IR 05000346/2001015
| ML020220085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/2002 |
| From: | Christine Lipa NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Bergendahl H FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| -nr, EA-01-261 IR-01-015 | |
| Download: ML020220085 (22) | |
Text
ary 18, 2002
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-346/01-15
Dear Mr. Bergendahl:
On December 31, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 3, 2002, with you and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-346/01-015 See Attached Distribution
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DAVI\dav 2001 015 drp.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:"C" = Copy without enclosure "E"= Copy with enclosure"N"= No copy OFFICE RIII RIII RIII NAME LCollins:dtp BClayton CLipa DATE 01/17/02 01/17/02 01/18/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
REGION III==
Docket No: 50-346 License No: NPF-3 Report No: 50-346/01-15(DRP)
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Dates: November 14 through December 31, 2001 Inspectors: D. Simpkins, Acting Senior Resident Inspector P. Louden, Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton NPS G. Hausman, Senior Engineering Specialist L. Collins, Project Engineer D. Schrum, Engineering Specialist S. Sanchez, Acting Senior Resident, Perry NPP H. Peterson, Senior Operations Engineer J. Belanger, Security Specialist Approved by: Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000346-01-15, on 11/14-12/31/2001, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covers a 6-week routine inspection conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialists. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
A. Inspector Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee Identified Violations No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power throughout most of the inspection period. Exceptions were for brief power reductions to about 93 percent for turbine testing, and to 90 percent at the request of the system dispatcher.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a partial walkdown inspection of the #1Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) when the #2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump was unavailable due to planned surveillance testing. The inspectors used valve checklists provided in procedure DB-OP-06316, Diesel Generator Operating Procedure to verify the EDG was in the proper lineup to support a loss of power event. Additional documents were reviewed as well.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors walked down selected risk significant areas looking for any fire protection issues related to: the control of transient combustibles, ignition sources, fire detection equipment manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities, automatic suppression capabilities, and barriers to fire propagation. Areas walked down were the
- 1 and #2 Electrical Penetration Rooms, Spent Fuel Pool Areas, Auxiliary Building Ventilation Rooms and Low Level Radiological Waste building. Fire protection documents were reviewed as well.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Review of Open Items (71111.11)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-office review of records to evaluate corrective actions for an unresolved item (URI) discussed in the Findings Section below.
For the unresolved item, the inspectors evaluated the quality and level of effort expended to resolve the issue in accordance with requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
b. Findings (Closed) URI 50-346/00-012-01: This unresolved item involved the apparent lack of evaluating all senior reactor operators (SROs) in all applicable licensed positions for an SRO.
The inspectors identified that licensed SROs were not always evaluated in all SRO licensed control room positions during the annual requalification examination.
Specifically, the SROs were not always evaluated in the Shift Supervisor-Assistant (SSA) position, the licensed position of implementing and directing activities of Abnormal Operating Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures. The facilitys requalification training program procedure P-OPS-4, Development and Conduct of Simulator Evaluations, Revision 7, restricted evaluation of SROs who were qualified as either Shift Supervisor (SS) or Shift Manager (SM) in only those two identified positions.
Specifically, an SRO qualified as a SS or SM may not be evaluated in the SSA position during the annual requalification operating test evaluations.
After further review, the inspectors determined that the facility may rotate an individual qualified as a SS or SM into the SSA position for the purpose of simulator evaluation if the crew make up was lacking a qualified SSA. As a result, 36 percent of the SROs qualified as either SS or SM were evaluated in the SSA position. This practice was considered adequate to place all SROs at risk of being evaluated in all SRO licensed positions, and hence was sufficient to meet applicable regulations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the facilitys revised procedure P-OPS-4, Development and Conduct of Continuing Training Simulator Evaluations, Revision 8, which, in part, described the new practice of conducting simulator evaluations of all SROs. The revised procedure stated that all SROs should have a simulator evaluation conducted biennially, at a minimum, while in the Unit Supervisor position, previously designated as the SSA. The facilitys new procedure revision ensured satisfactory evaluation of all licensed SROs. These actions were considered reasonable, and no findings of significance were identified. This issue is closed.
