IR 05000443/1989015
| ML20005G762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1990 |
| From: | Briggs L, Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005G753 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-89-15, NUDOCS 9001230045 | |
| Download: ML20005G762 (8) | |
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.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION
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REGION 1-
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Y Report No.:
50-443/89-15
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License No.:
NPF-67-
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Licensee:
Public' Service Company of New 'ampshire H
1000 Elm Street
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Mar,chester, New Hampshire 03105
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Facility;;
Seabrook Statio'n, Unit 1
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Location:
Seabrook, New Hampshire a
Dates:
November 27.- December'I and December 14 and 15, 1989 Inspectors:
L. Briggs, Sr'. Oper~ations Engineer
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D. Silk, Sr. Operations Engineer R. Temps, Resident Inspector-L.~Sherfey, PNL Examin u
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Submitted by:
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C L. Brig {rs, Sr. Oper@fa#s Engineer Date Approved By:
/ f 90 P. Eselgroth, Chief, PWR Section,
' Date Operations Branch, Division of-Reactor Safety INSPECTION SUMMARY The November 27 through December 1 inspection was a special announced inspec-tion which assessed the.Seabrook Unit 1 operator proficiency and use of faci-
lity procedures, primarily the Emergency Operating Procedures (E0P), during
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emergency situations and transients. This inspection evaluated the performance-of the on-shift operating crews using NRC developed scenarios on the-Seabrook plant specific simulator.
No violations or deviations were identified. All six operating crews demon-
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. strated satisfactory performance on the simulator scenarios.
The December 14 and 15 inspection reviewed and closed five items from the Corrective Action Plan.
Details of the review are contained in Section 4.0 of this report, t
9001230045 900108 Y
PDR ADOCK 05000443 Q
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DETAILS 1. 0' PERSONS CONTACTED AND SHIFT SUPERINTENDENTS OF EVALUATED CREWS
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Licensee Representatives
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+ C. Beverly, Regulatory Compliance
- # + L. Carlsen, Operations Training Supervisor
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M. David, Shift Superintendent-
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M. Debay, Shift Superintendent-
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. + B. Drawbridge, Executive Director'of Nuclear Production L. Fritz, Shift Superintendent
- # +'J. Grillo, Operations Manager
- .+ R. Hanley, Operations Training Manager
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+ G. Kann, Program Support Manager T. Harpster, Director of Licensing Services
-G. Kilby, Shift Superintendent
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Kirchhoff, Simulator Instructor
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+ G. Kline, Power Ascension Test Program Manager
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D. Moody, Station Manager
J. Peterson, Assistant Operations' Manager
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- # + P. Richardson, New Hampshire Yankee Training Manager G. St. Pierre,-Shift Superintendente R. Strickland,' Shift Superintendent
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- # + L. Briggs, Senior Operations Engineer.
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A. Cerne, Senior Resident-Inspector,.Seabrook Station
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P. Eselgroth, Chief, PWR Section, Operations Branch
L. Sherfey, Senior Development Engineer, PNL
- # + D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer'
R. Temps, Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point Unit 1
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- Denotes those present at the December.1, 1989 exit meeting.
- Denotes those personnel that observed the NRC assessment process at 1.
various times at the Seabrook simulator.
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+ Denotes those present at the December 15,'1989 exit meeting.
2.0 OVERVIEW 0F REPORT During the week of November 27, 1989, the NRC conducted an evaluation of
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the proficiency of the Seabrook Unit 1 operators.
This evaluation was performed using scenarios that were developed by the NRC for use on the Seabrook specific simulator.
During the inspection of December 14 and 15, the NRC closed five items from the licensee's Corrective Action Plan.
This was accomplished by verifying procedural modifications to the licensee's Operations Management
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Manual and the Power Ascension Test Program, as'well'as observing opera-tions and startup testing personnel during_ pretest briefings and simulator
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scenarios of startup tests, 3.0 PROFICIENCY EVALUATION
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- Crew performance was_ evaluated using'the current operator licensing exami-
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ner! standards, NUREG-1021. The examiner standards provided an_ objective and standardized basis to evaluate the operating crews.
Evaluation cri-
-teria were specifically developed for the Shift Superintendent (SS), the
Unit Shift Supervisor (USS), and the overall crew which included the SS-and the'USS.
The criteria _used are shown in Attachment'1.
Each crew participa'tedLin two (2) scenarios.
Each crew consisted o'f_the-following personnel:
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One Shift Superintendent - Senior Reactor Operator licensed One Unit Shift Supervisor - Senior Reactor Operator licensed One Senior Control Room Operator - Reactor Operator licensed:
.One Control Room Operator - Reactor Operator _ licensed Five Auxiliary Operators (simulated) - non-licensed operator Following each scenario the NRC observed the crew self critique their performance and then held additional discussions to note any NRC observa-
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tions not identified by the crew or facility staff.
