IR 05000346/2002002
| ML021060078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/2002 |
| From: | Christine Lipa NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Bergendahl H FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-002 | |
| Download: ML021060078 (21) | |
Text
ril 15, 2002
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-346/02-02
Dear Mr. Bergendahl:
On March 31, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on March 29, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, Original signed by Christine A. Lipa Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-346/02-02 See Attached Distribution
See Previous Concurrence DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DAVI\DAV 2002 002 drp.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:"C" = Copy without enclosure "E"= Copy with enclosure"N"= No copy OFFICE RIII RIII NAME LCollins:dtp CLipa DATE 04/11/02 04/15/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
REGION III==
Docket No: 50-346 License No: NPF-3 Report No: 50-346/02-02(DRP)
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Dates: February 16, 2002, through March 31, 2002 Inspectors: S. Thomas, Senior Resident Inspector D. Simpkins, Resident Inspector J. House, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by: Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000346-02-02, on 02/16-03/31/2002, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covers a 6-week routine inspection conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialists. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
A. Inspection Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee Identified Findings A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. This violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operators began a plant power reduction on February 15, 2002 in preparation for refueling outage 13. The plant was shutdown on February 16. On March 7, the licensee identified significant degradation of the reactor vessel head material adjacent to control rod drive mechanism penetration #3. The plant remained shut down for the entire inspection period due to an extended refueling outage.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the #2 emergency diesel generator to verify that the redundant train was in the correct lineup while the #1 emergency diesel generator was inoperable due to planned maintenance. The inspectors used the system checklist and drawings listed at the end of this report to determine the correct lineup. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders (WO) and condition reports (CR) associated with the #2 emergency diesel generator to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. The inspectors used the information contained in the applicable sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and the Technical Specifications (TS) to determine the functional requirements of the system. During the walkdown, the inspectors also observed the material condition of the equipment to verify that there were no significant conditions not already in the licensees work control system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed at the end of this report, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use, that fire detectors
and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits, and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.
The following areas were inspected:
containment;
number 1 electrical isolation room;
number 2 electrical isolation room; and
battery room 2.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed systems to verify that the licensee properly implemented the maintenance rule for structures, systems, or components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:
whether the SSC was properly scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
whether the performance problem constituted a maintenance rule functional failure;
the proper safety significance classification;
the proper 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSC; and
the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).
The above aspects were evaluated by using the maintenance rule scoping and report documents listed at the end of this report. For each SSC reviewed, the inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and CRs listed at the end of this report to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered in the licensees corrective action system.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following SSCs:
main steam system;
nuclear fuel; and
250/125VDC and 120V instrument AC.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities or weather conditions that may have impacted one or more safety significant systems. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The licensees daily configuration risk assessments, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, and the documents listed at the end of this report were used by the inspectors to verify that the equipment configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were being communicated to the necessary personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance activities:
reactor head repairs; and
ultimate heat sink/decay heat removal icing issues.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions (71111.14)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed operator conduct during the performance of the second deep drain subsequent to the completion of steam generator eddy current testing. The inspectors verified that the evolution was conducted in a safe and conservative manner and performed in accordance with applicable TSs requirements, operations procedures, and facility administrative procedures.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected condition reports which discussed potential operability issues for a risk significant components or systems. These condition reports were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components or systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the
TSs and USAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the conditions reports listed below to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were necessary to maintain operability, the inspectors verified by review of the documents listed at the end of the report that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled.
The conditions evaluated were:
decay heat pump 2 oil problems; and
argon blanket used instead of the required nitrogen blanket for an electrical penetration.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating and support systems to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of TS and the USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end of this report; to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and verify that the post-maintenance testing performed adequately demonstrated that the maintenance was successful and that operability was restored. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The following activity was observed and evaluated:
decay heat removal system train 1 valve test.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage (71111.20)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed activities associated with the refueling outage which began on February 16, 2002. The inspectors reviewed the reactor coolant system (RCS)
cooldown rate, configuration management, clearance activities, reduced RCS inventory operations, shutdown risk management, conformance to applicable procedures, and compliance with TSs. The following major activities were also observed:
RCS cooldown and the transition to placing the decay heat removal system into service;
reactor fuel handling evolutions;
draining the RCS from reactor flange level to 26" (approximately the level of the top of the RCS hot legs); and
the initial evaluation of the reactor vessel head nozzle repairs.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance procedures (SPs) met TS, USAR, and licensee procedural requirements, and also demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in verifying mitigating systems capability. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the testing met the TS frequency requirements; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded.
