IR 05000346/2023011
| ML23240A714 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/2023 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Tony Brown Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2023011 | |
| Download: ML23240A714 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2023011
Dear Terry Brown:
On July 28, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
August 30, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000346
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-011-0023
Licensee:
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Facility:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Location:
Oak Harbor, OH
Inspection Dates:
July 10, 2023 to July 28, 2023
Inspectors:
T. Briley, Senior Project Engineer
B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
E. Magnuson, Reactor Inspector
R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer
C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The team performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The team conducted a five-year review of the decay heat removal / low pressure injection system. The team also reviewed the corrective actions for selected NRC non-cited violations and findings.
Operating Experience: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
Self-Assessments and Audits: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE): The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's programs to establish and maintain a SCWE.
The team reviewed the completed corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPR) opened during IP 95001 Supplemental Inspection (ML22314A225),dated November 10, 2022, associated with a White Notice of Violation in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The team verified these corrective actions had been completed as scheduled and as prescribed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment Assessment of the Corrective Action Program 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP completely and accurately.
The team noted that issues were being identified by all levels of organization and with varying degrees of safety significance. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, and they were subsequently entered into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized a number of CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE) Program. For example, the licensee performed departmental self-assessments and Nuclear Oversight audits to identify issues in station processes. The identified deficiencies and improvement opportunities were entered into the CAP for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both the NRC and from industry OE programs and entered them into the CAP when they were applicable to the station.
The team determined the licensee was generally effective at trending low-level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the CAP to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.
The team performed a 5-year review of the decay heat removal / low pressure injection system. Specifically, the team focused on any recurring or age-related issues of the system. As part of this review, the team reviewed plant health reports, selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents, and interviewed the system engineer. The team also performed a partial system walkdown to assess the material condition of system piping, selected components and surrounding areas. The team concluded that deficiencies and concerns were identified and entered into the CAP at a low threshold. Corrective actions appeared to be adequate and timely, commensurate with their safety significance.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. In general, once a degraded or non-conforming issue was identified, the CAP process was effective in directing equipment operability or functionality reviews. The licensee used a multi-discipline team consisting of department directors and managers to verify the condition report categorization, evaluation method selection, and other actions adequately addressed the scope and significance of the documented issue. Upon completion of the evaluation or action, the Corrective Action Review Board reviewed those actions to ensure they met the CAP requirements. During the Management Review Board and Corrective Action Review Board meetings the team observed, licensee staff were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing and screening issues. The team also observed healthy dialogues and good interactions among the members of the respective groups. The members came prepared and challenged each other on disposition of the identified conditions. Actions were prioritized based on the safety significance of the issues.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of a root cause evaluation or other causal evaluation methodologies were resolved in accordance with CAP requirements. The team sampled assignments associated with violations that were identified by the NRC previously and with licensee event reports. The team determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally effective and timely.
Assessment Use of Operating Experience 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in the use of OE was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, condition reports were written and actions were developed and implemented to prevent similar issues from occurring. OE lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed OE information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as issue reviews and investigations.
Although the team did not identify any issues of significance in this area, the team noted that the licensee did not have a formal process that captured the initial OE screening results. For example, the licensee screened NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2022-02, "Operational Leakage," as information only. This was in accordance with procedure NOBP-LP-2100, "Operating Experience Process," which allowed RIS documents to be screened as information only. This RIS was screened as information only because licensee personnel compared the information in the RIS to existing procedures for evaluating operational leakage and determined that the existing procedures matched the information in the RIS. As a result, no additional actions or procedure revisions were required. However, the station did not retain a formal record for the decision to screen the RIS as information only. The licensee was able to produce an informal record of the screening decision, however, this could potentially make it more difficult for future reviewers to understand the rationale behind a particular OE screening. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR-2023-06405, "Lack of Operating Experience Evaluation Documentation," to further evaluate the issue.
Assessment Self-Assessments and Audits 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known, including issues within the CAP itself. Those issues were addressed by the licensee through the CAP. The team did not identify any concerns in this area.
Assessment Safety Conscious Work Environment 71152B The team reviewed the Davis-Besse safety culture survey results from 2020-2022 and noted the survey results revealed negative staff responses regarding the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). The teams also noted that there was a high number of negative responses in several departments regarding confidence in the CAP to prioritize, investigate, and resolve issues. As a result, the team reviewed licensee actions to address the negative survey trends. The team also performed individual and group interviews of a representative cross-section of licensee personnel, including individual contributors and supervisors from various departments. The team also interviewed the ECP manager and reviewed selected ECP case files. A total of 51 licensee personnel were interviewed during this inspection.
