IR 05000346/2002005
| ML022060551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2002 |
| From: | Grobe J Division of Reactor Safety III |
| To: | Bergendahl H FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-005 | |
| Download: ML022060551 (26) | |
Text
uly 25, 2002
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-346/02-05
Dear Mr. Bergendahl:
On June 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on June 25, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
The NRC has increased security requirements at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
John A. Grobe, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-346/02-05
REGION III==
Docket No: 50-346 License No: NPF-3 Report No: 50-346/02-05(DRP)
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Dates: April 1, 2002, through June 30, 2002 Inspectors: S. Thomas, Senior Resident Inspector D. Simpkins, Resident Inspector T. Ploski, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Belanger, Senior Security Specialist Approved by: Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000346-02-05, on 04/01-06/30/2002, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covers the second quarter of routine inspection activities conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialists. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
A. Inspection Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee Identified Findings A violation of very low significance identified by the licensee was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable.
This violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant was shut down for a refueling outage on February 16. As of June 25, the reactor fuel had been completely offloaded to the spent fuel pool. The licensee continued to pursue efforts to replace the reactor vessel pressure head with an unused head from the Midland facility.
During this inspection period, regional management decided to implement Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition With Performance Problems, as a direct result of the need to resolve many issues surrounding the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head degradation prior to allowing the facility to restart. The plant remained shut down for the entire inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04S)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the component cooling water system to verify equipment alignment and identify any discrepancies that impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved any equipment alignment problems that would cause initiating events or impact the availability and functional capability of mitigating system. Specific aspects of this inspection included reviewing plant procedures, drawings, and the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), to determine the correct system lineup and evaluating any outstanding maintenance work requests on the system or any deficiencies that would affect the ability of the system to perform its function. Key aspects of the walkdown inspection included:
valves were correctly positioned and do not exhibit leakage that would impact their function;
electrical power was available as required;
major system components are correctly labeled, lubricated, cooled, ventilated, etc;
hangers and supports are correctly installed and functional;
essential support systems are operational;
ancillary equipment or debris does not interfere with system performance;
tagging clearances are appropriate; and
valves are locked as required by the licensees locked valve program.
During the walkdown, the inspectors also observed the material condition of the equipment to verify that there were no significant conditions not already in the licensees work control system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed at the end of this report, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use, that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits, and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.
The following areas or components were inspected:
spent fuel pool pump room;
containment building; and
diesel driven fire pump.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.1Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operating crew on the simulator during requalification testing activities. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:
clarity and formality of communications;
ability to take timely actions in the safe direction;
prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;
procedure use;
control board manipulations;
oversight and direction from supervisors; and
group dynamics.
The inspectors also observed the performance of the examination evaluators, their critique of the crews performance, and the self-critique done by the operating crew to verify that any observed weaknesses were identified and documented by the licensee.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the simulator configuration compared to the actual control room to verify that they were as identical as practical.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities or weather conditions that may have impacted one or more safety significant systems. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The licensees daily configuration risk assessments, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, and the documents listed at the end of this report were used by the inspectors to verify that the equipment configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were being communicated to the necessary personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance issues:
unexpected transformer AC lockouts during electrical bus A fast transfer testing;
bus-tie transformers AC and BD declared inoperable due to suspect protective relaying scheme;
check valve CF-30 declared inoperable due to abnormal banging noise; and
decay heat train 1 weld leak.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected condition reports (CRs) which discussed potential operability issues for risk significant components or systems. These CRs were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components or systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and USAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the CRs listed below to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were necessary to maintain
operability, the inspectors verified by review of the documents listed at the end of the report that the measures were in place, would function as intended, and were properly controlled.