The following tests were observed and evaluated:
core flood tank 1 refueling check valve test;
4160 system transfer and lockout test buses C1 and C2; and
emergency diesel generator 2 monthly test.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
.1 Plant Walkdowns, Radiological Boundary Verifications and Radiation Work Permit Reviews a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted walkdowns of selected portions of the radiologically protected area (RPA) including high and locked high radiation areas and areas within the Auxiliary
and Containment Buildings where significant radiological work was occurring to verify the adequacy of radiation area boundaries and postings. Confirmatory radiation measurements were taken in order to verify that those areas were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures and TSs. The inspectors walked down areas having the potential for airborne activity and assessed the adequacy of the licensees continuous air monitoring systems and contamination control process. Selected radiation work permits (RWPs) for radiologically significant work being conducted during RFO13 were reviewed to verify that they contained adequate work controls, including protective clothing requirements and electronic dosimetry alarm set points for both dose rate and accumulated dose.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Job-In-Progress Reviews a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed work occurring in the refueling areas of the Containment and Auxiliary Buildings including fuel transfer and fuel sipping operations. Reactor vessel head inspection/repair activities and maintenance work on a purification demineralizer were also observed. Radiation work permit requirements and the As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) briefing packages for selected jobs were reviewed.
The inspectors verified that dosimetry placement including multiple badging, electronic dosimetry alarm set points, job site radiological surveys, radiological exposure estimates, contamination controls, airborne monitoring for radioactive materials, and postings were adequate, given the varying radiological conditions for the ongoing radiological work.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 High Risk Significant, High Dose Rate High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees controls, including procedures and surveillance data, for areas having elevated radiation levels. During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed areas that met the definition of high radiation areas and locked high radiation areas (LHRA) to verify that they were adequately posted and secured as required by 10 CFR Part 20 and the site TSs. There was one Performance Indicator occurrence for this area that was identified by the licensee and is documented in Section 4OA7.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Radiation Worker Performance a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated radiation worker (radworker) performance by observing the use of low dose waiting areas and proper use of protective clothing, based on RWP requirements. Radiological conditions were discussed with radworkers to determine worker awareness of significant radiological conditions and electronic dosimetry set points. Radiological problem condition reports were reviewed to determine if weaknesses in radworker performance had been identified, evaluated, and corrected.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Radiation Protection Technician Performance a. Inspection Scope Radiation protection technician performance was evaluated with respect to radiological work requirements. During work evolutions, the inspectors observed job coverage, contamination control, exit boundaries, and oversight of radworkers. The inspectors also reviewed technician response to radiological incidents. Radiological problem condition reports were reviewed to determine if technician errors had been identified, evaluated, and corrected.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
.1 Job Site Inspection and ALARA Control a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed jobs being performed in areas of elevated dose rates, examined exposure estimates and work sites, and evaluated selected RWPs, along with the associated ALARA briefing packages, to verify that worker radiological exposure was minimized. The inspectors also attended selected ALARA Review Committee meetings. Protective clothing requirements, dosimeter use including radiotelemetry dosimetry, and electronic dosimeter alarm set points for both dose rate and accumulated dose were evaluated. The use of engineering controls was also reviewed to verify that worker exposures were maintained ALARA.
The inspectors attended selected pre-job ALARA and work control briefings and observed portions of work evolutions to verify that adequate work controls were in place to maintain worker exposures ALARA. During job site walkdowns, radworkers and supervisors were observed to determine if low dose waiting areas were being used
appropriately and to evaluate the effectiveness of job supervision including equipment staging, use of shielding, availability of tools, and work crew size.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the Performance Indicator (PI) data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy for the Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours PI in the Initiating Events cornerstone. The time period evaluated included all 2001 data. The inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 1. The inspectors reviewed the licensees computerized data sources and logs to gather information regarding reactor power history, and compared that information to what was reported by the licensee.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up a. Inspection Scope Following a bottom up ultrasonic test of reactor head nozzle 3, the licensee identified cracks and began repairing the nozzle. During the repair on March 7, 2002, an area of significant reactor vessel head degradation was identified. Subsequent to the discovery of the reactor vessel head cavity, the inspectors evaluated the initial information about the issue provided by the licensee and communicated this information to Region and Headquarters staff. This information, in part, was used to determine the need for an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse to better understand the facts and circumstances related to the degradation of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary material. The team will also identify any precursor indications of this condition so that appropriate followup actions can be taken.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. Additional information on this issue will by documented in the AIT inspection report 50-346/02-03(DRS).
