IR 05000346/2022002
| ML22221A255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/2022 |
| From: | Eve E NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | Tony Brown Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2022002 | |
| Download: ML22221A255 (29) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2022002
Dear Mr. Brown:
On June 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On July 27, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.
August 11, 2022 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Elise C. Eve, Acting Branch Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000346
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2022-002-0043
Licensee:
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Facility:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Location:
Oak Harbor, OH
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2022 to June 30, 2022
Inspectors:
D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Barclay, Reactor Inspector
R. Cassara, Resident Inspector
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
E. Fernandez, Reactor Inspector
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
T. Ospino, Resident Inspector
J. Reed, Health Physicist
Approved By:
Elise C. Eve, Acting Branch Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71114.0
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Use Procedure during Loss of Letdown Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Event Green FIN 05000346/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified when the licensee failed to use procedures when responding to a loss of letdown. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter the annunciator response procedure, and isolated letdown with valve MU2B instead of valves MU6 and MU4 per procedure. The licensee also failed to utilize procedures while attempting to restore letdown during the initial response to the loss of letdown.
Failure to Provide Adequate Procedural Instructions when Swapping Purification Demineralizer Trains Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000346/2022002-02 Open/Closed
[H.2] - Field Presence 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1(a) were identified for the licensees failure to establish and implement procedural guidance for performing a change of the on-service purification demineralizer. Specifically, the guidance in licensee procedure DB-OP-6006, "Makeup and Purification System," revision 53, for switching purification demineralizers did not provide instructions to ensure that the purification demineralizer being placed on-service was not manually isolated. This lack of procedural guidance resulted in control room operators inadvertently isolating letdown because they failed to un-isolate the manually closed outlet valve of purification demineralizer 1 prior to putting it on-service.
This resulted in high pressure in the letdown system, lifting of the relief valve MU-1890, and subsequent increase of pressurizer level to over 228 inches. This required the licensee to enter TS LCO 3.4.9 conditions A and B, resulting in a rapid reduction in power to roughly 15 percent.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000346/2021050-06 Potential Adverse Changes During 2006 Emergency Diesel Generator Modifications 93812 Discussed
PLANT STATUS
The unit began the inspection period shut down for refueling outage. On April 18, the unit entered startup, and on April 21 the unit reached full power. On May 17, the unit was down powered to 64 percent to allow repair of a cracked small diameter instrument line on the secondary side. On May 19, the unit was returned to rated thermal power, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://ww.w.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance, and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Decay heat train 2 during the week ending April 30, 2022
- (2) Containment spray train 1 during train 2 scheduled maintenance during the week ending June 30, 2022
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the control room emergency ventilation system through the week ending June 11, 2022.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Containment closeout walkdown, fire areas D, AB, and A, during the week ending April 9, 2022
- (2) Emergency core cooling system train 2 room 115, fire area A-04, during the week ending April 16, 2022
- (3) Low voltage switchgear rooms E and F, fire areas X and Y, during the week ending May 7, 2022
- (4) Radioactive waste exhaust equipment and main station exhaust fan room, fire area EE, during the week ending June 30, 2022
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation, and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 7, 2022 to March 18, 2022:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities
Ultrasonic examination (UT) of cold leg inlet nozzle to pipe weld, component ID RC-MK-B-59-1-FW-113B
Ultrasonic examination (UT) of hot leg outlet nozzle to shell weld, component ID RC-RPV-WR-13/14/72-Z
Liquid penetrant (PT) examination of fillet weld on RCTC CLNT 1-2-1 seal return line component ID DB-FTMU60A
Liquid penetrant (PT) examination of fillet weld on RCTC CLNT 1-2-1 seal return line component ID DB-FTMU60B
Visual examination (VT) of reactor vessel interior keyways
Visual examination (VT) of control rod guide tubes per MRP-227
Welding of 2 to 1 fillet weld on RCTC CLNT 1-2-1 seal return line component ID DB-FTMU60B (WO 200747521)03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities
Visual examinations of 69 penetrations on the reactor vessel closure head 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities
Condition Report (CR)-2020-05467 containment spray pump 1 pipe cap at CS32
CR-2021-07323 BWST SFAS channel 2 level transmitter
CR-2021-07401 decay heat pump casing vent
CR-2021-02688 makeup pump 2 outlet isolation 03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities
Eddy current (ET) testing of 15502 steam generator tubes in SG 2A
Eddy current (ET) testing of 15538 steam generator tubes in SG 1B
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power ascension, including syncing main generator to grid, delta cold leg temperature adjustments, and starting of second main feed pump during the week ending April 23, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Replacement of station battery 2 during the week ending March 12, 2022
- (2) Decay heat pump 2 bearing and oil seal replacement due to oil leak during the week ending April 16, 2022 (3)10-year overhaul of the YVB inverter static transfer switch channel 'B' during the week ending May 7, 2022
