ML20011E772

Allegation Insp Rept 50-443/90-82 on 900109-0203.Major Areas reviewed:13 Concerns Submitted by Alleger on 900109-15 & Tapes Obtained on 900130 Following Issuance of Subpoena, Including Analysis of Licensee Responses to Alleger Ltrs

ML20011E772
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	02/07/1990
From:	Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20011E771	List: ML20011E770 ML20011E772
References
50-443-90-82, NUDOCS 9002220431
Download: ML20011E772 (77)

See also: IR 05000443/1990082

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L i b r i V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ! REGION I , -INSPECTION REPORT 50-443/90-82 l P

Docket: .50-443

License: NPF-67

p Public Service Company of New Hampshire , Seabrook Station Unit 1 -! Seabrook, New Hampshire i Inspection Dates: 1/9/90 - 2/3/90- INSPECTION DESCRIPTION i s 'This inspection consisted.of review'of 13 concerns submitted by an alleger on.

January 9'and January 15,-1990, and of tapes obtained on January 30, 1990, fol- ., lowing issuance of a subpoena. The concerns were~ based on the alleger's tran- script of- a: sample of tapes made of Seabrook Control Room radio transmissions' -since: January 1,:1989. . Review consisted of analysis-and assessment of the 13 ' submitted concerns and review of a sample of over.1300 me, sages on the sub- . poenaed tapes. The review included analysis.of_the licensee's responses,to the- - alleger's letters, consideration of previous inspection findings, application . of: inspector knowledge of _ the facility, and selected follow-up inspection. INSPECTION FINDINGS 4 Each~ submitted concern was.found-to to'be. unsupported,.not indicative of'a safety: inadequacy, and unsubstantiated.- Review of more than-1300 messages on the-subpoenaed tapes. identified no safety or security concern. It was con- cluded that the allegation is not material to licensing. -Inspection Participants:

Ron-Albert, Physical' Security Inspector, DRSS (Tape Reviewer)

' Richard S. Barkley, Project Engineer, Projects Branch 3 Arthur De11aRatta, Safeguards Auditor, DRSS (Tape Reviewer) .i Noel- F. .Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector at Seabrook Roy'L. Fuhrmeister, Resident Inspector at Seabrook

Brian-Hughes, Operations Engineer, DRS (Tape' Reviewer)

William'K.~Lancaster, Physical Security Inspecto_r, DRSS (Tape Reviewer) William'011veria, Reactor Engineer, DRS (Tape. Reviewer) - David Silk, Senior Operations Engineer, DRS (Tape Reviewer)' ! Ebe C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Projects-Section 3B (Team Manager) J ' Report Approved By: (A, Il M 2/7/70 Se'n R. Joh'6 son, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 (date) j 1. I- .9002220431 900207 R t .PDR ADOCK 05000443 , ' . . .G PNV y , _ . .

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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY- . REPORTLMETAILS- PAGE , 1. Background.'...-....................................................... 1- 2.: -Review Process........................................................ 1 s 3. Summary of Findings on Submitted Concerns............................ 2. , L' 4., Areas.for Improvement.................................-............... 4 5. Individual Concern Reviews............................................ S'

a 5 '.1 Concern 1 . Maintenance Personnel Drinking Before Work. . . . . . . . . 5 5.2 Concern: 2 -. Leaving Light Bulb on Plastic...................... 7 5.3--Concern 3 12/20/89- Accident. Rate............................. 9 5.4. Concern 4 - Water Treatment or Boiler Room Messy on 12/29/89... 11 5.5 Concern 5: - Control Room Operato. Attitude on 12/3/89..........: -12 5.6- Concern 61 - Control Room Operator. Attitude on:1J/29/89......... 13 c?

5.7 : Concern 7 - Control Room Operator Attitude and Valve Problem... ' 14 '

5.8 : Concern:8 . Valve Problem'on 12/1/89........................... ~15- 5.9 7 Concern 9 -. Valve Problems on 12/3/89.......................... 16 .5.10' Concern'10 - Brand New Valve Installed by DCR................... 17 5.11. Concern.11 '- -Fan Leaking 011 in Fuel Storage Building. . . . . . . . . . . ;18 5.12: Concern 12 - Repeated Problems Hearing Maintenance Personnel.... 19 5.13' Concern-13 - Additional Concerns' About Employee-Attitude and

Competence, and Plant Hardware..................................

20 9 6. ' Subpoenaed Tape Review............................................... 21 - ' APPENDICES . . i 11.; 1/9/90 Alleger Letter.to NRC (names deleted) 1 ' 2.; -1/15/90 Alleger Letter to NRC (names deleted) { l3. .1/24/90 New Hampshire; Yankee NYN-90020 Letter to NRC (w/encls 1 and 2 only) l , ' L 4. - -Tape. Review Guidance

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O p t EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This inspection addresses concerns submitted in support of an alleger's be- liefs. Those beliefs were stated to be that the concerns need resolution be- fore a full' power license is granted and that, if the problem areas are not corrected, the plant will have many unplanned shutdowns which could affect - public health and safety. The alleger's initial input was a January 9,1990 letter and transcript of a sample of the tapes made of Seabrook Control Room radio transmissions since January 1,1989. A subsequent, January 15, 1990 < letter included a page of tape excerpts which the alleger identified as cause- for concern about employee attitude and competency, and plant hardware. A~ third input consisted of copies of the alleger's tapes, provided under subpoena on January 30, 1990. < The alleger's initial input was categorized into 12 concerns based upon the alleger's listing of areas of concern. Concern 13 was added to address the January 15, 1990 alleger submittal, , The tapes were of Seabrook radio transmissions between the Control Room and ! in plant personnel. Only the control room transmissions were taped in most cases. (The other half of these two-way radio communicatipns at Seabrook are from lower power walkie-talkies and were seldom received by the alleger.) The alleger's inputs were evaluated-using the criteria of NRC Manual Chapter MC-0517, Management of Allegations, and particularly under the late allegation criteria of MC-0517 Section 059. In no case did this alleger's as-submitted input state why a concern supported- the alleger's belief that there will be an effect on public health and safety. NRC review found that each of the'13 submitted concerns was unsuprorted, not. indicative of a safety inadequacy, not substantiated, and not material to full power licensing. A random sample of the subpoenaed tapes was reviewed by three two person teams

of reviewers, each team reviewing a separate sample of the subpoenaed tapes.

That review was designed to provide a conclusion regarding the content of the remaining tapes based on a sample of about 1000 communications. Actual review of over 1300 taped messages identified no nuclear safety or security inade- quacy. It was concluded that there is high confidence that the remainder of the tapes contain little or no indication of a safety or security problem. l - l l l 1- L

_ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . ._ . .. REPORT DETAILS > 1. Background On January 9, 1990, shortly before the January 18, 1990 NRC staff briefing of the NRC Commissioners on the readiness of Seabrook Unit 1 for full power opera- tion, an individual sent, by facsimile, a letter to the Region I Administrator. Thct Tater stated that the individual had been monitoring and taping _ broad- ' casts ty the control room operators at Seabrook Station since January 1,1989. Included with the letter was a transcript of samples of the tapes. A copy of the~ letter and transcript are attached as Appendix 1 to this report. , The individual's letter stated the following as beliefs. ! That the samples demonstrate that significant safety concerns still need to be resolved before a full power license is granted. [ That, if these problem areas are not corrected, the plant will have many unplanned shutdowns, which could affect public health and safety. Subsequently, the individual sent, by facsimile, a January 15, 1990 letter (Appendix 2). That letter enclosed a page excerpting 6ther taped transmissions , which the individual considered cause for concern about employee attitude and complacency, and plant hardware. . . Twelve concerns were identified in the information in Appendix 1. The Appendix 2 submittal was identified as Concern 13. The group of 13 concerns and'the subpoenaed tapes were identified as Allegation RI-90-A-0003. j The alleger's concerns also were provided to the licensee for evaluation and response. That response is attached as Appendix 3. By subpoena,_ the NRC obtained copies of all' tapes made by the alleger. A sample of these tapes (21 tapes containing over 1300 messages) was . reviewed to assess the likelihood of there being significant safety or security information - on the tapes. (Of the 205 tapes, 202 were provided initially, and the review sample was selected before the remaining tapes were received.) ~1 , 2. Review Process L Allegation RI-90-A-0003 was reviewed pursuant to NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0517, Management of Allegations. Section 059 of MC 0517 addresses allegations re- , l. ceived-late in the licensing process. In such cases, it is first determined l- whether the allegations, if true, are material to licensing in that they would L require license denial, or additional license conditions, or further analysis [ or investigation. l l l , 4 - -

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'l 2 t For material allegations, the staff must then determine whether the information is'new-in that it raises a matter not previously considered or tends to corro- borate prior unresolved allegations. Material and_new late allegations require further evaluation. - -NRC review considered the licensee's submittal (Appendix 3), NRC inspections, other readily available documentation, facility knowledge on the part of NRC personnel, and selected inspection follow-up. Documented inspection effort . encompassed-197 hours. ' Submitted concerns which did not meet the " material and new" criterion were further evaluated for whether resolution could be effected based on readily. available information. A final disposition was made if available information was_ sufficient for doing so. l

3. Summary of Findings on Submitted Concerns

In no case did this alleger's submitted input specify why a concern supported'

! the alleger's belief that the concerns represent conditions which will affect public health and safety. Further NRC review found none of the 13 submitted concerns to be supported or material. Acceptably information to the contrary was identified. Each concern was found unsubstantiated and all 13 concerns , were therefore closed. . Individual concerns and findings are summarized in the > following. Concern 1. A communication that an individual had been delayed down by a_ drinking establishment and would be late for work was submitted as a con- .' ' cern about drinking before work. Review found-that the-establishment is a landmark-that'was used both by the individual and'the police to identify the location of'a verified accident and the road closure which was delay- ing the individual's arrival-for work. The individual had called in to - report the delay from a phone at a nearby gas station and was considered , fit for_ duty by the licensee upon arrival for work. ~ No nuclear _ safety ' inadequacy was found. ' Concern 2. This concern was about leaving a light bulb on plastic. That was developed'from a communication about a drop light coming into contact with and melting plastic sheeting. The drop light and sheeting were tem- a porarily in place to support a plant modification, and a fire watch quickly corrected the problem. Also, a light bulb had " exploded" when water from a pump venting evolution sprayed on it. These events had mini- mal significance. No nuclear safety inadequacy was found. Concern 3. This concern was for the site accident rate. Review identi- ' fied two lost time' injuries in December: a broken shoulder due to slipping on ice in a parking lot and a contusion from a manhole cover that rolled

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. - i 3 1 off the sawhorse it was leaning against. No significant. industrial safety -problem was apparent. The licensee's six-shift staffing and surplus of qualified personnel were assessed as adequate to assure nuclear safety. No nuclear safety inadequacy was found. Concern 4. A messy area in the plant was asked'about by the Control Room. Licensee follow-up found that this communication referred to the water treatment area being identified as messy to the Control Room by an auxili- - ., ary operator. That area was being cleaned; the cleaners were on a break i and some rags and dust were on the floor. The cleanup was completed be- . fore.. shift turnover. NRC review concluded that this communication indi- < cated appropriate plant staff addressal of a minor housekeeping matter. H No nuclear safety inadequacy was found. 1 Concern 5. . Operator attitude was questioned based on a communication about getting. naked and coming out. The licensee concluded that this re- , ,ferred to .a routine removal of clothing because of a low threshold frisker alarm. Radon daughter product deposition on clothing is a common Seabrook problem which poses a. negligible health hazard. NRC review found the lic- .ensee's explanation consistent with a known radon problem and the specific communication indicative of insistence upon adherence to conservative re- quirements. No nuclear safety inadequacy was found. Communications im- provement was referred.to the licensee as a matteF for consideration. Concern 6. Operator attitude was questioned based on a commun,1 cation stating that an individual was being paid'by the hour. The licensee iden-

tified this as a response to a query about continuing to monitor the aux--

.iliary boiler instead of returning to a tagging task. :NRC- review con- cluded that the Control Room had communicated a decision about an opera- tor's assignment, and that the substance of the1 query and response were -appropriate. No nucleaf safety inadequacy was found.

. Concern 7. Operator attitude and a valve problem were an' alleger concern based on a communication stating that a favorite nitrogen alarm had come

in again. The licensee identified this as a communication about a typical low nitrogen pressure alarm due to nitrogen usage, during shutdown, as a result of demands for steam generator wet layup cover blanket nitrogen and primary drain tank draining. Auxiliary operator alignment of another nitrogen bottle was required to clear the alarm. NRC review concluded that this communication: referred an alarm to the individual required to align another nitrogen bottle when this alarm is receiwd. No nuclear safety inadequacy was found. Concern 8. A valve problem was identified as a concern based on a com- munication about increasing flow to get a "recirc" valve to shut. The licensee identified this as an operator communication about adjusting = steam generator wet layup recirculation flow to get the wet layup pump discharge recirculation flow valve to shut, as designed, when a specified flow is established. NRC review concluded that the communication indi- cated appropriate action to establish desired conditions. No nuclear safety inadequacy was found.

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! s g - a .A Concern 9. -Concern that a valve problem existed was based on a communica- , tion about having a bad feeling about certain valves. The licensee iden-

tified this. communication as referring to aligning nitrogen to the steam generators during wet layup. The valves.were identified as isolation , valves which are shut during operation. Because the valve stem =1s sepa- ' rate from the valve disc and bellows, the valve stem can be in the open , position with the disc held in the shut position by backpressure. No i nuclear-safety inadequacy was..found. Concern 10.' A. concern was expressed about a brand new valve being in- I ~

stalled by Design Coordination Report (DCR).

