IR 05000443/1990010

Insp Rept 50-443/90-10 on 900410-0513.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Security,Engineering & Technical Support & Safety Assessment

ML20034C964
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/24/1990
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20034C961	List: IR 05000443/1990010 ML20034C960 ML20034C963
References
50-443-90-10, NUDOCS 9006040194
Download: ML20034C964 (18)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket / Report No.:

50-443/90-10 License No.:

NPF-86 i

Licensee:

Public Service Company of New Hampshire Facility:

Seabrook Station, Seabrook, New Hampshire Dates:

April 10 - May 13, 1990 Inspectors:

N. Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector R. Fuhrmeister, Resident Inspector A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction R. Freudenberger, Resident Inspector, Maine Yankee W. Olivera, Reactor Engineer J. Trapp, Senior Reactor Engineer J. Yerokun, Reactor Engineer Approved By:

O'-< G. k0e3< b S'/M /9c-

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Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date

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OVERVIEW Operations: Overall, the plant was operated safely and conservatively.

Oper-ators responded well to off-normal events.

A violation was identified for inadequate configuration control.

Radiological Controls: Appropriate controls were established for identified contaminated and radiation areas. A non-cited violation was identified for failure to lock the containment during power operation.

Maintenance / Surveillance: Work was generally well-controlled, i

Emergency Preparedness: The test of the Public Alert and Notification System identified a potential weakness with the public address system.

l Security: The security force responded well to demonstrations and identified a loaded weapon during routine access checks.

Engineering / Technical Support:

Root cause analyses for several equipment failures were acceptable. Coordination among technical support engineers, manufacturing representatives, and site departments was good.

Safety Assessment / Quality Verification:

Closure of a 10 CFR 21 report was well documented.

9006040194 900524

{DR ADOCK 05000443 PDC

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 Summary of Activities................................................

2.0 Operations (70302, 71707, 90713, 92701)..............................

2.1 Plant Tours.....................................................

2.2 (90-80-01) Control Room Instrumentation (RI-90-A-02)............

2.3 (90-08-01) Turbine First Stage Pressure Instrument..............

2.4 (90-08-02) Turbine Trip.........................................

2.5 (90-10-02) Loss.of Two Offsite A.C. Electrical Power Soerces,...

3.0 Radiation Controls (71707,90713)....................................

3.1 Plant Tours.....................................................

3.2 Unlocked High Radiation Area....................................

4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance (61726,62703)..............................

4.1 (89-20-01) Failure-to Lock Open Breaker.........................

4.2 LER 90-001: Wide Range Gas Monitor Inoperab1c...................

4.3 LER 90-003: Wide Range Gas Monitor Inoperable...................

4,4 Observations of Activities......................................

4.5 Flooded Electrical Cable Vaults (RI-90-A-21)....................

5.0 Emergency Preparedne s s (82203)......................................

6.0 Security (71707,92701)..............................................

6.1 Security Events.................................................

6.2 ' Background Investigation Program...

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6.3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Fill Connection.......................

7.0 Engineering and Technical Support (92702, 37700).....................

7.1 (90-80-04) Plant Computer Obsolescence (RI-90-A-02).............

7.2 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Vibration............................

7,3 Root Cause Analysis.............................................

7.4 Request For Engineering Services................................

7.5 Modification to Cooling Water Piping for SUFP Lube Oil Cooler...

8.0 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification (35501, 40500, 35702).........

8.1 Oresser Industries 10 CFR 21 Report.............................

8.2 LER 90-009: Missed Surveillance TS 3.6.1.3 - Containment Air Locks.........................................................

8.3 Reviews of Welding Quality Records..............................

9.0 Meetings (30703).....................................................

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f DETAILS 1.0 Summary of Activities i

1.1 Resident Inspection Activities Three resident inspectors were assigned to the facility during this

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period. The 219 inspection hours included 77 backshift hours, of

which 60 were deep backshift hours.

1.2 Visiting Inspector Activities

l A team of region-based inspectors and visiting resident inspectors

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provided 24-hour per day coverage of operations when the reactor was j

critical.

Inspection of the power ascension test program will be i

documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/90-81.

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On April 9-12, 1990, a regional inspector and three NRC contractors conducted licensing examinations.

The results will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/90-09.

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On April 23-17, 1990, a region-based inspector reviewed the implemen-l tation of the fire protection program and open items concerning the j

environmental qualification program. The results will be documented i

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in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/90-11.