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Reactor power reduction and emergent work related to instrument line steam leak repairs from May 17 - 19, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Main steam isolation valve 2 inoperable due to scaffold pole in path of MS100, CR 2022-01484, during the week ending April 9, 2022
- (2) Decay heat pump 2 pump outboard constant level oiler empty, CR 2022-02550, during the week ending April 16, 2022
- (3) Decay heat pump 1 inboard/outboard bearings constant level oilers were found empty, CR 2022-03669, during the week ending April 30, 2022
- (4) RCP 1-2 seal leak / lower differential pressure, CR 2022-03463, and CR 2022-03482, during the week ending June 30, 2022
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
- (1) Containment air cooler 2 outlet temperature control valve SW1357 during the week ending May 14, 2022
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R22 activities from March 4, 2022 through April 19, 2022
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) Steam feed rupture control system channel 2 integrated testing during the week ending April 9, 2022
- (2) Physics testing during power ascension during the week ending April 23, 2022
- (3) Emergency diesel generator 1 monthly test during the week ending April 30, 2022
- (4) Steam feed rupture control system channel 1 differential pressure inputs surveillance on May 16, 2022
- (5) Low pressure injection quarterly test during the week ending June 11, 2022
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Annual run of FX-P1A alternate low pressure flex emergency feed water pump and FX-P2A flex emergency feed water storage tank replenishment and spent fuel pool spray N+1 pump during the week ending 30 June, 2022
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
2020 annual siren preventive maintenance (PM) results
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the emergency preparedness organization
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Integrated drill on May 24,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) ARGOS-5 number Li 2.12.112 at the main exit of the radiologically controlled area
- (2) SAM-11 number Li 2.12.54 at the main exit of the radiologically controlled area
- (3) GEM-5 number Li 2.12.115 at the main exit of the radiologically controlled area
- (4) AMP-100 number Li 2.7.502 in the calibration facility
- (5) Chronos-4 number Li 2.12.113 in the rad waste truck bay
- (6) Telepole Li.2.7.337 ready for issuance in radiation protection counting room
- (7) Area radiation monitor RE-8426 in the fuel handling building
- (8) Area radiation monitor RE-1998 in the auxiliary building
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (13 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) ARGOS 5-AB number Li 2.12.112
- (2) GEM-5 number Li 2.12.115
- (3) SAM-11 number Li 2.12.54
- (4) FUJI neutron detector number Li 2.7.682
- (5) AMP-100 number Li 2.7.502
- (6) Chronos-4 number Li 2.12.113
- (7) Whole body counter number Li 2.12.42
- (8) TopTrak air flow calibration standard number 65775
- (9) Benchtop counter model L-177 number Li 2.7.545
- (10) Benchtop counter model L-177 number Li 2.7.558
- (11) Failed fuel monitor number RE-1998
- (12) Control room normal air supply monitor number RE-4597
- (13) Containment air normal monitor number RE-4597 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Sample 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Batch tank liquid effluent monitor, RE-1878A
- (2) Station vent accident range noble gas monitor, RE-4598AB
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12)===
- (1) January 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022 EP03: Alert And Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022
71152A - Annual Follow-Up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) February 5, 2022, forced downpower due to loss of letdown
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-Up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated forced downpower and licensees response on February 5,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71114.02 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation:
On July 19, 2020, Ottawa County, Ohio notified the licensee that a single emergency siren sounded spuriously. On July 20, 2020, the licensee notified the Ottawa County Dispatch that the affected siren was out of service for repair. Title 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) requires the licensee to report within four hours, any event related to the health and safety of the public for which notification to other government agencies has been made. Initially on July 19, the licensee concluded that the siren actuation was not reportable because less than 25 percent of the local population was affected. On July 20, the licensee reviewed the circumstances surrounding the siren, and concluded that 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) applied and a four-hour report should have been made. NUREG-1022 includes as an example that an emergency notification is needed if county governments are informed of an actuation by concerned members of the public. The licensee made the notification at 1636 on July 20, 2020. The inspectors concluded that the failure to make the required four-hour notification in timely fashion was a performance deficiency. Because the violation impacted the regulatory process, in that the licensee failed to make a required report on time, the inspectors assessed the performance deficiency using traditional enforcement. The licensee entered the condition into the corrective action process as Condition Report 2020-05859. Corrective actions included clarifications to licensee procedures to prevent similar occurrences.
Significance/Severity: Severity Level IV. The inspectors concluded that the finding was a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which includes a failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 as an example of a SL IV violation.
Because the licensee self-identified the condition, entered the condition in the corrective action program, and took action to address the causes, the inspectors concluded that the issue could be addressed as a licensee-identified non-cited violation.
Corrective Action References: CR 2020-05859 Failure to Use Procedure during Loss of Letdown Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Event Green FIN 05000346/2022002-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified when the licensee failed to use procedures when responding to a loss of letdown. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter the annunciator response procedure and isolated letdown with valve MU2B instead of valves MU6 and MU4 per procedure. The licensee also failed to utilize procedures while attempting to restore letdown during the initial response to the loss of letdown.