.2 Licensed Operator Requalification Training (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator training program to evaluate operator performance in mitigating the consequences of a simulated rod ejection event. The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the activities:
- Communication clarity and formality
- Timeliness and appropriateness of crew actions
- Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
- Correct use and implementation of procedures
- Oversight and direction provided by the shift manager and control room supervisor Training documents were reviewed as well.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
.1 Biennial Evaluation (71111.12B)
a. Inspection Scope
- Verify the periodic evaluation was completed within the time restraints defined in 10 CFR 50.65 (once per refueling cycle, not to exceed two years). Ensure that the licensee reviewed its goals, monitored Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) performance, reviewed industry operating experience, and made appropriate adjustments to the maintenance rule program as a result of the above activities;
- Verify the licensee balanced reliability and unavailability during the previous refueling cycle, including a review of safety significant SSCs;
- Verify (a)(1) goals were met, that corrective action was appropriate to correct the defective condition, including the use of industry operating experience, and that (a)(1) activities and related goals were adjusted as needed; and
- Verify the licensee has established (a)(2) performance criteria, examined any SSCs that failed to meet their performance criteria, and reviewed any SSCs that have suffered repeated maintenance preventable functional failures including a verification that failed SSCs were considered for (a)(1).
The inspectors examined the periodic evaluation report completed for the time period of May 1998 through April 2000. To evaluate the effectiveness of (a)(1) and (a)(2)
activities, the inspectors examined a number of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Condition Reports (CR). In addition, the CRs were reviewed to verify that the threshold for identification of problems was at an appropriate level and the associated corrective actions were appropriate. Also, the maintenance rule program documents were reviewed.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Quarterly Inspection (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed equipment issues, surveillance failures, documents and other performance problems for the high risk importance systems listed below. The inspectors reviewed whether the components were properly scoped in accordance with the Maintenance Rule, whether the failures were properly characterized, and whether the performance criteria were appropriate.
- Station and Instrument Air
- Instrument Isolation Valves
- Containment Gas Monitoring (Hydrogen Analyzer)
- #2 EDG (during unexpected surging)
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed documents, evaluated the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance was conducted, and verified how risk was managed for the planned and emergent work activities listed below:
- Evaluation of actions taken to reduce the reactor average coolant temperature in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles
- Control room emergency ventilation compressor #1 failure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions (71111.14)
a. Inspection Scope
- The inspectors reviewed station personnel preparations, operator performance and documents for a reduction in average coolant temperature in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles. This review was to determine if personnel actions were appropriate to the evolution and in accordance with procedures and training.
- The inspectors verified that another action taken per the licensees response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, regarding a dedicated operator was implemented through training and procedures. This action involved a dedicated operator that was trained and prepared to perform manual actions to switch emergency injection to the emergency sump under certain scenarios.