The conditions evaluated were:
the potential of blocking the containment emergency sump screen caused by portable equipment with unqualified coatings that was left in containment during the last cycle; and
weld leak on decay heat train 1 piping.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of all identified operator workarounds to determine whether the cumulative conditions had a significant impact on plant risk or on the operators ability to respond to a transient or an accident.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating and support systems to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of TS and the USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end of this report, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and verify that the post-maintenance testing performed adequately demonstrated that the maintenance was successful and that operability was restored. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
The following activity was observed and evaluated:
13.8 kv system bus A transfer test;
13.8 kv system bus A fast transfer test; and
replace the differential relays on bus tie transformers AC and BD.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing (71114.02)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors discussed with Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff the design, operation, and periodic testing of the ANS for the Davis-Besse Stations plume pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) to determine whether the system was adequately maintained and tested between 2000 and early 2002 in accordance with relevant documents. The inspectors also reviewed 2001 through early 2002 CRs associated with scheduled and non-scheduled maintenance activities to verify that corrective actions were taken following test failures and other reported equipment malfunctions. The inspectors reviewed records of the ongoing ANS upgrade project, which involved the replacement of the EPZs 54 sirens and poles over a three-to-four year period that began in Summer 2001. The inspectors also reviewed an assessment report of 2001 ANS maintenance and testing activities that was performed by the licensee and State emergency management agency staff.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing (71114.03)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and discussed the procedure that included the primary and back-up methods for initiating an activation of the on-call ERO, the procedure for maintaining the EROs telephone directory, and procedures for activating and periodically testing the Computerized Automated Notification System (CANS). The inspectors also reviewed the procedure on conducting semi-annual, off-hours ERO augmentation drills and reviewed records of such drills conducted in 2001 and early 2002 to determine whether the licensee maintained and tested its ability to activate its ERO during an emergency in accordance with emergency plan commitments. The inspectors also reviewed CRs associated with these augmentation drills and more frequent CANS tests to determine whether the licensee initiated adequate corrective actions on concerns identified during these activities.
The inspectors reviewed the current roster of the Stations ERO to verify that adequate numbers of personnel were assigned to key and support positions. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed with EP staff the provisions for maintaining the EROs call out roster. The inspectors reviewed a sample of ERO members training records to determine whether personnel listed on the current revision of the call out roster had
completed all EP training requirements within the relevant time period. The inspectors reviewed the lesson plan and a sample of other records associated with CANS training.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and discussed the EP staffs records, which included a draft training package, on the planned relocation of the Alternate Emergency Operations Facility (AEOF), which was scheduled to be completed by June 1, 2002. The inspectors reviewed correspondence from Ottawa and Lucas County officials that indicated no objection to the planned AEOF relocation. The inspectors also toured the AEOFs new location, which was being refurbished prior to equipment installation.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies (71114.05)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the 2001 audit of the Davis-Besse Stations EP program to ensure that this independent assessment complied with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), including informing State and county officials of relevant audit conclusions. The inspectors also reviewed self-assessments and a sample of CRs associated with the May 2001 biennial exercise and integrated emergency response facility drills that were conducted in March, April, August, and October 2001 in order to evaluate the licensees efforts to identify, track, and correct concerns identified during these activities. The inspectors reviewed portions of an early 2002 peer review of the Davis-Besse Stations EP program that was performed by personnel from the licensees three nuclear power plants and the corporate office.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
3. SAFEGUARDS Cornerstone: Physical Protection 3PP3 Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees current protective strategy which included designated targets and target sets, their associated analysis, and security and operation response procedures. The inspectors also reviewed security event reports (SERs), and portions of the licensees problem identification and resolution program to determine that issues related to the licensees contingent event program were identified at the appropriate threshold and were entered into the licensees corrective action program.
Items reviewed included self-assessments, audits, and a sample of training records, force on force drill evaluations, and the licensees procedure for their corrective action process. In addition, the inspectors conducted interviews with security officers and security management to evaluate their knowledge and use of the licensees corrective action system.
The inspectors reviewed appropriate security records and procedures that were related to security drills, drill demonstrations, and drill critiques to verify the licensees continuing capabilities to identify issues that represented uncorrected performance weaknesses or program vulnerabilities.