Description:
On February 5, 2022, a switching of on-service purification demineralizers was performed.
During operator performance of this evolution, letdown was inadvertently isolated. Letdown pressure raised above 150psig, sounding annunciator alarm 2-2-A, "Letdown Pressure High,"
and letdown system pressure relief valve MU-1890 lifted. The annunciator response procedure corresponding to annunciator 2-2-A, "Letdown Pressure High," was not entered.
Entering the correct annunciator response procedure is required by NOP-OP-1002 "Conduct of Operations" revision 16. The annunciator response procedure, DB-OP-02002, 2-2-A, step 3.1 states, verify MU-4, pressure reducing valve closed, and step 3.2 states verify MU-6 letdown flow control valve closed. Operators did not reference a procedure but instead used their system knowledge and isolated letdown by closing letdown isolation valve MU-2B.
Operators attempted to restore letdown by closing MU10A (1 purification demineralizer inlet),opening MU10B (2 purification demineralizer inlet), and then opened MU-2B. Makeup system pressure increased to 145psig, and indications of rising reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT)level again caused operators to isolate letdown with MU2B again. Operators then entered abnormal procedure DB-OP-02512 Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions, section 4.3 Loss of letdown flow path." Following the loss of letdown, the level in the pressurizer increased. When pressurizer level reached 228 inches, operators entered LCO 3.4.9 condition A restore level to within limit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Operators attempted to restore letdown again by opening MU104 purification demineralizer bypass and closing MU10B before opening MU2A and slowly raising letdown flow through MU6. Operators correctly diagnosed that letdown relief valve MU1890 failed to reseat based on indications of increasing RCDT level, and operators isolated letdown by closing MU6 and MU4. Operators again attempted to restore letdown through MU104 to allow mechanical agitation of MU1890 to seat the relief valve, but continuing indications of increasing RCDT level indicated MU1890 did not reseat.
Operators then entered DB-OP-02504, "Rapid Shutdown," and commenced a power reduction at 10 percent per minute. Operators did not restore pressurizer level to within limit and entered LCO 3.4.9. condition B be in mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in mode 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Letdown was isolated by closing MU4 and MU6, and MU1890 was manually cycled and reseated. Letdown was then restored with a stable level in the RCDT. Pressurizer level was restored to within limits and LCO 3.4.9 was exited with reactor power at approximately 15 percent.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included the removal of operators from duty for training remediation including simulator training specific to alarm response and procedural adherence, revisions to operating procedures, and improved control board markings.
Corrective Action References: CR 2022-00879, Abnormal procedure entries for loss of letdown flow path
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors reviewed this finding using the guidance contained in IMC 0612, "Issue Screening," Appendix B, "Issue Screening Directions," dated July 23, 2021.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to use procedures during the initial response to the loss of letdown constituted a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented.
Specifically, the licensee failed to enter the annunciator response procedure for letdown pressure high requiring isolation with valve MU6 and valve MU4 but operators isolated letdown with valve MU2B by memory without procedural guidance.
Screening: The performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Issue Screening," Appendix B, "Issue Screening Directions," dated July 23, 2021, because, if left uncorrected the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, by not performing activities affecting quality in accordance with a procedure, the operators could improperly manipulate plant equipment and challenge plant safety by causing unexpected transients or impact safety-related equipment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) since it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter the annunciator response procedure for letdown pressure high during the initial response to loss of letdown.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Failure to Provide Adequate Procedural Instructions when Swapping Purification Demineralizer Trains Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000346/2022002-02 Open/Closed
[H.2] - Field Presence 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1(a) were identified for the licensees failure to establish and implement procedural guidance for performing a change of the on-service purification demineralizer. Specifically, the guidance in licensee procedure DB-OP-6006, "Makeup and Purification System," revision 53, for switching purification demineralizers did not provide instructions to ensure that the purification demineralizer being placed on-service was not manually isolated. This lack of procedural guidance resulted in control room operators inadvertently isolating letdown because they failed to un-isolate the manually closed outlet valve of purification demineralizer 1 prior to putting it on-service. This resulted in high pressure in the letdown system, lifting of the relief valve MU-1890, and subsequent increase of pressurizer level to over 228 inches. This required the licensee to enter TS LCO 3.4.9 conditions A and B, resulting in a rapid reduction in power to roughly 15 percent.
Description:
On February 5, 2022, a switching of on-service purification demineralizers was performed. A turnover for the command senior reactor operator and the balance of plant reactor operator was conducted so they could participate in a concurrent fire brigade drill. A pre-job brief for swapping to purification demineralizer 1 was conducted in the control room. The brief did not include a discussion of the caution tagged purification demineralizer outlet isolation valve MU139 that was closed due to leak-by of purification demineralizer 1 inlet isolation valve MU10A. A pre-job brief form was not used as required by procedure. The demineralizer swap was performed per DB-OP-6006, "Makeup and Purification System," revision 53.