1.3 Plant Activities At the beginning of the period, the plant was in Mode 2, Startup,

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with power ascension testing on a licensee-imposed hold while a tur-bine trip evaluation and an extensive instrument valve walkdown were completed. The plant was taken to Mode 1, Power Operat. ion, on April

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14 and was returned to Mode 2 the same day due to main steam isola-

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tion valve position indication problems.

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The plant was returned to Mode 1 on April 16. Turbine testing re-l sumed. On April 22, the plant was returned to Mode 2 to adjust the

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main turbine and main generator controls and repair nitrogen pressure

switches on the main steam isolation valves.

On April 25, the plant

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was taken to Mode 1 and turbine tening was resumed.

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To modify the Low Pressure Turbine 'C' (LPT-C) rotor, the reactor was shutdown on April 28 and cooled to Mode 5, cold shutdown, on May 1.

Turbine torsional testing had identified that a natural torsional l

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LPT-C last stage 120 Hz resonance conflicts with the 60 Hz frequency

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of the electrical grid. Turbine modifications involve replacement of the tubular circular tie rods in the 14th stages of LPT-C with solid tie rods and silver brazing of the turbine buckets (blades) to the tie rods. This modification is expected to stiffen the rotor stages and raise the LPT-C last stage natural frequency above 120 Hz.

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1.4 Licensing Activities On April 18, the Atomic Safety Licensing Appeals Board held a hearing on the Atomic Safety Licensing Board's November 9, 1989 decision on the adequacy of the New Hampshire and Massachusett's emergency evacu-

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ation plans.

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On April 20, the Bankruptcy Court approved interim teorganization of Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) and appointed a new PSNH Board of Directors effective April 30, 1990.

The reorganization did not change New Hampshire Yankee's management of the Seabrook Station.

April 26, U. S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rhenquist rejected, without comment, an appeal filed by the Massachusetts Attorney General and others.

The appeal was for an emergency stay of Seabrook power operation until a federal court could rule on the adequacy of the evacuation plan.

2.0 Operations 2.1 Plant Tours Daily control room tours included review of log books and control room staffing, assessment of the technical specification action statements in effect, and discussions with licensed operators. Ob-servation of main control room activities included reactor shutdown, plant cooldown, turbine testing, establishment of excess letdown, shift turnovers, and responses to off-normal conditions.

Shift turnovers and briefings were noted to be sufficiently detailed.

Plant evolutions were conducted in a controlled manner. Control room-staffing met requirements. Operator responses to off-normal situ-ations such as the spurious actuation of a fire protection-deluge system and a security computer malfunction were assessed as timely and conservative.

Plant tours included the primary auxiliary building, containment, pipe chases, turbine building, switchgear rooms, and service water building.

No equipment problems were identified.

Housekeeping was assessed as acceptable.

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2.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 90-80-01:

Control Room Instrumentation A concern expressed by the Employee's Legal Project (ELP) about the adequacy of control room instrumentation (RI-90-A-02) was vague.

Conversations were held with ELP employees on January 22 and 23, and additional information was requested. Also, a letter was written to ELP on March 28, 1990 requesting information on the specific defi-ciencies. No reply has been receive.

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NRC inspections and reviews of main control room indications have found the instrumentation to be adequate.

The Technical Specifica-tions issued with the facility operating license establish operabil-ity and surveillance requirements for instruments and indications serving safety functions.

Based upon NRC inspection and evaluation of instrumentation and the safeguards provided by the Technical Specifications, the NRC has concluded that adequate reliable informa-tion is available to the operators.

This allegation was assessed as providing inadequate information to support a valid safety concern, and is closed.

2.3 (Closed) Unresolved item 90-08-01: Turbine First Stage Pressure Instrument PT-506 Early in April, isolation of PT-506 had caused its inoperability when it was required to be operable for turbine operation during the power ascension test program.

The licensee determined that the root cause of the isolation was failure to control an instrument isolation valve by either procedures or valve lineup.

NRC review noted that, while the main turbine is not safety-related, PT-506 provides a safety input to the reactor protective system.

As a result of a follow-up licensee walkdown of 2731 valves contained in the Mercury instrument racks, 52 valves were found out of position.

Of 933 Safety-Related and Important-to-Safety instrument valves not in instrument racks, 47 were found out of position. Most of the mis-positioned valves were vent or drain valves on capped lines and did not affect instrument operability. A leak detection instrument on the waste gas compressor, a pressure detector for_ the waste gas particulate filter, and a fire pump flow transmitter used during 18-month surveillance tests also were found inoperable. The inoperabil-ity of these instruments did not affect the operability of the sys-tems in which they were installed.