The licensee's follow-up identified a. properly completed venting evolution and identification of design change information in documents provided to the Control Room. NRC review noted that a DCR-is an authorized change mechanism and that the . communication indicated identification of the change in question by the Control Room. -No nuclear safety inadequacy was found. Concern 11. .A concern was expressed based on a communication about a fan leaking oil in the fuel storage building. The licensee found that com-

munication involved a unit heater glycol-leak which made a spot about the

size of a 25-cent coin on the floor. No nuclear safety inadequacy was found. Concern 12. .A' concern about inability to hear maintenance personnel was - based on requests for information to be repeated. The licensee noted that s radio communication is difficult or cannot occur at some locations and that .the radio communication system is a ccnvenience. NRC reviewinoted -that there are four communications systems, including intraplant tele- 'i phone, paging, and' sound powered telephone systems. .No. nuclear safety ^ . inadequacy was.found. , Concern 13. A concern about attitude, competence, and hardware was based upon excerpts referring to items.such.as not being so zealous and review- m ing 200 pages of schematics. NRC review found that these items preceded

low power testing, were quotes without context, and did not provide a suf- ficient basis to suspect a nuclear safety problem. No nuclear safety in- adequacy was indicated, u ' 4 .' Areas For Improvement If no condition material to licensing and no failure to meet NRC requirements were indicated but a potential for improving performance over and above NRC requirements was indicated, that potential was noted for licensee considera- tion. Those' items follow. ._ Training in -housekeeping and equipment venting (Concern 2).

Addressing root causes of personnel injuries (Concern 3). L Training in communication formality (Concerns 5, 6, 7, 13). - - - - - . - - - - - - - -

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5 , 5. Individual Concern Reviews i -5.1: Concern 1 - Maintenance Personnel Drinking Before Work on 11/30/89 5.1.1 Concern 1 Basis Tape transcript by alleger stating that, at 10:15 p.m.,11/30/89, an in- dividual was late and had been delayed down by a named drinking establishment. - 5.1.2 Licensee Input on Concern 1 > _ _ .The individual had called in at 10:06 p.m. and 10:47 p.m. from a public ~ telephone booth at a gas _ station near the named establishment. Telephone credit invoices show that the individual placed the telephone calls from this telephone. The individual had telephoned to report that he would be late for . the 11:00 p.m. shift. A traffic accident and icy road conditions had blocked

all northbound traffic on a divided state highway and the road was officially i -closed by the Massachusetts Department of Transportation at 9:37 p.m. A State t . Police report documents the accident and road closure. The specified estab- clishment is a well _ known -landmark which was a logical way to quickly convey the location of the road closure. When the delayed individual arrived, he reported to his supervisor to in- form him of his presence and to obtain his work assignment. Based on the cause ! for the delay being reported, the responsibility of supervisors und,er.the-fit- s- ness-for-duty program, and the normal conversation that a supervisor has with. a late arrival, there was no question about the individual's competence to per- form-his assigned duties. The late arrival of this auxiliary operator did not i _. impair the shift complement required for operating the plant. Interviews with the individual's supervisor confirmed that the individual was competent to per- - form his assigned duties when he arrived on site.

5.1.3 _NRC Review'of Concern 1 For this concern that an individual was drinking before work to be poten- tially material to licensing, there would have to be reasonable cause for one to suspect that: (1) the individual had been drinking an intoxicating beverage; 3 and '(2):the licensee's response to such a potential was inadequate. ~ The named drinking establishment was identified as a well known place > which serves alcoholic beverages. The alleger's basis for the concern about ' drinking before work was the indicated proximity of the auxiliary operator to ' that establishment. Drinking was not indicated by the tape transcript. The - l licensee verified the proximity and provided a reasonable explanation of appro- ! priate reporting of and supervisory checking on a delay in getting to work. The licensee's normal shift complement meets the requirements of the Technical Specifications-for the plant shutdown conditions in existence without the pre- sence of this_ individual, an auxiliary operator. Further, it is licensee prac- tice;to hold over watchstanders whose reliefs are late, and this communication reflected implementation of that practice. - .

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6 NRC interviews of the-delayed individual and his supervision corroborated the licensee's input.- The licensee's fitness-for-duty program requires super- visors to monitor and assess individual reliability. Chronic tardiness is a , specific related consideration. The delayed. individual is considered by his supervision to be reliable. Lateness in reporting'to work on his part is con- ' sidered rare, and absenteeism has not been a problem, Inspector review of associated police logs corroborated the licensee's input and noted that- the police log of the accident and road closure used the j phrase "in front of the (named drinking establishment)" to mark the position , of the accident.- " This concern is not'a new consideration. Drug and alcohol abuse concerns about Seabrook have been specifically evaluated by the NRC staff in 1989 in response _ to a congressional inquiry. That review found an acceptable fitness for duty program. i 5.1.4- NRC Conclusions Credible information exists to refute this concern. .An auxiliary operator reported to his employer that he would be late for work because of road closure due to an- accident near a drinking establishment. That drinking establishment is a local landmark. No consumption of an' intoxicating beverage was found or indicated. No improper employee lor licensee behavior was shown or is reason- ably inferred. Follow-up on this concern indicates responsible emp,loyee and employer addressal of a late arrival for work. Concern 1 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and' closed. , . 4

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. 5 '. 2 Concern 2 - Leaving Light Bulb'on Plastic on 12/1/89 ! 5.2.1 Concern 2 Basis 1

Alleger'p transcript stating, after a time entry of 12:45 a.m., the fol- 1owing:- , "You said you had a~ light bulb explode" and "(name deleted) we found out what the problem was. There was a drop light- , on some plastic end the plastic was starting to melt. Ah the fire watch < has taken care of it." 5.2.2 Licensee ~ Input on Concern 2 q The Auxiliary Operator noted that a temporary drop light bulb had ex- ploded. That was attributed to inadvertent, momentary spraying of the bulb with liquid while venting the steam generator wet layup pump. The temporary light's purpose-.was to facilitate installing modification DCR-86-420. There- , was no electr.ical_ hazard to personnel because the wire guard:on the light pre- .' c' vented direct contact. Power to the.-light was from a local wall outlet powered from a1115 VAC power panel equipped with a 15 ampere circu_it breaker. Such power is easily removed. This incident did not~ threaten personnel safety and , was resolved using existing programs and practices. Upon investigating a report of an unusual odor near the West Pipe Chase, the on-duty fire fighters found that a construction drop light had come in con- tact with temporary- plastic sheeting and caused the plastic to melt. House- i ikeeping and industrial' safety practices normally prevent plastic sheeting from coming into' contact with temporary lighting. The roving fire watch removed the light from the plastic covering. This temporary lighting and plastic sheeting was'being used to. support- the installation of plant modification DCR 86-420. The plastic . sheeting is self-extinguishing and will not support combustion. At worst, this scenario would:have produced smoke due to heating of the plastic. -This and. surrounding work areas are equipped with fire detection equipment that would eventually have caused control room and local area alarms. Routine rounds by roving fire watches and auxiliary operators provide a backup to in-

- stalled fire detection and suppression equipment. On duty fire fighters would ' have responded to any fire or smoke alarm. There was no impact on public health and safety. 5.2.3 NRC Review of Concern 2 ' For these occurrences to be material to licensing, reasonable cause to , suspect that associated' conditions could significantly impede the ability to safely operate the facility would have to be evident. The alleger did not identify such a linkage. . - - - - - -

_ - - __ . 8 , It is a good practice to direct the effluent from venting evolutions away from electrical equipment. That was not done in this case. The potential teoblem was mitigated by the lighting guard preventing direct contact with cur-

• nt carrying components of the temporary lighting.

It is not, however, clear that the 15 ampere circuit breaker would have prevented an electrical shock to the individual in the worst case. Temporary lighting should be clear of plastic sheeting and other mate- rials. The licensee's normal practice accomplishes this, based on the licen- see's input and general observations by NRC inspectors. Use of self- extinguishing sheeting is a mitigating factor. In this case a fire watch found and corrected the problem, as is indicated in the alleger's transcript and the licensee's input. Other related protective measures inclede auxiliary operator tours and the fire detection and fire fighting provisions included in the plant design and ttaffing. 5.2.4 NRC Conclusions In these instances, protection against a hazard was lessened, but the de- fense-in-depth provisions of the facility design and staffing, including the way associated activities were perfcrmed resulted in there being no personnel injury and no signi'icant equipment damage. Industrial and nuclear safety were thereby adequately safeguarded. Concern 2 is not material; it it unsubstanti- ated and closed. ' ' Whether training should be provided in the housekeeping and equipment . venting considerations which appear to be root causes of these minor occur- rences was noted for licensee consideration. . l 4

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! 5.3 Concern 3 - 12/20/89 Accident Rate (Several Others in Dec. ember) ! l 5.3.1 Concern 3 Basis A11eger's transcript for 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m.,12/20/89, identifying needing the Seabrook ambulance at the Termination Yard and transporting a ' patient by ambulance to the hospital. (Other such events in December 1989 were not found in the as-received transcript.) 5.3.2 Licensee Input on Concern 3 The transcript refers to an event involving a laborer shoveling snow away from a sawhorse. A manhole cover leaning against the sawhorse rolled off and struck that laborer on the leg. First aid was administered and he was taken to the hospital for examination by a physician. Due to his contusion, he remained out of work for the next two days, when he was laid off as scheduled. Also, a security guard experienced shortness of breath on 12/20/89 and was taken to the . hospital by ambulance. On 12/7/89, three persons were taken by ambulance to the hospital, two due to injuries and one due to illness. One of these injuries occurred when the wind blew a temporary shelter into an individual.,, This was not a lost time accident. The other 12/7/89 injury was due to a person slipping on ice while walking in a parking lot. This individual broke his shoulder, lost six days of work, and remains on restricted duty. The licensee considers their lost time accident rate to be good, improv- ing, and better than the general industry and government average. 5.3.3 NRC Review of Concern 3 For this concern to be material to licensing, there would have to be reasonable cause to suspect that the ability of the licensee to operate the plant safely might be adversely impacted by unsafe personnel conditions. The alleger provided no frame of reference for the contention that the accident rate could affect public health and safety. Routine NRC resident inspection regularly checks upon the adequacy of man- ning of the site. The licensee has consistently manned plant operating sta- tions with more than the minimum staff required by the technical specifica- tions. Also, the number of qualified licensed and non-licensed operators ex- ceeds the numbers required to man six operating shifts. Inspection references include the following reports: 89-83, Detail 4.2; and 89-05, Detail 4; 89-09, ' Detail 3.2; 89-12, Detail 10; and 89-15, Detail 5.f. In addition, although the NRC is not responsible for regulating industrial safety, we would notify the Department of Labor (OSHA) if we became aware of a significant concern. No such notification has been necessary.

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o 10 ! The NRC assesses, and requires licensees to promptly report, events which

significantly hamper performance of duties which assure safe nuclear power

plant operation, events requiring offsite transportation of radioactively con-

taminated persons and, if a news release or notification of other government

agencies is involved, events related to personnel safety. We also require ' licensees to report any event that threatened nuclear power plant safety or significantly hampered site personnel performance of duties necessary for safe operation. In this case, no such instances were identified. One injury from slipping on ice does not show an inadequate personnel safety progran. Nor does an injury to a laborer from a rolling manhole cover. , NRC requirements for plant staffing specify multiple operators and licenses, i and thereby provide the ability to take steps to assure continued safe opera- tion in case of injury. The licensee's written response did not specifically address the root causes of.the parking lot injury or the manhole cover accident.

5.3.4 NRC Conclusions

No inability to man required stations was indicated. Based upon the licensee's submittal, the ability to man required stations, and the surplus of qualified licensee personnel, credible contrary information is evident. Con- , cern 3 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed.

