IR 05000443/1993008
| ML20044E491 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1993 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044E486 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-93-08, 50-443-93-8, NUDOCS 9305250079 | |
| Download: ML20044E491 (16) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No:
93-08
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Docket No.:
50-443
License No.:
NPF-86 Licensee:
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation Post Office Box 300 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Facility:
Seabrook Station Dates:
April 6 - May 10,1993
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Insptors:
Noel Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector Richard I2ura, Resident Inspector
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Approved By:
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F. Rogge, Chief y//
' Dafe eactor Projects Section 4B, DRP Inspection Summary: This inspection report documents the safety inspections conducted during day shift and back shift hours. The inspections assessed station performance in the
areas of plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance and surveillance, engineering and
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technical support, emergency preparedness, security, and safety assessment and quality l
verification.
Results: North Atlantic operated the facility safely. The inspector identified one unresolved item concerning whether the use of check valves as isolation boundaries is allowed by the
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equipment tagging program. Sec executive summary for assessment of performance.
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9305250079 930518 PDR ADDCK 05000443 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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SEABROOK STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50 443\\93-08 Operations: Operations personnel safely operated the plant. Operators responded to operational challenges in an excellent manner and properly resolved out-of-specification instrument readings. Operators maintained a questioning attitude and strictly followed procedural guidance.
Radiological Controls: The health physics department's support of a containment entry was
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excellent. Minor weaknesses existed in the performance of routine health physics
surveillances. A chemist sampling the primary demonstrated good sampling technique and
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procedural adherence.
Maintenance / Surveillance: The mechanical maintenance department identified worker performance problems associated with the repair of a primary coolant sample line drain valve, and initiated procedural changes and training requests. Instrumentation and control (I&C)
technicians properly controlled and tested a circuit card even though performance weaknesses existed. Management showed a proper safety perspective by initiating a review of the
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continuing service water pump failures. I&C technicians were knowledgeable of seismic monitor surveillance requirements, properly followed procedure steps, and utilized work control processes to resolve deficiencies.
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Maintenance workers performed the repair of a demineralized water valve well, and were experienced in forming freeze seals. However, the use of check valves as an isolation boundary was a poor practice.
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Security: The guard force performed routine activities well and clearly understood the
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purpose and the responsibilities associated with a compensatory watch.
Emercency Preparedness: Drill coordinators effectively implemented a dress rehearsal drill and identified opportunities for improvement.
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Encineerine/ Technical Sunoort: The engineering self-assessment report training was
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effective after the instructor enhanced the initial lesson plan and retrained the initial workshop participants.
Safety Assessment /Ouality Verificatiort: Audits of technical specification section 6.0 administrative requirements were adequately performed over the past two years, but the
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quality of the audit plans and scheduling did not improve. The station operations review committee's discussions of compensatory plans for ventilation system outages included excellent interaction between members of different departments.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Page EXECUTIVE SUMM ARY....................................... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................ iii
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t 1.0 OPERATIONS G1707, 92701)...............................
I 1.1 Plant Activities....................................
I 1.2 Routine Plant Operations..............................
I 2.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707).....'....................
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3.0 MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE (61726, 62703, 92701)
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3.1 Maintenance......................................
3.2 S u rveillance......................................
4.0 SECURITY (71707)
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5.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS G1707)
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6.0 ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT G1707)
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6.1 Offsite Power Relay I_ogic (TAC M81943)
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6.2 Engineering Self-Assessment Reports Training................
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7.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION p1707,92701)
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7.1 Technical Specification Section 6.0 Requirements..............
7.2 Review of Licensee Event Reports........................ 11 7.3 Station Operation Review Committee (SORC)
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8.0 M EETING S (30702)..................................... 13
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DETAILS 1.0 OPERATIONS (71707,92701)
1.1 Plant Activities The plant operated at 100% power.
1.2 Routine Plant Operations The inspector conducted daily contml room tours, observed shift turnovers, attended the morning station manager's meeting, and monitored plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspector reviewed plant staffing, safety system valve lineups, and compliance with technical specification requirements. The inspector conducted tours in the primary auxiliary building, the emergency diesel generator rooms, the residual heat removal vaults, the turbine building, the condensate stomge tank building, and the service water pumphouse. During the tours and i
attendance at the various meetings, the inspector noted good performance by the operations staff.