Proper valve positioning and com-ponent operability was restored in all cases.

The licensee plans to lock-wire selected Mercury rack isolation valves open and include a verification of these valves in all calibration procedures. The Repetitive Task Sheets (RTSs) used to verify Tech-nical Specification required instrument operability are being revised to address the positions of all valves associated with instruments.

Also, a Maintenance Group Instruction is being developed to address configuration control for all valve. _.... _........

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The inspector concluded that corrective actions were conservative and that no immediate safety concerns existed.

However, the inspector also concluded that a loss of component status control had occurred.

The isolation of PT-506 is one example of a violation.

(50-443/90-10-01)

Unresolved Item 90-08-01 is closed administrative 1y.

2.4 (Closed) Unresolved Item 90-08-02: Turbine Trip The inspector reviewed the issues surrounding the turbine trip that occurred on April 4, 1990, and the licensee's Turbine Trip Event Evaluation Report.

The Event Evaluation Report contained the chronology of events, an evaluation and supplement, the station information report (SIR 90-033), a root cause analysis, the preliminary human performance evaluation system report, and a preliminary self-assessment team evaluation report.

The root cause was identified as improper action / lack of attention which resulted in an inadequate review of an open work request, Corrective actions were identified and tracked in a commitment items report.

Short-term corrective actions included the removal of system test engineers as Test Directors for testing of systems under their cognizance; Station Manager's approval for restarting major equipment with troubleshooting in progress; management's presence for starting major equipment; additional management review of open work packages; increased formality of maintenance technician turnovers; dissemina-tion of lessons learned to plant personnel; and revisions to the work control program Long-term actions include finalizing preliminary reports and revising the Seabrook Station Management Manual, The cause of the event was well-documented and understood by the licensee.

The inspector concluded that the immediate corrective actions were effective and observed strong management attention to ongoing plant activities and testing.

The inspector concluded that this event resulted in a loss of con-figuration control and is another example of violation 90-10-01, Unresolved item 90-08-02 is closed administrative 1y.

2.5 Loss of Two Offsite A.C. Electrical Power Sources On April 17, 1990, a portion of the Scobie offsite line to the 345 VV switchyard was deenergized and grounded for personnel protection while repairing a leaking capacitor.

The associated breakers and disconnects

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6-were controlled by the system load dispatcher using a switching order.

After completion of the repairs, the system load dispatcher requested a switching order which resulted in closing Breaker 294 before re-movel of the installed ground.

Breaker 294 tripped immediately upon being closed and the switchyard experienced a momentary undervoltage condition.

The undervoltage resulted in tripping the main turbine, all contain-ment air coolers, both containment instrument air compressors, and the service air. compressor.

The instrument bus inverters transferred to their DC power source.

Steam generator bicwdown isolated. Opera-tors responded well to the transient and expeditiously restored systems to normal.

The undervoltage also caused a breaker to open on the Newington-Timber Swamp line. There is no position indication for this breaker in the main control room, and Seabrook operations personnel were unaware for ten minutes that two offsite AC sources, Scobie and Newington, were lost. Operations personnel learned of the loss of the Newington line upon calling the load dispatcher for confirmation of the availabil-ity of two offsite lines to verify compliance with Technical Speci-fication 3.8.1.1.a.

It is the responsibility of the load dispatcher to inform the operations personnel of any loss of an offsite line.

New Hampshire Yankee is evaluating the interfaces between the Manchester Control Center and the station.

The inspector determined that operator actions taken in response to the transient were appropriate. However, the inspector noted a-lack of Seabrook operations staff review of switching orders and the in-ability of Seabrook operations personnel to verify availability of offsite power from control room indications. The inspector classed these items as unresolved pending further review of the licensee's actions (50-443/90-10-02),

3.0 Radiological Controls 3.1 Plant Tours Tours of the primary auxiliary building and the containment included review of posted radiological work-permits (RWPs), posted radiologi-cal survey maps, and radiological control areas. The RWPs were com-plete and up-to-date.

Posted survey maps clearly indicated contami-nated areas.

Radiological control areas were adequately established, with proper postings and controlled step-off pads.

Radiological con-trols personnel were present and helpful. No deficiencies were noted.

3.2 Unlocked High Radiation Area On April 19, the personnel air lock to the containment was found un-locked. The cover plate securing the air lock control panel had been installed upside down, with a lock through the eyelet on the control

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panel frame but not through the eyelet on the cover.

