LINE CONTAINING VALVE 21208-X4-544. ALSO, TIE BLIND FLANGE AND PIPE NIPPLE AT TIE END OF THE CVCS SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE TEST CONNECTION BRANCH, WHICH CONTAINS VALVE 2-1208-U4-462, WAS REMOVED AND WAS REPLACED BY A THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE. TIE CVCS SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE IS A PART OF TIIE CVCS, SYSTEM 1208. THE ADDITION OF THE NEW LLRT ISOLATION VALVE REDUCE TIE CHANCE OF A SPILLAGE OF WATER IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, SINCE TIE LLRT IS CURRENTLY ISOLATED BY VALVE 2HV-41329A OR B, LOCATED AT TIE INLET AND OUTLET, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE CVCS SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER, WHICH FAILS OPEN ON A LOSS OF POWER. TIE PROJECT CLASS IS i 212. THE PORTION OF THE TEST CONNECTION WlERE TIE NEW PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE WAS INSTALLED WAS PROJECT CLASS 424. THIS IS IN CONFORMANCE WITH TIE REQUIREMENTS OF DRAWING AX4DR001, REV.19. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE IN-LINE LLRT VALVE BEING ADDED BY THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION CONFORM TO THE SAhE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AS THE SYSTEM WHERE IT IS BEING ADDED. THE VALVE IS LOCKED OPEN DURING NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATIONS. THE NEW THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE ADDED DOWNSTREAM OF VALVE 2-1208-U4-462 ALLOWS MAINTAINING TIE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SINGLE ISOLATION CRITERIA FOR TEST CONNECTIONS PER DRAWING AX4DR001, REV.19. ADDITIONALLY, THE GATE VALVE BEING ADDED IS THE FULL BORE SOLID WEDGE DESIGN WHICH ALLOWS MAXIMUM FLOW WHEN FULLY OPEN, AND THEREFORE, CREATES AN INSIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL IN THE LINE. TIE ADDITION OF TIE LLRT ISOLATION GATE VALVE OR REPLACEMENT OF TIE BLIND  ; FLANGE AND PIPE NIPPLE WITH A NEW THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE DOES NOT AFFECT TIE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN CHAirTERS 6 AND 15 OF THE FSAR. THE PIPE STRESSES AND PIPE SUPPORT STRESSES, RESULTING FROM THE ADDITION OF TIE LLRT ISOLATION VALVE AND REPLACEMENT OF THE BLIND FLANGE AND PIPE NIPPLE WITH A THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CODE ALLOWABLE STRESSES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE REDUCES TIE POSSIBILITY OF A FLOODING ACCIDENT. TIE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. 106

SUBJECT:

DCP; 92 V2N0198, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DID NOT MAKE ANY PIIYSICAL CilANGES TO TIIE PLANT EQUIPMENT. Tile K4 TERM IN Ti1E OPDT SET POINT EQUATION AND Ti!E TAU 3 TERM IN Tile OPDT AND OTDT SET POLNT EQUATIONS WAS CilANGED. K4 WAS CilANGED FROM !.08 TO 1.095 AND TIIE TAU 3 TERMS WAS CHANGED FROM O TO 2 SECONDS BY ADJUSTING POTENTIOMETER SETTINGS IN Tile 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT WillCil IS PROJECT CLASS 111. WESTINGilOUSE HAS IDENTIFIED A POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL ISSUE RELATED TO A PHENOMENON DISCOVERED IN Tile REACTOR VESSEL UPPER PLENUM WillCil IS CilARACTERIZED BY TEMPERATURE INCREASES IN ONE IlOT LEG. Tile LOOP REMAINS AT THE lilGilER TEMPERATURE FOR SEVERAL SECONDS TilEN RETURNS TO TIIE ORIGINAL TEMPERATURE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, Tile ADJACENT llOT LEG TEMPERATURE DECREASES BY ABOUT Tile SAME AMOUNT FOR THE SAME TIME PERIOD. PREDICTIONS BASED ON CIIARACIT.RIZATION OF Tills TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATION INDICATE TilAT SUFFICIENT MARGIN BETWEEN TiiE OPERATING AND TURBINE RUN BACK AND REACTOR TRIP SET POINTS MAY NOT EXIST TO PERMIT PLANT OPERAT10N AT UP RATED POWER WITIIOUT Tile POSSIBILITY OF ACTUATING OPDT AND OTDT TRIPS AND TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS IN A SINGLE CilANNEL. Tile CHANGES IN THE K4 AND TAU 3 TERMS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MARGIN BETWEEN OPERATING CONDITIONS AND REACTOR TIUP SET POINTS FOR Tile OPDT AND OTDT EQUATIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS ARE PART OF TiiE ACCIDENT MITIGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT THEMSELVES INITIATORS FOR ANY TRANSIENT. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT AFFECTED. Tile STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY OF ANY PLANT SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED BY Tile CHANGES TO THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. TIIE CllANGES TO THE REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF Tile FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED FOR MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH THE MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED WITil THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, Tile OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DO SO CALCULATIONS ARE UNCilANGED FROM TilOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. TilEREFORE, TIIE OFFSITE DOSE PREDICrlONS REMAIN WITHIN Tile ACCE17FANCE CRITERIA FOR EACli OF TIIE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. NO NEW OPERATING CONFIGURATION IS BEING IMPOSED BY THE SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS THAT WOULD CREATE A NEW FAILURE SCENARIO. IN ADDITION, NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. TiiEREFORE, THE ACCIDENTS DEFINED IN Tile FSAR CONTINUE TO REPRESENT TIIE CREDIBLE SPECTRUM OF EVENTS TO BE ANALYZ.ED WillCil DETERMINE SAFE PLANT OPERATION. Tile REVISED OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS DO NOT EFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM EXTLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY ASSUMED TO OPERATE DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS CitANGE DO A NOT DEGRADE Tile DESIGN BASIS PERFORMANCE OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM ASSUhED TO FUNCTION IN TIIE ACCIDENT ANALYSES. TIIE CHANGES RISES TO Tile RECTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT Tile INTEGRITY OF TIIE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER UTILIZED FOR MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTil Tile MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL TEMPERATURE LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED WITH Tile REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECrlVELY. IN ADDITION, Tile OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DOSE CALCULATIONS ARE UNCilANGED FROM TilOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THEREFORE, THE OFF SITE DOSE PREDICTIONS REMAIN WITHIN Tile ACCElvrANCE CRITERIA FOR EACll OF THE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. TIIE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS ARE PART OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT TilEMSELVES INITIATORS FOR ANY EQUIPMENT FAILURE. TIIE EFFECT OF Tile CilANGE ON Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY 107 i

l 1 ASSOCIATED WITil TIIE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS IS DESCRIBED BY THE EVALUATIONS PERFORMED FOR TOE ACCIDENT ANALYSES DOCUMENTED IN SECTION 3.0, ANALYSES AND EVALUATIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED TO DETERhUNED TIE EFFECT ON PLANT RESPONSE TO AFFECTED TRANSIENTS DUE TO THE NEW REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. THIS EFFORT IIAS CONFIRMED TilAT Tile ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CRITERIA ARE MET AND THE REQUIRED MARGIN OF SAFETY REGULATED FOR EACH AFFECTED SAFETY ANALYSIS IS MAINTAINED. THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR Tile ANALYZED EVENTS ARE UNCHANGED. TIIUS. THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SET POINTS DO NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN A MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92-V2N0200, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I I DESCRIFilON: THIS DCP IMPLEMENTS THE WESTINGilOUSE REVISED T-HOT AVERAGE SCALING (RTAS) SCIEME. TiiE RCS HOT LEG TEMPERATURES ARE MEASURED USING I FAST-RESPONSE RTDS LOCATED 120 DEGREES APART IN TIE SAME PLANE. RTAS ASSIGNS DIFFERENT WEIGliTING FACTORS TO Tile THREE HOT LEG RTDS TO MINIMlZE THE EFFECT OF THE TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS FROM THE RTD WHICH IIAS TIIE MOST PROCESS NOISE. RTAS IS IMPLEMENTED BY MODIFYING Tim NSA CARDS, WHICH ARE LOCATED IN Tile 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT, PROJECT CLASS 11J, FOR TIIE AFFECTED LOOPS. Tile NSA CARDS, WillCH RECEIVE THE HOT LEG RTD SIGNALS, WILL HAVE THE INPUT AND BALANCING RESIS10RS CHANGED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PLANT CHANGE IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. T1IE FSAR ACCIDENTS ANALYSES liAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR Tills PLANT CilANGE AND IT IIAS BEEN SilOWN THAT TIIE ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED NOR IS TIIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE INCREASED BY TIE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY TIE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. THUS, THERE IS NO CilANGE IN THE DOSES AS A RESULT OF RTAS. Tile MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT RT AS DO NOT RESULT IN ANY NEW LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES WHICH COULD CP,EATE TIE POSSIBILITY OF A CREDIBLE ACCIDENT. Tile MODIFICATIONS DO NOT INVOLVE AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THUS, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE TilAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. VPO4-92 TIERE IS NO INCREASE IN TIE PROBABILITY OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. TIERE IS NO ADDITIONAL HARDWARE INTRODUCED TO TIIE CONTROL OR PROTECTION SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. TIE INTRODUCTION OF TIE

• PROCESS CALCULATION CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT HARDWARE OPERATION, IT ONLY DIMINISHES THE MAGNITUDE OF TIE EFFECT OF SiiORT TERM PROCESS NOISE VARIATION ON A SINGLE, SPECIFIC RTD FOR Tile DETERMINATION OF TIIE AVERAGE TIIE ,

VALUE FOR A LOOP. FOR ACTUAL llEAT UP EVENTS, ALL THREE RTDS IN A HOT LEG WILL RESPOND TliUS PROVIDING Tile NEEDED PROTECTION FUNCrlON ACTUATION. TIIE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED WAS NOT INCREASED. THIS IS DUE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT TIE CURRENT FAILURE MODES AS ANALYZED ARE UNCliANGED DUE TO Tills CALCULATION PROCESS MODIFICATION. WlEN A HOT LEG RTD IS DETERMINED TO DE j INOPERABLE, RTAS IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE AND THE PROCEDURE FOR OPERATION WITil A HOT LEG RID OUT OF SERVICE GIVEN IN REFERENCE 2 SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. Tile PLANT MODIFICATION DO NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF , EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED, l TIERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CilANGE TO HARDWARE AS A RESULT OF Tills CALCULATION l PROCESS MODIFICATION. Tile DESIGN BASIS OF TIE HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITil TIIE OTDT AND OPDT PROTECTION SYSTEM IS NOT CilANGED. TIIE PLANT OPERATING STAFF 108

WILL CONFIRM TIIAT Tile INDICATED T-IIOT IS GREATER TilAN OR EQUAL TO ACTUAL T-IlOT AND CONFIRM TIIAT TiiE ACTUAL TAVG STAYS WITil THE ALLOWABLE RANGE, TO MAINTAIN CONSERVATIVE OPERATION WITil RESPECT TO THE SAFETY ANALYSES ASSUMI FIONS. Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO Tile TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION WAS NOT REDUCED, ALL INITIAL CONDITIONS OF Tile SAFETY ANALYSES WITil RESPECT TO TEMPERATURE WERE MAINTAINED. TiiE RESULTS OF SUCH ANALYSES AS NOTED IN Tile FSAR ARE STILL VALID. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TlIE BASES OF TIIE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 92 VAN 0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tills DESIGN CIIANGE PACKAGE PERMANENTLY INSTALLED Tile PORTABLE WASiiER/ DRYER USED BY HEALTil PIIYSICS FOR CONTAMINATED PERSONAL CLOTHING. Tile WASIIER/ DRYER IS LOCATED IN ROOM R-l% OF TIE CONTROL BUILDING. ELECTRICAL, WATER SUPPLY, DRAIN, AND DRYER EXIIAUST CONNECTIONS WERE ADDED TO ALLOW TllE WASHER / DRYER TO BE USED ON A PERMANENT BASIS. ROOM R-106 IS LOCATED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 AREA WITillN A SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURE. TIIE ELECTRICAL FEED IS PROVIDED FROM PANEL ANYO6 TO A RECEPTACLE LOCATED NEAR TiiE WASIIER/ DRYER. TIE ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS ARE PROJECT CLASS 62E. Ti!E MECHANICAL COMPONENTS, WHICH CONSIST OF Tile DRYER EXHAUST, WATER SUPPLY LINES, DRAIN LINE, AND Tile WASiiER/ DRYER, ARE PROJECT CLASS 626. Tills IS A DEVIATION FROM REGULATORY GUIDE 1.143. THIS IS JUSTIFIED FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1. THERE IS NO UNMONITORED RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM Ti!E WASHER / DRYER 2. TIE EXHAUST FROM THE DRYER PASSES THROUGli TIIE IIEPA FILTER. TIIE FILTER PROVIDES A MINIMUM OF 99.97% OVERALL EFFICIENCY ON 0.3 MICRON PARTICLES. BY MEANS OF Tile CONTROL BUIL. DING llVAC SYSTEM, TIIE EXHAUST WILL PASS TIIROUGli TWO MORE IIEPA FILTERS BEFORE IT IS RELEASED TilROUGH TIIE VENT STACK. 3. Tills ROOM IS LOCATED IN A RADIOLOGICALLY CONTROLLED AREA (RCA). ACCESS TO AN RCA IS CONTROLLED BY TIE USE OF A RADIATION WORK PERMIT (RWP). ANY WORKER ENTERING AN RCA MUST HAVE A TLD AND A POCKET DOSIMETER, AND MUST LOG IN ON lilS RWP. Tile ACCESSIBILITY ZONE FOR ROOM R-106 IS LESS TIIAN OR EQUAL TO 2.5 MREM /IIR DURING OPERATIONS. 4. ADEQUATE DRAIN PROVISIONS liAVE BEEN MADE TO PROTECT TIIE ROOM AGAINST FLOODING FROM FAILURE OF TIIE WASilER/ DRYER DRAIN. (PER DOCUMENTATION OF ENGINEERING JUDGMENT.) POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED WATER FROM TIE RUPTURED WASIIER/ DRYER DRAIN ARE COLLECTED IN THE FLOOR DRAIN AND FLOW BY GRAVITY TO TIE LAUNDRY AND HOT SHOWER TANK. TiiE FLOOR DRAIN IfAS BEEN INSTALLED WITH RIMS WlilCH ARE FLUSH WITli THE LOW POINT ELEVATION OF Tile FINISIIED FLOOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: DURING NORMAL OPERATION, Tile CONTAMINATED WATER FROM TIIE WASHER IS ROUTED FROM TIIE WASHER DRAIN TO Tile LAUNDRY AND llOT SIIOWER TANKS. IF TIIERE WERE A FAILURE OF Tile DRAIN LINE, THE WATER WOULD, BE COLLECTED BY THE FLOOR DRAIN WiiERE IT WOULD THEN BE ROUTED TO THE LAUNDRY AND IlOT SHOWER TANKS. TIIERE ARE NO POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PERMANENTLY INSTALLING THE PORTABLE WASHER / DRYER. TIIE PERMANENT INSTALLATION OF THE WASHER / DRYER IN THE HEALTH PHYSICS LAUNDRY ROOM INVOLVES NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 AREA. 109

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93 VIN 0003, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills DCP ADDED AN ENilANCEMENT TO Tile AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUITRY TilAT RESETS Tile SEQUENCER IF Tile DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS WillLE LOADS ARE BEING SEQUENCED ONTO Tile BUS.THIS DCP ADDED AN ENilANCEMENT TO TiiE AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUlTRY, WillCil RESETS Ti!E UNDER VOLTAGE (U/V) LATCll IN APPROXIMATELY 60 SECONDS. Tills SENDS A SECOND U/V SIGNAL, WillCil OPENS TIIE CLOSED FEEDER BREAKERS .AND SEND A SIGNAL TO RE-CLOSE TIIE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER. IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER RE-CLOSES, Tile LOADS ARE AUTOMATICALLY SEQUENCED ON. ALL OF TIIESE MODIFICATIONS ARE SAFETY CLASS 1, SEISMIC CLASS 1, EXCEPT FOR Tile CABLES AND INTERNAL WIRES TilAT ARE SEISMIC CLASS 2. Tile PURPOSE OF Tile ADDITIONAL RESET FEATURES IS TO PREVENT AN INADVERTENT RE-CLOSURE OF Tile DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER ON A PARTIALLY LOADED BUS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile DESIGN CllANGE FULLY MEETS Tile DESIGN, 1 l MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCrlON SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EQUIPMENT TilAT IS BEING MODIFIED. Ti!E DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF TIIE SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED TO CAUSE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN TIIE FSAR. Tile DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY LIMITS OR SETTINGS. Tills IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR TilAT INCLUDED SECTIONS 1.9.9,7.3,8.3.1,16.3 AND CilAl'TER 15. THE ENHANCED AUTOMATIC SEQUENCER RESET FEATURE IS ONLY FUNCTIONAL IF Tile DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS DURING SEQUENCING. THUS, i Tills NEW RESET FEATURE RESULTS IN AN IMPROVEMENT IN Tile RELI ABILITY OF Ti!E EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM. Tile DESIGN CIIANGE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIIE ABILITY OF Tile EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS ROLE IN TIIE MITIGATION OF Tile CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDEES EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. Tile DESIGN CilANGE ENilANCED Tile ABILITY TO RECOVER FROM A , MALFUNCTION OF TIIE EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM. THE RISK OF AN INADVERTENT FEEDER BREAKER CLOSING ONTO A DEAD, BUT PARTIALLY LOADED BUS, HAS DEEN REDUCED. Tile ABILITY TO RE INSTATE Tile EMERGENCY LOADS AND RESTORE Tile STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM llAS BEEN ENIIANCED. Tile DESIGN CilANGE FULLY MEETS TIIE DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCrlON SPECIFICATIONS OF Tile EQUIPMENT TilAT IS BEING MODIFIED. TIIB DESIGN WAS EVALUATED AND IT WAS DETERMINED TilAT ALL SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIFICATIONS, ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA AND OTIIER DESIGN CRITERI A liAVE BEEN MET. TiiE i MODIFICATIONS ARE ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED FROM OTilER CIRCUITS BY COORDINATED FUSES AND ARE PilYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM CIRCUlTS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS. THE NEW CIRCUITS ONLY BECOME ACTIVE IF AN U/V SIGNAL IS  ! PRESENT AND Tile DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER TRIPS WilEN IT SilOULD DE CLOSED. l THE DESIGN CilANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES f)F Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ANY SAFETY LIMIT OR ANY SAFETY LIMIT SETTING. IT DOES NOT AITECT TiiE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION OR Tile SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - AC SOURCES, SECTION 3/4.8.1. Tile CHANGE MELTS Tile APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE TIMING OR SEQUENCE TilAT LOADS WOULD DE STARTED IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT. Tills IS BASED ON A ITVIEW OF TIIE FSAR AND THE TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.8.1. 110

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0004, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRII' TION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM AIR RECEIVE RELIEF VALVES WITH AN ANDERSON, GREENWOOD & CO. (AGCO) RELIEF

 ._                                 VALVE WHICil MEETS ALL ORIGINAL FUNCTION AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE REPLACEMENT RELEF VALVE SATISFIES ALL ORIGINAL DESIGN AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND ARE SIZED TO MEET THE , EXISTING DESIGN CRITERIA AS SPECIFIED IN FSAR SECTION 9.5.6.. ALL SEISMIC l QUALIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MET. THE REPLACEMENT RELIEF VALVE WAS SIZED TO HAVE A BLOWDOWN OF LESS TilAN 10%; THIS PREVENTS THE AIR RECEIVER PRESSURE FROM DROPPING BELOW TIIE TECH SPEC LIMIT OF 210 PSIG. THEREFORE THIS CHANGE HAS NO EFFECT ON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS SPECIFIED BY TECH SPEC 3/4.8.1.1.2.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0016, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) IMPLEMENTED BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) FOR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS,7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP SYSTEM REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS,7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS SYSTEM REACTOR TRIP (RT) FUNCTIONS AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) FUNCTIONS. HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE PER WESTINGilOUSE FCN'S FOR INSTALLING BTI PANELS IN TIIE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: A) NIS CABINET (1-1602-Q5-NIR) B) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS CABINETS (1-1604-QS-psi /PS2/PS3/PS4) C) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP CABINETS (1-1604-QS-PPl/PP2/PP3) VISUAL INDICATION ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD IS PROVIDED BY TFE ADDITION OF i1 NEW ANNUNCIATOR WINDOWS FOR BTI TEST PANELS STATUS. ADDITIONALLY, LOCAL INDICATION IS PROVIDED ON EACH BTI TEST PANEL FOR CHANNEL STATUS. THE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) UTILIZE l-OUT-OF-2,2-OUT-OF-3, AND 2-OUT-OF-4 COINCIDENCE LOGIC FROM REDUNDANT CHANNELS TO INITIATE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. WITHIN THESE SYSTEMS, ANALOG CHANNEL COMPARATORS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) 1-OUT-OF-2 FUNCTIONS, ARE CURRENTLY PLACED IN THE TRIPPED STATE FOR CHANNEL TESTING OR IN RESPONSE TO A CHANNEL BEING OUT OF SERVICE. WITH AN INOPERABLE CHANNEL IN THE TRIPPED STATE, A REDUNDANT CIIANNEL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED OR TESTED WITHOUT CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION. WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF T1E BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI), A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION IS AVOIDED SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT IS ELIMINATED AND THE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED BY REQUIRING SIGNALS FROM ADDITIONAL CIIANNELS TO ACTUATE TlIE PROTECTIVE IliNCTIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIIE OPERABILITY OF THE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEMS (NSSS & BOP) OR THE NIS. THE ACTIVITY DID NOT CHANGE TIIE CIIANNEL REDUNDANCY OR SEPARATION REQUIREMENT PROVIDED BY THE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM OR THE NIS. WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIE BTI, l A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION, DURING TESTING, IS l LESS LIKELY SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN { PRESENT IS ELIMINATED WHILE TIIE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE NO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES OF THE BTI TOGGLE SWITCIES TilAT CAN CAUSE A PLANT TRIP. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTI DOES 111

1 NOT AFFECT TIE INTEGRITY OF ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED IN TIE MITIGATION OF TIE RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. TFE INSTALLATION OF TIE BYPASS PANELS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF TIE NIS OR 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS AND BOP RACKS (REFERENCES 2,3 & 4). FAULT TESTEVALUATIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED FOR THE BTI SYSTEM TO DETERMINE THAT A CREDIBLE FAULT DID NOT PROPAGATE TO OR FROM TIE BTI AS IT INTERFACES WITH ASSOCIATED PROTECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS (REFERENCE 1). THE BTI SYSTEM IS NOT SUBJECT TO COMMON MODE FAILURES. THE BTI SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PERFORM ITS ASSOCIATED PROTECrlVE FUNCTION (1.E., TESTINGrfROUBLESHOOTING IN THE BYPASSED CONDITION) AND NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT EQUIPMENT UTILIZED IN THE MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES. INSTALLATION OF THE BTI SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT INITIATION SEQUENCES OR RESPONSE SCENARIOS. NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. ALTHOUGH THE FSAR DOES NOT EVALUATE ACCIDENTS WHICH ARE TIE RESULT OF THE PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILING TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION, A COMMON MODE FAILURE OF MORE THAN ONE PROCESS PROTECTION CHANNEL COULD LEAD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT BEING CREATED THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN TIE FSAR. MEASURES TO ENSURE SYSTEM RELIABILITY, HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT TIE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPhENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR WAS NOT CREATED BY THE INSTALLATION OF TIIE BTI SYSTEM (REFERENCE 1). THESE hEASURES INCLUDE: RELIABILITY EVALUATION, ISOLATION CAPABILITY EVALUATION, SEISMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPhENT QUALIFICATION EVALUATIONS AND TESTING, AND DESIGN CONSTRAINTS GOVERNED BY WCAP-11368 AND SERS FOR APPLICATION OF ROUTINE TEST IN BYPASS. NO FUNCTIONS CREDITED IN SAFETY ANALYSES ARE ALTERED OR AFFECTED BY TIE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI. Tills DCP DOES NOT REDUCE TIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-vin 0020, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIITION: TIIIS DCP ADDED FOUR " NORMAL-DISABLE" HANDSWITCHES TO TIE CONTROL POWER CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED WITH TIE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEM (AFWAS) AND STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN (SGBD) ISOLATION SYSTEM. THESE HANDSWITCHES ARE LOCATED IN VARIOUS LOCAL AUXILIARY RELAY PANELS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP ALTERED TIIE AFWAS AND SGBD ISOLATION LOGIC BUT THE HAND SWITCII POSITION, LIKE REMOVAL OF THE CONTROL POWER FUSES, IS ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED THROUGH SOPS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM OPERATION IN ANY WAY WlEN THE HAND SWITCHES ARE IN TIE " NORMAL" POSITION, AND DID NOT ADD ANY NEW ACCIDENT SOURCES. WlEN PLACED IN THE DISABLE POSITION, TIE HAND SWITCHES ADDED BY THIS DCP, BLOCK SIGNALS FROM CAUSING ALTTOMATIC POSITIONING OF THESE VALVES. AUTOMATIC START OF TIE MDAFP ON A TWO4F-TWO MFPT TRIP SIGNAL IS ALSO BLOCKED. THE CAPABILITY OF TIIE AFWS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FLOW TO THE STEAM GENERATORS DLPING SOME ACCIDENTS IS PREDICATED ON TIESE SGBD VALVES BEING CLOSED. PLACING TIE HAND SWITCHES INTO THE DISABLE POSITION IS NO DIFFERENT THAN REMOVING THE CONTROL POWER FUSES, WHICH IS ALLOWED BY CURRENT SOPS. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF TIE HAND SWITCIES LIKEWISE PREVENT AN INCREASE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE HAND 112

l i SWITCHES ARE MOUNTED INTERNAL TO EXISTING PANELS AND ARE DESIGNED TO MEET j THE APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION AND ELECTRICAL SEPARATION , CRITERIA. ADDITION OF THESE HAND SWITCIIES DID NOT CREATE TIIE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE TilAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. TIIE ADDITION OF TiiESE HAND SWITCilES DID NOT AFFECT THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES OR SAFETY MARGINS.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0024, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDRESSED TIE MODIFICATION OF TWO REACTOR VESSEL IIEAD VENT SYSTEM (RVHVS) PIPE SUPIORTS: VI-1201-055-Il604 AND VI-1208-487-II608. SUPPORT VI-1201-055-H604 WAS MODIFIED FROM A TWO DIRECTIONAL RESTRAINT TO A ONE DIRECTIONAL VERTICAL RESTRAINT. SUPPORT V!-1208-487-H608 WAS REINFORCED BY ADDING A PLATE TO THE STRAP OF THE SUPPORT. TIIE RVliVS IS A TWO TRAIN SYSTEM WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS TO REMOVE, VIA REMOTE MANUAL OPERATION FROM TIIE CONTROL ROOM, NONCONDENSIBLE GASES, STEAM AND WATER, OR FLASHING WATER FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL FOLLOWING A POSTULATED LOCA OR A BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENT. THE RVHVS MAY ALSO BE USED AS A LETDOWN SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION USING ONLY SAFETY GRADE EQ'UIPMENT. THE ORIGINAL RVHVS DESIGN ANALYSIS CONSIDERED SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF BOTH KVilVS TRAINS. HOWEVER, Tile SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE CRITERION DICTATES THAT ONLY ONE RVIIVS FLOW PATil (TRAIN) MAY BE OPERABLE. AS A RESULT, TIIERMAL EXPANSION RE-ANALYSIS OF TIIE RVHVS CONSIDERING BOTH ONE AND TWO TRAIN OPERATION WAS CARRIED OUT. ALSO INVESTIGATED WAS THE LOADING CONDITION OF A WATER SLUG DISCHARGE FOLLOWED BY IIYDROGEN DISCIIARGES THAT COULD OCCUR DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THIS RE-ANALYSIS REVEALED TilAT SUPPORT VI 1201-055-H604, IN THE VICINITY OF ISOLATION VALVES IHV-8095A AND IHV-8096A, AND SUPPORT VI-1208-487-H608 IN THE VICINITY OF THROTTLE VALVES IHV-0442A AND llIV-0442B, NEED TO BE MODIFIED IN ORDER FOR TIIE PIPE STRESSES TO SATISFY TIIE ASME CODE SECTION III ALLOWABLES FOR THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE SYSTEM AND ANSI B31.1 ALLOWABLES FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE RVHVS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS ENSURES THAT TIIE RVIIVS PIPING STRESSES ARE WITHIN CODE DESIGN LIMITS FOR EITHER ONE OR TWO TRAIN OPERATION, THUS SATISFYING THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION. THE RVHVS PIPING IS 1" NPS AND IS EXEMPTED FROM HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK POSTULATION PER DC-1018, REV. 3. THE RE-ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE EXISTING HELB ANALYSIS. THE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS DO NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. TIIE MODIFICATIONS MEET Tile DESIGN, MATERIAL, INSTALLATION, TESTING AND QUALITY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO TIIE RVHVS. THE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CIIANGE, DEGRADE, OR PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN THE FSAR FOR AN ACCIDENT, NOR DO TIEY ALTER ANY ASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN EVALUATING RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. THE MODIFICATIONS ADDRESSED IN Tills DCP DID NOT AFFECT ANY ACTIVE COMPONENTS OF THE RVHVS. THE MODIFICATIONS TIE OPERATION AND RESPONSE OF THE RVliVS liAS BEEN IMPROVED SINCE TIIE RVHVS STRESSES REMAIN WITillN ASME CODE ALLOWABLES FOR EITHER ONE OR TWO TRAIN 113 l