Whether personnel safety program improvements could prevent th'e occurrence . of similar accidents is a potential performance improvement item for licensee ' consideration. i 1

p: p L o - o p L I 11 5.4 Concern 4 - Water Treatment or Boiler Room Messy on 12/29/89 5.4.1 Concern 4 Basis A11eger's transcript stating: Is that the water treatment or boilder .. (boiler) room that was so messy? 5.4.2 Licensee Input on Concern 4 Contracted labor was cleaning the water treatment area; the boiler room < had already been cleaned. When the auxiliary operator (AO) arrived, the. labor force was on break and there were some rags and dust on the floor. The A0 re- ported this to the control room. The area was cleaned prior to shift turnover. The conversation was about supervision of in process housekeeping. No safety system challenges or threats to public health and safety were involved. 5.4.3 NRC Review of Concern 4 For this concern to be potentially material to licensing, an unsafe plant condition would have to be shown or reasonable inferred, or licensee housekeep - ing would have to t,e reasonably suspected of being inadequate to assure safety. The alleger did not provide a reason for considering the "jnessy" space to con- stitute a concern for public health and safety. The licensee's input is consistent with the alleger's transcript; both in- dicate active licensee identification of the messy condition. Examples of NRC reviews of Seabrook housekeeping are documented in Inspec- tion Reports 89-83, Detail 4.2.4, and 89-13. Detail 3.2. Minor problems with housekeeping have been found. One of these has been housekeeping adequacy while an activity is in progress. The ability to perform safety functions has -not been found to have been significantly impeded due to housekeeping. House- keeping will continue to be routinely inspected and assessed by the NRC. 5.4.4 NRC Conclusions Based upon NRC findings that housekeeping items which do not significantly affect safety occur, the timely addressal of this specific case indicated in the transcript and the licensee's input, the lack of indication that this con- dition caused a significant problem at Seabrook, and repeated findings of acceptable housekeeping, housekeeping at Seabrook has not been a safety prob- lem. Good licensee performance by timely addressal of a minor. housekeeping condition is indicated in this case. This concern is not material; it is un- p substantiated and closed. , i

w 'o- o ! [ 12 5.5 Concern 5 - Control Room Operator Attitude on 12/3/89 5.5.1 Concern 5 Basis , Alleger's transcript stating, after the 12/6/89 (later corrected by alle- ger to 12/3/89), 6:30 a.m. time entry: Hey, what's the worst that can happen. You have to get naked and come on out. i 5.5.2 Licensee Input on concern 5 Seabrook's whole body frisking booths alarm due to the daughter products i of radon being deposited on clothing. That deposition is related to both radon '; level and clothing type. Extensive investigation has shown that radon levels at Seabrook pose a negligible health hazard. Delays are caused by the addi- tional monitoring needed to determine if the alarm is due to the radon problem or to contamination. Those who experience radon daughter deposition may remain in the radiological, control area until the daughter products decay in about two hours, or they may surrender the clothing involved and wear cloth or paper coveralls to continue working until the daughter products decay. A personnel contamination report must be completed before such persons are released from the radiation checkpoint. In this case, the transcript refers to an individual - who woulci have to surrender his clothing af ter extended work on establishing the inerting cover gas for the steam generators. 5.5.3 NRC Review of Concern 5 For this concern to be material to Seabrook licensability, there would have to be sound reason to suspect that the licensee had inadequately addressed safety. The alleger did not specify a basis for concluding that this communi- cation shows a condition affecting public health and safety. Natural radon (not radiation produced by the nuclear reactor) and sensi- tive detectors produce the current radon situation at Seabrook. The radio- active decay of radon produces radioactive " daughter" products which can adhere to clothing. At Seabrook, no significant health hazard has been identified from this condition, but it does cause delay. In this case, the licensee's response is consistent with the experience of NRC personnel onsite. The alle- ger's transcript is consistent with an acceptable, if not tactful, control room reply to a complaint about such a delay. 5.5.4 NRC Conclusions In this case, no basis was shown for concluding that Control Room communi- cations indicate inadequate addressal of safety. Credible contrary information considered is evident in the licensee's input and the experience of NRC per- sonnel. This communication was an informal insistence upon adherence to re- quirements. Concern 5 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed. Whether additional training in formality of communications is appropriate was identified as a matter for licensee consideration. ! L

r , , 1 i .c . j. i 13 i l 5.6 Concern 6 - Control Room Operator Attitude on 12/29/89 ! 5.6.1 Concern 6 Basis ) Alleger's transcript stating, after the 12/29/89, 1:00 p.m. time entry: No there's every reason. You're being paid by the hour. 5.6.2 Licensee Input on Concern 6 i This communication refers to auxiliary boiler monitoring while testing an auxiliary steam pressure reducing valve and to the preceding control room i statement transcribed as: Ah (name deleted) do you have problems with the l boiler? Is that why you're asking? The Auxiliary Operator had asked about r being assigned to monitor the boiler, was questioned as to whether there were any problems with the boiler, had stated that there were no such problems and

he would like to return to his tagging assignment, and had been told that he was being paid by the hour in response. Licensee evaluation concluded that the , comment was made in jest by a person who meant that all jobs are important and , it shouldn't matter what the assignment is as long as it is oerformed conscien- tiously. This was a normal communication. No threats to the public health and safety were involved.

5.6.3 NRC Review of Concern 6 For this concern to be material, it would have to be reasonable to suspe;ct. that equipment might not-fulfill its safety functions, or that operator addres- . sal of safety was inadequate. The alleger did not specify why this communica- tion represents a condition which could affect public health and safety. The auxiliary boiler system is not needed to assure safe operation. The licensee's input is reasonable. It is proper for an individual to ask 1 about the priority of tasks and for the controlling station to make a decision and communicate it to the questioner. 5.6.4 NRC Conclusions No basis was shown for concluding that this communication reflects inade- quate public health and safety. Credible contrary information is provided by NRC review of the transcript and the licensee's response. There is no indica- tion that any activity affecting safety was inadequately performed. This com- munication shows control room insistence upon performance of a task. Concern 6 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed. Whether performance could be improved by further communications training is a matter for licensee consideration. t

= > s C y

. 14 . i- I 5.7 Concern 7 - Control Room Operator Attitude and Valve Problem on 1/6/90 5.7.1 Concern 7 Basis j A11eger's transcript stating after the 1/6/90, 2:45 a.m. entry: Yeah (name deleted) your favorite nitrogen alarm has just come in again. 5.7.2 Licensee Input on Concern _7 The steam generators were in wet layup with a cover gas of nitrogen. That and the nitrogen demand for draining the primary drain tank typically results in frequent nitrogen system low pressure alarms. An Auxiliary Operator must . then manually align a new nitrogen bottle to the system to clear the alarm. That is the alarm referred to in the transcript and the action that followed. This is an expected condition and does not create a safety problem. 5.7.3 NRC Review of Concern 7 For this concern to be material to licensing, operator attitude toward safety, or inadequacy in equipment ability to perform safety functions, would have to be reasonably suspect. The alleger did not .,pecify why this communica- tion indicated improper operator attitude and equipment in, adequacy which could affect the public health and safety, c The steam' generator nitrogen blanket has safety importance in that it ex- cludes oxygen and thereby inhibits corrosion and increases the assurance of steam generator integrity. In-service inspection separately assures that steam generator integrity is maintained, as do periodic leak rate checks and steam generator radiochemistry checks. Routine alarms, by design, initially identify potential problems so as to i permit. preventing actual ones. In this case, a routine alarm was communicated, informally, to the person who had to take action on it. There is no indication of untimely addressal of this condition. 5.7.4 NRC Conclusions No basis was shown for concluding that public health and safety was affected. A credible contrary conclusion was provided. The communication ade- quately identified a routine alarm. No improper action on th:t alarm was indi- , L cated. . Concern 7 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed. , The value of additional training in communications formality was noted as a matter for licensee consideration. l > L .

, . ! 15 5.8 Concern 8 - Valve Problem on 12/1/89 5.8.1 Concern 8 Basis Alleger's transcript stating, after the 12/1/89, 1:45 a.m. entry: So I'm going to increase flow to see if we can get the recire valve to go closed. 5.8.2 Licensee's Input on Concern 8 This is a communication.between the Control Room and Auxiliary Operator about locally adjusting the steam generator wet layup system. That system is not safety-related and is used to recirculate the liquid contents of the steam generators. Recirculation mixes the steam generator contents for sampling. . The system has a pump discharge recirculation flow control valve that auto- matica11y closes after the pump develops a specified flow rate. There is no safety significance involved in discharge recirculation valve operation. 5.8.3 NRC Review of Concern 8 . For this concern to be material, inadequate assurance of safety would have to be reasonably indicated. The alleger identified no reason why this communi- cation supports a contention of impact on public health and safety. Recirculation of the steam generator contents during wet layup has a safety implication insofar as it maintains a more uniform mixture in the steam generator and thereby better prevents corrosion. In-service inspections of steam generators during refueling outages also assure steam generator adequacy, as do periodic leak rate checks and steam generator radiochemistry checks. Adjustment of flow to get the wet layup recirculation valve to shut does not connote improper personnel or equipment performance. NRC inspection veri- fied that control room operator adjustment of the Emergency Feedwater throt- tling valves is accomplished to change the wet layup flow. 5.8.4 NRC Conclusions No. basis for a safety concern was identified by follow-up of this communi- cation. A credible contrary conclusion was identified by review of the tran- script and the licensee's input. Increasing flow to shut the wet layup re- circulation valve indicates appropriate action to establish desired conditions. Concern 8 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed. - . I l __ 4

r 0. 8 I i 16 ( v , 5.9 Concern 9 - Valve Problems on 12/3/89 l ~ 5.9.1 Concern 9 Basis A11eger's transcript stating, after the 12/6/89 (later corrected by the ,

alleger to 12/3/89), 6:15 a.m. entry: Copy (name deleted). I've got a bad feel- ing about those valves, i l 5.9.2 Licensee Input on Concern 9 ' The comment refers to nitrogen gas valve alignment and t.he nitrogen header pressure needed for a nitrogen gas blanket on the steam generators. Alignment i is only performed in Mode 5 and has no impact on plant safety. The bad feeling comment refers to the characteristics of the nitrogen isolation valves on the , steam generator main steam lines. These are bellows diaphragm valves and the valve disc and bellows are not directly connected to the valve stem. Back f pressure could shut these _ valves with the stem in the open pc sition. Nitrogen pressure must overcome the bellows and disc and main steam pressure in order to t initiate nitrogen flow to the steam generators. During normal plant operation, ' the valves are shut and nitrogen is isolated from the steam generators. Im- proving the operatic,nal characteristics of these valves is being evaluated. Station Operating Procedure 051027.02 identifies the syste,m alignment require- ments and describes increasing the nitrogen supply pressure to overcome a water

L loop seal which exists during extended Mode 5 operation. The evolution in-

volved has no impact on plant safety. 5.9.3 NRC Review of Concern 9 For this concern to be potentially material, there would have to be reason to suspect an inadequacy in the valves involved, and that the possible inade- . quacy could have a significant adverse impact on safe operatior. The alleger did not state why this concern supports a belief that there will be an impact ' on public health and safety. - Valves which may be in a position different than is indicated by the valve stem are likely to be viewed with distrust. In this case, the possible erro- neous indication has been identified by the licensee as applicable only to plant shutdown conditions. The safety implications involved during shutdown are the same as those already discussed under Concern 7. NRC inspection con- firmed the licensee's response and concluded that the valves adequately perform their stop-check function of preventing nitrogen system contamination. 5.9.4 NRC Conclusions No basis has been shown for the alleger's contention that this condition represents a possible impact on public health and safety. A credible contrary , conclusion was provided by reasonable licensee input. NRC review found a lack of operational safety significance. Concern 9 is not material; it is unsub- stantiated and closed. I .

C _. , o C [ , I 17 l 5.10 Concern 10 - Brand New Valve Installed by DCR I ' i 5.10.1 Concern 10 Basis A11eger's transcript statement, after 12/28/89, 9:30 p.m. time entry, that: It looks like it's a brand new valve installed by DCR. (Other transcript ' entries near this time show a successful attempt to establish flow.) > -5.10.2 Licensee Input on Concern 10

' The licensee treated _this as an allegation that valves were sticking, and concluded that the operators adeqtlately performed the venting evolution in- t volved. Licensee input also stated that the control room retains copies of all approved design modifications, that modifications are incorporated into re- qualification training upon completion of field work and that, through these and other mechanisms, operations personnel have ready access to current infor- mation on. design modifications. 5.10.3 NRC Review of-Concern 10 NRC review focused on the alleger's stated concern about there being a brand new valve installed by DCR. A DCR is a Design Coordination Report, which is en authorized means of making plant changes. The alleger's input does not provide a frame of reference for the concern about installing brand new valves, and the alleger's transcript does not indicate that the valves are inadequate, , in any way. Control Room statements such as "It looks like its a brand new . valve installed by DCR" indicate consideration of the modification data avail- able to the Control Room. Installing brand new valves as called for during performance of a DCR is proper. In this specific case, the transcript indicates that the operators identified the valves appropriately and established the desired flow. 5.10.4 BCConclusions No basis has been shown for the alleger's contention that this condition represents a possible impact on public health and safety. A credible contrary conclusion was provided based on NRC review, which found a lack of operational safety significance. Concern 9 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed.

{ . t ..*

j - I 18 , ! ! , 5.11 Concern 11 - Fan Leaking 011 in Fuel Storage Building on 12/29/89 5.11.1 Concern 11 Basis A11eger's transcript stating, af ter the 12/29/89, 2:30 a.m. time entry, the following:

1 We just got a report from the roving fire watch. 21 Elevation in the fuel l storage building just when you go inside the door. Apparently there's a fan there that's leaking some oil. Would you get me some information on that please? 5.11.2 Licensee Input on Concern 11 A roving fire watch noticed what he thought was an oil leak in the Fuel Storage Building and reported it to the Control Room. An Auxiliary Operator (AO) was dispatched. The A0 reported a very small glycol leak coming from a union connection to a unit heater. That leak made a spot of about the size of a 25-cent coin on the floor. Work Request 90W000004 was initiated to correct the leak. -This is not a safety system. There was no personnel or equipment hazard. Glycol is not a fire hazard. This was a priority 3 work request scheduled for completion on January 25, 1990. ,, 5.11.3 NRC Review of Concern 11 'For this communication to be material, there would have to sound reason to suspect that the leak presented a significant hazard or that licensee action to correct spillage problems is inadequate to assure safety. The alleger did not state why this matter might affect public health and safety. The transcript and the licensee response indicate appropriate identification of and response to a concern identified by a fire watch. 5.11.4 NRC Conclusions Review of the alleger's transcript and the licensee's respons'e found no basis for suspecting a safety inadequacy. Credible contrary information re- futes this concern. The identified leak is a minor housekeeping item. As noted in the review of Concern 4, housekeeping at Seabrook has been found ade- quatetopreventasignificantsafetyhazardfromdeveloping. This communica- tion and the licensee s response identify appropriate addressal of a small problem. Concern 11 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed. )

a . = 19 ' 5.12 concern 12 - Repeated Problems Hearina Maintenance Personnel (e.g. , on 1/6/90) 5.12.1 Concern 12 Basis The alleger's transcript for 1/6/90 includes several requests for informa- tion to be repeated. 5.12.2 Licensee Input on Concern 12 This radio communications system is a convenience for operators who fre- quently traverse the plant. From some locations, such communications are dif- ficult or cannot occur. A series of corrective measures is planned to be com- pleted in 1991. Reliable communications are assured by the FSAR Section 9.5.2 described Seabrook communications system, 5.12.3 NRC Review of Concern 12 For this concern to be material, inability to communicate would have to be reasonably suspect. If the radio system were to fail, the alternate communica- tions means available to the licensee include the plant paging system, the internal telephone system (with various stations throughout the plant), and a sound powered phone system (reauires carrying phones - jacks are" installed throughout the plant). There is sufficient redundancy and diversity in the four systems, and'the four part plant communications system is described in . , Facility Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.2. , . 5.12.4 NRC Conclusions Credible contrary information refutes this concern. Adequate intraplant communication can be accomplished without radio communications. Concern 12 is not material; it is unsubstantiated and closed. , i

I ~ c

n.