Based on the individual and group interviews and a review of licensee actions, the team determined licensee personnel believed that they could raise nuclear safety and safeguards issues through multiple channels including ECP without fear of retaliation and that the CAP effectively addresses quality issues. Although morale appeared low in several departments due to resource issues, the team found no evidence of challenges to the SCWE at Davis-Besse.
Assessment Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence for the Emergency Diesel Generator White Finding 71152B During the 95001 Supplemental Inspection for the Emergency Diesel Generator Speed Switch White finding (ML22314A225), two CAPRs had not been completed. Therefore, during this inspection, the team reviewed the completed actions to verify prompt and effective CAPR implementation.
For EF-2022-0079-001, "Add DC System Voltage to Ground Configuration of the DC Electrical Distribution System to the Design Criteria Manual," the team noted that the licensee revised the Design Criteria Manual with a discussion on grounded Direct Current (DC)components experiencing more than 260 Volts DC during a DC system positive to ground fault based on the licensees specific 125/250 Volt battery configuration. Specifications E-005Q, E-007Q, E-039Q, E-287Q, E-854Q, and M-180Q, and System Descriptions 003A, 003B,007, 009, 022C, and 049 were also updated with a discussion on this condition and that DC components are specified to be rated for the full voltage of 260 Volt and above. The team concluded this action met the intent of the action item and therefore, this correction action item is closed.
For CA-2022-0079-004, "Determine the Need for Group Specific Training on 125/250 Volt DC System," the team noted the licensee performed a training needs analysis and concluded a document based training manual describing the DC distribution system and voltages experienced by grounded DC components during a positive to ground fault condition was needed. The team reviewed the subject training manual slides created by the licensee and concluded the licensee captured their 125/250 Volt DC system configuration and voltages encountered by grounded DC components during positive to ground fault condition appropriately. This corrective action item is closed.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 28, 2023, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Terry Brown and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CA-2022-00079-
001
Add DC System Voltage to Ground Configuration of the DC
Electrical Distribution System to the Design Criteria Manual
07/07/2022
CA-2022-00079-
004
Determine the Need for Group Specific Training on 125/250
Volt DC System
05/09/2022
CR-2015-05014
NRC Response to Task Interface Agreement 2014-11:
Design and Licensing Basis for Shield Building
04/10/2015
CR-2015-05215
INPO 2015: BACC - Valve Packing Leak Found on HP2B
During Walkdown
04/14/2015
CR-2015-07969
NRC NCV: Departure from Method of Evaluation (Described
in DB UFSAR) Required Prior NRC Approval Under 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(2) And Method Not Approved by NRC For Intended
Application
06/05/2015
CR-2016-04587
Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature RTD Wire Insulation
Degradation
04/05/2016
CR-2017-03117
Broken ROCA Outrigger Wires
03/19/2017
CR-2017-11317
Cyber Security Program: Control Deficiencies
11/11/2017
CR-2018-00682
Quality Records Discovered in Desk
01/25/2018
CR-2018-06678
Shield Building Bore S5-666.0-10 Findings
07/26/2018
CR-2018-07467
Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Steps for DB-OP-06012 Not
Incorporated for DH Venting Train 1 from DH51
08/23/2018
CR-2019-00643
Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Time Between DH 1A Motor
Operated Valve (MOV) Closed Seat Contact to Control
Switch Trip Greater Than 0.155 Seconds
01/22/2019
CR-2019-01943
Form NOP-OP-4705-01 10CFR50.75 (g) Leak Spill Record
Needs Added to Closed CR-2018-03211.