The inspectors reviewed records and interviewed seven selected members of the uniformed security force to evaluate and verify security training that related to alarm station operations, tactical force-on-force training, and weapon proficiency training.
The inspectors also reviewed performance indicator information related to alarm equipment performance to determine if isolated or system problems with the protected area intrusion alarm system and/or assessment system had become predictable and potentially exploitable by an adversary.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
3PP4 Security Plan Changes (71130.04)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Revision 13 to the Davis Besse Nuclear Security Training and Qualification Plan to verify that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the submitted document. The referenced revision was submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p) by a licensee letter dated January 22, 2002.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
1. Drill/Exercise Performance and Emergency Response Organization Drill Performance a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified that the licensee had reported the following indicators in accordance with relevant procedures and industry guidance endorsed by NRC:
ANS, ERO Drill Participation, and Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) for the EP cornerstone. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees records associated with PI data reported to the NRC for the period April 2001 through December 2001.
Records included assessments of DEP opportunities during pre-designated Control Room Simulator training sessions, the biennial exercise, and several drills, as well as the rosters of personnel who filled key ERO positions during these activities. The inspectors also reviewed records of periodic ANS tests.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2. Unplanned Scrams Per 7000 Critical Hours and Unplanned Scrams With Loss of Heat Sink a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified that the licensee had reported the following indicators in accordance with relevant procedures and industry guidance endorsed by NRC:
Unplanned Scrams Per 7000 Critical Hours and Unplanned Scrams With Loss of Heat Removal for the Initiating Events cornerstone. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees records associated with PI data reported to the NRC for the period January 2001 through March 2002.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope 71152A The inspectors selected 11 issues that were documented in the licensees corrective action program to verify that the licensee had taken corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issues. These conditions reports documented deficiencies in
the implementation of various aspects of the licensees fire protection program during refueling outage 13. This issue was selected as one of the Identification and Resolution of Problems samples for further in-depth evaluation due to the potential risk significant aspect of not properly implementing fire protection processes on site. The inspectors verified that the licensees corrective actions for this issue included the following performance attributes:
complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its significance;
evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues;
consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with its safety significance;
identification of corrective actions which are appropriately focused to correct the problem; and
completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-UP (71153)
.1 (Closed) Security Event Report 2000-S01: Unescorted Access Improperly Granted to Contract Employee Due to Misfiling of Derogatory Information. On December 1, 2000, the licensee discovered that derogatory information had been received for a contract employee on November 7, 2000. This derogatory information was not adjudicated by contractor access control personnel prior to the licensees granting interim unescorted access to the employee on November 20, 2000. This event was entered into the licensees corrective action process as CR 2000-2974. The unescorted access of the contract employee was immediately revoked. The discovery was made as a result of an extent of condition review for CR 2000-2946 which had documented that two other instances of derogatory information were received and not adjudicated prior to the granting of unescorted access.
This issue was determined to have a credible impact on safety since the licensee would have denied unescorted access to the individual granted interim unescorted access on November 20, 2000, if the derogatory information had been adjudicated. Additionally, this contract employee did not disclose this derogatory information on the self-disclosure form that he completed on November 2, 2000. The issue was determined to have very low safety significance and was characterized as Green by the SDP. This issue is dispositioned in Section 4A07 of this report.
.2 (Closed) LER 50-346/2002-001-00: Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoints Greater Than Allowable Limits.
This LER documents a condition where four main steam safety valves were found during testing to have lift pressures in excess of 3 percent of their maximum lift setpoint.
Appropriate actions per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.1 were taken, until each valve was adjusted and demonstrated proper operation within the allowable band. This LER also documents long term corrective actions planned to prevent recurrence of this problem This issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 02-0502.
.3 (Closed) LER 50-346/2002-03-00: Fuel Movement in the Spent Fuel Pool Without Required Door Attendant.