20 5.13 Concern 13 - Additional Concerns About Employee Attitude and Competence, and Plant Hardware 5.13.1 Concern 13 Basis A11eger's documentation of site transmissions as follows. For 5/4/89 at 12:45 a.m.: (name deleted) -- Let's not be so zealous in the future. For 5/4/89 at 9:51 p.m.: I enjoyed reviewing those 200 pages of sche- matics. But I know a lot more now. 5.13.2 Licensee Review of Concern 13 The licensee found the alleger provided statements about equipment to re- fer to normal operation or routine testing, and did not find a basis for a safety concern about employee attitude. 5.13.3 NRC Review of Concern 13 There were entries other than those documented in Detail 5.13.1 above on the alleger's submittal, but review of those entries indicated n6 potential . safety significance. The alleger did not specify why these comments support a - contention of impact on public health and safety. . , , The two above noted items could be material if either zeci or review of schematics were reasonably suspect of producing safety inadequacies. A com- munication about not being so zealous could infer dissatisfaction with the way something was done, but it does not show that anything was done wrong. As pro- 4 vided, it is a quote without context. Also, a possible interpretation of a comment about not being zealous is that it refers to not fulfilling require- ments. However,' this communication preceded a major licensee program for assuring strict adherence to requirements. That program has produced accept- able results. The communication about reviewing schematics indicates a gain in knowledge and does'not connote any safety inadequacy. The appropriateness of these and some other transmissions is questionable from the viewpoint of appropriate formality. No inadequate addressal of safety considerations has thereby been identified. 5.13.4 NRC Conclusions t 'No basis for a safety concern was identified. Credible contrary information , was provided by NRC review. No safety inadequacy was shown. Concern 13 is not material; it is unsubstaatiated and closed. - Training in appropriate formality of communications was identified as a matter for licensee consideration. . L _ _ , , _ _ _ . , _ . . _ .

P L %

21 6. Subpoenaed Tape Review The NRC reviewed a randomly selected sample of 21 of the 202 tapes (con- taining over 1300 messages) provided by the alleger on January 30, 1990 (3 additional tapes were subsequently received on February 5, 1990). That review, by Region I security and reactor safety inspectors, identified no adverse im- pact on public health and safety or plant' security. and acceptable operator attitude. The reviewers found the control room communications to be generally good. To assure a statistically valid sample, it was concluded that about 1000 -individual messages would be reviewed, and that a sample-of 21 tapes would pro- vide a sufficient data base. This statistical sample was based upon the con- sideration that a 2% problem rate in 1000 messages would provide 95% confidence that the problem rate in all the tapes is between 1% and 3% (if the tapes pro- ' vided by the alleger on January 30, 1990 were also representative of the tapes which were not provided'then). . Selection of which ninety-minute tapes to re- view was made based on a table of random digits, and the 21 tapes were split up among three two person reviewing teams. The NRC tape reviewers were provided guidance on tape review (Append;x 4) and identified a total of seven messages as potentially significant. These are evaluated in the following: ~ 2/23/89, 2:45 p.m.: . . .index says you should have a key.. .I'1.1 run one " down to you..." This communication reflects provision of a key to someone who should have one. It thereby indicates control over key distribution. The transmission doe; not identify the key usage, and there are multiple possibilities. Locked equipment control is routinely reviewed during inspection tours, and there are no outstanding concerns on this matter. This item is not material to licensing. Further specific review is not needed because'of routine inspection coverage. 5/22/89, 9:00 a.m.: ... offloading chlorine... trouble alarm...' (What are " they doing with chlorine)." The question about chlorine use by the tape reviewer indicates a concern for the personnel hazard from chlorine. At Seabrook, the service water and circulating water system receive chlorine '. treatment (sodium hypochlorite) for anti-fouling purposes. Sodium hypo- chlorite is the active ingredient in household bleach; its use does not present the potential hazard that use of liquid chlorine does. There is a separate building in the protected area for the sodium hypochlorite treat- ment. This communication does not indicate a condition material to lic- ensing; further follow-up is not needed. 12/4/89, 2:15 a.m.: ...it is a known problem. Everybody knows about it. " - Nobody wrote a work request..." NRC interview of the shift superintendent and the. unit shift supervisor for the shift in question identified no re- collection of this transmission. Routine incorporation of items into the maintenance work request system by this shift has been noted by the senior resident inspector, with a specific example noted as being in progress when the interview was begun on February 2, 1990, while the crew was on I i

1 9

22 ' shif t. Further, senior resident inspector onsite inspection experience has repeatedly noted careful licensee attention to incorporation of prob- lems in the maintenance work request system. There are five work request priorities, with Category- 1 the most significant (see Inspection Report 50-443/89-83, Detail 5). Another example of a specific case is the assign- ment of a Category 3 priority to the maintenance work request to correct the 25-cent coin size glycol leak from a heater as described in the review of Concern 11 in this report. These factors enable classification of this transmission, which reflects widespread knowledge of a problem, as being unlikely to reflect the failure to incorporate a significant matter into the work request system. Therefore, this item was assessed as not mate- rial to licensing and not a new issue. Credible information that signi- ficant problems are incorporated into the work request system is readily available. Further review of this item is not necessary; routine inspec- tion coverage adequately addresses the underlying concern. 12/10/89, 6:45 a.m.: ...let something from last shift...with regards to " the Bravo air compressor." The air compressors are not safety-related, and safety functions are assured by backup nitrogen supplies. Maintenance has been ongoing on the air compressors. No inability to assure perform- ance of safety functions is indicated by this transmission or plant con- ditions. This communication is not material to licensing; further review is not needed. 12/28/89, 2:15 p.m.: . . . in contair. ment. . .near Alpha RCP. . . ankle high." , " . This appears to be a communication identifying the location of a com- . ponent. ,There were no flooding incidents in containment during December '1989'and;there are some low valves in the area identified (Reactor Coolant Pump'"A"). This item is not material to licensing. Further review is not needed. 1/7/90, 9:00 a.m." "Can not close a breaker on a MCC (Breaker 622)." This communication, if stated by the control room, reflects a_ control over breaker positioning. If it was one of the seldom received transmissions from the plant, it reflects a potential breaker problem. It does not re- flect an inadequacy in addressing such a problem, however, and NRC experi- ence has been that such problems are properly resolved. NRC inspection on February 2, 1990 found Breaker 622 racked in to the bus, open, and with - control power available. The breaker supplies a Motor Control Center (MCC) that supplies motor-operated valves which are positioned in their accident position, and tagged in that position with power removed. Opera- tion of one of those valves for maintenance requires closure of Breaker 622, which supplies the MCC, and closure of the breaker for the valve in- volved. This transmission was assessed as not material to licensing, and not requiring further follow-up. 1/7/90, 12:00 noon: " Leak on 'A' DG air compressor." This communication indicates identification of a problem. It does not indicate inadequate problem handling. Subsequently, on January 14-15, 1990, this diesel gene- rator successfully passed periodic surveillance consisting of a fast start and a 24-hour' load test. Diesel adequacy was thereby demonstrated. NRC

_ c. . 23 inspection of the "A" diesel generator on February 2,1990 identified no air compressor leak. Discussion with the licensee's system engineer iden- tified no awareness of a leak, and knowledge of potential misinterpreta- tion of normal actuation of the compressor-unloading valve to drain inter- cooler /aftercooler moisture as a leak. This item is not material to lic- ensing; further review is not needed. Based on review of this sample of tapes with no substantive safety or security findings, no additional tapes were reviewed. Statistically, the review results were assessed as providing a 99% confidence level that there is a 0.0% to 0.4% population of inadequacies on the remaining tapes. It was concluded that there is little or no likelihood that any safety or security inadequacies are identi- fied on the rest of the tapes. Pending transcription of the other tapes, lic- ensee analysis of the transcription, and NRC review of the licensee's analysis, this matter is being lef t open for tracking (UNR 90-82-01). ,. % l <

m- [~ % .>. ' APPINDIX 1 F

I i

, ! Fax to: 1-215-337-5241 (Copy also sent via Federal Express) . Page 1 of 17 January 9,1990 . William Russell

I

Regional Administrator

' U.S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION

475 Allendale Road King of Prussia PA 19406. < ! Dear Mr. Russell: l L Since January 1,1989 I have been monitoring and taping broadcasts ' by the control room operators at Seabrook Station. I understand that the {'

NRC staff will be meeting with NH Yankee personnel this Friday (12th) in.

Scabrook to review open items prior to a recommendation to the full commission regarding full power licensing for Scabrook Station,

I have recently only had time and resources to review a few of the o tapes I have made, but 1 believe these few samples demonstrate that. ' significant safety concerns still need to be resolved before a full power , >> license is granted. You will remember that the plant was shut down during - its low power test, if these problem areas are not corrected, I believe that

'

the plant will have many un-planned shutdowns, which could affect public ' ' safety. [ The areas for concern involve both plant personnel and hardware. The ' next page outlines specific concerns about Maintenance personnel r competence and Control Room Operator attitude; as well as problems with a < I variety of valves, Icaks. and the control room to maintenance personnel communications system (the one I have monitored). The pages that. follow . provide my own transcript, made today, of these examples. <> I would be willing to provide you with copics of any of these tapes so that you might make your own transcripts. As I noted, I have listened to just a few sections of tape in order raisc Ole many areas of concern noted below. I belicyc the other tapes might disclose other problem areas. I look forward to hearing from you regarding this information. !

pW [ , , , . 'e $ = 4 .; f.'. ( --

, I !. i. I'

.,

, SEABROOK CONTROL ROOM TRANSMISSIONS ' g , AREAS OF CONCERN t ,

Personnel: Maintenance Personnel Competence

Drinking prior to work -- 11/30/89 Ienving light bulb on plastic -- 12/1/89 Accident rate -- 12/20/89 (Several others in December)

Water treatment or boiler room that was messy -- 12/29/89 Control Room Operator Attitude '!

• Hey, what's the worst that can happen, You have to get

, naked and come on out" -- 12/6/89 -

'You're being paid by the hour" -- 12/29/89 - "Your favorite Nitrogen alarm has just come in again" -- 1/6/90L l Hardware: Valve Problems "See if we can get the recirc valve to go closed" -- 12/1/89 "l*ve got a bad feeling about these valves" --.12/6/89 " Brand new valve installed by DCR" -- 12/28/89 " Favorite nitrogen alarm has just come in" -- 1/6/90 ., Leaks l ' Fan leaking oil in fuel storage building -- 12/29/89 ~ ! Communications Repeated problems hearing maintenance personnel

See 1/6/90 for one example , ' . . ' - . .

- , .. !

1. [

(-.,

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, I ..ia Seabrook ControlRoom ,s - Maintenance Personnel Competence , November 30,1989 (Thursday) - ! 10PM Go ahead a i 326 and 328 Unlocked and shut both valves ! M control i W. How come we unlocked and closed those two RC valves please? , ! Restoring a partial. What's the tag order number please? 1976 copy j M control room f . ! Yeah gghie me a call if you get a minute would you please j g control room j 10:15PM El believe is your relief tonight. You know he might be more j than' a little late

"Ijust looked on their shift rotation and it shows that Eis the ah late

man tonight, We'11 ge a s are out to you as soon as we can. He's ah been delayed down by the " . % control g . I ! 1 . e

. ; L l. , h

,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. , . . _ .- - - . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . .._. _._.._. _ _ 1 4 ..

Seabrook Control Room - Maintenance Personnel Competence ' = Fire Hazards Recirc Valve Problems Nitrogen Valve Problems ) i December 1,1989 (Friday) 12:45 AM -i r r . Go ahead % 1 UnderstandM j -, - Control Room. Go aheadg j Go for it. , , , Go aheadM . Ilike the sound of thatM l was looking for you but I pretty much took care of it. Control room. Go ahead M

" You said you had a light bulb explode? " 1 , . Understand. I'll see if I can get him to come out there. You're at the rectre , and wet layup pump? > OKg j Go ahea'd M l Understand M We have. Everything looks good from up here Control room. Go ahead M ! . OK have at it ,

" Control Room Hi 1 just got a call fromM He was wondering if you could ! possib y meet him down in the Admin Building cafeteria? ' l~ ! { - - . .:.. -- . . - . .. . . . . - . - . . - -

- -- . - - - . - - - - . - . . - - _ , - - - - . . , -;

.- 4 ! l Seabrook Control Room 12/1/89 Page 2

1 OK thanks @ l Co'ntrol room. Go ahead g ! licy could you go to a phone and give me a call please i Bring something along to write on and with when you go to the phone also ' Control room go aheadM ! Understand excellent. After you crack it open let it go like that for a couple of minutes.

@ Control Room 6 Control Room

• Mwe found out what the problem was. There was a drop light on some

' plastic and the plastic was starting to melt. Ah the fire watch has taken care of it."

