ML19257C779

Responds to NRC 791022 Request for Addl Info Re Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis.Response to Items 8(c)(e) & 8(l) Will Be Forwarded by 800301

ML19257C779
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	01/23/1980
From:	Janecek R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8001300405
Download: ML19257C779 (28)

Text

Commonwealth Edison One first National Plaza. Chicago Illinois Address Reply to: Post Omce Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 January 23, 1980 Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors - Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis NRC Docket Nos. 50-254/265 References (a) : T. A. Ippolito letter to D. L. Peoples dated October 22, 1979

Dear Mr. Ippolito:

Reference (a) requested additional information concerning the Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 fire protection safe shutdown analys is. Enclosed are three (3) copies of our response to that request. The response addresse<, all questions except items 8 (c) , 8(e), and 8 (1) of Reference (a). Responses to these items will be provided by March 1, 1980.

Please address any additional questions you may have concerning this matter to this office.

One (1) signed original and thirty-nine ( 3 9,' copies of this transmittal letter are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

,v.pr? w<' b Robert F. Janecek Nuclear Licensing Administrator Boiling Water Reactors Enclosure enT7 IUs/ 182 I

800130 0 gg

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(a)_

Description of the systems or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capa-bility and modifications required to achieve the alternate shutdown capability if required.

RESPONSE

The description of the systems or portions thereof used to provide the hot shutdown capability and modifications required to do this is provided in the Quad Cities 1 &

2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis and Supplement 1 to that report.

A supplement to this report will be provided to discuss the systems used to pro-vide cold shutdown capability.

1037 183

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(b)

System design by drawings which show nonnal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location of components, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which is out of the area that required the alternate system.

RESPONSE

Because of the nature of the safe shutdown analyses on Quad Cities 1 & 2, detailed drawings are not necessary. The power and control cables necessary for safe shut-down are identified in the Quad Cities Safe Shutdown Analyses. Divisional cable pan locations are identified on the color coded figures in the fire protection report, "Information Relevant Fire Protection Sytems and Programs, Part 3, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2", April, 1977.

If an electrical cable was identified in a fire zone, the component it serviced was assumed to be inoperable unless some other form of operation was also identi-fied (e.g. , manual valve operation, local control).

1037 184

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(d)

Demonstrate that wiring, including power sources for the control circuit and equipment operation for the alternate shutdown method, is independent of equipment wiring in the area to be avoided.

RESPONSE

The Quad Cities 1 & 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, demonstrates that wiring necessary for at least one method of safe hot shutdown is independent of any single plant area.

Power sources for control circuits were not analyzed. If manual action is required to reclose a breaker that is not in a fire zone, credit is taken for that action.

See Quad Cities 1 & 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis paragraph 1.4 (h).

The breakers in each 4Ky and 480V SWGR are independently fed from two 125 DC divi-sional sources as shown on figure 2.1-10 in the fire protection report "Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Pregrams - Part 3 - Quad Cities 1 & 2" April, 1977.

1037 185

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(f)

Demonstrate that licensee procedure (s) have been developed which describe the tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown method. A summary of these pro-cedures should be reviewed by the staff.

RESPONSE

In accordance with the Safe Shutdown Analysis, the primary system used for shut- '

down is the RCIC System. QOP 1300-7, RCIC Local Manual Control, is the procedure which provides for use of the system in the event it cannot be remotely operated.

Further analyses have prompted Supplements 1 and 2 to the Safe Shutdown Analysis.

These supplements provide for modifications to additional systems to provide sup-port for RCIC. As these modifications are completed and the additional systems are tested, procedures will be developed to effect the shutdown method.

\

,t

'/

1 4

- 1037 186

/

\

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(g)

Demonstrate that spare fuses are available for control circuits where these fuses may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for the shutdown method and may be blown by the effects of a cable spreading room fire. The spare fuses should be located convenient to the existing fuses. The shutdown procedure should infonn the operator to check these fuses.

RESPONSE

All spare parts inventories are located in the Station Storeroom. The Shift Engi-neer and Shift Foreman have ready access to all spare parts which come under the cognizance of the Operations Department, including spare fuses. Operational pro-cedures which deal with plant abnormalities are sufficient to cope with problems that are a result of blown fuses. As modifications are implemented, procedures are reviewed and appropriate changes made.

'ius"7 187

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(h)

Demonstrate that the manpower required to perfonn the shutdown functions using the procedures of (f) as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical specifications.

