IR 05000443/1990085
| ML20029A956 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1991 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029A954 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-90-85, NUDOCS 9103050148 | |
| Download: ML20029A956 (10) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region i Report No.
50 443/90 85 Docket No.
50 443 License No.
NPF 86 Licensee:
Public Service Company of New linmpshire New linmpshire Yankee Division Seabrook, New llampshire 03874 Facility Name:
Seabrook Station, Unit i Inspection Dates:
December 11 14, 1990 Inspection At:
Ilolton, Massachusetts, and Newington ami Seabrook, New llampshire Inspector: _0f 2h*M&hY
/ggf_ C.li. Amat6, Regional Team 1 cader ' date NRC Region i N. Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector, Seabrook Station E. Fox, NRR/PEPB R. Fuhrmeister, Resident inspector, Seabro A Smtion ) / / h/k/ Approved: g ec4mu - WdM$arusCChief, Emergency date Preparedness Section, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on December 11 14,1990 (Inspection Report No. 50-443/90 85) Areas Inspected: Announced, routine, safety inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness exercise.
Results: No exercise weaknesses or plan deficiencies were identified. The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement their emergency plan in a manner which would protect the health and safety of the public.
910305014e 910220 PDR ADoCK 05000443 O PDR
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PERSONS CONTACTED Unless indicated otherwise the following personnel are Public Service Company of New Hampshire, New Hampshire Yankee Division, Seabrook Station (NilY) staff, who attended the exercise exit meeting at Seabrook on December 14,1990.
R. Boyd, Jr., Manager, Performance Services E. Darois, Health Physics Supervisor B. Drawbridge, Executive Director, Nuclear Production S. Ellis, Emergency Preparedness Manager, Response and Implementation T. Feigenbaum, President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire Division, Public Service Company of New Hampshire G. Gram, Executive Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness and Community Relations T. Grew, Specialty Training Manager J. MacDonald, Emergency Preparedness Technical Issues Coordinator D. McLain, Freduction Services Manager D. Moody, Seabrock Station Manager J. Peschel, Corporate Support Manager J. Peterson, Assistant Operations Manager N_. Pillsbury, Director of Quality Programs D. Scanzoni Corporate Communications Manager S. Schultz, Vice President, Yankee Atomic Electric Company P. Stroup, Director, Emergency Preparedness W. Sturgen, Nuclear Services Manager D. Tailleart, Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Young, Scenario Department Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed and observed the actions of other licensee personnel.
2.
EMERGENCY EXERCISE The Seabrook Station, Unit No I announced, full. participation exercise was conducted on December 13,1990, from 11:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. The State of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Yankee Off-Site Respense Organization, and surrounding New Hampshire Towns participated.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on Aegust 27,1990 and, the complete scenario package on September 24,1990 for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed
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adequate testing of the major portions of the Seahrook Station Unit No.1 Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures and also provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in nned of corrective action. NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on December 13, 1990. NRC suggested changes to the scenario made by the licei ee were discussed during the briefing. The licensee identified which emeigency response activities would be s;mulated and indicated that conttollers would int" ie in exercise activities if necessary to prevent disruption to normal plant acto . 2.2 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following events: Initial condition equipment out of service: a charging pump, a containment
spray pump, a Waste Building Exhaust Fan, and a Control Building Intake Fan; A reactor coolant system loop piping weld fails and a leak into the
containment results; Declaration of an Alert (reactor coolant leak greater than 70 gallons per
minute); The irradiation specimen bask.:t and specimens fall to the bottom of the
reactor vessel; \\ The resulting loose parts from the irradiation specimen basket caused fuel ' damage and the release of fission products to the reactor coolant system , l water; A high radiation alarm on let down system monitor occurs as a resub of high
fission product activity; l l Solar storm induced geomagnetic disturbances cause damage to unit + substations at the Seabrook Station site and the Newington Emergency l Operations Facility (EOF) One alternating current supply to the EOF is lost and several Waste Processing Building electrical loads are lost; ' The high range post loss of coolant monitor indicates exposure rates in
excess of 2,500 rem /hr inside the containment as a result of the failed fuel and coolant system leak, causing declaration of a Site Area Emergency;
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4 The leaking reactor coolant loop piping weld fails completely, resulting in a - large break loss of coolant accident followed by a reactor trip and safety injection; The loss of coolant accident results in a high range post loss of coolant
monitor reading of 25,0(K) rem /hr inside contaiment and declaration of a General Emergency; As a ec. ult of a damaged contalhment spray pump, radioactive material is
released into the environment.