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The following table _ summarizes the results_of-the NRC evaluation of the
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Seabrook Unit 1 Operating Crew performance.
Performance was evaluated by
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the use of the criteria of Attachment 1.
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TOTAL CREWS l DEMONSTRATED l
DEMONSTRATED l
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EVALUATED l SATISFACTORY l
UNSATISFACTORY I l
l PERFORMANCE-l PERFORMANCE l
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SHIFT l
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SUPERVISOR l
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3.1 CONCLUSIONE-
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The NRC Operating. Crew Performance Evaluation Team determined that the performance of all six (6) Operating Crews satisfactorily met the
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rating factors and acceptance criteria of Attachment 1.
~ The team did note some specific operational program areas that could -
be strengthened to.further enhance the operating crews performance.
Each area is discussed below.
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COMMUNICATIONS The inspection team noted that the level of. detail of the commu-
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nications varied from crew to crew and even within crews between
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the different crew members.
In particular the feedback from
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some crew members in response to directions given by the USS
during EOP performance was not formal and standardized. The team determined that overall communications were satisfactory, but could be improved by additional training emphasis.on stand-ardization and formalization.
The licensee stated that a Standard Work Practices document addressing communications was in draft and would be issued and
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fully implemented by June 1, 1990.
In the interim period,
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communications will-be emphasized during the current requalifi-cation cycle which'will address all crews within the next six (6) weeks.
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STANDARDIZATION OF CREW OPERATING PRACTICES Ouring the team evaluation the NRC observed minor differences in
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operations communications and shift turnover practices between'
the various operating crews. Although the facility has.a shift turnover procedure, the various crews implemented it to different degrees prior to the start of the scenarios.
Some examples of differences observed during crew turnover and simulator operations were:
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The formality and detail of crew briefings during shift
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turnover for the simulator scenarios was not consistent
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between operating crews.
Annunciator testing, although not required by procedure,
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was performed by most crews when assuming the simulator shift; however, some crews did not.
The level'of detail of communications varied between
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operating crews (addressed above).
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The team noted that, although the above' differences were slight i
and did not significantly impact crew performance.during the simulator scenarios. a stronger emphasis on standardization of operations would serve.to further enhance crew performance.
JThe licensee stated that the identified differences will be addressed i
during the current cycle'of requalification training.
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. 4.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN REVIEW
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22,-1989, Region I issued Confirmatory l
In response to the events of June
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Action: letter 89-11~on June 23,.1989.
Subsequently _New Hampshire Yankee-i (NHY) developed a Corrective' Action Plan (CAP): addressing. specific action-items. - The CAP was' submitted to the NRC on July 12,.1989 with additional-CAP ~information on August 25,.1989. -The -following CAP items, using the NHY's alpha-numeric designators, were reviewed to ensure:that corrective
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actions taken by NHY to address identified weaknesses were adequate to correct the problem.
Following each item is a discussion of NRC~ findings
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for that item.
Item 1. A-11, Enhance the Licensed Operator Training Program to in-
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,clude simulator training which challenges the operators with regard-
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to following procedures.
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The licensee developed a list of procedure c.ompliance related ques-tions that was used as: discussion and training topics in the current-operator requalification training phase;that began on October 10, 1989. Also, all operators and instructors have attended procedural
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compliance training classes. Before the end of January 1990, all operating crews will have undergone a week of training which will include classroom and simulator training on 13 of the more complex i
Power Ascension Tests.and the Corrective Action Letter (CAL) items
addressing the June 22 Natural Circulation ~ Test.
Classroom training-is conducted in'the morning, followed by-simulator training in the afternoon (as of December 15, 1989 two of six crews had completed
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this training).
Simulator scenarios-incorporating power ascension tests were used-by the licensee to train and evaluate the operators regarding procedural compliance. The licensee used criteria similar
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to that of the examiner standards, NUREG-1021, to evaluate crew per-formance. The NRC observed the two' crews in four scenarios that-challenged procedural compliance. The NRC determined that the crews
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performed satisfactorily during' the simulator scenarios' observed.
l Item 1.C-2, Revise the Startup Test Program to require that a com-
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l-prehensive pretest briefing be provided prior to the crew assuming the shift to ensure that the crew understands the test criteria, expected parameters and required actions.
l The Startup Test Program Description was converted to the Power
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Ascension Test Program (PATP) and was' approved as Station Management Manual (SSMM) Procedure SM 8.1.
Section 4.2.2 of SM 8.1 states that
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a pretest briefing will be conducted.to ensure that'the oncoming crew
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of test' engineers and operations personnel understands the test
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~ criteria, expected parameters, and required actions prior to operations ll
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personnel assuming'the shift.