This LER documents a situation where the emergency ventilation system was inoperable for approximately 37 minutes during a time when it was required to be operable. Technical Specification 3.9.12 permits an emergency ventilation train servicing the spent fuel pool area to be considered operable when the containment equipment hatch is open and both doors of the containment personnel are open, provided at least one personnel air lock door is capable of being closed and a designated individual is available immediately outside the personnel airlock to close the door. During that 37 minutes, no designated individual was immediately available to close the personnel airlock door.
Although this is a violation of TS 3.9.12, it constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the Enforcement Policy. The issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 02-1199.
4OA6 Exit Meetings Exit Meeting The inspectors presented the inspection results to M and other members of licensee management on June 25, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Interim Exit Meetings Senior Official at Exit: Date: April 25, 2002 Proprietary: No Subject: Emergency preparedness program and performance indicators inspection Change to Inspection Findings: No Senior Official at Exit: R. Fast, Plant Manager
Date: April 11, 2002 Proprietary (explain yes): No Subject: Baseline Security Inspection Change to Inspection Findings: No 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following finding of very low significance was identified by the licensee and was a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation.
If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Davis Besse facility.
NRC Tracking Number Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet NCV 50-346/02-05-01 Section 1.6.1 of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Industrial Security Plan (Revisions 19 (effective 10/18/99)
and 20 (effective 7/00)) stated that the Davis-Besse Access Authorization Program shall meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 5.66, dated June 1991, which are specified in IS-AC-00516, Unescorted Access Requirements. Section 6.7.3 of security procedure IS-AC-00516 (Revision 9) required that negative or derogatory information that emerges during the course of a background investigation or after an individual has been granted unescorted access authorization shall be subject to investigation and management evaluation. Contrary to these requirements, the licensee failed to evaluate negative or derogatory information received August 15, August 17, and November 7, 2000, during the background investigation process for three employees. This issue was included in the licensees corrective action program as CR 2000-2946 and CR 2000-2974.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee H. Bergendahl, Vice President - Nuclear R. Fast, Plant Manager S. Coakley, Outage Manager B. Cope, Senior EP Specialist D. Eshelman, Director, Support Services M. Ginn, EP Supervisor J. Grabnar, Manager, Design Engineering D. Imlay, Superintendent, E&C Maintenance P. McCloskey, Manager, Regulatory Affairs G. Melssen, Maintenance Rule Coordinator J. Messina, Director, Work Management D. Miller, Supervisor, Compliance W. Mugge, Manager, Nuclear Training D. Nelson, Manager, Work Control R. Pell, Manager, Chemistry and Radiation Protection J. Powers, Director, Nuclear Engineering R. Rishel, PRA Specialist M. Roder, Manager, Plant Operations J. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering P. Schultz, Manager, Radiation Protection A. Schumaker, Supervisor, Access Control (Acting)
G. Skeel, Manager, Nuclear Security H. Stevens, Manager, Quality Assessment M. Stevens, Manager, Maintenance S. Wise, Superintendent, Plant Operations G. Wolf, Senior Licensing Engineer LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-346/02-05-01 NCV Failure to adjudicate derogatory information during background investigations for three contract employees (Section 4OA7)
50-346/2000-S01 SER Unescorted Access Improperly Granted to Contract Employee Due to Misfiling of Derogatory Information (Section 4OA3)
