IR 05000443/1989020

Insp Rept 50-443/89-20 on 891212-900124.Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance, Reportable Events & Open Items,Qa & fitness-for-duty Program Implementation

ML20006F305
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	02/14/1990
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20006F303	List: IR 05000443/1989020 ML20006F302 ML20006F304
References
50-443-89-20, NUDOCS 9002270371
Preceding documents:	ML20012F279 (2 April 1990)
Download: ML20006F305 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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Docket / Report No.:

50-443/89-20 License No.: NPF-67 Licensee:

Public Service Company of New Hampshire

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Facility:

Seabrook Station, Unit 1, Seabrook, New Hampshire i

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e Dates:

December 12, 1989 - January 24, 1990

Inspectors:

A. Cerne, Senior. Resident Inspector (through 12/31/89)

N. Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector (Deginning 1/21/90)

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R. Fuhrmeister, Resident Inspector

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' Approved:By:

bO N,b C.lWl90

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Ebe C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B

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. Areas Inspected: Operational Safety,' Maintenance, Surveillance, Reportable Events and-0 pen Items, Quality Assur3nce, and Fitness-for-Duty Program imple-mentation.

Results: Generally good performance was identified. The following specific I

items are noteworthy.

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The portions of the Fitness-for-Duty program reviewed were found to be acceptable.

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A violation for-failing to lock open a safety infection pump breaker was identi fi ed.-

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An. unresolved item was evaluated as a non-cited' violation..

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Two open issues were closed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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-1.0 S umma ry o f Ac t i v i t i e s.......... -............... -................... -.....

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1.1 Resident Inspection Activities..................................

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1.2 Visiting Inspector Activities...................................

1.3 Plant Activities................................................

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2.0 Plant Tours...........................................................

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j 3.0 Fitness-For-Duty Training............................-................

2-4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identi fied Items.......................

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5.0: Confirmatory Issue No.

56............................................

6.0 Premature RHR Pump Thrust' Bearing Failure............................

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7.0 Assessment of.Qua11ty................................................

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7.1 Assessment of Fal si ficati on Incidents...........................

7.2 Corrective Action Request for Post-Maintenance Testing..........

8.0 Maintenance..........................................................

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19.0 'Surve111ance.......................................................

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-10.0' Meetings With Licensee'...............................................

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APPENDICES-

. Appendix 1 - Documents Related to RHR Pump Thrust Bearing Issues

' Appendix 2 - Documents Reviewed for Verification of Training

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Appendix 3 - Observations From Facility Tour

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DETAILS 1.0 Summary of Activities-1,1-Resident Inspection Activities

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A total of 93 inspection hours, including 10 backshift hours, were expended. -The inspection included 6 deep backshift hours.

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The present and former senior resident inspectors (SRIs) participated

in a Jan'uary 3,1990 inspection of Seabrook Station by NRC regional management. Observations made are summarized in Appendix 3.

(The-licensee has taken actions to address these observation.)

The former SRI. participated in an NRC-staff briefing of the NRC Commissioners on January 18, 1990 in Ror.kville, Maryland.

I The resident staff participated in-inspections of concerns raised by

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the Employee's Legal Project and by a local businessman.

That effort will be reported in NRC Region I Inspection Reports 50-443/90-80 and 50-443/90-82.

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l 1.2 Visiting Inspector Activities

From December 11, 1989 to January 5,1990, a special inspection by

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resident and region-based inspectors addressed Confirmatory Action

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Letter 89-11 items.

The results were documented in NRC Region I In-spection Report 50-443/89-21, _ issued on January 9, 1990.

On January 8-12, 1990, region-based inspectors inspected the 11cen-see's emergency preparedness plan and the implementation of the Vehicle Alert Notification System (VANS).

The results will be docu-mented in NRC Inspection Report 50-443/90-01.

'On Jantary 8-12, 1990, a' region-based inspector inspected the 11cen-see's program for handling solid radioactive waste.

The results will be documented in 50-443/90-03.

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1.3 plant Activities

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The plant remained in operational mode 5, cold shutdown, with primary-coolant temperature.between 120 degrees Fahrenheit (120F) and 140F and the reactor coolant system vented at the top of the pressurizer.