During plant tours, the inspector observed auxiliary operators utilizing locally posted pump prestart guidelines. Each guideline listed the flow path, suction pressure, and lubricant levels to be checked prior to starting a specific pump. The inspector noted that the operations support staff designed the human factor changes installed on the steam seal and drain control
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panel, CP-66, located in the turbine building. The changes included mimics and improved labeling. The inspector assessed that the pump prestart guidelines and human factor changes on CP-66 enhanced plant safety.
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During the conduct of routine rounds, an auxiliary operator identified that the lube oil temperature on the 'A' emergency diesel generator was low out-of-specification. The auxiliary operator contacted the control room operators who asked the system engineer for guidance. The system engineer reviewed the basis for the specification and determined that the diesel generator was operable. Operators generated a work request to troubleshoot and repair the lubricating keep warm system. The control room operator documented the
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operability review in the unit journal. The inspector concluded that operators properly evaluated out-of-specification reading.
Operators removed the 'D' moisture separator reheater (MSR) from service due to a small steam leak from a crack in the socket weld on the MSR drain tank level tree tap. Operators decreased the generator output to avoid exceeding the limit on first stage turbine pressure.
After the maintenance staff repaired the weld, operators placed the 'D' MSR in service.
North Atlantic personnel generated a station information report (SIR) to evaluate the failure mode of the weld.
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The inspector held a discussion with the system engineer to review the maintenance history of the failed weld. The socket weld is in a section of piping that connects the MSR drain tank to the level detector. Since there is no flow in the pipe, North Atlantic determined that the crack in the weld was not caused by erosion or corrosion. A similar weld on the 'C' MSR failed during the second operating cycle. As a result, the licensee inspected the inside of all four MSR drain tanks during the second refueling outage. North Atlantic planned to inspect similar welds on the 'A' and 'B' MSR drain tanks during the third refueling outage. The inspector assessed that North Atlantic demonstrated an excellent safety perspective by identifying and repairing the steam leak.
Due to high pump vibrations, the operators declared the.'B' service water pump inoperable and entered a seven day technical specification action statement. The opemtors placed the service water cooling tower in service. Mechanical maintenance technicians replaced the pump. The inspector assessed that operators performed well during the pump replacement by carefully entering and exiting technical specification limiting conditions for operations at the different phases of the work.
During routine rounds, an auxiliary operator identified live steam issuing from a failed steam sample line located on a bridge between the turbine building and the emergency feedwater pump house. The sample line connects the main steam line to the chemical analysis system that measures conductivity. Following the proper safety precautions, the auxiliary operator isolated the steam leak by shutting the root valve, MS-V-209.
The inspector concluded that the operators responded to plant operational challenges in an excellent manner. The operators maintained a questioning attitude and strictly followed procedural guidance.
2.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROIE (71707)
The inspector observed the health physics (HP) department support an at power containment entry to replace a circuit card. The inspector reviewed the associated radiation work permit.
An HP supervisor conducted the containment entrance briefing and highlighted the radiation and heat stress dangers. The shift superintendent discussed the technical, regulatory, and communication aspects of the planned work. The inspector noted that the radiation work permit was complete and accurately identified the neutron and gamma dose rates experienced in the work area.
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HP personnel prestaged neutron and alarming dosimetry for the five people, including the inspector, who entered the containment. The HP technician continually monitored the neutron and gamma dose rates in the work area and obtained an air sample and contamination smears. The inspector noted that the workers demonstrated an appreciation for minimizing personnel dose and the spread of contamination. The inspector concluded that the HP department's planning and control of the containment entry were excellent.
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The inspector noted that the survey map posted at the HP control point had not been completely updated and that a worn step-off pad in the fuel handling building had not been replaced. HP technicians promptly corrected the deficiencies. Although the possibility for the spread of contamination resulting from the identified deficiencies was minimal, the
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inspector concluded that minor weaknesses existed in the performance of routine HP surveillances.
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During plant tours, the inspector verified the proper calibration of various pieces of portable
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chemistry equipment including several PH meters, a syringe pump, and a hydrogen analyrw.
The inspector observed a chemist drawing a primary sample at the primary sample panel.
The chemist drew the sample in accordance wi'h Step 8.1 of Procedure CSO910.15, " Primary System Sampling," and analyzed the sample for gaseous activity and hydrogen. While collecting and transporting the sample to the primary chemistry laboratory, the chemist followed the requirements specified in the chemistry department routine activity radiation work permit,93-R-3. The inspector assessed that the technician demonstrated good sampling I
technique and good procedural adherence.