1 i OPERATION. 'llIE MODIFICATION DID NOT INTEODUCE ANY ADDmONAL EQUIPMENT TO THE RVHVS NOR ANY NEW FAILURE MODES.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0044: REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: GEORGIA DOWER COMPANY HAS UNDERTAKEN A PROGRAM TO UPRATE VOGTLE ELECTRIC GEA.AATING PLANT (VEGP), UNITS 1 AND 2 TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT WHICH RESULTED IN AN ADDITIONAL OUTPUT OF APPROXIMATELY 50 MWE FOR EACll UNIT. IN ADDITION TO Tim POWER UPRATE, A REDUCTION IN Tih! DESIGN REACTOR VESSEL OUTLET TEMPERATURE (T-HOT) WITH UP TO 10*/. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGGING WAS IMPLEMENTED. Tills DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED TIE T-HOT PEDUCTION WillCH CORRESPONDS TO A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AVEkaGE TEMPERATURE (T-AVG) RANGE OF 588.4 'F TO $70.7 "F (T-HOT REDUCTION OF 16.8 'F). GEORGIA POWER COMPANY liAS ESTABLISilED A TARGET T-AVG TEMPERATURE OF 583.4 "F TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED PLANT ELECTRICAL POWER OUTPUT FOR PLANT OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED OUTSIDE OF TIIEIR DESIGN LIMITS. TilERE WERE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CilANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING TIIEIR SAME FUNC"lO:NS. Tile EXISTING DESIGN BASIS FOR FLOODING LEVELS INSIDE CONTAINMENT, WillCH CONSIDERS A POSTULATED MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OR MAIN FEED WATER LINE BREAK AS THE MOST SEVERE FLUID RELEASE CONDmON, WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE T-HOT REDUCTION SINCE TIIE FLUID RELEASE IS BASED ON A STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE COlUESPONDING TO A ZERO LOAD CONDmON WillCH BOUNDS THE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE FOR TiiE RANGE OF T-IIOT VAL;ES ASSOCIATED Wml T-HOT REDUCTION. STEAM GENERATOR INVENTORY WAS NOT AFFECTED BY Tile T llOT REDUCTION. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN UREATED AS A RESULT OF Tills MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFTECTED TiiE T HOT REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MmGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOlt WHICH IT IIAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED SINCE THE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDmONS (E.G., PRESSURE (REFERENCE 5) TEMPERATURE, DOSE)INSIDE AND OUTSIDE TIE CONTAINMENT BUILDING ARE BOUNDED BY THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDmONS. SYSTEMS Wml DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED AND WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY Tills , MODIFICATION. EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY WERE NOT ALTERED BY THE DCP, Tim DCP llAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CAPABILITY OF SYSTEMS TO PERFORM TIIEIR SAFETY FUNCTION. NO NEW LIMmNG SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED NOR HAVE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES DEEN DEFINED FOR ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENT AS A RESULT OF TIIIS MODIFICATION. OPERATION WmilN TIE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND CRITERIA LIMrl5 FOR ALL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDES FOR Tile MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FUNCTIONAL CAPABILmES UNDER TIE REDUCED TEMPERATURE CONDmONS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, OR FAILURE MECHANISMS WERE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE T llOT REDUCTION. CHANGES TO COMPONENTS, OR ADDmONS OF NEW COMPONENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED FOR TIE DCP. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITH ANY SYSTEMS OR j COMPONENTS NOR WERE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS l CREATED. ANALYSES ilAVE BEEN PERFORMED (REFERENCE 1) WillCH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE T llOT REDUCTION DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. TIE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DID NOT i CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED . i l i14 I

EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMPONENTS WERE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS WERE CilANGED, NOR WERE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR TIIE DCP. TiiERE WERE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES WillCH CREATE THE POSSIBILrrY OF A NEW TYPE OF MALFUNCTION. THE DCP HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON Tile AVAILABILITY, OPERABILITY, OR PERFORMANCE OF PLANT EQUIPMENT (REFERENCE 1). THE PLANT RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS HAS BEEN SilOWN TO REMAIN WITIIIN ANALYZED CONDITIONS FOR TRANSIENT RESPONSE AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0048, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CIIANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED Tile POWER UP RATE FOR VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT I FROM A NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) POWER LEVEL OF 3425 MWT TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills ACTIVITY DOES NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO DE OPERATED OlfrSIDE OF THEIR DESIGN LIMITS. TIERE ARE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. ADDITIONALLY, SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING THEIR SAME FUNCTIONS. FURTilERMORE, TilOSE SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR WillCl! POWER UP RATE HAS AN EFFECT HAVE BEEN EVALUATED (REFERENCE 1) AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED TilAT THESE EVALUATIONS ARE BOUNDED BY THE NEW AND EXISTING DESIGN CRITERIA. ACCEPTABILITY OF TIIE NEW DESIGN CRITERIA HAS DEEN EVALUATED IT WAS DETERMINED TH AT FOR THE BEC11TEL SCOPE OF TIE ACTIVITY, NSCW IS THE ONLY SYSTEM WHICH COULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF AFFECTING ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS. Tile NSCW SYSTEM PROVIDES COOLING TO PLANT COMPONENTS DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, AND TRANSFERS TIIE HEAT REMOVED FROM THESE SYSTEMS TO THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK. CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED (REFERENCES 8 AND 9) TO CONFIRM THAT TIE MAXIMUM NSCW TOWER BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW THE DESIGN BASIS BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE, AND THE NSCW TOWER BASIN INVENTORY AVAILABILITY MEETS Tile REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.27 FOR THE INCREASED POWER LEVEL. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. SYSTEMS WITH DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS POST-ACCIDENT CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED AND ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. ADDITIONALLY, EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY ARE NOT ALTERED BY THE ACTIVITY. TIIE DESIGN BASES FOR Tile LlQUID, SOLID, AND GASEOUS WASTE SYSTEMS AND THE PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON SOURCE TERMS AND WASTE VOLUMES ASSOCIATED WITH A REACTOR CORE THERMAL POWER LEVEL OF 3565 MWT, WillCH IS TIE UP RATED POWER LEVEL. ADDITIONALLY, NO CHANGES ARE MADE TO THE NSCW SYSTEM DESIGN WHICil DETECTS AND PREVENTS LEAKAGE TO Tile ENVIRONMENT OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION THAT MAY ENTER THE NSCW SYSTEM FROM TIE CCW SYSTEM, ACCW SYSTEM, OR Tile CONTAINMENT COOLERS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, FAILURE MECIIANISMS, OR LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES ARE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE POWER UP RATE. CilANGES TO COMPONENTS, OR ADDITIONS OF NEW COMPONENTS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS ACTIVITY. ADDITIONALLY, THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITII ANY SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS NOR ARE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS CREATED. IN ADDITION, CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN, AFTER RERATE, TO TIE SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) COOLING SYSTEM DUE TO TIE POTENTIAL INCREASE IN iiEAT LOAD. TiiE SFP COOLING SYSTEM WAS EVALUATED 115

(REFERENCES 4 AND 5) TO DETERMINE Tile SYSTEM CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN DESIGN FUEL POOL TEMPERATURE WITH ONE TRAIN IN OPERATION. TIE SFP COOLING SYSTEMS FOR UNITS 1 AND 2 ARE TIE SAME DESIGN,llOWEVER, HIGli DENSITY FUEL STORAGE RACKS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN THE UNIT 2 SFP. THE UNIT 2 SFP IS DESIGNED TO CONTAIN 2098 FUEL ASSEMBLIES, WHICH IS GREATER TIIAN THE ORIGINAL UNIT 1 DESIGN STORAGE CAPACITY OF 936 FUEL ASSEMBLIES. SINCE THE STORAGE CAPACITY FOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IS GREATER FOR THE UNIT 2 SFP, THE lEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS WILL ALSO BE GREATER THAN TilOSE FOR THE UNIT I SFP. TilEREFORE, Tile UNIT 2 SFP COOLING SYSTEM ANALYSIS BOUND TIE UNIT 1 DESIGN. FOR NORMAL REFUELING, THE UNIT 2 SFP TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW 140 F. IN ADDITION, FOR MAXIMUM NORMAL REFUELING AND MAXIMUM EhERGENCY CORE UNLOADING, TIE POOL TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW BOILING AND THE MAXIMUM DESIGN TEMPERATURE FOR TIE SFP. (FOR TFE DEFINITIONS OF THESE REFUELING CONDTTIONS, ) SEE FSAR SECTION 9.I.3.1.)THEREFORE, REFERENCES 4 AND 5 ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH )' SRP 9.1.3. ANALYSES IIAVE BEEN PERrORMED (REFERENCE 1) WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT TIIE ACFIVITY WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIE FUNCrlON OF ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. NO NEW COMPONENTS ARE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS ' ARE CHANGED, NOR ARE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR THE ACTIVITY. FURTHER, TIERE ARE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CIIANGES WHICH INCREASE Tile LIKELIHOOD OF A MALFUNCTION. WESTINGHOUSE EVALUATIONS (WCAP-13001) HAVE DETERMINED THAT TIE BOUNDING ACCIDENT FOR THE MAXIMUM PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE IS TIE LARGE BREAK LOCA INSTEAD OF THE STEAM LINE BREAK. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE THE CALCULATED CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSUIE (REFERENCE 1) DOES NOT EXCEED THE I EXISTING DESIGN PRESSURE OF 52 PSIG FOR TIE LOCA.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0063, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRWTION: THIS DCP ALLOWS THE USE OF A FIVE RING GRAPHITE PACKING SET, AND l TIE REMOVAL AND CAPPING OF THE VALVE STEM LEAK OFF LINE ON VALVES IHV-8701 A & B AND IHV-8702A &B. THE EXISTING PACKING CONFIGURATION IS ALSO AN APPROVED hETHOD; liOWEVER, IF IT IS USED THE VALVE STEM LEAK OFF LINE MUST BE RECONNECTED. IN EITHER CASE LIVE-LOAD PACKING MAY BE APPLIED. THE AFFECTED VALVES ARE SAFETY RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY I VALVES. TIE LEAK OFF LINE IS NON SAFETY SEISMIC CATEGORY 2. SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE AND EPRI STUDY REPORT NUMBER NP-5697, AN IMPROVED PACKING CONFIGURATION IS A FIVE RING GRAPHITE PACKING SET. WHEN THE FIVE RING PACKING SET IS INSTALLED PER THIS DESIGN CHANGE, NO STEM SEALING WILL DE PRESENT ABOVE THE VALVE STEM LEAK OFF LINE. A SECTION OF TIE LEAK OFF LINE WILL BE REMOVED AND CAPPED TO PREVENT RADIOACTIVE FLUID FROM LEAKING INTO THE AREA DUE TO THIS OPENING. TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF VALVE STEM LEAKAGE AS THE PACKING CONSOLIDATES Tim VALVE PACKING CAN BE LIVE-LOADED. THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE VALVE, VALVE OPERATOR, AND RHR SYSTEM WILL BE MAINTAINED. NEITHER Tile GLAND NUT TORQUE VALUE NOR Tile VALVE STEM FRICTION WILL BE INCREASED ABOVE Tile DESIGN APPROVED VALUES GIVEN IN IEFERENCE 5.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VIN 0064, REVISION 0. SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A FLOW ORIFICE PLATE BETWEEN AN EXISTING SET OF FLANGES ON TiiE DISCilARGE LINE OF Tile (B CCP) B TRAIN CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING 116

PUMP. Tills ORIFICE WILL MAINTAIN TiiE PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW RATE DURING NEAR PUMP RUNOUT CONDITIONS WITHIN TIIE TECliNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS. Tills DCP 1 WAS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW IMPELLER IN TifE B CCP WilEN TiiE OLD IMPELLER WAS DISCOVERED TO liAVE BEEN DAMAGED. Tile NEW IMPELLER IS A DIFFERENT TYPE OF CASTING WHICil HAS IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTALLATION OF THE ORIFICE PLATE DID NOT CilANGE Tile OPERABILITY, AVAILABILITY, OR QUALIFICATION OF THE B CCP AS REQUIRED BY TECHN8 CAL SPECIFICATIONS. USE OF TIIE ORIFICE PLATE ENSURES THAT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS / LIMITS ARE MAINTAINED AND THAT ANY ASSUMITIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE EVALUATION DESCRIBED IN TiiE FSAR ARE NOT AFFECTED.

SUBJECT:

DCP; 93-V2N0025, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFTION: Tills DCP MODIFIED REACTOR VESSEL IIEAD VENT SYSTEM (RVHVS) PIPE SUPPORT V2-1208-055-il610. TlilS SUPPORT WAS MODIFIED FROM A TWO DIRECTIONAL RESTRAINT TO A ONE DIRECTIONAL VERTICAL RESTRAINT. TIIE RVHVS IS A TWO TRAIN SYSTEM WilOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS TO REMOVE, VIA REMOTE MANUAL OPERATION FROM TIE CONTROL ROOM, NONCONDENSIBLE GASES, STEAM AND WATER, OR FLASHING WATER FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL FOLLOWING A POSTULATED LOCA OR A BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENT. Tile SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE CRITERION DICTATES TIIAT ONLY ONE RVHVS FLOW PATH (TRAIN) MAY BE OPERABLE. AS A RESULT, TIERMAL EXPANSION RE-ANALYSIS OF TIE RVHVS CONSIDERING BOTil ONE AND TWO TRAIN OPERATION WAS CARRIED OLTr. ALSO INVESTIGATED WAS Tile DESIGN CONDITION OF A WATER SLUG DISCilARGE FOLLOWED BY HYDROGEN DISCilARGES WillCH COULD OCCUR DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. Tills RE-ANALYSIS REVEALED TilAT SUPPORT V2-1208-055-H610, IN THE VICINrrY OF ISOLATION VALVES 2HV-8095A AND 2HV-80%A NEEDED TO DE MODIFIED IN ORDER FOR Tile PIPE STRESSES TO SATISFY THE ASME CODE SECTION ill ALLOWABLES FOR TiiE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF TIIE SYSTEM AND ANSI B31.1 ALLOWABLES FOR TiiE NON NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF TIIE RVliVS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SUPPORT MODIFICATION ENSURES THAT TIE RVliVS PIPING STRESSES ARE MAINTAINED WITHIN CODE DESIGN LIMITS FOR EITHER ONE OR TWO TRAIN OPERATION, TIIUS SATISFYING THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION. TiiE RVIIVS PIPING IS 1" NPS AND IS EXEMITED FROM HIGli ENERGY PIPE BREAK POSTULATION PER DC-1018, REV. 3. THEREFORE, THE RE-ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT MODIFICATION DID NOT AFFECT THE EXISTING IIELB ANALYSIS. THE SUPPORT MODIFICATION DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIIE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. TIIE MODIFICATION MEETS Tile DESIGN, MATERIAL, INSTALLATION, TESTING AND QUALITY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO Tile RVHVS. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT CllANGE, DEGRADE, OR PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN TIIE FSAR FOR AN ACCIDENT, NOR DOES IT ALTER ANY ASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN EVALUATING RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. THE RELIABILITY OF Tim RVIIVS IS IMPROVED. TIE MODIFICATION ADDRESSED IN THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY ACTIVE COMPONENTS OF TIIE RVHVS NOR DOES IT AFFECT Tile FUNCTION OF THE RVHVS. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT Tile ABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM INTENDED SAFETY l17

FUNCTIONS NOR DOES IT CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. INHERENT TO THIS DESIGN BASES IS THE SAME MARGIN OF SAFETY AS THE ORIGINAL DESIGN.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0026, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills CHANGE ADDED PIPING (2-1208-241-1") AND A VALVE (2-1208-X4-902) TO AN EXISTING VENT (VALVE 2-1208-X4-468) OF THE BORIC ACID TRANSFER PORTION OF TIE CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS). THE NEW PIPING IS CLASSIFIED SEISMIC CATEGORY l AND IS lEAT TRACED AND INSULATED. THE CHANGE EXTENDED THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF TIE SYSTEM UP TO THE NEW VALVE 2-1208-X4-902. FOLLOWING THE MODIFICATION, VALVE 2-1208-X4-468 WAS LEFT OPEN. VENTING OF THIS PORTION OF BORIC ACID TRANSFER LINE 2-1208-241-3" IS NOW ACCOMPLISIED BY OPENING VALVE 2-1208-X4-902. VENTING OF A PORTION OF LINE 2-1208-241-3" IS REQUIRED AS PART OF BORIC ACID TRANSFER OPERATIONS. THE LOCATION OF THE EXISTING VALVE (2 1208-X4-468) USED IN THIS OPERATION IS SUCH THAT PERSONNEL CANNOT USE NORMAL ACCESS MEANS TO GET IN POSITION TO OPERATE IT. TIUS IS CONSIDERED AN UNACCEPTABLE SAFETY IIAZARD. EXTENSION OF TIIE VENT PIPING AND INSTALLATION OF TIE NEW VALVE ALLOWS VENTING OF LINE 2-1208-241-3" TO BE DONE FROM THE FLOOR ABOVE EXISTING VALVE 2-1208-X4-468. SAFETY EVALUATION: NO NEW ACCIDENT INITIATORS WERE CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE EXTENSION OF THE VENT PIPING WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVIOUS DESIGN CRITERIA TO ENSURE THAT THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM WERE MET. Tile NEW VENT VALVE IS SIMILAR IN TYPE AND FUNCTION TO THE PREVIOUS VENT VALVE. THE EXTENDED VENT PIPING IS SUPPORTED BY A NEW PIPE SUPPORT. A STRESS ANALYSIS OF THE VENT PIPING AND OF THE NEW PIPE SUPPORT WAS PERFORMED AND THE RESULTS WERE ACCEPTABLE. THE NEW VENT PIPING IS INSULATED AND REDUNDANTLY lEAT TRACED. THE MODIFICATION WAS EVALUATED FOR SEISMIC 2/1 EFFECTS AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. APPROPRIATE EXAMINATIONS WERE PERFORMED FOLLOWING THE MODIFICATION TO ENSURE THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PIPING SYSTEM WAS MAINTAINED. EXTENSION OF THE PREVIOUS VENT LINE HAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON ANY COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES. NO NEW ACCIDENTS IIAVE BEEN CREATED SINCE NO NEW FAILURE MODES IIAVE BEEN INTRODUCED AND NO NEW SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. THIS MODIFICATION WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVIOUS DESIGN CRITERIA TO ENSURE THAT THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS IS MAINTAINED. VENTS TO TIE BORIC ACID TRANSFER PORTION OF THE CVCS SYSTEM ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE BASIS OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0027, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFilON: Tile DESIGN CHANGE INVOLVED TIE ADDITION / MODIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING IN THE VOGTLE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING: A.) A PERMANENT REACTOR VESSEL HEAD RADIATION SHIELD (PilS) ADDED TO TIE REACTOR VESSEL INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE, THE PHS CONSISTED OF 24 CURVED PLATES,76 INCH RADIUS,1.5 INCH TillCK, AND REPLACED THE PREVIOUS 3/16 INCH THICK PANELS THAT WERE ATTACHED TO TIE LOWER COOLING SilROUD ASSEMBLY OF TIIE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE. TIIE PHS SHIELD IS PERMANENTLY ATTACHED AND BOLTED TO THE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY MAINTENANCE. HINGED DOORS ARE PROVIDED FOR ACCESS TO THE REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE AND PIPING 118

l l l 1 FLANGES, AND THERMOCOUPLE CONOSEALS. B.) liOLES WERE CUT IN TIE MIDDLE COOLING SilROUD OF TIE REACTOR VESSEL INTEGRATED IEAD PACKAGE TO INSTALL FOUR ACCESS DOORS. TIIESE DOORS WERE FORMED OUT OF DIE OLD DOORS IN DE LOWER SHROUD ASSEMBLY TilAT WERE REPLACED, TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ACCESS TO TIE THERMOCOUPLE CONOSEALS DURING THE PLANT OLITAGES. C.) A REMOVABLE CONNECTION (UNION) TO TIE REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (RVLIS) TUBING WAS ADDED APPROXIMATELY 4 INCHES OUTSIDE OF THE PilS. Tills ENABLES MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO DISCONNECT THE RVLIS TUBING WITHOUT GOING INSIDE THE PilS BEFORE LIFilNG Tile INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE DURING EACli REFUELING OUTAGE. Tile CHANGES DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL REDUCE RADIATION EXPOSURE TO THE PERSONNEL DURING MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS BY APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT, AND ELIMINATE TiiE NEED FOR TEMPORARY SIIIELDING AROUND THE REACTOR INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE DURING EACil REFUELING OLITAGE. ALSO, TiiE ADDITION OF A UNION ON THE RVLIS TUBING APPROXIMATELY 4 INCIES OUTSIDE THE PilS ALLOWS RVLIS TUBING TO BE DISCONNECTED WITilOUT GOING INSIDE TIE PilS BEFORE LIFFING TIE INTEGRATED LEAD PACKAGE DURING EACH REFUELING OUTAGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: A.) CALCULATION M2X5DY01311-B, REV. Al, WAS - PERFORMED TO DETERMINE Tile EFFECTS OF TIIE ADDITION OF A UNION TO THE RVLIS TUBING, INDICATED THAT THE STRESSES IN Tile TUBING AND Tile ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS ARE WITHIN THE DESIGN ALLOWABLES OF THE ASME CODE. B.) AS DISCUSSED IN THE ATTACIED WESTINGHOUSE SECL 93-075, PAGE 8 OF 10, AND LETTER GP-15935, TIE ADDITION OF TiiE PilS AND MODIFICATION TO Tile MIDDLE SHROUD ASSEMBLY DOES NOT INCREASE Tile STRESSES IN TIIE REACTOR VESSEL AND CONNECTED COMPONENTS BEYOND Tile ASME ALLOWABLES. ALSO, THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD LIFTING RIG CONTINUES TO COMPLY WrrH TIIE NUREG 0612. Tile ADDITION OF THE PIIS DOES NOT AFFECT Tile RESPONSE OF TIIE REACTOR VESSEL AND CONNECTED COMPONENTS TO PREVIOUSLY POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THE STRESSES IN TIIE RVLIS TUBING DID NOT INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY DUE TO TIE ADDITION OF A UNION, AND REMAIN WITlilN TIE DESIGN ALLOWABLES. THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR WERE NOT BE INCREASED DUE TO THESE CHANGES. PHS AND MIDDLE COOLING SHROUD ARE NON-SAFETY-RELATED PASSIVE COMPONENTS TIIAT ARE SUPPORTED AND CONNECTED TO TIE REACTOR INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE TO SEISMIC CATEGORY I REQUIREMENTS. Tile RVLIS TUBING, WITH NEW UNION, AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS SATISFIES THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY I STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS. IN ADDITION, TILE WEIGitT OF THE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE, INCLUDING THE ADDITIONAL WEIGilT OF PHS, DOES NOT EXCEED Ti!E CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE CAPACITY OF 225 TONS DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. SEISMIC AND STRESS ANALYSES OF THE REACTOR VESSEL, ITS COMPONENTS, AND RVLIS TU.BING WERE PERFORMED FOR TIE CHANGES IDENTIFIED IN Tills DCP. THE PliS PANELS ARE COATED WITH CARBOLINE CARBOZINC 11 SG ZINC PRIMER OF 2.5-5.0 MIL DRY FILM THICKNESS. TIESE PHS PANELS REPLACED THE PREVIOUS 3/16 INCII THICK PANELS FOR THE LOWER SHROUD COOLING ASSEMBL,Y TilAT WAS PREVIOUSLY COATED WITil MOBIL 13-G-10 UNIPAK ZINC PRIMER OF 4-6 MIL TiiICKNESS. THEREFORE, THIS PORTION OF THE DESIGN CilANGE REPRESENTED A REPLACEMENT ONLY. TIE TOTAL SURFACE AREA OF THE ZINC COATING INSIDE TIE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT REMAINS THE SAME. THUS, A REVISION TO THE IIYDROGEN GENERATION ANALYSIS IS NOT REQUIRED. THE PilS IS COATED WITIl Q CLASS QUALIFIED COATING. TilEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF Tile CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN BLOCKAGE DURING LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT (LOCA) IS NOT INCREASED. BASED UPON THE ABOVE DISCUSSION AND A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3.3.6, 3/4.4.10, AND 6.7.4.E, AND THEIR BASES, Tile ACTIVITY DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. I19

l l l l l

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0045, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: GEORGIA POWER COMPANY HAS UNDERTAKEN A PROGRAM TO UPRATE VOOTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP), UNITS 1 AND 2 TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT WHICH RESULTED IN AN ADDITIONAL OUTPUT OF APPROXIMATELY 50 MWE FOR EACH UNIT. IN ADDITION TO TIE POWER UPRATE, A REDUCTION IN THE DESIGN REACTOR VESSEL OUTLET TEMPERATURE (T-HOT) WITH UP TO 10% STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGGING WAS IMPLEhENTED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED TIE T-HOT REDUCTION WHICH CORRESPONDS TO A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (T-AVG) RANGE OF 588.4 F TO 570.7 F (T- - IlOT REDUCTION OF 16.8 'F). GEORGIA POWER COMPANY HAS ESTABLISHED A TARGET T-AVG TEMPERATURE OF 583.4 'F TO ACHIEVE TIE DESIRED PLANT ELECTRICAL POWER OUTPUT FOR PLANT OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED OUTSIDE OF TIEIR DESIGN LIMITS. TIERE WERE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING THEIR SAME FUNCTIONS. THE EXISTING DESIGN BASIS FOR FLOODING LEVELS INSIDE CONTAINMENT, WHICH CONSIDERS A POSTULATED MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OR MAIN FEED WATER LINE BREAK AS TIE MOST SEVERE FLUID RELEASE CONDITION, WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE T-iiOT REDUCTION SINCE THE FLUID RELEASE IS BASED ON A STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE CORRESPONDING TO A ZERO LOAD CONDITION WlilCli BOUNDS TIE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE FOR TIE RANGE OF T-HOT VALUES ASSOCIATED WITli T HOT REDUCTION. STEAM GENERATOR INVENTORY WAS NOT AFFECTED BY TIE T HOT REDUCTION. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF Tills MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED TIIE T HOT REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOR WHICli IT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED SINCE THE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS (E.G., PRESSURE (REFERENCE 5), TEMPERATURE, DOSE) INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING ARE BOUNDED BY TIE EXISTING EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. SYSTEMS WITH DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS CONrlNUE TO FUNCrlON AS INTENDED AND WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY WERE NOT ALTERED BY Tile DCP. THE DCP HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON TIE CAPABILITY OF SYSTEMS TO PERFORM TiiEIR SAFETY FUNCTION. NO NEW LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED NOR HAVE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES BEEN DEFINED FOR ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENT AS A RESULT OF Tills MODIFICATION. OPERATION WITHIN TIE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND CRITERIA LIMITS FOR ALL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDES FOR TIE MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES UNDER TIE REDUCED TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, OR FAILURE hECHANISMS WERE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE T HOT REDUCrlON. CHANGES TO COMPONENTS, OR ADDITIONS OF NEW COMPONENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED FOR TIE DCP. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITH ANY SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS NOR WERE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS CREATED. ANALYSES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED (REFERENCE 1) WlHCH DEMONSTRATES THAT TIE T llOT REDUCTION DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT TIIE FUNCTION OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. TIE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DID NOT CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMPONENTS WERE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS WERE  ! CilANGED, NOR WERE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR TIE DCP. TIERE WERE l 120 - 1 1

NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES WHICH CREATE TIE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW TYPE OF MALFUNCTION. THE DCP HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE AVAILABILITY, OPERABILITY, OR PERFORMANCE OF PLANT EQUIPMENT (REFERENCE 1). THE PLANT RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS HAS BEEN SHOWN TO REMAIN WITHIN ANALYZED CONDITIONS FOR TRANSIENT RESPONSE AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-V2N0049, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED THE POWER UP RATE FOR VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT I FROM A NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) POWER LEVEL OF 3425 MWT TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED OUTSIDE OF THEIR DESIGN LIMITS. THERE ARE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. ADDITIONALLY, SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING THEIR S AME FUNCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THOSE SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR WHICH POWER UP RATE HAS AN EFFECT HAVE BEEN EVALUATED (REFERENCE 1) AND IT HAS BEEN DETERhENED THAT THESE EVALUATIONS ARE BOUNDED BY THE NEW AND EXISTING DESIGN CRITERIA. ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NEW DESIGN CRITERIA HAS BEEN EVALUATED IT WAS DETERMINED THAT FOR THE BECHTEL SCOPE OF THE ACTIVITY, NSCW IS THE ONLY SYSTEM WHICH COULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF AFFECTING ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS. THE NSCW SYSTEM PROVIDES COOLING TO PLANT COMPONENTS DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, AND TRANSFERS THE IIEAT REMOVED FROM THESE SYSTEMS TO THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK. CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED (REFERENCES 8 AND 9) TO CONFIRM TilAT THE MAXIMUM NSCW TOWER BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW THE DESIGN BASIS BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE, AND THE NSCW TOWER BASIN INVENTORY AVAILABILITY MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.27 FOR THE INCREASED POWER LEVEL. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. SYSTEMS WITH DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS POST-ACCIDENT CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED AND WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION ADDITIONALLY, EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY ARE NOT ALTERED BY THE ACTIVITY. THE DESIGN BASES FOR THE LIQUID, SOLID, AND GASEOUS WASTE SYSTEMS AND THE PROCESS AND  ; EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON l SOURCE TERMS AND WASTE VOLUMES ASSOCIATED WITH A REACTOR CORE THERMAL i POWER LEVEL OF 3565 MWT, WHICH IS TIE UP RATED POWER LEVEL. ADDITIONALLY, NO I CHANGES ARE MADE TO THE NSCW SYSTEM DESIGN WHICH DETECTS AND PREVENTS  ! LEAKAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT OF RADIO ACTIVE CONTAMINATION THAT MAY ENTER l THE NSCW SYSTEM FROM THE CCW SYSTEM, ACCW SYSTEM, OR THE CONTAINMENT l COOLERS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, FAILURE MECHANISMS, OR LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES ARE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE POWER UP RATE. CHANGES TO COMPONE!frS, OR ADDITIONS OF NEW COMPONENTS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR ' IRIS ACTIVITY. ADDITIONALLY, THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITH ANY SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS NOR ARE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS CREATED. IN ADDITION, CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN, AFTER RERATE, TO THE SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) COOLING SYSTEM DUE TO THE POTENTIAL INCREASE IN HEAT LOAD. THE SFP COOLING SYSTEM WAS EVALUATED (REFERENCES 4 AND 5) TO DETERMINE THE SYSTEM CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN DESIGN FUEL POOL TEMPERATURE WfrH ONE TRAIN IN OPERATION. THE SFP COOLING SYSTEMS 121

FOR UNITS 1 AND 2 ARE THE SAME DESIGN, HOWEVER,lilGil DENSITY FUEL STORAGE RACKS IIAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN 'nlE UNIT 2 SFP. TIE UNIT 2 SFP IS DESIGNED TO CONTAIN 2098 FUEL ASSEMBLIES, WHICH IS GREATER TIIAN THE ORIGINAL UNIT I DESIGN STORAGE CAPACITY OF 936 FUEL ASSEMBLIES. SINCE TIIE STORAGE CAPACITY i FOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IS GREATER FOR THE UNIT 2 SFP, THE lEAT REMOVAL l REQUIREMENTS ARE ALSO GREATER TilAN THOSE FOR THE UNIT 1 SFP. THEREFORE, THE j UNIT 2 SFP COOLING SYSTEM ANALYSIS BOUNDS THE UNIT I DESIGN. FOR NORMAL REFUELING, TIE UNIT 2 SFP TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW 140 F. IN ADDITION, FOR MAXIMUM NORMAL REFUELING AND MAXIMUM EMERGENCY CORE UNLOADING, THE POOL TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW BOILING AND THE MAXIMUM DESIGN TEMPERATURE FOR TIE SFP. (FOR THE DEFINITIONS OF THESE REFUELING CONDITIONS, SEE FSAR SECTION 9.1.3.1.) THEREFORE, REFERENCES 4 AND 5 ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP 9.1.3. ANALYSES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED (REFERENCE 1) WHICII DEMONSTRATE TilAT TIE ACTIVITY WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT Tim FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. NO NEW COMPONENTS ARE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS ARE CilANGED, NOR ARE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR THE ACTIVITY. FURTHER, TilERE ARE NO PilYSICAL PLANT CliANGES WHICil INCREASE THE LIKELillOOD OF A MALFUNCTION. WESTINGHOUSE EVALUATIONS (WCAP-13001) HAVE DETERMINED TilAT TIIE BOUNDING ACCIDENT FOR TIIE MAXIMUM PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE IS Tile LARGE BREAK LOCA INSTEAD OF Tile STEAM LINE BREAK. THE MARGIN OF S AFETY AS DEFINED IN Tile TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE Tile CALCULATED CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSURE (REFERENCE 1) DOES NOT EXCEED TIIE EXISTING DESIGN I,)RESSURE OF 52 PSIG FOR THE LOCA.