Control Room go head W Understand I'm go.ag to be very slowly initiating Dow to the A generator MControl Yeah his is ah I've got to go down the ah vaults so I'll check them out or you and a 1 check the running RllR pump and stuff to see if crerything is OK so you don't have to go down there this set 6 Control Room M . Where you atWl'm sorry I didn't hear you , Nevermind M Control Room is going to check that valve in the EFW pump house e g vc you a yell if there was any problems WControl Room Myou doing anything with the Demin water system? . - . - . - . - - - - . . ._- . _ _ _ _

, . . . . -- - - - - . - . .. . ._. _. . . =.. j ! ! v1 .. . j Seabrook Control Room 12/1/89 Page 3 OK the standby pump may havejust started. We got a low system pressure. alann h1 momentarily j OKgl'm up to 55 GPM flow

.. OKSI'll let you know when I get to 100. q Let me know when the rectre valve goes closed ! 1:45AM ! , MControl Room L ) 4 !^ How's it looking down thercM I show 105 up herc ! - Understand ! - i "So I'm going to increase flow to see if we can get the recirc valve to go i ' closed" Control Room. Go aheadM .; What were you trying to say about the limit switchE as far as the valve l ' knowing whether or not it should open? ' Understand,$doesn't think that matters. The follower connected for the positioner? - i Nevermind E that's not that type of valve that would have a follower

OKMI'm continuing to go up on flow. I'm at 130 l 4 ~ @ Control Room. What do you show for suction pressure? And the rectre valve is still open? 4 OK@l'm at 155 GPM right now. I'm going back down to 100 ' . ~ Understand, Let's go ahead and get Nitrogen on the Generators. You can. i isolate the two Nitrogen valves to the RCDT and the PRT please .Yes we arc. Thank you very much for your persitence$ 2AM' l OK great ., ' = -- - - - - . . . . . . - - . - . - - - -- .. . - - - -

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p Seabrook Contro1 Room 12/1/89 Page 4 Duty Chemist control room i ! M contEol room - M says fuel storage building temperature 72 Understand i I > Go ahead @

. Understand so'all four valves are open on the generators? ' (SEE DECEMBER 6TH - G:15 AM) .Thank you very much -

Mcontrol room , Yeah where are you at?. On your way back in head over towards the Nitrogen regulator station and u give us a call when you get there j l

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Nitrogen Valve Problems Contro'l Room Operator Attitude ! December 6,1989 (Stmday)

> 6:15 AM , i No, were trying to blow the loop seal to the generator . B is isolated. Copy j " Copy MI've got a bad feeling about these valves":

Copy S did you copy that? j YeahgWhy don't you open up 42 and leave all four of them open - Yeah you're rightM ., ,

! Sopen 42 and we'll see what we've got there and then we'll open the Alpha one Copy - Yeah. Bravo Charlie and Delta Right. We're going to try that X. i ' ActuallyEl don't think it'll matter. Do you have it boosted'up out there to s 35 or 40 pounds? Going too fast OK l've got you ' Ego ahead and shut 39 please - , t , ' OKE.Why don't you go ahead and boost it up. NGB 39 is closed j ~ and when you get it up to 45 let us know and thenStry to do your thing.

5 ' Copy @ You seeing a change in pressure? ' You said you got it 4 . . 6:30 AM i MI want to open up ah 39 now so we've got all four of them open.M will pressurize all four of them up until ah we get each of them to three or

four pounds and then we'll put it back on the regulator , Four open right nowW Copy. 39 to 42. , , - 4 - . - - ~_ -. _.~.. ,. , + -e

f .c . 1, Seabrook Control Roorst 12/6/89 Page 2 Gl am definctly seeing a rise in A. B and C. D started out negative so it's a little h'ard to tell but I think that it's come up OK as soon as I get a couple of pounds on the lowest one wc*ll put it on the regulator And W the answer to your question is D is definedy coming up now I'm at 0.1 M l'm looking at a half a pound positive now on die Delta generator if you want to slowly go closed on those bypasses and see if the regulator will take it the rest of the way I think you're in good shape "Let me know when they're closed and I'll watch it more closely" 6 air dryer A trouble ' M The logs are more priority M the dryer trouble has reset 'On the regulator, copyM Yes we are M OK A is dropping down toward the odlers and it looks like it's going to be fine No thank you4 Goodjob " Hey, what's the worst that can happen. You have to get naked and come on out. " 6:45AM L You're clear for a round trip l Go aheadM Ah not really. Hold on a minute and let me askW ! gneeds a Chalkman h L ' Whatever looks good l 7AM P _ )

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Seabrook Control Room P Maintenance Personnel RecentIngh Accident Rate? ] l . December 20,1989 (Wednesday) ! 1:30 PM ! Go ahead g Rack in and close 01c battery breaker for Bus 11 Bravo - ,

Control Bravo Thank youg g control room f 6 control room . Radio check i ! Sounds good 6 thank you

X with parking lot Delta l t -(High pitched tone) - 6 should be on her way j ! Understand You are going to need the Seabrook ambulance at the ! Termination Yard -! ~l This is in the Control Room. You are going to need die ambulknee to ! i go off s e _

' right, is the victim conscious and breathing? , OKMl'm calling Seabrook ambulance right now to meet you at the l Termination Yard i 1:45 PM .; g control ! The Seabrook ambulance has been requested. Security has been informed

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p i L 4 . L Seabrook Control Room 12/20/89 Page 2

i control room. When possible could I please have somebody call me w 1 le name of Ole injured person please? Seabrook ambulance on the scene. Copy l l ggo ahead this isg No but I didn't copy his name please. 6 copy { i Find out if you can from him whedier he wants anybody notifled such as- ! friend or family j i Negative copy

Go aheadM

The amb'ulance has the patient and they are transporting to Exeter Hospital copy Go ahead @ Yes I do but thanks for the call. I'm going to lower my flow. I'll see you when

you get up hereg

r Yes- ]

Please do so ! i Titank you g 2PM _; 1 .i !

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1 i 9. v- y ) Seabrook Control Room New Valves Sticking? , . December 28,1989 (Thursday) j 9:30 PM

i Allright. 'ihat's supposedly a locked open valve. Is that true? l . Allright. It looks like its a brand new valve installed by DCR. l There's a vent downstream of 471 labeled 472. Is that closed? . t Go headW l c Copy. Go head and open valve 471 { -f Control. I'm going to go ahead an reopen the vent and we > >u ow a this time l ! 9:45 PM ! , , f control . ., We definetly look like we're moving water now so ah we're happy. Thanks

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Fire Hazards .

t December 29,1989 (Friday) -' ! . 2:30 AM ' , control room We just got a report from the roving fire watch, 21 Elevation in the fuel storage building just when you go inside the door.- Apparently there's a fan

,:. there that's leaking some oil. Would you get me some information on that .) please? g control . @would you give " a phone call please? l , 2:45 AM i . L ~[ .. - I . 1 1: , . 'i l :. i ' s , t - , i ' . . . .

, -- - - g;, , , ] . , . . . . .; n. g ., t 'e Seabrook Control Room ,i n .. ! 1 - Control Room Operator Attitude ' W - r. . 1 ' ~ December 29,1989 (Friday) l . , t ) IPM , . - 1 - He's'still playing with it ' . Ah@ do you have problems with the boiler? Is that why you're asking? - .l . N6 there's every .rcason. You're being paid by the hour q Control room..Go ahead @ OK.- Thank you much ., t - 1:15 PM (

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h Lack of Cleanliness I b .i - ~ December 29,1989 (Friday) j

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. g ,+ 1 f ' 6 3:15 PM' % control- .ls that the' water treatment or the boilder room that was so messy?. .! r . Understand. Thank you

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.. , t , > Seabrook Control Room - Control Room Operator Attitude - i , - De'cember 29.- 1989 (Friday) ' 1PM - He's still playing with it Ah@do you' have problems with the boiler? Is that why you're asking?'- No there's every reason. You're being paid by the hour Cbntrol~ room. Go ahead @OK. Thank you much ' ' 1:15 PM - 'i i i i . -! . _:_ _ _ - - - -__ -_ _ - - _ _-_ ___-___-____-- _ _ _ _ _ - - _

. - . 3 . . , -. . '- . ' .. , ' , - Seabrook Contsal Room Communications Problems Control Room' Operator Attitude Nitrogen Problem ' ' January 6,1990 .12:45 -AM on - You got it. Thanks l'AM One more timeM I didn't get that .76- @ control room ' , @ control room 41:15 AM 1:30 AM Go aheadW P! case repeat < That's 6 0? ' s- 6-87. 1 Copy finally l -1 6 control room - ! l Yeah @could you please give me a phone call?

i 1:45 AM ! 2AM l

Control room Mcontrol room ! , ,

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^; ..: r . Seabrook Control Room 1/6/90 Page 2 - M_could you 'give 'me a phone call please? .0 ,; , , 2:15' AM . 6-control' room go ahe'ad. And security.wants me to call them back-- for you to come back in - Go ahead ! Go ahea6 (Swings) will do that for us ~ 2:30 AM 2:45 AM: 6 - MControl room MControl room "Yeahg your favorite nitrogen alarm has just come in again" - Thank you- 3 AM - Go ahead W

Yes$ the alarm has reset

3:15 AM. o Full open Nitrogen is reset . Yeah I'm going to do the B feedwater isolation valve Copy -X and Nitrogen Full open@ut I still got my Nitrogen in - I'll do the A one again -Copy-- 3:30 AM . E

. - . - - - - - - . . - - .; -.- .- .- - - -. -. . o 4 g c.1 - APPENDIX -2 L f

, 5 FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET j , / ' TO:- William Russell, Regional Administrator, US NRC -- FAX: 1-215-337 5241 [

, This is the only page [-] or Number of Pages to follow [ / ] L DATE:: January 15,1990 J SUBJECT: Seabrook Control Room Transmissions. 7 L MESSAGE: ^t's ' / s / . 's l- L 1) I have enclosed another page made from some notes I found in i . . my flies, indicating other conversations which I think are cause for i c_oncern, regarding employee attitude and competency, and plant . j

s'( hardware. To especially May 4,1989 at 00:25 "M let's not be sof . . ..a

, zealous in the future." . _ . _ . . _ . . - . . _ - - - _.__,..._._ _ ' . _ _ _ % . _. . - 2).In my letter /far to you on the 9th I made a mistake identifying the date of one of the transmissions. It should have been Sunday December 3rd not the 6th. I have changed my summary and the l

transcript for that conversation to reflect the correction.

p ' 3) I understand from your comments on Friday that you may not have made a final determination that these conversations are "not 4 material to plant licensing" as Ebe McCabe told me on the 10th. I await a letter from you, and as I said I would be happy to help in any investigation you might undertake. u I i _ . . .. a - -- - .. .- . . . . . . . .

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, 1. 3 ! y 5/3/89 }09:15 .No We're not going to vent there again. At least- . we on t antjcipate it anyway. ] ., , ~ 5/4/89 00:25 6 -- Let's not be so zealous in the future. 5/4/89 09:14- Turbine building alarm 5/4/89'- 21:30 Might-have to do throttling of valves if temperatures - get high 5/4/89- 21:51

1 enjoyed reviewing those 200 pages of schematics.

, But I know a lot more now. ]

5/14/89 ,00:30 '3 Feet-7 Inches. What didM say it was yesterday? ' l It's come up a foot and that's a lot of water. ' ~ 5/14/89 /02:30, M Could you check the lube oil and see if it's? running OK; Just got an alarm in and out. - } > , 5/23/89 14:43 Check' EHB Reservoir. Check it to make sure we're ' < W" f; .not spilling it.' ' '

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rm y , . - . ,. . . v - .. ) ' , 1 . . . . . d ' ' I SEABROOK CONTROL ROOM TRANSMISSIONS , , ^ AREAS OF CONCERN r' . ' (, Personnel: - N_.. 4 Maintenance Personnel Competence ' Drinking prior to work -- 11/30/89 Iraving light bulb on plastic -- 12/1/89 Accident rate -- 12/20/89 (Several others in December) Water treatment or boiler room that was messy -- 12/29/89 Control Room Operator Attitude "licy, what's the worst that can happen. You have to get naked and come on out"-- 12/3/89 "You're being paid by the hour" -- 12/29/89 ' "Your favorite Nitrogen alarm has just come in again" -- 1/G/90 l r Hardware: Valve-Pr65 ems "See if we can get the rectre valve to go closed" -- 12/1/89 , "I've got a bad feeling about these valves". -- 12/3/89 l " Brand new valve installed by DCR" -- 12/28/89 " Favorite nitrogen alarm has just come In" -- 1/6/90 Leaks

, Fan leaking oil in fuel storage butiding -- 12/29/89 Communications ' Repeated problems hearing maintenance personnel ' See 1/6/90 for one example ' . 6 i$- , . . _ . _ _ . . . . -

wt . . . 3% M M ' ~ - [ < * c '( .: gg r, 30 } 3: 33 , .

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c , ' i. ~ i: ] b Seabrook Station Control Room = ' , J ' Nitrogen' Valve Problems? . '! Control Room Operator Attitude < . p. December 3,1989 (Sunday)l

e ~. 6:15 AM a > , No, were trying to blow the loop seal to the generator .

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f

. . B is isolated. Copy 1 -"Co'p6 I've got a bad feeling about these valves" j , , l Copy.g did you copy that? - > , ( Yeahg Why don't you open up 42 and leave all four of them open . l 1 Yeah you're rightg , open 42 and we'll see what we've got there and then we'll open the.

la one

Copy. p - eah. Bravo Charlie and Delta Right. We're going to try that X. ' - ,; Actually@l don't think it'll matter.- Do you have it boosted up out there 10 35 or 40 pounds? . , LGoing too fast. OK I've got you - . Ego ahead and shut 39 please a i OK Why don't you go ahead 'and boost it up. NGB 39 is closed - .

and w en you get it up to 45 let us know and then g try to do your thing.

