IR 05000414/1985042

Insp Rept 50-414/85-42 on 850930-1004.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Preoperational Test Procedure Review & Test Witnessing,Hot Functional Test Witnessing & Followup Items

ML20134A433
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/28/1985
From:	Jape F, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134A432	List: IR 05000414/1985042 ML20134A429
References
50-414-85-42, NUDOCS 8511040410
Download: ML20134A433 (7)

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@ 08204 UNITED STATES

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Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No.: 50-414/85-42 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket No.: 50-414 License No.: CPPR-117 Facility Name: Catawba 2 Inspection Conducted: September 30 - October 4,1985 Inspector: @fv/M w2.<te.- #.qf (6 M. '~homas d ate Signed Approved by: h; h, /0/1 8/84 F. Jape, Section Chief (/ / Date Signed Test Programs Section, Ei.gineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 46 inspector-hours on site in the areas of preoperational test procedure review and test witnessing, hot functional test witnessing, and followup on previous enforcement matter Results: No violations or deviations were identifie O

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees y

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J. W. Hampton, Station Manager W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer

• J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services

1. C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer

1. R.'A. Jones, Unit 2 Test Engineer

1. J. A. Kammer, Hot Functional' Test Coordinator P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

• W. R. McCollum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling

• 1. F. P. Schiffley, Licensing Engineer

• E. G. Williams, Project QA Technician Other licensee employees contacted included test coordinators, engineers, technicians, and operator NRC Resident Inspectors

• 1. P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector, Operations

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1. P. K. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction

• Attended exit interview October 4, 1985

1. Attended exit interview via telecon October 7, 1985 Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 4 and via telecon on October 7,1985, with those percons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 414/85-42-01, Followup licensee resolution of low oil level in aiesel generator 2A governor - paragraph IFI 414/85-42-02, Followup on resolution of discrepancies identified during Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Cooldown Functional Test - para-graph 6.d.(1).

- IFI 414/85-42-03, Resolve question concerning location of controls on the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine control panel for steam generators 2A and 2B - paragraph 6.d.(2).

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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

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to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 414/85-12-01, concerning inadequate procedure and failure to follow procedure which resulted in overpressurization of portions of the-residual heat removal (RHR) syste (Closed) Violation 414/85-12-02, concerning overpressurization of the volume

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control tank (VCT) and other portions of the chemical and volume control system (CVCS).

4 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the above violations, dated Aune 28, 1985, and verified that the stated corrective actions had been completed. The overpressurization events were also reported to NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e), as report no. SD 414/85-06, dated May 22, 1985, for t% VCT, and report No. SD 414/85-08, dated May 31, 1985, for the RHR -

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system. The design evaluations and related corrective actions are addressed in these report Followup on resolution of the 50.55(e) items will be discussed in subsequent inspection reports by the resident inspecto . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

j Preoperational Test Procedure Review (70300, 70304, 70336, 70352)

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The inspector- reviewed the preoperational (preop) tests listed below to verify that they were consistent with applicable sections of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapters 5, 6, 8, and 14; Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and its supplements; Regulatory Guides 1.68, 1.68.2, 1.79, and 1.10 The following procedures were reviewed

TP/2/A/1200/02A, Residual Heat Removal System Functional Test TP/2/A/1200/028, Residual Heat Removal System (Hot) Functional Test

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TP/2/A/1200/03E, Safety Injection System Check Valve Functional Test

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! TP/2/A/1400/14A, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel 2A Functional Test TP/2/A/1400/14B, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel 28 Functional Test

! TP/2/A/1400/14C, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Control Panel Functional Test

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TP/2/A/1400/15, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Cooldown Functional Test

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The procedures were reviewed for conformance to administrative control This included verifying that pertinent prerequisites were identified, initial test conditions and' system status were specified, acceptance

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criteria specified, the required reviews were performed, and management approval was indicate No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte . Preoperational Test Witnessing (70312, 70314, 70315, 70441, 70452)

The inspector witnessed portions of the preop tests discussed below. Some of the tests were being performed at various temperature and pressure plateaus as part of the overall hot functional testing (HFT) sequence. The tests were witnessed to verify that:

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Appropriate revisions of the procedures were available and in use by test personne Test prerequisites were me Personnel involved in the tests were briefed prior to beginning the test Proper plant systems were in servic Special. test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in servic The tests were performed in accordance with requirement Adequate coordination among personnel involved in the tes Test data were collected and recorded in the proper manne Problems encountered during testing were properly identified and documented for evaluatio The following tests were reviewed: TP/2/A/1100/01, Controlling Procedure for Hot Functional Testing, Section 12.3, which covers the reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown from normal operating temperature and pressure. This section also coordinates all other testing to be performed during the cooldown, TP/2/A/1100/02A, Diesel Generator 2A Preoperational Functional Test, Sections 13.8 and 13.11. Section 13.8 verifies the proper operation of engine controls when diesel generator (DG) 2A is started from the main control room. This test was being' run in conjunction with Section 13.11, which is the procedure for the 35 consecutive start verification

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tests, which demonstrates that DG 2A can be successfully started and loaded to 3500 KW and run for 60 minutes 35 consecutive times without a valid failure (as specified iii Regulatory Guide 1.108).

