IR 05000413/1985052

Insp Repts 50-413/85-52 & 50-414/85-62 on 851126-1225.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on Identified Items,Plant Operations,Surveillance & Maint Observations & Observation of Preoperational Testing

ML20137S460
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/05/1986
From:	Brownlee V, Skinner P, Van Doorn K, Vandorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137S429	List: IR 05000413/1985052 ML20137S424
References
TASK-***, TASK-TM 50-413-85-52, 50-414-85-62, NUDOCS 8602180055
Download: ML20137S460 (12)

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Report Nos.: ' 50-413/85-52 and 50-414 '85-62

. Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC- 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and'50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and'CPPR-117 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: vember 26 - December 25, 1985 Inspectors: ,- , /4#A/ Mv _j _$ [4 P. H. Skinne > // Fate Signed

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Approved.by: /AQM (/dYbhW V.VL'. B(/srflee, Acting SectionMhief ( MNN Ost6 Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY

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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 103 inspector-hours on. site in the areas of followup of licensee and NRC identified items (Units 1 and 2);

plant operations (Unit 1); surveillance observation (Unit 1); maintenance observations (Unit 1); observation of preoperational testing (Unit 2); review of administrative ~ control of operating procedures; and review of TMI action items (Units 1 and 2).

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie ,

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. W. Hampton, Station Manager E. M. Couch, Project Manager H. L. Atkins, QA Engineering Supervisor H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

• W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer T. B. Bright, Construction Engineering Manager

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• R. N. Casler, Shift Operating Enginee *B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent J. W. Cox, Superintendent,. Technical Services T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer L. R. Davidson, Project QA Manager J. R. Ferguson, Assistant.0perating Engineer

• C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer R. A. Jones, Test Engineer C. S. Kelly, Instrumentation / Electrical Technical Support P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer T. D. Mills, Construction Engineer, Electrical C. L. Ray, Principal Design Engineer T. Robertson, Construction Engineer

• F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent

• D. Tower, Operating Engineer

'Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection. scope and findings were summarized on December 23, 1985, with those persons-indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this. inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) (Unit 1)

! (0 pen) Violation 413/85-43-01: Failure to Follow QA -Procedure for Control of Nonconforming Item The response for this i t tin was submitted on December 6, 1985. The inspector verified that corrective actions described in the response were completed. Licensee actions are acceptable, however, the QA Surveillance of Nonconforming Item Reports

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has identified findings requiring licensee followup. This item remains open pending review of this licensee followu (0 pen) Unresolved Item 414/85-56-02: Evaluation of Cold Spring in Safety-Related ' Piping. The licensee had reported this . issue as potentially reportable on November 8,1985. The licensee reported on-December 3, 1985, that technical evaluation of the cold sprirg incidents had shown that the piping was acceptable as is and therefore the item was not reportabl The NRC reviewed this evaluation and documented this review in NRC Report 50-414/85-63. During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the affidavits of those personnel interviewed by the licensee's investigators. The affidavits affirm the incidents that the licensee has investigated and do not identify other technical issues. The licensee is preparing a report of the investigation and evaluating the need for personnel actio This item remains open pending further review of licensee action No violations or de/iations were identifie . Licensee Identified Items 50.55(e) (99020) (Unit 2) The inspector reviewed interim licensee actions relative to Diesel Gerierator 2B main bearing failures. The licensee informed the NRC on November 25, 1985 and December 5, 1985 that _No. 7 mairi bearing had failed on November 20, 1985 and again on December 5, 198 On December 19, 1985, the licensee informed the NRC that this was a potentially reportable item. The inspector observed the first failed bearing and held discussions with licensee personnel as to their evaluation of this problem. Duke vendors (Delaval and FAA Corp.) are performing failure analysi Preliminary information indicates possible installation errors, however, evaluation is still in progres Further inspection of this problem will be conducte The inspector ~ reviewed interim licensee evaluation of a problem relative to a missin'g closure spring om of the Pressurizer PORV Thi.s was one of two springs which close the valve upon loss of non-safety-related instrument air. Duke informed NRC that this was a potentially reportable item on December 6, 198 The licensee's preliminary evaluation has shown that the valve ' was from a lot different than the other PROVs on both units and the valve would have