= Major maintenance conducted included sealing of ASCO solenoids, re-placing emergency feedwater turbine steam injection valves, and work on the plant vent wide-range gas radiation monitor system. On January 18, 1990, containment integrity was set in preparation for l-plant heat up.

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=2.0 PlantTours(71707)

During routine tours of the facility, the inspector noted that a number of doors marked as' fire doors did not have automatic closure devices. Auto-matic closure devices are required by paragraph 2-8.5.2 of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 97 provisions for fire doors and windows. When questioned on this issue, New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) engi-neering_ personnel provided the inspector a copy of a December 2,.1986 let-ter from Factory Mutual Research, an _ independent laboratory authorized by the NFPA to grant fire ratings. This letter authorizes an alternative to automatic closure devices for these doors: security receives a door open alarm if the door is open more than 30 seconds, and a guard is dispatched to determine the cause and ensure closure of the door.

The inspector had no further questions.

3.0 TI'2515/104 Fitness-for-Duty Training Program (25104)

On December 19, 1989, the incpector observed training of supervisors on

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-behavior observation. This training satisfies the requirements estab-lished in 10 CFR 26.22(a)(4) and (5).

The training class was part of the New Hampshire Yankee continuing training program for supervisors and man-agers, and all supervisors have_ received this training.

In addition, the inspector reviewed the following New Hampshire Yankee procedures relating i

to Fitness-for-Duty:

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11400 " Fitness for Duty Program," Revision 4

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11401 "Use of Alcoholic Beverages," Revision 3

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13402 "Use of Controlled Drugs," Revision 3

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11403 " Fitness for Duty Program Implementation," Revision 6

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The chemical, drug 'and alcohol screening program and the proscriptions against the use of drugs and alcohol described in the procedures were-found to be in compliance ~with 10'CFR 26.

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L The-inspector assessed the above Fitaess-for-Duty training and precedures as' adequate.

W 4'0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701, 37700)

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4.1 _(Closed) Unresolved Item (89-05-02): Operating Two Charging Pumps in

.i Mode 5.

On April' 29, 1989, a second charging pump was operated for-eight seconds in mode 5 with the discharge valve closeo and power H

available to the valve operator. Technical Specification (TS)

h 3.1.2.3 allows a second charging pump to be operated only if its dis--

charge valve is shut with-power removed from the operator.

The in-i spector determined that the event had no safety significance due-to the plant design but questioned the technical accuracy of the speci-

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fication bases and the format of the technical specification.

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The inspector determined through discussions with NRR that the format of TS 3.1.2.3 is similar to the format of the standard technical specification under development. Also, the basis for TS 3.1.2.3 assumes a conservative plant design and results in more restrictive requirements. The. inspector concluded that the format and bases for TS 3.1.2.3 are adequate. - Based on the appropriateness of the tech-nical specif1' cation, the licensee concluded a violation of the foot-note to the surveillance requirement of TS 3.1.2.3 had occurred and committed to issue a licensee event report.

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Based on the adequacy of Technical Specification 3.1.2.3 and the failure to meet the specification' requirements, the inspector con-

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cluded that a Level 5 violation had occurred.. Appropriate licensee

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corrective actions were initiated.

No similar violation was identi-fied. This violation is not'being cited because the 10 CFR 2, Appen-i dix C,Section V.A criteria (isolated Severity 5 event on which appropriate corrective action had been initiated) for not issuing a Notice of Violation were fulfilled.

..t This item is closed (NCV 50-443/89-05-02).

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4.-2. (Closed) Unresolved Item (89-19-01): Post-Accident Sample System.

Item 1: Establish Backup Accident Monitoring Instrumentation-

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Technical Specification 6.7.4.f requires'the use of preplanned

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operating procedures and backup instrumentation if monitoring instruments become inoperable. This specification takes effect when the plant exceeds 5% power for the first time. At the time of.the PASS inspection, the unit.had not exceeded 5% power.and backup instrumentation was not available for the middle and.high

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ranges of the-Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM). Minor Modification (MM00) 89-0627 Change Authorization (CA) I was initiated to cor-rect this deficiency. CA-1 adds a Victoreen Model 945 radiation

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monitor which-has an 8 decade range, allowing' detection of con-

centrations in the range from 2.78E-3 uCi/cc to 2.78E5 uCi/cc.