3.0 MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE (61726, 62'703, 92701)
3.1 Maintenance The inspector attended morning maintenance planning meetings and observed maintenance activities during routine plant tours. Maintenance observed by the inspector included the
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following.
Reactor Coolant Sample Line Drain Valve The inspector observed portions of the repair of reactor coolant loop 1 primary sample line
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drain valve, RC-V339, reviewed the associated work package, and verified the related safety l
tagging order. Mechanics replaced the original leaking valve with a new valve. The weld
travelers documented the QA inspection of the welds, and the required rework performed on a socket weld. The new valve failed the post repair seat leak test. After the mechanics torqued the valve into the seat, tightened the valve bonnet, and flushed the drain line, T
RC-V339 still leaked. When the mechanics removed the valve bonnet to inspect the valve seat, they damaged the stem.
The disc on the replacement valve stem required minor rhachining and the valve seat required i
lapping before mechanics could complete satisfactory seat checks. The inspector witnessed both the prussian blue and neolube seat checks. The mechanics reassembled the valve and operators completed a satisfactory seat leak test.
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The inspector met with the mechanical maintenance department supervisor to discuss the problems encountered during the valve repair. Supervisors and mechanics completed a review of the valve repair on April 22,1993. While repacking the new valve, mechanics failed to recognize an improperly sized gland follower bushing and a burr on the valve body near the stem. The gland follower bushing and the burr on the valve body contributed to galling the stem when the valve was cycled. The review determined that the most likely cause of the seat leakage was debris or foreign material lodged between the disc and seat of the new valve. The review recommended revising Procedure MS 0519.37, "Yarway Rigid Backseat Valve Maintenance," to require workers to check for proper stem, stuffing box, and follower fit. Also, the mechanical maintenance department supervisor initiated training development recommendations for checking the sizing of the gland bushing when repacking
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valves and for flushing valves prior to leak tests.
The inspector reviewed the results of the mechanical maintenance department valve repair review, the training development recommendations, and the minutes of the mechanical maintenance department meeting of April 27,1993. The inspector concluded that the raaintenance department identified worker performance problems associated with the repair of RC-339, and initiated procedural changes and training requests to prevent recurrence of similar problems.
Primary Component Cooling Water Temperature Control Valve The inspector observed instrument and control (l&C) technicians perform corrective maintenance on the train 'B' primary component cooling' water (PCCW) temperature controller. On February 10,1993, operators identified erratic operation of the setpoint meter section of the controller and initiated work request 93WO503. Prior to starting the work, operators took local control of the PCCW heat exchanger outlet valves at the remote shutdown panel.
The inspector reviewed the work package, which contained the necessary information to perform the work. I&C technicians removed the temperature controller, which is located on the main control board, and brought the controller to the meter and test shop. I&C technicians disassembled the meter and sprayed the meter movement with anti-static spray.
Utilizing a temporary power supply, the technicians exercised the indicator over the entire range of the meter. The setpoint meter indicator did not stick. The technicians reassembled and installed the controller. The inspector assessed that the I&C technicians followed the procedure and successfully eliminated the sticking of the setpoint meter indicator.
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Condensate Storage Tank Demineralired Water Sunoly Valve The inspector observed mechanics perform corrective maintenance on valve DM-V517.
Valve DM-V517 is a chain operated four inch gate valve used to fill the condensate storage tank (CST) from the demineralized water system. Prior to the second refueling outage, operators identified seat leakage through DM-V517 by an increase in CST water level. The operators generated a work request to repair the valve during the second refueling outage.
However, mechanics were unable to form a freeze seal due to continual valve seat leakage.
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The inspector reviewed tagging order 93-0540, which provided isolation for the work on DM-V517. On the upstream side of DM-V517, the operators used a liquid nitrogen freeze
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seal for isolation. On the downstream side of DM-V517, the operators danger tagged shut i
several valves and relied on the proper seating of two check valves to the CST. Valve DM-i V517 is located several feet below the required CST technical specification water level.
Thus, the potential existed for check valve leakage to decrease the CST water level below the minimum acceptable limit. The shift superintendent signed a specific tagging order step
authorizing the use of check valves as part of the maintenance boundary isolation. The inspector considered using check valves as boundary isolation to be a poor practice.