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closed on loss of air but may not have met response time. The licensee has performed system pressure valve timing tests with air available which would not have detected the missing sprin It should be noted that a safety-related modification which supplies nitrogen to these valves for closing has been implemented for Unit 2 and is planned for Unit Unit 1 valves were declared operable based on ' the above information and available operable block valve No violations or deviations were identifie m

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3 Previously Identified Inspector Findings (92701) (Unit 2)

(Closed) Inspector Followup ~ Item 414/85-63-03: Duke Audits of Bahnson. The inspector reviewed two corporate QA audits dated August 1, 1984 and October 16, 1985 of FLAKT/Bahnson Corporation. ' Attributes considered in this inspection were audits performed as scheduled, . appropriate areas reviewed, documentation, review and approval, disposition of findings and followup of corrective action Licensee actions are acceptabl . Plant Operations Review (Unit 1) (71707 and 71710) The ' inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Tech.nical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, danger tag outs, Technical Specification Action Item . Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewe Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedure The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, that measures taken to assure ' physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and procedures followe In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance and construction ~ activitie On December 19, 1985, the utility experienced a failure in the auxiliary building ventilation system. One of the ventilation exhaust fans required replacemen Since this replacement could not be performed within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action statement of TS 3.7.7, the utility requested relief from this TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) on a one time basis as discussed in NRC correspondence EGM-85-05A dated November 21, 1985. Since the system would still perform its intended

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function if an emergency occurred the region extended the corrective action time by 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. This fan was repaired and returned to service about 2:00 a.m. on December 2 No violations or deviations were identifie _

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4 Surveillance Observation (61726) (Unit 1)

During the- inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical . of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventilation, and direct current electrical power source The inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the approved written procedurss, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than' the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne Typical of the surveillance items that were witnessed in part or in full were various calibrations of the nuclear instrumentation, radiation monitoring systems instrumentation, auxiliary feedwater system testing, and turbine stop valve testin No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observations (62703) (Unit 1)

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain . that they were conducted in accordance with the requirements. .The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection: the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations. were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and parts and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may effect system performanc No violations or deviations were identifie . Preoperational Test Program Implementation (70302 and 71302) (Unit 2) The inspector conducted tours to verify that turned-over equipment was adequately protected and controlled. This review included observation of construction activities, observation for fire hazards and observa-tion of security boundarie The inspector observed conduct of portions of the Engineered Safeguards Features Functional Test. This included attendance at a coordination meeting, discussions with the test program director and test engineers, general observation of testing and operations in the control room and observation of the test described in Section 12.1 of TP/2/A/1200/03 .- -. - . .. _

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This inspection was performed to assess whether the licensee was conducting a well organized program, personnel had a good understanding of responsibilities and conduct of specific. tests, control or organiza-tional interfaces was ~ good, and procedures were properly approve Additional documentation of this inspection is described in Report No. 50-414/85-6 The inspector also reviewed Nonconforming Item Reports to determine if documentation was clear and complete and whether appropriate resolution and corrective action was specifie No violations or deviations were identifie .

1 Plant Procedures (42400B) (Unit 2)

Requirements for plant operational procedures are contained in the FSAR, Chapter 13.4; TS 6.8; Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, and ANSI 18.7-197 The licensee has established procedure controls via various manuals such as the Station Directives (SD) Manual, the Administrative Policy Manual (APM),

and the Operations Management Procedures (OMP) Manual. The inspector reviewed these ' manuals generally and also reviewed specific procedures from these manuals in more detail to verify that the licensee had an administra-tively well controlled process for procedures in areas such as admiristra-tion, general plant operation, startup and shutdown of safety-related systems, abnormal operations, emergency operations, control of radioacti-vity, control of measuring and test equipment, maintenance, chemical and radiochemical activities, testing, security, refueling, emergency plans and technical support. Procedures specifically reviewed included:

SD 2.3.1 - Control of Test and Measuring Equipment SD 2.3.2 - Control of Process ~ Instrumentation used as Test and Measuring Equipment SD 3.1.2 - Access to Containment SD 3.1.3 - Recall of Station Personnel SD 3.1.10 - Control Room Access and Control SD 3.1.18 - Investigation of Reactor Trip SD 4.2.1 - Development, Approval and Use of Station Procedures SD 4.2.2 - Independent Verification Requirements SD 4.4.3 - Temporary Station Modifications APM 4.1 - Administrative Instructions for Preoperational Test Procedures

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.APM 4.2 -' Administrative Instructions for Permanent Station Procedures APM 4.3 - Administrative Instructions for Temporary Sta. tion Procedures OMP 1-5 - Independent Verification 0MP 1-10 - Shift Manning and Overtime Requirements

.0MP 2-5 - Operations Work List and Technical Memorandums OMP 2-17 - Control Room and Unit Supervisor Logbooks OMP 2-22 - Shift Turnover 0MP 2-25 - Temporary Operating Instructions and Periodic Tests The above documents were reviewed to verify that:

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' Administrative controls have been established for the preparation, approval, changes, and revision of plant procedures

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Responsibilities have been established and assigned for the revision and approval of plant procedures

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Controls have been established for the format of procedures, distribution, disposal of outdated procedures, handling of temporary changes and the training organization appraisal of changes to procedures

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Controls are provided- that govern the preparation and use of various types of operating logs, shift turnover activities and log reviews

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Controls are provided in the preparation of plant procedures which takes in to consideration 10 CFR 50.59 requirement to ensure that an unreviewed safety question doesn't exist

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Controls are provided in the preparation of plant procedures which takes into consideration ALARA concepts regarding radiological conditions as applicable

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Controls 'are provided for issuance, review, updating, approval, and limitations of standing orders (Technical Memorandums).

In addition, the inspector reviewed 11 various procedure master files to verify that procedures were controlled and approved in accordance with requirements. The inspector also reviewed five procedures in the control room to verify that the latest procedures were available. The inspector verified that a shift supervisor understands the system for control of temporary procedure changes. Finally, the inspector reviewed the active Technical Memorandums to verify that they were properly controlled and not being used in lieu of appropriate procedure changes.

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No violations or deviations were identifie >

11. TMI Action Plan Verification (Units I and 2)

This inspection was conducted to verify the adequacy of implementation of licensee commitments made to the NRC. The commitments were made in response to the requirements of NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident, published May 1980, Revised August 1980; NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, published November 1980; and NUREG-0694, TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses, published June 198 The verification adequacy was based upon personal observations in the plant and review of licensee drawings, procedures, and documents. The specifics are centained in each paragrap The following items for Unit 2 are being closed based on the specific item actions- which are applicable to both Units 1 and The item being ' closed is identified in the left column and the report that-discusses the verification of adequacy is shown in the right colum I.A. /84-63 I.A. /84-63 I.A. /84-29 I. /84-63 I. '413/84-106 I. /84-29

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I. /84-63 I.C 7 414/84-34 I. /84-34 II. /85-20 II. /84-29 II.E. /84-87 II.K. /84-29

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II.K.2.13 413/84-29 II.K.2.17 413/84-29 II.K.2.19 413/84-29

, II.K. /S4-29 II.K. /84-29 II.K. /84-29 II.K. /84-29 II.K.3.10 413/84-29 II.K.3.12 413/84-29 II.K.3.17 413/84-29 II.K.3.25 ~413/84-29 II.K.3.31 413/84-29

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i II.E.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater Initiation and Indication (Unit 2)

Safety Evaluation Report paragraph 7.3.2.6 states that the automatic

initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater is part of ESFAS and a single auxiliary feedwater flow indicator is provided in the control room for

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each steam generator. The inspector verified the installation of the f

flow indicators by direct observation of the control panel The highly reliable power supply installation was verified by review of auxiliary feedwater system elementary diagrams. This item is close I.B.1.2, Evaluation of Organization and Management Improvements of Near-Term Operating License Applicants (Units 1 and 2)

SER paragraph 13.4.3 requires an Independent Safety Engineering Group

.to be implemented at Catawba essentially identical to that currently in ,

place at McGuire Nuclear Station. The Independent Safety Engineering 1 group has been implemented at Catawba and TS 6.2.3 addresses the functions of this group. This item is close II.B.1, Reactor Coolant System Vents (Units 1 and 2)

