IR 05000346/2023011
| ML23240A714 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/2023 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Tony Brown Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2023011 | |
| Download: ML23240A714 (1) | |
Text
August 30, 2023
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2023011
Dear Terry Brown:
On July 28, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Signed by Stoedter, Karla on 08/30/23 Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000346 License Number: NPF-3 Report Number: 05000346/2023011 Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-011-0023 Licensee: Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Dates: July 10, 2023 to July 28, 2023 Inspectors: T. Briley, Senior Project Engineer B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector E. Magnuson, Reactor Inspector R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By: Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The team performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The team conducted a five-year review of the decay heat removal / low pressure injection system. The team also reviewed the corrective actions for selected NRC non-cited violations and findings.
Operating Experience: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
Self-Assessments and Audits: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE): The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's programs to establish and maintain a SCWE.
The team reviewed the completed corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPR) opened during IP 95001 Supplemental Inspection (ML22314A225),dated November 10, 2022, associated with a White Notice of Violation in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The team verified these corrective actions had been completed as scheduled and as prescribed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP completely and accurately.
The team noted that issues were being identified by all levels of organization and with varying degrees of safety significance. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, and they were subsequently entered into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized a number of CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE) Program. For example, the licensee performed departmental self-assessments and Nuclear Oversight audits to identify issues in station processes. The identified deficiencies and improvement opportunities were entered into the CAP for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both the NRC and from industry OE programs and entered them into the CAP when they were applicable to the station.
The team determined the licensee was generally effective at trending low-level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the CAP to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.
The team performed a 5-year review of the decay heat removal / low pressure injection system. Specifically, the team focused on any recurring or age-related issues of the system. As part of this review, the team reviewed plant health reports, selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents, and interviewed the system engineer. The team also performed a partial system walkdown to assess the material condition of system piping, selected components and surrounding areas. The team concluded that deficiencies and concerns were identified and entered into the CAP at a low threshold. Corrective actions appeared to be adequate and timely, commensurate with their safety significance.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. In general, once a degraded or non-conforming issue was identified, the CAP process was effective in directing equipment operability or functionality reviews. The licensee used a multi-discipline team consisting of department directors and managers to verify the condition report categorization, evaluation method selection, and other actions adequately addressed the scope and significance of the documented issue. Upon completion of the evaluation or action, the Corrective Action Review Board reviewed those actions to ensure they met the CAP requirements. During the Management Review Board and Corrective Action Review Board meetings the team observed, licensee staff were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing and screening issues. The team also observed healthy dialogues and good interactions among the members of the respective groups. The members came prepared and challenged each other on disposition of the identified conditions. Actions were prioritized based on the safety significance of the issues.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of a root cause evaluation or other causal evaluation methodologies were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements. The team sampled assignments associated with violations that were identified by the NRC previously and with licensee event reports. The team determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally effective and timely.
Assessment 71152B Use of Operating Experience Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in the use of OE was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, condition reports were written and actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. OE lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed OE information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as issue reviews and investigations.
Although the team did not identify any issues of significance in this area, the team noted that the licensee did not have a formal process that captured the initial OE screening results. For example, the licensee screened NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2022-02, "Operational Leakage," as information only. This was in accordance with procedure NOBP-LP-2100, "Operating Experience Process," which allowed RIS documents to be screened as information only. This RIS was screened as information only because licensee personnel compared the information in the RIS to existing procedures for evaluating operational leakage and determined that the existing procedures matched the information in the RIS. As a result, no additional actions or procedure revisions were required. However, the station did not retain a formal record for the decision to screen the RIS as information only. The licensee was able to produce an informal record of the screening decision, however, this could potentially make it more difficult for future reviewers to understand the rationale behind a particular OE screening. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR-2023-06405, "Lack of Operating Experience Evaluation Documentation," to further evaluate the issue.
Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known, including issues within the CAP itself. Those issues were addressed by the licensee through the CAP. The team did not identify any concerns in this area.
Assessment 71152B Safety Conscious Work Environment The team reviewed the Davis-Besse safety culture survey results from 2020-2022 and noted the survey results revealed negative staff responses regarding the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). The teams also noted that there was a high number of negative responses in several departments regarding confidence in the CAP to prioritize, investigate, and resolve issues. As a result, the team reviewed licensee actions to address the negative survey trends. The team also performed individual and group interviews of a representative cross-section of licensee personnel, including individual contributors and supervisors from various departments. The team also interviewed the ECP manager and reviewed selected ECP case files. A total of 51 licensee personnel were interviewed during this inspection.