The inspector reviewed Procedure MA 4.2, " Equipment Tagging and Isolation,"
Step 4.2.1.11. The step specified that check valves shall not be used as boundary isolation
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valves. The inspector noted that alternatives existed for isolating DM-V517 such as using
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multiple frmze seals or performing the work during an outage. The inspector met with a regulatory compliance engineer and the manager of the operations department to discuss a disclaimer statement in section 3.0 of MA 4.2. The disclaimer allows deviation from the tagging procedure. Whether North Atlantic properly controlled use of check valves as
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isolation boundaries in accordance with MA 4.2 is an unresolved item. (URI 93-08-01)
During the pre job briefing, the shift superintendent and a mechanical maintenance supervisor discussed precautionary measures for the initial breech of DM-V517 integrity. Maintenance technicians substituted a few body-to-bonnet studs with long threaded rods that had nuts
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engaged on the end. As the mechanics removed the valve bonnet, the bonnet rode up the threaded studs. This configuration allowed for rapid restoration of valve integrity if the two CST integrity check valves leaked.
J The maintenance technicians disassembled the valve. The check valves did not leak. The
technicians cleaned and polished the internal seating surfaces of the valve to enhance the contact area between the seat and disc. The technicians adjusted the alignment of the valve gate relative to the guide tabs. The technicians inspected and adjusted the chain operator. A maintenance supervisor periodically visited the work site and assisted with the job.
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The inspector assessed that the maintenance workers performed well, and were experienced in
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forming liquid nitrogen jacket freeze seals.
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Service Water Pomo
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The inspector observed portions of the replacement of the 'B' service water pump.
Mechanical maintenance personnel replaced the pump using Procedure MS0523.06, "Johnston Vertical Service Water Pump Maintenance." The inspector observed excellent communication and teamwork between maintenance, security, quality control, operations, and engineering personnel. The mechanical maintenance department supervisor frequently visited the work site to pmvide oversight. Mechanics used good procedural adherence during the
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work. The inspector verified the torque wrenches were of the proper range and were in calibrsen.
Since the end of the second refueling outage, three serv'ee water (SW) pumps have failed.
Station management requested that the NQG initiate an evaluation. The inspector discussed the failures with North Atlantic's nuclear quality group (NQG) and reviewed an interim
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report, datcd March 22,1993. The evaluation emphasized factors that may have contributed to the pump failures and assessed the need to enhance the programmatic process. The NQG evaluation was in addition to individual pump failure analyses performed by the technical support staff. Nonh Atlantic plans to rebuild the next SW pump with shafts hardened by a chrome-oxide layer at the journal bearings and with composite journal bearings, which are more resistant to abrasive pa*les in the lubricating water.
The inspector assessed that the maintenance s'aff performed well when replacing the 'B' SW
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pump. North Atlantic management showed a proper safety perspective by initiating a review to evaluate the premature degradation of the SW pumps.
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Digital Rod Position Indication
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The inspector observed 1&C technicians preparing for and replacing an electronics circuit card in a digital rod position indication system cabinet located in the containment. Work i
request 93WO555 controlled the work scope. The technical support engineer processed a
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work request ecope change to replace the logic card for rod F-8 and to conduct the post maintenance test in accordance with Surveillance Procedure IS 1666.910.
After the station operations safety review committee disapproved a revision to Procedure
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IS 1666.910, which allowed using the procedure with the reactor critical, the technical
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support engineer wrote a second work request scope change. The scope change provided
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detailed guidance for conducting the post maintenaece test. The in.spector observed an I&C
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technician and an I&C supervisor review the scope change. A health physics technician and the work control coordinator were notified of the change and signed the change request.
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The inspector met with the maintenance manager to discuss using work request scope changes to provide directions for performing tests. The level of review required for a procedure is more extensive than the level of review required for a work request scope change. The I&C technicians had completed the scope change and reviews in accordance with the program directions in the maintenance manual. The maintenance manager stated that the point at which a work request description of work becomes a procedure was not defined. The maintenance manager acknowledged the problem and stated that the work request process would not be used to bypass procedural reviews and approvals.