During testing on October 1,1985, DG 2A output breaker tripped on overcurrent on two separate occasions. Each trip occurred.during the 60 minute load run. Licensee personnel stated that the meter indicating DG ' output power was oscillating just before each tri Durin'g troubleshooting after the first trip, the licensee discovered that the oil level was low in DG 2A governor, so oil was added. The governor oil level was found to be low after the second trip also. Oil was added again and several start verification tests were run successfully without any further problems with the governor oil leve During further review of this problem, it was learned that a 24-hour load run and over 20 start verification tests had been run on DG 2A prior to the trips on ' October The only significant problem encountered during those tests was a problem with the voltage regulator which resulted in a tri This occurred after approximately ten consecutive start verification tests. The licensee determined that trip to be a valid failur The voltage regulator was replaced and approximately 11 more consecutive start verification tests had been run when the trips occurred on October 1. Based on the tests which had been run prior to October 1,1985, and the several tests which had been run after oil was added to the governor the second time, the licensee concluded that the low oil level in the governor led to the trips on October 1, 1985. The licensee determined the trips to be valid failures. During further discussions of this problem, .the inspector raised the question of why was the oil level low in the governor, given that the oil level should not decrease under normal condition Licensee personnel speculated that since there were no signs of external oil leakage, there could be either a small internal oil leak or a problem with their method of monitoring governor oil level. The licensee stated that the governor oil level will continue to be monitored during DG 2A testing and appropriate corrective actions will be taken if another decrease in oil level is observed. The inspector informed the licensee that fcllowup on this problem will be done during future inspections. This item will be tracked as IFI 414/85-42-01, Resolve ouestion of low oil level problem in DG 2A governor, c. TP/2/A/1200/03E, Safety Injection System Check Valve Functional Test, Sections 12.4 and 12.5. This test demonstrates the abil.ity of various emergency core cooling system (ECCS) components to supply flow through the ECCS injection lines and proper operation of the injection lines check valves. This is done while the RCS is at the operating conditions of the various components. Section 12.4, safety injection pumps and hot leg injection check valves test and Section 12.5, cold leg accumulators and check valves test, were witnessed. This test was part of the HFT sequenc . .

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, TP/2/A/1400/15, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Cooldown Functional Test, Section 12.2. This portion of the test demonstrates the ability to cool down the RCS by lowering the RCS temperature and pressure s

sufficiently frokhot standby conditions (starting with RCS temperature 350 F at andapproxiinately 385 psig) where 400RCS F) temperature to permit operation will be lowered of the another RHR system 50 (T using RH This section of the test is to be performed outside the main control roo (1) There were several discrepancies written during performance of the

test on October 4,198 Two of the discrepancies concerned problems encountered during attempts to operate the RHR system

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from the auxiliary shutdown panels (ASP). A discrepancy was

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written during attempts to operate RHR system train A when valve 2ND-1B (RHR pump 2A suction from RCS loop B) could not be automatically opened from the ASP. Attempts to manually open the valve locally also proved unsuccessful. The licensee then switched to RHR system train B. Train B of RHR could not be put into operation either because train B of component cooling water could not be supplied to train B RHR from locations outside the main control room. Valve 2KC-81B (component cooling water to RHR heat exchanger 28 supply isolation valve) could not be opened locally because the valve handwheel was missing. This valve can be opened either automatically from the main control room or locally, but not from the AS Rather than delay the test in order to locate a Sandwheel for the valve, the licensee decided to open the valve from the main control room. A test discrepancy was written for the ,nissing handwheel and for the valve being opened from the main control room. After transferring to RHR, the RCS was successfully cooled down another 50 During discussions with the licensee on October 7 and 8, 1985, it was stated that valve 2ND-1B was opened after completion of the tes The apparent problem with the valve was that it was stuck on its sea The licensee stated that additional corrective actions will be taken after completion of HFT to ensure that the valve operates properly. The licensee also committed to replace the handwheel on valve 2KC-81B and prior to transferring to the

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RHR system, verify that it can be opened. This will be done prior to completing HFT, during cooldown from the second system heatup for RCS thermal expansion monitoring. The inspector informed the licensee tnat followup on resolution of the above discrepancies, as well as others identified during the test, will be done during future inspections. This item will be ' tracked as IFI 414/85-42-02, Resolution of discrepancies identified during performance of auxiliary shutdown panel cooldown tes (2) The inspector noted another item while observing the above test from the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine control panel (AFWPTCP).

.The controller used for operating valve 2CA64 (steam generator 2A auxiliary feedwater flow control valve) is located directly

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beneath the instrumentation displaying steam generator 28 parameters. Also, the controller for valve 2CA52 (steam generator 28 auxiliary feedwater flow control valve) is located directly beneath the instrumentation displaying steam generator 2A parameters. Since steam generator level and auxiliary feedwater flow are among the parameters displayed, the inspector expressed concern over possible operating errors due to the location of the instrumentation'and controls for steam generators A and B on the AFWPTC The licensee stated that item will be reviewed and appropriate corrective actions taken. This item will be tracked for followup as IFI 414/85-42-03, Resolve question concerning location of controls on the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine control panel for steam generators 2A and 2 No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte ,

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