The air lock door had been unlocked for over twenty-four hours while the reactor was at 9% power with neutron radiation levels above 1000 mr/hr in accessible areas of the containment. As a corrective measure, security personnel were tasked with inspecting and verifying the security of the lock on the control panel once each shift.

The breaker that supplies power to the control panel had been danger tagged open.

Security records indicated no air lock door openings during this period.

Therefore, no radiation exposure occurred.

The licensee identified the failure to properly lock the high radiation area.

The inspector evaluated this item as an isolated Severity Level V violation for which acceptable corrective action was taken.

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No past similar violations for which corrective action should have prevented this occurrence were identified. Therefore, this item was classified as a non-cited violation per 10 CFR 2, Appendix C, Section V.A.(50-443/90-10-03).

4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance 4.1 (Closed) Violation 89-20-01: Failure to Lock Open Breaker

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This violation was issued for failure to lock the supply breaker for Safety Injection Pump SI-P-6A in the racked out position as required by Procedure 0X1456.08.

NHY responded to the Notice of Violation by letter dated March 22, 1990.

The inspector reviewed the corrective actions and has monitored the condition of the circuit breakers during the current shutdown.

Corrective training has been effective to date. This item is closed.

4.2 (Closed) LER 90-001: Wide Range' Gas Monitor Inoperable On January 9, 1990, during routine weekly sampling, the sample pump for the Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was found to be inoperable.

The system low flow alarm had not actuated.

NHY investigation re-vealed that purge air from the instrument air system was lined up and flowing through the WRGM. The valve misalignment had occurred on January 5, 1990, while restoring the WRGM after modifications had been made. The root cause of the event was identified as "...the inability to accurately determine the required position of the purge air line valves." A contributing factor was "the purge air valves....

that were left in the open position are typically not shown on the P& ids since these valves are instrument valves 'used only for main-tenance isolation. Additionally, this type of valve is not included in valve lineups of opertting procedures."

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The inspector questioned the scope of the corrective actions docu-mented in the LER and was informed that additional efforts in the area of configuration control have since been initiated. The inspec-tor concluded that the loss of control of the purge air valves is another example of violation 90-10-01.

LER 90-001 is closed admini-stratively.

4.3 (Closed) LER 90-003: Wide Range Gas Monitor Inoperable On January 16, 1990, during routine sampling, the low range pump for the Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was found to be inoperable due to a ruptured diaphragm.

Diaphragms for these pumps are replaced annually as routine preventive maintenance.

The event of January 9 (LER 90-001)

is believed to have been a contributing factor to the pump failure.

This item is closed.

4.4 Observation of Activities The following maintenance and surveillance observed by the inspectors were conducted in accordance with plant procedures, with appropriate emphasis on safe conduct. No inadequacies were identified in these activities.

Main Steam Isolation Valves Work on two pressure switches associated with the hydraulic actuator for MS-V-92, the "D" MSIV, was performed in accordance with Work Re-quest WR 90 WOO 2137.

Internal hydraulic oil leakage insidn the switches had caused them to malfunction. They were replaced.

The intpector witnessed the valve being satisfactorily retested.

A low gas (nitrogen) pressure alarm on MS-V-88, the "B" main steam isolation valve (MSIV) would not reset after a ten percent stroke of the valve for a surveillance test. The inspector witnessed the In-strument and Control technicians satisfactorily investigate the problem in accordance with WR 90W002261 and Procedure 1S0652.955,

" Main Steam Isolation Valve Maintenance."

(he investigation indicated a faulty pressure switch.

An erroneous valve position indication was satisfactorily corrected for MS-V-90, the "C" MSIV, in accordance with WR 90W0002260.

Condensate and Main Feed pump Strainers Condensate pump strainers were removed, cleaned and reinstalled in accordance with preventive maintenance (PM) recurring task sheet (RTS) 90RM2059961 (Pump A), 90RM2060061 (pump B), and 90RM2060162 (Pump C).

The Main Feed Pump strainers were also removed, cleaned

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and reinstalled (WR 90 WOO 2133 for Pump A and WR 90W002110 for Pump B). The inspectors witnessed the biennial PMs and WRs being satis-factorily performed in accordance with procedure MS 0517.03, " Instal-lation of Piping, Piping Support, and Stowed Support."