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The technical support system engineer ard two I&C technicians prestaged new circuit cards and the required test equipment prior to entering the containment. An I&C technician in the containment established continual communications with an I&C technician in the main control room. Shift turnovers in the main control room delayed the start of the circuit card replacement. During the post maintenance test of the new circuit card, an I&C technician incorrectly positioned a switch on thc test box. The technicians stopped the test due to unexpected rod position signals. The inspece determined the technicians would no,.ontinue the test until the cause of the unexpected signals was identified. To minimize radiation exposure, the inspector pointed out the incorrect switch position and the I&C technicians successfully completed the test.
The inspector noted performance weaknesses in the communications between the I&C technicians and the main control room operators, and in the conduct of the post maintenance test. The inspector concluded that I&C technicians controlled and properly tested the new i
digital rod position indication circuit card.
3.2 Surveillance The inspector observed instrument and control (I&C) technicians perform technical specification Surveillance Procedure IX 1670.919, " Service Water Pumphouse Seismic Monitor Calibration." Two I&C technicians calibrated the three service water pumphouse seismic recorders. A quality control (QC) inspector performed a routine surveillance check of the activity.
The IAC technicians moved the seismic recorders from the -c v:ater pumphouse to a meter and test shop, and performed stationary and sensitiv1 oxations. Sixteen s
mechanme inotion sensors (accelerometers) are located iiside each seismic recorder. The technicians generated work request 93WO995 to replace six sensors, which were out of tolerance. The I&C technicians installed new metal scratch plates, replaced the bag of desiccant, torqued the cover plate, and inspected the side cover gasket.
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The inspector reviewed the calibration data and the QC inspection plan. The inspector observed that all acceptance criteria were met and that calibrated torque wrenches were used.
The inspector noted that the inspection plan placed emphasis on performance based critical
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elements of the work activities. The inspector assessed that the I&C technicians were knowledgeable, properly followed procedural steps, and utilized the work control processes to resolve deficiencies.
i The inspe tor observed a health physics (HP) technician change the filter paper and charcoal
canister in radiation monitor 6526. The technician indicated that this repetitive task is
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performed once every two weeks. The inspector found the technician to be experienced and
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competent. The inspector verified that the control room operators entered the proper technical specification limiting condition for operation during the conduct of the surveillance.
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4.0 SECURITY (71707)
The inspector toured the protected area, observed security guards on patrol,'and monitored activities ia the cer. tral alarm station and secondary alarm station. The security force monitored people and packages entering the protected area. The inspector concluded that the
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security force performed routine activities well. During replacement of the 'B' service water pump, the security department implemented compensatory actions. The inspector assessed that the security guard clearly understood the purpose and the responsibilities associated with
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the compensatory watch.
5.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (71107)
F On April .1993, the inspector observed the performance of a dress rehearsal emergency preparedness (EP) drill. The inspector monitored the drill from the technical support center.
During the drill, North Atlantic exercised the blue EP response team. Most of the team members had never been evaluated during an NRC graded drill. The inspector held a discussion with the drill supervisor and reviewed the preliminary drill report.
Controllers identified strengths and documented areas for improvement. On April 19, 1993, North Atlantic conducted a tabletop exercise for the same blue team to practice communications and discuss the results of the dress rehearsal drill. The inspector assessed that the drill coordinators effectively implemented the drill and identified opportunities for
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improvement.
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6.0 ENGINEERING /TECIINICAL SUPPORT (71707)
,j 6.1 Offsite Power Relay Logic (TAC M81943)
l NRC Special Team Inspection Report No. 50-443/91-16 discussed a loss of offsite power :
event at Seabrook. During the event, breakers 11 and 163 tripped open isolating the main generator from the 345 kV switchyard. Per the relay logic design, the unit auxiliary
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transformer (UAT) ou'put breakers did not open and the reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT)
j output breakers did not automatically close. He emergency diesel generators started and
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powered the emergency buses for approximately twenty minutes, until operators restored j
offsite power through the RATS. The NRC questioned whether the relay logic design should t
be modified to allow automat % closure of the RAT output breakers during similar events.
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I The inspector reviewed Yankee Atomic Electric Company's engineering evaluation number j
92-01, " Evaluation of 345,13.8, and 4.16 kV Circuit Breakers Interlock and_ Tripping i
Schemes," dated January 13, 1991. The evaluation identified two cases where breakers 11
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and 163 could be opened without tripping the UAT output breakers. In one case, the out-of-
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step relay would activate. In the second case the breaker would be manually tripped. The.