. 1 ' L CopM You seeing a change in pressure? You said you got it M '~6:30 AM. . El want to open up ah 39 now so we've got all four of them open. E . win pressurize all four of them up unul ah we get each of them to three or four pounds and then we'll put it back on the regulator Four open right nowg Copy. 39 to 42. . 4 i- ! - . - . -

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1m !! '90 !? ?? F.5 ! . . Scabrook ControlRoom 12/3/89 Page 2 1 am definctly seeing a rise in A, B and C. D started out negative so it's a itt e hard to tell but I think that it's come up OK as soon as ' get a couple of pounds on the lowest one we'll put it on the regulator AndW the answer to your question is D is definetly coming up now I'm at 0.1 WI'm looking at a half a pound positive now on the Delta generatcr if you want to slowly go closed on those bypasses and see if the regulator will take it the rest of the way I think you're in good shape "Let me knew when they're closed and I'll watch it more closely" M air dtyer A trouble e logs are more priority Mthe dryer trouble has reset On the regulator, copy E Yes we areg OK A is dropping down toward the others and it looks like it's going to be fine No thank youS Good job " Hey, what's the worst that can happen. You have to get naked and come on out. " ' 6:45AM You're clear for a round trip Go aheadW Ah not really. Hold on a minute and let me askg Mnceds a Chalkman fix Whatever looks good 7AM 1 __.

- \\ :l / y M$ i % J. :' Mw Hampshire

APPENDIX 3 ' + - - . Tod C. F _.mu< r- _ ' . Senior Vice President and ' , _^ , Chief Operating Officer g NYN-90020 January 24, 1990 .): United States Nuclear- Regulatory Comstission , a ,. , Washington, DC- 20555 '

n >

Attentions- Document Control Desk . References: (a) Facility Operating License NPF.-67. Docket No. 50-443 - (b) Letter dated January 9, 1990. F. Anderson, Jr., to 'W. T. Russell, USNRCr ' ' .(c) Letter dated January 15, 1990. "Seabrook Control Room Transmissions", F.-Anderson, Jr. to W. T. Russell, USNRC s '(d) -United States House _of Representatives letter dated January 8, 1990 N. Mavroules.-et al to K. M. Carr. USNRC_ . Subject: . Response to Allegations Gentlemen:- i. New Hampshire Yankee;(NHY) has investigated the allegations forwarded' by References (b)-'- (d), utilizing the NHY Faployee Allegation' Resolution-- ~ =(EAR) Program and the NHY Independent Review Team. The results of these evaluations:are'provided as enclosures'to this letter.- As detailed in the enclosures, NHY-has determined that these allegations do not represent any unresolved = safety =significant issues. _ . Enclosure 1 provides the results of the NHY evaluation =of-the allegations raised via Reference =(b)., Additional allegations-raised by Mr. Anderson in Reference (c) are addressed in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3

provides the results of the NHY evaluation of~each allegation raised by the ' Employees-Legal Project in Reference (d). The documentation and information referenced in the. Enclosures are ~'available at . Seabrook Station for your review . Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact- Mr. Neal A. Pillsbury, Director of Quality Programs, at (603) 474-9521, extension'3341. Very truly yours, f M Ted C. Feigenbaum , Enclosures l ! ' - New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 300 * Seabrook, NH 03874 * Telephone (603) 474 9521 , , 1

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i!) ' t , < United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission January. 24, 1990 TAttentions? Document Control; Desk- 'Page 2- +' , f ,' t c cca Mr. William-T. RussellL

Regional-Administrator- ! United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I' _ . e i 475 Allendale Road . King =of Prussia, PA 19406 s Mr.. Victor Heroes, Project Manager Project Directorate I-3 , , United States Nuclear Regulatory-Commission- Division of, Reactor Projects Washington, DC 20555 ,e C Mr. Noel Dudley_ , ' NRC Senior Resident. Inspector- P.0. Box 1149 . Seabrook, NH 03874 3 , , P , [f . 1; , ! , 1-

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January =24,t1990- , 1 - ( t , > h ENCLOSURE l'TO NYN-90020

' RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS- J + .

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, ... .,a .. b ; : , . ' New Hompshire- + % MEMORANDUM ^ ' i ' Subject - Control: Room Ra'dio Comunications Allegations , From W.:J. Gagnon Date January 24, 1990 ,. . To N. A. Pillsbury Reference ~ . t Thel attached report provides the results of_an Employee Allegation ^ Resolution (EAR) evaluation of allegations raised by Mr. Fred Anderson, Jr. in a January 9, 1990 letter to the NRC Region 1 Administrator, Mr. William Russell. The basis for these allegations are select Control Room radio.comunications which Mr. Anderson monitored, taped and subsequently transcribed. Based upon' these communicationso Mr.-Anderson requested that the NRC review the events described for their tuafety significance and impact on recommending a full power. license for Seabrook. The EAR review of the radio comunications transcripts indicates that they represent only that portion of the conversations which originated from the Control Room. These conversations are.the Control Room's (Shift. Superintendent, ' Unit Shift Supervisor. Supervisory Control Room Operator and Control Room operator) normal comunications with Auxiliary Operators performing assigned responsibilities'in the plant. The Auxiliary Operator's portion of the' conversation, which would provide a more complete undertitanding of the activities in: progress, are'not included in the transcript. -The reasons for these omissions are.' discussed in the body of the enclosed report under the. heading of ' Control Room Radio Comunications System (Section 12.0). -The EAR. review of the allegations raised,by Mr. Anderson concluded'that 'NHY's existing programs,-and conduct of operations,' design and maintenance are-- - appropriate and reflect a comitment to excellence. There are no-areas of concern _which pose-safety significance to the-public, plant personnel _or -operation and maintenance of the plant. For each of the dates cited in the transcript the plant was in Mode 5, cold shutdown. , .$ W. J. Gagnon WJG/EWD:bes i New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire l P.O. Box 300 * Seabrook, NH 03874 * Telephone (603) 474 9521 E= = _ =-_ : =

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et' ~ CONTROL ROCH BADIO C000 N IC&TIONS . 'a' .. - ALLEGATIONS ,, ' f k ? f . - - . - - . - - - . _ . - . . . i. . . .

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Section ' Title Pane

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1.0 Fitness For Duty 1 , . , ( , 2.0 December 1, 1989 -- Lightbulbs 3

~ > 3. 0. December 1, 1989 -- Recirculation Valve 5

i . 4.0. December 6, 1989 -- Radon 7 t 1- 5.0 December 6, 1989 -- Nitrogen Valves a

6.0 December 20, 1989 -- Accident Rate 10 7.0 December 28, 1989 -- Valve Testing 12 > ' 8.0 December 29, 1989 -- Post-Modification Testing 13 '

'9.0 December 29, 1989 -- Housekeeping 15 4 . 10.0 December 29, 1989 -- Fan-Repair- 15 11.0 January'6, 1990'---Nitrogen Alarm 16 > !! L, 12.0 Control Room Radio Communication System 17 i ' , 1

_ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ __ . -4. $ 1.0 FITNESS FOR DUTY ..- The Employee Allegation Resolution Program (EAR) reviewed the allegation of a -potential ' Fitness For Duty' concern regarding a radio cmamunication on - November 30, 1989. In addition EAR also reviewed one other transcript- . portion (December 6, 1989) because of the potential inference on ' Fitness For Duty' even though Mr. Anderson made no specific allegation or-citation. In support,of this review, the EAR Program interviewed the following individuals to obtain their perspective and recollection of events which Mr. }m Anderson lists as November 30, 1989 (2215) and December 6, 1989 (0645): -- Shift Superintendent -- Unit Shif t Supervisor -- Auxiliary Operator -- Auxiliary Operator -- Auxiliary Operator , -- Auxiliary Operator ' -- Auxiliary Operator -- Firefighter Technician -- Firefighter Technician . From the transcript of November 30, 1989 (2215), Mr.' Anderson infers .j impaired Maintenance personnel competence as a result of drinking prior to work. This' inference appears to be; based on the landmark referenced in i radio communications concerning an individual (an' Auxiliary Operator) who would be' reporting late for his assigned shift (shift started at 2300). This individual had telephoned the control Room.,while enroute from his residence to Seabrook Station, to advise his supervisor that he was being i delayed and indicated his approximate location by referencing a nearby well- i known establishment as a landmark. As a result of this delay,'the 1 -individual placed two telephone calls from a gas station-pay phone -- the initial call at 2206 and a subsequent call at 2247. t

The individual was delayed because of a traffic accident, due to icy road conditions, which had blocked all northbound traffic on a divided state i highway. In fact, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had officielly closed the road at 2137. The traffic accident and road closure have also been documented in a State Police report. The traffic accident and road closure l prevented all northbound traffic on U.S. Route 1 from proceeding further on 1 si

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] g , . . q , , L it g q h i . - . . il . . ' Route l'or ontoLInterstate 95. Using the well known= landmark was-_a logical ] , , . means to quickly and' accurately convey the location of the road closure. LA. j k telephone credit card invoice substantiates that this individual did place 1 h tthe telephone calls from a public telephone at a gas station'in the l s l proximity of the referenced landmark.. I Upon arriving'at Seabrook Station the delayed _ individual reported to his: , , supervisor to inform him of his presence on site and to obtain his work - assignment. ' Site personnel had been trained and followed a Fitness For Duty (FFD) Policy and Program implemented in April 1986. NHY has subsequently " . implemented an enhanced FFD Program on December 7, 1989. Under the FFD

'" Program, each NHY supervisor retains the implicit responsibility, at all times, to determine the competence of assigned individuals to discharge their duties. Based upon the normal conversation that a supervisor has with

an' employee that'is a late arrival, the known cause for his delay and the implicit FFD supervisory responsibility, there was no. question that the individual was competent to perform his assigned duties. P The. late arrival of this individual (Auxiliary Operator) did not impair the 't shift complement required for operating.the plant. Therefore the allegation , q- - regarding the impaired ability to perform assigned responsibilities is t K ' inaccurate and unsubstantiated by the facts and did not impact the safe operation of,the plant. , > < The communication on December 6, 1989 (0645) regarding a 'Chalkman fix' was p not an area of concern raised by Mr. Anderson. Based upon the EAR Program 4 l - interviews, this transcription should be ' chocolate' and refers to consuming a chocolate donut with morning coffee. Based upon the interviews with the - personnel involved there is no basis to assume or infer impaired performance - "' , . or ability to perform assigned responsibilities. Therefore, the EAR concludes that the activities described in the December 6, 1989 portion of H the transcript did not impact the safe operation of the plant. t- t Sections 2.0 through 12.0 of this report contain the r wiev. analysis and 1f evaluation of communications that concern the conduct of plant operations j l E and the adequacy of design and maintenance activities. The Independent l: Review Team-(IRT) coordinated these assessments under the auspices of the ' EAR Program. The IRT assessments included interviews with appropriate plant i 1 I' s - .

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' 5 , <> . . . . > I. " personnel and-verification of'the' events and activities described. The IRT ' v ..has: reviewed documentation ~which supports the description of each event and' ' . - - , , j9 -provides4 the basis for the conclusions for each area of concern. ] ' L. '

!;; 2.0 DECEMBER 1. 1989 LIGHTBULBS -- , 5 i - References. ,, 9

- on December-1, 1989, at approximately 0045.EST, the transcript indicates that a light bulb exploded. % Resoonse: , c, + During the process of venting the steam generator' wet layup recirculation % ~ system,=the Auxiliary Operator (AO) conducting this activity noted that a Y temporary construction drop light bulb exploded.; The light bulb failure is. attributed to the lightbulb being momentarily sprayed with pump venting- efflue't-(steam generator liquid) while venting the: steam generator wet L n - Llayup pump. Temporary lighting was in the area of the steam generator wet- < 3 ! llayup pump to facilitate the installation of plant.dec1gn modification DCR ' y 86 420; , Safety Sinnificances i p 2.' The steam generator wet layup pump recirculates steam generator fluid to ' maintain water chemistry within_specified parameters.- This' fluid.is non- ' ' radioactive and.its release did not constitute a radiation or personnel ' safety hazard. , r,

The explosion / implosion of the temporary construction lightbulb was the

, result c,f momentary contact with a subcooled liquid, the steam generator wet layup pump vent effluent, while venting entrapped air from the pump. The ~L bulb filament'then vaporized upon contact with the oxygen in the surrounding i air. The remaining electrical portions of the lightbulb remained energized > - until the temporary lighting power cord was removed from the local wall " , .. r o n , Y - - - . . - . - . - . . . . - - . . . - - - - - . .

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. ! 4 ! , .. . , . outlet. 'The temporary construction lights are equipped with metal wire- , guards that' prevent direct bulb contact and provide personnel protection

against electrical' shock. The wall circuits are powered from 120 VAC power. panels equipped with 15 Amp circuit breakers. There were no special design

t g . features associated with these convenience wall outlets. However, temporary power-that is used for equipment, such as drills, pumps, or other active equipment that has the potential to result in electrical shock to the operator, is equipped with electrical ground fault interrupter circuit breakers. ! i , ' h l :, Temporary lighting is powered from~ local wall outlets so that the-power to ' L L the lighting string may be easily removed and therefore does not constitute- a personnel electrical hazard. The on-shift duty electrician responded to.

<

replaceLthe lightbulb. This incident did not constitute a threat to L personnel safety'and was appropriately resolved using existing EHY programs L and work practices, y b , References l: - That a drop light was found on plastic and caused the' plastic to' melt.- . Responses On December 1, 1989, at approximately 0045 EST, a verbal report was made-to. the Control Room Fire Fighters that an unusual odor was noticed in the area l i of the West Pipe Chase. The on-duty Fire Fighters investigated the report. ' The investigation determined that a construction drop light had come in ' contact with temporary plastic sheeting and had caused the plastic to melt. The condition was corrected by the roving fire watch by removing the temporary. construction drop light from the plastic covering' The temporary . lighting and plastic sheeting was being used to support the installation of plant modification DCR 86-420.