That range envelopes the top of the WRGM low range (IE-1 uCi/cc)

and the top of the range specified in' Regulatory Guide 1.97 (1ES uCi/cc). The detector and sample chamber will be enclosed in a shielded container to reduce background radiation levels at the detector. The installation was completed and the equipment was placed in service on January 5, 1990.

In addition, procedure CS 0925.15, "WRGM Mid/High Range out of Service," has been issued

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and all chemistry technicians and working foremen completed training on the procedure and equipment by January 18, 1989.

Field installation was inspected and found acceptable.

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This item is close '

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Item 2: Repair Heat Trace for the Containment Atmosphere

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Sampling Line i

The heat trace for the containment air sample line was not cap--

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able of maintaining a temperature of 300F, which is required to

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prevent condensation and plating out in the sample lines.

CA-5, CA-6, and CA-7 to Design Coordination Report (DCR) 89-0039 ad-

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dressed this problem. These.CAs changed the heat trace cable to

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a'high temperature Raychem cable, moved the heat tracing from.

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the tubing tray to the tubing, added a redundant train of heat-tracing cable, added heat tracing to sections of tubing runs which were not previously heated, and added insulation to the heated tubing. CA-10 relocated the Resistance Temperature De-tectors (RTDs) for the primary and backup temperature control-

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lers so that they sense the tubing temperature at the same loca-tion. The two sample vessels have been relocated to a heated-

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enclosure to~ prevent moisture condensation. The enclosure con-

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sists of an insulated metal box equipped with internal electric heaters, a thermostatic control, temperature indication and a thermocouple for calibration of control and indication. The

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sample vessels are mounted within the enclosure using valves ud quick-disconnects. A_similar enclosure has been fabricated for

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the Chemistry Lab in order to re-establish sample conditions for analysis. The as-installed condition of the field equipment was inspected and.found acceptable.

This item is closed.

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Item 3: Justify a 65F Heat Trace Temperature for the Plant Vent.

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. Sample Line or Increase the Heat Trace Temperature-to Prevent -

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Condensation in the Sample Line

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It could not be' demonstrated that a 65F temperature would pre-

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vent condensation in the WRGM sample lines.. CA-12 to DCR-88-0012 increased the temperature for the heat trace installed be-tween the stack sample point and the-Primary Auxiliary Building

_(PAB) wall-to'120F.

It also added new heat tracing within the'

PAB to-maintain the same 120F temperature. The heat trace por-tion _ of 'this DCR (CA-10) was completed and placed in operation on January 17, 1990.

Installation was inspected and found acceptable.

i This-item is closed.

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Item 4: Appropriate Training on Design Changes and post-Accident Sample Collection, Transport and Analysis Procedures The inspector reviewed the documentation listed in Appendix 2-and determined that, with two acceptable changes (noted below),

the procedure revisions and training referred to in Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 5.4 and 6.3 of report 50-443/89-19 were completed.

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Report 50-443/89-19, Section 4.4.1 indicates that' chemistry per-sonnel will acquire and be trained on the use of hand-held hydro-gen monitors. Health Physics (HP) personnel have obtained Exo-

tector G634P hydrogen detectors; training of HP personnel in-stead of chemistry personnel is therefore appropriate,. Training'

of HP technicians on the use of the G634P hydrogen detectors was completed January 18, 1990.

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Report 50-443/89-19, Section 5.3 discusses radiation monitors on the Main Steam Lines and conversion of dose rates to release

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rates. Corrections for two phase flow were removed from the procedures. Upon evaluation of a concern raised by the inspec-tor, NHY determined that the correction for two phase flow should-be re-inserted into the' procedures and appropriate train-

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ing conducted.

It was determined that correction for two phase j

flow was included in the initial HP technician training and re-

training was therefore not required. Re-insertion in the proce-dures was verified by the inspector.

This item is closed.