RESPONSE

Of the 12 Operations Department personnel on shift, only 4 are used for the fire brigade. Further fire fighting assistance from the local fire department could possibly relieve 3 operating personnel from fire brigade duties. This allows for 8 to 11 personnel to effect the shutdown which is an adequate number.

1037 188

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(i)

Demonstrate that adequate acceptance tests are perfomed. These should ver .*v that: equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the " local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equipment operates from the control room but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the " remote" position.

RESPONSE

The C.E.Co. Quality Assurance Program Procedures for fire protection cover the installation of plant modifications. The procedure for acceptance of plant modification requires that adequate tests be perfomed. It is not necessary to disallow operation of an item of equipment from the controi room or visa versa unless this was an original requirement in the FSAR. The additional control stations being added at Quad Cities do not have such a restriction; therefore, the premise stated in this question is not valid for these stations.

,nyJ 1U 189

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(j)

Technical Specifications of surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation for that equipment not already covered by existing Tech Specs. For ex-ample, if new isolation and control switches are added to a service water system, the existing Tech Spec surveillance requirements on the service water system should add a statement similar to the following:

"Every third pump test should also verify that the pump starts from the alternate shutdown station after moving all service water system isolation switches to the local control position."

RESPONSE

While Technical Specifications should call out the surveillance requirements and intervals, they shocid not address actions to be taken to carry out those require-ments. The best method for describing how a Technical Specification requirement is fulfilled is by Station Procedures. Station Procedures have the flexibility of being upgraded for the best methods of doing surveillance testing in a timely man-ner. Tech Specs require substantial time for upgrading as improvements and methods of surveillance testing are found.

1037 190

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(k)

Demonstrate that the systems available are adequate to perform the necessary shut-down functions. The functions required should be based on previous analyses, if possible (e.g., in the FSAR), such as a loss of normal a.c. power or shutdown on a Group I isolation (BWR). The equipment required for the alternate capability should be the same or equivalent to that relied on in the above analysis.

RESPONSE

The adequacy of the systems utilized to perform safe hot shutdown of the reactor is demonstrated in the Quad Cities 1 & 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis.

A supplement to that report will discuss the adequacy of systems necessary to take the plant to cold shutdown.

1037 191

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(a)

Description of the systems or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capa-bility and modifications required to achieve the alternate shutdown capability if required.

RESPONSE

The description of the systems or portions thereof used te provide the hot shutdown capability and modifications required to do this is provided in the Quad Cities 1 &

2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis and Supplement I to that report.

A supplement to this report will be provided to discuss the systems used to pro-vide cold shutdown capability.

1037 192

OUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(b)

System design by drawings which show normal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location of components, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which is out of the area that required the alternate system.

RESPONSE

Because of the nature of the safe shutdown analyses on Quad Cities 1 & 2, detailed drawings are not necessary. The power and control cables necessary for safe shut-down are identified in the Quad Cities Safe Shutdown Analyses. Divisional cable pan locations are identified on the color coded figures in the fire protection report, "Information Relevant Fire Protection Sytems and Programs, Part 3, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2", April, 1977.

If an electrical cable was identified in a fire zone, the component it serviced was assumed to be inoperable unless some other form of operation was also identi-fied (e.g. , manual valve operation, local control).

1037 193

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(d)

Demonstrate that wiring, including power sources for the control circuit and equipment operation for the alternate shutdown method, is independent of equipment wiring in the area to be avoided.

RESPONSE

The Quad Cities 1 & 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, demonstrates that wiring necessary for at least one method of safe hot shutdown is independent of any single plant area.

Power sources for control circuits were not analyzed. If manual action is required to reclose a breaker that is not in a fire zone, credit is taken for that action.

See Quad Cities 1 & 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis paragraph 1.4 (h).

The breakers in each 4Kv and 480V SWGR are independently fed from two 125 DC divi-sional sources as shown on figure 2.1-10 in the fire protection report "Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Programs - Part 3 - Ouad Cities 1 & 2" April, 1977.

1037 194

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(f)

Demonstrate that licensee procedure (s) have been developed which describe the tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown method. A summary of these pro-cedures should be reviewed by the staff.

RESPONSE

in accordance with the Safe Shutdown Analysis, the primary system used for shut-down is the RCIC System. Q0P 1300-7, RCIC Local Manual Control, is the procedure which provides for use of the system in the event it cannot be remotely operated.