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evaluation concluded that an electrical grid disturbance that would cause the activation of the i
out-of-step relay would result in offsite power not being available in the switchyard. The.
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report noted that main control room operators or the dispatcher controlled breaker position.
The evaluation studied several relay logic designs. The new designs would require extensive j
studies and the addition of qualified hardware. New relay logic designs would add j
complexity to IE-Non1F and separated train interactions, and could degrade safety related
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circuits. The evaluation stated that in the unlikely event of an out-of-step relay actuating, the
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i most prudent design was to prevent an automatic transfer to offsite power. After the diesel
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generators started, the operators could assess grid availability.before reconnecting to offsite power.
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Engineering Evaluation 92-01 concluded that the existing out-of-step scheme was adequate f
and that no changes were required. The evaluation recommended describing the out-of-step
protection scheme in the updated final safety evaluation (UFSAR) and revising procedures to
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control switchyard breaker operation. The inspector verified that the licensee updated the
UFSAR with change request 92-017. The inspector reviewed operations department i
instruction (ODI) 12, " Switching Orders," and concluded that the ODI provided adequate l
- dministrative controls for operating switchyard breakers.
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The Electrical Systems Branch of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) re iewed the offsite power system at Seabrook to determine whether the system met general design criterion (GDC) 17 [ TAC M81943]. The NRC concluded that the design meets or exceeds the requirements of GDC 17. Opening 345 kV breakers 11 and 163 does not prevent the use of the emergency diesel generators nor prevent connecting to the RATS. With degraded voltage, fast transfer from the UATs to the RATS is not desirable because the degraded voltage from offsite power could have an adverse effect on safety-related loads. The preferred method would be to use the diesel generators to supply safety-related loads.
Subsequently, the operators could take manual action in the main control room to restore power from the offsite system.
The inspector determined that the North Atlantic evaluation was thorough The NRC concluded that the present relay logic meets design criteria. This issue is closed.
6.2 Engineering Self-Assessment Reports Training The inspector attended the first of two workshops held by engineering on the revised engineering department Procedure 30070, " Engineering Self-Assessment Reports." Training consisted of 30 minutes of lecture. The instructor did not present any examples of when to use the engineering self-assessment reports (ESAR) and did not cover the lessons learned from the non-conforming tornado door root cause analysis.
Based on comments from the workshop participants and the inspector, the instructor restructured the workshop and developed examples of when to use the ESAR. The instructor then conducted a second workshop. The engineering department concluded that the second workshop was more effective and resuited in a healthy exchange of information. The instructor conducted the same workshop for the initial workshop participants to ensure the messages regarding the tornado doors and the use of the ESAR were addressed to all engineering personnel. Between June 1990 and January 1993, engineers wrote six ESARs.
After attending training sessions on the revised engineering vrocedure 30070 in April 1993, engineers have written four ESARs.
The inspector concluded that the engineering department conducted effective training on the use of the ESAR. However, the initial lesson plan needed to be enhanced and the initial participants needed to be retraine.
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I1 7.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707,92701)
7.1 Technical Specification Section 6.0 Requirements NRC inspection report number 50-443/91-01, noted that the nuclear quality group (NQG) had not verified compliance with Technical Specification section 6.0, " Administrative Requirements." The NQG had generally reviewed compliance with section 6.0 requirement by surveillance and audits of the station operating review committee and the nuclear rafety audit review committee. The NQG developed a matrix of planned audits and section 6.0 requirements.
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In August 1992, the director of quality programs reorganized the NQG and moved the audit and evaluation function to the nuclear safety and assessment group. The inspector met with the audit and evaluation supervisor and reviewed the matrix developed by NQG in
March 1991. Seven audits over a two year period verified most of the items in section 6.0,
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even though the audits were not performed on the originally scheduled dates. North Atlantic had not audited section 6.0 requirements for the radiation monitoring system or the post accident sampling system. The audit was scheduled to be performed in May 1993.
The audit and evaluation supervisor stated that a consultant would develop an audit system to verify completion of section 6.0 requirements, focusing on the areas of records retention and
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compliance with technical requirements. At the exit meeting, the nuclear safety and assessment manager stated that the present method for auditing compliance with technical specification section 6.0 was too resource intensive and that the consultant was hired to develop an efficient program.