DB-OP-6006 does not have a step to address the plant conditions encountered, namely that MU139 purification demineralizer 1 outlet had been manually isolated for an extended period due to leak-by of purification demineralizer 1 inlet, MU10A. The procedure does have such a step applying to purification demineralizer 3 outlet, for similar leak-by conditions. Operators inadvertently isolated letdown when taking purification demineralizer 2 off service because the purification demineralizer 1 lineup was not complete due to MU139 being closed. Letdown pressure increased above 150 psig, resulting in annunciator alarm 2-2-A, "letdown pressure high." Operators attempted to restore letdown but were unsuccessful. Following the loss of letdown, the level in the pressurizer rose. When pressurizer level reached 228 inches, the operators appropriately entered LCO 3.4.9 condition A restore level to within limit within one hour. Operators did not restore pressurizer level to within limit and entered LCO 3.4.9 condition B, be in mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in mode 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Operators entered DB-OP-02504, "Rapid Shutdown," and commenced a power reduction at 10 percent per minute. During the rapid shutdown, letdown was reestablished, and pressurizer level was restored to within limits, allowing operators to exit LCO 3.4.9 conditions A and B. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 15 percent before the restoration of letdown and proper pressurizer level.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions included the removal of operators from duty for training remediation, issuance of standing order 22-001 for crew engagement in briefs and observations of evolutions, revision of the system procedure (DB-OP-6006, "Makeup and Purification System," revision 55) to address manipulation of each purification demineralizer outlet valve as required if there is known leak-by of the inlet valve, control room crew reorganization and assessment, and senior crew mentor implementation.
Corrective Action References: CR 2022-00879, "Abnormal procedure entries for loss of letdown flow path"
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors reviewed this finding using the guidance contained in IMC 0612, "Issue Screening," Appendix B, "Issue Screening Directions," dated July 23, 2021.
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to provide adequate procedural instructions to plant operators for performing a change of the on-service purification demineralizer constituted a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide procedural instructions to open purification demineralizer 1 outlet, MU 139, if it had been isolated due to leak-by of the purification demineralizer 1 inlet, MU 10A. However, the procedure has a step for purification demineralizer 3.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, "Issue Screening," Appendix B, "Issue Screening Directions,"
dated July 23, 2021, because it was associated with the configuration control (or human performance) attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. This issue is similar to example 4.b from IMC 0612 Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues."
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding had resulted in a transient initiator for the Initiating Events cornerstone and using, "Exhibit 1 - Initiating Events Screening Questions," determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, because the finding did result in a turbine trip, and not a reactor trip, the finding screened directly to Green without the need for a detailed risk evaluation.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.2 - Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in the work areas of the plant observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from standards and expectations are corrected promptly. Senior managers ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel.
Specifically:
A procedural change order was in progress to address procedural inadequacies in DB-OP-6006 but was not yet implemented at the time of the event.
The reactivity manipulation pre-job brief that occurred in the control room prior to the evolution did not accurately review the activity, or potential consequences, and supervision did not identify or correct the deviation from the standards and expectations.
Concurrent fire drill and relief turnover distractions occurred that impacted the brief, peer checks, and supervisory oversight of the reactivity manipulation for changing purification demineralizers with no intervention of supervision to mitigate the distractions.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 3 addresses Procedures for Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of Safety-Related PWR Systems, Instructions for energizing, filling, venting, draining, startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation should be prepared, as appropriate, for the following systems, Section 3.n, addresses Chemical and Volume Control System (including Letdown/Purification System). The licensee established procedure DB-OP-6006, Makeup and Purification System, revision 53, to provide instructions for operating the makeup and purification system.