5.0 Confirmatory Issue No. 56 (92701)

This ite:n involved the installation of optical isolators in the Radiation Data. Management System. The optical isolators were reviewed and found

acceptable-in the Seabrook Station Safety Evaluation Report,-Supplement 8,-

and Region I' Inspection Report 50-443/89-19.

Full operability for these o

isolators was established on January 19,1990. The inspector had no fur-ther questions on this matter.

6.0 LER 88-009 - Premature RHR pump Thrust Bearing Failure (92700)

On December 8, 1988 testing performed by Ingersoll-Rand for New Hampshire Yankee' confirmed that premature failure'of the_ Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

pump. thrust bearing could occur. The problem was first identified on November 25, 1987 when-RHR Pump "A" was-removed from service-~due to high vibration.. Measured vibration frequency indicated degradation of the thrust bearing._ Subsequent testing revealed thrust values significantly above the design values and closely matching values calculated as neces-

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sary to cause the noted degradation.

Short-term corrective action in-

cluded replacing the-thrust bearings more often.

Long-term corrective

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action included design review by'Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse and modi-fication of the pump. internals. That modification was performed under DCR

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161 and involved reducing the diameter of the-impeller wearing ring and installation of a thicker wearing ring in the~ pump casing. The result was reduced axial thrust due to improved hydraulic balance. The design change

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was implemented and. tested on a spare Unit 2 pump prior to being applied to,the Unit 1-pumps.

Testing conducted in December 1988 at the Ingersoll-Rand facility.in Phillipsburg, N.J. verified an approximate 50% reduction in thrust loading, giving an expected bearing life of 28500 hours at worst

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case conditions.

New Hampshire Yankee is reserving 8760 hours0.101 days <br />2.433 hours <br />0.0145 weeks <br />0.00333 months <br /> of this life to provide for one year of continuous operation for long-term post accident cooling.- The inspector reviewed the related documents listed in Appendix 1 to this report and had no concerns, This item is closed.

7.0'AssessmentofQuality(40500)

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7.1. Independent Assessment of Falsification Incidents A six meraber licensee panel consisting of a chairman, three managers, a supervisor and an auditor conducted a review of two incidents in-

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volving two technicians (one Chemistry and one Health Physics) sepa-m rately falsifying plant records (documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-443/89-08, 50-443/89-09, and 50-443/89-83). A random sample of 334 logs were reviewed, 30 station staff personnel were interviewed,

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and the staff investigations were reviewed. Also, the Employee Alle-

gation Resolution Manager reviewed the NHY Employee Termination Re-ports. The inspector reviewed the licensee's December 15, 1989 report of assessment of the falsification incidents.

i Licensee panel review of station legs and security access logs found no indication'of improprieties. The panel's conclusions on the in-terviews were that the station staff were supportive of management's actions and that there was no known falsification other than the two identified incidents. The Manager of Employee Allegation Resolution raised no concerns based on review of the two employee exit inter-

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views and the employment termination reports for the chemistry and health and physics technicians who had falsified records.

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The panel recommended that enhancements be made to supervisory / manage-ment observation training programs relative to awareness of the per-sonne 1~ behavior traits common to the two technicians who' falsified records.

The inspector concluded that the licensee had' adequately addressed-the-technical and personnel issues involved with record falsifica-tions and had performed an effective independent assessment of these-events.

7.2. Corrective Action Request for Post-Maintenance Testing l

The inspector reviewed the results of Corrective Action Request (CAR)

89-0005, initiated on July 18, 1989 concerning incomplete.or inade--

quate post-maintenance testing which resulted in seven internal Sta-tion Information Reports (SIRS) over the previous five months. An

NHY multi-disciplinary team of six members led by a Technical Pro-

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l jects engineer evaluated the effectiveness of corrective actions

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The team also examined the retests associated L

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with: selected tasks of the December 1989 outage of the train "A" sys-tems and components for completeness, appropriateness, and timeli-ness. The team completed their evaluation on December 12, 1989.

A revision to the post-maintenance testing chapter of the Station Maintenance Manual became effective on May 4, 1989.

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revision required that necessary post-maintenance testing be speci-fied in the work procedure by the responsible. engineer in accordance with applicable post-maintenance testing guidance.

The team concluded that. timely and proper retests were performed..