4OA6 Exit Meetings Exit Meeting The inspectors presented the inspection results to M and other members of licensee management on March 28, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Interim Exit Meeting Senior Official at Exit: R. Fast, Plant Manager Date: March 8, 2002 Proprietary: No Subject: Radiological Access Control Program, and the ALARA Planning and Controls Program Change to Inspection Findings: No 4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations The following finding of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV).
NCV Tracking Number Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet (1) NCV 50-346/02-02-01 Technical Specification 6.12.2(a) requires, in part, that LHRAs with dose rates greater then 1.0 rem/hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or from any surface penetrated by the radiation be conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and shall be provided with a locked door, gate, or other barrier that prevents unauthorized entry.
On Friday March 1, 2002, the radiation protection section unlocked and deposted the barriers in containment that prevented access to areas adjacent to the fuel transfer tubes. This was done to facilitate maintenance activities, as fuel movement had been suspended. On Saturday, March 2, 2002, at 0930 the outage radiation protection manager directed that these areas be locked and posted as LHRAs and not be deposted in the future. Actions were then taken to accomplish this. On Sunday, March 3, 2002, the barrier at the 565 foot elevation near core flood tank 1-1 was found unlocked and was not posted as a LHRA. The licensee documented this incident in CR 02-00998. Since this failure did not represent a significant potential for an overexposure, the inspectors concluded that the failure was a Green finding and an associated
Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of TS 6.12.2(a) for the failure to properly control access to a LHRA. This was also a performance indicator occurrence under the occupational radiation safety cornerstone.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee H. Bergendahl, Vice President - Nuclear R. Fast, Plant Manager W. Bentley, Superintendent, Operations S. Coakley, Outage Manager D. Eshelman, Director, Support Services D. Geisen, Manager, Design Engineering D. Lockwood, Manager, Regulatory Affairs G. Melssen, Maintenance Rule Coordinator J. Messina, Director, Work Management D. Miller, Supervisor, Compliance S. Moffit, Director, Technical Services W. Mugge, Manager, Nuclear Training D. Nelson, Manager, Work Control R. Pell, Manager, Plant Operations R. Rishel, PRA Specialist J. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering P. Schultz, Manager, Radiation Protection G. Skeel, Manager, Nuclear Security H. Stevens, Manager, Quality Assessment M. Stevens, Manager, Maintenance G. Wolf, Licensing Engineer LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-346/02-02-01 NCV Failure to properly control access to a locked high radiation area.
(Section 4OA7)
Closed 50-346/02-02-01 NCV Failure to properly control access to a locked high radiation area.