Contrary to the above, between September 2, 2020 and February 7, 2022, the licensee failed to maintain a written procedure for the chemical and volume control system (including letdown/purification system). Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain procedure DB-OP-6006, Makeup and Purification System, such that it accurately directed operations personnel to un-isolate purification demineralizer 1 if it was manually isolated by MU-139 outlet for purification demineralizer 1.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
URI (Discussed)
Potential Adverse Changes During 2006 Emergency Diesel Generator Modifications URI 05000346/2021050-06 93812
Description:
The NRC continues to evaluate an unresolved item documented in inspection report 2021050-06 (ADAMS Accession Number ML21348A767). Generally, the staff is assessing the adequacy of the sites modification associated with the installation of the emergency diesel generator field flash selector switches.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On July 27, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On March 18, 2022, the inspectors presented the ISI Exit Meeting inspection results to Mr. T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On May 16, 2022, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness program inspection results to Mr. T. Brown, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03619
BACC: Boric Acid Leak from DH154 Pipe Cap
04/26/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03714
Maintenance Rule Reviews for CREVS System
04/29/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03879
CREVS Refrigerant Line Insulation and Support Degradation
05/05/2022
Procedures
DB-OP-06012
Decay Heat and Low-Pressure Injection System Operating
Procedure
Procedures
DB-OP-06013
Containment Spray System
Procedures
DB-OP-06505
Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Procedure
Fire Plans
ECCS Pump Room 1-2, Rooms 115, Fire Area A-04
Fire Plans
Low Voltage Switchgear Room F - Bus, Room 428,
Fire Area X
Fire Plans
Low Voltage Switchgear Room E - Bus, Room 429,
Fire Area Y
Fire Plans
Radwaste and Fuel Handling Areas Air Supply Equipment
Area, Room 500, Fire Area EE
Fire Plans
Radwaste Exhaust Equipment and Main Station Exhaust Fan
Room, Rooms 501 and 501DC, Fire Area EE
Fire Plans
Purge Exhaust Equipment Room, Room 515, Fire Area EE
Fire Plans
Core Flooding Tank Area, Room 214, Fire Area D
Fire Plans
Let Down Coolers Area, Room 215, Fire Area D
Fire Plans
Steam Generator West D Ring Area, Room 216, Fire Area D
Fire Plans
Steam Generator East D Ring Area, Room 218, Fire Area D
Fire Plans
Containment Air Cooler Area, Room 317 and 317A,
Fire Area D
Fire Plans
East Elevation 603' and Valve Room Elevation 636', Rooms
410 and 508, Fire Area D
Fire Plans
Southwest Penetration Area of Annulus Space Elevations
585' and 603', Partial Room 127W, Fire Area AB
Fire Plans
East and Southwest Penetration Areas at Elevations 585'
and 603', Partial Rooms 127W and 127W, Fire Area A and
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Fire Plans
East Penetration Area of Annulus Space Elevations 585' and
603', Partial Room 127E, Fire Area A
Fire Plans
North Area 565' Elevation, Rooms 213, 217 and Normal
Sump Area, Fire Area D
Fire Plans
Fuel Transfer Pool and North and West 603' Elevation,
Rooms 219, 407 and 410A, Fire Area D
Corrective Action
Documents
22-02047
Foreign Material Found During Control Rod Guide Tube
MRP-227-A Exam
04/08/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
INR-DB1R22-001
Reactor Vessel - RPV Interior - Keys Examination
03/14/2022
Procedures
54-IISI-400-024
Multi-Frequency Eddy Current Examination of Tubing
2/07/2020
Procedures
54-ISI-808-000
Automated Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of PPWR
Vessel Shell Welds
03/24/2020
Procedures
54-ISI-809-000
Automated Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of PWR
Vessel Nozzle to Shell Welds from Nozzle Bore
03/24/2020
Procedures
NA-QC-00191
Liquid Penetrant Examination
Procedures
NOP-CC-5763
Appendix VIII Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of
Austenitic Pipe Welds
Procedures
NOP-CC-5765
Appendix VIII Procedure for Straight Beam Ultrasonic
Examination of Bolts and Studs
Procedures
NOP-ET-2001
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
Procedures
WPS A8-2-1
Gas Tungsten (GTAW) of Stainless Steel (P8), Groove with
or Without Backing
Corrective Action
Documents
2015-15566
Document NA of Step in DB-ME-09205 During YVA PM
11/15/2015
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03731
Decay Heat Pump Problem Solving
04/29/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03860
X2 Replacement Board for YVB Found Bad
05/05/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03869
Document NA of Step in DB-ME-09205 During YVB PM
05/05/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04131
P42-2, 2 Decay Heat Oil Pump 2, Pump O/B Bearing Level
Low
05/15/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04174
Turbine Building Ventilation Concerns
05/17/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04175
Annunciator 5-1-B Delayed During SFAS CH 1 Monthly
Functional
05/17/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04452
YVB Normal Operations Light is Out
05/26/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04722
DH Pump 2 Pump O/B Oil Leak
06/09/2022
Miscellaneous
80-9230400-90 Oscillator Board Technical Description
Procedures
DB-ME-09202
Maintenance of Essential SC1 UPS
Procedures
DB-ME-09205
Maintenance of Inverters YVA and YVB
Corrective Action
Documents
22 -04032
Main Feed Pump 2 Recirculation Valve FW438 Packing Leak 05/12/2022