SER paragraph 5.4.5 addresses the reactor vessel head vents and ,

pressurizer vents. The proposed systems have been reviewed by NRC and '

found to be acceptabl The inspector observed the as-built configuration and controls to determine conformance to FSAR submittal In addition, procedures that specify use of these components have been reviewed to assure inclusion of adequate operating instructions. Based on this action, this item is close II.D.3, Relief and Safety Valve Indication (Unit 2)

SER paragraph 7.5.5.2 states that stem mounted limit switches are used for power operated relief valve position indication. The safety valve positions are detected by a acoustic flow detection syste The inspector verified the installation of the acoustic flow detectors and Bar Graph Monitor Panel by visual observation of the field installa-tion. This item is close II.G.1, Emergency Power for Pressurizer Equipment (Unit 2)

SER paragraph 8.4.12 states _that th'e power operated relief valve (PORV)

dc_ solenoids are powered from a Class IE 125 Vdc system. The PORV block valves are powered from the Class IE 600 Vac essential auxiliary power syste Two of the three PORV/PORV block valve combinations receive power from a Division.B source and the third from a Division source. The compressors supplying . air _ to the PORVs are supplied from the 4160 Vac blackout auxiliary power system. And the three redundant pressurizer level instrumentation channels are powered from the vital instrumentation buses. The inspector has verified 'the vital power supply by review of the Mechanical Instrument and Control List. This item is close . . -. . ..

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g. II.E.3.1, Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heaters (Unit 2)

Position II.E.3.1 of NUREG-0737 -lists various requirements for the power supply to the pressurizer heaters. Table 1.9-1 of the Catawba FSAR describes the specifics of how Catawba meets the NUREG require-ment There are two groups of pressurizer heaters (each rated at 416 kW) for each Catawba unit, which can be supplied from offsite power or from the

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onsite emergency power syste The applicant has verified that one heater group has- the capability to maintain natural circulation under hot standby condition Each group of heaters has access to only one

. Class 1E division power suppl If the pressurizer heaters are being supplied from the emergency onsite system, they will be automatically load shed upon the occurrence of an SI. The SI and the diesel generator load. sequencer must both be reset before the operator can manually reload the pressurizer heaters onto the emergency power sources. These resets and the manual controls for the pressurizer heater feeder breaker are located in the control roo Procedures for manually loading the pressurizer heaters onto the emergency peser. sources following an SI are available to the operato NRR reports in Catawba SER, Section 8.4.11 that the above provisions meet the requirements of TMI Item II.E.3.1 and are, therefore, acceptabl This item is close h. I.C.1, Short-Term Accident Analysis and Procedures Revision (Units 1 and 2)

SSER 4 paragraph 13.5.2 stated that NRR's review concluded that the Catawba writer's guide, verification / validation crogram, and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) training program provided acceptable methods for meeting the objectives of- NUREG-0899, " Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Operating Procedures", and are adequate for development of E0Ps for_ coping with accident and transient condition The issued E0Ps for Units 1 and ~ have been written and validated based on these guidelines. The E0Ps have been reviewed in part during a team inspection conducted f rom May 4-18, 1984, in addition to frequent reviews conducted by the resident inspectors. Based on these reviews, this item is close . II.E.1.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Reliability (Unit 2)

On the basis of its review, NRR staff concluded that the auxiliary feedwater system (AWS) meets the requirements of GDC 2, 4, 5, 19, 34,

- 44,' 45, and 46 with respect to p otection against natural phenomena, missiles, and environmental effects, shared systems and operational c capability from the control room, decay heat removal, cooling water

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capability, inservice inspection functional testing; and the guidelines of RG 1.29 and BTPs ASB 10-1 and RSB 5-1 concerning seismic classifi-cation, power diversity, and the recommendations of NUREG-0611 concerning generic improvements to the AFWS design, procedures, and TS and AFWS reliability, except with regard to loss of the primary source