(Section 4OA7)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AIT Augmented Inspection Team AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ALARA As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DB Davis-Besse DBNPS Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station DBT Design Basis Threat DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG Emergency Diesel Generator IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events LHRA Locked High Radiation Area MR Maintenance Rule NCV Non-Cited Violation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NPS Nuclear Power Station NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OA Other Activities PARS Publically Available Records PI Performance Indicator Radworker Radiation Worker RCS Reactor Coolant System RFO Refueling Outage RPA Radiologically Protected Area RWP Radiation Work Permit SDP Significance Determination Process SP Surveillance Procedure SSC Systems, Structures, and Components TS Technical Specifications USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report WO Work Order
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R04 Equipment Alignment SD-003B Emergency Diesel Generators Rev. 3 USAR EDG Auxiliary Systems Rev. 1 Figure 9.5.8 OS-041A, EDG Systems Rev. 18, Sheets 1&2 15 P&ID M-017A Diesel Generators Rev. 17 P&ID M-017B Diesel Generator Air Start Rev. 32 1R05 Fire Protection NRC Reg. Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants Guide 1.189 Fire Hazards Analysis Report Rev. 14 PFP-AB-428A Battery Room 2 Rev. 2 PFP-AB-429A Number 2 Electrical Isolation Room Rev. 2 PFP-AB 428B Number 1 Electrical Isolation Room Rev. 2 A-222F Fire Protection General Floor Plan El. 565 Rev. 11 A-223F Fire Protection General Floor Plan El. 585 Rev. 14 A-224F Fire Protection General Floor Plan El. 603 Rev. 17 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation General Davis-Besse System Health Report 1st Quarter 2001 Davis-Besse System Health Report 2nd Quarter 2001 Davis-Besse System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2001 Davis-Besse System Health Report 4th Quarter 2001 Maintenance Rule Program Manual Rev. 7 DB-PF-00003 Maintenance Rule Administrative Procedure Rev. 1
Nuclear Fuel NG-EN-318 Nuclear Fuel Integrity Program Rev. 2 DB-NE-10200 Fuel Integrity Monitoring Rev. 3 CR 02-1203 During Investigation of Failed Fuel Assembly, Fuel Rod B15 Separated CR 02-01103 Perform a Collective Significance Investigation For 13 Refueling Outage Spacer Grid Issues CR 02-01062 Loose Fuel Rod in Fuel Assembly NJ100U CR 02-01113 Loose Fuel Rod in Fuel Assembly NJ101A CR 02-01122 Missing Piece of Spacer Grid in Fuel Assembly NJ100N CR 02-01068 Missing Spacer Grid Piece in Fuel Assembly NJ1009 CR 02-01162 Damaged Spacer Grid in Fuel Assembly NJ1019 CR 02-01060 Defective Fuel Assembly NJ1010 CR 02-00997 Loose Fuel Rod in Fuel Assembly NJ1014 CR 02-01001 Piece of Space Grid Resting on Top of Fuel Assembly NJ08GT CR 02-01063 Slipped Spacer Grid in Fuel Assembly NJ08F9 CR 02-01000 Missing Portion of Spacer Grid on Fuel Assembly NJ100H CR 02-01083 Potential Defective Fuel Rod in Fuel Assembly NJ08FP CR 02-01098 Damaged Spacer Grid in Fuel Assembly NJ1006 CR 02-01102 Fuel Assembly NJ1029 Sustained Additional Damage During Cycle 13 CR 01-3195 Collective Significance Investigation of Fuel Vendor Related Condition Reports CR 01-1897 Design Deficiency of Mark B10K-s (Batch 15E) Fuel Assemblies Main Steam DB-OP-6201 Main Steam System Operating Procedure CR 02-00523 Turbine Bypass Valve SP13B3 Failed to the ICS Control Station CR 02-00522 Turbine Bypass Valve SP13A3 Failed Approximately 20%
During Plant Shutdown
CR 01-2433 Turbine Bypass Valve Air Regulators MOD 99-0041 250/125VDC and 120V Instrument AC System Drawing Auxiliary Building Non Radiation Areas Rev. 38 M-027B Drawing 250/125VDC and 120V Instrument AC System Rev 12 OS-060 Sheet 1 CR 01-1232 Cracks in Seal Rings For Positive Posts On Cell 21, 2P Battery Cause Analysis for CR 01-1232 CR 01-1442 Battery Room #2 Exhaust Fan Found Tripped Cause Analysis for CR 01-1442 CR 02-1400 Battery Room 428A Room Temperature Concerns 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation CR 02-01343 Debris (rust) on Reactor Head Under Insulation CR 02-01302 Reactor Head Insulation Degradation CR 02-01128 Reactor Head Material Finding 1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions DB-OP-6904 Shutdown Operations Rev. 4 DB-OP-6903 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Rev. 5 DB-OP-6002 RCS Draining and Nitrogen Blanketing Rev. 3 DB-OP-1003 Operations Procedure Use Instructions Rev. 1 DB-OP-0000 Conduct Of Operations Rev. 4 1R15 Operability Evaluations CR 02-00634 Decay Heat Pump #2 Oil Problems Operability Decay Heat Pump #2 Oil Problems Rev. 0 Justification 02-0004
Cause Analysis for CR 02-00634 CR 02-00874 Incorrect Inert Gas was Used for West Electrical Penetrations 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing DB-PF-03132 Decay Heat Train 1 Valve Test Rev. 3 OS-4, sh. 1, 2 Decay Heat Removal / Low Pressure Injection Rev.