However, several concerns ware identified with the attention to de-

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tail in specifying retest requirements and recording retest data.

The team recommended that these concerns be re-emphasized to the Technical Support Engineers and Maintenance Group personnel. Also, a

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recommendation was made to require a listing of delayed retests as

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part of the Mode Change Check list.

The inspector verified that the recommended training of the' Technical

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Support Engineers and Maintenance Group was being conducted and that additional requirements for listing required post-maintenance testing were incorporated in the mode change check list. The inspector con-cluded,-based on review of the licensee Corrective Action Request and on independent verification, that the licensee had conducted an in-depth review of the post-maintenance testing program and has imple-e mented recommendations for improving program implementation.

The inspector had no further questions on this matter.

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8.0 Maintenance (62703)

On December 19, 1989, the inspector observed alignment of safety injection pump SI-P-6A. The inspector also reviewed the following associated docu-ments:

Raoiation Work Permit 89-R-150

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Work Request 89W004506

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MS0523.26, Revision 1, Change 3, General Alignment Procedure

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The alignment was performed using the reverse dial indicator method which is permitted by procedure. Motor alignment was adjusted to less than 1/2

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the allowable tolerance. The inspector had no concerns.

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9.0 Surveillance (61726)

During routine surveillance conducted under Operating Procedure 0X1456.08,

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"SI/ Charging Pump Monthly Inoperability Check-Modes 4,5,6" on January 6

.1990, it was found that the supply breaker for safety injection pump SI-P-

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6A did not conform to the condition specified in the procedure. The breaker was racked off the bus and tagged but was not locked as required.

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0X1456.08 implements Technical Specification 3.5.3.2, "ECCS Subsystems,

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Tavg Equal to or Less Than 200. degrees F."

Surveillance Requirement 4.5.3.2 specifically requires the motor circuit breakers to be secured in the'open position. This is accomplished by racking the breaker off the bus, thus leaving it open with control power disconnected.

Locking the

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breaker is an additional step which NHY chose to impose by procedure. The

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purpose.of racking and locking out the breakers is to prevent low tempera-ture overpressurization of the. primary system.

Failure to lock out the breaker violates 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (89-20-01). The safety signific-ance of this violation was low because the Technical Specification re-

-quirement was met due to the breaker being open and racked off the bus; however, in view of the importance of attention to detail in adhering to

station procedures, this violation was assessed as requiring a formal lic-ensee review and response.

The inspector observed portions of the load test of the 1A Emergency Diesel

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Generator on January 14 and 15. The inspector reviewed the precautions listed in Station Operating Procedure EX 1804.01, Revision 3, Change 1,

" Diesel Generator 1A 18-Month Operability and Engineered Safeguards Pump and Valve Response Time Testing Mode 5 Surveillance." Activities in the contro11 room and at the diesel generator local controls were observed.

Communications were noted to be excellent, with the use of repeat-backs to ensure proper understanding. The load _ test and subsequent valve timing test were satisfactorily completed. During the 24-hour load run,_the in-spector.noted a minor head gasket leak on the #9 cylinder. This condition had also been noted by operations personnel and the system engineer had been contacted.

It was determined that the leak was not significant and the test was continued.

Subsequent consultation with the vendor by NHY resulted in a determination that extended operation (several months'of continuous operation under load) with this minor leak could lead to a warped-cylinder head. The engine would still be able to operate under load with the head warped. -NHY currently plans to install a spare head-during the outage after the 50% plateau and send'the head currently on #9 cylinder to the vendor for evaluation and any necessary repairs.

The in-spector found the. diesel test performance and licensee ~ follow-up actions acceptable.

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'10.0 Meetings with Licensee (30702, 30703)

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The resident staff attended a licensing status meeting held on January 12,

-l 1990 between NHY management and the NRC headquarters staff.

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-The resident staff also accompanied the Director, Office of Nuclear Reac-tor Regulation and-the Region I Administrator during a January 12, 1990

.I inspection tour of Emergency Response Facilities in the Massachusetts por-

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tion of the EPZ.

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The resident. staff met periodically throughout the period with site man-agement'to discuss items of mutual interest including schedule,-ongoing work, status of plant equipment and surveillance testing.