, 2.3 Activities Obserm! During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC inspection team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities and the Emergency Response Organization staff and actions of the Emergency Response Organization staff during operation of the Emergency Response Facilities in response to the simulated emergency. The following activities were observed: Use of operations and emergency plan implementing procedures; + Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; + Direction and coordination of emergency response;
Notification of licensee and New Hampshire State government personnel + and communication of pertinent plant status information to 4 tate personnel; Communications /information flow, and record keeping;
As:.:ssment and projection of off site radiological dose anti consideration of + protective actions; Accident analysis and mitigation.
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CIASSIFICATION OF ENERCISE FINDINGS Emergency prep,aedness exercise findings are classified as follows: Exercise Strengths Exercise strengths are areas of the licensee's staff response that provide strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the emergency plan implementing procedures.
Exercise Weahnesses h Exercise weaknesses are areas of the licensee's staff response in which the performance was such that it could have precluded effective implementation of the emergency plan implementing procedures in the event of an actual emergency in the area beinb observed. Existence of an exercise weakness does not of itself indicate that overall response was inadequate to protect public health and safety.
Areas for improvement An aren for improvement is an area of the licensee's staff response which did not have a significant negative impact on the licensee's ability to implement the emergency plan and implementing procedures and response was adequate.
Ilowever,it should be evaluated by the licensee to determine if corrective action could improve perrormance.
4.
EXEitClSE 011SER, ATIONS The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency llesponse Organization, Emergency Response Facilities, and use of these facilities were consistent with their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan implementing Procedures.
No exercise weaknesses were identified. Following are the detailed observations of performance in each of the emergency response facilities.
4.1 C,mtrol Itoom The following strengths were identified: 1.
Reactor operators recognized symptoms and selected the correct control room procedures and used them properly.
2.
Operators correctly interpreted changing containment conditions indicating a reactor coolant leak and took corrective action including estimation of the leak rate,
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3.
When control room habitability was challenged following loss of positive pressure, air samples were taken and the correct evaluation was made preventing an unnecessary control room evacuation.
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Operators responded correctly to an anomalous safety parameter display system indication for subcooling margin and reactor coulant system integrity.
No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
4.2 Technical Support Center (TSC) The following exercise strengths were identified: 1.
Excellent command and control was demonstrated and frequent staff briefings were conducted.
2.
Data were trended and extrapolated. Problems were anticipated. As a result, the time to reach conditions justifying a Site Area Emergency declaration were accurately predicted.
3.
The need to identify plant vulnerabilities as early as possible led to a request to use probabilistic risk assessment.
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Support resources from Yankee Nuclear Service Division engineers were - appropriately requested and utilized.
No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
4.3 Operations Support Center (OSC) The following exercise strengths were identified.
1.
The OSC was promptly staffed with health physics personnel and the various disciplines of maintenance personnel.
2.
Command and control were excellent. OSC operations were conducted in a quiet professional atmosphere.
" 3.
Repair teams were quickly established, well controlled, and dispatched with adequate protection from hazards.
No weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
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4.4 Emergency Operations l'acility (EOl') The following exercise strengths were identified:
L There was excellent support of and interaction with representatives of the { New Hampshire State government and the New llampshire Yankee l Massachusetts Off Site Itesponse Organization.
' 2.
There was prompt and correct response to a simulated loss of the main electrical supply to the EOF.
3.
Dose assessment personnel anticipated possible release pathways and performed a "what if" calculation based on possible containment breach in anticipation of a possible release.
4.
There was good command and control, frequent staff briefings and EOF manager's meetings, which included government representatives and the NHY Massachusetts Off Site ltesponse Organinition.
5.
Environmental monitoring teams were repositioned to minimize mission dose.
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Feedback was obtained regarding implementation of off site protective actions, This information was announced to EOF staff and relayed to other Emergency Response Facilities and Seabrook Station staff.
No exercises weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified: , L The responsibilities of the NilY staff member processing inhalation pathway samp ts should be reviewed to ensure that activities which might impede his performance are assigned to other response personnel.
2.
The procedure for processing of inhalation pathway samples could be streamlined by restricting concerns to iodine and noble gas concentrations.
4.5 Media Center The following strengths were identified: 1.
There were good press t3riefings using language understandable to the public.
2.
There was good response to 'he inquiries of real and simulated reportersi . - - . . - . -, . - -.. - -. - - -. - . ....
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e j i No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
l 4.6 Correction of Previously Identified Exercise Weaknesses and Areas for improvement The inspectors observed licensee response in areas which had previously been i identified ns weaknesses or areas for improvement during the 1988 and 1989 ' evaluated emergency exercises.