Based on the individual and group interviews and a review of licensee actions, the team determined licensee personnel believed that they could raise nuclear safety and safeguards issues through multiple channels including ECP without fear of retaliation and that the CAP effectively addresses quality issues. Although morale appeared low in several departments due to resource issues, the team found no evidence of challenges to the SCWE at Davis-Besse.
Assessment 71152B Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence for the Emergency Diesel Generator White Finding During the 95001 Supplemental Inspection for the Emergency Diesel Generator Speed Switch White finding (ML22314A225), two CAPRs had not been completed. Therefore, during this inspection, the team reviewed the completed actions to verify prompt and effective CAPR implementation.
For EF-2022-0079-001, "Add DC System Voltage to Ground Configuration of the DC Electrical Distribution System to the Design Criteria Manual," the team noted that the licensee revised the Design Criteria Manual with a discussion on grounded Direct Current (DC)components experiencing more than 260 Volts DC during a DC system positive to ground fault based on the licensees specific 125/250 Volt battery configuration. Specifications E-005Q, E-007Q, E-039Q, E-287Q, E-854Q, and M-180Q, and System Descriptions 003A, 003B,007, 009, 022C, and 049 were also updated with a discussion on this condition and that DC components are specified to be rated for the full voltage of 260 Volt and above. The team concluded this action met the intent of the action item and therefore, this correction action item is closed.
For CA-2022-0079-004, "Determine the Need for Group Specific Training on 125/250 Volt DC System," the team noted the licensee performed a training needs analysis and concluded a document based training manual describing the DC distribution system and voltages experienced by grounded DC components during a positive to ground fault condition was needed. The team reviewed the subject training manual slides created by the licensee and concluded the licensee captured their 125/250 Volt DC system configuration and voltages encountered by grounded DC components during positive to ground fault condition appropriately. This corrective action item is closed.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 28, 2023, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Terry Brown and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71152B Corrective Action CA-2022-00079- Add DC System Voltage to Ground Configuration of the DC 07/07/2022
Documents 001 Electrical Distribution System to the Design Criteria Manual
CA-2022-00079- Determine the Need for Group Specific Training on 125/250 05/09/2022
004 Volt DC System
CR-2015-05014 NRC Response to Task Interface Agreement 2014-11: 04/10/2015
Design and Licensing Basis for Shield Building
CR-2015-05215 INPO 2015: BACC - Valve Packing Leak Found on HP2B 04/14/2015
During Walkdown
CR-2015-07969 NRC NCV: Departure from Method of Evaluation (Described 06/05/2015
in DB UFSAR) Required Prior NRC Approval Under 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2) And Method Not Approved by NRC For Intended
Application
CR-2016-04587 Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature RTD Wire Insulation 04/05/2016
Degradation
CR-2017-03117 Broken ROCA Outrigger Wires 03/19/2017
CR-2017-11317 Cyber Security Program: Control Deficiencies 11/11/2017
CR-2018-00682 Quality Records Discovered in Desk 01/25/2018
CR-2018-06678 Shield Building Bore S5-666.0-10 Findings 07/26/2018
CR-2018-07467 Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Steps for DB-OP-06012 Not 08/23/2018
Incorporated for DH Venting Train 1 from DH51
CR-2019-00643 Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Time Between DH 1A Motor 01/22/2019
Operated Valve (MOV) Closed Seat Contact to Control
Switch Trip Greater Than 0.155 Seconds
CR-2019-01943 Form NOP-OP-4705-01 10CFR50.75 (g) Leak Spill Record 03/05/2019
Needs Added to Closed CR-2018-03211.
