ML20044H309
| ML20044H309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1993 |
| From: | Lusher J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044H306 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-93-07, 50-443-93-7, NUDOCS 9306080167 | |
| Download: ML20044H309 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000443/1993007
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Docket / Report:
50-443/93-07
License: NPF-86
Licensee:
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation
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Facility Name:
Seabrook Station
Inspection:
May 4-6,1993
Inspection At:
Seabrook, New Hampshire
Inspectors:
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E Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I
' date
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D. Chawaga, Emergency Response Coordinator, Region I
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N. Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector, Seabrook
B. Olsen, Resident Inspector, Maine Yankee
A. De Agazio, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation / Project
Dimetorate I-4
B. Spitzberg, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region IV
Approved:
b f.
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s'/29/97
E. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section
date
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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Scope
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Announced inspection of the annual, partial-participation emergency preparedness exercise.
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Results
Overall, the on-site response to this exercise scenario was very good. In the Simulator
Control Room, excellent use of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) was evident,
and there was excellent teamwork and group discussion of actions to mitigate the accident.
The most significant area for potential improvement was the communications between the
Site Emergency Director and the Operational Support Center, in order to minimize delays in
team deployment. Also, the on-site Emergency Response Organization did not recognize
radiological conditions involving the Administration Building and other areas due to rain-out
of released radioactive material and contamination via the ventilation intakes.
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9306080167 930528
ADOCK 05000443
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TABLE OF CONTFNI'S
1.
Persons Contacted
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.. .... ...............
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2.
Exercise Timing
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3.
Scenario Planning . ... .
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4.
Exercise Scenario . .
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5.
Activities Observed . . . . .
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6.
Exercise Finding Classifications . . .
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7.
General Findings - .
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7.1
Recognition of the Potential for Contamination
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8.
Simulator Control Room (SCR) Findings
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8.1
Control Room Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2
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9.
Technical Support Center (TSC) Findings . .
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9.1
Technical Support Center Habitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.
Operations Support Center (OSC) Findings
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10.1
OSC Radiation Pmtection Measures . . . . . .
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10.2
Dispatch of OSC Teams . . . .
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11.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Findings
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11.1
Correctness of News Release Information
.............10
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12.
Media center Findings
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13.
Schiller Remote Monitoring Area Findings
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13.1
Contamination Control for Site Evacuees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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14.
Ovemil Response Timing
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15.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items .
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16.
Licensee Critique . . . . .
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17.
Exit Meeting . . . .
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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The following individuals were contacted or were present at the exit meeting.
R. Badger, Facilities Supervisor
M. Campbell, Health Physics Supervisor
W. Diprofio, Station Manager
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B. DuBois, Communications Program Supervisor
B. Drawbridge, Executive director, Nuclear Production
S. Ellis, Site Services Manager
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T. Feigenbaum, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
J. Giarrusso, Jr., Performance Services Manager
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J. Grillo, Opemtions Manager
G. Gram, Executive Director of Suppon Services
T. Grew, Technical Training Manager
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B. Hauley, Operations Training Manager
J. Manin, Director Communications
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P. Morse, Senior Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
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P. Plazeski, Radiological Services Supervisor
R. Sterritt, Health Physics Supervisor
J. Sobotka, NRC Coordinator
P. Stroup, Director, Emergency Preparedness and Site Services
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D. Taillean, Emergency Preparedness Manager
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J. Tefft, Lead Engineer
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R. Thompson, Technical Training Supervisor
R. Thurlow, Health Physicist
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel.
2.
Exercise Timing
A panial-participation emergency exercise was conducted at the Seabrook Station on May 05,
1993 from 0700 to 1200, with an out-of-sequence demonstration of the Schiller remote
monitoring area at 1330.
3.
Scenario Planning
Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on February 23,1993. The scenario
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was submitted to the NRC on March 19,1993. Region I reviewers discussed scenario
improvements with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on March 31,1993. The
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final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing
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Procedures, and also demonstmted an:as previously identified for funher review.
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On May 04,1993, NRC observers attended a licensee brief' g on the revised scenario. The
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licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that
controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent dismpting plant activities.
4.
Exercise Scenario
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The scenario included the following simulated events:
The plant was near the end of core life after prolonged operation at high power.
The Newington off-site power source was out of service for scheduled insulator
replacement maintenance. No estimate of outage duration was provided.
Start-up feedwater pump P-ll3 was tagged out of service for n: placement of the pre-
lube oil pump.
Residual heat removal pump RHR-P-8A was tagged out to investigate high pump
vibration and the low flow mte recorded during recent sun'eillance testing.
Reactor coolant system (RCS) gross activity had been trending up for the past week.
The May 4,1993 primary chemistry repon indicated a gross activity of 7.8 E-01
uCi/gm and a dose equivalent iodine of 2.4 E-01 uci/gm.