Main Feed Pump (MFP) "B" Speed Sensors f

An oscilloscope was used in accordance with WR 90W001972 to " scope"

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the speed sensor No. I replacement in MFP "B."

The " scoping" indi-cated that the speed sensor problem was not corrected.

Follow-up determined that the internal wiring for two of the three speed sen-sors in the pump control circuitry was not in accordance with the wiring diagrams. Speed sensors No I and No. 3 were cross-wired, re-sulting in the removal of the wrong sensor. The inspector witnessed the successful troubleshooting and corrective action.

Service Water System Valve SW-V-4 SW-V-4 failed its quarterly stroke time test. Corrective action was taken in accordance with WR 90 WOO 2138 and Procedure 0X1416.10, "Ser-vice Water System." The valve's limit switch was realigned in accordance with procedure MS0514.19, "Namco Limit Switch Mainten-ance," and the valve was satisfactorily stroked.

Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve A solenoid valve associated with the nitrogen gas supply to the actu-ator for MS-PV-3003, the "C" atmospheric steam dump valve, was re-placed. The inspector observed the post-maintenance retest of the valve. The valve was satisfactorily tested in accordance with WR 90W001804 and Procedure 0X1456.81.

Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection and Testing The inspector monitored activities conducted under Repetitive Task Sheet 90RM0458261, Diesel Generator 18-month Inspection. The work satisfied the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.f.1.

During the post-maintenance run under load, it was determined that two cylinders had exhaust temperatures slightly beyond.

the recommended range, but within the allowable range.

Investigation revealed damaged springs in the fuel injector pump.

These springs were replaced with a spring the manufacturer claims is less subject

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to-breakage of the type seen. The inspector also witnessed the over-speed trip test which was conducted pursuant to Procedure MS0539.02.

The overspeed trip was within the allowable tolerance. Also per-formed were insulation resistance checks and rotor-stater air gap checks on the generator. All results were satisfactory. Compliance sn " governing procedures was found to be acceptable.

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e 4.5 Flooded Electrical Cable Vaults (RI-90-A-0021)

NHY has continued the inspection of electrical cable vaults for flooding.

During this period, additional NHY inspection covered non-safety-related manholes throughout the site, primarily telephone and construction power cables.

Electrical cable vault inspections and dewatering have now been completed. The manholes will be re-checked at 6-month intervals to determine the rate of accumulation of water (if any) and whether further corrective actions are warranted.

This program will be monitored and reviewed as part of routine resi-dent activities.

Conditions, to date, have been found acceptable based upon the ability of the cables to withstand long-term sub-mergence and corrosion in salt water having been accounted for in the design of the cable supports.

(See IR 50-443/90-07 for prior inspection.)

5.0 Emergency Preparedness On April 25, 1990, a test of the Public Alert and Notification System was conducted by NHY in conjunction with the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management.

The test involved all 94 pole-mounted sirens in the New Hampshire 10-mile EPZ.

It included actuation of several difference tones, announcements by dispatchers at Rockingham Control, and a test of the backup actuation capability from the station's Control Room.

NHY stationed observers throughout the EPZ to verify the functioning of each siren and monitor the public address announcements.

Some difficulty was experienced in understanding one dispatcher.

In an emergency, the public address function of the sirens would be used to direct the actions of the beach population.

These instructions are contained on professionally prerecorded tapes, which avoids 'he difficulty encountered with the police dispatcher.

An NRC resident inspector monitored the test, including intelligibility of the pre-test announcements and the ability to hear the tones in several buildings along the beach. The inspector found the announcements easy to understand at the south end of Hampton Beach. Also, the siren tones were readily audible inside several motels and retail establishments. Another test is scheduled for May 16.

6.0 Security 6.1 Security Events On April 13, a NHY employee was identified as having a blood alcohol content of 0.058 and 0.049 (two tests). The employee was badged for protected area access but had not entered the protected area prior to the random screening. The employee's access was~ revoked, he was given the mandatory NHY program 14-days off without pay, and was referred to the substance abuse center.

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On April 22, about 40 demonstrators at the South Gate protested the operation of the facility. The demonstration was peaceful. No arrests were made. No attempt was made to enter the owner-controlled'

area.

On April 30, a loaded.22 caliber derringer was found in the coat pocket of a New Hampshire employee during protected area entry checks.

The individual was denied entry and his access to the protected area was terminated. After being interviewed by security, he was referred to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for evaluation. As a result of interviews, security personnel determined that the individual had been shooting vermin several nights before the event and had left the gun in his coat pocket.