, Four exercise weaknesses were identified during the June,1988 exercise. All of these weaknesses were re. addressed and closed in a specialinspection. The . satisfactory resolution of these weaknears is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/88 10.
l Three areas for improvement were identified during the 1989 exercise: ' 1.
Transfer of authority from the Short Term Emergency Director (Shift Supervisor) to the Site Emergency Director was not announced on the plant paging system.
2.
Telephone line noise caused some minor communications problems in the Technical Support Center.
These items did not recur. Performance in the above areas was acceptable during this exercise.
3.
Baron concentration curves should be reviewed to verify that they cover
all reasonably expected conditions.
This item was the result of the scenario which involved a core at end of-life while the plant was actually at beginning-of core life. The curves used during the exercise were appropriate for the actual plant conditions. As the core ages the licensee revises the curves as appropriate. The inspector has no further concerns regarding this item.
The inspector considers each of the previously identified weaknesses or areas for improvement to be satisfactorily resolved.
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5.
YANKEE ATOh11C ELECrillC COMPANY (YAEC) SUPPoltT Ol' SICAllitOOK STATION EMERGENCY PitEPAllEDNESS ACrlVITIES 5.1 Emergency llesponse Supimrt Through contractual arrangement YAEC provides emergency response support to New llampshire Yankee (NilY)(as well as several other New England area utilities) to supplement emergency response funtions performed by the station emergency response organization. Generally, the support services provided are a back up to functions performed by the NilY staff, however in two cases the functions me the primary tasks of YAEC.
The first at these is the task of core damage assessment, which is conducted for NilY by the Yankee Nuclear Service Division (YNSD) of Yankee Atomic Electric Company at the YAEC Engineering Support Center. The relationship and function are described in the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan. During the exercise, core damage assessments were conducted promptly, results were consistent with the scenario information available to the emergency response organization, and the information was promptly communicated to the Site Emergency Director in the TSC.
The other emergency response task is the analysis of non airborne environmental samples (water, soil, milk, vegetation, etc.). As this exercise was not an ingestion pathway exercise, demonstration of this capability was not an objective of the exercise. The YNSD support personnel responsible for this function were observed to arrive at the EOF and set up and test their equipment and would have been ready to perform the appropriate sample analyses if necessary.
5.2 Audit of YNSD Functions The inspector interviewed YAEC Ouality Assurance (OA) personnel and NilY personnel to ascertain whether audits are performed of the emergency response functions that YNSD provides under the Seabrook Emergency Plan. Although YAEC performs audits of the support provided by YNSD to several utilities, the audits are not specific to services provided to NilY. NilY performs project managment reviews of the YAEC Nuclear Service Division program. A NilY representative indicated that he believed that a combination of the YAEC audits, YAEC program reviews, and the NilY management reviews adequately ensured the quality of emergency response services provided by YNSD. llowever, based on the inspector's concerns, NiiY agreed to add the audit of the YNSD supplied services to the routine 10 CFR 50.54(t) audit of the N1lY emergency preparedness program.
The inspector had no further questions in this are. ,
6.
1,1CENSEE CRITIQUE The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on December 14,1990 during which the licensee's lead controllers and observers discussed observations of the exercise. The licensee's critique was entical and thorough.
7.
SEAllROOK STATION ES1ERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO) TRAINING STATUS To determine if an adequate number of personnel were qualified to implement the on site portion of the Seabrook Radiological Emergency Plan, the inspector reviewed training summaries, the qualification list, and the drill schedule.
There are 242 positions described in the emergency response organization (ERO).
The training status at the time of this inspection indicated that 1088 persons were qualified to fill these positions. A check of the ERO qualification list indicated an adequate number of personnel were qualified ior each key position. During 1990 the licensee conducted 14 drills as follows: one dress rehearsal, six medical drills, one radiation monitoring drill, two evacuation drills, two combined functional drills, one NilY Off site Response Organization callin drill, and one Post Accident Sampling System drill.
Based on the above review, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
8.
EXIT h1EETING Following the licensee's exercise self critique, the NRC team met with the licensee's representatives listed in Section 1 on December 14,1990 to discuss findings as detailed in this report. The NRC team leader summarized the obserwtions made during the exercise. The licensee was advised that no exercise weaknesses were identified and that all previously identified exercise weaknesses and areas for improvement had been adequately demonstrated. The NRC team also determined that within the scope and limitation of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated the capability to implement the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan implemt.nting Procedures in a manner that would adequately protect the health and safety of the public. }}