Radiation monitor RM-11 No. I computer was out of service for maintenance. RM-
11 No. 2 computer was polling all Radiation Detection Monitoring System (RDMS)
monitors instead of sharing that load with RM-11 No.1.
Steam generator RC-E-llD suffered a tube rupture that resulted in a 350 gpm
primary to secondary leak rate. (An Alen)
High radiation alarms were received on main steam line D and the condenser off-gas
monitors.
High steam generator pressure caused an atmospheric steam dump valve (ASDV) to
open for about five minutes, causing a release.
RM-11 No. 2 computer power failed.
Loss of all off-site power occurred with a steam genemtor tube rupture in existence.
(A Site Area Emergency)
Both emergency diesel-generators started and assumed loads.
Motor-driven emergency feedwater pump P-37B failed due to pump shaft seizure.
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Off-site power from Newington was restored.
The exercise was tenninated.
5.
Activities Observed
The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency
Response Facilities and the actions of the Emergency Response Organization staff. The
following activities were observed:
1.
Selection and use of control room procedures.
2.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
3.
Direction and coordination of emergency response.
4.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
5.
Communications /infonnation Dow, and record keeping.
6.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses
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Protective Action Recommendations (PARS).
8.
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.
9.
Provisions for communicating infonnation to the public.
10.
Accident analysis and mitigation.
I1.
Accountability of personnel.
12.
Post-exercise critique by the licensee.
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6.
Exercise Finding Classifications
Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:
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Exercise Strengt.h; a strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnonnal
plant conditions and implement the emergency plan.
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Exercise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not,
alone, constitute overall response inadequacy.
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Area for Potential Improvement; an aspect which did not significantly detract from the
licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for possible corrective action.
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7.
General Findings
Activation and use of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and Emergency
Response Facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). The following general area for potential
improvement was identified.
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7.1
Recognition of the Potential for Contamination (IFI 50-443/93-07-01)
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The on-site Emergency Response Organization did_not address contamination from airborne
radioactivity being taken into the Administrative Building and other areas due to the rain-out
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of the radioactive release being brought into the plant via ventilation intakes. (Details 8.2,
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9.1, and 10.1 further address this item.)
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8.
Simulator Control Room (SCR) Findings
No exercise weaknesses were observed. The following strengths were identified:
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Excellent use and understanding of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) by the
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Control Room staff.
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Excellent teamwork and group discussions of problems and actions to mitigate the
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accident scenario problems.
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The following areas for potential improvement were noted.
8.1
Control Room Communications (IFI 50-443/93-07-02)
.About 0838, the Control Room Communicator was unable to contact the Metro Media
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primary responder paging system using either of the telephone numbers listed in ER 1.2E,
Revision 21, Change 1. That procedure did not include instructions on how to proceed.in
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such a case. The controller acting as the temporary Site Emergency Director (SED) in the
plant Control Room had to give extensive instruction to the communicator, prompting him to
utilize an alternate notification method. Also, the control room Shift Superintendent did not
announce the turnover of the Station Emergency Director duties from the control room to the
Station Emergency Director in the Technical Support Center.
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8.2
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Control Room habitability consideration was not evident during the drill. There was no
Health Physics coverage in the simulator (i.e. surveys, air samples, etc.) and no discussion
of the need for contamination control. Also, there were no announcements that control
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building ventilation had isolated and that contamination control needed to be established for
entrance into the control room. No contamination control was established until about two
hours later. (See Detail 7.1.)
9.
Technical Support Center (TSC) Findings
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No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.' Overall, the performance of the
Technical Support Center was very good. The Technical Support Center was staffed and
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declared activated 33 minutes after the Alert Declaration. The Site Emergency Director
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requested an accountability check shortly after arriving at the Technical Support Center.
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Prior to activation, the Site Emergency Director veniGed that the staff was ready. During the
exercise, the Site Emergency Director, Emergency Operations Manager (EOM), and
Technical Support Coordinator maintained a good focus on plant conditions and quickly
established a strategy for recovering lost plant equipment or functions. The strategy included
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prioritization of the more imponant elements and was updated as changing plant conditions
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required. For example, restoration of the RHR pump and the start-up feed pump were
identified early as priority actions. Later, a strategy was devised for starting the start-up
feed pump without the pre-lube oil pump. Also, a team was dispatched to prepare to use fire
main water to feed the steam generators.
Interactions among Technical Suppon Center staff were effective, especially among the Site
Emergency Director, Emergency Operations Manager, Technical Suppon Coordinator, and
the Health Physics (HP), Chemistry, Maintenance, and Instrumentation & Control
Coordinators. Interaction with Engineering was less frequent, but that was due to the nature
of the exercise scenario. Frequent updates of the Technical Support Center staff by the Site-
Emergency Director and for the Site Emergency Director by the Technical Support Center
staff provided an effective interchange of information.