SUBJECT:

DCP: 93-VAN 0056, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tills CHANGE ADDED TWO FUSES IN THE CIRCUIT SUPPLYING 120V POWER TO TIIE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER (1/2TI40160 AND 1/2TI40161) LOCATED IN Tile HYDROGEN RECOMBINER CONTROL PANEL (1/2 1513-P5-ERA AND 1/2 1513-P5-ERB). THE < TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, TIERMOCOUPLE SELECTOR SWITCll (1/2TS40160 AND 1/2TS40161), TIERMOCOUPLES (1/2TE40160A,1/2TE40160B,1/2TE40160C,1/2TE40161 A, 1/2TE40161B, AND 1/2TE40161C) AND ASSOCIATED CABLES (1/2ACPERAXC, XD, XE, XF, XG, X11, AND 1/2BCPERBXC, XD, XE, XF, XG, XH) WERE RECLASSIFIED AS NON-lE (61J FOR INSTRUtvENTS AND 62E FOR CABLE). THE FUSES, ASSOCIATED FUSE BLOCK, AND WIRING FROM TIIE EXISTING POWER SUPPLY TO Tile FUSE ARE CLASS lE. Tile WlRING FROM THE FUSE TO Tile TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER IS NON-lE. THE NON-lE WIRING IIAS BEEN ANALYZED TO SilOW THAT INSUFFICIENT ENERGY EXISTS TO DAMAGE ANY CLASS lE WIRING. TIE THERMOCOUPLES AND THE CABLES TO THE THERMOCOUPLES WERE INSTALLED AND ARE MAINTAINED Tile SAME AS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. TIIE HYDROGEN RECOMBINER CONTROL PANEL IS LOCATED ON LEVEL B OF TIE CONTROL BUILDING. Tile CONFIGURATION AND ELECTRICAL PROTECTION OF THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY Tills CilANGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE TIIE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT. TIE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER (READOUT) IS USED TO DETERMINE THE IIYDROGEN RECOMBINER HEATER SHEATH TEMPERATURE DURING PERIODIC CHECKOUT OR TESTING OF THE RECOMBINER. IT PERFORMS NO CONTROL FUNCTION AND IS NOT REQUIRED FOR PROPER OPERATION OF THE RECOMBINER. A CLASS lE QUALIFIED WA'IT METER IS PROVIDED AT THE RECOMBINER CONTROL PANEL TO DETERMINE PROPER llEATER OUTPUT. A CLASS lE FUSE PROVIDES ELECTRICAL SEPARATION OF THE RECOMBINER IEATER/ CONTROLS AND Tile NON-SAFETY RELATED TEMPERATURE READOUT. FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT. THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER SERVES ONLY AN INDICATION FUNCTION. RECLASSIFYING Tim TEMPERATURE 122

CONTROLLER llAS NO EFFECT ON Tile CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. FAILURE OF Tim CONTROLLER HAS NO EFFECT ON ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. TilESE FUSES AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITRY llAVE BEEN ANALYZED TO ASSURE THAT NO CREDIBLE FAILURE OF Tim RECLASSIFIED NON 1E EQUIPMENT DEGRADES TIE OPERATION OF ANY CLASS IE EQUIPMENT. THIS CHANGE DID NOT }{ AVE ANY EFFECT ON TIIE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.6.4.2 ADDRESSES THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TIE HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT AITECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 89-VIM 046, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Soli (STATIC O-RING) SWITCII MODEL NUMBER 102AS-AA702-RRX IS NO LONGER A.VAILABLE TilROUGH THE VENDOR. MODEL NUMBER 103Wl-AA502-N4-Cl A-RRX HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE A DIRECT REPLACEMENT FOR TIE OBSOLETE PART NEW SWITCH WAS INSTALLED ON THE REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP FLOW SWITCli. THE NEW SWITCH DIFFERS ONLY IN MOUNTING DETAILS. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.2.7 DESCRIBES THE REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FACILITY. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY TIE REQUIRED MODEL NUMBER ASSOCIATED WITil THE RMW PUMP FLOW SWITCH. THE OPERATION OF THE REPLACEMENT SWITCH IS IDENTICAL TO TIE PREV!OUSLY INSTALLED SWITCH. THE REACTOR WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR DOES IT IMPACT ANY OTHER SYSTEM'S FUNCTION AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 89-V2M047, REVISION 0. SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: AN EXISTING CLEANOUT BRANCH ON DRAIN LINE 2-1225-0318" WAS NOT FUNCTIONAL DUE TO AN EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE. TO RESOLVE Tills INTERFERENCE, TIE CLEANOUT BRANCH WAS ROTATED 45 DEGREES FROM THE ORIGINAL DESIGN ORIENTATION TO PERMIT FUTURE USE OF Tile DRAIN LINE CLEANOUT. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEMS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.3. TIIE ADDITION OF A LINE CLEANOUT DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE TO TIE DESCRifrTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE FSAR. SYSTEM FUNCTION IS NOT ALTERED BY TIIIS CIIANGE. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/411 ADDRESSES RADWASTE. THE REORIENTATION OF A CLEANOUT DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENT CONTAINED WIT 111N Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 89 VlM056, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tile CHANGE INVOLVED THE DEL.ETION OF A PIPING SUPPORT AND THE MODIFICATION OF A PIECE OF DAMAGED SUPPORT STEEL ASSOCIATED WITil TiiE FEEDWA~ER SYSTEM. THE DELETED SUPPORT WAS DETERMINED NOT TO DE TEQUIRED AS DEAD LOADS WERE TRANSMITTED TO ADJACENT SUPPORTS WITil NO ADVERSE AFFECTS. Tile DAMAGED SUPPORT WAS REPLACED WITli A LARGER MEMBER TO PROVIDE COMPLETE LOAD BEARING SURFACE FOR Tile PIPE LUG. 123

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DELETION OF THE SUPPORT AND MODIFICATION OF ANOTIER SUPPORT DID NOT IMPACT SYSTEM DESIGN FUNCTION OR DESIGN FUNCTION CAPABILITY. A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 ADDRESSING TIE FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS DID NOT REVEAL ANY MENTION OF REQUIRED SUPPORTS. TIE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT DEVIATE FROM THE ESTABLISHED CODES AND STANDARDS COMMITTED TO IN THE FSAR. TIIE SUPPORTS WERE NOT REQUIRED BY THE PLANT 4 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO SUPPORT SYSTEM OPERABILITY. l

SUBJECT:

MDD 89-VIM 058, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRil'flON: TIE FLOW ELEMENTS ORIGINALLY INSTALLED FOR INDICATION OF DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP FLOW DID NOT PRODUCE THE CORRECT l FLOW INDICATION ON IF1-19104 AND IF1-19105. THE NEW FLOW ELEMENTS WILL i PRODUCE THE PROPER FLOW INDICATION DURING PUMP TESTING IN WillCH GPM l MEASUREMENTS MUST BE TAKEN. ) l SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3.1 DESCRIBES ON SITE POWER I DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE DIESEL GENERATORS. TIE DISCUSSION DOES NOT IN.CLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF TIE FLOW ELEMENTS / ORIFICES TO BE USED IN TIE FUEL OIL TRANSFER SYSTEM. Tile CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT DIESEL GENERATOR DESIGN OR FUNCTION. TIIE FUEL OIL TRANSFER SYSTEM FLOW DEVICES ARE NOT A PART OF TIE STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 89-V2M076 REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: ADDITION OF A 1/2" N.P.T. CONNECTION FOR USING NITROGEN GAS AS A B ACKUP TO TIE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM FOR THE UNIT 2 LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (2301) IN THE EVENT THAT AIR COMPRESSOR 2 2301-C4-502 IS OUT OF SERVICE OR TiiE DRYER DESICCANT IS BEING REPLACED. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.5.1 DISCUSSES THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM. THE ADDITION OF THIS BACKUP CONNECTION ENHANCES FIRE PROTECrlON AVAILABILITY IN Tile LOW VOLTAGE SWITCilYARD. TlilS ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN TIE FSAR. THE CilANGE WILL NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION NOR WILL IT AFFECT Tile WAY IN WHICH Tile SYSTEM IS OPERATED. THE FIRE PROTECrlON SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 89-V2M122, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tile CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK DEGASIFIER PUMP OUTLET PRESSURE INDICATORS (2PI-5058,5062 AND 5064) WERE CHANGED FROM A 0-60 PSIG GAUGE TO A 0-100 PSIG. Tile NORMAL OPERATING DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF TIE CST DEG ASIFIER PUMPS IS APPROXIMATELY 65 PSIG. l l SAFL~rY EVALUATION: Tile CST DEGASIFIER PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.6. REPLACEMENT OF Tile DISCilARGE PRESSURE INDICATORS WILL NOT l AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION AS DISCUSSED IN Tills SECTION OR ANY ACCIDENT I ANALYSIS CONTAINED WITHIN CIIAPTER 15. Tile CllANGE WILL NOT AFFECT CST l EMERGENCY RESERVE LEVELS INTENDED FOR SAFETY USE. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TABLE 3.4-2) REQUIRES DISSOLVED OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TO DE LESS THAN 100 PPB. Tile DESCRIBED CilANGE WILL NOT AFFECT Tile ABILITY OF TIIE SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN THIS LIMIT. 124

SUBJECT:

MDD 90-VIM 131, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: HARDWARE CilANGES WERE IMPLEMENTED ON TIIE PROTEUS COMPlTTER TO SUPPORT Tile PROTEUS COMPLITER SYSTEM RE-DESIGN. THE CilANGES INVOLVED TIE ADDITION OF MEMORY CARDS, DEVICE CONTROLLER CARDS, CABLES AND A MODEM. Tile CIIANGES PROVIDE THE ABILITY FOR SYSTEM EXPANSION AND PC CONNECTIONS TO TIE SYSTEM ALLOWING FOR DATA REVIEW, MANIPULATION, AND PROGRAMMING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FROM A PC, PROM ClllPS WERE ALSO ADDED TO THE SYSTEM BOOTSTRAP CONTROLLER (SBC) TO SUPPORT NEW STOP LOG SOFTWARE FOR AUTOMATIC SBC OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 7.5 AND 7.7 ADDRESS THE IIARDWARE ASPECTS OF TIE PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM. THE IIARDWARE CHANGES WERE COMPATIBLE WITH SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND DO NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THE COMPUTER TO PERFORM TIESE FUNCTIONS. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FUNCTIONS PERFORNED BY TIE COMPUTER SYSTEM ARE DESCRIBED IN SECTIONS 3/4.1.3,3/4.2.1, 3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.31. Tile CHANGES DID NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF TIE COMPUTER SYSTEM TO CONTINUE TO PERFORM T1ESE FUNCTIONS. ,

SUBJECT:

MDD 90 V2M132, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRilrTION: 11ARDWARE CHANGES WERE IMPLEhENTED ON TIE PROTEUS COMPUTER ) TO SUPPORT Tile PROTEUS COMPUTER SYSTEM RE-DESIGN. THE CilANGES INVOLVED l Tile ADDITION OF MEMORY CARDS, DEVICE CONTROLLER CARDS, CABLES AND A  ! MODEM. THE CHANGES PROVIDE TIE ABILITY FOR SYSTEM EXPANSION AND PC i CONNECTIONS TO THE SYSTEM ALLOWING FOR DATA REVIEW, MANIPULATION, AND PROGRAMMING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FROM A PC. PROM CHIPS WERE ALSO I ADDED TO THE SYSTEM BOOTSTRAP CONTROLLER (SBC) TO SUPPORT NEW STOP LOG SOFTWARE FOR AUTOMATIC SBC OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 7.5 AND 7.7 ADDRESS THE IIARDWARE ASPECTS OF TIE PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM. THE HARDWARE CHANGES WERE COMPATIBLE WITH SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND DO NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF Tile COMPlJTER TO PERFORM TIESE FUNCTIONS. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE COMPUTER SYSTEM ARE DESCRIBED IN SECTIONS 3/4.1.3,3/4.2.1, 3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.3-1. TIE CilANGES DID NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF TIIE COMPUTER SYSTEM TO CONTINUE TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VlM001, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRWTION: PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE IPV 41217,' STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN TO CONDENSER" POSITIONER INPUT SIGNAL WAS CilANGED FROM 6-18 PSIG TO 6-30 PSIG BY REPLACEMENT OF THE RANGE SPRING. TIE CHANGE WAS NECESSA'W TO PREVENT IMPROPER VALVE OPERATION AND OSCILLATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.8 DISCUSSES THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM OPERATION AND FLOW PATHS. THE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE IS DISCUSSED AS TO ITS FUNCTION HOWEVER NOT TO TIIE DETAIL OF SPRING PACK SIZING. 125

l I I VALVE OPERAT]ON/ FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.6 AND 3/4.7 ADDRESSING CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AND PLANT SYSTEMS INDICATED THAT THE NATURE OF THIS C11ANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY SPECIFICATION, 1

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M002, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE 2PV-41217," STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN TO CONDENSER" POSITIONER INPUT SIGNAL WAS CHANGED FROM 6-18 PSIG TO 6-30 PSIG BY REPLACEMENT OF TifE RANGE SPRING. Tile CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT IMPROPER VALVE OPERATION AND OSCILLATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.8 DISCUSSES THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM OPERATION AND FLOW PATHS. Ti!E PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE IS DISCUSSED AS TO ITS FUNCTION llOWEVER NOT TO THE DETAIL OF SPRING PACK SIZING. VALVE OPERATION / FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CilANGE. A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.6 AND 3/4.7 ADDRESSING CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AND PLANT SYSTEMS INDICATED TliAT TIIE NATURE OF Tills Cl{ANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91 VlM003, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIIrFION: A MOUNTING BRACKET WAS ADDED TO HEATER DRAIN PUMP 1 A TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR TWO VIBRATION PROXIMITY PROBES THAT WILL BE USED TO PROVIDE DETAILED SHAFT VIBRATION DATA. THE MOUNTING BRACKET IS ATTACIIED TO Tile EX1 STING GLAND MOUNTING STUDS THE PROXIMITY PROBES WILL BE CONNECTED TO PORTABLE RECORDERS TO OBTAIN VIBRATION DATA. ALSO INCLUDED IN Til!S ACTIVITY WAS THE ADDITION OF TUBING SUPPORTS ON THE SUCTION IIEAD BEARING LUBE LINE !!frERNAL TO Tile PUMP. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF VIBRATION PROBE MOUNTING BRACKETS AND TUBING WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF Tile PUMP OR ITS OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.7. TIIESE ADDITIONS DO NOT IMPACT ANY DESCRIlrTION PRESENTED IN Tills SECTION. THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIMOIS, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE ACTUATOR SPRING ON THE COOLING TOWER LEVEL CONTROL VALVES (ILV-272688,27268C AND 27268D) AND THE BLOWDOWN SUMP DILUTION VALVES (AHV-17672B,17673B AND 176778) WERE REPLACED WITil A LARGER SPRING TO HELP  ; OVERCOME VALVE BINDING. IN ADDITION, Tile AIR SET PRESSURE WAS INCREASED TO i 33 PSIG FROM 18 PSIG. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION AND , OPERATION OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM. MAKEUP AND BLOWDOWN IS l GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION HOWEVER NOT TO THE EXTENT THAT WOULD SPECIFY SPRING SIZES. THE SPRING REPLACEMENT DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN { FUNCTION OF THESE VALVES NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE VALVES i 126

I l l ARE MANIPULATED. TifE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY 4 STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION..

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M017, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: THE RUNNING SPEED OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP WAS INCREASED FROM 4200 RPMS TO 4230 RPMS. THIS SPEED CORRESPONDS TO A CONTROL ROOM DEMAND SIGNAL OF 100% SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH TIE OVERSPEED TRIP CIRCUITS WERE NOT CHANGED. THIS CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE (1675 PSIG) AND FLOW (145 GPM) ARE MET. TIESE PARAMETERS WERE MARGINAL AT TIE PREVIOUS RATED SPEED. SAFETY EVALUATION: INCREASING THE RATED RUNNING SPEED RAISE TIE PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE FROM 1675 PSIG TO 1715 PSIG. THIS VALUE IS WELL BELOW TIE PUMP PRESSURE DESIGN OF 2000 PSIG AND LINE DESIGN OF 1975. FLOW AT TIE HIGHER PRESSURE DOES NOT INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT SEEN AT 4200 RPMS. TIE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED ON FSAR SECTION 10.4.9. FIGURE 10.4.9-1 LISTS A TURBINE RPM VALUE OF 4200 RPM. Tills VALUE IS IN REFERENCE TO TiiE SPEED REQUIRED TO MEET THE DESIGN FLOW AND LEAD AND DOES NOT REQUIRE REVISION. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.7.1.2.1.A.2 SETS FORTH TIE REQUIREMENTS PLACED UPON Tile AUXILI ARY FEEDWATER PUMP. THIS REQUIREMENT IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VCM019, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: AT Tile REQUEST OF MAINTENANCE, A GATE WITH PANELS WAS PLACED BETWEEN ROOMS R140 AND R141 AND TIE " HOT" MACHINE SilOP ON LEVEL 1 OF TIIE AUXILIARY BUILDING. IN ADDITION, A SECOND GATE WAS INSTALLED JUST INSIDE DOOR 151 IN THE HOT MACilINE SHOP AND A DOUBLE CAGE DOOR PLACED BETWEEN THE PASSAGE WAY AND ROOM RA150 (AUX BUILDING LEVEL A) TO CONTROL THE USE OF CONTAMINATED TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE ADDITION OF THE GATES AND FENCING TO PROVIDE FOR BE' ITER ACCESS CONTROL IN TIE HOT MACHINE SHOP. THE CHANGES ARE CONSISTENT WITil THE HEALTH PIIYSICS PROGRAM ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 12.5.2 & 3 "HEALTil PilYSICS PROGRAM. THE CHANGFS DO NOT AFFECT ANY DESCRIPTION CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTION 3.0 " DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS". THE IlOT MAC111NE SHOP IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M024, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: A 0.25 MICRO-FARAD />00 VOLT CAPACITOR AND A 150 OHM, ONE WATT RESISTOR WAS ADDED TO THE ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY FOR THE BORON CONCENTRATION METER PARALLEL WITH TIE K5 COIL TO ACT AS A SURGE SUPPRESSER. Tills WAS NECESSARY TO REDUCE TIE INDUCTIVE KICKBACK FROM THE 120 VAC IIEATER RELAY DURING ENERGlZATION AND DE-ENERGIZATION ELIMINATING DAMAGE TO SENSITIVE CIRCUIT COMPONENTS. 127 l l

SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE BORON CONCENTRATION MONITORING SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.7.1.2 "DORON CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM", TABLE 7.7.1.2 " BORON CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS AND 9.3.4.1 " REACTOR MAKEUP UP CONTROL SYSTEM'. TIIE ADDITION OF THE PARALLEL CIRCUIT DOES NOT AFFECT FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM TilEREFORE THE FSAR SECTIONS ARE NOT IMPACTED. TIE ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY IS NOT ADDRESSED BY PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS COVERING THE CVCS SYSTEM.

SUBJECT:

MDD 9l-V2M033, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: 2UQ-14503 SUPPLIES POWER IN THE MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT PANEL USED FOR POWER TO VARIOUS ROSEMOUNT PRESSURE AND DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND OUTSIDE AREAS. TIE POWER SUPPLY WAS CHANGED FROM A 24 VDC SUPPLY TO A 36 VDC SUPPLY. THIS CHANGE PREVENTS EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LOOP RESISTANCE l DURING CALIBRATION WlilCll AFFECTS TRANS MrITER PERFORMANCE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SUBJECT TRANSMITTERS ARE CONTAINED WITHIN I JYSTEMS GENERALLY DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 9.5,10.2 AND 10.4. TIE FSAR DOES VNOT PROVIDE SPECIFICS AS TO POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE OR MODEL NUMBER. TIE POWER SUPPLY OR TRANSMTfTERS FED FROM TIE NEW SUPPLY ARE NOT TIIE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 039, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: AS A RESULT OF SEVERAL PLANT TRIPS DUE TO TIIE DESIGN OF TIE ] STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP SPEED CONTROLS AND OPERATOR INTERFACES, l SEVERAL CHANGES WERE IMPLEMENTED TO TIE CONTROL SYSTEM TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND OPERATOR INTERFACE. Cl!ANGES INCLUDED DELETION OF TIE

   " AUTO" TO " MANUAL" INTERLOCK AND BACKUP POWER SUPPLIES TO THE " SIGNAL MEMORY FUNCTION" AND TIIE FEED PUMP SPEED CONTROL CABINET AND ALARM RELAYS IN TIIE CONTROL CABINET.

SAFETY EVALUATION: DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE CONTROLS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.7. THE SIGNAL { MEMORY FUNCTION, " AUTO" TO " MANUAL" TRANSFER AND CONTROL PANEL POWER l SUPPLIES ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES IN THIS SECTION. THE CilANGES ENHANCE SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND OPERATOR INTERFACE. BACKUP POWER SUPPLIES WILL NOT IMPACT CURRENT SYSTEM OPERATION. THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINES l ARE NOT Tile TOPIC OF ANY STATION TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 046, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tile TIME SYNCIIRONIZE SIGNAL FROM THE ERF COMPUTER TO THE SOE IIAS A NOISE ON IT CAUSING TIE SOE TO RE-SYNCHRONIZE INCORRECTLY. THE NOISE CAN CAUSE Tile SOE TO RE-SYNCHRONIZE EVERY 45 SECONDS GROUNDING TIIE DRAIN CONDUCTOR ON TIE CABLE THAT TRANSMITS TIE SYNCliRONIZE SIGNAL FROM THE ERF WILL REDUCE THE NOISE AND ALLOW THE SOE TO SYNCIIRONIZE CORRECTLY TO THE ERF COMPUTER. TIE DRAIN WILL BE GROUNDED BY A SOE INTERNAL WIRE GOING TO AN ISOLATED GROUND BUS. 128 , I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-. _. ~

SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE GROUNDING OF TiiE DRAIN WIRES ON CONTROL CABLES OR INTERNAL WIRING OF Tile ERF SOE IS NOT COVERED BY SECTION 113 OF Tile VOGTLE EMERGENCY PLAN OR THE FSAR. TiiE ADDITION OF A GROUND WIRE WILL NOT CHANGE Tile FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91 VIM 052, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIE 3/4" TIIREADED PLUG LOCATED ON TIE TOP OF THE CONDENSATE FILTER DEMIN RESIN TRAPS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A 600# GLOBE VALVE AND THREADED CAP VENTING ARRANGEMENT, THE ADDITION OF TIIE VALVES ALLOWS OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO VENT Tile RESIN TRAPS IN A MORE CONTROLLABLE AND SAFE MANNER WHEN PLACING THE TRAP IN SERVICE. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE ADDITION OF TIE VENT VALVES REQUIRES A CilANGE TO FIGURE 10.4.61 TO 1.LLUSTRATE TIE ADDED VALVES. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISIED UNDER LDCR FS 92-093. TIIE ADDITION OF TiiE VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT TIE DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.6 ADDRESSING TIIE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM WILL PERFORM TIIE FUNCTION TO WHICil IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED. TIIE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM IS NOT TIE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M053, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: THE 3/4" TIIREADED PLUG LOCATED ON THE TOP OF TIIE CONDENSATE FILTER DEMIN RESIN TRAPS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A 600# GLOBE VALVE AND TIIREADED CAP VENTING ARRANGEMENT. TIIE ADDITION OF TiiE VALVES ALLOWS OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO VENT TIIE RESIN TRAPS IN A MORE CONTROLLABLE AND SAFE MANNER WlEN PLACING THE TRAP IN SERVICE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF THE VENT VALVES REQUIRES A CHANGE TO FIGURE 10.4.6-1 TO ILLUSTRATE THE ADDED VALVES. Tills WILL BE ACCOMPLISIIED UNDER LDCR FS 92-093. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT TifE DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.6 ADDRESSING THE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM WILL PERFORM THE FUNCTION TO WillCH IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED. TIIE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM IS NOT TIIE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VCMOS(REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIl7 TION: ROOM i19 IN THE CONTROL BUILDING WAS ORIGINALLY SPECIFIED AS THE PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION MONITORING ROOM. TIIE PURPOSE OF TIIE AREA WAS REDEFINED TO ESTABLISil AN AREA FOR CLEARANCE AND TAGGING. TO ACCOMMODATE Tills CilANGE, ONE FIRE DOOR WAS DELETED AND A 3-HOUR FIRE WALL DERATED. NO FIRE AREA BOUNDARY WAS IMPACTED BY THIS CHANGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: TifE FIRE IIAZARDS ANALYSIS AND TiiE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECrlONS 9.A AND 9.5.1 RESPECTIVELY. TIE DELETED DOOR IS NOT PART OF ANY FIRE AREA BOUNDARY AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. Tile DERATING OF TIIE 3-HOUR BARRIER IS PERMITTED DUE TO THE CONTINUOUS OCCUPANCY OF TIE NEWLY DESIGNATED AREA. CHANGES TO TILS FSAR AS A RESULT OF 129

l THIS CilANGE HAVE BEEN INITIATED VIA AN LL)CR. THE FIRE PROTECrlON PROGRAM IS NOT TIIE SUBJECT OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M058, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIFTION: THE CST DEGASIFIER TRANSFER PUMP FLOW INDICATION WAS UNDER-RANGED. TIIE PUMP OPERATES AT APPROXIMATELY 440 GPM WHICH CORRESPONDS TO 300 IN 1120 DP. EXISTING MODEL (RANGE 20 TO 200 IN H2O DP) WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW MODEL HAVING A RANGE OF 200 TO 850 IN 1120 DP. FLOW INDICATOR WAS ALSO REPLACED WITF1 A 0 TO 500 GPM INDICATOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE CST DEGASIFIER TRANSFER PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.6 " CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITY". REPLACEMENT OF TIE TRANSFER PUMP FLOW TRANSMITTER AND INDICATOR WILL NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION AS DESCRIBED IN Tills SECTION OR ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CONTAINED WITlilN CHAPTER 15. THE CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT CST EMERGENCY LEVELS INTENDED FOR SAFETY USE. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TABLE 3.4-2) REQUIRES DISSOLVED OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TO BE LESS THAN 100 PPB. THE DESCRIBED ACTIVITY WILL NOR AFFECT TIE ABILITY OF Tile SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN TlHS LIMIT.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91 VIM 066, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRiirrlON: THE LEADS FOR THE ION CHROMATOGRAPH CONDUCTIVITY DETECTOR LOCATED IN TiiE PASS PANEL WERE FITTED WITil A FEMALE CONNECTOR TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING TIE DETECTOR AND CELL WHICH IIAS A MALE CONNECTOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. THE DETAILS OF THE WIRING CONFIGURATION OF TIE DETECTOR AND CELL ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE ADDITION OF Tile CONNECTOR DOES NOT IMPACT DETECTOlVCELL OPERATION OR CALIBRATION. THE CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT OPERATIONS OF PASS AS REQUIRED IN TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.7.4.D.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M067, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: THE LEADS FOR Tile ION CHROMATOGRAPil CONDUCflVITY DETECTOR LOCATED IN TFE PASS PANEL WERE FITTED WITH A FEMALE CONNECTOR TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING TIIE DETECTOR AND CELL WHICH llAS A MALE CONNECTOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. TIIE DETAILS OF THE WIRING CONFIGURATION OF THE DETECTOR AND CELL ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE ADDITION OF TIIE CONNECTOR DOES NOT IMPACT DETECTOR / CELL OPERATION OR CALIBRATION. Tim CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT OPERATIONS OF PASS AS REQUIRED IN TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.7.4.D.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 070, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL PLATFORM STRUCTURES AND ASSOCIATED LADDERS WERE ADDED TO ENHANCE ACCESS TO THE CONDENSATE (POWDEX) 130

I DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM VESSEL INLET AND OUTLET VALVES. IN ADDITION, MANIPULATION OF TIE MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES WILL DE VIA LOCAL llANDWHEEL OPERATOR INSTEAD OF Tile FLOOR OPERATED CHAIN OPERATOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile ADDITION OF A PLATFORMS AND LADDERS TO ALLOW - ENHANCED OPERATION OF THE POWDEX INLET AND OUTLET MANUAL VALVES DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10

  " STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION",9.3 " PROCESS AUXILIARIES" AND 9.5 "OTilER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS". TIE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENTS STATED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (3/4.7 " PLANT SYSTEMS").