. . ... ?L ' * " , , , ' 5 g 41 Safety Sinnificances - The use of temporary lighting and plastis sheeting during plant design

g

_ ' modifications is a routine practice to provide enhanced local' lighting and to prevent'the spread of welding and grinding debris. The plastic sheeting provided'to'all activities within the plant is self-extinguishing, and will. not support combustion. The temporary lighting was supported from existing -physical supports. . NHY recognizes the importance of good housekeeping and industrial safety practices and normally, plant housekeeping requirements for construction activities would have prevented _the plastic: sheeting from coming in contact with the temporary lighting.. Inadvertently, however, the. temporary lighting and/or the plastic sheeting moved close_enough together to cause the plastic to melt. If theitemporary light and plastic sheeting had^ remained undetected in this condition, the worst case scenario would have resulted in 'the generation of smoke due to the reduction of plastic by heating. The extent of, plastic reduction and smoke would be limited to the small ~1ocalized area that could be affected by the direct radiant heat emitted -from the lightbulb.- This work area and the surrounding areas are' equipped .with fire detection equipment that would have eventually caused control Room and local area alarms. In addition, the routine rounds by roving fire- watches and auxiliary operators provide a manual backup to' installed- detection and suppression equipment. 10n duty-fire fighter personnel would have responded to any fire or smoke detection alarm. There was no impact on. .the public health-and safety as a_ result of this event. '3.0 DECEMBER 1. 1989 RECIRCUIATION VALVE -- au- Reference: Communications betwoun two Auxiliary Operators regarding the vaults and the ~ running RHR pump. -- _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . _ . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

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.? ' 3 , ( '6 ,4; . Resconses' ' . The referenced commuab.. tion. on December 1, 1989, at approximatelyL0045 ~ . -EST, 'between two Auxiliary Operators concerns a routine periodic visual' inspection of: operating equipment within the Equipment Vaults which includes ~the operating RHR pump. The Auxiliary Operator at the time of'the~ '$ discussion, was in the West Pipe Chase assigned to establishing the steam: ' ' generator wet layup recirculation (see previous Section 1.0 description), , 'and was unable to perform this routine tour. Another Auxiliary Operator -3 informed the first Auxiliary Operator that he would be able to pe'rform the . ~i -Equipment-Vault routine inspection.for him,'and that he would check out-the equipment' vault'and RHR pump. The reference made to.'this set' refers.to 'a set. of rounds' or periodic visual inspections. performed during routine

Operations personnel plant tours. .; , ' Safety Sinnificance: i The communications between the two Auxiliary Operators regarding the ! Equipment Vault inspection and checking the running RHR pump is a normal ~ operations practice and is of no safety significance. All Auxiliary Operators-are trained and qualified to the same standards and are therefore. ' capable!of providing a 100Z' backup recponse. Referenqg: 'On December 1, 1989, at 0145 EST, the transcript listed the verbal report, "So I'm going to increase flow to see if we can get the recirc valve-to go closed."- Resoonse: .This-discussion deals with instructions between the Control Room and an Auxiliary Operator while locally adjusting the Steam GJnerator Wet Layup System. The Steam Generator Wet Layup System is used to recirculate the liquid contents of the Steam Generators. The system design incorporates a > ,e . , , . -

k, w J , ' . , " " . 7: .. // pump dis' charge recirculation flow control valve that automatically closes ' a , after-the pump develops a specified, flow rate.' At this time the Auxiliary: ~ Operator was' manually adjusting valves in the system flow path to increase ~ pump developed flow.. This' increased downstream system flow would be- sufficient to allow the recirculation valve to close automatically. Safety Sinnificance: j -The Steam Generator Vet Layup System is a non-safety-class system and-the- purpose of the system is to mix the steam generator contents for maintaining- secondary side. chemistry when the plant-is in a shutdown configuration. Tlie position of the Steam Generator Wet Layup System pump discharge-

j

' recirculation valve has no safety significance and there is no safety 1 -

significance to the steam generator wet layup-system pump discharge flow . rate adjustment. .The discussion concerning the manual adjustment of the system flow path and the automatic operation of the Steam Generator Wet- Layup pump recirculation valve is consistent with the design of that system.

)

1 4.0 Dw'N m 6. 1989 MA%gi -. L ' Reference: Basis of statement cited in transcript, " Hey, what's the worst that can i happen. You.have to get naked and come on out." Resoonse: New Hampshire Yankee has-a documented history of the Nuclear Enterprises , n" IPM-7 whole body frisking booths alarming due to the daughter products from

. naturally existing background radon being deposited on clothing. NHY can make this report available to NRC Region 1 personnel. Radon daughter product deposition is related to both'the concentration of radon and to the type of clothing worn. ,

. , - - . . . - - .- - - - -- .. - ' . ,. .. 8 W .: 'New Hampshire' Yankee has performed an extensive investigation of this naturally! occurring condition and has determined that there is. a negligible radiologic'al health hasard posed by the radon levels involved.- There are,

_ however, delays imposed on personnel who alarm the IPM-7, in order to provide additional monitoring which determines if the ' alarm is due to radon ' daughter deposition or to contamination. The several options available for l personnel that have experienced radon daughter deposition includes remaining in the Radiological Control Area until the daughter deposition has decayed ( about _ two - hours ) :' surrendering the article (s) of clothing and ! completion of a personnel contamination report which documents the results of. the radon daughter deposition analysis. The transcript refers to an individual that would have to surrender his clothing after having worked in containment for an extended period of time establishing the inerting cover gas to the Steam Generators. In this circumstance the individual would have ~ the option of wearing cloth coveralls or paper coveralls to continue with ! .the balance of assigned work activities until radon daughter deposits had

decayed.' Safety Sinnificance - The NHY Health Physics Department has documented- the- analysis of radon - , concerns which indicate that no - health hazards are involved.- The existing '{ radiation protection-practices for controlling the expected levels of j radiation during plant operation have been in place for more than one year. I - . The sensitivity of _the equipment used has been sufficient to detect these ! levels of radon daughter deposits. There is no safety significance associated with this event. i , i 5.0 DECEMBER 6. 1939 NITROGEN VALVES --

Reference: ! On December 6,1989, at approximately 0615 EST, the transcript lists the verbal report which states, " copy --- , I've got a bad feeling about these valves". , _I x

W ' m, - - Qi 41 9' .,. Et,g,panjg: s . ' This-discussion refers to inerting the Steam Generator secondary side. Station Operating Procedure OS1027.02,~ Section 6.3, identifies the system alignment.. requirements for Inerting the Steam Generators with a nitrogen' gas blanket via the E N header. Section 6.3.1.6 of this procedure .s describes how to increase the nitrogen gas supply pressure to overcome a water loop seal which exists in the Main Steam header during' extended Mode 5 ~ operation. . Establishing the nitrogen inerting blanket requires increased nitrogen header pressure to bubble the nitrogen through the water loop-seal. l- The=" bad feeling about these valves' comment refers to the operational' characteristics of the nitrogen gas Y-type diaphragm isolation valves on l- each of the steam generator Main Steam lines. These isolation valves are L . 1 4 , bellows diaphragm valves with the valve stem at an angle to the direction of ' l fluid flow. The valve design is such that the valve disc and bellows 1 - assembly are not directly connected to the valve stem. Therefore, in the h presence of a back pressure, the valve may actually be closed even though' L the valve stem has been operated in the open direction. The current valve orientation is such that the Nitrogen system header pressure must overcome the: bellows'and disc and Main Steam system pressure in order to initiate the i nitrogen gas flow to the Steam Generators. This operation is similar toi !) that of a stop check valve. These valves function to isolate the Nitrogen Gas System from the Main Steam System when operated in closed direction-and . under= normal plant operations the Nitrogen system is isolated from the Main L ' Steam system by two valves. 1 L.a; l NHY Technical Support is. evaluating the Nitrogen isolation valves-to improve

their current operational characteristics. The remainder of the transcript

' describes the process of increasing Nitrogen header pressure to 40 PSIG to

the open valves and the subsequent restoration of the Nitrogen header- . . pressure supply through the Nitrogen regulator after establishing a 3 psig Nitrogen inerting blanket on each of the Steam Generators. L l l-

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g y, -Q> ' ,~ - '10 - , m , Safetv Sinnificances. 'i ~ 1 ' t .The alignment'of Nitrogen Gas System: Valves to provide an inert ccver gas {' on the-Steam Generators is only performed-during MODE 5, shutdown; j conditions, and has no impact on plant safety. No: safety' system challenges- t or threats to the public. health and safety occurred as a result of this. _ n -event. 3

a l c -{ - . . -[ 6.0i'D E m m 20.'1989 ACCIDENT RATE -- Reference: }

. -Maintenance personnel -- recent high accident rate. )

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f Resoonse: , ! l The' accident on December 20, 1989-cited in the transcript involved-a. ' . laborer who was shovelling snow away from a wooden sawhorse. A manhole' ' , - -cover that was leaning on the sawhorse rolledfoff and struck'the' laborer'on the' lower portion of his lef t leg. .New. Hampshire Yankee: medical personnel f reported to the scene and administered-first aid. The' laborer was then 'ti ' transported to the Exeter Hospital Emergency Room so that the injury could

be-examined by a; physician. The total time elapsed.from the time the injury-

was reported until the time the ambulance = arrived was approximately 12 i , minutes. This accident was investigated.in accordance with the NHY- procedure for accidents - work related injury and illness. Although not cited in Mr. Anderson's transcript. NHY also reviewed requests- for all ambulance services in the month of December, the overall trend'for < first aid and lost time accidents and the method for documenting and investigating accidents to prevent reoccurrence. There was an additional ambulance call on December 20th. A security guard ' experienced shortness of breath at about 1530. New Hampshire Yankee's EMTs responded and determined the guard should be examined by a physician. The - .-

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. . Seabrook ambulance. wasf requested. : It responded and transported the -

i

security guard to Exeter Hospital. , There were mul'tiple; ambulance calls on one other day in December. On J 1 December _7, 1989 these personnel were transported to Exeter Hospital by the: ' ' i ~ ite ambulance'. Two of these individuals had sustained injuries and the s other sufferedLan illness. ,0f the .two injured personnel, one -was hurt when - 'a wind gust-blew a temporary shelter into him and the other slipped while- . walking'in a. parking lot. E i All accidents' involving New:Hr.mpshire Yankee employees and all accidents . involving contractor. personnel which result in lost work time and/or medical ~ expense are-investigated per NHY Procedure 18620 (Accident.- Work Related .5 Personal-Injury and Illness). Investigations are initiated by the Safety. ~ Supervisor :and are. performed by,the injured individual's supervisor, manager, or a conmittee assigned by the manager / supervisor; The person (s) -performing the investigation interviews the injured individual', his supervisor, and any witnesses. The investigation is documented along.with -recommendations to prevent recurrence. Recommendations are reviewed and approved'by management,and tracked on ICTS. j

The accidents which occurredIon~ December 7'and 20, 1989 were investigated- per NHY Procedure 18620. One of.the accidents on December 7-resulted-in a lost time accident'(employee slipping on ice in a parking lot). This individual suffered a broken shoulder, lost six (6) days of work,;and remains on restricted duty, i ' The individual injured on December 20, 1989 by a falling manhole cover'was " scheduled to be laid off on December 22, 1989. He remained out of work through December 22 due to his contusion. Since he was laid off, no .; further data on his condition is available. ! , . The December 7th accident (shelter-blowing into a worker) involved a paving . t ' ' contractor and did not result in. lost time. '. u i- L In terms of overall personnel accident statistics, there were fewer lost L l time accidents in the last six months of 1989 and fewer injuries requiring

first aid for NHY and GMSS personnel than any prior semi-annual period j 1 , . -

(. - , .. . 12 . since the completion of construction in 1986. Comparing 1989 with 1988, the lost time incident rate for 1989 continued to reflect good performance as well as_ consistent improvement for all NHY. UELC, and GMSS personnel. Safety Sinnificance: ' The trend in first-aid and lost time accidents over several years indicates the implementation of highly challenging industrial safety performance goals s I and consistent improvement in safety. NHY's safety performance also reflec+.s a better than average record in comparison with general industry I and government. The inferred problem of maintenance personnel competence is y not supported by the facts. 4 7.0 DECEMBER 28. 1989 VALVE TEST _ING -- Egiprence: On December ta, 1989, at 0930 EST the allegation is that 'new valves are sticking'. Resoonse: From the transcript there is nothing that implies or infers that valves were sticking. The communication does involve the Control Room and an Auxiliary Operator discussing the alignment of the Reactor Vessel Head Vent to the L Primary Relief Tank to remove non-condensable gasses. This process vents the ' ' Reactor Vessel head region to the Primary Relief Tank which can be at nearly I the same pressure since the Reactor Coolant System had been vented for the , pset four months under Mode 5 conditions. The vent path includes valves recently installed by DCR 86-116 RC-V471 and RC-V472, which are manual , rising stem globe valves and RC-FV2881 which is a pilot operated solenoid valve. A pilot operated solenoid valve requires sufficient differential pressure to operate the valve main disc. The vent path collection point is ' , the Primary Relief Tank and in Mode 5 is typically pressurimed by nitrogen L I . - - - - - . . - . - - -