The following area for potential improvement was noted.
9.1
Technical Support Center IIahitability
The Technical Support Coordinator, early in the drill, expressed concern about possible site
contamination and the need to control tracking of the contamination, but there was no
concern expressed about control room and TSC habitability or contamination control. About
two hours into the exercise, survey results from an on-site survey team identified
contamination levels within the protected area and on the owner controlled propeny. Step-
off pads were then established at all entrances to the administration and control buildings. It
appeared that such precautions could reasonably have been taken sooner. (See Detail 7.1.)
10.
Operations Support Center (OSC) Findings
No OSC exercise strengths or weaknesses were observed. Overall, OSC performance was
good. SpeciGc examples follow.
The OSC staff rapidly and effectively compensated for the loss of power and its effect
on sample analysis and personnel monitoring capabilities, and maintained full
ftmetionality of the OSC throughout the exercise. Respirator qualification status and
remaining allowable exposure data for OSC personnel was obtained and recorded
prior to loss of computer power, and was manually maintained until power was
restored. Also, the staff effectively used available emergency power and
expeditiously established temporary lighting.
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Team briefings were well perfonned and protective clothing requirements were
commensurate with the radiological hazards likely to be encountered.
The OSC coordinator and the Radiological Controls Coordinator properly managed
the resources available to them.
Technicians displayed good confidence and ability in handling this event. For
example, contamination control measures, once implemented, were logical and
deliberate.
The OSC's Radiological Control Coordinator evaluated radiological conditions and
instmeted that personnel assembled in the guardhouse were to shelter in the basement
of that building.
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The Radiological Controls Group in the OSC provided good briefings to the teams
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prior to dispatching them to their plant locations.
The mdiological control staff expeditiously surveyed the lower tunnel areas within the
mdiation control areas and detennined that those areas were not affected by the
radioactive release and were suitable for the counting of radioactive samples.
The OSC was staffed, set-up and declared fully operational within 24 minutes. The
inspector found no problems with OSC equipment condition.
Control and utilization of personnel within the OSC was generally well perfonned.
The following Areas for PotentialImprovement were identified:
10.1
OSC Radiation Protection Measures
A step-off pad was not placed at the entrance to the administration building until
approximately 80 minutes after the release began. Also, no statement was made regarding
eating, drinking and smoking in the OSC area, and OSC personnel drank cottee and ate
when the radiation control area personnel contamination survey monitors were simulated to
be alanning. In addition, the radiological controls group provided health physics coverage to
escort a guard with accountability logs to the Guard-Island when that was a relatively low
priority job and there were other means of transmitting that data. (See Detail 7.1.)
10.2
Dispatch of OSC Teams (IFI 50-443/93-07-03).
On several occasions, the dispatching of OSC teams was inefficient. An example was the
Site Emergency Director (SED) request that Health Physics send someone to the " Guard
Island" to check on alanning portal monitors. In response, the SED was informed of the
monitors' radiation readings, but no-one was sent to check the monitors and the SED was not
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infonned that no-one had been sent to make the requested check. (Dispatching of OSC teams
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was a licensee critique item. Also, both the SED and Technical Support Coordinator had
expressed concern about the time required to organize and dispatch teams.)
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11.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Findings
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified. The Emergency Opemtions Facility
was activated within 60 minutes of an alert being declared. The Site Emergency Director
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briefed the Response Manager before the Response Manager assumed command of the
overall emergency response. Noise level in the EOF was high, but acceptable, during initial
activation and subsided as the event progressed. Each member of the EOF response team
maintained a nmning log. The inspector observed that the logs were acceptable but of-
inconsistent quality.
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Communications between the Emergency Response Manager and the Site Emergency
Director continued throughout the exercise. Plant status, emergency action level
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classifications, and protective action recommendations were continually discussed.
Announcements about plant status were routinely made to the EOF staff by the Response
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Manager. The inspector observed that, although the announced data was acceptably
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communicated, the EOF staff did not reduce the noise they wem generating to listen to plant
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and emergency status announcements. Response Manager briefings wem held with EOF
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managers and with State representatives every half hour. The inspector assessed these
briefings as infonnative, concise, and appropriate.
The Off-Site Monitoring Team Coordinator and the METPAC (dose assessment program)
Operator were directed by the EOF Coordinator. Off-site dose projections were produced
by the METPAC opemtor within 15 minutes of the activation of the EOF, and were updated
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every 15 minutes when the main plant computer was available. Three off-site monitoring
teams were dispatched by the Off-Site Monitoring Team Coordinator and transmitted initial
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off-site radiation measurement data about 90 minutes after EOF activation. The survey
teams were repositioned to the site boundary and obtained a second set of radiation readings.