~ of condensate storage wate The staff required that a condition be placed in the license r'e quiring that before fuel loading, design modifications be made by the applicant which are satisfactory to the staf The AFWS. met the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 10. except as noted abov SER, Supplement 2, Section 10.4.9 states that by letter dated September 28, 1983, the applicant stated that valve CA103 had been remove (Note: This was a typographical error, the correct designation should be CA130). Removing this valve will not block the water from the primary water source to the auxiliary feedwater (AFW)

pumps. The staff found this acceptabl An onsite review confirms that the valve was remove This item is close I.A.2.1, Immediate Upgrading of R0 and SRO Training and Qualifications (Units 1 and 2)

A review perform'ed by NRR, the results of which were reported in the Catawba SER, Section 13.2.3, identified that Duke Power Company (DPC)

has satisfied the requirements of this task of the action pla DPC has developed Operations Management Procedure (OMP) 3-1, Conduct of Operator Training, which uses the guidance of Denton's March 28, 1980 letter on Qualifications of Reactor Operators and procedures contained in NUREG-1021, Revision In addition, TS 6.4, " Training", also requires'the training and experience-requirements addressed in Denton's March 28, 1980 letter be met. A review of OMP 3-1 indicates that Attachment 3 does not contain the requiremont that an applicant for senior operator licenses shall have held an operator's license for one yea This area was discussed. with DPC managemen DPC management-stated that a TS change is going to be proposed to request a modification of this are Pending this submittal and NRR review of the pronosals, this item will be identified as an Inspector Followup Item 413/85-52-01, 414/85-62-01: Revision of OMP 3-1 for Senior Operator License Applicants. This TMI action item will remain open pending resolution of. this issu II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability (Units 1 and 2)

A review performed by NRR, the results of which were reported in the Catawba SER, Section 6.2.4 revealed that except for'two confirmatory items concerning containment purging and design provisions for isolation barr!ers, the containment isolation system design 1:

acceptable and meets the requirements of GDC 1, 2, 4, 16, 54, 55, 56, and 57 and Appendix K to 10 CFR 5 _

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In Section 6.2.4 of SER, Supplement 2, it was reported that the additional documentation required to confirm the applicant's statement that the. design provisions for containment isalation barriers (e.g.,

Quality Group B, seismic Category I, protection from pipe whip and jets) had been received and it had been confirmed that the appropriate design provisions for containment isolation barriers have been provided

'- - in the Catawba desig . In Section 6.2.4 of -SER, Supplement 4, the staff has reviewed additional information provided by DPC. The staff determined.that the information submitted demonstrated the ability of the purge'9alves to function as required in the event of a design base accident and were tnerefore acceptabl Based on this review, this item is close . II.K.1, IE Bulletin on Measures to Mitigate Small-Break LOCAs and Loss of Feedwater Accident (Unit 2)

SER Item C.1.5: FSAR Table 1.9-1 states that a . complete review of Engineered Safety Features valves receiving a safety injection or containment isolation was to verify response time and positioning was conducted. Correct valve positioning and control would be accomplished by operating procedure The inspector reviewed the following procedures to verify the implementation of valve control: (1) OMP 4-1, Revision 9, Procedure Writing Guide; (2) OMP 1-4, Revision 25, Use of Procedures; and (3) OMP 2-18, Revision 12, Tagout/ Removal and Restoration (R&R) Procedur The implemented controls appear sati sfactor SER Item'C.1.10: FSAR Table 1.9-1 describes various controls for valve'

positioning, redundant system operability checks prior to removing system from' service, system operability checks when returning to service after maintenance, safety tagging systems, operator notifica-tions and shift turnovers. Some of these controls were embodied in the procedures referenced in the previous paragraph (Item C.1.5). The following additional procedures wers reviewed to verify incorporation of the controls: (1) OMP 1-8, Revisior. 5, Authority and Responsibility of Licensed R0s and Licensed SR0s; (2) OMP 2-17, Revision 14, Control Room and Unit Supervisors Logbooks; (3) OMP 2-22, -Revision 12, Shift

. Turnover; (4) Catawba Nuclear Station Directive 3.3.2(m), Revision 1, Control of the Maintenance Program; and (5) OMP 2-29,^ Revision 9, TS Logbook. The implemented controls appear to be satisfactor SER Item C.1.7: FSAR Table 1.9-1 states that Catawba Nuclear Station l does not have this safety injection featur ]

Based on the above information, this item is close :

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