W. . .- .- 13 . gas to a pressure of approximately 10 PSIG. When the Reactor Coolant System is vented via the Pressurizer vent the only pressure differential available would be the static column of water in the pressuriser. A pressurizer level of greater than 24 feet of water column would be required to provide sufficient pressure necessary to flow to the Primary Relief Tank. Given that pressuriser level is normally maintained at 352 (approx. 26') the differential pressure available may be insufficient to open the main disc of RC-TV2881 without opening a downstream vent such as RC-V-472. By observing normal operator indications, e.g. Reactor Vessel Water Level Indicating System (RVLIS), the control room operators can determine when the Reactor. Vessel head has been purged of gas, thereby detecting the evidence of flow through the valves identified above. Safety Sinnificance: There is no safety significance to the allegation. The last portion of the transcript does indicate that the Control Room observed that the intended vent flow path had been established. Valves RC-V471, and RC-V472 are isolated from.the Reactor Coolant System during normal plant operations, and therefore do not impact the plant safety. During normal plant operations , the Reactor Coolant System has sufficient pressure to operate RC-TV2881., t ! The Control Room retains copies of all approved design modifications. Upon ! completion of field work the licensed Training Center incorporates-these , modifications into requalification training. Through these and other > mechanisms Operations personnel have ready access to current informstion on design modifications. 8.0 DECEMBER 29. 1989 POST-MODIFICATION TESTING -- ' ! Reference . He's still playing with it. ' , , , . . -.

p . , e i i' 14 . Ah ---- do you have problems with the boiler? Is that why you're asking? F No there is every reason 'You're being paid by the hour'. Control Room Go shead --- . OK. Thank you much. , i Response: This conversation refers to the retest being performed on PAB Auxiliary Steam Pressura Reducing Valve PCV-9254. The retest was required by Technical Support as part of WR #89 WOO 6331. The Auxiliary Operator (AO) was directed to monitor the auxiliary boiler during the performance of the retest because large load swings caused by the test could h6ve tripped the boiler and required a subsequent restart. The A0 asked the Control Room if the retest was complete. The Control Room - assumed that this inquiry was predicated on possible problems with the- boiler and questioned if the A0 had problems with maintaining its operation. The A0 responded that there was no problem with the boiler but l that he would like to return to his tagging assignment. The related ' comment 'You're being paid by the hour" was in jesti The person making the , comment meant that all jobs are important and it shouldn't matter what the ' assignment is as long as it is performed conscientiously, f !

Safety Sinnificance: Post modification testing is a normal part of ensuring equipment performance before returning it to full operational service. The post maintenance testing of steam reducing valve has no impact on safety. The exchange between the A0 and the Control Room is normal in the conduct of operations. ' No safety system challenges or threats to the public health and safety occurred as a result of this event. l

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G i e' . e- . 15 p... l.- 9.0 nacmaER 29. 1989 a00$EKliEFING -- i Reference: r Is that the water treatment or the boiler room that was so messy? Understand. Thank You. ! ! !

!

Resoonset t [ ! This is the control Room clarifying which area required cleaning. The water i treatment area was in the process of being routinely cleaned by the contracted labor force and the boiler room had already been cleaned. . The { typical method for cleaning is start at the highest elevation within a room i and to work towards the lowest elevation. When the Auxiliary Operator (AO) l arrived on the scene the labor force was on break and there were some rags and dust on the floor. The A0 reported this to the Control Room. The area ! in question was cleaned prior to shift turnover. l l i Psfety Sinnificance: ) l Housekeeping is a key indicator of attention to detail and conduct of plant ' operations and maintenance. The conversation refers to the normal f supervision of in-process housekeeping activities..- No safety system ! challenges or threats to the public health and safety occurred as a result I of this event. i i i i 10.0 De=" 29. 1989 FAM m ATa -- , I Response: We just got a report from the roving firewatch 21 elevation in the Fuel j Storage Building just when you go inside the door. Apparently there's a 1 fan there that's leaking some oil. Would you get me some information on -r that please? I 1 .' . . L. _j

r; . ' . . . 16 , . Resoonses A UE&C construction worker was performing the duties of a roving fire watch- when he noticed what he thought was an oil leak in the Fuel Storage Building and reported it to the Control Room. The Control Room dispatched an Auxiliary Operator (AO), as noted in the transcript, to verify the situation. The A0 reported a very small glycol leak coming from a union < connection to a unit heater. The leak resulted in a spot on the floor of about the size of a quarter (coin). Work Request #90W000004 was initiated to correct the leak. This Work Request has been assigned a Priority 3 and , is scheduled for work on January 25, 1990. The probable method of repair will be to clean the union sealing surface and threads of the connection and- to tighten as necessary. If this repair is inadequate, the connection will be replaced. . Safety Sinnificanti . The hot water system is not a safety system and there was no personnel safety or plant equipment in jeopardy. Glycol is not a fire hazard. l < 11.0 JANUARY 6. 1990 NITIOGEN ALARM -- L References i l On January 6, 1990 at 0245 EST, " Yeah your favorite nitrogan &larm has just j come in again'.

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Response: l l The steam generators were in wet layup condition which requires a continuous nitrogen cover gas. This cold shutdown plant condition coupled with the concurrent draining of the Primary Drain Tank places an increased demand on l- . .. . . . . .. - - . .

4. - - ]

. ) ?: w 4 t 17 7. j the Nitrogen Gas System which typically results in frequent nitrogen system { low pressure alarm actuation. These low pressure alarms would require an l Auxiliary Operator to manually align a new nitrogen gas bottle onto the l system to clear the low nitrogen header pressure alarm. The transcript j provides the Control Room notification to the A0 indicating that the ) i Nitrogen System low pressure alarm had alarmed. This required the A0 to

J [ align a new bottle of nitrogen which would increase header pressure and f clear the alarm per normal Operations procedures. 1 ! ! E Safety Sinnificance: ' ! Nitrogen System low pressure alarms do not create a safety significant f problem. During normal plant operations the nitrogen gas pressure will become low enough to actuate this alarm and require the Auxiliary Operator to align new bottles to clear the low pressure condition. This is an [ expected plant condition for Mode 5 operation. ! . 12.0 CONTROL ROCH EADIO C(Rt(DNIC& TION SYSTai The radio segment of the Control Room Comunication system is described as j part of the overall Comunications System in FSAR Section 9.5.2.2.a.4. The intent of this system is to provide a portable communications means for- . , plant personnel, primarily auxiliary operators and firefighter technicians, ! to comunicate directly with the Control Room regardless of their location within the Protected Area. The field personnel utilize handheld radios which transmit at 0.25 watts. The power of these hand-held radios'is adequate for on-site communications. The radio from the Control Room

L transmits at 12 watte and is subsequently repeated at 75 watts, which ' provides sufficient power to be heard offsite. This is the basis for the one-sided (Control Room only) communications noted on the transcripts. The design of the Control Room radio communications system includes the. capability to transmit 'in the clear' or 'in the encoded' mode. The main repeater originally provided the encoding function for the entire Control Room communications system. When normally powered, the entire radio system r , y + ~ r , . ~ - ~ . . , -- -m, e - . - .,+w --

. - -- 4 - ., e; e

l. 18 , i consnunication was encoded. . However, with a loss in power, the 12W g transceiver defaults to transmitting communications in the clear. The ! transceiver must then be manually reset to resume encoded transmissions. h f The transceiver was reset to the encoced mode on January 11, 1990. ! A subsequent design modification to the radio system added two repeater _! units within the Main Control Board to accommodate additional Control Room radio communications handsets. These repeaters also retain the dual I ' function clear and encoded capability. Since initial installation, these i , L repeaters have been set in the ' clear' transmission mode. On January 12,. 1990, the repeaters were reset in the encoded mode. These repeaters do not i require resetting upon a loss of power. { !.i NHY has conducted radio communication field tests which identified specific l locations within the plant and on site where one-way or two-way radio ! communications are difficult or cannot occur. As a result of these tests ! NHY prioritised a series of corrective measures in five categories. The

, physical modifications for the highest priority items have been completed i and the Engineering and implementation for the remaining items have bcen i scheduled for 1991. These radio system enhancements are, however, ' improvements to a consnunications system which provides a convenience to Operations personnel that frequently traverse the plant. The portable i radios carried by the Auxiliary Operators, for the most part, allow constant two-way communication with the Control Room. FSAR Section 9.5.2 describes - ' i; the Seabrook Consnunications System which meets the design basis for

-providing a dependabla communications system that will ensure reliable I

communications during normal plant operation and emergency situations. The

, NHY Independent Review Team is currently evaluating the radio communications I

system to provide recommendations which will enhance company policy and the design and operating characteristics of the system. > > 14 l - , .. E ,, ,n , +-,,

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F New H mpshiro i @ MEMORANDUM ) , ? Subject Control Room Radio Consnunications: Additional Allegations

From v. J. Gagnon Date January 24, 1990 ) To N. A. Pillsbury Reference { ! The following provides the results of an Employee Allegation Resolution { I (EAR) evaluation of the second set of allegations raised by Mr. Fred Anderson. Jr. in a January 15, 1990 letter to the NRC Region 1 Administrator, Mr. William Russell. The basis for these allegations, as with the first set of allegations, j is select Control Room radio consnunications which Mr. Anderson monitored, taped '} I and subsequently transcribed. Based upon these comunications, Mr. Anderson requested that the NRC review the events described for their safety significance ' and impact on recommending a full power license for Seabrook. t The EAR review of the radio conununications transcripts as with the first i I set of Anderson allegations, indicates that they represent only that portion of the conversations which originated from the Control Room. These conversations , are the Control Room's (Shift Superintendent, Unit Shift Supervisor, Supervisory , Control Room Operator and Control Room Operator) normal communications with

Aurillary Operators performing assigned responsibilities in the plant. The Auxiliary Operator's portion of the conversation, which would provide a more complete understanding of the activities in progress, is not included in the l transcript. The reasons for these omissions are discussed in the body of the previous report regarding the first set of Anderson's allegations, under the

heading of Control Room Radio Conununications System.

i The EAR review of the allegations, raised by Mr. Anderson concluded that NHY's conduct of operations and maintenance are appropriate. There are no areas of concern which pose safety significance to the public, plant personnel or operation and maintenance of the plant. New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 300 * Seabrook, NH 03874 * Telephone (603) 474 9521 . - -. ,w.. .- , , _ _ _ . .

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f From eight statements on four days between May 3 and May 23, 1989. Mr. i l Anderson raises concerns regarding employee attitude and competency and plant i hardware. From the equipment and plant locations cited, all of the ' connunications except the first do not involve safety related equipment. The first statement, regarding venting, refers to the routine post maintenance , i hydrostatic test of RH-FCV-619. The remaining statements involving plant l t equipment are communications involving normal plant operation. Inferred

allegations regarding plant hardware from this transcript have no factual basis, are not safety related and are not material to the issuance of the full power operating license. , 1 The second concern, regarding Operator competency, also has no basis in- ' fact from the transcript. The transcript reflects statements initiated by Operations personnel in the Control Room. The competency of these personnel has

been demonstrated by completing the NNY Licensed Operator Training Program, pasning the NRC Licensed Operator exams and through operator requalification i training every six weeks. NHY Operations personnel have repeatedly demonstrated their proficiency for safely operating Seabrook Station. , The remaining concern, regarding employee attitude, is based upon a single - sentence i the transcript. This portion of the transcript is suspect in that the , individual referenced (first name only) cannot be substantiated with the personnel actually on watch for the date and time specified. To compensate for this' discrepancy the EAR reviewed, in detail, Operations Logs for the shifts t preceding and succeeding the commanications cited in tho transcript. This review did not reveal any personnel in the field with this first name and only one Supervisory Control Room Operator with the same first name cited in the transcript. This SCR0 would have been located in the Control Room and therefore not. receive radio connunications directed f rom the same location. Assuming, that this statement did in fact occur, there is no basis in fact to impugn employee attitude or to substantiate a concern having safety significance. -. - - - -.

p '- o a , t.... . . o 3

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For the entire period cited in the transcript, the plant was in a Mode 5 cold shutdown condition. During this time frame the activities in progress consisted of routine maintenance, operations surveillance testing and preliminary activities for low power testing.

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W. J. Gagnon VJGIEWD bes . L s' i _. 3

f

n. o APPD(DIX 4 GUIDANCE ON REVIEWING RI-90-A-0003 TAPES L 1. Basically, the review is for safety or security inadequacies which could affect the issuance of a full power license, including associated viola- tions of NRC requirements. The following are of particular interest. 1.1 Intentional Wrongdoing. 1.2 Fitness for Outy Inadequacies (including those prior.to issuance of 10CFR26). 1.3 Unauthorized transmission of safeguards information. 2. Weaknesses which do not violate NRC requirements or indicate unsafe condi- tions, if significant, should be identified but are not an element of whether a license should be issued. 3. A security inadequacy exists if transmitted information reveals exploit- able elements of the security plan or equipment. 4. The June 22,190') Natural Circulation Test event should be considered. That event resulted in a mahr licensee program for assuring strict proce- dural compliance. Preceding occurrences, and subsequent ones, need to be considered in light of their relationship to implementation of the correc- tive actions in order to assess potential impact on licensing. For refer , ence, the basic NRC concerns associated with this event related to the . following: 4.1 Not manually tripping the plant per procedure. 4.2 Not resolving human error considerations before proceeding with startup planning, u 5. Items which have already been identified and which do not need further ' documentation (unless serious instances are identified) follow: 5.1 Extraneous transmissions not related to operation and not interfering with operational information. L 5.2 Speaking in jest about conditions, unless there is also an indication l that safety is not being adequately addressed. l 5.3 Communication informality, unless there is reason to suspect that safety has not been adequately addressed. 5.4 Minor housekeeping problems. 5.5 Industrial safety precautions. 1" 5.6 Personnel injuries. - . }}