32, 4 M-033B Decay Heat Train 1 Rev. 39 1R20 Refueling and Outage DB-OP-6904 Shutdown Operations Rev. 4 DB-OP-6903 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Rev. 5 DB-OP-6002 RCS Draining and Nitrogen Blanketing Rev. 3 1R22 Surveillance Testing DB-SC-3071 Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Monthly Test Rev. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Crankcase Pressure Plots Since Last 12 Year Planned Maintenance DB-PF-03176 Core Flood Tank 1 Refueling Check Valve Test Rev. 1 DB-SC-04053 4160 System Transfer and Lockout Test Buses C1 and C2 Rev. 1 2OS1 Access Control DB-HP-01206 Multiple Badging: Issue, Use and Collection 12/5/01 DB-HP-01109 High Radiation Area Access Control 12/13/01 DB-HP-04003 Locked High Radiation Area Inside Containment 3/4/02 DB-HP-04003 Locked High Radiation Area Outside Containment 3/4/02 CR 02-00998 Locked High Radiation Area (During Fuel Movement) Not Locked CR 02-01088 LHRA Control-Key and Lock Control CR 02-01038 Machining of CRD Nozzles CR 02-01037 Non-Proceduralized Protocol
CR 02-01034 Valve Operations in LHRA CR 02-01014 Personnel Contamination With Particle in Eye CR 02-01008 Misleading Dose Rates Due to Meter Used with Too High Range CR 02-01005 Stopped Work to Preclude Inadvertent Entry into LHRA CR02-00995 Merlin-Gerin On Pause While Worker in Containment CR 02-00910 Radiation Dose Control CR 02-00909 Disassembly of Reactor Services Hoist CR 02-00876 Work Performed on Wrong RWP CR 02-00824 Reactor Vent Valve Inspection CR 02-00714 Administrative Dose Control Levels Exceeded Without Approval from the RPM CR 02-00709 Internal Dose Assessment CR 02-00702 Locked High Radiation Area Entry CR 02-00668 Increase Radioactivity in RCS CR 02-00659 Modified Primary System Shutdown Chemistry Methodology CR 02-00649 Loss of Access to Containment and Auxiliary Building Due to Contamination CR 02-01086 Merlin Gerin Dose and Dose Rate Alarms CR 02-01091 Worker Exceeding His Dose Rate Setpoint RCS Gross Specific Activity Data Cycle 13 RCS Filtrate: Cobalt 58 and Cobalt 60 Cycle 13 RCS Crud: Cobalt 58 and Cobalt 60 Primary System Strategic Water Chemistry Plan 13RFO RP/Chemistry Shift Turnover 3/6/02 3/7/02 13RFO Outage Control Center Turnover 3/6/02 3/7/02 2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls 2002-5010 RWP/ALARA Package: Primary Valve Maintenance Work 1/28/02 2002-5107 RWP/ALARA Package: Reactor Head Removal 2/1/02
2002-5109 RWP/ALARA Package: CRD Nozzle Inspections, Repairs and 2/13/02 Associated Work Activities 2002-5115 RWP/ALARA Package: Perform Fuel Shuffle in Containment 2/14/02 and Auxiliary Buildings Including Operational Checks of Refueling Bridges 2002-6016 RWP/ALARA Package: Inspect, Decon, and Repair Purification 3/1/02 Demineralizer #3 2002-5301 RWP/ALARA Package: Setup, Maintenance, Teardown of Eddy 2/15/02 Current Equipment ALARA Review Committee Meeting Agendas 3/2/02 3/4/02 3/5/02 3/7/02 Special RP/ALARA Meeting Notes 13RFO RWP Estimates Versus Actual Dose 3/4/02 3/5/02 Lift Plan for Control Rod Drive Flange Assembly 3/6/02 Man-way Removal, Decontamination, Gasket Removal and 3/4/02 Repair 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification Davis-Besse Monthly Operating Reports for the January through December 2001 Unit Operations Logs 4OA3 Event Follow-up CR 02-00932 CRDM Nozzle Crack Indications CR 02-01128 Reactor Head Material Finding 19