Drawings
OS-012A SH 1
Main Feedwater System
Miscellaneous
IR22 Shutdown Defense In-Depth Report
Procedures
NOP-OP-1007
Risk Management
Corrective Action
Documents
20-01652
1R21 BACC: Boric Acid Crystals and Oil Underneath West
Fuel Transfer Tube Flange
03/01/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-01664
1R21 BACC: Fuel Transfer Tube 1-2 Flange
03/02/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03169
1R22 BACC: Active Leak in Refueling Canal/ Deep End
04/11/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03435
Main Feed Pump 2 Recirculation Valve FW438 Packing Leak
05/19/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03566
Minor Cooling Water Leak on Decay Heat Pump 2
04/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03570
AFPT 1 Steam Admission Valve Leak-By
04/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03614
Periodic Verification Testing of MS106, MS107 and MS107A
Missed Frequency
04/26/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03669
Decay Heat Pump 1 IB/OB Bearings Constant Level Oilers
Were Found Empty
04/28/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03704
RCP 1-2 Motor Lower Bearing High Oil Level Alarm
04/29/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03879
CREVS Refrigerant Line Insulation and Support Degradation
05/05/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04128
RCP 1-2 Seal Leakage Increased Following CAC Swap/CAC
Monthly Testing
05/15/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04380
RCP 2-2 Seal Return TIRC17A2 Failed to Mid-Scale
(Approx. 214 F)
05/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04523
Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2 Leakage Missed 1R22 Learning
Opportunity
05/31/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04535
Main Steam Line 1 MS131 Leaks by the Closed Seat
06/01/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04574
Found CCW Train 1 Ventilation Damper Open with Fan Off
06/01/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04651
Component Cooling Water Pump 1 Outboard Bearing Oil
Leak
06/06/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04668
Potentiometer Dead Spots Found While Cycling SBODG
06/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04688
SBODG Overfilled with Lube Oil
06/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04691
DH Pump 2 Outboard Bearing Oil Leak
06/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04695
Foreign Material Identified in New Hoses for Replacement on
SBODG
06/08/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04722
DH Pump 2 Pump O/B Oil Leak
06/09/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04759
Potential FME Falling into Cooling Tower Basin
06/09/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04788
Station Blackout Diesel Generator Water Jacket Specific
Gravity High Out of Specification
06/10/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04789
Unexpected Alarm Received for Control Valve 4 Output
Current Voting Mismatch
06/10/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04807
Entered DB-OP-02515 Reactor Coolant Pump And Motor
Abnormal Operation Due to RCP 1-2 Third Stage Seal
Pressure Lowering and Bringing in Computer Point P814
06/12/2022
Miscellaneous
ODMI 22-02
Operation with Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2 Indications of
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Degraded Seal Performance
Corrective Action
Documents
22-03912
Service Water SW1357 Failed to Stroke Open
05/07/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04063
SW1357 Open Stroke Time Exceeded Maximum Time
05/13/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04101
Service Water SW1357 Nitrogen Supply Box Shield has
Stripped, Broken Fasteners
05/13/2022
Procedures
DB-PF-03027
Service Water Train 2 Valve Test
Procedures
DB-MI-05253
Nuclear Instrumentation NI 06 (RPS Channel 1) Power
Range Adjustment
Procedures
DB-MI-05254
Nuclear Instrumentation NI 05 (RPS Channel 2) Power
Range Adjustment
Procedures
DB-MI-05255
Nuclear Instrumentation NI 08 (RPS Channel 3) Power
Range Adjustment
Procedures
DB-MI-05256
Nuclear Instrumentation NI 07 (RPS Channel 4) Power
Range Adjustment
Procedures
DB-NE-03212
Zero Power Physics Testing
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04169
PDS-2686B Preconditioned During Performance of
DB-MI-03203
05/16/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04169
PDS-2686B Preconditioned During Performance of
DB-MI-03203
05/16/2022
Procedures
DB-MI-03203
Channel Functional Test and Calibration of SFRCS Actuation
Channel 1, Steam Generator Differential Pressure Inputs
PDS-2686A, PDS-2686B, PDS-2685C AND PDS-2685D
Procedures
DB-PF-03001
Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Test
Work Orders
200821891
RT 11915 DB-FX-P1A Operational Inspection
05/04/2020
Work Orders
200821891
RT 11915 DB-FX-P1A Operational Inspection
05/04/2020
Work Orders
200822483
SFRCS Channel 2 Integrated Test
03/06/2022
Work Orders
200825784
Decay Heat Train 2 Pump and Valve Test (Mode 1-3)
06/06/2022
Work Orders
200842476
MI3203-001 08.000 CH1 SFRCS ACH1
05/16/2022
Work Orders
200842476
MI3203-001 08.000 Channel 1 SFRCS ACH1
05/16/2022
Work Orders
200860045
2/27/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
20-03003
Communication Failure on Siren 803 and Battery Failures on
Sirens 402&507
04/08/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
20-05101
Siren Computer Remote Access Phone Lines Issues
06/16/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-05859
Late 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of Siren Activation