03/05/2019
CR-2019-05867
2019 NRC PI&R: Violation for Lack of Design Calculation for
Control Room Blockwall 5337
07/11/2019
CR-2020-00013
Five Year Review of DH-LPI; Pipe Support Spring Hangers
are Set Outside the Working Range
01/02/2020
CR-2020-01739
1R21 BACC: Tail Pipe of DB-SV4610B
03/03/2020
CR-2020-04201
BACC: Active Leakage Identified on DH1509
05/12/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2020-05859
Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of Siren Activation
07/21/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-2020-09055
Storm Damage to Shield Building Scaffold
11/24/2020
CR-2021-02023
Five Year Review of DH-LPI; DH Pump 2 Seal Leakage
03/19/2021
CR-2021-04967
Clogged Floor Drains Near SFP on 603'
06/27/2021
CR-2021-05199
Potential NCV of 10 CFR 72.48 for 2019 DB Fuel Loading
Campaign
07/08/2021
CR-2021-05249
Circ Water Pump 1 & 3 Casing Drains Blocked
07/09/2021
CR-2021-05261
Shield Building Scaffold Pans Dislodged
07/09/2021
CR-2021-05342
Excessively Dirty Smoke Detector in Service Water Pump
Room
07/13/2021
CR-2021-05395
NRC Identified: Vegetation Growth Around Radiological
Environmental Monitoring Program Air Sampling Stations
07/15/2021
CR-2021-05789
Water Curtain Activation
07/30/2021
CR-2021-05835
Lane 1A Explosive Detector Flow Warning
08/02/2021
CR-2021-06786
Near Miss: Negligent Discharge of Rifle at Security Weapons
Range
09/08/2021
CR-2021-06947
Failed Post Maintenance Testing on Miscellaneous Diesel
Generator
09/15/2021
CR-2021-07039
Misposition of Containment Air Cooler (CAC) Number 3 to
Slow Speed
09/19/2021
CR-2021-07100
Elevated Vibrations on Containment Purge Exhaust Fan
Motor Outboard Bearing
09/21/2021
CR-2021-07124
Governor linkage Bolting Connection from the Terminal Shaft
Lever Broken
09/22/2021
CR-2021-08097
ROCA Fence Outriggers Posing Trip Hazard
10/25/2021
CR-2021-08097
ROCA Fence Outriggers Posing Trip Hazard
10/25/2021
CR-2021-08681
Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System Refueling Interval Test
DB-SS-03708 Step 4.5.5 required CR
11/13/2021
CR-2021-08974
Service Water Baseline Test Engineering Review
DB-PF-03216
11/24/2021
CR-2021-09167
Causal Evaluation; NRC Non-Sited Violation (NCV), Failure
to Provide Procedural Instructions for Transferring Gland
Sealing Steam from Main to Auxiliary Steam Following
2/03/2021
CR-2021-09279
Fatigue Rule Violation
2/07/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-2021-09697
DB-FP-0417 Acceptance Criteria 5.1.2 went Overdue on
2/23/2021 for Number 4 Mechanical Penetration Room
(MPR) Water Curtain Spray System
2/25/2021
CR-2022-00101
Diesel Air Start Relief Valves Potential Leakage
01/06/2022
CR-2022-00112
Flex N+1 EFWST Replenishment and SFP Spray Pump
Would Not Start
01/06/2022
CR-2022-00158
Video Capture System Not Functioning
01/07/2022
CR-2022-00491
Video Capture Not Working as SAS/CAS
01/22/2022
CR-2022-00673
Items Stored on Top of Flammable Locker in Maintenance
Hot Shop
01/28/2022
CR-2022-00731
Video Capture Not Working at SAS/CAS
01/31/2022
CR-2022-00735
Video Capture Server Was Offline for Five Days
01/31/2022
CR-2022-00744
Video Capture System Not Functioning
01/31/2022
CR-2022-00774
Five Year Review of DH-LPI; DH Pump P 42-1, Outboard
Bearing Indication of Oil Leakage
01/01/2022
CR-2022-00821
FirstEnergy Notified D-B That Relay Calibrations Marked
Complete on Order Record 200803544 Still Need to Be
Performed
2/03/2022
CR-2022-00879
Root Cause Evaluation, Abnormal Procedure Entries for Loss
of Letdown Flow Path
2/07/2022
CR-2022-01302
EFWP Quarterly Test Time to Rated Speed Not Obtained
2/19/2022
CR-2022-01484
Scaffold Pole in Travel Path of MS100
2/10/2022
CR-2022-01780
MS100 Limit Switch Issue
03/07/2022
CR-2022-01861
Site Protection Officer Left a Security Door Without Proper
Authorization
03/08/2022
CR-2022-02089
DB-SC-03076, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1, 184
Day Test Step Incorrectly Signed
03/12/2022
CR-2022-02550
Decay Heat Pump 2 Pump O/B Constant Oiler Empty
03/23/2022
CR-2022-02578
DH Pump 2 Spray Shield Installed and Not Tracked
03/23/2022
CR-2022-02731
Integrated SFAS Test Train 2 Required Evaluation of IST