- The inspectors reviewed personnel performance during activities involved with the reracking of the spent fuel pool. Activities included removal of old racks, preparation of the pool liner and installation of the new racks. Documents related to this activity were also reviewed.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees list of control room deficiencies and operator workarounds, dated December 18, 2001, to evaluate the cumulative effect of these issues on the reliability, availability, or potential for misoperation of a system. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees guidance for identifying and tracking deficiencies and workarounds contained in Work Process Guideline - 2, Operations Equipment Issues. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether the aggregate effect of these issues could impact operator response during an abnormal or emergency event.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the post-maintenance test procedures and test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability for the following risk significant activities:
- AF-68 reverse flow test
- Core flood tank pressure indication repair
- EHC hydraulic power test b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed the following surveillance tests and/or reviewed applicable test data, to verify that the subject risk-significant SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety function. The inspectors conducted reviews of TS, USAR, and licensee procedure requirements and evaluated the tests for potential preconditioning, effects on plant risk, clear and adequate acceptance criteria, operator procedural adherence, test data completeness, test frequency, test equipment range and accuracy, and post-test equipment restoration:
- Monthly Exercising of PT-2000, Containment Pressure Transmitter to SFAS Channel 1
- Monthly Exercising of PT-2002, Containment Pressure Transmitter to SFAS Channel 3
- Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Time of RCP Monitor (RC3601) to SFRCS LCH 1 and RPS CH 1
- Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Time of RCP Monitor (RC3603) to SFRCS LCH 3 and RPS CH 3
- AFW Train 1 Level Control, Interlock and Flow Transmitter Test
- Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Monthly Valve Verification
- AF-68 reverse flow test (IST)
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports and unit log entries to determine if the Performance Indicators for Safety System Unavailability, Auxiliary Feedwater System and Emergency AC Power System were accurately and completely reported to the NRC by the licensee. The previous 12 months of data were inspected.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other
.1 Violation of 10 CFR 50.7 Employee Protection (EA-01-261)
From March 5, 2001 to August 23, 2001, the NRCs Office of Investigations (OI)
conducted an investigation to determine whether a nuclear security officer at the Davis-Besse facility was deliberately discriminated against by security management for raising safety concerns relating to the lack of training on a new security monitoring system and a potential fitness-for-duty procedure violation. Based on the information developed during this investigation by OI, the NRC concluded that a security officer was discriminated against for engaging in protected activities within the scope of 10 CFR 50.7, Employee Protection. A security supervisor subjected the officer to a fact-finding meeting on January 12, 2001, and placed a copy of the documentation from the meeting in the security officers personnel file.
The NRC determined that these actions were taken, at least in part, as a result of the security officer engaging in protected activity when he identified and documented in the condition report the potential security department training deficiency.
The NRC issued a Notice of Violation by letter dated December 20, 2001, requiring a response by the licensee (VIO 50-346/01-15-01). The licensees response is pending.
4OA6 Meetings Exit Meetings The inspectors presented the inspection results to M and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 3, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Senior Official at Exit: W. J. Bentley, Superintendent, Operations Date: November 29, 2001 Proprietary: No Subject: Maintenance Rule Implementation -
Periodic Evaluation Change to Inspection Findings: No Senior Official at Exit: Dave Lange, Senior Nuclear Training Advisor, Requalification Program Lead Date: December 13, 2001 Proprietary: No Subject: Closure of URI Change to Inspection Findings: No