08/20/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-06246
DB Sirens 309 and 504 Reported False Failures
09/04/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
21-00752
DB EPZ Sirens Indicated Chopper Motor Current Fail After
the 02/05/2021 One Minute Audible Siren
2/05/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-03470
Trending of Alert and Notification System (Sirens)
04/29/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-04458
Trending of Alert and Notification System Sirens - Siren 504
06/04/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04213
05/18/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
20-06204
Missed ERO 3rd Quarter Tabletop Drill
07/30/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-06317
On Duty ERO Member Did Not Respond Appropriately
08/10/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
21-03367
Emergency Response Organization Not Notified When
Individual Assigned to On-Call Position Went on Short Term
Leave
04/27/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-03667
CANS Weekly Test Phone Call Issue
05/05/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-03929
Individual Did Not Complete All Required Requalification
Training to Support SCBA Quals
05/13/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-04224
Strategic Engineer Call-Tree Individual Did Not Respond to
Augmented Call-In Drill in a Timely Manner
05/25/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-04233
RP Call-Tree Individual Did Not Respond to the Augmented
Call-In Drill in a Timely Manner
05/25/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-04271
Chemistry Call-Tree Individual Failed to Respond to
Augmented Call-In Drill
05/26/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-06935
Ops Advisor Call-Tree Position Individual Did Not Respond
to the ERO Call-In Drill
09/15/2021
Corrective Action
21-09314
ERO Call-Tree Position Individual Did Not Respond to CANS
2/08/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Call-In Drill
Corrective Action
Documents
22-01665
Effective Review for ERO Call-In Response Did Not Meet
Success Metrics
03/03/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
ATA-2021-13077
4th Quarter 2021 Unannounced Call-In Drill
10/14/2021
Miscellaneous
ATA-2020-12191
3rd Quarter 2020 Unannounced Call-In Drill
11/06/2020
Miscellaneous
ATA-2020-15528
4th Quarter 2020 Unannounced Call-In Drill
2/19/2020
Miscellaneous
ATA-2021-13075
2nd Quarter 2021 Unannounced Call-In Drill
04/12/2021
Miscellaneous
ATA-2021-13076
3rd Quarter 2021 Unannounced Call-In Drill
07/01/2021
Miscellaneous
ATA-2021-4521
1st Quarter 2021 Unannounced Call-In Drill
03/26/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-01242
EP Drill: Drill Objective C.7 Not Met Due to Failing to
Communicate Entire PAR
2/24/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-01253
EP Drill: EOF Controller Interject For State and County
Communication
2/24/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-06491
EP Drill: CTRM Simulate Initial Notification Objective C.1 Met
with Comments
08/27/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-06496
EP Drill: Drill Objective F.6 Not Met for DA due to Controller
Inject
08/27/2021
Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous
ATA-2020-13695
20 Medical Emergency Drill
11/06/2020
Miscellaneous
ATA-2021-5276
EP Integrated Drill Evaluation
04/07/2021
Miscellaneous
ATA-2021-5372
Evaluate 1st Quarter 2021 ERO Proficiency Table Top Drills
04/09/2021
Miscellaneous
ATA-2022-10418
Evaluation the Performance of the ERO During the
August 24, 2021 EP Integrated Drill
06/07/2022
Miscellaneous
ATA-2022-10737
3rd Quarter 2021 ERO Proficiency Tabletop Drill Summary
06/11/2022
Miscellaneous
ATA-2022-9175
Assess the Performance During the 2021 Post-Accident
Sample Drills
05/15/2022
Miscellaneous
ATA-2022-9176
Evaluated Performance During October 15, 2021, Ops DA
Focus Area Drill
05/15/2022
Miscellaneous
CA-SA-DB-2020-
0005
20 RMT Environmental Sample Drill Results
10/13/2020
Miscellaneous
DBRM-EMER-
1500A
Davis-Besse Emergency Action Level Basis Document
Miscellaneous
RA-EP-01500
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Implementing Procedure
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04375
Simulator Malfunction Could Not be Removed During an
Evaluated Scenario
05/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04396
EP Drill 5/24/22 Integrated Drill UE Classification
06/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04403
EP Drill Simulator Computer Point Did Not Display Correctly
06/24/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04413
05/24/22 EP Integrated Drill Started 1 Hour Late Due to
Phone Issues in Simulator
05/25/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-04415
EP Drill - Incorrect Release Path Analyzed Caused Missed
Drill Objective F.13
05/25/2022
Miscellaneous
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Drill/Exercise
May 24, 2022
05/24/2022
Calculations
Library 105
Gamma Spectroscopy Nuclide Library
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.112
ARGOS-5 Calibration Record
2/31/2020
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.112
ARGOS-5 Calibration Record - Partial Calibration
Completed for Detector Replacement
03/05/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.112
ARGOS-5 Calibration Record
01/19/2022
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.113
Chronos-4 Calibration Record
10/08/2020
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.113
Chronos-4 Calibration Record
10/19/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.115