Program Document for Valve Stroke Times - 1R22
03/28/2022
CR-2022-02787
Initial Venting of the CRDM Quick Vent Hydraulic Closures
Failed at Seven Locations
03/30/2022
CR-2022-03028
Maintenance Tag Found in Incore Tank in MODE 3
04/05/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-2022-03195
As Found Condition of the East Transfer Tube Flange
04/12/2022
CR-2022-03669
Decay Heat Pump 1 IB/OB Bearings Constant Level Oilers
Were Found Empty
04/28/2022
CR-2022-03731
Decay Heat Pump Problem Solving
04/29/2022
CR-2022-03960
Causal Evaluation; Inadvertent Drain of EHC Fluid
05/10/2022
CR-2022-04169
Pressure Differential Switch PDS-2686B Preconditioned
During Performance of DB-MI-03203
05/16/2022
CR-2022-04258
Work Performed During 1R22 Without Notification
05/20/2022
CR-2022-04648
MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200822950 Missing Initials and Dates
on Line-Outs
06/06/2022
CR-2022-04683
MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200574481 Missing Information
06/07/2022
CR-2022-04714
MS-C-22-05-07 - Order 200878599 Procedure Adherence
Issue and Error
06/08/2022
CR-2022-04715
MS-C-22-05-07 - Order 200861477 Procedure Adherence
Issues and Errors
06/08/2022
CR-2022-04763
EDG Critical Relays Identified as Non-Critical
03/28/2022
CR-2022-04767
MS-C-22-05-07: Order 200789259 Issues
06/10/2022
CR-2022-04822
MS-C-22-05-07 - Orders Have Several Procedure
Non-Adherence Issues
06/13/2022
CR-2022-04845
CAC Inlet MOV's That Require Static Testing Due to ASME
Section III Potentially in Conflict with Plant Conditions
06/14/2022
CR-2022-04936
HKD Circuit Breaker Tolerance Change Found to Impact
Coordination of Recently Installed HKD Circuit Breakers for
BE2168, BE3320, and BF2315
06/17/2022
CR-2022-04943
Decay Heat Pump#2 Concluded to be Previously Inoperable
in Mode 3 with Outboard Bearing Oil Leak Not Resolved
06/17/2022
CR-2022-05830
Operator Actions Not in Accordance with Procedure,
Following Isolation of Letdown
07/27/2022
CR-2022-06032
MS-C-22-08-02: FINDING Issues Identified with the Last
Three Revisions of the Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM) Non-Compliance with Administrative Technical Specifications 5.5.1, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM).
08/05/2022
CR-2022-07873
MS-C-22-09-19 Finding: Missing Reportable Events Log
10/18/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documentation Identified
CR-2022-08738
Davis-Besse 2022 Safety Conscious Work Environment
Survey Chemistry Red Pillars
11/15/2022
CR-2023-00252
RCS Pressure Inputs to Inadequate Core Cooling Curve Are
Inconsistent
01/11/2023
CR-2023-00480
Main Steam Line 2 Pressure Low to SFRCS PS-3689D Was
preconditioned (Trending)
01/23/2023
CR-2023-00689
Potential FME issue with DO3671
2/01/2023
CR-2023-00753
Emergency Diesel Generator Lockout Due to Improper
Continuity Reading
2/03/2023
CR-2023-00856
Causal Evaluation; New Site Gap Identified from Integrated
Performance Assessment
2/07/2023
CR-2023-00909
QC Witness Point Missed
2/09/2023
CR-2023-01360
Year Review of Decay Heat Removal-Low Pressure
Injection (DH-LPI) System; Increased Particle Content in Oil
for DH Pump 2
2/27/2023
CR-2023-01484
Work Performed on CDA Without Addressing Cyber Security
03/02/2023
CR-2023-02017
CAS SDMS Alarm Screen Host Down
03/16/2023
CR-2023-02239
Explosive Detector 1A Air Pump Warning
03/23/2023
CR-2023-02416
EP Drill 2023-03-28, Emergency Response Dry Run, Initial
Notification not Timely Completed
03/29/2023
CR-2023-02421
EP Drill 2023-03-28, Emergency Response Dry Run Staffing
Forms Not Completed
03/29/2023
CR-2023-02426
CAS SDMS Graphics Screen Locked Up
03/29/2023
CR-2023-02485
Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill 2023 Emergency
Response Dry Run Drill, Three Objectives Not Met in Dose
Assessment
03/31/2023
CR-2023-02657
Condition Report Not Initiated for Reciprocating Internal
Combustion Engine (RICE) Rule Non-Compliance
04/05/2023
CR-2023-02696
JT3035 Hard Tamper
04/06/2023
CR-2023-02941
Plant Walkdown Concern Emergency Core Cooling System
(ECCS) Pump Room 105 Auxiliary Latch
04/12/2023
CR-2023-03429
2B Explosive Detector Air Pump Warning