CR-2019-05867 2019 NRC PI&R: Violation for Lack of Design Calculation for 07/11/2019
Control Room Blockwall 5337
CR-2020-00013 Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Pipe Support Spring Hangers 01/02/2020
are Set Outside the Working Range
CR-2020-01739 1R21 BACC: Tail Pipe of DB-SV4610B 03/03/2020
CR-2020-04201 BACC: Active Leakage Identified on DH1509 05/12/2020
CR-2020-05859 Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of Siren Activation 07/21/2020
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
CR-2020-09055 Storm Damage to Shield Building Scaffold 11/24/2020
CR-2021-02023 Five Year Review of DH-LPI; DH Pump 2 Seal Leakage 03/19/2021
CR-2021-04967 Clogged Floor Drains Near SFP on 603' 06/27/2021
CR-2021-05199 Potential NCV of 10 CFR 72.48 for 2019 DB Fuel Loading 07/08/2021
Campaign
CR-2021-05249 Circ Water Pump 1 & 3 Casing Drains Blocked 07/09/2021
CR-2021-05261 Shield Building Scaffold Pans Dislodged 07/09/2021
CR-2021-05342 Excessively Dirty Smoke Detector in Service Water Pump 07/13/2021
Room
CR-2021-05395 NRC Identified: Vegetation Growth Around Radiological 07/15/2021
Environmental Monitoring Program Air Sampling Stations
CR-2021-05789 Water Curtain Activation 07/30/2021
CR-2021-05835 Lane 1A Explosive Detector Flow Warning 08/02/2021
CR-2021-06786 Near Miss: Negligent Discharge of Rifle at Security Weapons 09/08/2021
Range
CR-2021-06947 Failed Post Maintenance Testing on Miscellaneous Diesel 09/15/2021
Generator
CR-2021-07039 Misposition of Containment Air Cooler (CAC) Number 3 to 09/19/2021
Slow Speed
CR-2021-07100 Elevated Vibrations on Containment Purge Exhaust Fan 09/21/2021
Motor Outboard Bearing
CR-2021-07124 Governor linkage Bolting Connection from the Terminal Shaft 09/22/2021
Lever Broken
CR-2021-08097 ROCA Fence Outriggers Posing Trip Hazard 10/25/2021
CR-2021-08097 ROCA Fence Outriggers Posing Trip Hazard 10/25/2021
CR-2021-08681 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System Refueling Interval Test 11/13/2021
DB-SS-03708 Step 4.5.5 required CR
CR-2021-08974 Service Water Baseline Test Engineering Review 11/24/2021
DB-PF-03216
CR-2021-09167 Causal Evaluation; NRC Non-Sited Violation (NCV), Failure 12/03/2021
to Provide Procedural Instructions for Transferring Gland
Sealing Steam from Main to Auxiliary Steam Following
CR-2021-09279 Fatigue Rule Violation 12/07/2021
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
CR-2021-09697 DB-FP-0417 Acceptance Criteria 5.1.2 went Overdue on 12/25/2021
2/23/2021 for Number 4 Mechanical Penetration Room
(MPR) Water Curtain Spray System
CR-2022-00101 Diesel Air Start Relief Valves Potential Leakage 01/06/2022
CR-2022-00112 Flex N+1 EFWST Replenishment and SFP Spray Pump 01/06/2022
Would Not Start
CR-2022-00158 Video Capture System Not Functioning 01/07/2022
CR-2022-00491 Video Capture Not Working as SAS/CAS 01/22/2022
CR-2022-00673 Items Stored on Top of Flammable Locker in Maintenance 01/28/2022
Hot Shop
CR-2022-00731 Video Capture Not Working at SAS/CAS 01/31/2022
CR-2022-00735 Video Capture Server Was Offline for Five Days 01/31/2022
CR-2022-00744 Video Capture System Not Functioning 01/31/2022
CR-2022-00774 Five Year Review of DH-LPI; DH Pump P 42-1, Outboard 01/01/2022
Bearing Indication of Oil Leakage
CR-2022-00821 FirstEnergy Notified D-B That Relay Calibrations Marked 02/03/2022
Complete on Order Record 200803544 Still Need to Be
Performed
CR-2022-00879 Root Cause Evaluation, Abnormal Procedure Entries for Loss 12/07/2022
of Letdown Flow Path
CR-2022-01302 EFWP Quarterly Test Time to Rated Speed Not Obtained 02/19/2022
CR-2022-01484 Scaffold Pole in Travel Path of MS100 02/10/2022
CR-2022-01780 MS100 Limit Switch Issue 03/07/2022
CR-2022-01861 Site Protection Officer Left a Security Door Without Proper 03/08/2022
Authorization
CR-2022-02089 DB-SC-03076, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1, 184 03/12/2022
Day Test Step Incorrectly Signed
CR-2022-02550 Decay Heat Pump 2 Pump O/B Constant Oiler Empty 03/23/2022
CR-2022-02578 DH Pump 2 Spray Shield Installed and Not Tracked 03/23/2022
CR-2022-02731 Integrated SFAS Test Train 2 Required Evaluation of IST 03/28/2022
Program Document for Valve Stroke Times - 1R22