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL PLATFORM STRUCTURES AND ASSOCIATED LADDERS WERE ADDED TO ENHANCE ACCESS TO TIE CONDENSATE (POWDEX) DEMINERALI2ER SYSTEM VESSEL INLET AND OUTLET VALVES. IN ADDITION, MANIPULATION OF THE MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES WILL BE VIA LOCAL HANDWlEEL OPERATOR INSTEAD OF Tile FLOOR OPERATED C11AIN OPFEATOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF A PLATFORMS AND LADDERS TO ALLOW ENilANCED OPERATION OF THE POWDEX INLET AND OUTLET MANUAL VALVES DOES NOT AFFECT TiiE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10

  " STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION",9.3 " PROCESS AUXILIARIES" AND 9.5 "OTIER        ;

AUXILIARY SYSTEMS". THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENTS l STATED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (3/4.7 " PLANT SYSTEMS"). l

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M073, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tile MODIFICATION CONSISTED OF INSTALLATION OF INSULATED SUPPORTS AT THE COLLECTOR HOUSING. TIE SUPPORTS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL STRENGTH TO TIE EXCITATION BUSES WlEN TIEY ARE DlSASSEMBLED FOR GENERATOR MAINTENANCE. THE ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS WERE RECOMhENDED BY GE (TURBINE-GENERATOR SUPPLIER). SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE TURBINE GENERATOR AND ITS AUXILIARIES. THE ADDITION OF THE 1 SUPPORTS ON Tile EXCITATION BUSES DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION. THE l CIIANGE DOES NOT IMPACT Tile TURBINE TRIP CAPABILITIES AS REQUIRED BY Tile PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VlM076, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: PERSONNEL BARRIERS MEETING THE SECURITY BARRIER REQUIREMENTS WERE INSTALLED AT THE OPENINGS FOR THE TENDON ACCESS SIIAFT NEAR CONTAINMENT BUTTRESS NO. 2 AND AT PIPE PENETRATION ROOM RB-08 TO PROHIBIT ACCESS INTO NON-DESIRABLE PLANT AREAS DURING MAINTENANCE ON THE VSL  ; PLATFORMS WlEN THE BUTTRESS COVER IS REMOVED WITilOUT POSTINO SECURITY l PERSONNEL. 1 SAFL~TY EVALUATION: THE ADDED BARRIERS DO NOT RESULT IN A PHYSICAL CHANGE WillCil ALTERS THE FUNCTION OF A STRUCTURE OR SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN 131

Tile FSAR. THE BARRIERS DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION NOR ARE THEY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. Tills CHANGE IS BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECrlONS 3.2,3.5,3.6 AND CHAPTERS 13,14 AND 15. TIIE BARRIERS ARE NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF TIIE TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.  ;

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M077, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: PERSONNEL BARRIERS MEETING Tile SECURITY BARRIER REQUIREMENTS WERE INSTALLED AT Tile OPENINGS FOR TIE TENDON ACCESS SHAFT NEAR CONTAINMENT BUTTRESS NO. 2 AND AT PIPE PENETRATION ROOM RB-08 TO PROHIBIT ACCESS INTO NON-DESIRABLE PLANT AREAS DURING MAINTENANCE ON THE VSL PLATFORMS WilEN TIE BirITRESS COVER IS REMOVED WITliOUT POSTING SECURITY PERSONNEL. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE ADDED BARRIERS DO NOT RESULT IN A PilYSICAL CilANGE WillCII ALTERS TIIE FUNCTION OF A STRUCTURE OR SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN TIIE FSAR. THE BARRIERS DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION NOR ARE TIEY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THIS CHANGE IS BEYOND Tile LEVEL OF DETAIL DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 3.2,3.5,3.6 AND CliAPIERS 13,14 AND 15. TIIE BARRIERS ARE NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF TIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91 V2M078,REV1510N O, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: A FLOW REDUCING BAFFLE PLATE WAS ADDED INTO TiiE SUPPLY DUCT FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM 220 (llOUSING TRAIN B OF TIIE PIPING PENETRATION AREA FILTRATION AND EXilAUST SYSTEM) TO ENABLE ADJUSTMENT OF Tile AIR FLOW TO WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE. Tile DESIRED BAFFLE PLATE CONFIGURATION WAS ADDED TO DRAWING AX4DJ0005, DETAIL 29. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE DESCRIIrrlON OF TIIE PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS CONTAINED IN FSAR SECrlON 9.4 DOES NOT EXTEND TO Tile DETAILS OF DUCT SYSTEM - CONSTRUCTION. THE USE OF BAFFLES / ORIFICES IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE VENTILATION DUCT DESIGN DRAWINGS. THE ABILITY TO PROPERLY ADJUST SYSTEM FLOWS WILL ENSURE THAT VENTILATION SYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITillN THEIR DESIGN CAPACITY. THE UNIT 2 TRAIN B PPAFES (R-220) IS MAINTAINED AT O.25" NEGATIVE PRESSURE PER TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION 4.7.7.D.3. ADDITION OF TIE BAFFLE WILL PERMIT SUPPLY FLOW TO BE ADJUSTED SO TIIAT Tills SPECIFICATION IS SATISFIED.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M080, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: TIIE SUCrlON PRESSURE INDICATOR ASSOCIATED WITil TIIE WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED PUMP WAS OVER-RANGED FOR ITS INTENDED OPERATING CONDITION. NORMAL OPERATING RANGE IS APPROXIMATELY 3 PSIG. TiiE EXISTING 0 TO 200 PSIG WAS REPLACED WITil A 0 TO 15 PSIG INDICATOR. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 11.2 WillCil DESCRIBES Tile LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEMS. Tile RANGE OF TIIE SUCrlON PRESSURE INDICATOR ASSOCIATED WITil TIE FEED PUMP WAS NOT SPECIFIED. THE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION. 132 i

I Tile WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED PUMP IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. I

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 085, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 1 DESCRIPTION: THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK STRAINER LOCATED ON TiiE DISCilARGE LINE OF TIIE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP REQUIRES EXCESSIVE CLEANING. AS TIIE DELTA-P OF Tile STRAINER APPROACllES SifUT OFF HEAD OF TIIE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP, TIIE STRAINER MUST BE CLEANED. THE STRAINER IS NO LONGER REQUIRED SINCE TiiE INSTALLATION OF Tile IMPELL MICRO-FILTRATION SYSTEM. A NOTE WAS ADDED TO THE DESIGN DRAWING TO SPECIFY THE INSTALLATION OF Tile STRAINER AS OPTIONAL AS REQUIRED BY PLANT OPERATIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.2 DISCUSSES THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM. SECTION 11.2.2.6.6 OF TIIE FSAR AND FIGURE 11.2.1-1 (SHEET 3 GF 4) WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE STRAINER OlrTION. DELETION OF THE STRAINER WILL NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION AS TIIE FILTRATION ASPECTS OF OPERATION ARE BEING IIANDLED BY TIIE NEWLY INSTALLED IMPELL MICRO-FILTRATION SYSTEM. TIIE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM FILTRATION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADDRESSED BY TIIE PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 089, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: Tile ORIGINALLY INSTALLED NUPRO JB SERIES GRAFOIL PACKED VALVES IN TIIE UNIT 1 PASS SYSTEM (VALVES 11V-3709,3710,3711,3712,3714 AND 3717) WERE  ; REPLACED WITilIDENTICAL VALVES WITH A UllWPE (ULTRA HIGH MOLECULAR WEIGilT POLYETHYLENE) TYPE PACKING WH1Cil IS BETTER SUITED TO THE TYPE OF ENVIRONMENT SEEN IN TIIE PASS SYSTEM. SAFETY EVALUATION: CIIANGING TiiE TYPE OF PACKING UTILIZED IN THE PASS VALVES DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR OR A REVISION TO ANY PORTION OF THE FSAR. THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. THE SECTION DOES NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO NOR l DOES IT SPECIFY PACKING REQUIREMElfrS FOR THE VALVES. TIIE PASS SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 6.0 llOWEVER NOT TO THE DETAIL AS DEFINED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M090, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: TIIE LEVEL SET DIAGRAM FOR Tile SPENT RESIN STORAGE TANK ORIGINALLY PLACED THE lilGil LEVEL ALARM ABOVE Tile UPPER LEVEL TAP ASSOCIATED WITil ITS DELTA-P TYPE TRANSMITTER. Tills MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REACil THE lilGli LEVEL ALARM POINT AS ONCE TIIE LEVEL RISES ABOVE Tile UPPER TAP, NO DELTA-P WILL DE MEASURED EVEN TIIOUGH TIIE TANK LEVEL MAY BE INCREASING. TIIE LEVEL SET DIAGRAM ASSOCIATED WITil Ti1E SPENT RESIN STORAGE TANK WAS REVISED TO LIMIT THE CALIBRATION RANGE TO CORRESPOND WITH THE INSTRUMENT LEVEL TAPS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEMS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 11.2. THE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IDENTIFIED , l BY THIS CHANGE. TIIE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AS DESCRIBED IN Tills 133

i l i l SECTION. PROVIDING A MORE ACCURATE SPAN FOR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. I

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 092, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: ARV HAND PUMP THERMAL RELIEF VALVES WERE REDESIGNED BY THE MANUFACTURER (ENERTECll). THE NEW VALVES ARE DIMENSIONALLY LARGER AND , UTILIZE A CRIMP TYPE CONNECTION AS OPPOSED TO THE ORIGINAL FLARED CONNECTION. THIS DOCUMENT APPROVED THE USE OF THE REPLACEMENT TIERMAL RELEF VALVE ON TIE ARV. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE APPROVED TIIERMAL RELIEF VALVE REPLACEMENT DOES NOT IMPACT TIE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE ARV HAND PUMPS NOR DOES IT CHANGE THE L'ESCRIPTION OF THE ARV'S AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3.2. TilERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETTING WAS NOT AFFECTED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.4.4 AND 3/4.4.9 ADDRESS THE RELIEF VALVES AND TEMPERATURE / PRESSURE LIMITATIONS. Tile!E REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT IMPACTED BY Tile CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M093, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRilrrlON: ARV HAND PUMP THERMAL RELIEF VALVES WERE REDESIGNED BY THE MANUFACTURER (ENERTECH). THE NEW VALVES ARE DIMENSIONALLY LARGER AND UTILIZE A CRIMP TYPE CONNECTION AS OPPOSED TO THE ORIGINAL FLARE CONNECTION. THIS DOCUMENT APPROVED THE USE OF TIIE REPLACEMENT THERMAL RELIEF VALVE ON THE ARV. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile APPROVED TilERMAL RELIEF VALVE REPLACEMENT DOES NOT IMPACT TIIE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE ARV HAND PUMPS NOR DOES IT CllANGE Tile DESCRIPTION OF TIIE ARV'S AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3.2. THERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETTING WAS NOT AFFECTED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.4.4 AND 3/4.4.9 ADDRESS Tile RELIEF VALVES AND PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS. TilESE REQUlFEMENTS ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THE CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 099, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 , l DESCRIlvrlON: Tile O TO 60 PSI GAUGE LOCATED DOWNSTREAM OF Tile PRESSURE l REGULATOR ON Tile BYPASS FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (BFIV) WAS REPLACED WITH A 0 TO 100 PSI GAUGE. THE GAUGE PROVIDES LOCAL INDICATION OF SUPPLY AIR PRESSURE TO THE AIR PUMP WHICH POSITIONS TIIE BFIV. Tile AIR REGULATOR l MAINTAINS SUPPLY AIR PRESSURE AT 80 PSIG CAUSING GAUGES TO BE OVERPRESSURIZ.ED. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7," CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM" DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE BYPASS FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES. Tile DESCRIPTION DOES NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO PRESSURE GAUGE RANGE REQUIREMENTS. BFIV OPERATION IS NOT IMPACTED BY Tile CHANGE. Tile REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESSURE GAUGE DOE NOT AFFECT REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3.2 CONCERNING FEEDWATER ISOLATION. l l 134

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 101, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE DC/DC CONVERTER MODULE (NWX-514-2) FOR THE MAIN GENERATOR UNDER FREQUENCY RELAY LOCATED IN PANEL 1816-U3 012 WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW MODIFIED MODULE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF FAILUIE DUE TO OVERHEATING. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.0 AND 10.2 PROVIDE A DISCUSSION OF THE STEAM POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM AND THE TURBINE GENERATOR. THE UNDER FREQUENCY PROTECTION RELAY IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TiiESE SECTIONS. TIIE NEW RELAY PRQVIDES THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED RELAY. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8, " PLANT SYSTEMS" DOES NOT ADDRESS TIE MODEL REQUIREhENTS ASSOCIATED WITH Tile RELAY.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91 V2M104, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRII' TION: THE CAPACITANCE OF CAPACITOR "Cl4" ON CONTROL BOARD "A" IN 125 VDC BATTERY CHARGERS WAS INCREASED BY PARALLELING A CAPACITOR OF SIMILAR RATING WITH "Cl4". THIS WAS NECESSARY DUE TO OSCILLATIONS TIIAT HAD BEEN OCCURRING IN TIE BATTERY OUTPUT WHEN ATTEMPTING TO RECHARGE A DISCllARGED BATTERY. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MODIFICATION TO THE CIRCUIT BOARD DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION OF FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3.2. THE CHARGERS CAPABILITY TO FULFILL ITS DESIGN FUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN ALTERED BY THIS ADDITION OF TIE PARALLEL CAPACITOR. THE ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8.2 SINCE THE CHARGER WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VIM 105 REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: TIE CAPACITANCE OF CAPACITOR "C14" ON CONTROL BOARD "A" IN 125  ; VDC BATTERY CHARGERS WAS INCREASED BY PARALLELING A CAPACITOR OF SIMILAR RATING WITH "Cl4". THIS WAS NECESSARY DUE TO OSCILLATIONS THAT HAD BEEN i OCCURRING IN THE BATTERY OUTPUT WlEN ATTEMPTING TO RECHARGE A l DISCIIARGED BATTERY.  ! 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE MODIFICATION TO THE CIRCUIT BOARD DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION OF FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECrlON 8.3.2. THE CHARGERS CAPABILITY TO FULFILL ITS DESIGN FUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN ALTEIED BY Tills ADDITION OF TIE PARALLEL CAPACITOR. TIE ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT PLANT - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8.2 SINCE TIE CllARGER WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION I AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V2M106, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: FLOOR DRAINS IN THE kWST VALVE ROOM AND DIKE AREA WERE ORIGINALLY INTERCONNECTED AND DESIGNED SUCH TilAT WATER FROM BOTH DRAINS WOULD FLOW TOWARDS TIE REACTOR MAKEUP STORAGE TANK VALVE PIT. THE RWST VALVE ROOM DRAIN WAS PLUGGED AND SEALED TO PREVENT RAIN WATER ENTERING THE RWST DIKE AREA FROM FLOWING BACK INTO THE VALVE ROOM CAUSING 135

FLOODING IN TiiE VALVE ROOM. THE VALVE ROOM TO NCCW TUNNEL PIPE CHASE WAS ALSO DIKED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION TO THE NSCW TUNNEL BY RWST LEAKAGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECrlON 9.3.3 " EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEMS" DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THIS FLOW PATii. FSAR FIGURE 9.3.3-3 (SHEET 10 OF 11) DEPICTS THE FLOOR DRAINS IN THE RWST VALVE ROOM AND DIKE AREA. Tile FIGURE WILL BE REVISED VIA LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUEST FS-91053 WHICli WILL ILLUSTRATE THE PLUGGING OF THE RWST VALVE ROOM FLOOR DRAIN. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS TIIE FLOOR DRAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RWST AREA.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VlM109, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: SHIELDING WAS ADDED AROUND AND OVER Tile INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES BETWEEN THE DIESEL ENGINE BULKHEAD AND THE ENGINE CONTROL PANEL ON BOTH TRAINS OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR. IN ADDITION, A LADDER WAS ADDED TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE ENGINE PEDESTAL. THESE CHANGES WERE NECESSARY TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO THESE SENSING LINES DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 8.0. THE ADDITION OF PROTECrlVE SIIIELDING/ COVERS OVER SENSING LINES DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION OR TiiE ABILITY OF THE DIESEL GENERATORS TO PERFORM TIEIR SAFETY FUNCTION. THE SIIIELDING IS NON INTRUSIVE. TIE DIESEL GENERATORS ARE DISCUSSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS HOWEVER, THE ADDITION OF PROTECTIVE COVERS AROUND SENSING LINES WILL NOT IMPACT ANY DEFINED REQUIREMENTS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VAMi17, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: PLANT MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM CAUSTIC VALVE A-1409-U4-670 WAS RELOC ATED UPSTREAM OF ITS ORIGINAL LOCATION TO PERMIT PROPER VALVE ORIENTATION (UP-RIGIIT). ORIGINAL POSITION (SIDE-WAYS) PERMITTED CAUSTIC TO REMAIN IN CONTACT WITli TIIE VALVE'S DIAPHRAGM WHEN THE LINE WAS STATIC WlilCII RESULTED IN LEAKAGE ONTO AN ELECTRICAL CONDUIT BELOW. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE LOCATION OF THE CAUSTIC VALVE IS NOT SPECIFIED l IN FSAR SECrlON 9.2.3 WHICH DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCrlON OF THE DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO BE i OPERATED AS BEFORE. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE, PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT IMPACTED.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-VlMi19, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 l DESCRIPTION: THE INSTRUMENT ROOT VALVES (X4-976 & 987) FOR THE MAIN TURBINE THROTTLE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS HAD REQUIRED REPLACEMENT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AS A Tile RESULT OF LEAKAGE AT THE BODY TO BONNET JOINT. THE VALVES APPEAREL) TO BE UNDER RATED FOR Tile APPLICATION IN WHICH THEY WERE BEING USED. TiiE VALVES WERE REPLACED Wmf 1500# ANSI CLASS VALVES TO IMPROVE VALVE RELI ABILITY. 136

SAFETY EVALUATION: Ti!E MAIN TURBINE IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. Tile ANSI PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE RATING FOR THE MAIN TURBINE THROTTLE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS IS NOT PROVIDED IN THIS DESCRIPTION. THE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND CORRESPONDING INSTRUMENT ROOT VALVES ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN TiiE PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 91-V1M122, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: MOTOR MOUNTING BRACKETS WITH STIFFER HEAVY ANGLE SECTIONS ALONG WITH STIFFENING ANGLE SECTIONS ALONG TIE LENGTH OF THE EXISTING MOTOR SUPPORT CilANNELS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED ON THE AUXILIARY BUILDING SUPPLY FANS IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE VIBRATION LEVELS TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL. SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED UPON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3.5 AND 9.4.3, TIIE MODIFICATION OF THE MOTOR SUPPORT STRUCTURE WILL NOT CHANGE Tile PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION LISTED. THE ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING BRACKETS DO NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE WAY IN WHICll THE SYSTEM IS OPERATED. TIE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT COVERED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 9l-V2M125, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE CHANGE INVOLVED THE REDUCTION OF THE LOW FLOW TRIP SETPOINT AND AN INCREASE IN THE TRIP DELA'Y TIhE SETTING FOR THE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL AIR SUPPLY UNITS TO REDUCE UNNECESSARY TRIPS THAT HAD BEEN OCCURRING DURING THE START UP OF A STANDBY SYSTEM FAN WHEN ONE UNIT WAS ALREADY IN OPERATION. THE CHANGE REFLECTS TIE CURRENT CONFIGURATION ALREADY EXISTING ON UNIT 1. SAFETY EVALUATION: PLANT AIR CONDITIONING,IIEATING, COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4. THE CHANGE IN SE1 TINGS DESCRIBED DO NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN THESE SECTIONS. THE FUNCTION OR MODE OF OPERATION OF TIIE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL AIR SUPPLY UNITS IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE. THE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT COVERED BY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR DOES IT AFFECT ANY OTHER SYSTEM TilAT IS COVERED.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 006, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIE TEST CIRCUITS FOR THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP hECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP DEVICE, MECHANICAL TRIP PISTON AND TIIE ELECTRICAL TRIP VALVE HAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO DECREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIP RESULTING FROM TIIE FAILURE OF COMPONENTS IN THE EXISTING TEST CIRCUIT DURING MONTIILY TESTING. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISilED TIIROUGH TIIE ADDITION OF BLOCKING SWITCHES ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD WlilCII PERMIT ACTUATION OF Tim MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL LOCKOUT VALVES INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE EXISTING AUTOMATED TEST INITIATION LOGIC PREVENTING SIMULTANEOUS ACTUATION OF BOTil ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL LOCKOUTS DURING TESTING. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MECHANICAL LOCKOUT VALVE IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2.2 AND IS ILLUSTRATED ON FIGURE 10.2.2-6. TiiESE SECTIONS IMPLY A 137

RELATIONSillP BETWEEN TllE ACTUATION OF THE LOCKOUT VALVES AND TIE CONDUCT l OF THE ASSOCIATED TESTS. THE NEW SWITCHES DO NOT IMPACT TlilS RELATIONSillP. TIIE SWITCHES WILL DE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITil Tile LOCKOUT VALVES TO l PREVENT TRIPS DURING TESTING. TIIE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT THE TURBINE l TRIP FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED IN PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M007, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRif* TION: TIIE TEST CIRCUITS FOR Tile MAIN TURBINE TRIP MECilANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP DEVICE, MECilANICAL TRIP PISTON AND TiiE ELECTRICAL TRIP VALVE IIAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO DECREASE Tile PROBABILITY OF AN UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIP RESULTING FROM TIE FAILURE OF COMPONENTS IN TIIE EXISTING TEST CIRCUIT DURING MONTHLY TESTING. Tills WAS ACCOMPLISilED TIIROUGli THE ADDITION OF BLOCKING SWITCHES ON TIIE MAIN CONTROL BOARD WillCH PERMIT ACTUATION OF l TIIE MECIIANICAL OR ELECTRICAL LOCKOUT VALVES INDEPENDENTLY FROM Tile I EXISTING AUTOMATED TEST INITIATION LOGIC PREVENTING SIMULTANEOUS ACTUATION OF BOTH ELECTRICAL AND MECllANICAL LOCKOUTS DURING TESTING. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE MECliANICAL LOCKOUT VALVE IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2.2 AND IS ILLUSTRATED ON FIGURE 10.2.2-6. TIESE SECTIONS IMPLY A RELATIONSIIIP BETWEEN Tile ACTUATION OF TIIE LOCKOUT VALVES AND Tile CONDUCT OF TIIE ASSOCIATED TESTS. TIE NEW SWITCHES DO NOT IMPACT Tills RELATIONSHIP. THE SWITCHES WILL DE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITil THE LOCKOUT VALVES TO PREVENT TRIPS DURING TESTING. Tile MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT THE TURBINE TRIP FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED IN PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VlM013, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRII" TION: TiiE MAIN TURBINE STOP VALVES ARE EQUIPPED WITH ABOVE SEAT DRAIN LINES / VALVES TO REMOVE ANY CONDENSATION THAT MAY COLLECT WillLE THE i STOP VALVE IS CLOSED THEREBY PREVENTING WATER INDUCTION INTO Tile TURBINE. l TIIE VALVES WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO AITTOMATICALLY OPEN AND INTERLOCKED OPEN FOR SIXTY SECONDS ON A TURBINE TRIP. THE VALVES WOULD i ilAVE TO DE MANUALLY CLOSED BY T1[E OPERATOR TO LIMIT STEAM GENERATOR l COOLDOWN. TIIE INTERLOCK WAS REMOVED AS TilESE VALVES ONLY NEED TO DE l OPENED PRIOR TO OPENING TIIE STOP VALVES FOR TURBINE ROLL.  ; 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile MAIN STEAM SYSTEM AND THE MAIN TURBINE ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.3 AND 10.2 RESPECTIVELY. NEITilER DISCUSSION INCLUDES A DESCRIPTION / FUNCTION ASSOCIATED WITH THE TURBINE STOP VALVE ABOVE SEAT DRAINS. Tile PURPOSE OF THE DRAINS WILL STILL DE FULFILLED BY OPERATING THE DRAIN VALVES PRIOR TO TURBINE ROLL. THE LOGIC CIIANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE Tile TURBINE TRIPPING OR OVERSPEED PROTECTION FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE PLANT TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.  ! l l

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VAM016, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 l DESCRIPTION: SECURTrY DOOR C-102 WAS CIIANGED FROM A LOCKED AND ALARMED l DOOR TO AN ACAT DOOR TO PERMIT ACCESS FROM THE TURBINE ALLEY INTO TIIE UNIT l 2 CONTROL BUILDING. Tills CilANGE PERMITS PLANT PERSONNEL TO ENTER TIIE CONTROL BUILDING /RCA FROM Tile DRESS OUT TRAILERS LOCATED IN Tile TURBINE 138

ALLEY TO SUPPORT Tills CilANGE, Tile DOOR WAS MODIFIED TO ACCOMMODATE AN ELECTRIC STRIKE LOCK, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CARD IWADERS WERE INSTALLED AT Tile DOOR AND NEW CONDUlT AND CABLE TO SUPPORT DOOR OPERATION INSTALLED. SAFETY EVALUATION: PLANT SECURITY EQUIPMENT IS NOT DISCUSSED IN TiiE FSAR AND Tile PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. Tile CONVERSION OF THE LOCKED AND ALARMED DOOR TO A SECURE ACAT DOOR DOES NOT AFFECT 111E SECURITY PLAN.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M017, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: ONE NORMAL LIGHT FIXTURE WAS ADDED IN FRONT OF Tile UNIT 2 GENEREX PANEL LOCATED ON LEVEL 3 OF THE CONTROL BUILDING IN ROOM R 325. TIIE ADDITION WAS ADDED TO ADEQUATELY ILLUMINATE Tile AREA SO TilAT PEILSONNEL COULD READILY IDENTIFY PANEL MARKINGS. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3 DESCRIBES THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS. FSAR SECTION 9.5.3 DE!.CRIBES THE NORMAL LIGilTING SYSTEMS. Tile ADDITION OF ONE NORM AL LIGilTING FIXTURE DOES NOT IMPACT Tile DESCRIPTIONS PROVIDED IN THESE SECTIONS. THE FIXTURE IS SEISMICALLY MOUNTED. Tile ADDITIONAL FIRE LOADING IS NOT SIGNIFICANT. TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 " ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS" IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CilANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 019,REVIS10N 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil' TION: Tile MAIN TURBINE EXCESS Tl!ROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT WillCil WAS SUPPLIED AS PART OF Ti!E TURBINE CONTROL CIRCUIT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM Tile CONTROL CIRCUITRY. Tile EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT DID NOT PROVIDE A PROTECTIVE FUNCTION. TIIE ORIGINAL CIRCUIT WAS PROVIDED TO ACCOUNT FOR VARIATIONS IN Tile STEAM FLOW TilROUGli TiiE CONTROL VALVES AS 11IE STEAM LINE PRESSURE DECREASES FROM NO LOAD TO FULL LOAD. TIIE EFFECT OF Tills CIRCUIT WAS DETERMINED TO BE NEGLIGlBLE AND WAS TilEREFORE DELETED. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile MAIN TURBINE IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. Tile EXCESS TilROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE l OPERATION OF Tile MAIN TURBINE IS NOT AFFECTED BY DELETION OF Tills CONTROL CIRCUlT. TIIE DELETION DOES NOT IMPACT TIIE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING AND j I OVERSPEED FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY TIIE PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M020, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN TURBINE EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT WillCH WAS SUPPLIED AS PART OF Tile TURBINE CONTROL CIRCUIT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM TIIE CONTROL CIRCUITRY. THE EXCESS Ti!ROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT DID NOT PROVIDE A PROTECT 1VE FUNC110N. TIIE ORIGINAL CIRCUIT WAS PROVIDED TO ACCOUNT FOR VARIATIONS IN TIIE STEAM FLOW TilROUGH TIIE CONTROL VALVES AS Tile STEAM LINE i PRESSURE DECREASES FROM NO LOAD TO FULL LOAD. THE EFFECT OF THIS CIRCUIT WAS l DETERMINED TO BE NEGLIGIBLE AND WAS Ti!EREFORE DELETED. l SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile MAIN TURBINE IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTI')N 4 ).2. ! Ti!E EXCESS TIIROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TIIIS DISCt%!O- 1. TiiE OPERATION OF THE MAIN TURBINE IS NOT AFFECTED BY DELETION OF THIS L / AOL 139

CIRCUIT. TIIE DELETION DOES NOT IMPACT TIIE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING AND OVERSPEED FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY Tile PLANT TECliNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SUDJECT: MDD 92-VAM021, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TiiE "DEMIN WATER LOW PRESSURE" ALARM IN TIIE CONTROL ROOM WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO ALARM ON A LOW IIEADER PRESSURE CONCURRENT WITli AT LEAST ONE OF TIIREE DEMIN PUMPS OPERATING. AN INTERLOCK EXISTED TO PREVENT CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATION ON LOW llEADER PRESSURE WITil NO PUMPS RUNNING. Tills COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION WilEREBY ALL TilREE PUMPS ARE LOST AND IIEADER PRESSURE DROPS WITiiOtTT CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATION. Tills INTERLOCK WAS DEFEATED (JUMPER INSTALLED). SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKE-UP SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.3. Tile DEMINERALIZED WATER TRANSFER PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY IN Tills SECTION ilOWEVER TIIE CONTROL LOGIC ASSOCIATED WITli Tile PUMPS IS NOT ADDRESSED. Tile DELETION OF Tile INTERLOCK PROVIDES MORE RELI ABil ITY FOR Tile ALARM CIRCUIT TO DETECT LOW PRESSURE CONDITIONS. TIIE DEMIN~ ~ ' ZED WATER MAKE-UP SYSTEM IS NOT TIIE TOPlc OF ANY PLANT TECill > ECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 025, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRifrrlON: A I/2" PULSATION DAMPENER WAS INSTALLED BETWEEN ROOT VALVE 4X-947 AND PRESSURE INDICATOR PI-17377 LOCATED ON Tile TPCCW SUCrlON LINE. TIIE DAMPENER WAS ADDED TO REDUCE RAPID INDICATOR POINTER MOVEMENT INDUCED BY VIRRATION OF Tile TPCCW SUCTION PIPING TO REWJCE TIIE INCIDENCE OF INDI 'R FAILURE RESULTING IN RECALIBRATION OR REPLACEMENT. SAFETY EVALUATION: TPCCW SYSTEM FUNCTION AND OPERATION IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECrlON 9.2.10. Tile DISCUSSION DOES NOT PROVIDE Ti!E LEVEL OF DETAIL TO INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF LOCALLY MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION. TIIE ADDITION OF A DAMPENER DOES NOT AFFECT INDICATOR OPERATION. Tile TURBINE PLANT CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT A' SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM AND IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TIIE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M026, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRII'flON: BLIND FLANGES USED FOR LLRT CONNECrlONS FOR PENETRATION 84 i l WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITil Tl!READED PIPE CAPS. TlilS REDUCED STAY TIMES (ALARA) IN CONTAINMENT WillCil WERE PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED DUE TO TIIE TORQUEING REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITil TIIE FLANGE S. T}lREADED PIPE CAPS WERE INSTALLED ON UNIT 1. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECrlON 9.4.6 DISCUSSES TIIE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF Tile CONTAINMENT BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS. Tile CIIANGE IMPLEMENTED UNDER TIIIS MDD DOES NOT IMPACT Tills DESCRIPTION. LLRT TESTING IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 6.2. TIIE IMPLEMENTATION OF Tills CilANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PORTION OF Tills DISCUSSION. Ti!E REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED UNDER i TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.2, " QUARTERLY LEAKAGE TEST" ARE NOT AFFECTED BY TIIE CIIANGE. 140

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V1M027, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilYrlON: FLOW TRANSMrlTERS 1FT-6131,617i AND 6172 (MAIN STEAM FLOW TO Tile MOISTURE SEPARATOR REllEATERS)llAVE BEEN RECALIBRATED TO CORRESPOND TO TIE ACTUAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE PRODUCED BY Tile ASSOCIATED ORIFICES. PREVIOUS CALIBRATION METilOD WAS INCORRECT CAUSING Tile INDICATORS TO READ LOWER TIIAN ACTUAL. Tile NEW RANGE IS 0 TO 500,000 W/IIR. INDICATOR SCALES IIAVE BEEN REPLACED AND PROTEUS POINTS RECALIBRATED. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE MOISTURE SEPARATOR /REllEATERS ARE INCLUDED AS PART OF T11E DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 ON TIE MAIN TURBINE. Tim IEATING STEAM FLOW LOOPS ARE NOT DISCUSSED. PLANT PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO ALLOW FOR PROPER CALIBRATION. THE MAIN TURBINE MSR REllEATERS AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M02d, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: FLOW TRANSM11TERS 2FT-6131,6171 AND 6172 (MAIN STEAM FLOW TO TIE MOISTURE SEPARATOR REllEATERS) IIAVE BEEN RECALIBRATED TO CORRESPOND TO Tile ACTUAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE PRODUCED BY TIIE ASSOCIATED ORIFICES. PREVIOUS CALIBRATION METliOD WAS INCORRECT CAUSING THE INDICATORS TO READ LOWER TilAN ACTUAL. Tile NEW RANGE IS 0 TO 500,000 #/IIR. INDICATOR SCALES IIAVE BEEN REPLACED AND PROTEUS POINTS RECALIBRATED. SAFL'TY EVALUATION: TIE MOISTURE SEPARATOR /REllEATERS AIT INCLUDED AS PART OF Tile DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 ON Tile MAIN TURBINE. Tile IEATING STEAM FLOW LOOPS ARE NOT DISCUSSED. PLANT PROCEDURES IIAVE BEEN REVISED TO ALLOW FOR PROPER CALIBRATION. THE MAIN TURBINE MSR RElEATERS AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M030, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 l

                                                                                    ~

DESCRIFTION: TIIE CLOCK SYNCIIRONIZ.ATION CIRCUIT BETWEEN THE PLANT COMPLJTER AND THE ERF COMPUTER DID NOT FUNCTION CORRECTLY CAUSING UNDESIRABLE CALCULATIONAL INACCURACIES ON PROTEUS (ERF COMPUTER UPDATES Tile CLOCK ON PROTEUS TO SYNCHRONIZE TiiE TWO SYSTEMS). Tile CHANGE DELETED , TIE DESIGN FOR TIIE AUTOMATIC CLOCK SYNCllRONIZATION OF THE TWO COMPUTERS -l AND DELETED TIIE FIELD WIRING BETWI EN TIIE TWO COMPUTERS ASSOCIATED WITH I Tile CIRCUIT. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE CLOCK SYNCIOONIZATION CIRCUlT IS NOT 1 ADDRESSED IN Tile DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPUTha' SYSTEMS PROVIDED FOR IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.5 "INFORMATION SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO OFETY" AND 7.7 " CONTROL SYSTEMS NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFETY". TIE DELETION OF 'l C CIRCUlT DOES NOT 1 INVOLVE TIIE COMPUTER FUNCTIONS USED TO MEET ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION l DEFINED IN 3/4.1.3,3/4.2.1,3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.3 1. I i l 141