He had not worn his coat for several days and stated that he had forgotten the loaded weapon. Af ter evaluation under the EAP, NHY concluded that there was no intent to introduce the derringer onsite in this case. The individual's access was re-

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stored after a three-day layoff.

The inspector concluded that security personnel were properly imple-menting the security program and had effectively responded te events.

6.2 Background Investigation Program Through discussions with New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) personnel, the inspector determined that background investigations are conducted 5s Creative Services Inc.

The investigations are reviewed for complete-ne.es by NHY security contractor personnel.

NHY personnel issue the final clearance, with questionable individuals being reviewed by the NnY Security Department Supervisor. Annual audits of the program are conducted by NHY QA personnel.

The NHY personnel were knowledgeable of problems with incomplete background investigations at other facilities. As a result, the security department developed a file of companies which have been identified as providing incomplete background investigations.

The inspector found no problems with the NHY background investigation program.

6.3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Fill Connection Inspector review addressed whether contaminants could be introduced into the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks through connections and valves outside vital areas. The inspector reviewed P& ids (piping and instrument diagrams) DG-20459 and DG-20464 showing the fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping. The inspector walked down the piping system and verified that the valves are in appropriately se-cure locations and that they are normally closed.

In addition, the inspector determined that the fill connection is located in a man-hole, the cover of which is kept closed and padlocked. A review of

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the fuel oil storage and transfer operating procedures. OS1026-05 (train 'A') and 0S1026.13 (train 'B') showed opening the valves be-fore taking on fuel and closing the valves upon completion of fuel-ing.

The inspector concluded that there are adequate safeguards against introduction of foreign material into the fuel oil storage tanks.

7.0 Engineering and Technical Support 7.1 (Closed) Follow-up Item 90-80-04: Plant Computer Obsolescence

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In response to an allegation (RI-90-A-02) concerning the obsolescence of the main plant computer system (MPCS), the inspector reviewed the

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licensee's Study Report on MPCS requirements dated January 1990 and

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held discussions with the MPDCS project manager.

The existing MPCS has an estimated (by NHY) remaining service life of three to five years.

Procurement of a replacement system is tenta-tively projected for installation during the third refueling outage, in the fall of 1993, and requires approval of the Joint Owners Groups.

The MPCS vendor, Modular Computer System, Inc. (MODCOMP), no longer

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manufactures or fully supports the hardware for the MPCS, New Hampshire Yankee has purchased a supply of repair parts and has the capability of repairing failed components using parts from two com-parable operating computer systems on site. Also, New Hampshire Yankee is able to order parts from the vendor on an "as-available-basis." The inspector concluded that adequate replacement parts are

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The MPCS is not safety-related, and there is no NRC requirement to qualify repair parts.

The Safety Parameter Display System is supported by the MPCS and is physically and electrically isolated from equipment and sensors that are used in safety systems, with the exception of the reactor vessel level indication system.

SPDS availability and performance under heavily loaded plant conditions are license conditions which will be reviewed by the NRC after the first refueling outage.

MCPS obsolescence is evident.

However, the licensee has taken action to assure repair parts availability until a new system is installed.

The inspector concluded that the ability to respond to plant transients and the availability of the MPCS is adequate to support plant operations.

This item is close _

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L 7.2 Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) Vibit.tioS i

t Data for RCP-1A showed shaft vibNtion amplitudes of 10-11 mils from April 1-17, 1990 and 11-12 mils from April 18-29, 1990. While the 11-12 mil vibration amplitude had stabilized, it was slowly approach-

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ing the alarm value of 15 mils.

(There are 2 shaft vibration alarms:

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HI = 15 mils; and HI-HI = 20 mils.) The licensee's technical support group brought in the pump manufacturer's representative on April 30

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and May 1, 1990 to evaluate and resolve this problem before initiating

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a cooldown to bring the plant to cold shutdown.

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The pump manufacturer's representative reviewed the vib*ation cata

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n and concluded that the observed vibration level is reasonable con-

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sidering the relatively short service time of this pump, Post pump

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experience has shown that RCPs need periodic rebalance w rk, usually

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during the first two fuel cycles. Therefore, it was recom'nended that the pump be rebalanced.

The pump was balanced in one shift by in-stalling weights on the pump coupling. After the balancing, RCP-1A

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shaft vibration amplitude was 5-7 mils. During this work the inspec-i tor noted good coordination among technical support, pump manufac-turer, operations and maintenance personnel.