Closed 50-346/02-05-01 NCV Failure to adjudicate information during background investigations for three contract employees (Section 4OA7)
50-346/2000-SO1 SER Unescorted Access Improperly Granted to Contract Employee Due to Misfiling of Derogatory Information (Section 4OA3.1)
50-346/2002-001 LER Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoints Greater Than Allowable (Section 4OA3.2)
50-346/2002-003 LER Fuel Movement in Spent Fuel Pool Without Required Door Attendant (Section 4OA3.4)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADAMS NRCs Document System AEOF Alternate Emergency Operations Facility ANS Alert and Notification System CANS Computerized Automated Notification System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DEP Drill and Exercise Performance DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EP Emergency Preparedness EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERO Emergency Response Organization FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OA Other Activities PARS Publically Available Records PI Performance Indicator SDP Significance Determination Process SER Security Event Report TS Technical Specifications USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R04 Equipment Alignment P&ID Drawing No. M-036A, Component Cooling Water Rev. 24 P&ID Drawing No. M-036B, Component Cooling Water Rev. 30 P&ID Drawing No. M-036C, Component Cooling Water Rev. 25 Operational Drawing OS-021, Component Cooling Water System, Sheet 1 Rev. 28 Schematic Operational Drawing OS-021, Component Cooling Water System, Sheet 2 Rev. 21 Schematic Operational Drawing OS-021, Component Cooling Water System, Sheet 3 Rev.9 Schematic 1R05 Fire Protection NRC Reg. Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants Guide 1.189 Fire Hazards Analysis Report Rev. 14 Pre-Fire Plan Containment - All Levels Pre-Fire Plan Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Rev.02 PFP-AB-312 CR 02-2869 Diesel Fire Pump Temperature Alarm Pre-Fire Plan Diesel Fire Pump Area Rev. 02 PFP-IS-51 Unit Log Entry Log entries dated 6/28/02 at 10:44 and 11:11, regarding the diesel fire pump temperature alarms.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Drill Scenario Reactor Coolant Flow Transmitter Degradation Followed By A Rev. 01 OLE-EPE- MSIV Failure and Stuck MSSV S116 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation DB-SC-3023 Off-Site AC Sources Lined Up and Available CR 02-1526 Unexpected AC Transformer Lockout
CR 02-1550 Unexpected AC Transformer Lockout CR 02-1553 Critical Spare Parts Not Readily Available Troubleshooting Plan For Transformer AC Inadvertent Lockout During DB-SC-4026 Operability Evaluation of Bus-Tie Transformer BD Operability Justification 2002-0012 DB-SC-3020 13.8 KV System Bus A & B Transfer Test Rev. 03 DB-SC-4026 13.8 KV Buses A & B Fast Transfer Test Rev. 01 CR 02-2513 Flow Induced Cavitation In Decay Heat Train 2 Piping CR 02-2279 Check Valve CF-30 Banging in Flow Stream Operability Check Valve CF-30 Had Audible Banging Noise Coming From Rev. 00 Justification Within The Check Valve With Decay Heat Train 2 Inservice and Rev. 01 2002-0016 Approximately 3000 GPM Flowrate Through This Check Valve NG-DB-116 Outage Nuclear Safety Control Rev. 00 Troubleshooting Plan - CR 02-2279 (CF-30) and CR 02-2410 (Decay Heat Train 1 Leak)
CR 02-2410 Leak On Decay Heat Train 1 Line CR 02-2420 Notification of NRC Resident Requirements CR 02-2416 Inoperability of Both Emergency Diesel Generators While Decay Heat Train 2 Was Inoperable and Decay Heat Train 1 Was Leaking Engineering Remove The 3 Foot Section of Piping and Welded 90 Degree Work Request Elbow and Install a Socket Welded Cap in Its Place 02-248-00 1R15 Operability Evaluations CR 02-2417 Operability Justification Not Performed For Leak On Decay Heat Train 1 Operability Leak Was Discovered on the Outlet Piping of the Decay Heat Justification Cooler Temperature Control Valves DH-13B and DH-14B Off an 2002-0017 Unused, Unisolable Tap on the Weld Connecting the Vertical Straight Pipe to the 90 Degree Elbow.