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I I DESCRIPTION: TIE USE OF FISilER MODEL 4211 POSITION TRANSMITTERS IN PLACE OF MODEL 3552 TRANSMITTERS WAS APPROVED BY Tills CllANGE. THE TRANSMITTERS AFFECTED BY Tills CilANGE ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION - VALVE BYPASS VALVES (2HV-13005C,211V-13006C,211V-13007C AND 2ilV 13008C). Tile ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED TRANSMITTERS ARE NO LONGER MANUFACTURED AND TIE VENDOR RECOMMENDS TIIE NEW MODEL AS A REPLACEMENT. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS ACTIVITY APPROVES TIE USE OF AN ALTERNATE POSITION TRANSMITTER HAVING IDENTICAL PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS AS ONE ALREADY INSTALLED ON Tile MSIV BYPASS VALVES. TiiE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3. THE LEVEL OF DETAIL CONTAINED WITHIN THIS SECTION DOES NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING POSITION TRANSMITTER l MODELS TO BE USED. TiiE REPLACEMENT MODEL FUNCTIONS IN THE SAME MANNER AS l THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED MODEL. TIE CllANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT l TECliNICAL SPECIFICATION. SUBJECr; MDD 92-VAM033, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tile CARBON DIOXIDE GENERATOR GAS PURGE SYSTEM USES A REFRIGERATION SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN CO2 IN THE PRESSURE VESSEL AT APPROXIMATELY 0 DEGREES. A PROBLEM WITil REFRIGERANT MIGRATION INTO TIE SUCrlON OF Tile COMPRESSOR CAUSED SEVERAL COMPRESSORS TO BURN UP. TO CORRECT THIS PROBLEM, A 3/8" INCll SOLENOID VALVE WAS ADDED DOWNSTREAM FROM Tile LEVEL GAUGE SIGHT GLASS AND UPSTREAM FORM THE EXPANSION VALVE. THE SOLENOID VALVE RECEIVES POWER UPON COMPRESSOR MOTOR START AND WILL OPEN ON COMPRESSOR START. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 ADDRESSES Tile TURBINE-GENERATOR SYSTEM. Tile GENERATOR PURGE OPERATION IS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO DETAIL OPERATION OF THE CO2 COMPRESSOR AND CONTROL CIRCUITRY. Tile CARBON DIOXIDE GENERATOR GAS PURGE SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN Tim PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VlM035, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIFFION: WESTINGHOUSE HAS PROVIDED NEW DEFAULT SET POINT VALUES FOR THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THESE VALUES ARE FROM A NEW BASELINE STUDY DONE AFTER SYSTEM REWORK DURING 1R3. IN GENERAL, THE SETPOINTS IIAVE BEEN LOWERED, INCREASING Tile SENSITIVITY OF Tile SYSTEM. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 4.4.6.4 DETAILS Tile FUNCTION OF TIE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THE SETPOINT CHANGE DOES NOT IN , ANY WAY CilANGE THE FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM. THE SETPOINTS ONLY AFFECTS THE  ! SYSTEM ALARM POINT. THE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN THE  ; FSAR. THE DIGITAL META.L IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM IS NOT Tile ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M037, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 ~ l l 142

DESCRifrTION: PIPING BETWEEN STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE "2B" IIIGli PRESSURE STOP VALVE AND TIIE 111G11 PRESSURE STOP VALVE ABOVE SEAT DRAIN WAS REROLTTED TO ELIMINATE FUTURE INTERFERENCES WITH FEED PUMP TURBINE DISASSEMBLY. PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION REQUIRED PIPING TO BE CUT OFF DURING DISASSEMBLY AND TilEN REWELDED DURING REASSEMBLY. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 " CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS" DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ROUTING OF DRAIN LINES NOR DOES THE ROlITING OF THIS LINE APPEAR AS A PART OF ANY DRAWING CONTAINED IN THE FSAR. TIIE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT IIE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. l l

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 038, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 ) DESCRIPTION: Tile SJAE FILTER UNIT INLET, OUTLET AND BYPASS VALVES IIAVE A I MANUAL OPERATOR TilAT IF ENGAGED WILL INHIBIT AUTOMATIC VALVE OPERATION IN l RESPONSE TO ITS RESPECTIVE RADIATION ELEMENT. TO PREVENT INADVERTENT INSERTION OF THE MANUAL ACTUATOR ENGAGEMENT KEY, A STAINLESS STEEL SLEEVE WAS INSTALLED OVER THE EXPOSED PORTION OF THE KEY PROVIDING A POSITIVE MEANS OF IIOLDING THE MANUAL ACTUATOR OUT OF ENGAGEMENT TliEREBY ENSURING VALVE AVAILABILITY FOR AUTOMATIC OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.4.4 PROVIDES A DESCRIIrTION OF THE STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM. AS THE ADDITION OF THE SLEEVE DOES NOT AFFECT VALVE OPERATION TiiE DESCRIPTION GIVEN IN TIIE SECTION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE SJAE EXilAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN TIE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ALTHOUGII SPECIFICATION 3.11.2.4 DOES DESCRIBE OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE " VENTILATION EXIIAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM" OF WHICH THE SJAE FILTER UNIT FORMS A PART OF. THE CHANGE ' DOES NOT IMPACT TIIE ABILITY OF TIIE SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION TO l CLOSE THE BYPASS VALVE AND OPEN TIIE INLET AND OU'ILET VALVES UPON RECEIPT l OF HIGH RADI ATION IN THE TURBINE BUILDING VENT LINE..

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M039, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1  ; DESCRilrTION: THE SJAE FILTER UNIT INLET, OUTLET AND BYPASS VALVES HAVE A i MANUAL OPERATOR TIIAT IF ENGAGED WILL INHIBIT AUTOMATIC VALVE OPERATION IN l RESPONSE TO ITS RESPECTIVE RADI ATION ELEMENT. TO PREVENT INADVERTENT i INSERTION OF Tile MANUAL ACTUATOR ENGAGEMENT KEY, A STAINLESS STEEL SLEEVE l WAS INSTALLED OVER THE EXPOSED PORTION OF THE KEY PROVIDING A POSITIVE j MEANS OF IIOLDING Tile MANUAL ACTUATOR OUT OF ENGAGEMENT TilEREBY  ! ENSURING VALVE AVAILABILITY FOR ALTTOMATIC OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.4.4 PROVIDES A DESCRIPTION OF THE STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR EX11AUST FILTRATION SYSTEM. AS THE ADDITION OF THE SLEEVE DOES NOT AFFECT VALVE OPERATION THE DESCRIPTION GIVEN IN THE SECTION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE SJAE EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN TIIE TECl!NICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ALTHOUGH SPECIFICATION 3.11.2.4 DOES DESCRIBE OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE " VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM" OF WlilCH THE SJAE FILTER UNIT FORMS A PART OF. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT TIIE ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION TO I 143

CLOSE TIIE BYPASS VALVE AND OPEN THE INLET AND OUTLET VALVES UPON RECEllrr OF lilGli RADIATION IN TIE TURBINE BUILDING VENT LINE.

SUBJECT:

92-V2M042, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED KRATOS FREQUENCY RELAY SUPPLIED BY WESTINGHOUSE AND USED IN NON-IE INVERTERS IS OBSOLETE AND liAS BEEN REPLACED BY A PIIAOSTRON FREQUENCY RELAY. INSTALLATION OF TIE NEW RELAY REQUIRED A CIIANGE IN THE WIRING CONFIGURATION FOR TIIE INVERTER. Tile NEW RELAY FUNCTIONS Tile SAME AS TIE OLD RELAY BUT REQUIRES WIRING CHANGES. SAFETY EVALUATION: REPLACEMENT OF AN OBSOLETE FREQUENCY RELAY WITH NEW RELAY WILL NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3. Tile NEW RELAY REQUIRES ADDITIONAL WIRING CHANGES BUT WILL FUNCTION IN THE SAME MANNER AS TIE OBSOLETE PART. THE SYSTEM WILL BE OPERATED AS BEFORE. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 ADDRESSES ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BUT DOES NOT PLACE REQUIIEMENTS ON RELAY TYPES USED. AS SYSTEM FUNCTION IS UNCHANGED, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT IMPACTED.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VlM045, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: THE ORIGINAL PLANT DESIGN FOR CIRCULATING WATER CHEMICAL ADDITION CONSISTED OF AN INJECTION MANIFOLD THAT CROSSED TIE CIRCULATING WATER FLUME (CANAL) TO ALLOW FOR EVEN DISTRIBUTION OF CHEMICALS. TIE USE OF Tills MANIFOLD AS A CHEMICAL ADDITION METHOD HAS BEEN ABANDONED. TIE INJECTION MANIFOLD IIAS BEEN REMOVED TO PERMIT Tile USE OF MECHANIZED EQUIPMENT TO CLEAN Tile FLUME WITIIOUT MANIFOLD INTERFERENCE. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES TIE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY TIIE REQUIREMENTS FOR CHEMICAL ADDITION LOCATION OR METilOD. Tile ORIGINAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN SUPERCEDED BY A NEW CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OF FUNCTION OF A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. l

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 j DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINAL PLANT DESIGN FOR CIRCULATING WATER CHEMICAL ADDITION CONSISTED OF AN INJECTION MANIFOLD TilAT CROSSED THE CIRCULATING l WATER FLUME (CAN AL) TO ALLOW FOR EVEN DISTRIBUTION OF CHEMICALS. TIE USE OF 1 I Tills MANIFOLD AS A CIEMICAL ADDITION METHOD 11AS BEEN ABANDONED. TIE INJECTION MANIFOLD flAS BEEN REMOVED TO PERMIT Tim USE OF MECilANIZED EQUIPMENT TO CLEAN THE FLUME WITHOUT MANIFOLD INTERFERENCE. I SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM. TIIE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY Tile REQUIREMENTS FOR CIIEMICAL ADDITION LOCATION OR METHOD. THE ORIGINAL l SYSTEM HAS DEEN SUPERCEDED BY A NEW CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM. j IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM 144

OF FUNCTION OF A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. Ti!E CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT 'IllE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M047, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: CONFIGURATION OF Tile PROTECTIVE SHROUD ATTACHMENT CLIPS ON Tile 24" EXTRACTION STEAM BELLOWS LOCATED IN THE MAIN CONDENSERS WERE CilANGED FROM FOUR EQUALLY SPACED CLIPS TO A CONFIGURATION USING SIX EQUALLY SPACED CLIPS IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT SHROUD DAMAGE FROM STEAM FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 1.2.4 " STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION", 10.2 " TURBINE-GENERATOR" AND 10.4 "OTIER FEATURES OF STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION" DO NOT DESL RIBE THE EXTRACTION STEAM EXPANSION BELLOWS TO TIIE EXTENT OF SPECIFYING SIIROUD ATTACIIMENT CLIP ARRANGEMENT. TIE EXTRACTION STEAM EXPANSION BELLOWS IS NOT ADDRESSED IN PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS (REFERENCE 3/4.7 " TURBINE CYCLES".

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 048, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIIYTION: UNITED ELECTRIC TEMPERATURE INDICATING SWITCIES REQUIRE REPEATED CUTTING AND RE-SPLICING OF THE FIELD WIRE DURING REMOVAL FOR INSTRUNENT CALIBRATION. THIS CHANGE ALLOWS THE USE OF AN EGS CABLE CONNECTOR TO BE USED AS AN ALTERNATE TO Tile RAYCilEM IEAT SHRINK SPLICE TO FACILITATE INSTRUhENT REMOVAL. DRAWING 1X3D-AA-A00V (SIIEET 2 OF 4) INCORPORATES THIS SUBSTITUTION FOR NON lE FIELD WIRE TERMINATION APPLICATIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE EGS CABLE CONNECTOR, LIKE TIE RAYCllEM HEAT Si! RINK SPLICE, WILL PROVIDE Tile INSULATING PROPERTY COMPATIBLE TO TIIAT OF Tile FIELD WIRES. THIS ALTERNATE CABLE CONNECTOR WILL NEITIIER CilANGE THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, CONCERNING DELD WIRE TERMINATION, NOR AFFECT TIE INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL FUNCTION OF TIIE SWITCHES. Tills CllANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN Tile FSAR DUE TO Tile NATURE OF Tile CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M051, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: UNITED ELECTRIC TEMPERATURE INDICATING SWITCHES REQUIRE REPEATED CUTTING AND RE-SPLICING OF TiiE FIELD WIRE DURING REMOVAL FOR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION. Tills CilANGE ALLOWS TiiE USE OF AN EGS CABLE CONNECTOR TO BE USED AS AN ALTERNATE TO THE RAYCilEM IIEAT SHRINK SPLICE TO FACILITATE INSTRUMENT REMOVAL. DRAWING 2X3D-AA-A00V (SHEET 2 OF 4) INCORPORATES Tills SUBSTITUTION FOR NON 1E FIELD WIRE TERMINATION APPLICATIONS. ) l SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile EGS CABLE CONNECTOR, LIKE THE RAYCIEM lEAT SilRINK SPLICE, WILL PROVIDE THE INSULATING PROPERTY COMPATIBLE TO THAT OF Tile FIELD WIRES. Tills ALTERNATE CABLE CONNECTOR WILL NErnER CHANGE THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, CONCERNING FIELD WIRE TERMINATION, NOR l AFFECT Tile INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL FUNCTION OF Tile SWITCliES. THIS CIIANGE l l 145 i

DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN TIE FSAR DUE TO TiiE NATURE OF TIE CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIM 052, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlrTION: Tile ROTARY COMPRESSORS UTILIZE OlJrLET AIR FROM TIEIR RESPECTIVE SUMP / SEPARATOR TO SUPPLY CONTROL AIR FOR COMPRESSOR OPERATION. ALTilOUGli THIS AIR HAS BEEN FILTERED BY THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ELEMENTS ON THE COMPRESSOR DISCliARGE, A SMALL AMOUNT OF MOISTURE / CONTAMINATION PASSES THROUGil TO Tile CONTROL SYSTEM RESULTING IN CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS. THE ADDITION OF TIE INLINE FILTER IN THE CONTROL SYSTEM SUPPLY WILL GREATLY ENilANCE CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTRUMENT / SERVICE AIR SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.1. Tile ADDITION OF TIE FILTER IMPROVES CONTROL SYSEM OPERATION WITHOUT ALTERING TIE SYSTEM DESIGN FUNCTION. Tile PLANT IS DESIGNED SUCH TilAT NO PLANT EQUIPMENT RELIES UPON INSTRUMENT AIR TO PERFORM ITS S AFETY RELATED FUNCrlON. Tile SERVICE /INSTRUNENT AIR SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M053, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: TiiE ROTARY COMPRESSORS UTILIZE OUTLET AIR FROM TilEIR RESPECTIVE SUMP / SEPARATOR TO SUPPLY CONTROL AIR FOR COMPRESSOR OPERATION. ALTilOUGilTHIS AIR IIAS BEEN FILTERED BY TiiE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ELEMENTS ON TIIE COMPRESSOR DISCIIARGE, A SMALL AMOUNT OF MOISTURE / CONTAMINATION PASSES THROUGH TO TIIE CONTROL SYSTEM RESULTING IN CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCrlONS. 'ME ADDITION OF TiiE INLINE FILTER IN THE CONTROL SYSTEM SUPPLY WILL GREATLY ENilANCE CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE INSTRUMENT / SERVICE AIR SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.1. THE ADDITION OF THE FILTER IMPROVES CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION WITilOUT ALTERINO Tile SYSTEM DESIGN FUNCTION. TIIE PLANT IS DESIGNED SUCH TIIAT NO PLANT EQUIPMENT RELIES UPON INSTRUMENT AIR TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. Tile SERVICE / INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN Tile PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M058, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: Tile FIELD INPUT FOR COMPUTER POINT Q2832 " MAIN GEN VARS" WAS MOVED FROM 1/O CABINET 05A TO 1/0 CABINET 03B AND TIIE ORIGINAL BRIDGE NETWORK WAS REPLACED TilROUGli TIIE USE OF A PRECISION 10K OllM RESISTOR ACROSS THE TRANSDUCER INPUT LEADS. THIS CilANGE ENABLES THE COMPUTER Tile ABILITY TO PROPERLY INDICATE GENERATOR VARS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CllANGE AFFECTS TiiE COMPUTER INDICATION CIRCUrr ASSOCIATED WITli GENERATOR VAR'S. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE FSAR DESCRIPTIONS RELATED TO Ti!E FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE COMPUTER SYSTEM IN SECrlONS 7.5.3.6,7.7.1.3.1,7.7.1.3.4,7.7.1.9 AND 7.7.2. Tile CHANGE ALLOWS COMPlTTER POINT Q2832 TO BE CALIBRATED CORRECTLY, RESULTING IN PROPER INDICATION ON TIIE COMPUTER SYSTEM. THE CHANGE DID NOT INVOLVE COMPUTER SYSTEM 146

FUNCTIONS USED TO MEET Tile REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN PLANT TECllNICAL ' SPECIFICATIONS 3/4/1/3,3/4.2.1,3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.3-1.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 061, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: VENT VALVES WERE ADDED TO TIIE STATOR COOLING WATER DEIONIZER TANK AND FILTER llOUSING. TIIE VALVES REPLACED Tile EXISTING VENT PLUGS. Tile ADDITION WILL PERMIT SAFER AND EASLER OPERATION WilEN PLACING Tile EQUIPMENT IN AND OUT OF SERVICE. SAFETY EVALUATION: TiiE STATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. T11E ADDITION OF Tile VENT VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT TIE DESCRIlrrlON CONTAINED IN Tills SECTION. TIIE STATOR COOLING WATER IS NOT ADDRESSED IN Tile TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M062, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: VENT VALVES WERE ADDED TO THE STATOR COOLING WATER DEIONIZER TANK AND FILTER llOUSING. Tile VALVES REPLACED Tile EXISTING VENT PLUGS. TIE ADDITION WILL PERMIT SAFER AND EASIER OPERATION WilEN PLACING Tile EQUIPMENT IN AND OUT OF SERVICE. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE STATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. TIIE ADDITION OF TIIE VENT VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT TIIE DESCRIPTION CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION. THE STATOR COOLING WATER IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TIIE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M063, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION! INSTRUMENT LOOPS 2P-2560 AND 2P-2561, ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AREA PRESSURE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DELETED HOWEVER, THE ASSOCIATED CONTROL LOOPS IN TIE 7300 BOP PROTECTION RACK QPPI AND QPP2 WERE LEFT IN PLACE. THE CONTROL LOOPS SERVE NO FUNCTION AND WERE TIEREFORE DELETED. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile CONTROL BUILDING ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FILTER EXHAUST SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.5, THE SYSTEM WAS i DELETED IN 1987. TIIESE CHANGES DELETE THE CONTROL LOOPS ASSOCIATED WITH l Tills SYSTEM AS THEY ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED. LDCR FS 92-039 PROVIDED AN UPDATE TO THE FSAR TO REFLECT CURRENT PLANT CONFIGURATION. TIE CIIANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.  ! SUl3 JECT: MDD 92 VIMC65, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRII'rlON: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN CONFIGURATION OF THE COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVES (CIVS) ON THE MAIN TURBINE DID NOT INCLUDE INDIVIDUAL ISOLATION VALVES IN TIIE EHC LINES [FAS (FLUID ACTUATOR SUPPLY) & ETS (EMERGENCY TRIP SYSTEM)) TO PERMIT ON-LINE MAINTENANCE.1" LOCKED OPEN BALL VALVES liAVE DEEN ADDED IN EACil ETS AND FAS LINES TO EACH INTERCEl'T AND INTERhEDIATE STOP VALVE TO PERMIT VALVE ISOLATION. 147

SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile TURBINE GENERATOR IS DESCRIDED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. TIE ADDITION OF TIE ISOLATION VALVES WILL NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION liOWEVER FSAR FIGURE 10.2.2 4 WILL BE REVISED UNDER LDCR 92-058 TO SIIOW TIE ADDITIONAL VALVES. TiiE ADDITION OF TIE VALVES WILL NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OR VALVE OPERATION. STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP AND OVERSPEED PROTECTION FUNCrlONS. TlIIS CllANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M066, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tile CONTROL CIRCUITRY FOR TIIE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE NON-ESF SUPPLY FAN (2-1593-B7 003)WAS MODIFIED TO ALLOW Tile FAN TO BE SECURED FROM Tile CONTROL ROOM FOLLOWING AUTO START ON HIGH ROOM TEMPERATURE. 'IllE PREVIOUS WIRING CONFIGURATION PREVENTED SECURING THE FAN FROM TIE CONTROL ROOM HANDSWITCH. TIE FAN WOULD ONLY STOP IF ROOM TEMPERATURE DROPPED BELOW 60 DEGREES FOLLOWING AN AUTO START, SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE NON-ESF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE IIVAC SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.8. THIS DISCUSSION DID NOT INCLUDE A DESCRIlrrlON OF THE SUPPLY FAN START /STOP INTERLOCKS T1EREFORE TIIERE IS NO IMPACT ON TIE FSAR. TIE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE NON-ESF SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED UNDER ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 069, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlrrlON: Tile CONDUCTORS FOR THE OPEN AND CLOSED LIMIT SWITCIES OF ATMOSPIERIC RELIEF VALVE 2PV-3030 ARE ROLLED AT TIE LOCAL TERMINATION CABINET. THIS RESULTED IN Tile OPEN LIMIT SWITCH CONDUCTORS FEEDING A VALVE CLOSED ERFPOINT AND TiiE CONDUCTORS OF THE CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH FEEDING THE OPEN ERF POINT. THE CONDUCTORS WERE ROLLED TO THE PROPER POSITION TO PROVIDE THE CORRECT VALVE POSITION INDICATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ATMOSPIERIC RELIEF VALVES ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3," MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM". THE CORRECTION TO TIE WIRING DISCREPANCY DOES NOT IMPACT VALVE OPERATION OR FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN Tills SECTION. Tile CllANGE CORRECTED VALVE POSITION INDICATION ONLY. THE ERF SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION AND IS NOT DISCUSSED IN TIE TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M070, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: THE CONDUCTORS FOR THE OPEN AND CLOSED LIMIT SWITCIES OF ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE IPV-3030 ARE ROLLED AT THE LOCAL TERMINATION CABINET. Tills RESULTED IN THE OPEN LIMIT SWITCH CONDUCTORS FEEDING A VALVE CLOSED ERF POINT AND THE CONDUCTORS OF THE CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH FEEDING TIE .] OPEN ERF POINT. Tile CONDUCTORS WERE ROLLED TO TIE PROPER POSITION TO PROVIDE TIIE CORRECT VALVE POSITION INDICATION. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ATMOSPIERIC RELIEF VALVES ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3," MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM". TIE CORRECrlON TO THE WIRING DISCREPANCY DOES NOT IMPACT VALVE OPERATION OR FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN 148 I

4 Tills SECTION. TIIE CHANGE CORRECTED VALVE POSITION INDICATION ONLY. THE ERF SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCrlON AND IS NOT DISCUSSED IN Tile TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIM 071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRII' TION: INADVERTENT PUSilING OF Tile CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATOR TEST BUTTON DISRUlYrS OPERATIONS AND DISTRACTS OPERATING PERSONNEL. TO PREVENT Tills, A TEST BUTTON COVER ON TliE CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR ACK., RESET AND TEST SWITCll PUSIIBUTTONS WAS INSTALLED. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE ADDITION OF A COVER TO PREVENT INADVER1ENT DEPRESSION OF Tile ANNUNCIATOR ACK, TEST AND RESET PUSHBUTTONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OR OPERABILITY OF TIESE SWITCHES. TIE ADDITION OF THE COVER DOES NOT IMPACT ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M072, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRll'flON: INADVERTENT PUSHING OF THE CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATOR TEST BUTTON DISRUlrFS OPERATIONS AND DISTRACTS OPERATING PERSONNEL. TO PREVENT Tills, A TEST BUTTON COVER ON THE CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR ACK., RESET AND TEST SWrFCli PUSilBUTTONS WAS INSTALLED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF A COVER TO PREVENT INADVERTENT DEPRESSION OF Tile ANNUNCIATOR ACK, TEST AND RESET PUSilBUTTONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OR OPERABILITY OF TIESE SWITCHES. THE ADDITION OF THE COVER DOES NOT IMPACT ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 077, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: LARGE AMOUNTS OF CONDENSATION COLLECT UPSTREAM OF TIE CONDENSER VACUUM PUMPS ISOLATION AOV'S DURING PLANT OPERATION. SUBSEQUENT VACUUM PUMP STARTUP HAS RESULTED IN SEVERE PUMP DAMAGE. TO ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM, A 200 GALLON VENTABLE COLLECTION CliAMBER WAS ADDED FOR EACH PUMP. THE CHAMBER BECOMES THE NEW SYSTEM LOW POINT. CHAMBER DRAINS AND ISOLATION VALVES ARE PROVIDED TO TIE TURBINE BUILDING FLOOR DRAIN SYSTEM. SEVERAL ONE INCil DRAIN CONNECTIONS WERE ADDED AT LOCATIONS WilERE CONDENSATION COLLECTS. DRAINS WERE ROUTED TO THE COLLECTION ClIAMBER. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.2 DISCUSSES Tile FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF Tile MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM. THE MECilANICAL VACUUM PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN Tills SECTION llOWEVER, NOT TO THE DETAIL ASSOCIATED WITil THIS CllANGE. FIGURE 10.4.2 1 WILL DE CIIANGED (LDCR FS 924)93) TO REFLECT Ti!E ADDITION OF THESE DRAIN VALVES AND DRAIN CHAMBER TO THE VACUUM PUMP SUCTION LINES. OPERATIONS PROCEDURES IIAVE BEEN CHANGED TO REFLECT TIIIS ADDirlON. TIE CHANGE TO THE CONDENSER AIR EJECTION SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M078, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 149

l l l DESCRIPTION: LARGE AMOUNTS OF CONDENSATION COLLECT UPSTREAM OF TIE CONDENSER VACUUM PUMPS ISOLATION AOV'S DURING PLANT OPERATION. I SUBSEQUENT VACDUM PUMP STARTUP IIAS RESULTED IN SEVERE PUMP DAMAGE. TO l ALLEVIATE TIIIS PROBLEM, A 200 GALLON VENTABLE COLLECTION CHAMBER WAS l ADDED FOR EACH PUMP. THE CHAMBER BECOMES THE NEW SYSTEM LOW POINT. CHAMBER DRAINS AND ISOLATION VALVES ARE PROVIDED TO THE TURBINE BUILDING FLOOR DRAIN SYSTEM. SEVERAL ONE INCH DRAIN CONNECTIONS WERE ADDED AT LOCATIONS WilERE CONDENSATION COLLECTS. DRAINS WERE ROUTED TO THE COLLECrlON CHAMBER. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECrlON 10.4.2 DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM. THE MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN Tills SECTION HOWEVER, NOT TO TIE DETAIL ASSOCIATED WITH Tills CHANGE, FIGURE 10.4.2-1 WILL BE CHANGED (LDCR FS 92-093)TO REFLECT THE ADDITION OF TilESE DRAIN VALVES AND DRAIN CilAMBER TO THE VACUUM PUMP SUCTION LINES. OPERATIONS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO REFLECT THIS ADDITION. THE CHANGE TO THE CONDENSER AIR EJECTION CM run DOES NOT AFFECT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M080, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tile ORIGINALLY INSTALLED WHITEY SERIES 'ITE PACKED VALVES IN IllE UNIT 2 PASS PANEL (VALVES HV-3709,3710,3711,3712,3714,3717 AND 3726) WERE REPLACED WITH IDENTICAL VALVES WITII A UHWPE (ULTRA HIGH MOLECULAR WEIGilT POLYETHYLENE) TYPE PACKING WIIICH IS BETTER SUITED TO TIE TYPE OF ENVIRONMENT SEEN IN TiiE PASS SYSTEM. SAFETY EVALUATION: CHANGING TIIE TYPE OF PACKING UTILIZED IN TIE PASS SYSTEM VALVES DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE TO TIE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR OR A REVISION.TO ANY PORTION OF TIIE FSAR. THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. Tile SECTION DOES NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO NOR DOES IT SPECIFY PACKING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALVES. THE PASS SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 6.0 IIOWEVEP NOT TO TIE DETAIL DEFINED BY Tills CilANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIMOSI, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: AN IN-LINE, ADJUSTABLE, NEEDLE VALVE SNUBBER WAS INSTALLED IN TIIE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR (PI 10634) FOR THE REFUELING WATER PURIFICATION PUMP. Tills CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT RAPID POINTER MOVEMENT DURING PUMP STARTUP WHICH HAD CAUSED INDICATOR DAMAGE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THE ADDITION OF THE SNUBBER DOES NOT AFFECT INDICATOR READING. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.1.3 DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE SPENT FUEL PURIFICATION SUBSYSTEM. TIIE FUNCTION OF THE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR IS NOT ADDRESSED AS A PART OF THIS DISCUSSION. FURTHERMORE TIE ADDITION OF THE SNUBBER DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE INDICATION OBSERVED ON TIE INDICATOR. TIE SPENT FUEL 150 l

, l PURIFICATION SUBSYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TIIE I PLANTS TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M082, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: AN IN-LINE, ADJUSTABLE, NEEDLE VALVE SNUBBER WAS INSTALLED IN Tile SUCrlON PRESSURE INDICATOR (PI 10634) FOR TIIE REFUELING WATER PURIFICATION PUMP. Tills C11ANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT RAPID POINTER MOVEMENT DURING PUMP STARTUP WillCIIIIAD CAUSED INDICATOR DAMAGE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. Tile ADDITION OF TIIE SNUBBER DOES NOT AFFECT INDICATOR READING. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.1.3 DESCRIBES Tile OPERATION AND FUNCrlON OF Tile SPENT FUEL PURIFICATION GUBSYSTEM. TIIE FUNCTION OF THE SUCrlON PRESSURE INDICATOR IS NOT ADDRESSED AS A PART OF Tills DISCUSSION. FURTilERMORE TIIE ADDITION OF TIIE SNUBBER DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION  ; NOR DOES IT AFFECT TIIE INDICATION OBSERVED ON Tile INDICATOR. Tile SPENT FUEL PURIFICATION SUBSYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT ADDRESSED IN Tile , PLANTS TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VAM088, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tile COOLING TOWER BLOWDOWN SUMP PUMP IIAD EXPERIENCED SEVERAL TRIPS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS GROUND FAULT PROTECTION RECEPTACLES. TIIE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF Tile PUMP WAS SUCli TIIAT TIIE USE OF A GFCI RECEl'rACLE WAS NOT PRACrlCAL AND TIIEREFORE ABANDONED AND A STANDARD DUPLEX RECElrrACLE INSTALLED. SAIETY EVALUATION: Tile INSTALLATION OF A STANDARD DUPLEX RECElrrACLE IN PLACE OF A GFCI RECElvrACLE DOES NOT IMPACT FSAR SECTION 8.3 WillCII ADDRESSES Tile ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS. Tile FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF TIIE SUMP PUMP IS NOT AFFECTED BY Tills CilANGE. Tile POWER SUPPLY TO Tile SUMP PUMP IS NOT Tile SUBJECT OF ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION AS DESCRIBED IN SPEC 3/4.8 CONCERNING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VAM091, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: STAINLESS STEEL GUARDS WERE FABRICATED AND INSTALLED OVER Tile FIVE EIGliT INCII DIAMETER VENT PIPES ON TiiE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) TO PREVENT BIRDS FROM ENTERING Ti!E TANK AND CONTAMINATING REFUELING WATER. SAFETY EVALUATION: ADDING A COVER AT Tile VENT PIPES DOES NOT IMPACT TIIE OPERATION OF TIIE RWST AS DESCRIBED IN TliE FSAR.TIIE ADDITION OF SCREEN COVER OVER Tile VENT PIPES WAS SO EVALUATED AS TO NOT CAUSE ANY RESTRICTION TIIAT WOULD IMPACT ECCS OPERATION WilEN Tile TANK IS USED AS A SUCTION SOURCE. TIIE PLANT TEClINICAL SPECIFICATION DOES NOT ADDRESS TifE PIIYSICAL CONFIGURATION OF Tile TANK VENT PIPING. 1 l