7.3 Root Cause Analysis

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New Hampshire Yankee Procedures 12810, " Root Cause Analysis," and 12830, " Event Evaluation and Reduction Program," have been in use for several years.

The inspector discussed with licensee personnel the-general use of these procedures. Also, the specific root cause analysis concerning the turbine trip event of April 4, 1990, as re-

quested by the Station Manager and detailed in Station Information

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Report (SIR) No.90-033, was discussed. Although the turb!ne gene-y-

rator is not safety-related, a comprehensive root cause analys!s and I

event evaluation were conducted. However, the root caun analysis

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effectiveness associated with lesser component prob % s addressed at

lower levels in the station organization was not as apparent.

For example, a pinhole leak in the startup feedpump cooling water line to the lube oil cooler was corrected by replacing the eroded carbon steel piping. A similar failure two weeks later resulted in SIR 90-027, which then prompted engineering evaluation 90-018 and resulted in the identification of the root cause of the prob?em (see Detail 7.5).

The intpector discussed with the licensee the actions taken on main steam isolation valve pressure switch failures, Inverter IV-4 con-tr'

reuit failures, the fire deluge system spurious actuation, and mai' ' sed pump speed control circuit failures.

The inspector con-ci i that adequate root cause analyses were being performed and that y

a aate actions were taken or planned.

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The inspector also noted that evaluation of the failure of the con-

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tainment instrument air compressor was incomplete. The discharge valves of the air compressors are known to fail every 6 to 9 months.

No surveillance is in place to identify a failure. A discharge valve

failure may result in air compressor cylinder damage which would re-sult in an instrument air header pressure low alarm.

The licensee recognizes the unacceptability of conducting maintenance on the con-

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tainment instrument air compressors while at power and the need for a

surveillance program.

The inspector concluded that more management attention could improve the effectiveness of root cause analysis of component problems presently being resolved at lower levels of the station organirttion,

7.4 _ Requests for Engineering Services (REss)

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New Hampshire Yankee Procedure 17400 " Request for Engineering Ser-i vices (RES)" provides the requirements and instructions for obtaining engineering services from the Engineering or the Station Staff Tech-i nical Support Group. The procedure includes a method for prioritiz-ing RESs by safety significance. Generally, RESs are assigned an estimated completion date by mutual agreement between the Engineering and Technical Support Group managers. Most REss are dispositioned by the Engineering Group.

The inspector reviewed RES dispositioning.

This review was conducted by discussing various RES aspects with licensee personnel and by evaluating the rationale for dispositioning a sample of six (6) open RESs.

For example, RES 89-0353 was listed as an open, Priority 1 item to address excessive movement of an 8-inch condensate line.

Further discussion indicated that this concern had been resolved by modifying the intervals of a condensate valve in this line to elimin-

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ate excessive vibration and usacceptable movement.

Five of the six items in the inspector's sample were mechanical

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issues.

Each item was from a different system. The inspector had no technical or safety concerns related to the RESs reviewed.

No unacceptable conditions were noted. The inspector concluded that periodic NHY reviews ensure timely disposition of all RESs.

For example, prior to initial criticality, all RESs were reviewed in April and May, 1989 to ensure readiness for low power testing.

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Similar reviews are conducted several times each year as engineering personnel prioritize and allocate their work efforts consistent with the engineering organization's long term work plan.

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No unacceptable conditions were noted.

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i 7.5 Modifications to Cooling Water Pipin;, for Startup Feed Pump (SUFP)

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Lube Oil Cooler

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During initial power ascension testing, the SUFP, which is referenced in Seabrook Station Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.1.2, developed a pinhole leak in the cooling water piping to the lube oil cooler.

After replacement of the affected carbon steel piping, a similar

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failure again occurred. Minor Modification (MM00) 90-0550 was then initiated to change the piping to erosion resistant stainless steel.

In parallel, Engineering Evaluation 90-018 was completed and con-

cluded that the piping erosion failured were due to high velocity (approximately 260 feet per second) jet impingement created by a single stage restriction orifice R0-4365.

The evaluation concluded that another MMOD, 90-0556, would be undertaken to prevent further occurrences of pipe erosion by:

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(1) Changing the design of the restriction orifice from a single to

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a multiple stage device; and (2) Changing the existing cooling water supply from the SUFP dis-charge to the pump first stage discharge where a connection exists in the mechanical seal cooling water piping.

The inspector discussed MM00 90-0556 with the cognizant design engi-

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neer and determined that some preliminary engineering work had been performed. The licensee indicated that the lube oil cooling water flow requirements were approximately 1% (16 GFM) of rated SUFP flow.