CR-2022-02787 Initial Venting of the CRDM Quick Vent Hydraulic Closures 03/30/2022
Failed at Seven Locations
CR-2022-03028 Maintenance Tag Found in Incore Tank in MODE 3 04/05/2022
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
CR-2022-03195 As Found Condition of the East Transfer Tube Flange 04/12/2022
CR-2022-03669 Decay Heat Pump 1 IB/OB Bearings Constant Level Oilers 04/28/2022
Were Found Empty
CR-2022-03731 Decay Heat Pump Problem Solving 04/29/2022
CR-2022-03960 Causal Evaluation; Inadvertent Drain of EHC Fluid 05/10/2022
CR-2022-04169 Pressure Differential Switch PDS-2686B Preconditioned 05/16/2022
During Performance of DB-MI-03203
CR-2022-04258 Work Performed During 1R22 Without Notification 05/20/2022
CR-2022-04648 MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200822950 Missing Initials and Dates 06/06/2022
on Line-Outs
CR-2022-04683 MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200574481 Missing Information 06/07/2022
CR-2022-04714 MS-C-22-05-07 - Order 200878599 Procedure Adherence 06/08/2022
Issue and Error
CR-2022-04715 MS-C-22-05-07 - Order 200861477 Procedure Adherence 06/08/2022
Issues and Errors
CR-2022-04763 EDG Critical Relays Identified as Non-Critical 03/28/2022
CR-2022-04767 MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200789259 Issues 06/10/2022
CR-2022-04822 MS-C-22-05-07 - Orders Have Several Procedure 06/13/2022
Non-Adherence Issues
CR-2022-04845 CAC Inlet MOV's That Require Static Testing Due to ASME 06/14/2022
Section III Potentially in Conflict with Plant Conditions
CR-2022-04936 HKD Circuit Breaker Tolerance Change Found to Impact 06/17/2022
Coordination of Recently Installed HKD Circuit Breakers for
BE2168, BE3320, and BF2315
CR-2022-04943 Decay Heat Pump#2 Concluded to be Previously Inoperable 06/17/2022
in Mode 3 with Outboard Bearing Oil Leak Not Resolved
CR-2022-05830 Operator Actions Not in Accordance with Procedure, 07/27/2022
Following Isolation of Letdown
CR-2022-06032 MS-C-22-08-02: FINDING Issues Identified with the Last 08/05/2022
Three Revisions of the Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM) Non-Compliance with Administrative Technical Specifications 5.5.1, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM).
CR-2022-07873 MS-C-22-09-19 Finding: Missing Reportable Events Log 10/18/2022
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Documentation Identified
CR-2022-08738 Davis-Besse 2022 Safety Conscious Work Environment 11/15/2022
Survey Chemistry Red Pillars
CR-2023-00252 RCS Pressure Inputs to Inadequate Core Cooling Curve Are 01/11/2023
Inconsistent
CR-2023-00480 Main Steam Line 2 Pressure Low to SFRCS PS-3689D Was 01/23/2023
preconditioned (Trending)
CR-2023-00689 Potential FME issue with DO3671 02/01/2023
CR-2023-00753 Emergency Diesel Generator Lockout Due to Improper 02/03/2023
Continuity Reading
CR-2023-00856 Causal Evaluation; New Site Gap Identified from Integrated 02/07/2023
Performance Assessment
CR-2023-00909 QC Witness Point Missed 02/09/2023
CR-2023-01360 5 Year Review of Decay Heat Removal-Low Pressure 02/27/2023
Injection (DH-LPI) System; Increased Particle Content in Oil
for DH Pump 2
CR-2023-01484 Work Performed on CDA Without Addressing Cyber Security 03/02/2023
CR-2023-02017 CAS SDMS Alarm Screen Host Down 03/16/2023
CR-2023-02239 Explosive Detector 1A Air Pump Warning 03/23/2023
CR-2023-02416 EP Drill 2023-03-28, Emergency Response Dry Run, Initial 03/29/2023
Notification not Timely Completed
CR-2023-02421 EP Drill 2023-03-28, Emergency Response Dry Run Staffing 03/29/2023
Forms Not Completed
CR-2023-02426 CAS SDMS Graphics Screen Locked Up 03/29/2023
CR-2023-02485 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill 2023 Emergency 03/31/2023
Response Dry Run Drill, Three Objectives Not Met in Dose
Assessment
CR-2023-02657 Condition Report Not Initiated for Reciprocating Internal 04/05/2023
Combustion Engine (RICE) Rule Non-Compliance
CR-2023-02696 JT3035 Hard Tamper 04/06/2023
CR-2023-02941 Plant Walkdown Concern Emergency Core Cooling System 04/12/2023
(ECCS) Pump Room 105 Auxiliary Latch
CR-2023-03429 2B Explosive Detector Air Pump Warning 04/24/2023
CR-2023-03924 NRC Question on External Operating Experience for 05/09/2023