GEM-5 Calibration Record
2/04/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.115
GEM-5 Calibration Record
2/11/2022
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.42
Whole Body Counter Calibration Record
11/03/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.42
Whole Body Counter Calibration Record
2/28/2022
Calibration
Records
LI 2.12.54
SAM-11 Calibration Record
07/21/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.233
ASP-1 with Neutron Radiation Detector Calibration Record
04/14/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.233
ASP-1 with Neutron Radiation Detector Calibration Record
07/08/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.502
Amp-100 Calibration Record
03/01/2022
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.502
AMP-100 Calibration Record
03/01/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.545
Model L-177 Stationary Frisker Calibration Record
01/04/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.545
Model L-177 Stationary Frisker Calibration Record
01/03/2022
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.558
Model L-177 Stationary Frisker Calibration Record
2/22/2021
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.558
Model L-177 Stationary Frisker Calibration Record
2/11/2022
Calibration
Records
LI 2.7.682
FUJI Electric Model NSN3 Calibration Record
11/08/2021
Calibration
Records
M&TE FAF0047
Calibration of Mass Thermal Flowmeter
09/21/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
20-07352
RE5328A Will Not Calibrate
09/21/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-07798
Station Vent Flow Computer Point F885 Step Change
10/08/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-07980
20 D-B Mid-Cycle Assessment Observation - Radiation
Element Belt Guards
10/14/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-08509
RE4597A Flow Reg Valve is >60 Percent Open
11/02/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-09062
RP Section Gamma-Spec Failed Daily QC Check
11/25/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-09113
Gamma-Spec Failed Daily QC Check
11/29/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
20-09482
451B 2.7.525 Failed Source Check
2/15/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
20-09645
HPGe 3 (Radiation Protection) Failed Daily Source Check
2/22/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
21-00174
Gamma-Spec Failed Daily Quality Control Check
01/10/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-00727
J.L. Shepherd Model 89 Gamma Irradiator Safety Lock
Failure
2/04/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-01230
RE4597BA Flow Regulating Valve is >60 Percent Open
2/24/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-08786
IPA Quarterly Trending - Radiation Monitoring Equipment
11/17/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
22-04055
NRC Identified: Full Standardization of the Model 89
Calibrator
05/12/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
22-04146
NRC Identified: DB-HP-04029 Inconsistencies
05/16/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
22-04147
NRC Identified: Documentation of Dose Study for Measuring
RE4598 Grab Samples
05/16/2022
Miscellaneous
DB-0395-2
Model 89 Standardization Check
01/13/2022
Miscellaneous
DB-0395-2
Model 89 Standardization Check
01/15/2021
Miscellaneous
Interlab Cross
Check Program
Results of Radiochemistry Cross Check Program
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2021
Miscellaneous
NOP-OP-3201-06
20 and 2021 Interlaboratory Testing Program Results
01/01/2020 -
2/31/2021
Procedures
DB-0500-0
Instrument Evaluation Form
Procedures
DB-HP-00010
Radiation Measuring and Test Equipment Calibration and
Control Program
Procedures
DB-HP-01103
Use of Portable Radiation, Contamination, and Airborne
Survey Equipment
Procedures
DB-HP-01407
Calibration and Use of the J.L. Shepherd Model 89
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
DB-HP-01458
Ludlum Model 2000 Portable Scaler Operation and
Calibration
Procedures
DB-HP-1407
Calibration and Use of the J.L. Shepherd Model 89
Procedures
DB-MI-04559
Channel Calibration if RE-1998 (Failed Fuel)
Procedures
DBBP-RP-1007
Meter Source and Response Testing
Procedures
NOP-OP-4416
ARGOS-5 Personnel Contamination Monitor Calibration and
Use
Work Orders
200761572
DB-HP4029-001 Review Rad Monitor Setpoints
2/30/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness
Drill/Exercise Performance
01/01/2021 -
03/30/2022
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness:
ERO Participation Drill
01/01/2021 -
03/30/2022
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency Preparedness:
Alert and Notification System
01/01/2021 -
03/30/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-00879
Abnormal Procedure Entries for Loss of Letdown Flow Path
2/05/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-00879
Abnormal Procedure Entries for Loss of Letdown Flow Path
2/05/2022
Procedures
DB-OP-01003
Operations Procedure Use Instructions
Procedures
DB-OP-02002
Letdown/Makeup Alarm Panel 2 Annunciators
Procedures
DB-OP-02512
Makeup and Purification System Malfunctions
Procedures
DB-OP-06006
Makeup and Purification System
Procedures
DBBP-DCU-0109
Processing Engineering Change Packages
Procedures
NOBP-OP-0012
Operator Work-Arounds, Burdens, Control Room
Deficiencies and Operations Aggregate Assessment
Procedures
NOBP-SS-4001
Change Management
Procedures
NOP-LP-2601
Procedure/Work Instruction Use and Adherence
Procedures
NOP-OP-1001
Clearance/Tagging Program
Procedures
NOP-OP-1002
Conduct of Operations
& 17
Procedures
NOP-OP-1014
Plant Status Control
08