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M092, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I 1 1 l I$1 1 l

DESCR11 TION: PREVIOUS MLTIIODS OF CHECKING TIIE OIL LEVEL IN Tile POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP WAS TilROUGli A VENDOR SUPPLIED OIL INSPECTION PORT WillCil REQUIRED Tile PUMP TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE. TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF CllECKING OIL LEVELS WilILE Tile PUMP WAS IN SERVICE, A SIGilTGLASS WAS ADDED CONNECTING AT Tile EXISTING OIL DRAIN PLUG. IN ADDITION, Tile CONNECTION / SETUP AT Tile DRAIN PLUG WAS EXTENDED TO PERMIT EASIER DRAINING. SAFETY EVALUATION: T11E POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY sal ETY RELATED FUNCrlON AS FOR FLOW REQUIREMENTS BUT DOES CONTRIBUTE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY. TIIE ADDITION OF Tile SIGilTGLASS ON Tile PUMP OIL SIDE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS FUNCTION. Tile POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.4," CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM". Tile CllANGE DOES NOT IMPACT TiliS DESCRIlrrlON. TIIE TECliNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONCERNING Tile CVCS CliARGING SYSTEM DO NOT PROVIDE TIIE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF Tills CIIANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 096, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: NORMAL LIGilTING AND 120 VAC RECEPTACLES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO Tile BACKFLUSIIABLE FILTER PIT AREA ON LEVEL B OF Tile AUXILIARY BUILDING. FIXTURES WERE MOUNTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LIGIITING AND COMMUNICATION DETAIL DRAWINGS AND PER CATEGORY I STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE ADDrrlON OF TEN NORMAL LIGilTS AND FOUR 120 VAC RECEPTACLES TO Tile BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER PIT A.REA DOES NOT IMPACT THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3 "ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS" AND 9.5.3 "LIGliTING SYSTEMS". ADDITION OF TIIE LIGirrING AND RECElrrACLES DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF TIIE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 WillC11 ADDRESSES ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M097, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrrlON: NORMAL LIGitTING AND 120 VAC RECEPTACLES IIAVE BEEN ADDED TO Tile BACKFLUSilABLE FILTER PIT AREA ON LEVEL B OF TIIE AUXILIARY BUILDING. FIXTURES WERE MOUNTED IN ACCORDANCE WITil LIGilTING AND COMMUNICATION DETAIL DRAWINGS AND PER CATEGORY I STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile ADDITION OF TEN NORMAL LIGitTS AND FOUR RECEPTACLES TO TIIE BACKFLUS!!ABLE FILTER PIT AREA DOES NOT IMPACT Tile PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8,3 "ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS" AND 9.5.3 "LIGilTING SYSTEMS". ADDITION OF Tile LIGliTING AND RECElrrACLES DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF Tile REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/U WillCll ADDRESSES ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M100. REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: MATERI AL CLASSIFICATION FOR Tile DISCllARGE PIPING FROM Tile NORTil AND SOUTil TURBINE BUILDING SUMPS WAS CHANGED FROM PROJECT CLASS LLO (150# CARBON STEEL) TO LL3 (150# STAINLESS STEEL) IN ACCORDANCE WITil Tile VOGTLE PROJECT PIPING MATERI ALS CLASSIFICATION. MATERIAL CLASS WAS CIIANGED 152

l l i TO PIEVENT INTERNAL SURFACE CORROSION Wil!CII IIAS CAUSED TIIE PUMP SUCTION LINE TO CLOG. IN ADDITION, SUCTION LINES WERE INSTALLED WITil FLANGED CONNECTIONS INSTEAD OF WELDED CONNECTIONS TO ASSIST FUTURE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.5 " PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEM" DOES NOT PROVIDE TIIE LEVEL OF DETAIL (MATERIAL CLASS) AFFECTED BY Tills CIIANGE. Tile SYSTEM WILL STILL FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR SECTION. CIIANGING Tile SUCTION PIPING MATERIAL CLASS WILL NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VlM101, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrrlON: WilEN REMOVING Tile 4A OR 4B FEEDWATER IIEATER AND ITS ASSOCIATED HEATER DRAIN TANK FROM SERVICE WITil Tile UNIT ON LINE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO FREEZE SEAL TIE CIEMICAL INJECrlON LINE TO TIE OUT OF SERVICE PAIR TO PERMIT TiiE OTIIER IIEAT11R DRAIN TANK TO REMAIN IN SERVICE. TO ELIMINATE TIIE NEED TO FREEZE SEAL Tills LINE, A MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE WAS ADDED TO ENABLE THE ISOLATION OF TiiE OUT OF SERVICE HEATER / HEATER DRAIN TANK FROM THE INSERVICE PAIR. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.10. Tile IEATER DRAIN TANKS ARE GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4.7. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVE DOES NOT IMPACT TIE FUNCTION OF TilESE COMPONENTS AS DESCRIBED IN THESE SECTIONS. Tl!E SYSTEM WILL FUNCTION AS BEFORE. THE IIEATER DRAIN AND Tile CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER CIIEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT CONTAINED WITillN Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIM 103, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIYrlON: THE ECCS FLOW VERIFICATION SURVEILLANCE VENTING (OPERATIONS PROCEDURE 14460) ADDRESSES 5 ECCS FLOW-PATH VERIFICATION VENT VALVES WHICH llAVE BLIND FLANGES IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM. Tile BLIND FLANGES MUST BE REMOVED FOR VENTING REQUIRING PLANT PERSONNEL IN RESPIRATORS BEING ESCORTED INTO A HIGH-RAD AREA TO REMOVE TIE FLANGES. TO REDUCE TiiE STAY TIMES IN TilESE AREAS, THE EXISTING BLIND FLANGES WERE REPLACED WITH A PIPE AND PIPE CAP ASSEMBLY IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM OF THESE VALVES. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE PERFORMANCE OF THE REQUIRED ECCS 110W VERIFICATION VENTING SURVEILLANCE IS NOT AFFECTED BY TIIE ADDITION OF THE PIPE AND CAP ASSEMBLY. Tile RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RilR) SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 5.4.7 AND DEPICTED ON FSAR FIGURE 5.4.7-1, SHEETS 1 AND 2 OF 2. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DESCRIlYrlON HOWEVER Tile FIGURE WILL REQUIRE UPDATING AS PART OF Tile ANNUAL UPDATE PROGRAM. AS ALL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BEING MET, PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT AITECTED.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M104, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE I DESCRII' TION: Tile ECCS FLOW VERIFICATION SURVEILLANCE VENTING (OPERATIONS PROCEDURE 14460) ADDRESSES 5 ECCS FLOW-PATil VERIFICATION VENT VALVES WHICH 153

11 AVE BLIND FLANGES IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM. THE BLIND FLANGES MUST BE REMOVED FOR VENTING REQUIRING PLANT PERSONNEL IN RESPIRATORS BEING ESCORTED INTO A HIGH-RAD AREA TO REMOVE THE FLANGES. TO REDUCE TIIE STAY TIMES IN TIESE AREAS, TIE EXISTING BLIND FLANGES WERE REPLACED WITH A PIPE AND PIPE CAP ASSEMBLY IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM OF TIESE VALVES. l SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE PERFORMANCE OF Tile REQUIRED ECCS FLOW VERIFICATION VENTING SURVEILLANCE IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF TIE PIPE AND CAP A'SSEMBLY, TIE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 5.4.7 AND DEPICTED ON FSAR FIGURE 5.4.7-1, SIEETS 1 AND 2 OF 2. THE CilANGE DOES NOT IMPACT Tills DESCRII' TION HOWEVER TIE FIGURE WILL REQUIRE UPDATING AS PART OF TIE ANNUAL UPDATE PROGRAM. AS ALL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BEING MET, PLANT TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT AFFECTED

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VAM105, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlYrlON: TIE CANNED TRANSFER PUMPS ASSOCIATED WITH TIE LARGE COMMON WASTE MONITOR TANKS IIAD A lilSTORY OF FAILURE DUE TO INTERNAL MECHANICAL DAMAGE. IT WAS DETERMINED TilAT AS DESIGNED, TIE LEVEL IN TIE LARGE WASTE MONITOR TANKS ASSOCIATED WITH TIE LIQUID RADWASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM MAY FALL BELOW THE TOP OF THE SUCTION FLANGE ASSOCIATED WITH TIE PUMP TAKING SUCTION FROM TIE TANK LEADING TO AIR INTRUSION INTO THE PUMP AND SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE. TO PREVENT THIS, THE LOW LEVEL CONTROL POINTS FOR PUMPS TAKING SUCrlON FROM THE WASTE MONITOR TANK WERE RAISED. SAFETY EVALUATION: SECTION 11.2 ADDRESSES TIE OPERATION AND DESIGN OF TIIE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEMS THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE LOW LEVEL SETPOINT TO A POINT SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT PUMP CAVITATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED WITIIIN Tills SECTION. TIE LEVEL CONTROL SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH Tim WASTE MONITOR TANK IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIM 106, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATES ASSOCIATED WITH SOLA TRANSFORMERS, SEVERAL TRANSFORMERS WILL BE DE-ENERGIZED. OF 'IIESE TRANSFORMERS, TilREE (ANDT17, ANDT18 AND ANDT19) SERVE AS BACK-UP TO INVERTERS. THE INVERTERS SYNCIIRONIZE TO THE TRANSFORMER OLTTPUT AND PRODUCE AN INVERTER TROUBLE ALARM (LOSS-OF-SYNC) IF THE TRANSFORMER IS DE-ENERGIZED SINCE SYNCHRONIZATION WITil THE TRANSFORMER OUTPUT IS NOT NECESSARY IN THIS APPLICATION, THE LOSS-OF-SYNC ALARM CIRCUIT FOR TiiESE TRANSFORMERS WAS DEFEATED. SAFETY EVALUATION: ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION (INVERTERS) ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3.1 AND 8.3.2. THE DELETION OF THE ALARM CIRCUIT ASSOCIATED WITH TIE THREE TRANSFORMERS DOES NOT AFFECT TIE DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN Ti!ESE SECrlONS. THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ADDRESSING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE DELETION OF THE LOSS-OF-SYNC ALARM CIRCUIT ON T1IE SPECIFIED TRANSFORMERS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2Mi10, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 i 154 l

                                                                                      \

1 DESCRilrTION: SEVERAL JUMPERS IN SWITCH GEAR 2NB02 FOE ISO-PHASE BUS COOLER  ; FAN MOTOR WERE REMOVED. THE JUMPERS, LOCATED IN CUBICLE 2NBO213 (TERMINAL  ; BLOCK 3) PROVIDED FOR A SPACE lEATER FOR TIE MOTOR AND CUBICLE I ANNUNCIATION. Tile JUMPERS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATION OF THE ISO-PIIASE BUS COOLER FAN MOTOR (NO SPACE HEATER) OR TO PROVIDE ANNUNCIATION. SAFETY EVALUATION; TIIE REMOVAL OF THE JUMPERS DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION AS THE JUMPERS WERE INSTALLED TO SUPPORT EQUIPMENT THAT IS NOT UTILIZED ON Tile ISO-PHASE BUS COOLER FAN. FSAR SECrlON 8.3 AND 10.2 ADDRESS Tile FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF TIE ONSITE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AND TIE TURBINE GENERATOR AND ITA AUX 1LIARY SYSTEM. THE DELETION OF THESE ' i I JUMPERS DOES NOT IMPACT HE DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED WITHIN TIIESE SECTIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M111, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPflON: VALVES 2LV-6189 " MAIN STEAM DUMP HEADER DRAIN VALVE' AND 2UV-6287 " MAIN STEAM LINE LEADER DRAIN" HAD SEVERE PACKING LEAKS AND COULD NOT BE ISOLATED FOR REPAIR. TIE ACTIVITY APPROVED THE DRILLING OF AN INJECTION PATHWAY INTO TIIE STUFFING BOXES OF VALVES 2LV 6189 AND 2UV-6287. AN LEAK 1 REPAIR INJECTION VALVE WAS INSTALLED. THIS PERMITS TIE INJECTION OF LEAK REPAIR MATERIAL INTO THE STUFFING BOX TO SEAL TIE PACKING LEAK WHEN ) PERMANENT PACKING IS REINSTALLED, A TIIE LEAK INJECTION VALVE WILL BE REMOVED AND A PLUG INSTALLED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ACrlVITY WILL NOT PREVENT THE IEFERENCED MAIN l STEAM DRAIN VALVES FROM PERFORMING THEIR DESIGN FUNCTION NOR WILL ANY j OTilER PLANT COMPONENTS BE AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THIS ACrlVITY DOES NOT AFFECT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.3 ' MAIN STEAM SUPPLY , SYSTEM" AND 10.4.1

• MAIN CONDENSER". TIE VALVES ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN Tile PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VlM112, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: PREVIOUS METHODS OF CHECKING THE OIL LEVEL IN THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP WAS THROUGH A VENDOR SUPPLIED OIL INSPECTION PORT WHICH , REQUIRED THE PUMP TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE. TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF l CHECKING OIL LEVELS WHILE THE PUMP WAS IN SERVICE, A SIGHTGLASS WAS ADDED . CONNECTING AT TIE EXISTING OIL DRAIN PLUG. IN ADDITION, THE CONNECTION / SETUP I AT THE DRAIN PLUG WAS EXTENDED TO PERMIT EASIER DRAINING. 1 SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP DOES NOT PROVIDE j ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION AS FOR FLOW REQUIREMENTS BUT DOES CONTRIBUTE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY. ' HIE ADDITION OF THE SIGHTGLASS ON TIE PUMP OIL SIDE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS FUNCTION. THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.4,'CIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM". TIIE CIIANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DESCRIPTION THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONCERNING TIE CVCS CHA.RGING SYSTEM DO NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF Tills CIIANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M113, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I 155

l DESCRilrrlON: AN ADDITIONAL 1.5 INCilES OF FIBERGLASS INSULATION WAS INSTALIED OVER Tile EXISTING INSULATION ON Tile STEAM GENERATOR DLOWDOWN llEAT  ; EXCilANGER INLET PIPING AND CONDENSATE OUTLET PIPING TO ASSIST IN REDUCING i ROOM TEMPERATURES. ELEVATED TEMPERATURES COULD CAUSE PREMATURE I ACTUATION OF Tile IIIGli ENERGY LINE BREAK PROTECrlON OR llAVE ADVERSE AFFECTS ON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS CONTAINED WITillN Tile LOCAL llLOWDOWN CONTROL PANEL. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.8. Tile TYPE AND QUANTITY OF INSULATION IS NOT SET FORTil IN Tills DESCRIPTION. Tile OPERATION OF Tile BLOWDOWN SYSTEM IS NOT AITECTED BY TIIE ADDITION OF INSULATION. Tile OPERABILITY OF Tile II!Gil ENERGY LINE BREAK PROTECrlON CIRCUITS IN ROOM R-C02, REQUIRED BY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.3.11 ARE NOT AFFECTED BY Tills CllANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIMll8, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrrlON: Tile TUR131NE BUILDING COOLING WATER PUMPS (TPCW) USE A SPLIT MECilANICAL SEAL WITil UTILITY WATER IN1ECTING INTO Tile SEAL. SEAL WATER FLOW TO Tile SEALS WAS INADEQUATE. FLOW WAS BEING DIVERTED (NO RESTRICrlON) Ti!ROUGil Tile DUSillNG 13LEED OFF LINE ON Tile STANDBY PUMP INSTEAD OF FLOWING TO Tile RUNNING PUMP. TO RESTRICT TIIE FLOW OF UTILITY WATER TO Tile SEAL llOUSING OF TIIE STANDBY TPCW PUMP TO PERMIT SEAL INJECrlON PRESSURE FOR Tile OPERATING PUMP TO EXCEED TPCW PUMP DISCIIARGE PRESSURE AND FLOW INTO Tile SEAL. Tile TIIROTTLE 13USillNG BLEED OFF LINE WAS REMOVED AND PLUGGED ON BOTil PUMPS. SAFLTY EVALUATION: Tile TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.11 llOWEVER Tile DISCUSSION DOES NOT PROVIDE Tile LEVEL OF DETAIL ASSOCIATED WITil Tills CllANGE. PUMP OPERATION REMAINS Tile SAME. TIIE TURDINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN Tile PLANT TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIM 128, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: Tile STEAM DUMP VALVES IIAVE EXPERIENCED EXCESSIVE SEAT LEAKAGE PROBLEMS SINCE INITI AL OPERATION. TO CORRECT Tills Tile FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE TAKEN. Tile BENCll SET FOR Tile ACTUATORS WAS CilANGED FROM 6 TO 56 PSIG TO 9 TO 56 PSIG ALIDWING MORE SEATING FORCE APPLICATION TO Tile PILOT PLUG WilEN Tile VALVE IS IN Tile CLOSED POSITION ADDITIONALLY. Ti!E "TIGilT SilUTOFF FEATURE" OF TIIE I/P TRANSDUCER WillCil DRIVES TIIE AIR OUTPUT TO ZERO WilEN TIIE INPUT FALLS BELOW A PREDETERMINED VALUE WILL DE ACTIVATED AT A lilGilER VALUE TO PERMIT ACTUATION OF Tile FEATURE. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECrlON 10.4.4. Tile ACTIVrrY GOVERNED BY Tills CilANGE WILL llAVE A SMALL AFFECT ON Ti!E INITIAL MODULATION OF Tile DUMP VALVES IlOWEVER TIIE CilANGE WILL DE INSIGNIFICANT IN REGARDS TO Tile DESIGN FUNCrlON OF Tile VALVES AS ADDRESSED IN Tills SECTION. Tile VALVES DO NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DO TilEY 156

l l I i l IMPACT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.Ti!E VALVES ARE NOT TIIE TOPIC OF ANY TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION. i i

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VlM132, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIl7FION: Tile C11LORIDE INVERTER (EMERGENCY BATTERY STATION) 1 1808-Q3-E00 llAD A IllSTORY OF BEING UNRELIABLE WITil VENDOR SUPPORT, DOCUMENTATION AND PARTS BEING DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. TIIE EXISTING STATION WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW CYBEREX UPS AND BATTERY SYSTEM. TIIE NEW REPLACEMENT CYBEREX UPS WILL PROVIDE Tile NECESSARY 1.5 llOURS OF POWER FOR EMERGENCY AND EXIT LIGilTS AS REQUIRED BY NFPA 101 AND FSAR SECTION 9.5.3.2.3.C. I SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE NEW REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WILL hEET Tile DESIGN INTENT OF Tile EXISTING INVERTER SYSTEM. INVERTER / BATTERY REQUIREMENTS FOR TiiE EXIT AND EMERGENCY SIGNS IN TiiE BUILDINGS AS SPECIFIED BY NFPA 101 AND FSAR SECTION 9.5.3.2.3.C ARE MET BY TIE NEW SYSTEM. Tile TURBINE BUILDING EMERGENCY AND EXIT LIGilTING IS NOT Tile TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECl!NICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VAM133, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: Tile ORIFICE BORE DIAhETER ASSOCIATED WITli TIIE MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION LINES OF EACil LARGE WASTE MONITOR TANK PUMP WERE INCREASED l TO Tile FULL DIAMETER OF TIIE SCllEDULE 40S PIPE (1,049") TilEREBY ELIMINATING Tile EFFECTS OF Tile ORIFICE. TIIIS WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT EVENTUAL PUMP DAMAGE DUE TO TIE INADEQUATE SIZING OF Tile ORIGINALLY INSTALLED ORIFICE. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.2 DISCUSSES TIIE PLANTS LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS. TIIE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY ORIFICE SIZING REQUIREMENTS. TIIE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND BE OPERATED AS BEFORE. Tile LARGER ORIFICE ENIIANCES PUMP PERFORMANCE. TIIE PUMPS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS. l

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIM 136, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil'flON: SEVERAL MINOR WIRING DISCREPANCIES WERE DISCOVERED IN MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1 ABC. SEVERAL JUMPER CONNECTIONS ON Tile BOTTOM SIDE TERMINAL BLOCKS WERE FOUND TO DE DUPLICATED ON THE TOP TERMINAL BLOCK AND WERE REMOVED. THE SECOND CllANGE INVOLVED THE REMOVAL OF INTERNAL WIRING FOR TIE SPACE IIEATER ASSOCIATED WITII CUBICLE l ABC30 Wil!CH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN REMOVED WilEN TIIE LOAD WAS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTIER SUPPLY. SAFETY EVALUATION: ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION l 8.3. TilESE CHANGES CORRECT MINOR WIRING ERRORS AND DO NOT AITECT TIIE DESCRilrrION OR OPERATION OF TIIE ONSITE DISTRIBirrlON SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN Tills FSAR SECTION. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT IMPACTED. TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 ADDRESSES OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. TIIESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT AFFEC TED BY TIIE WIRING CilANGES. 157

r ]. l 4 l l l

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VIM 141, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIIE RAD MONITORS IIAVE EX111BITED ERRATIC OPERATION AND BACKGROUND DUE TO Tile LACK OF A SUFFICIENT GROUND ON Tile DETECTOR. Tills  ! RESULTED IN NOISE INTERFERENCE ON TIIE DETECTOR TUBE CAUSING IMPROPER OPERATION OF Tile MONITOR. IN ACCORDANCE WITil Tile RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE VENDOR (WESTINGilOUSE), A GROUND STRAP WAS ADDED BETWEEN TIIE PREAMP ASSEMBLY AND Tile CIECK SOURCE ACTUATOR MOUNTING SCREW FOR RAD MONITOR CHANNEL 1RE2562. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tim DIGITAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 11.5.2. Tile DETAILS OF Tile WIRING FOR TIE PREAMP SECTIONS OF TIIESE MONITORS IS NOT COVERED IN THIS DISCUSSION. TIIE GROUND STRAP CREATES A PATH TO ELIMINATE INDUCED NOISE IN Tile DETECTOR / PREAMP  ; SECTIONS. TIIE ADDITION OF THE STRAP WILL NOT AFFECT DETECTOR / PREAMP OPERATION, RAD MONITOR CHANNEL 1RE2562 IS REQUIRED UNDER Tile TECl!NICAL  ; SPECIFICATIONS. TIIE CilANGE DOES NOT ALTER Tile INTENT OF Tills SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M145, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tite STEAM DUMP VALVES IIAVE EXPERIENCED EXCESSIVE SEAT LEAKAGE PROBLEMS SINCE INITIAL OPERATION. TO CORRECT THIS Tile FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE ThKEN. THE BENCil SET FOR Tile ACTUATORS WAS CilANGED FROM 6 TO 56 PSIG TO 9 TO 56 PSIG ALLOWING MORE SEATING FORCE APPLICATION TO THE PILOT i PLUG WilEN Tile VALVE IS IN Tile CLOSED POSITION. ADDITIONALLY, TIE "TIGilT l SIIUTOFF FEATURE" OF Tile 1/P TRANSDUCER WHICil DRIVES THE AIR OUTPUT TO ZERO I WHEN Tile INPUT FALLS BELOW A PREDETERMINED VALUE WILL BE ACTIVATED AT A filGilER VALUE TO PERMIT ACTUATION OF THE FEATURE. SAFETY EVALUATION: Ti!E TURDINE BYPASS SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.4. THE ACTIVITY GOVERNED BY Tills CilANGE WILL IIAVE A SMALL AFFECT ON TIIE INITIAL MODULATION OF THE DUMP VALVES IIOWEVER THE CHANGE WILL DB INSIGNIFICANT IN REGARDS TO THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF TIIE VALVES AS ADDRESSED IN TlilS SECTION. TIIE VALVES DO NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DO THEY IMPACT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. Tile VALVES ARE NOT Tile TOPIC OF ANY TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M146, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Ti!E TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMPS (TPCW) USE A SPLIT MECHANICAL SEAL WITil UTILITY WATER INJECTING INTO TIE SEAL. SEAL WATER FLOW TO Tile SEALS WAS INADEQUATE. FLOW WAS BEING DIVERTED (NO RESTRICTION) THROUGli TIIE BUSilING BLEED OFF LINE ON THE STANDBY PUMP INSTEAD OF Tile RUNNING PUMP. TO RESTRICT Tile FLOW OF UTILITY WATER TO TIE SEAL HOUSING OF TIIE STANDBY TPCW PUMP TO PERMIT SEAL INJECTION PRESSURE FOR THE OPERATING PUMP TO EXCEED TPCW PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE AND FLOW INTO TIIE SEAL, THE THROTTLE BLEED OFF LINE WAS REMOVED AND PLUGGED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.11 HOWEVER THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL ADDRESSED BY Tills CilANGE. PUMP OPERATION REMAINS TIIE SAME. 158

TIIE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TiiE PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 VlMI5O, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIlvrION: Tile EHC PUMP DISCilARGE AIR REMOVAL VALVES WERE RELOCATED FROM TIIE TOP OF Tile OF TIIE FLUID TANK TO THE TOP OF Tile PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING. ADDITIONALLY, THE TUBING BETWEEN THE AIR REMOVAL VALVE AND TANK WAS REPLACED AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS WERE PROVIDED FOR Tills TUBING. THIS WAS DONE TO REDUCE Ti!E POSSIBILITY OF TUBING RUPTURE DUE TO FATIGUE AND BEING CONSTANTLY PRESSURIZED. IN Tile NEW MOUNTING CONFIGURATION Tile TUBING IS NOT PRESSURIZED SO THAT ITS FAILURE WOULD ONLY RESULT IN MINOR FLUID LEAKAGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE EllC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 " TURBINE GENERATOR". Tile FUNCTION, OPERATION AND LOCATION OF TIIE AIR REMOVAL VALVES , ASSOCI ATED TUBING AND TUDE SUPPORTS IS NOT INCLUDED IN TilESE DISCUSSIONS, SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY TIIE VALVE RELOCATION, THE EHC llYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M151, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilYrION: THE EllC PUMP DISCilARGE AIR REMOVAL VALVES WERE RELOCATED FROM TIIE TOP OF Tile OF Tile FLUID TANK TO Tile TOP OF THE PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING. ADDITIONALLY, Tile TUBING BETWEEN THE AIR REMOVAL VALVE AND TANK WAS REPLACED AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS WERE PROVIDED FOR THIS TUBING. Tills WAS DONE TO REDUCE TiiE POSSIBILITY OF TUBING RUPTURE DUE TO FATIGUE AND BEING CONSTANTLY PRESSURIZED. IN TIIE NEW MOUNTING CONFIGURATION TifE TUBING IS NOT PRESSURIZED SO TilAT ITS FAILURE WOULD ONLY RESULT IN MINOR FLUID LEAKAGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile EllC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 " TURBINE GENERATOR". THE FUNCTION, OPERATION AND LOCATION OF Tile AIR REMOVAL VALVES , ASSOCIATED TUBING AND TUDE SUPPORTS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY Tile VALVE RELOCATION. THE EllC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE SUDJECT OF ANY PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VAM155, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: TIIE DEMINERALIZER WATER ISOLATION VALVE (2-1418-U4 07I) TO THE BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER CRUD TANK IS LOCATED IN SUCil A MANNER TilAT VALVE MANIPULATIONS POSE A SAFETY HAZARD. A NEW VALVE WAS INSTALLED TO ELIMINATE TIIE NEED TO OPERATE THIS VALVE. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile ADDITION OF A NEW VALVE DOWNSTREAM OF Tile EXISTING VALVE DOES NOT IMPACT Tile DESCRIPTION CONTAINED WITlilN FSAR SECTION 9.2.3. IIOWEVER, Tile FSAR FIGURE 9.2.3 1 (SHEET 2 OF 4) WILL DE REVISED TO ILLUSTRATE Tile NEW VALVE. TIIE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. 159

SUBiECT: MDD 92 VIM 157, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: Tile SETPOINT FOR Tile MAIN TURBINE STEAM SEAL SUPPLY HEADER UNLOADING VALVE IPV-6159 WAS INCREASED FROM 4.0 TO 4.5 (-0.0,+0.25) PSIO. THE TURBINE GENERATOR SUPPLIER (GENERAL ELECTRIC) RECOMMENDED TilAT Tills CllANGE DE MADE TO AVOID SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF Tile SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WillCH WOULD RESULT IN A SLIGHT EFFICIENCY LOSS. IN ADDITION, TOLERANCES FOR BOTil TIE SUPPLY AND UNLOADER VALVES WERE ESTABLISi!ED TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SETPOINT OVERLAP. SAFETY EVALUATION: IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, Tile SETPOINT FOR BOTH THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WERE THE SAME. RAISING THE UNLOADING VALVE SETPOINT ABOVE THE SUPPLY SETPOINT PERMITS OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM WITHOUT BOTil VALVES OPERATING SIMULTANEOUSLY. Tile DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4.3 DO NOT ADDRESS Tile ilEADER PRESSURE AND CONTROLLER SETPOINTS GOVERNING OPERATION OF TIIESE VALVES. SYSTEM OPERATION HAS BEEN ENilANCED BY TIIE SETPOINT CllANGE. Tile MAIN TURBINE SHAFT SEALING SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M158,lEVISION O. SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: THE SETPOINT FOR Tile MAIN TURBINE STEAM SEAL SUPPLY HEADER UNLOADING VALVE 2PV-6159 WAS INCREASED FROM 4.0 TO 4.5 (-0.0,+0.25) PSIG. THE TURBINE GENERATOR SUPPLIER (GENERAL ELECTRIC) RECOMMENDED TilAT Tills CilANGE BE MADE TO AVOID SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF TIIE SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WillCil WOULD RESULT IN A SLIGHT EFFICIENCY LOSS. IN ADDITION, TOLERANCES FOR BOTH Tile SUPPLY AND UNLOADER VALVES WERE ESTABLISIIED TO PRECLUDE Tile POSSIBILrrY OF SETPOINT OVERLAP. SAFETY EVALUATION: IN TIIE ORIGINAL DESIGN, THE SETPOINT FOR BOTil THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WERE TIIE SAME RAISING Tile UNLOADING VALVE SETPOINT ABOVE Tile SUPPLY SETPOINT PERMITS OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM WITHOUT BOTli VALVES OPERATING SIMULTANEOUSLY. TIIE DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4.3 DO NOT ADDRESS THE HEADER PRESSURE AND CONTROLLER SETPOINTS GOVERNING OPERATION OF TilESE VALVES. SYSTEM OPERATION HAS BEEN ENilANCED BY Ti!E SETPOINT CilANGE. THE MAIN TURBINE SHAFT SEALING SYSTEM IS NOT TiiE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TEClINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92 V2M160, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE i DESCRIPTION: WESTINGHOUSE HAS PROVIDED NEW DEFAULT SET POINT VALUES FOR THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THESE VALUES ARE FROM A NEW BASELINE STUDY DONE AFTER SYSTEM REWORK DURING 2R2. IN GENERAL, THE SETPOINTS IIAVE BEEN LOWERED, INCREASING THE SENSITIVITY OF Tile SYSTEM. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 4.4.6.4 DETAILS THE FUNCTION OF THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. TIIE SETPOINT CilANGE DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CilANGE Tile FUNCTION OF TIIE SYSTEM. TIIE SETPOINTS ONLY AFFECTS THE 4 SYSTEM ALARM POINT. Tile SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN Tile 160