Although this had been discussed with the SUFP vendor to ensure that the pump hydraulic performance would not be adversely impacted, the licensee indicated that they would verify this with.the SUFP vendor.

-The final design was being prepared for review by an independent re-

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viewer and the engineering manager.

Presentation of MM00 90-0556 to the Station Operation Review Committee was scheduled during the cur-rent outage.

No unacceptable conditions were noted. However, as noted in Detail 7.3, this item is an indicator that more management attention to

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problems upon their first occurrence might result in improved root cause analysis.

8.0- Safety Assessment / Quality Verification

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8.1 (Closed) Dresser Industries 10 CFR 21 Report On November 10, 1989, Dresser Pump Division of Dresser Industries.

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notified the NRC that defective parts might have been supplied to the nuclear industry.

Specifically, pressure reducing sleeves for some models of Pacific Pumps may have been improperly heat treated. The

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sleeves are intended to be surface hardened, but some were hardened l

throughout the entire thickness of the part.

This report was formally l

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documented by letter dated November 13, 1989.

NHY conducted tests of the spare Pressure Reducing Sleeves in the warehouse; some of the j

hardness readings were outside the specified range.

The sleeves were retorned to Dresser for further analysis and evaluation.

Dresser determined that one of the sleeves is surface hardened and the other is through-hardened.

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Dresser further determined that the failure of through-hardened sleeves is

' a concern when the sleeve is an interference t'It on the pump aaft,

'he only nuclear grade pumps in the Pacific line which us an ir fference fit are the model 2" RL.

Limitation of the applicab *ity u 2" RL pumps is documented in a December 15, 1989

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letter fro 1 e Dresset Pump Division to NRC.

There are no 2" RL pumps in us at Seabrook. Therefore, Dresser has determined that-the Pressure Reducing Sleeves provided to NHY are acceptable for use.

This item is closed.

8.2 (Closed) LER 90-009: Missed Containment Air Lock Surveillance NRC IR 50-443/90-08 contains the details supporting closure of this item.

8.3 Reviews of Welding Quali_ty Records As documented in NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-443/90-08, para-graph 7.1, additional inspection of weld quality for piping systems was initiated as a result of Congressional interest.

During this period, NRC resident inspector review of construction records was continued to support the NRC response to additional Congressional staff questions and to further verify the adequacy of licensee records.

At the same time, an Independent Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) was established by the NRC to review certain pipe welding and NDE issues at Seabrook.

Region I inspectors have provided support and assist-ance to the visiting NRC team, but have not participated in their inspection activities because of the independent nature of the IRRT

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efforts. The independent regulatory review team was continuing its inspection when this resident inspection report period ended.

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activities, the resident inspectors conducted separate inspection and record review activities to assess the acceptability of licensee record

l controls, retrievability and quality verificition efforts relative to the welding /NDE areas of interest.

Construction procedures were re-viewed, quality assurance and engineering personnel were interviewed,

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and quality documents were examined to evaluate the samp1..r construc-

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tion processes for documented quality verifiability from A nistorical standpoint. As of the end of this report period, the record review and quality verification inspection activities were continuing.

So far, resident inspector review has produced no evidence of defec-tive work, improper process controls, incomplete records, or un-resolved safety questions.

9.0 Meetinos 9.1 _ Preliminary Inspection Findinos The scope and-findings of the inspection were discussed periodically throughout the inspection period. Conference calls were conducted between the NRC Projects Section Chief and the NHY Executive Director of Nuclear Production to discuss plant conditions and status of iden-tified corrective actions for a turbine trip and isolation of the turbine first stage pressure instrument.-

An oral summary of the preliminary inspection findings was provided to the Station Manager and the plant staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

A drop-in meeting on plant conditions, the status of the power ascen-sion program, and corrective action status was held between the NRC Projects Section Chief and New Hampshire Yankee Executive Director of Nuclear Production, Assistant Plant Manager, and Director of Licensing Services on April 11, 1990, in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

9.2 Exit Meetinos Conducted by Inspectors Inspection Lead Dates

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Reporter

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4-12 Operator Licensing 90-09 Norris i

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4-12 Independent Review Interim Exit H.Q.

Spessard 4-20 Power Ascension Interim Exit 90-81 Trapp 4-26 Power Ascension Interim Exit 90-81 Yerokun 4-27 Fire Protection 90-11 Paolino l

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