CR 02-1532 Steam Cleaners Left Inside Containment With Unqualified Coating
CR 02-982 Inadequate Evaluation Allowed Equipment To Be Stored In Containment NG-DB-00212 Containment Storage Rev. 00 CR 02-01532 Steam Cleaners Left Inside Containment With Unqualified Coatings CR 02-00982 Inadequate Evaluation Allowed Equipment To Be Stored In Containment Cause Analysis For CR 02-00982 NG-DB-212 Containment Storage 1R16 Operator Workarounds Operator Workaround Level 2 List 6/25/02 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing DB-SC-3020 13.8 KV System Bus A and B Transfer Test DB-SC-4026 13.8 KV Bus and B Fast Transfer Test EWR Design Summary - Replacement of Differential Relays 87/AC 02-177-00 and 87/BD 10 CFR 50.59 Replace Differential Relays on Bus Tie Transformers AC and BD Screen 02-00719 Work Order Fabricate, Paint, and Install New Metal Plate With Mounting 02-2514-002 Hole For New Relay to Cover Hole In HAAC Cubicle Door Work Order EWR 02-177-00, Replace The Bus Tie Differential Relays 02-2514-001 [D1 Bus Cubicle 2 Work]
Work Order EWR 02-177-00, Replace The Bus Tie Differential Relays 02-2514-000 [A Bus Cubicle 13 Work]
Work Order Perform All Post Maintenance Testing For Transformer AC Bus 02-2514-003 Tie Relay to Support EWR 02-177-00 1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing RA-EP-00400 Prompt Notification System Maintenance Rev. 1 RA-EP-00420 Response to Prompt Notification System Malfunction Rev. 1
RA-EP-04400 Prompt Notification System Test Rev. 1 Memo: Status of Siren Replacement Project 9/5/01 Memo: Self-Assessment - Alert and Notification System 1/17/02 Annual Preventive Maintenance Records for 27 Sirens 8/2000 Annual Preventive Maintenance Records for 27 Sirens 4/2001 CR 01-0403 Two Sirens Lost Power During a Storm CR 01-0881 One Siren Sounded But Did Not Rotate CR 01-0995 False Activation of One Siren Due to Thunderstorm CR 01-1005 One Siren Sounded But Failed to Rotate CR 02-1061 One Siren Lost Power CR 01-1249 Two Sirens Operating With High Current CR 01-2151 Problems During Replacement of Two Siren Poles CR 02-0371 Two Sirens Failed During Monthly Test 1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing RA-EP-00510 Maintenance of the Emergency Plan Telephone Directory Rev. 1 RA-EP-00520 Emergency Response Organization Rev. 1 RA-EP-00550 Computerized Automated Notification System (CANS) Rev. 1 RA-EP-04003 CANS weekly Test Rev. 3 RA-EP-00100 Emergency Plan Training Program Rev. 5 RA-EP-02110 Emergency Notifications Rev .2 RA-EP-00200 Emergency Plan Drill and Exercise Program Rev. 1 Emergency Plan Training Records of a Random Sample of 25 ERO Members Records of 2001 Training on Activating CANS Records of Unannounced Off-Hours Augmentation Drills in March 2001, September 2001, and March 2002
CR 01-0436 CANS Problem During a Weekly Test CR 01-0480 Reassess Number of Technicians Who Should Be Qualified to Use Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus CR-01-0912 CANS Problem During a Weekly Test CR 01-1670 CANS Problem During a Weekly Test CR 01-3212 Problem Affecting Some Pagers Emergency Plan Telephone Directory 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes CR 01-3201 Assess Impact on AEOF Due to Sale of Bayshore Station RA-EP-00600 Emergency Facilities and Equipment Maintenance Program Draft 10 CFR 50.54(q) Review on AEOF Relocation Letter From Ottawa Country Board of Commissioners on AEOF 4/2/02 Relocation Letter From Lucas County Deputy Director of Emergency Services on 4/3/03 AEOF Relocation Draft Training Package on Revised AEOF 1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies Surveillance Report on April 2001 Drill 5/3/01 10 CFR 50.54(t) Audit of the EP Program for 2001 1/16/02 Letters Three Letters to State and County Officials on the 2001 Audit of 2/13/02 the EP Program 3/30/01 Integrated Drill Report 5/14/01 4/24/01 Integrated Drill Report 7/18/01 5/22-23/01 Biennial Exercise Report 7/26/01 8/9/01 Integrated Drill Report 10/8/01 10/2/01 Integrated Drill Report 11/30/01 2001 Post Accident Sampling System Drill Report 1/21/02 FENOC EP Program Review - February 2002 3/5/02 CR 01-0911 Meteorological Data Availability Problem During April Drill