The inspector noted that, although audits of section 6.0 requirements had oeen performed, the audit and evaluation section had not developed a comprehensive, well thought out audit plan and schedule. The inspector concluded that over the past two years, the audit and evaluation section provided adequate audits of section 6.0 requirements but had not improved the quality of the audit plans or process.
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The inspector reviewed the following licensee event reports (LERs) to verify that they conform to the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73. Those requirements include a proper narrative de.ccription of the event, the cause of the event, an assessment of the safety consequences, and corrective actions.
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Non-Comoliance With Technical Specification Hieh Radiation Area Controls. LER 92-18 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed LER 92-18, which reported that two workers entered an area
designated as a high radiation area without the proper radiological controls. The actual dose
rates in the area were less than 0.002 PJllisievert [0.2 millirem] per hours. North Atlantic
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identified the root cause to be improper oversight by a health physics technician who allowed I
the workers to access the area and an inadequate radiation work permit. The inspector assessed that the LER contained the information required by 10 CFR 50.73 and that North Atlantic implemented good corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this event. This LER
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is closed.
Non-Comoliance With Technical Specification Surveillance Reauirement. LER 92-21-01 (Closed)
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The inspector reviewed LER 92-21, which reported that operators energized the non-operating charging pump without first closing the pump discharge valve as specified in the
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Technical Specification surveillance procedure. North Atlantic identified the root cause as personnel error. The inspector assessed that the event was of minor safety significance and that the corrective actions taken were thorough. This LER contained the information required by 10 CFR 50.73 and is closed.
Reactor Trio Resulting From a Sourious Overnower Delta Temperature Sienal. LER 92-24 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed LER 92-24, that reported a spurious reactor protection system signal, j
which caused an automatic reactor trip. The inspector previously assessed this event in NRC Inspection Report No. 50443/92-27. The inspector assessed that the LER contained the
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information required by 10 CFR 50.73, and clearly defined the root cause and corrective l
actions. This LER is closed.
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Bolt Failures in Xom._qx Tufline Valves. LER 92-26 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed LER 92-26, that reported valve cover bolt failures in the chemical
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volume control system. North Atlantic performed a failure analysis and implemented thorough corrective actions. North Atlantic identified the root cause of the bolt failures as high material hardness. The inspectors documented and assessed the bolt failures in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-13. The inspectors assessed that the LER was of excellent
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quality and that North Atlantic demonstrated a good safety perspective by voluntarily reporting this issue.
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.7.3 Station Operation Review Committee (SORC)
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The inspector attended a SORC meeting that discussed the required minimum capabilities of
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plant ventilation systems that are needed to suppon equipment operability. The engineering l
and regulatory compliance group managers led the discussions. Based on analysis the
engineering staff developed specific action statements for the unavailability of the various t
ventilation system components. The regulatory compliance group planned to incorporate the.
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action statements into an operations department abnormal procedure. The inspector j
determined that this North Atlantic effort is consistent with NRC Generic Letter 91-18, which j
highlights the need to consider support systems while determining the operability of technical j
specification equipment.
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Approximately 50 personnel attended and participated in the SORC meeting. The atteulaas
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asked numerous questions that focused on the safety aspects of the issues. During the l
meeting, station personnel questioned the operability of a specific ventilation damper that was
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stuck shut awaiting corrective maintenance. Shortly after the meeting, operators entered the technical specification limiting condition for operation until the auxiliary operators opened the damper. The inspector observed excellent interaction between the representatives of the.
variou, disciplines. The inspector concluded that the members at the meeting effectively
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discussed all relevant aspects of the proposed technical clarification.
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8.0 MEETINGS (30702)
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Two resident inspectors were assigned to Seabrook Station throughout the period. The.
inspectors conducted back-shift inspections on April 12 and 21, and deep back-shift inspections on April 11, 17, 18, and May 2.
Throughout the inspection, the inspectors held periodic meetings with' station management to
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discuss inspection findings. At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspectors held an exit l
meeting with the station manager and his staff to discuss the inspection findings and
observations. Licensee comments concerning the findings are documented in sections of this l
report. No proprietary information was covered within the scope of the inspection. No I
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written material regarding the inspection findings was given to the licensee.
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A region based inspector conducted the following exit meeting during this inspection period.
DATE SUBJECT REPORT NO.
INSPECTOR l
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May 6 Emergency Preparedness 93-07 J. Lusher i
Drill
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