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee G. Campbell, Site Vice President H. Bergendahl, Plant Manager/Site Vice President C. Ackerman, Supervisor, NQA S. Coakley, Outage Manager R. Cook, Compliance Engineer L. Dohrmann, Manager, Quality Services D. Eschelman, Director, Support Services R. Fast, Plant Manager C. Gale, System Engineering D. Geisen, Manager, DBE D. Imlay, Supervisor, Operations Training D. Lange, Senior Nuclear Training Advisor, Requalification Program Lead D. Lockwood, Manager, Regulatory Affairs A. McAllister, Supervisor, Equipment Reliability P. McCloskey, Manager, Chemistry G. Melssen, Maintenance Rule Coordinator J. Messina, Director, Work Manager D. Miller, Supervisor, Compliance S. Moffit, Director, Engineering W. Mugge, Manager, Nuclear Training R. Pell, Manager, Operations R. Rishel, PRA Analyst J. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering P. Schultz, Radiation Protection Manager G. Skeel, Security Manager H. Stevens, Manager, QA M. Stevens, Maintenance Manager T. Swim, Supervisor, Design Basis Engineering G. Wolf, Senior Licensing Engineer LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-346/01-15-01 VIO SL IV Violation of 10 CFR 50.7 (Section 4OA5)
Closed 50-346/00-012-01 URI Apparent lack of evaluating all senior reactor operators (SROs) in all applicable licensed positions for an SRO (Section 1R11.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AFW Auxiliary Feedwater CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DB Davis-Besse DBNPS Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG Emergency Diesel Generator MR Maintenance Rule NPS Nuclear Power Station NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OA Other Activities SDP Significance Determination Process SM Shift Manager SRO Senior Reactor Operator SS Shift Supervisor SSA Shift Supervisor Assistant SSC Systems, Structures, and Components TS Technical Specifications URI Unresolved Item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R04 Equipment Alignments SD-003B Emergency Diesel Generators Rev. 3 USAR Figure EDG Auxiliary Systems Rev. 1 9.5.8 OS-041A, EDG Systems Rev. 18, 15 Sheets 1&2 P&ID M-017A Diesel Generators Rev. 16 P&ID M-017B Diesel Generator Air Start Rev. 32 1R05 Fire Protection Pre-Fire Plan NRC Information Notice 2001-04: Neglected Fire Extinguisher Maintenance Causes Fatality, dated April 11, 2001 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189: Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants Fire Hazards Analysis Report Rev. 14 Drawings Fire Protection General Floor Plan A221F-A226F 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification DB-OP- Conduct of Operations Rev. 4 00000 Drill Scenario Licensed Operator Training Schedule P-OPS-4 Development and Conduct of Continuing Training Revision 8 Simulator Evaluations 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation Third Quarter System Health Report dated October 2001 USAR 5.0 Reactor Coolant System M-030A Sh. 1 Reactor Coolant System M-030B Sh. 2 Reactor Coolant System OS-19A Sh. 1 Instrument Air System Rev. 20
OS-19A Sh. 2 Instrument Air System Rev. 14 OS-19B Sh. 1 Station Air System Rev. 14 OS-19B Sh.2 Station Air System Rev. 18 OS-20 Sh. 1 Service Water System Rev. 54 OS-20 Sh. 2 Service Water System Rev. 23 CR 01-2207 Emergency Instrument Air Compressor Expansion August 27, 2001 Tank Level Rising CR 01-2127 Air Bubble Formed or Leaked into the Emergency August 17, 2001 Instrument Air Compressor Closed Cooling Loop CR 01-2657 Station Air Compressor #2 Tripped After Start October 8, 2001 CR 01-3394 Service Water Pump #1 Motor Oil Foaming December 15, 2001 CR 01-3017 Oil Added to Breather Port on Top of Service Water November 8, 2001 Pump Motor CR 01-2050 Bus EF6 Tie Breaker Tripped Open August 9, 2001 CR 01-2124 Bus F6 Tie Breaker Failed to Close August 16, 2001 CR 01-2446 Bus E1 Normal Feed Breaker Failed to Close September 19, 2001 CR 01-3450 #2 EDG Surging December 20, 2001 Periodic Maintenance Assessment Report for Cycle December 1998 11 (June 2, 1996 to May 23, 1998)
Cycle 12 Periodic Maintenance Effectiveness October 2000 Assessment Report (May 23, 1998 to April 1, 2000)
CR 01-1687 AFW Status Changing to Category (A)(1) Per July 5, 2001 Maintenance Rule CR 00-1129 Multiple PT Indications in the Valve Body Casting on April 23, 2000 Seal Weld of ICS 38A Valve Seat CR 00-2418 Limiting Particle Diameter to the AFW Bearing Cooler October 6, 2000 CR 01-1518 Common Inlet Damper to Both EDG Room Supply June 12, 2000 Fans Inoperable CR 01-1050 #2 EDG Inoperable Due to the Lockout Relay April 12, 2001 Tripping CR 00-1520 Check Valve MS735 Banging May 26, 2000 PCAQR EDG Room Temperature Can Exceed 120F When October 2, 1998 98-1646 Outdoor Temperature is 95F