The resident. inspectors met with the station manager and members of his staff on' January 29, 1990 to discuss the results of this inspection.

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APPENDIX 1 DOCUMENTS RELATED TO RHR PUMP THRUST. BEARING ISSUES

' '4 Premature RHR Pump Thrust Bearing Failure Final Report j

J Licensee Event Report 88-009-00

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Intra-Company Business Memo, SS#45892, dated September 14, 1988 PSNH Letter CE-88-003, dated January 19, 1989

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~ Intra-Company Business Memo, CEM-89-022, dated January 10, 1989 Engineering Evaluation-89-001

1 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Letter NAH-3396, dated September 20, 1988

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~ Design Change llequer.t 88-161

Work Request (WR) 89W000952

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WR 89 WOO 4213 SKF Bearing Services Letter, Iendzurski to Leader, dated March 1,1988 H

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APPENDIX 2 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED FOR VERIFICATION OF TRAINING Emergency Response Organization Supplemental Training Lesson Plans and Attend-ance Sheets Titled " Review of WRGM Backup Monitoring Data Calculation Sheet"

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Chemistry Technician Continuing Training Program Lesson Plan No. CH1015C and Attendance Sheets Titled " Post Accident Sampling and Analysis (P. A.S.S) Proce-dures Development and Revision Supplemental Training"-

Auxiliary Operator Initial Training Program Lesson Plan'No N4504I, "Exotector G634P H Detector", and Attendance Sheets for HP Technicians

Health Physics Technician Training Lesson Plan No. HP1015C, "First Quarter 1990

- Health Physics Procedure & Equipment Changes", and Attendance Sheets l

Health Physics Continuing Training Program Lesson Plan No. HP1012C, "4th Quar-

-l ter 1989 HP Procedure and Equipment Changes", and Attendance Sheets

't Health Physics Procedure Signoff Sheets:

i HD0955.40, Rev. 00, "Use of the G634P Exotector" j

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ER 8.1, Rev. 10, "NPER (Emergency Response Manual)"

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H00955.01,-Rev. 6, " General Count Room Guidelines",

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H00955.33, Rev. 2, " Operation of the NMC Continuous Air Monitor"

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HX0958.12, Rev. 2, "HP Response to RDMS Failure"

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HN0955.41, Rev. O, " Operation of the Victoreen Model 945"

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Production Emergency _ Response-Manual;(NPER), Rev 50

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Revised Procedures:

CSO925.01, Rev. 3, " Post Accident Liquid Sampling"

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CS0925.02, Rev. 4, Change 1, " Post Accident Activity Analysis"

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CS0925.06, Rev. 2, Change 1, " Post Accident Chloride by Ion Chromotography"

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' CS0925.07, Rev. 4, " Post Accident Gas Sampling"

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CSO925.11, Rev.1, Change 1, " Post Accident Activity Analysis with OSC

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Evacuation" CSO925.14, Rev. O, "WRGM Mid/High Range out of Service"

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CS0925.15, Rev. 1, " Preparation for Post Accident Sampling with OSC

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Evacuated"

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i APPENDIX 3

OBSERVATIONS FROM REGIONAL MANAGEMENT TOUR I

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1-RH-V107 has a packing leak.

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1-CB8-LE-2385-1 has oil leaking from conduit.

3.

Secondary plant areas need cleaning up.

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A Deficiency Tag Program should be developed and implemented.

5.

Fire barriers on cable tray 86-CEVa-8605 in "A" train East Chase need to be reinstalled.

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RM 6510 and 6511 have broken glass on flow elements (WR90-0000018).

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Control room manning requirements inside the ' sacred' area should be better defined.

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Expansion joint booting on CAP exhaust in the CEVA area appears to be de-formed.

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The high point vent for 1-SW-V173 has repeatedly spilled water over the SW piping.

Installing a dedicated drain line should be considered.

10.

Develop an action plan and schedule for the Primary Drain Tank replace-ment.

11.

Evaluate removing the paint on the latching mechanism for the turbine-driven EFW pump. That might prevent an inadvertent trip of the Terry turbine.

12. Turbine building lighting appears to be dark. There is a need to evaluate and to correct any deficiencies.

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