04/24/2023
CR-2023-03924
NRC Question on External Operating Experience for
05/09/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Underground Fire Protection Piping Leaks
CR-2023-04687
SBODG extended Unavailability Time Due to Low Fuel Oil
Level
06/08/2023
CR-2023-05314
Officer Assumed Shift Without Required Equipment
07/04/2023
CR-2023-05341
SW Strainer 1 Packing Leak
07/05/2023
CR-2023-05365
2B Explosive Detector Failed to Verify
07/06/2023
CR-2023-05524
EDG 1 Governor Oil Level Increasing
07/14/2023
CR-2023-05525
CCW Room Door 332 Left Unsecure
07/14/2023
OE-2021-0201
IN 21-01, Lessons Learned from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Inspections of Design-Basis Capability of
Power-Operated Valves at Nuclear Power Plants
05/18/2021
OE-2021-0218
OE478914R20210601 Second Fuel Defect Identified During
Outage Fuel Sipping
08/04/2021
OE-2021-0288
Power Reduction Due to Condensate Pump Lower Motor
Bearing Temperature
10/11/2021
OE-2021-0328
IN21-03, Operating Experience Related to the Duane Arnold
Energy Center Derecho Event on August 10, 2020
08/21/2021
OE-2021-0329
IN21-02, Recent Issues Associated with Monitoring
Occupational Exposure to Radiation from Licensed and
Unlicensed Radiation Sources
08/21/2021
OE-2021-0346
Circulating Water Pump Bearing Failure Due to Water
Intrusion
10/17/2021
OE-2021-0473
INPO 21-003, Achieving and Sustaining High Plant Reliability
2/28/2021
OE-2022-0026
IER L4-22-2, Fire Events and Trends
01/22/2022
OE-2022-0028
Plant Status Control Program Performance Continues to Be
Unacceptable
03/16/2022
OE-2022-0029
OE512183R20220121 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Received a Start Signal During Preparations for a
Surveillance test
03/22/2022
OE-2022-0037
Operations Use of Glass Top Simulator in the Control Room
03/22/2022
OE-2022-0168
Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to
CONTROL Element Slip
06/30/2022
OE-2022-0170
IER L3-22-3, Power Excursion and Delayed Scram During
Zero-Power Physics Testing
08/04/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
OE-2022-0243
IER L2-19-6 Revision 1, Preventing Debris-Induced Fuel
Failures
07/19/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-2023-06405
Lack of Operating Experience Evaluation Documentation
08/17/2023
EER 601325660
Shld Bldg Scaffold Wire Tie/Debris Nets
07/21/2021
Engineering
Evaluations
PERP 882
Part/Component Equivalent Replacement Package;
Replacement of LB3250 Style Breaker with KD3250
NOBP-LP-2008
Corrective Action Review Board
NOBP-LP-2008
Corrective Action Review Board
NOBP-LP-2100
Operating Experience Process
NOBP-LP-3002
Incident/Near Miss Response and Reporting
NOP-LP-1103
Reportable Events
NOP-LP-2001
Corrective Action Program
NOP-WM-1003
Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation and Screening
NOP-WM-5008
Control of Scaffolding
NOP-WM-5008
Control of Scaffolding
NOP-WM-5008
Control of Scaffolding
NOP-WM-5008
Control of Scaffolding
NOP-WM-5008-1
Scaffold Request Form
Procedures
NORM-OP-1009
SRO Review of Condition Reports
ATA-2021-15159
Self-Assessment: Review of Engineering Product Quality
Observations with Design Engineering Manager 2Q21-3Q21
11/03/2021
ATA-2021-8770
Self Assessment of Equipment Important to Emergency
Response
07/28/2021
ATA-2022-11340
Self-Assessment: Integrated Control System
09/29/2022
ATA-2023-0593
Davis-Besse Clearance Assessment
03/08/2023
ATA-2023-4498
Davis-Besse Emergency Feedwater System Assessment
05/18/2023
ATL-2021-0346-
ATA-05
21 CREHAB Self-Assessment Objective #6 - Safety
Analysis Control
09/16/2021
Self-Assessments
ATL-2022-0785-
ATA-02
Review of Extended Corrective Actions - Strategic
Engineering
10/04/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-2022-05970-
ATA-01
Engineering Training Program Focused Self Assessment
11/10/2022
MS-C-21-11-24
Quality Assurance (QA) Audit of Emergency Preparedness
2/07/2021
MS-C-22-03-01
QA Audit of Operations
05/10/2022
MS-C-22-05-07
Quality Assurance Audit Report
06/27/2022
QFO-2022-0004
(MS-C-22-09-19)
Security Audit (2022)
11/01/2022
Work Orders
EER 601301892 PM 12328 RPLC for ZS100D and ZS100E
01/08/2021