Individual duties and responsibilities
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are to be-reviewed and-abnormal. plant conditions or system configura-
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tions to be encountered during the test are to be discussed.' Figure i
. 5.3 of SM 8.1, PRETEST BRIEFING DOCUMENT GUIDELINES, provides direc--
- tions on how to conduct the. briefing. :The four pretest briefings
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L observed by the NRC-during:the simulator scenarios on December 15,
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1989 were extensive'and detailed with good interface between the test engineers and operations personnel, j
' Item 1.C-3, Revise the:Startup Test Pr.ogram to require-that additional
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preparation, including simulator' rehearsals when' feasible, be given~to test crews. assigned to-perform complex tests'.
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Section 4.4 of SM 8.1 states that specific' licensed operators and test personnel will receive simulator training and/or classroom training on tests listed in section.4.4.
Training:is to be conducted within three months of the actual performance of the test.. -The NRC-audited classroom training for ST-23,-Dynamic Automatic Steam Dump Control..and ST-19, Loss of 0ffsite; Power-Test. The training was j
conducted by the Shif t. Test: Director responsible for that test.
The-training was thorough,.with interaction between the instructor.and the participants to discuss details and questions related to the.
tests.
Simulator training was also satisfactorily conducted by the
"t operations and test personnel and observed by the'NRC, as discussed-
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in Item 1.A-11 above.
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Item 1.D-9, Revise the-Operations Management Manual and.the Power
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Ascension Test Program to clearly state the.. responsibilities of the Operations and Power Ascension Test personnel to raise any issue that is not. understood, or to stop an evolution if.they'do not understand-
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their responsibilities in the conduct-of the test.'
i Operations Management Manual (0PMM) section 1.1.1 and SM 8.1 section 3.0 states the responsibilities of the operations and test personnel, respectively, to raise any issue that is not: understood or to stop'an evolution if their responsibilities' in the conduct of the test are not understood. -During the pretest briefings, the NRC observed good f
interaction between the test engineers and operations personnel. Any I
area that was not understood was' fully discussed until all personnel
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Responsibilities of involved j
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personnel were also discussed, with a clear understanding prior to assuming the shift that licensed operations personnel were in charge
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of plant activities and responsible for safe plant operation. During l
each of the scenarios observed by the NRC the operations and test
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validity problems induced by simulated equipment failures or plant anomalies. During each scenario the. test and operations personnel
discussed the issue and either interrupted or terminated the test as
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appropriate for the plant conditions.
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Item 2.B-3, Revise the Operations Management Manual to: 1) Clarify.
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the integration of Startup Test personnel with the shift operating
crew; 2) Clarify responsibility and authority when supplemental operators are assigned to a shift; 3) Encourage non-shift licensed
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Operations personnel. to provide a point of clarification or informa-
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tion when an assigned operator's actions appear to be inappropriate or are not understood by the observer; 4) Require the Operations
Management licensed personnel to define their responsibilities when they enter the horseshoe area of the Control-Room during testing.-
OPMM section 1.1.3, Test Group Responsibilities, defines the integra-tions of test engineers personnel with operations personnel including coordination of and recommendations regarding plant conditions.
Section 1.7.1, number S., clar'fies the responsibilities of additional operators assigned to perform.drious control room activities such as reactor startup, or feedwater control. Section 1.6.2 encourages input from operations personnel observing the test if an apparent abnormal condition arises.
In a November 10, 1989 memorandum, the Executive Director of Nuclear Production stated company policy regarding manage-
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ment personnel responsibilities in the control room " horseshoe ares,"
such as being knowledgeable of the safety and operational limits of a-
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special evolution or, when it is not possible to be familiar with an
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evolution, to inform the USS m the SS that.they are observers; and-if inside the control room, Los outside the " horseshoe area," the managers are to be considered as observers.
Strict formality was practiced when entry was made into the " horseshoe area" of the simu-lator control room with each person stating the purpose of entry prior to being allowed initial access.
During each scenario the OPMM was properly implemented.
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4.1 CONCLUSION
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NRC review of the changes to the OPMM discussed above, indicates that
changes were appropriate and address the concerns of the CAL.
In addition, the NRC noted that test engineers and the operations' staff functioned well as a team during simulator scenario performance and i
freely exchanged information during both the scenarios and the pretest briefings, t
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5.0 EXIT MEETINGS An exit meeting was conducted on December 1,1989, at the training complex with the licensee representatives noted in Paragraph 1.0 of this report.
The inspection scope and findings as detailed in this report were summari-zed at the meeting.
A second exit meeting was conducted on December 15, 1989, in which the NRC informed the licensee that five of the Corrective Action Plan items were considered closed.
At no time during the inspection was written material concerning inspec-tion results or determinations provided to the licensee by the inspectors.
This report does not contain any information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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