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Coordination and use of the Off-Site Monitoring Teams was assessed as good.
Three additional field survey teams and mobile counting equipment were requested from
Yankee Atomic Electric Company by the EOF Coordinator. When the station computer
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failed, dose assessment personnel appropriately used their backup sources to obtain
meteorological infonnation for dose projections. The Technical Assistant supplied the
Emergency Response Manager with current reactor and plant status, accident prognoses, and
evaluations of potential releases and release paths. The emergency response manager
detennined that no protective action recommendations were applicable. NRC inspection
concluded that Emergency Response Manager's characterization of plant releases was
excellent based on the available infonnation.
The EOF staff briefed State of New Hampshire, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and State
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of Maine representatives when they arrived, and informed them of changing conditions.
Interaction between the State representatives and the Response Manager, during briefings and
during discussions of protective actions, was assessed as outstanding.
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Overall, the inspector concluded that EOF performance was good. Dispatching of the field
monitoring teams and the calculations of the site boundary dose were timely. The Response
Manager's brief'mgs and interfaces with State representatives were outstanding. Areas for
potential improvement were:
11.1
Correctness of News Release Information (IFI 50-443/93-07-04)
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Some news releases contained errors. For example, a dose rate of 6 millirem per hour was
used instead of 6 millirem of exposure for a chest X-ray.
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12.
Media Center Hndings
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No exercise strengths, weaknesses, or an:as for potential improvement were identified. The
inspector observed a simulated news briefing and noted that the responses to the simulated
media questions were good.
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13.
Schiller Remote Monitor * g Area Findings
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No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified. Demonstration of the ability to monitor
and decontaminate site evacuees at the Schiller Station remote monitoring area was
considered good. The following area for potentialimprovement was noted:
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13.1
Contamination Control for Site Evacuees (IFI 50-443/93-07-05)
It was not clear that the licensee opted for the best method of transporting site evacuees.
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The evacuees were directed to take their personal vehicles and report to Schiller Station
located outside the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Using other vehicles (that
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were not potentially contaminated) could have reduced the likelihood of transporting
contamination from the owner controlled area.
14.
Overall Response Timing
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Unless not applicable (N. A.), the following table lists the times of significant exercise
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occurrences and actions for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (AI), Site Area Emergency (SAE),
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and General Emergency (GE) classifications,. These include simulated emergency
occurrence, recognition, declaration, State and local (S & L) notifications, NRC notification,
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Emergency Response Organization (ERO) callout, and Emergency Response Facility
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activation and full staffing.
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RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE
MILESTONE
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Occurrence
N.A.
0810
0943
N.A.
Declaration
N.A.
0818
0943
N.A.
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S & L Notifications
N.A.
0828-0831
0945-0952
N.A.
NRC Notification
N.A.
0913-0923
0948-0951
N.A.
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ERO Callout
N.A.
0832-0845
N.A.
N.A.
The above table shows that all notifications were timely.
15.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items
Based upon discussions with the licensee representatives, examination of procedures, and
records, and NRC obsenations during the exercise, the following open item was closed.
(Closed) URI 92-21-02, Job Perfonnance Mission JPM-103, Off-site Dose Projection System
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(ODPS) Emergency Action Level (EAL) Classification: Operator problems in perfonning
ODPS calculations.
This JPM required the operators to gather and input data into the OPDS computer and then
transcribe data to a work-sheet and perfonn simple conversions and calculations to determine
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if protective action recommendations needed to be changed. Several operators had failed to
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perfonn the JPM correctly due to calculation errors.
In October 1992, the examiner met with the licensee personnel and reviewed the proposed
changes to the station procedures, OPDS computer program and training. The examiner's
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assessment was that the proposed actions appeared adequate and appropriate for addressing
the problem. This item was lef t as unresolved pending follow-up inspection of the proposed
action. On May 5,1993, the inspector who observed the exercise in the station simulator
observed the Shift Superintendent perfonn the tasks required of the JPM-103 satisfactorily,
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observed that the compuier program had been restructured to be more user-friendly, and had
no funher questions on perfonnance of this function.
16.
Licensee Critique
Oa May 06,1993 the NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique. The Supervisor of
Drills and Exercises summarized the licensee's observations. The licensee's critique was
assessed as thorough and critical, and it identified all of the NRC inspection concerns. No
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licensee critique inadequacies were identified.
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17.
Exit Meeting
On May 6,1993, the NRC inspection team met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1
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of this report. Team observations were summarized. The licensee was informed of the
following:
Overall, the on-site licensee response to this exercise scenario was very good.
No violations were found.
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The specific areas for potential impmvement identified.
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The licensee indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action on the NRC
items.
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