IR 05000443/1993015

Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Rept 50-443/93-15 on 930726-30 (Ref 10CFR73.21).Major Areas Inspected:Security Program Plans & Audits & Protected & Vital Area Physical Barriers

ML20046D249
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	08/09/1993
From:	Albert R, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20046D245	List: IR 05000443/1993015
References
50-443-93-15, NUDOCS 9308170114
Download: ML20046D249 (6)

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.. sArEGUARDS I!60 MAW DETED1!iiATICU MADE My*

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_ g Itt:r:-Of t ice-ucte U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION I

Report No.: 50-443/93-15

Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 Licensee:

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation

P.O. Box 330 Manchester. New Hampshire Facility Name:

Seabrook Station Inspection At:

Seabrook. New Hampshire Inspection Conducted:

July 26 - 30.1993

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O M G 7$8 8997 Inspector:

iC I Alfie'rt, Physical Security Inspector Date Assisted By:

D. N. Orrik, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

C. Koonce, U.S. Army M. Swceney, U.S. Army

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Approved By:

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8 9.frJ-R. iCkeimig, Chief, Safeguards Section Date Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Areas Inspected: Security Program Plans and' Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Power Supply; and Security Training and Qualification.

Results: The licensee's program was directed toward ensuring public health and safety and was in compliance with the NRC requirements in the areas inspected. Security program upgrades and enhancements continue to be made. No safety concerns or violations of regulatory requirements were identified.

9308170114 930Bf O PDR ADOCK 05000443 G

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PETAIIE 1.0 Key Personnel Contacted 1.1 L*eensee t

W. DiProfio, Station Manager B. Drawbridge, Executive Director - Nuclear Production G. House, Processing Supervisor R. Martel, Engineer, Technical Projects R. Messina, Security Supervisor B. Seymour, Security Manager J. Sobotka, NRC Coordinator E. Sovetsky, Technical Projects Supervisor 1.2 Contractor C. Goodnow, Chief of Security, Green Mountain Security Services 1.3 U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission R. Laura, Resident Inspector The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel and members of the contract security force during this inspection.

2.0 Security Program Plans and Audits 2.1 Security Program Plans The inspector verified that changes to the licensee's Security, Contingency, and Guard Training and Qualification Plans, as implemented, did not decrease the effectiveness of the respective plans, and were submitted in accordance with NRC requirements.

2.2 Audits The inspector reviewed the report of the combined annual audit of the Security and Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) programs (Audit No. 93-A05-03) and verified that the audit had been conducted in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the Plan) and the licensee's FFD program. The audit resulted in no adverse findings and four observations in the FFD area. In' addition, the inspector reviewed the Security Access Authorization Program audit report, No. 93-A03-03. This audit resulted in two findings which did not appear programmatic in nature. The inspector verified that the results of both audits were reported to the appropriate levels of management and satisfactorily resolve __

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There were no deficiencies identified in these areas.

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3.0 hotected and Vital Area Physical Barriers. Detection and Assessment Aids Through its self-assessment program, the licensee determined that one type of the

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station's intrusion detection system (IDS) as applied, in a particular section of the

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perimeter, was generating an excessive number of nuisance alarms. As an effective corrective measure, the licensee took the initiative last year to replace the problem IDS i

with one of a different type that was better suited for that specific area of the perimeter.

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During this inspection, the inspector was assisted by a team consisting of one individual

from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and two individuals contracted by

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the NRC from the U.S. Army. The purpose of this assistance was to evaluate the l

application of the replacement perimeter IDS. In addition, the effectiveness of the

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assessment system and the other types ofIDS being utilized at the station were evaluated.

3.1 Protected Area fPA) Aids THIS PARAGRAPH CONINNS SAFEGUATIS INFORMA1:0N AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC

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DiSCLOSUREITIS INTENTIONALLY t

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The NRC team conducted performance testing of the perimeter IDS t y attempting

to circumvent or penetrate the system in 32 different locations. Testing consisted

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of jumping, running, crawling through or around the system, and probing for sensitivity. Representatives of the licensee observed all testing,

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The IDS performed as designed and was very effective, especially the new IDS type. However, there were two minor discrepancies in two different zones as follows:

GIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS

": FORMATION AND !S NOT FOR PUBUC O!SCLOSURE111SINTENIl0NALLY LEFT BLANK.

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THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS

INFORMATION ANDIS NOT FOR PUBLIC l

DISCLOSUREITISINTENTIONALLY j

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This area is considered an Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI 50443/93-15-01) and

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will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

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3.2 PA Assessment System

_j The team conducted performance testing of the closed circuit television (CCTV)

perimeter assessment system during the day and night. The testing was conducted using the video monitors in the alarm stations to observe team members in the

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isolation zones. They proceeded around the perimeter and ran or dove through '

l the perimeter IDS in an attempt to defeat the visual capabilities of the assessment system.

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THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SATEGUARDS

INFORMATION ANDIS NOT FOR PUBUC

DISCLOSUREITISINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

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l This area is considered an Inspection Follow-up Item (IFI 50443/93-15-02) and --

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will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

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3.3 Vital Area (VM Barriers The inspector conducted a physical inspection of selected VA barricts on July.29,1993, and determined by observation that the barriers were installed and i

maintained as described in the Plan.

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Other than those identified in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, no additional deficiencies were

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identified.

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4.0 Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel and Vehicles i

4.1 Personnel Access Control j

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over _

I personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the-

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following:

i 4.1.1 The inspector verified that the licensee took precautions to ensure that an unauthorized name cannot be added to the access list by having a member -

of management review the list.

4.1.2 The inspector reviewed the security lock and key procedures and -

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determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector also reviewed the PA and VA key inventory logs, and

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interviewed members of the licensee's security staff concerning lock and

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key procedures.

4.1.3 The inspector verified that the licensee has a mechanism for expediting access to vital equipment during emergencies and that the mechanism was

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adequate for its purpose.

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4.2 Vehicle Access Control The inspector determined that the licensee properly controlled access to and

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i within the PA. The inspector verified that vehicles are properly processed prior

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to entering the 1% and that the process was consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspectoi also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined

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they were consistent with commitmentsin the "lan. This determination was made

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by observing veh'.cle processing and search, inspection of vehicle logs, and by i

interviewing security cfficers and licensee's security staff about vehicle processing and search procedures.

No deficiencies were identified in these areas.

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5.0 Alarm Stations and Communications The inspector observed the operations of the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the

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Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined that they were maintained and operated as cammitted to in the Plan. The CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspector and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The insper, tor verified that the CAS and SAS were not required to engage in any activities tha'. would interfere with their assessment and response functions. No deficiencies were noted.

6.0 Power Sunolv

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The inspector verified that there are several systems (batteries, dedicated diesel generator

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within a VA, and plant on-site AC power) that provide backup power to the security systems. The inspector reviewed the test and maintenance records and procedures for these systems and found that they were consistent with the Plan. No deficiencies were identified.

7.0 Security Trainine and Oualification The inspector randomly selected and reviewed the tmining qualification, physical, and firearms qualificadons records for 12 security officers, including supervisory personnel.

The inspector also observed enhanced tactical firearms training at the firing range. The training showed good initiatives toward tactical readiness.

No deficiencies were identified.

8.0 Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives indicated in Section 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on July 30,1993. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented.

The licensce's representatives acknowledged the findings.

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