Further analyses have prompted Supplements 1 and 2 to the Safe Shutdown Analysis.

These supplements provide for modifications to additional systems to provide sup-port for RCIC. As these modifications are completed and the additional systems are tested, procedures will be developed to effect the shutdown method.

1037 MS

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(g)

Demonstrate that spare fuses are available for control circuits where these fuses may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for +t.e shutdown method and may be bioc, by the effects of a cable spreading room fire. The spare fuses should be located convenient to the existing fuses. The shutdown procedure should infonn the operator to check these fuses.

RESPONSE

All spare parts inventories are located in the Station Storeroom. The Shift Engi-neer and Shift Foreman have ready access to all spare parts which come under the cognizance of the Operations Department, including spare fuses. Operational pro-cedures which deal with plant abnormalities are sufficient to cope with problems that are a result of blown fuses. As modifications are implemented, procedures are reviewed and appropriate changes made.

1037 196

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(h)

Demonstrate that the manpower required to perfonn the shutdown functions using the procedures of (f) as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical specifications.

RESPONSE

Of the 12 Operations Department personnel on shift, only 4 are used for the fire brigade. Further fire fighting assistance from the local fire department could possibly relieve 3 operating personnel from fire brigade duties. This allows for 8 to 11 personnel to effect the shutdown which is an adequate number.

1037 197

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(i)

Demonstrate that adequate acceptance tests are performed. These should verify that: equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the " local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equipment operates from the control room but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the " remote" :osition.

RESPONSE

The C.E.Co. Quality Assurance Program Procedures for fire protection cover the installation of plant modifications. The procedure for acceptance of a plant modification requires that adequate tests be perforTned. It is not necessary to disallow operation of an item of equipment from the control room or visa versa unless this was an original requirement in the FSAR. The additional control stations being added at Quad Cities do not have such a restriction; therefore, the premise stated in this quest;on is not valid for these stations.

,nr/

iu 198

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(j)

Technical Specifications of surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation for that equipment not already covered by existing Tech Specs. For ex-ample, if new isolation and control switches are added to a service water system, the existing Tech Spec surveillance requirements on the service water system should add a statement similar to the following:

"Every third pump test should also verify that the pump starts from the alternate shutdown station after moving all service water system isolation switches to the local control position."

RESPONSE

While Technical Specifications should call out the surveillance requirements and intervals, they should not address actions to be taken to carry out those require-ments. The best method for describing how a Technical Specification requirement is fulfilled is by Station Procedures. Station Frocedures have the flexibility of being upgraded for the best methods of doing surveillance testing in a timely man-ner. Tech Specs require substantial time for upgrading as improvements and methods of surveillance testing are found.

1037 199

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(k)

Demonstrate that the systems available are adequate to perform the necessary shut-down functions. The functions required should be based on previous analyses, if possible (e.g., in the FSAR), such as a loss of normal a.c. power or shutdown on a Group I isolation (BWR). The equipment required for the alternate capability should be the same or equivalent to that relied on in the above analysis.

RESPONSE

The adequacy of the systems utilized to perform safe hot shutdown of the reactor is demonstrated in the Quad Cities 1 & 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis.

A supplement to that report will discuss the adequacy of systems necessary to take the plant to cold shutdown.

1037 200

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(a)

Description of the systems or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capa-bility and modifications required to achieve the alternate shutdown capability if required.

RESPONSE

The description of the systems or portions thereof used to provide the hot shutdown capability and modifications required to do this is proviaed in the Quad Cities 1 &

2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis and Supplement 1 to that report.

A supplement to this report will be provided to discuss the systems used to pro-vide cold shutdown capability.

1037 201

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(b)

'ystem design by drawings which show nonnal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location of components, and that wiring which is in the area and the wiring which is out of the area that required the alternate system.

RESPONSE

Because of the nature of the safe shutdown analyses on Quad Cities 1 & 2, detailed drawings are not necessary. The power and control cables necessary for safe shut-down are identified in the Quad Cities Safe Shutdown Analyses. Divisional cable pan locations are identified on the color coded figures in the fire protection report, "Infonnation Relevant Fire Protection Sytems and Programs, Part 3, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2", April, 1977.

If an electrical cable was identified in a fire zone, the component it serviced was assumed to be inoperable unless some other form of operation was also identi-fied (e.g. , manual valve operation, local control).