FSAR. Tile DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM IS NOT TIIE ADDRESSED IN TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SUBJEG MDD 92-vim 164, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil' TION: THE PLASMA DISPLAY FOR TiiE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM (DMIMS) IS NO LONGER MANUFACTURED BY OEM BOURROUGilS OR AVAILABLE. TIIE INSTALLED DISPLAY WAS INOPERABLE AND REPLACED WITH AN UPGRADED KIT FROM WESTINGilOUSE CONSISTING OF A DALE DISPLAY AND POWER SOURCE (12 VDC VS 250 VDC). SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DMIM SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 4.4.6.4. DISPLAY TYPE IS NOT SPECIFIED IN Tills DISCUSSION. Tile REPLACEMENT OF Tile DISPLAY TYPE DOES NOT ALTER SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION. Tile DMIMS SYSTEM IS NOT DISCUSSED IN TIIE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SUBJEG MDD 92-VIM 167, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIIE DESIGN CIIANGE PERMITS TIIE ISOLATION OF UP TO FOUR HEATING ELEMENTS IN TIIE AUXILIARY BUILDING SUPPLY UNITS TO PERMIT CONTINUED OPERATION OF Tile UNIT WITil THE REMAINING OPERABLE IIEATER ELEMENTS. THE HEATER ELEMENTS ARE NOT EASILY ACCESSIBLE. TIIE REMAINING HEATING ELEMENTS IIAVE ENOUGil CAPACITY TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.3. THE DISCUSSION INCLUDES A DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS. THE CHANGES ADDRESSED IN THIS DESIGN CHANGE DO NOT IMPACT ANY DESCRIPTIONS DISCUSSED IN tills SECTION. Tile AUXILIARY BUILDING FANS ARE NOT CONSIDERED A PART OF TIIE VENTILATION EX11AUST TREATMENT SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO MEET ITS DESIGN FUNCTION WITli UP TO FOUR llEATERS ISOLATED. SUBJEG MDD 92-VAM168, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil' TION: A REWORK OF TIIE FAN DRIVE MOTOR SUPPORT STEEL ON Tile CONTROL BUILDING NORMAL AIR SUPPLY UNIT (A-1533-A7-001) ADDED STIFFENERS TO THE MOTOR SUPPORT STRUCTURE IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE VIBRATION LEVELS OBSERVED AT THE MOTOR BEARINGS. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.4.1 DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF TIIE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM. TIIE CHANGE WAS A STRUCTURAL ENHANCEMENT AND DID NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. TIIE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION. SUBJEQ MDD 92-VIM 169, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: COMPUTER POINTS FOR ACCUMULATOR LEVEL CHANNELS L-950,1 953, L-954 AND L-957 WERE ADDED TO Tile ERF COMPlTTER AND THE PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEMS. THE PIEVIOUS DESIGN PROVIDED ONLY III AND LO LEVEL ANNUNCIATION. 161

TIIE Cl{ANGE ALLOWS OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TRENDING CAPABILITIES OF ACCUMULATOR LEVELS AT POWER OPERATION AND REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL AT REDUCED RCS INVENTORY CONDITIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CllANGE INVOLVED NON-SAFETY CONTROL SIGNALS CURRENTLY USED FOR LEVEL INDICATION ON Tile MAIN CONTROL BOARD. THESE FUNCrlONS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED WITli TIIE ADDITION OF THESE COMPUTER POINTS. TIIE CIIANGE WILL NOT IMPACT DISCUSSIONS ON INFORMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS AS DEFINED IN FSAR SECrlONS 7.5 AND 7.7, Tile ACCUMULATORS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 6.3 WilICil ADDRESSES EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS. THIS DISCUSSION IS NOT IMPACTED BY Tile CHANGE.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 176, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil'rION: Tile MECilANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP FOR Tile MAIN TUkblNE WAS INCREASED FROM 108 TO 109 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED TO A NEW VALUE OF 110 TO 111 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED. TIIE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITH TIIE STANDARD GENERAL ELECTRIC SETPOINT DESIGNED FOR THIS TURBINE. THE USE OF TIIE NEW VALUE INCREASES Tile MARGIN BETWEEN Tile NORMAL SPEED AND Tile TRIP SETPOINT TIIEREBY REDUCING Tile PROB ABILITY OF AN INADVERTENT TURBINE TRIP DUE TO SETPOINT DRIFT. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITil Tile STANDARD GE SETPOINT AND THE VALUE ASSUMED IN Tile OVERSPEED PROTECrlON AND MISSILE GENERATION ANALYSIS. Tile MAIN TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP DOES NOT SERVE TO MITIGATE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN FSAR CHAirTER 15. ALTilOUGH THE MAIN TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP IS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (4.3.4.2.C), THE SPECIFIC TRIP SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED. ,

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M177, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCR!PflON: Tile MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP FOR TIIE MAIN TURBINE WAS INCREASED FROM 108 TO 109 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED TO A NEW VALUE OF 110 TO Ii1 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED. TIIE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITil Tile STAND ARD i GENERAL ELECTRIC SETPOINT DESIGNED FOR THIS TURBINE. THE USE OF TIIE NEW VALUE INCREASES THE MARGIN BETWEEN THE NORMAL SPEED AND THE TRIP SETPOINT  ! TIIEREDY REDUCING Tile PROBABILITY OF AN INADVERTENT TURBINE TRIP DUE TO SETPOINT DRIFr. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STAND ARD GE ]' SETPOINT AND TIIE VALUE ASSUMED IN THE OVERSPEED PROTECrlON AND MISSILE GENERATION ANALYSIS. THE MAIN TURDINE OVERSPEED TRIP DOES NOT SERVE TO MITIGATE Tile CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN FSAR CHAIYTER 15. J ALTilOUGIl Tile MAIN TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP IS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL i SPECIFICATIONS (4.3.4.2.C), THE SPECIFIC TRIP SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED. *

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-VIM 178, REVISION 0 SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: Tile AUTOMATIC TRIP OF Tile MAIN TURBINE UPON TIIE TRIP OF BOTH I CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IIAS BEEN DELETED. SINCE TIIE TURDINE, CONDENSER 162 l

i SilELLS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AGAINST DAMAGE BY THE EXISTING AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM AND THE LOW PRESSURE TURBINE 1100D RUPTURE DI APHRAGMS, Tile LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP WAS NOT REQUIRED. Tim TRIP WAS NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF Tim VENDER RECOMMENDED TURBINE PROTECTION PACKAGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4 DESCRIBE THE MAIN TURBINE AND CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEMS RESPECTIVELY. TIIE AUTOMATIC TRIP OF T1E MAIN TURBINE UPON Tile TRIP OF BODI CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT INCLUDED IN Tills DISCUSSION. TIIE DELETION OF Tile TRIP DOES NOT IMPACT ANY i ACCIDENT ALREADY EVALUATED IN FSAR CllAl'TER 15.2 NOR DOES THE DELETION CREATE ANY NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS. TIE MAIN TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF BOT I CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT REQUIRED BY PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 92-V2M179, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFTION: TIE AUTOMATIC TRIP OF TIE MAIN TURBINE UPON TIE TRIP OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IIAS BEEN DELETED. SINCE THE TURBINE, CONDENSER SHELLS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AGAINST DAMAGE BY THE EXISTING AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM AND TIE LOW PRESSURE TURBINE liOOD RUPTURE DIAPilRAGMS, THE LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP WAS NOT REQUIRED. THE TRIP WAS NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE VENDER RECOMMENDED TURBINE PROTECTION PACKAGE. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4 DESCRIBE TIIE MAIN TURBINE AND CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEMS IESPECTIVELY. THE AUTOMATIC TRIP OF Tim MAIN TURBINE UPON THE TRIP OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS DISCUSSION Tile DELETION OF TIE TRIP DOES NOT IMPACT ANY ACCIDENT ALREADY EVALUA'ED IN FSAR CHAPTER 15.2 NOR DOES THE DELETION CREATE ANY NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS. TIIE MAIN TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF BOTTI CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT REQUIRED BY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. SUBJECr: MDD 93-VIM 001, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 , DESCRll' TION: TIIE MAIN TURBINE WAS PROVIDED WITil PUSHBUTTONS ON TIE TURBINE CONTROL PANEL PORTION OF TIE MAIN CONTROL BOARD TO INITI ATE AND/OR TERMINATE AN AUTOMATIC MAIN TURBINE RUNBACK (LOAD REDUCTION) TO APPROXIMATELY 810 MWE WlEN A RAPID LOAD REDUCTION IS REQUIRED SUCll AS ON A TRIP OF ONE MAIN FEED PUMP ADDITION OF THESE PUSHBUTTONS WILL PERMIT CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS TO FOCUS AND RESPOND TO OTIIER ACTIVITIES OCCURRING DURING TIE TRANSIENT CONDITION. T11E START PB. INITIATES THE RUNDACK. A STOP PB. IS PROVIDED IN THE EVENT TilAT TERMINATION OF THE RUNBACK IS DESIRED. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE MAIN TURBINE AND ITS CONTROLS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. NO SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE LOAD SETPOINT CAPABILITIES IS PROVIDED: THE CliANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE TO THE RESPONSE OF Tile PLANT TO A LOSS OF FEEDWATER EVENT. ALTIIOUGH A REVISION TO THE PROCEDURE USED TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM WAS NECESSARY, Tile SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS BEFORE. Tile MAIN TURBINE LOAD CONTROLS AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE ARE NOT Tile SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. 163

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-V2M002, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFIlON: TiiE MAIN TURBINE WAS PROVIDED WITH PUSHBUTTONS ON TIIE TURBINE CONTROL PANEL PORTION OF TIIE MAIN CONTROL BOARD TO INITIATE AND/OR TERMINATE AN AUTOMATIC MAIN TURBINE RUNDACK (LOAD REDUCTION) TO APPROXIMATELY 810 MWE WiiEN A RAPID LOAD REDUCTION IS REQUIRED SUCH AS ON A TRIP OF ONE MAIN FEED PUMP, ADDITION OF TIESE PUSIIBU1 TONS WILL PERMIT CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS TO FOCUS AND RESPOND TO OTIER ACTIVITIES OCCURRING DURING TIIE TRANSIENT CONDITION. THE START PB. INITIATES TIE RUNBACK. A STOP PB. IS PROVIDED IN TIIE EVENT THAT TERMINATION OF TIE RUNDACK IS DESIRED. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE MAIN TURBINE AND ITS CONTROLS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. NO SPECIFIC DESCRIFFION OF TIIE LOAD SETPOINT CAPABILITIES IS PROVIDED. TIE CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT A CIIANGE TO THE RESPONSE OF THE PLANT TO A LOSS OF FEEDWATER EVENT, ALTIIOUGli A REVISION TO THE PROCEDURE USED TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM WAS NECESSARY, THE SYSTEM CONT 1NUES TO FUNCTION AS BEFORE. TIIE MAIN TURBINE LOAD CONTROLS AFFECTED BY THIS CliANGE ARE NOT TIE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 010, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIE PREVIOUS 111 LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT FOR THE COOLING TOWER BASIN WATER LEVEL WAS SET ABOUT THREE INCllES BELOW THE POINT AT WHICH THE TOWER WOULD OVERFLOW. THE ALARM WAS LOWERED BY THREE INCIES TO PROVIDE MORE TIME FOR RESPONSE. THE ALARM PROVIDES AN EARLY WARNING OF COOLING TOWER MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE MALFUNCTION. SAFETY EVALUATION: CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.5. Tile 111 LEVEL ALARM 15 ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION AS EXISTING IIOWEVER THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. THE CHANGE WAS MADE TO ENilANCE SYSTEM OPERATION. LOWERING TIIE SETPOINT DOES NOT IMPACT NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-V2 Moll, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFTION: TiiE PREVIOUS HI LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT FOR THE COOLING TOWER BASIN WATER LEVEL WAS SET ABOUT THREE INCHES BELOW TIIE POINT AT WlilCil TIIE TOWER WOULD OVERFLOW. TIIE ALARM WAS LOWERED BY TliREE INCHES TO PROVIDE MORE TIME FOR RESPONSE. TIIE ALARM PROVIDES AN EARLY WARNING OF COOLING TOWER MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE MALFUNCTION. SAFETY EVALUATION: CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.5. TIIE HI LEVEL ALARM IS ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION AS EXISTING llOWEVER THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED. Tile CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT TiiE TOPIC OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. T11E CliANGE WAS MADE TO ENIIANCE SYSTEM OPERATION. LOWERING Tile SETPOINT DOES NOT IMPACT NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION. l l 164

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VlM012, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil' TION: TiiE MAClllNE GAS PRESSURE LOW ALARM IS SET FOR OPERATION OF Tim MAIN GENERATOR AT 75 PSIG. TIE MAIN GENERATOR CAN BE OPERATED A ANY llYDROGEN GAS PRESSURE WITIIIN TIIE CAPABILITY CURVE. Tile ALARM SETPOINT IS BEING CilANGED FROM 73 PSIG TO 63 PSIG. Ti!E ALLOWS MACillNE GAS PRESSURE TO BE ADJUSTED PER OPERATING PROCEDURE 13810-2 DOWN TO A LOW LIMIT OF 65 PSIO. SAFETY EVALUATION: Ti!E TURBINE GENERATOR IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITil MAC111NE GAS PRESSURE ANNUNCIATION. THE TURBINE GENERATOR WILL STILL BE OPERATED WITHIN Tile LIMITS SPECIFIED ON Tile CAPABILITY CURVE AND TilEREFORE WILL NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION, TIIE TURBINE GENERATOR IS NOT DISCUSSED IN Tile PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 V2M013, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRII'flON: TIIE MACillNE GAS PRESSURE LOW ALARM IS SET FOR OPERATION OF TIIE MAIN GENERATOR AT 75 PSIG. TIIE MAIN GENERATOR CAN BE OPERATED A ANY HYDROGEN GAS PRESSURE WITHIN Tile CAPABILITY CURVE. THE ALARM SETPOINT IS BEING CIIANGED FROM 73 PSIG TO 63 PSIG. Tile ALLOWS MACIIINE GAS PRESSURE TO BE ADJUSTED PER OPERATING PROCEDURE 13810-2 DOWN TO A LOW LIMIT OF 65 PSIG. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE TURBINE GENERATOR IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WTITI MACHINE GAS PRESSURE ANNUNCIATION. Tile TURBINE GENERATOR WILL STILL BE l OPERATED WITIIIN THE LIMITS SPECIFIED ON Tile CAPABILITY CURVE AND THEREFORE WILL NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION, THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS NOT I DISCUSSED IN Tile PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. I

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 014, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRil'rION: Tile MODIFICATION ADDED A CllECK VALVE BETWEEN Tile POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM (PASS) SUMP PUMP AND TiiE PASS SAMPLE COOLER. Tile i CllANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT BACKLEAKAGE TliROUGli TiiE PASS SUMP 1 SAMPLING PUMPS RESULTING IN PRESSURIZATION OF Tile RilR SYSTEM. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile PASS SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECrlON 9.3.2 AND DEPICTED ON FSAR FIGURE 9.3.2-4. ALTilOUGil SYSTEM OPERATION WILL NOT BE AFFECIED BY TIIE ADDITION OF TIIE CilECK, TIIE FSAR FIGURE WILL REQUIRE UPDATE TO ILLUSTRATE THE ADDITION OF THE CHECK VALVE. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISIIED VIA TIIE ANNUAL UPDATE. TIIE ADDED CIIECK VALVE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TEClINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 V2M015, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: A PRESSURE SWITCil ASSOCIATED WITil ELECTRICAL PENETRATION 2-1818-il3-Pl7 WAS EXPERIENCE LEAKAGE RESULTING IN TiiE INABILITY OF Tile PENETRATION TO PASS Tile LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT). Tile PRESSURE SWITCli WAS NOT BEING USED EXCEL'T FOR SUPPORT OF A PRESSURE GAUGE AND INPUT CONNECTION 165

AND WAS NOT CONNECTED ELECTRICALLY Tile SWITCil WAS DELETED AND Ti!E CONNECTION F11TED WITil A SWAGE-LOK TEE CONNECTOR TO SUPPORT Tile GAUGE / CONNECTION. SAFETY EVALUATION: ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3.1. Ti!E FUNCTION OF TiiE PRESSURE SWITCll IS NOT ADDRESSED IN Tills DISCUSSION. Tile ELIMINATION OF TIIE PRESSURE SWITCil WILL NOT IMPACT TiiE I FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF TIIE PENETRATION ASSEMBLY, AS TIE DELETION OF THE PRESSURE SWITCil AND SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT WITil A SWAGE-LOK TEE DOES NOT AFFECT PENETRATION SEALING REQUllEMENTS IT WAS DETERMINED TilAT Tile PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS WOULD NOT BE IMPACTED. l l

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 VIM 020, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 l l DESCRIPTION: TIIE MODIFICATION REPLACED Tile EXISTING ONE PIECE, SLIP-ON l COUPLING WITil AN AXIALLY-SPLIT COUPLING ON Tile ilEATER DRAIN PUMPS TO l PREVENT MIS-ALIGNMENT BETWEEN Tile UPPER AND LOWER SIIAFTS. IN ADDITION, Tile 1 USE OF EITilER SINGLE SPIRAL GROOVE OR TRI-LAND JOURNAL BEARINGS IN Tile PUMPS WAS APPROVED, SUPPORTS WERE ADDED TO Tile LOWER BEARING LUBE LINE AND PROXIMITY PROBE MOUNTING BRACKETS INSTALLED. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF Tile IIEATER DRAIN PUMPS IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.7. Tile MODIFICATION WILL EXTEND PUMP LIFE AND VIBRATIONAL MONITORING CAPABILITIES WITilOUT AFFECTING PUMP PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT IMPACTED. TIE IEATER DRAIN PUMPS ARE NOT Tile TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECliNICAL SPECIFICATION. FAILURE OF Tile PUMP WILL NOT AFFECT Tile OPERATION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 VlM026, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRililON: Tile SEAL OIL VACUUM PUMP INSTALLED ON UNIT I WAS NOT ABLE TO ACillEVETilE SAME PERFORMANCE LEVEL AS TilAT ATTAINABLE ON UNIT 2. TIIE DIFFERENCE IN PUMP PERFORMANCE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO AN UPDATED MOTOR AND GEAR REDUCER UTILIZED ON UNIT 2. Tile UNIT I PUMP ASSEMBLY / GEAR REDUCER WAS REPLACED WITil Tile SAME EQUIPMENT UTILIZED ON UNIT 2. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE REPLACEMENT OF TIE SEAL OIL VACUUM PUMP WTTli AN UPGRADED MOTOR AND GEAR REDUCER ASSEMBLY DOES NOT IMPACT Tile DISCUSSION GIVEN IN FSAR SECTION 10.2, " TURBINE-GENERATOR". Tile PERFORMANCE OF Tile PUMP INCREASED WITil TIIE NEW COMPONENTS, IIOWEVER SYSTEM OPERATION WAS NOT CllANGED. Tile SEAL OIL VACUUM TANK AND ITS COMPONENTS ARE NOT TIIE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 VIM 027, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TO MINIMIZE Tile POTENTIAL FOR VIBRATION INDUCED TUBING FAILURES ON Tile EllC SKID ASSOCIATED WITil Tile AUTOMATIC AIR BLEED VALVES. Tile AIR BLEED VALVES WERE RELOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET DOWNSTREAM TO AN AREA SUBJECTED TO LESS V!BRATION. Tile FUNCTION OF Tile VALVES WILL NOT CilANGE NOR WILL TIEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM Tile AIR REMOVAL FUNCrlON BE 166 l

AFFECTED IN Tile NEW LOCATION. Ti!E CllANGE WAS NECESSARY FOLLOWING SEVERAL VIBRATION INDUCED TUBE FAILURES RESULTING IN A LOSS OF EllC FLUID. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tile EHC HYDRAULIC POWEf' UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECDON 10.2 WillCll DESCRIBES Tile FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF TIIE TURBINE GENERATOR. THE AIR REMOVAL VALVES AR 3 NOT DISCUSSED IN Tills SECTION TIIE RELOCATED VALVES REMAIN CAPABLE OF PTRFORMING TifEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. THE EllC llYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE TUPIC OF ANY PLANT TEClINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 V2M028. REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrTION: TO MINIMlZE Tile POTENTIAL FOR VIBRATION INDUCED TUBING FAILURES ON THE EHC SKID ASSOCIATED WITil Tile AUTOMATIC AIR BLEED VALVES, THE AIR BLEED VALVES WERE RELOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET DOWNSTREAM TO AN AREA SUBJECTED TO LESS VIBRATION. Tile FUNCTION OF THE VALVES WILL NOT CilANGE NOR WILL TilEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM Tile AIR REMOVAL FUNCTION DE AFFECTED IN Tile NEW LOCATION. Tile CllANGE WAS NECESSARY FOLLOWING SEVERAL VIBRATION INDUCED TUBE FAILURES RESULTING IN A LOSS OF EllC FLUID. SAFETY EVALUATION: TIIE EllC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 WillCll DESCRIBES TIIE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF TIIE TURBINE GENERATOR. Tile AIR REMOVAL VALVES ARE NOT DISCUSSED IN Tills SECTION. Tile RELOCATED VALVES IEMAIN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. TIIE EllC tIYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECl!NlCAL SPECIF. CATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VAM029, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIIrTION: SEVERAL INPUTS TO IIEAT TRACE PANEL l-1817-U3-001 IIAVE PROCESS FLUID TEMPERATUIES GREATER Til AN TILE I! EAT TRACE ALARM SETPOINT OF 80 DEGREES F. Tills CAUSED Tile CENTRAL ALARM ASSOCIATED WITil Tills PANEL TO REMAIN IN Tile ALARMED STATE WHICll COULD MASK A VALID INPUT. THE SETPOINT FOR SEVERAL CIRCUITS Wil!Cll EX111BITED Tills CIIARACTERISTIC WERE RAISED FROM 80 DEGREES F. TO 105 DEGREES F. SAFETY EVALUATION: IIEAT TRACING REQUIREMENTS ARE GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN MULTIPLE SECTIONS OF TIIE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 8.3," ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION", AND SECTIONS 9.2. 9.3 AND 9.4 ADDRESSING IIEAT TRACE REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS PLANT WATER SYSTEMS. Tile HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM SETPOINT IS NOT SPECIFIED IN TIIESE DISCUSSIONS. IIEAT TRACING ALARM SETPOINTS ARE NOT Ti!E SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93. VIM 031, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: LINE l-1316-L4-502-11/2" LINE ASSOCIATED WITH Tl!E MSR POCKET DRAINS EXPERIENCED A BREACil OF TIIE PRESSURE BOUNDARY DUE TO PIPE EROSION. THIS PROBLEM HAD BEEN UNDER REVIEW BY PERFORMANCE OF UT EXAMINATIONS AND SYSTEM / MATERIAL USAGE REVIEWS CONDUCTED BY PLANT ENGINEERING. CARBON STEEL PIPING WillCl! IS MORE SOSCEPTIBLE TO EROSION / CORROSION WAS REPLACED WTril LOW ALLOY STEEL PIPING WillCil IS MORE RESISTANT TO EROSION / CORROSION. 167

I i l I l REPLACEMENT OF TIE CARBON STEEL PIPE WITH TIE LOW ALLOY S' EEL PIPE WILL CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE FUTURE RATE OF WALL THINNING DUE TO EROSION. ] SAFETY EVALUATION: SECTIONS 10.2,10.3,10.4.1 AND 10.4.7 DISCUSSES THE TURBINE-GENERATOR, MAIN STEAM SUPPLY, MAIN CONDENSER AND THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS. TIE DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THESE SECTIONS DOES NOT PROVIDE DETAILS SUCH AS PIPE MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE REPLACEMENT OF PIPING OF A DIFFERENT MATERIAL DOES IGT NPACT SYSTEM OPERATION, THE MSR POCKET DRAINS ARE NOT TIE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-vim 032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIlrTION: AN 8" X 14" CONCENTRIC REDUCER WELDED TO TIE OUTLET OF THE IEATER DRA!N PUMP DISCIARGE CONTROL VALVES WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW REDUCER OF A DIFFERENT MATERIAL. TIE REPLACEMENT OF TFE EXISTING REDUCERS WAS NECESS/.RY DUE TO WALL TillNNING THROUGH EROSION. THE CARBON STEEL REDUCER WAS REPLACED WITH A STAINLESS STEEL REDUCER WHICH SHOULD CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE WALL THINNING IN THIS AREA. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 DESCRIBES Tile CONDENSATE AND FEED WATER SYSTEMS INCLUDING TIE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM. THE SUBJECT VALVES ARE NOT DISCUSSED IN TIE FSAR. THE REPLACEMENT ONLY INVOLVES A CilANGE IN THE MATERIAL OF TIE REDUCER AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN TIE DESIGN FUNCTION OF Tile REDUCER. THE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 034, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRll' TION: PIPE SUPPORT VI-1201-210-H603 SUPPORTING LINE l-1201-210-1"(REACTOR COOLANT PUMP #1 OIL SPILL PROTECTION SYSTEM)IS BEING MODIFIED (SPLICE JOINT ADDED) TO PERMIT REMOVAL OF TIE SUPPORT TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE AND REMOVAL OF THE MOTOR FOR NUMBER 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP. IN ADDITION THE ONE INCH LINE SUPPORTED BY THIS SUPPORT WAS ALSO REROUTED TO FACILITATE TIE NEW SPLICE JOINT. SAFETY EVALUATION: ALTIIOUGH SOME STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS AND PIPE REROUTING WERE MADE UNDER THIS CllANGE, NO SYSTEM, STRUCI1JRE OR COMPONENT WAS ADDED OR DELETED. THE SUPPORT WILL STILL FUNCTION AS DESIGNED AS VERIFIED BY DESIGN CALCULATIONS. THE REROUTING OF TIE LINE DOES NOT AFFECT OPERATION OF THE RCP OIL SPILL SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VAM036, REVISION 0,SEQUEEE 1 l DESCRIPTION: PRESSURE INDICATORS LOCATED ON THE DISCHARGE OF TIE RECIPROCATING AIR COMPRESSORS WERE EXPERIENCING DAMAGE DUE TO TIE PULSATION AFFECTS FROM THE LOADING AND UNLOADING OF THE COMPRESSORS.1D RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, PULSATION DAMPENERS WERE INSTALLED AT THE INLET TO EACH OF THE DISCHARGE PRESSURE INDICATORS ON THE RECIPROCATING AIR COMPRESSORS BETWEEN Tile ROOT VALVE AND THE PRESSURE INDICATOR. 168 l

SAFETY EVALUATION: TIE INSTRUMENT / SERVICE AIR SYSTEM IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.1. TIE ADDITION OF THE PULSATION DAMPENERS IN TIIE PRESSURE INDICATOR INLETS DID NOT IMPACT SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION AS DESCRIBED IN Tills SECTION. THE INSTRUMENT AND SERVICE AIR SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADDRESSED BY ANY STATION TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 037, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TWO SHORT SECTIONS OF PIPE AT THE OUTLETS OF TIE HEATER DRAIN PUMP DISCIIARGE AUTOMATIC RECIRCULATION VALVES WAS REPLACED WITH LOW ALLOY STEEL PIPING. Tim EXISTING SECTIONS OF PIPE IIAD EXPERIENCED WALL TilINNING DUE TO EROSION. REPLACEMENT OF THE CARBON STEEL PIPE WITli THE LOW ALLOY STEEL PIPE WILL CONSIDERABLY REDUCE TIE FUTURE RATE OF WALL THINNING DUE TO EROSlON. SAFETY EVALUATION: SECTION 10.4.7 DISCUSSES THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE IIEATER DRAIN SYSTEM. THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION IX)ES NOT PROVIDE DETAILS SUCli AS PIPE MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS. TIIE REPLACEMENT OF PIPING OF A DIFFERENT MATERIAL DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION. TIE IIEATER DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT TIE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 VIM 038, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIFFION: PIPING BETWEEN STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP 'l URBINE "lB" HIGH PRESSURE STOP VALVE AND TIIE HIGli PRESSURE STOP VALVE ABOVE SEAT DRAIN WAS REROtJFED TO ELIMINATE FUTURE INTERFERENCES WITH FEED PUMP TURBINE DISASSEMBLY. PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION REQUIRED PIPING TO BE CUT OFF DURING DISASSEMBLY AND THEN REWELDED DURING REASSEMBLY. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 " CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS" DOES NOT ADDRESS TIIE ROUTING OF DRAIN LINES NOR DOES THE ROUTING OF THIS LINE APPEAR AS A PART OF ANY DRAWING CONTAINED IN THE FSAR. THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT HE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECifNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VAM039, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 i DESCRilrTION: THIS DESIGN CIIANGE ADDS NOTES TO THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE DESIGN DRAWINGS ALLOWING TIE INSTALLATION OF ADDITIONAL SIGIIT GLASSES TO THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE HYDRAULIC FLUID RESERVOIRS. TIIE LOCATION OF TIIE EXISTING SIGIIT GLASSES ON SEVERAL OF THE ACTUATORS MAKES OBSERVATION OF TiiE RESERVOIR LEVEL DIFFICULT. THE NEW SIGliT GLASSES WILL BE IDENTICAL TO TiiE EXISTING SIGilT GLASSES. SAFLTY EVALUATION: TifE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES ARE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IN FSAR SECTION 10.3. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE CAPABILITY OF MONITORING RESERVOIR LEVELS VIA TIIE SIGHT GLASS. ADDITION OF AN IDENTICAL SIGHT GLASS AT A LOCATION ON THE RESERVOIR THAT CAN BE BETTER OBSERVED BY PERSONNEL WILL NOT AFFECT MSIV OPERATION OR TIEIR DESIGN FUNCTION TO RAPIDLY CLOSE ON ISOLATION SIGNALS. THE MAIN STEAM VALVES ARE REQUIRED BY 169