SR-01-ENGR Davis-Besse Nuclear Quality Assessment October 23, 2001 G-11 Surveillance Report - Plant Engineering DB-SA-01-01 DBNPS Self-Assessment Report Engineering October 11, 2001 17 Technical Support Group Davis-Besse System Health Report 2nd Quarter 2000 Davis-Besse System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2000 Davis-Besse System Health Report 4th Quarter 2000 Davis-Besse System Health Report 1st Quarter 2001 Davis-Besse System Health Report 2nd Quarter 2001 Davis-Besse System Health Report 3rd Quarter 2001 Predictive Maintenance Level 1 Equipment Concerns November 8, 2001 Systems Added or Removed From the MR Program November 27, 2001 List of Functional Failures From 5/19/00 to 11/14/01 November 14, 2001 Maintenance Rule - Performance Criteria November 1, 2001 MRPM 06 Maintenance Rule Program Manual October 27, 2001 DB-PF-00003 Maintenance Rule Administrative Procedure June 8, 2000 Performance Criteria Changes for MR SSCs November 2001 C-NSA-99.16 Maintenance Rule Unavailability and Reliability April 2, 1999-20 Sensitivity Analysis Maintenance Rule Systems and Status November 15, 2001 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation NRC Bulletin Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel August 3, 2001 2001-01 Head Penetration Nozzles Davis-Besse Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, September 4, 2001 Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles Supplemental Information in Response to NRC October 17, 2001 Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles Responses to Requests for Additional Information October 30, 2001 Concerning NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles
Transmittal of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station November 1, 2001 Risk Assessment of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Cracks NRC Letter to Davis Besse, Meeting Summary of November 6, 2001 October 24, 2001, to Discuss the Licensees Response to Bulletin 2001-01" NRC Letter to Davis Besse, Meeting Summary of November 19, 2001 November 14, 2001, to Discuss the Licensees Response to Bulletin 2001-01" Supplemental Information in Response to the November 30, 2001 November 28, 2001 Meeting Regarding the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01 NRC Letter to Davis-Besse, Summary of November December 12, 2001 27, 2001, Public Meeting to Discuss the Licensees Response to Bulletin 2001-01" CR 01-3463 #1 CREVS Compressor Failed to Start After Low December 26, 2001 Suction Pressure Trip 1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions CR 01-1465 Spent Fuel Pool FME Review June 4, 2001 CR -1-1986 Debris in the Spent Fuel Pool August 5, 2001 CR 01-2221 SFP Rerack Readiness Enhancements August 28, 2001 CR 01-2309 Leakage in SFP Floor Zone 6 September 6, 2001 CR 01-2757 Underwater Survey Probe Lodged in Support Struts October 18, 2001 for SFP CR 01-2897 Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Hose Sucked Into SFP October 30, 2001 Cooling Suction Line CR 01-3180 SFP Rerack Diving Suspended due to Elevated November 27, 2001 Temperatures in SFP NG-DB- Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests and Rev. 1 00201-C-1 Evolutions DB-OP- Power Operations Rev. 4 06902 TM 01-0026 Temporary Modification 01-0026 RCS Tave December 13, 2001 Reduction DB-OP- Boron Concentration Control 06001
DB-OP- Integrated Control System Operating Procedure 06401 DB-OP- Control Rod Drive Operating Procedure 06402 NG-EN- Control of Temporary Modifications Rev. 1 00313-C-3 50.59 Evaluation 01-01033 December 12, 2001 Letter to Davis-Besse from Framatome ANP, December 11, 2001 Verification Report for Operation of Cycle 13 with Reduced Tavg 1R16 Operator Work-Arounds WPG-2 Work Process Guideline - 2, Operations Equipment Issues 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing DB-PF-3162 AF-68 Reverse flow test Rev. 02 DB-SS-4164 EHC Hydraulic Power Test 1R22 Surveillance Testing DB-MI-03101 Monthly Exercising of PT-2000, Containment Pressure Rev. 2 Transmitter to SFAS Channel 1 DB-MI-03103 Monthly Exercising of PT-2002, Containment Pressure Rev. 2 Transmitter to SFAS Channel 3 DB-MI-03205 Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Rev. 5 Time of RCP Monitor (RC3601) to SFRCS LCH 1 and RPS CH 1 DB-MI-03206 Channel Functional Test/Calibration and Response Rev. 6 Time of RCP Monitor (RC3603) to SFRCS LCH 3 and RPS CH 3 DB-SP-03152 AFW Train 1 Level Control, Interlock and Flow Rev. 6 Transmitter Test DB-SP-03153 Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Monthly Valve Verification Rev. 1 T.S. 3.3.2.2 Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Instrumentation Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Business Plan August 2001 Monthly Performance Report Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Business Plan September 2001 Monthly Performance Report
DB-PF-3162 AF-68 Reverse flow test (IST) Rev. 02 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification Key Work Activities and Surveillances 1st, 2nd and 3rd Quarter 2001Davis-Besse System Health Reports 2000 Davis-Besse System Health Reports Unit Logs 18