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Underground Fire Protection Piping Leaks
CR-2023-04687 SBODG extended Unavailability Time Due to Low Fuel Oil 06/08/2023
Level
CR-2023-05314 Officer Assumed Shift Without Required Equipment 07/04/2023
CR-2023-05341 SW Strainer 1 Packing Leak 07/05/2023
CR-2023-05365 2B Explosive Detector Failed to Verify 07/06/2023
CR-2023-05524 EDG 1 Governor Oil Level Increasing 07/14/2023
CR-2023-05525 CCW Room Door 332 Left Unsecure 07/14/2023
OE-2021-0201 IN 21-01, Lessons Learned from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 05/18/2021
Commission Inspections of Design-Basis Capability of
Power-Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants
OE-2021-0218 OE478914R20210601 Second Fuel Defect Identified During 08/04/2021
Outage Fuel Sipping
OE-2021-0288 Power Reduction Due to Condensate Pump Lower Motor 10/11/2021
Bearing Temperature
OE-2021-0328 IN21-03, Operating Experience Related to the Duane Arnold 08/21/2021
Energy Center Derecho Event on August 10, 2020
OE-2021-0329 IN21-02, Recent Issues Associated with Monitoring 08/21/2021
Occupational Exposure to Radiation from Licensed and
Unlicensed Radiation Sources
OE-2021-0346 Circulating Water Pump Bearing Failure Due to Water 10/17/2021
Intrusion
OE-2021-0473 INPO 21-003, Achieving and Sustaining High Plant Reliability 12/28/2021
OE-2022-0026 IER L4-22-2, Fire Events and Trends 01/22/2022
OE-2022-0028 Plant Status Control Program Performance Continues to Be 03/16/2022
Unacceptable
OE-2022-0029 OE512183R20220121 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater 03/22/2022
Pump Received a Start Signal During Preparations for a
Surveillance test
OE-2022-0037 Operations Use of Glass Top Simulator in the Control Room 03/22/2022
OE-2022-0168 Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to 06/30/2022
CONTROL Element Slip
OE-2022-0170 IER L3-22-3, Power Excursion and Delayed Scram During 08/04/2022
Zero-Power Physics Testing
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
OE-2022-0243 IER L2-19-6 Revision 1, Preventing Debris-Induced Fuel 07/19/2022
Failures
Corrective Action CR-2023-06405 Lack of Operating Experience Evaluation Documentation 08/17/2023
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Engineering EER 601325660 Shld Bldg Scaffold Wire Tie/Debris Nets 07/21/2021
Evaluations PERP 882 Part/Component Equivalent Replacement Package; 1
Replacement of LB3250 Style Breaker with KD3250
Procedures NOBP-LP-2008 Corrective Action Review Board 25
NOBP-LP-2008 Corrective Action Review Board 25
NOBP-LP-2100 Operating Experience Process 24
NOBP-LP-3002 Incident/Near Miss Response and Reporting 16
NOP-LP-1103 Reportable Events 7
NOP-LP-2001 Corrective Action Program 50
NOP-WM-1003 Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation and Screening 17
NOP-WM-5008 Control of Scaffolding 0
NOP-WM-5008 Control of Scaffolding 2
NOP-WM-5008 Control of Scaffolding 3
NOP-WM-5008 Control of Scaffolding 4
NOP-WM-5008-1 Scaffold Request Form 0
NORM-OP-1009 SRO Review of Condition Reports 11
Self-Assessments ATA-2021-15159 Self-Assessment: Review of Engineering Product Quality 11/03/2021
Observations with Design Engineering Manager 2Q21-3Q21
ATA-2021-8770 Self Assessment of Equipment Important to Emergency 07/28/2021
Response
ATA-2022-11340 Self-Assessment: Integrated Control System 09/29/2022
ATA-2023-0593 Davis-Besse Clearance Assessment 03/08/2023
ATA-2023-4498 Davis-Besse Emergency Feedwater System Assessment 05/18/2023
ATL-2021-0346- 2021 CREHAB Self-Assessment Objective #6 - Safety 09/16/2021
ATA-05 Analysis Control
ATL-2022-0785- Review of Extended Corrective Actions - Strategic 10/04/2022
ATA-02 Engineering
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
CR-2022-05970- Engineering Training Program Focused Self Assessment 11/10/2022
ATA-01
MS-C-21-11-24 Quality Assurance (QA) Audit of Emergency Preparedness 12/07/2021
MS-C-22-03-01 QA Audit of Operations 05/10/2022
MS-C-22-05-07 Quality Assurance Audit Report 06/27/2022
QFO-2022-0004 Security Audit (2022) 11/01/2022
(MS-C-22-09-19)
Work Orders WO 200823448 EER 601301892 PM 12328 RPLC for ZS100D and ZS100E 01/08/2021
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