1 I l l l TIIE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, llOWEVER THIS ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT THEIR REQUIRED DESIGN FUNCrlON OR PRESENT ANY QUESTION OF MSIV OPERABILITY.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 043, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TiiE DESIGN CIIANGE PROVIDED A METHOD TO SUPPORT Tile LATERAL DISTIUBUTION EXTENSIONS LOCATED AT Tile PERIPHERY OF Ti!E COOLING TOWER TO PREVENT TIIE EXTENSIONS FROM SEPARATING FROM TiiE DISTRIBUTION HEADER. IN ADDITION, EXTENSIONS WERE ADDED TO Tile FLUME DRAINS TO PREVENT CLOGGING OR ENTRY OF DIRT / DEBRIS INTO TiiE IRENCil NOZZLES. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES THE FUNCrlON Aho OPERATION OF TIIE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM INCLUDING Tile COOLING TOWER. DIE CllANGES IMPLEMENTED DO NOT IMPACT Tills DISCUSSION. COOLING TOWER OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED AS A RESULT OF TIIIS CHANGE. Tile CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT Tile topic OF ANY PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TiiE DISCilARGE PIPING FROM Tile TURBINE BUILDING NORTH AND SOUTH SUMPS WAS CilANGED FROM A PIPING MATERIALS CLASSIFICATION OF PROJECT CLASS LLO (150# CARBON STEEL) TO LL3 (150# STAINLESS STEEL) TO PREVENT PUMP SUCTION LOSSES DUE TO INTERNAL SURFACE CORROSION. ADDITIONALLY, TiiE EXISTING FLOW INDICATORS WERE FOUND TO DE OBSOLETE AN SUBSEQUENTLY REPLACED. TO ENHANCE FUTURE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, SEVERAL FLANGES WERE ADDED TO EASE PIPE REMOVAL AS NEEDED. SAFETY EVALUATION: TiiE TURBINE BUILDING SUMPS AND RADIATION MONITORS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 11.5. Tile REPLACEMENT OF CARBON STEEL PIPING WITil STAINLESS STEEL PIPING DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION OR DESIGN FUNCrlON. THE CllANGE DOES NOT IMPACT Tile OPERATION OF THE RADIATION ELEMENTS OR THEIR FUNCTION. THE PIPING CLASS IS NOT CONSIDERED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 045, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIFrlON: A ONE OllM RESISTOR WAS ADDED TO Tile MOTOR BOARD ON SEISMIC MONITOR AXR-19928J TO ALLEVIATE NOISE ON Tile DATA CliANNEL OUTPUT THAT WAS OCCURRING ON ALL TilREE D ATA Cl!ANNELS. THE INSTALLATION OF Tile RESISTOR WAS A RECOMMENDATION FROM THE SYSTEM VENDOR (KINEMETRICS). THE ADDITION WILL ENABLE A BETTER SIGNAL SUPPLY TO TiiE CONTROL ROOM RECORDER. SAFETY EVALUATION: 111E CllANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TiiE CAPABILITY OF THE SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. THE REDUCTION OF CilANNEL NOISE WILL PROVIDE FOR A MORE USEFUL SIGNAL TO BE SUPPLIED TO Tile CONTROL ROOM RECORDER. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE ADDITION OF THE RESISTOR DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENTS SET FORTil IN Tile PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING Tile SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 048, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I 170

DESCRil' TION: THE DESIGN CilANGE PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC TRIP OF Tile MAIN TURBINE WilEN Tile GENERATOR OUTPlfr BREAKERS ARE OPENED AS Tile RESULT OF Tile DETECTION OF EXCESSIVE NEGATIVE PIIASE SEQUENCE CURRENTS. THE PREVIOUS DESIGN OPENED Tile OUTPlTF Cl,RCUlT BREAKERS WITilOUT TRIPPING TIIE TURBINE WillCil COULD CllALLENGE THE OVERSPEED PROTECrlON DEVICES AT A HIGHER POWER LEVEL. Tills CilANGE WAS INITIATED FOLLOWING A UNIT I STARTUP (IR4) IN WHICH TIIIS EVENT HAPPENED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. Tile GENERA ~lDR PROTECrlVE TRIPS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. T11E CilANGE DID NOT INVOLVE OR EFFECT TIIE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING FUNCrlONS REQUIRED BY Tile TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. Tile ADDED PROTECTION DOES NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION OR FUNCTION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-V2M049, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRilrrlON: THE DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE WilEN Tile GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS ARE OPENED AS TIIE RESULT OF Ti!E DETECrlON OF EXCESSIVE NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE CURRENTS. THE PREVIOUS DESIGN OPENED THE OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITHOUT TRIPPING THE TURBINE WIIICH COULD CHALLENGE TIIE OVERSPEED PROTECTION DEVICES AT A HIGHER POWER LEVEL. TIIIS CHANGE WAS INITIATED FOLLOWING A UNIT I STARTUP (IR4) IN WillCH TlllS EVENT llAPPENED. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. TiiE GENERATOR PROTECTIVE TRIPS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. TIIE CilANGE DID NOT INVOLVE OR EFFECT THE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING FUNCrlONS REQUIRED BY TIIE TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. TiiE ADDED PROTECTION DOES NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION OR FUNCTION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 050, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: Tile TURBINE EllC PRESSURE SWITCH WillCil ALARMS ON LOW PRESSURE WAS SET AT THE SAME PIESSURE IN WillCli AUTO START OF THE STANDBY PUMP OCCURS. T111S DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNING OF Tile LOW PRESSURE , CONDITION. TIIE LOW EllC PRESSURE SETPOINT WAS RAISED FROM 1300 PSIG TO 1400 PSIO. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 DISCUSSES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE EHC SYSTEM. RAISING TIIE ALARM SETPOINT TO PROVIDE EARLIER WARNING OF IMPENDING LOW EHC PRESSURE DOES NOT AFFECT THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED WITlilN Ti!E FSAR SECTION. Tile SETPOINT AITECTED BY TIIIS CHANGE IS NOT ADDRESSED BY Tile STATION TECllNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-V2M051, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I  ! DESCRIPTION: Tile TURBINE EHC PRESSURE SWITCH WHICH ALARMS ON LOW PRESSURE WAS SET AT TIIE SAME PlWSSURE IN WlilCH AUTO START OF Tile STANDBY PUMP OCCURS. Tills DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNING OF THE LOW PRESSURE 171 l 1 i

CONDITION, TIIE LOW EllC PRESSURE SETPOINT WAS RAISED FROM 1300 PSIG TO 1400 PSIG. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 DISCUSSES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF TIE EHC SYSTEM. RAISING THE ALARM SETPOINT TO PROVIDE EARLIER WARNING OF IMPENDING LOW EllC PRESSURE DOES NOT AFFECT THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED WITHIN TIE FSAR SECTION. THE SETPOINT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE IS NOT ADDRESSED BY TIIE STATION TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VIM 054, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIE INLET VALVE TO THE WASTE BALL COLLECTOR ON THE *B" CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING SYSTEM (AMERTAP) HAD INTERNAL VALVE DAMAGE RESULTING IN DIFFICULT VALVE OPERATION. THE VALVE WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW BALL VALVE AND DOWNSTREAM PIPING MODIFIED TO ACCEPT THE NEW LONGER VALVE. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE REPLACEMENT VALVE FUNCTIONS IN DESIGN AS THE ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED VALVE. TIE CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING SYSTEM 15 GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.1, " MAIN CONDENSER". THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT CONTAIN COMPONENT SPECIFIC INFORMATION. THE CONDENSER TUBE CL.EANING SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93. VIM 059, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: TIE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNIT 1 TURBINE BUILDING CRANE FAILED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS PARTICULAR BREAKER WAS NO LONGER MANUFACTURED. TIE CHANGE PERMITTED 'IIE INSTALLATION OF AN EQUIVALENT FEEDER BREAKER. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3 DISCUSSES THE DESIGN, FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL- POWER SYSTEMS. TIE REPLACEMENT OF THE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER WITil AN EQUIVALENT MODEL DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION. THE TURBINE BUILDING CRANE AND ITS ACCESSORIES ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. *

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-V2M060, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRWTION: TIIE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNIT 2 TURBINE BUILDING CRANE FAILED. IT WAS DETERMINED TilAT THIS PARTICULAR BREAKER WAS NO LONGER MANUFACTURED. TIE CilANGE PERMITFED TIE INSTALLATION OF AN EQUIVALENT FEEDER BREAKER. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3 DISCUSSES THE DESIGN, FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER WITil AN EQUIVALENT MODEL DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION. THE TURBINE BUILDING CRANE AND ITS ACCESSORIES ARE NOT Tile SUBJECT OF ANY STATION TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VAM064, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I 172

I l 1 DESCR!!' TION: Tile EXISTING PROBE CABLE, A COMPOSITE OF MICA / GLASS, ASSOCIATED WITli THE AQUA.RIAN PROBES WAS REPLACED WITH A HIGH TEMPERATURE TEFLON INSULATED CABLE. TIE OLD CABLE WAS SUSCEl'TIBLE TO MOISTURE ABSORI' TION l WillCII CAUSED IMPROPER INDICATION OF WATER INSTEAD OF STEAM. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.I,10.3 AND 10.4.9 ADDRESS FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF TiiE MAIN STEAM AND AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEMS. THE LEVEL CONTROL FUNCTION ASSOCIATED WITil THE AQUARIAN PROBES IS DISCUSSED BUT NOT TO TIE LEVEL OF DETAIL SPECIFYING PROBE CABLE REQUIREMENTS. THE REPLACEMENT CABLE PERFORMS THE SAME FUNCTION IN TIE SAME MANNER AS THE ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED CABLE BUT WILL NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOISTURE ABSORirTION. TIE STEAM CONDENS ATE DRAIN POT LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT DISCUSSED IN Tile PLANT TECTINICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-V2M066, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 DESCRIPTION: LIGilTING TRANSFORMER 2NBL2XI (4160-480 GE DRY TYPE XFMR) WAS REPLACED WITli A CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY SUPPLIED BY ABB.THE ABB SUPPLIED CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY WAS DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN THE EXISTING GE TRANSFORMER CASE. THE REPLACEMENT CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS OF A LATER DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A GREATER LEVEL OF RELIABILITY. SAFETY EVALUATION: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3. TIE LIGilTING TRANSFORMER IS DEPICTED ON FIGURE 8.3.1 1 (SIEET 2 OF 2) WHICH WILL BE UPDATED DURING THE NORMAL ANNUAL UPDATE. TIE REPLACEMENT TRANSFORMER HAS TIIE SAME ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AS THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED TRANSFORMER. TIE TRANSFORMER INVOLVED IN THE CilANGE WAS A NON-1E CLASS TRANSFORMER AND WAS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93 V2M072, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE I DESCRIPTION: A MANUALLY OPERATED ISOLATION VALVE WAS INSTALLED IN THE DISCilARGE LINE OF EACH OF THE MAIN TURBINE ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC CONTROL (EHC) FLUID HIGH PRESSURE PUMPS. Tile VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN AND DO NOT AFFECT Tile OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. THE BALL VALVES WERE ADDED TO ELIMINATE THE USE OF AN EXISTING CIIECK VALVE IN THE DISCHARGE LINE AS AN ISOLATION BOUNDARY DURING PUMP MAINTENANCE WHILE THE UNIT IS AT POWER. SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE AND GENERATOR ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. A DISCUSSION OF Tile EHC SYSTEM IS CONTAINED WITlHN THIS DESCRIPTION. THE ADDITION OF Tile VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPFJtATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE EllC SYSTEM IS NOT TIE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT:

MDD 93-VAM075, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE i DESCRH' TION: THE FILTER ELEMENT ASSOCIATED WITII THE LAUNDRY AND HOT EllOWER TANK (LIIST) REQUIRED FREQUENT CLEANING AND WAS REMOVED. THE 173

FUNCTION THAT WAS BEING PROVIDED FOR BY THIS FILTER IS NOW BEING PROVIDED TIIROUGli TIE RECENT INSTALLATION OF TIE IMPEli MICROFILTRATION SKID LOCATED IN THE ALTERNATE RADWASTE BUILDING. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.2 DISCUSSES TIE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF TIIE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM. TIE DESCRIPTION CONTAINED WITHIN THIS SECTION AND FSAR FIGURES WILL BE UPDATED TO INDICATE THAT THE FILTER ELEMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED. AS THIS FUNCTION IS BEING PROVIDED VIA AN ALTERNATE METilOD, SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED. TIIE LHST IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. 174

10 CFR 50.59(B) REPORT of TESTS & EXPERIMENTS. JUNE 1,1992 THRU OCTOBER 22,1993 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 175

SUBJECT:

T-OPER-93-003 DESCRII' TION: Tills PROCEDURE ALLOWS USE OF FIRE PROTECTION WATER HEADER PRESSURE TO PERFORM A IIYDROSTATIC TEST ON NSCW TRAIN B. TiiE TEST WAS PEIU GRMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROCEDURE 84003-C TO SATISFY ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS. THE FIRE PROTECTION WATER HEADER WAS CONNECTED VIA FIRE IIYDRANT TO THE NSCW HEADER AND BOT 11 JOCKEY PUMPS WERE STARTED TO SUPPLY Ti!E TEST PRESSURE. Tile PROCEDURE GAVE ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR OPERATING A MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMP IF JOCKEY PUMPS DID NOT SUPPLY TiiE APPROPRIATE TEST PRESSURE. TIIIS PROCEDURE WAS APPROVED FOR ONE-TIME USE WITH Tile UNTI I" COLD SIIUTDOWN. SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS TEST DOES NOT DEVIATE OR CREATE AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION DIFFERENT FROM Tile FSAR ANALYSIS. DURING THE TEST,'ITIE FIRE PROTECrlON WATER TANKS WERE MONITORED AND CONTINUOUS MAKEUP CAPABILITY PROVIDED TO ENSURE TIIE MINIMUM LEVELS WERE MAINTAINED. IN ADDITION, TWO FIRE PUMPS WERE AVAILABLE DURING THE TEST. TIIEREFORE, SINCE THE MINIMUM FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS WERE MET, Tile MARGIN OF SAFETY IS MAINTAINED.

SUBJECT:

93270-C REV 14T DESCRII' TION: A TEMPORARY PROCEDURE REVISION WAS MADE TO Tills PROCEDURE TO PROCEED WITH TiiE UNIT TWO FUEL OFF-LOAD IN A SAFE MANNER WITH A NON-FUNCTIONAL DISENGAGED LIMIT SWITCII. TO DISENGAGE A FUEL ASSEMBLY, TIE FUEL GRIPPER DISENGAGED LIMIT SWITCll MUST BE MADE UP, Tile FUEL GRIPPER DISENGAGED ENGAGED LIMIT SWITCH MUST BE OPEN, MAST IIEIGilT REQUIREMENTS MUST BE SATISFIED, AND Tile LOAD MONITOR MUST INDICATE TilAT THE WEIGHT OF Tile FUEL llAS BEEN REMOVED. TIIEREFORE, AN EXTERNALLY SUPPLIED SIGNAL WAS SUPPLIED TO TIIE SIGMA CONTROL CONSOLE WilEN TiiE FUEL WAS OVER TIIE UPENDER TO SIMULATE TIIE SWITCII DISENGAGING. TIIE LOAD MONITOR WAS RELIED UPON TO INDICATE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE FUEL ASSEMBLY. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills REVISION DOES NOT INCREASE PROBABILITY, DEVIATE, OR CREATE AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION DIFFERENT FROM FSAR ANALYSIS. STRICT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS WERE USED TO PROlllBIT DISENGAGEMENT OF A FUEL ASSEMBLY OVER Tile CORE. TIIROUGli VISUAL VERIFICATION AND LOAD MONITOR INDICATION, TIIE FUEL ASSEMBLIES WERE VERIFIED AS DISENGAGED PRIOR TO CONTINUING Ti!E OFF-LOAD. SUBJECf: SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-18) UNIT 1 DESCRIlrflON: DURING PERFORMANCE OF T-ENG-93 04 Tile SEQUENCER PANEL EXPERIENCED AN UNPLANNED LOAD SilED WHILE PERFORMING THE "U/V" MANUAL TEST IN THE "SYS" TEST MODE. Ti!E SPECI AL TlIST WAS TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE INADVERTENT LOAD SIIED WillCll OCCURRED DURING PERFORMANCE OF T-ENG-93-04 ON APRIL 10,1993. IN ADDITION, THIS TEST WAS USED TO VERIFY THE ADEQUACY OF ANY REPAIRS / MODIFICATIONS RESULTING IMOM THE PERFORMANCE OF T11E TEST. THIS TEST RECREATED TiiE CONDITIONS PRESENT WHEN TIIE LOAD SIIED OCCURRED. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR CilAl'TERS 3.0,5.0,6.0,8.0,13.0,15.0 WERE REVIEWED AND IT WAS FOUND TilAT TIIE TESTING DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED BY TIIE FSAR. ALTHOUGli TRAIN "A" 4160 SWITCIIGEAR WAS DE-176

ENERCIZED DURING TESTING, ALL LOADS REQUlIED TO SUPPORT THE PLANT IN ITS INITIAL CONDITIONS WERE TRANSFERIED TO TIE TRAIN "B" 4160 SWITCilGEAR. THIS PROCEDURE WAS IMPLEMENTED IN MODE 6. Ti(EREFORE, THE TEST COMPLIED WITH TECil SPEC 3.9.8.1. TECli SPEC 3.8.1.2 WAS ALSO SATISFIED SINCE TRAIN "B" 4160 SWITCllGEAR AND ITS ASSOCIATED DIESEL GENERATOR WAS OPERABLE.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-92 09) UNIT I DESCRIPTION: THE ATI FUNCrlON WAS DEFEATED BY A TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO ALLOW THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION FOR ALL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. Tills MODIFICATION PREVENTS Tile SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESETTING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF THE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFErrY INJECrlON SIGNAL (SI) WlIILE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. THIS TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY, BUT IS A COMPENSATORY ACTION WHILE ATI IS DEFEATED. Tills TEST DOES NOT OPERATE ANY PLANT COMPONENTS OTIER TilAN TIIE SEQUENCER INTERNAL LOGIC. IF AN SI OR UV OCCURS DURING THE TEST, TIIE SEQUENCER IS DESIGNED TO AUTOMATICALLY RESET FROM TEST MODE AND PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: SEQUENCER OPERATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3.1.1.2,8.3.1.1.3, TABLE 8.3.1-2, TABLE 8.3.1-3, AND FIGURE 8.3.1-2. THIS TEMPORARY PROCEDURE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR TIE OPERATION OF AN ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED SEQUENCER TEST CAPABILITY, Tills TESTING IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR. FOR TlilS REASON, TIIE PROCEDURE WILL BE REGARDED AS A SPECIAL TEST, EVEN THOUGli THIS PROCEDURE OPERATES ALL COMPONENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH TilEIR ORIGINAL DESIGN. Ti!E TESTING DOES NOT CilANGE TIIE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. Tills SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT AFFECT ASSOCIATED PLANT TECli SPECS 3/4.3(ESFAS INSTRUhENTATION) OR 3/4.8(EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY).

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST-(T-ENG-92-10) UNIT 2 DESCRIPTION: THE ATI FUNCTION WAS DEFEATED BY A TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO ALLOW TIE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION FOR ALL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. Tills MODIFICATION PREVENTS TiiE SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESETTING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF TIIE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFETY INJECrlON SIGNAL (SI) WHILE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. TIIIS TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY, BUT IS A COMPENSATORY ACTION WHILE ATI IS DEFEATED. Tills TEST DOES NOT OPERATE ANY PLANT COMPONENTS OTIER TIIAN THE SEQUENCER INTERNAL LOGIC. IF AN SI OR UV OCCURS DURING TIIE TEST, THE SEQUENCER IS DESIGMED TO AUTOMATICALLY RESET FROM TEST MODE AND PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: SEQUENCER OPERATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECrlONS 8.3.1.1.2,8.3.1.1.3, TABLE 8.3.1-2, TABLE 8.3.1-3, AND FIGURE 8.3.1-2. THIS TEMPORARY PROCEDURE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATION OF AN ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED SEQUENCER TEST CAPABILITY. TIIIS TESTING IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR. FOR Tills REASON, Tile PROCEDURE WILL DE REGARDED AS A SPECIAL TEST, EVEN TilOUGH TlilS PROCEDURE OPERATES ALL COMPONENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR ORIGINAL DESIGN. THE TESTING DOES NOT CHANGE THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN 'nIE FSAR. THIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT AFFECT ASSOCIATED PLANT TECH SPECS 3/4.3(ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION) OR 3/4.8(EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY). 177 4

F

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T ENG-92-11) UNIT I DESCRIPTION: TlilS TEST RAN TIIE CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP (PDP) AT VARYING DISCl{ARGE PRESSUIES. Tills TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER TIIE COMPLETION OF PD PUMP PACKING IEPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY " BREAK-IN" TIE PUMPS PACKING. Tills PROCEDURE SilOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF Tile PACKING. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES TIIE CVCS (PD PUMP). TIE PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO Tile FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO Tile PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL DE RESTORED WITIIIN ONE SillFT. Tills SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CllANGES TO TIIE TECilNICAL SPECIFICA110NS NOR ANY FORTION OF Tile ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93 9) UNIT 2 DESCRIPTION: Tills TEST RAN TIIE CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP (PDP) AT VARYING DISCliARGE PRESSURES. Tills TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER Tile COMPLETION OF PD PUMP PACKING REPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY " BREAK IN" Ti!E PUMP'S PACKING. Tills PROCEDURE SilOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF TiiE PACKING. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES TIIE CVCS (PD PUMP). TIIE PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO TIE FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO TiiE PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL BE RESTORED WITillN ONE SillFT. TlilS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CilANGES TO Tile TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR ANY PORTION OF TIIE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-20) UNIT 2 DESCRIFTION: Tills TEST RAN TIIE CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP (PDP) AT VARYING DISCilARGE PRESSURES. Tills TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER TIIE COMPLETION OF PD PUMP PACKING REPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY " BREAK IN" Tile PUMPS PACKING. TlilS PROCEDURE SilOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF TIE PACKING. SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES Ti1E CVCS (PD PUMP). Tile PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO TIIE FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO Tile PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL DE RESTORED WITlilN ONE SilIFT. Tills SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CilANGES TO Tile TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR ANY PORTION OF Tile ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-2l) UNIT I DESCRIPTION: Tills TEST RAN Ti!E CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP (PDP) AT VARYING DISCliARGE PRESSURES. Tills TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER TIIE COMPLETlON OF PD PUMP PACKING REPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY " BREAK-IN" Tile PUMPS PACKING. Tills PROCEDURE SilOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE PACKING. SAFL'TY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES TIE CVCS (PD PUMP). TiiE PROCEDUIE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO TIIE FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO Tile PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL DE RESTORED WITillN ONE StilFr. TIIIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CilANGES TO Tile TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR ANY PORTION OF TIIE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN. 178

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93 04) UNIT I DESCRIPTION: Tile PROPOSED TEST IS REQUIRED TO TEST THE SAFETY FEATURES SEQUENCERS ALTER THE CORRECTION OF TIE ATI STEP 61 TIMING ANOMALY UNDER DCP 93-VIN 003. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE PREVENTS THE SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESETTING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF TIE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL (SI) WlilLE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. ADDITIONALLY, TIIIS TEST VERIFIES TIE CORRECT DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF TIE AUTOMATIC RESET CAPABILITY INSTALLED UNDER DCP 92-VIN 0171. THIS TESTING IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY. Tills PROCEDURE MUST OPERATE THE SEQUENCER AND DG OUTSIDE ITS NORMAL DESIGN BY DEFEATING THE DG TO SIMULATE A MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP. Tile OVERALL TEST INCLUDES:

1. MANUAL SEQUENCER TESTS, AND ATIINSERVICE

2. INITIATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP OF TIE DG AND VERIFY AUTOMATIC RESET OCCURS AFTER 60 SECONDS 3.INITI ATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP FROM QEAB AND VERIFY NO AUTOMATIC RESET OF THE SEQUENCER OCCURS. VERIFY MANUAL RESET FUNCTIONAL.

4. VERIFY SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SI/UV, SI, AND UV ACTUATIONS IN ESFAS WITH THE SI SECTION INITIATED AT ATI STEP 61.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 6.0,7.0, AND 8.3 WERE REVEWED AND IT WAS CONCLUDED TilAT THIS TEST DID NOT CHANGE THE PLANT AS IT IS DESCRIBED IN TIE FSAR. TIE CHANGES MADE IN DCP'S 93-VIN 003 AND 92-VIN 0171 ARE CHANGES TO TIE PLANT BUT TIE FUNCTIONAL TESTING DESCRIBED IN THIS TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE TECil SPECS ADDRESSING TIE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT,3/4.3 ON ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION, AND 3/4.8 ON EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ARE UNAFFECTED BY TIE TESTING.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-05) UNIT 2 DESCRII' TION: TIE PROPOSED TEST IS REQUIRED TO TEST TIE SAFETY FEATURES SEQUENCERS AFTER THE CORRECTION OF Tile ATI STEP 61 TIMING ANOMALY UNDER DCP 93 VIN 003. TIIIS DESIGN CliANGE PACKAGE PREVENTS TIIE SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESE'ITING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF THE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL (SI) WlilLE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. ADDITIONAL 1Y, THIS TEST VERIFIES TIE CORRECT DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF TIE AUTOMATIC RESET CAPABILITY INSTALLED UNDER DCP 92-VIN 0171. THIS TESTING IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY. THIS PROCEDURE MUST OPERATE TIE SEQUENCER AND DG OUTSIDE ITS NORMAL DESIGN BY DEFEATING THE DG TO SIMULATE A MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP. TIE OVERALL TEST INCLUDES:

1. MANUAL SEQUENCERTESTS, AND ATIINSERVICE 2.lNITIATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP OF TiiE DG AND VERIFY AUTOMATIC RESET OCCURS AFTER 60 SECONDS 3.INITI ATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP FROM QEAB AND VERIFY NO AUTOMATIC RESET OF THE SEQUENCER OCCURS. VERIFY MANUAL RESET FUNCTIONAL.

179

4. VERIFY SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SI/UV, SI, AND UV ACTUATIONS IN ESFAS WITH TiiE SI SECrlON INITIATED AT ATI STEP 61.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 6.0,7.0, AND 8.3 WERE REVIEWED AND IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT Tills TEST DID NOT CilANGE THE PLANT AS IT IS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. Tile CHANGES MADE IN DCP'S 93-VIN 003 AND 92-VIN 0171 ARE CHANGES TO Tile PLANT BUT TIIE FUNCTIONAL TESTING DESCRIBED IN THIS TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE TO TIIE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR. Tile TECil SPECS ADDRESSING Tile AFFECTED EQUIPMENT,3/4.3 ON ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION, AND 3/4.8 ON EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ARE UNAFFECTED BY TIIE TESTING.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-13) UNIT 1 DESCRIPTION: TlilS TEST IS REQUIRED TO SATISFY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 (TABLE 4.3 1 F/U 7 AND 8) AND 4.3.3.6.B (TABLE 3.3-8 F/U 2 AND 3). Tills PROCEDURE WAS DEVELOPED FOR REFUELING OUTAGE IR4. THE PROCEDURE IS VERY SIMILAR TO THE EXISTING RTD CROSS CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE. SAFETY EVALUATION: BEING TilAT THIS PROCEDURE IS SO SIMILAR TO THE EXISTING RTD CROSS CALIBRATION PROCEDURE, IT WILL IMPLEMENT THE I REQUIREMENTS IMPLIED IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.2.2.3.2 AND 7.2.2.5. NO CIIANGE TO ANY PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR IS REQUIRED. THIS PROCEDURE DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE TO EITilER TIIE TECil SPECS OR Tile ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN. 1 l

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-II) UNIT I DESCRII'rION: Tills TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE WILL OPERATE THE STRONGER CCP IN COLD LEG INJECTION MODE, THE "B" S1 PUMP IN IIOT LEG INJECTION MODE WITli CONCURRENT MINIFLOW, AND THE STRONGER SI PUMP IN COLD LEG  ; INJECrlON MODE AND SUBSEQUENT COLD LEG RECIRCULATION MODE. MOV DIAGNOSTIC TEST DATA WILL BE OBTAINED FOR NUMEROUS VALVES. ALL VALVES WILL l UE STROKED IN BOTil DIRECTIONS AG AINST SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW I CONDITIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills PROCEDURE OPERATES Tile CHARGING SYSTEM AS IT IS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR. TIIIS TEST OPERATES THE S! SYSTEM IN A CONFIGURATION  ; SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM ITS OPERATIONAL DESCRilrrlON IN TIIE FSAR. TIIIS l PROCEDURE MAKES ONLY A TEMPORARY CilANGE TO EQUIPMENT. TilEREFORE, NO CIIANGE TO Tile FSAR IS NECESSARY. FSAR SECTIONS 3.9,5.4.7,5.4.12,6.3,7.3.2,7.4,9.3.4, 13.5, AND CHAirrER 15 WERE REVIEWED. REVIEW OF TECH SPECS 3/4.1.2.1,3/4.1.2.3, 3/4.1.2.5,3/4.8.4.2,3/4.9.8.1, AND 3/4.9.8.2 CONCLUDE TIIAT NO CHANGES TO THE TECH SPECS ARE NEEDED.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-10) UNIT I DESCRIPTION: Tills TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE WILL OPERATE THE "A" TRAIN CCP ON MINIFLOW AND TIIROUGli Tile SAFETY GRADE CilARGING FLOW PATil. DURING Tills TIME FRAME, FLOW WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE FOR SEAL INJECTION TO 180

ANY RCPS WillCil ARE NOT ON TilEIR DACKSEAT. MOV DIAGNOSTIC TEST DATA WILL DE OBTAINED FOR TWO VALVES. TilEY WILL BE STROKED IN BOTil DIRECFIONS AGAINST SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CONDITIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills PROCEDURE MAY OPERATE TIIE CilARGING SYSTEM l IN A CONFIGURATION TilAT IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IN Tile SYSTEM OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION IN TIIE FSAR. A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 5.4.7,6.3,7,4.1.3, 9.3.4,13.5, AND CilAPTER 15 CONCLUDE TilAT A PERMANENT CilANGE TO TiiE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN Tile FSAR IS NOT APPLICABLE SINCE TlilS IS A TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION. NO CilANGE TO Tile TECil SPECS OR Tile EPP 15 NEEDED FOR Tills PROCEDURE. SUDJECF; SPECIAL TEST -(T-ENG-93-01) UNIT I DESCRil'FION: Tills TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE WILL OPERATE TI-{E TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (TDAFW) PUMP ON MINIFLOW IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MOV DI AGNOSTIC TEST DATA FOR TWO VALVES. ONE OF Tile VALVES WILL BE STROKED IN Tile CLOSED DIRECTION AGAINST NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CONDITIONS. Tile OTl!ER VALVE WILL DE STROKED BOTil OPEN AND CLOSED AGAINST SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CONDITIONS. SAFETY EVALUATION: Tills PROCEDURE DOES NOT MAKE ANY PERMANENT Cl!ANGES TO TIIE PLANT AS DESCRIDED IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.3.7,10.4.9,13.5,15.0, AND APPENDIX 10A. Tills TEST OPERATES BOTil VALVES WITil!N TilEIR DESIGN DASIS PARAMETERS. Tile PERFORMANCE OF Tills TEMPORARY PROCEDURE IIAS NO IMPACT ON PERMANENT PLANT PROCEDURE. Tills TEST WILL BE PERFORMED IN MODE 3 UNDER LCO 3.7.1.2 AS IS REQUIRED BY 'ECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS. AFTER REVIEW OF TECil SPEC 3/4.7.1.2 AND 3/4.7.1.3 IT IS FOUND TilAT NO CilANGES TO TECli SPECS OR Tile EPP IS NECESSARY. 181 N}}