1037 202

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(d)

Demonstrate that wiring, including power sources for the control circuit and equipment operation for the alternate shutdown method, is independent of equipment wiring in the area to be avoided.

S RESPON_SE The Quad Cities 1 & 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis, demonstrates that wiring necessary for at least one method of safe hot shutdown is independent of any single plant area.

Power sources for control circuits were not analyzed. If manual action is required to reclose a breaker that is not in a fire zone, credit is taken for that action.

See Quad Cities 1 & 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis paragraph 1.4 (h).

The breakers in each 4Ky and 480V SWGR are independently fed from two 125 DC divi-sional sources as shown on figure 2.1-10 in the fire protection report "Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Programs - Part 3 - Quad Cities 1 & 2" April, 1977.

1037 203

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(f)

Demonstrate that licensee procedure (s) have been developed which describe the tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown method. A suninary of these pro-cedures should be reviewed by the staff.

RESP 0NSE In accordance with the Safe Shutdown Analysis, the primary system used for shut-down is the RCIC System. QOP 1300-7, RCIC Local Manual Control, is the procedure which provides for use of the system in the event it cannot be remotely operated.

Further analyses have prompted Supplements 1 and 2 to the Safe Shutdown Analysis.

These supplements provide for modifications to additional systems to provide sup-port for RCIC. As these modifications are completed and the additional systems are tested, procedures will be developed to effect the shutdown method.

,n27

\uJ 204

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(g)_

Demonstrate that spare fuses are available for control circuits where these fuses may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for the shutdown method and may be blown by the effects of a cable spreading room fire. The spare fuses should be located convenient to the existing fuses. The shutdown procedure should infonn the operator to check these fuses.

RESPONSE

All spare parts inventories are located in the Station Storeroom. The Shift Engi-neer and Shift Foreman have ready access to all spare parts which come under the cognizance of the Operations Department, including spare fuses. Operational pro-cedures which deal with plant abnormalities are sufficient to cope with problems that are a result of blown fuses. As modifications are implemented, procedures are reviewed and appropriate changes made.

yg37 205

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(h)

Demonstrate that the manpower required to perfonn the shutdown functions using the procedures of (f) as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical specifications.

RESPONSE

Of the 12 Operations Department personnel on shift, only 4 are used for the fire brigade. Further fire fighting assistance from the local fire department could possibly relieve 3 operating personnel from fire brigade duties. This allows for 8 to 11 personnel to effect the shutdown which is an adequate number.

1037 206

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(i)

Demonstrate th' > 3dequate acceptance tests are performed. These should verify that: equipr operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the " local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equipment operates from the control room but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the " remote" position.

RESPONSE

The C.E.Co. Quality Assurance Program Procedures for fire protection cover the installation of plant modifications. The procedure for acceptance of a plant modification requires that adequate tests be perfonned. It is not necessary to disallow operation of an item of equipment from the control room or visa versa unless this was an original requirement in the FSAR. The additional control stations being added at Quad Cities do not have such a restriction; therefore, the premise stated in this question is not valid for these stations.

1037 207

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(j)

Technical Specifications of surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation for that equipment not already covered by existing Tech Specs. For ex-ample, if new isolation and control switches are added to a service water system, the existing Tech Spec surveillance requirements on the service water system should add a statement similar to the following:

"Every third pump test should also verify that the pump starts from the alternate shutdown station after moving all service water system isolation switches to the local control position."

RESPONSE

While Technical Specifications should call out the surveillance requirements and intervals, they should not address actions to be taken to carry out those require-ments. The best method for describing how a Technical Specification requirement is fulfilled is by Station Procedures. Station Procedures have the flexibility of being upgraded for the best methods of doing surveillance testing in a timely man-ner. Tech Specs require substantial time for upgrading as improvements and methods of surveillance testing are found.

1037 208-

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 QUESTION 8(k)

Demonstrate that the systems available are adequate to perform the necessary shut-down functions. The functions required should be based on previous analyses, if possible (e.g., in the FSAR), such as a loss of nonnal a.c. power or shutdown on a Group I isolation (BWR). The equipment required for the alternate capability should be the same or equivalent to that relied on in the above analysis.

RESPONSE

The adequacy of the systems utilized to perform safe hot shutdown of the reactor is demonstrated in the Quad Cities 1 & 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis.

A supplement to that report will discuss the adequacy of systems necessary to take the plant to cold shutdown.

1037 209 4