CR 01-0912 CANS Problem During April Drill CR 01-0940 Equipment Operator Used as Communicator During a Drill CR 01-1185 One Objective Not Met During April Drill CR 01-1200 Consider Letting Emergency Control Center (ECC) Staff Make Plant Public Address Announcements CR 01-1208 Two Safety Concerns in ECC During a Drill CR 01-1209 Two Draft Procedures Tested During a Drill CR 01-1354 Communications With NRC Did Not Meet NRCs Expectations During the Exercise CR 01-1358 CANS Message Error During the Exercise CR 01-1366 Revise Operations Support Center Activation Procedure CR 01-1367 Simulator Output Had Incorrect Iodine to Noble Gas Ratio During the Exercise CR 01-1374 Reassess Emergency Dose Authorization Procedure and Form CR 01-1377 Retain State/County Notification Forms Generated During Control Room Simulator Drills CR 01-2078 Untimely Notification from ECC During a Drill CR 01-2594 Training and Equipment Concerns in Joint Public Information Center During October Drill CR 01-3098 Training Issues Identified During October Drill CR 01-3099 Equipment Issues Identified During October Drill CR 01-3213 Some Annual Reviews of Implementing Procedures Were Not Adequately Documented CR 01-3215 Two Cases of Sealed Facilities Not Re-sealed After Entry CR 01-3234 Premature Closure of Two CR by EP Staff CR 01-3247 Incomplete Preventive Maintenance in Administration Building CR 01-3267 EP Staff Should Improve Quality of CR Documentation RA-EP-2410 Operations Support Center Activation and Response Rev. 3 CR 01-2822 Procedure Change Request - Emergency Dose Control and Potassium Iodide Distribution Procedure 2001 ECC Training Handout
3PP3 Physical Protection Safeguards Event Log 2001 &
1st Qtr.
2002 CR 01-0542 Compensatory Measure Not Performed in Prescribed Frequency CR 01-1666 Enhancement To Training CR 01-1858 Collective Significance Review of Process Security CR 01-2321 Obstructed Pathway to Security Defense Barrier CR 01-2375 Attack on America CR 01-2925 Adequacy of Security Measures for OCA Contractors CR 01-2939 Security Protective Vest CR 01-3248 Nuclear Security Performance Indicator Trend CR 01-3390 Self-Evaluation - Security Performance Indicators CR 02-0091 Security Enhancements CR 02-0608 Nuclear Security Officer Inattentive at His Post Davis Besse Defensive Strategy Evaluation (NSSC) 9/1701 Lesson Plan: Alarm Station Operation with SAIC SDMS 3/30/01 Lesson Plan: Semi-Automatic Handgun Transition 10/26/01 SEC-NSI-800 Lesson Plan: Weapons Qualification 7/6/00 SEC-NSI-400 Armed Response Force 9/22/00 SEC-NSI-402 Tactical Training 8/14/00 SEC-NSI-401 Use of Incapacitating Agents 8/1/00 NOP-LP- Condition Report Process Rev. 01 2001 Training Shift Drills 2001 TS-DP-08500 Armed Response Force Rev. 01 DB-OP- Security Events or Threats 2/22/02 02544 SECV- Suggested Initial and Code Black Positions Rev.
PROG-801 051C-1
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification PI Desktop Guide - ANS Reliability 2/02 PI Desktop Guide - ERO Drill Participation 2/02 PI Desktop Guide - Drill/Exercise Performance 2/02 Monthly Siren Test Result Records - April 2001 through December 2001 Monthly Summaries of Key ERO Members Drill/Exercise Participation Dates - April 2001 through December 2001 Records of DEP Opportunities Assessments - April 2001 through December 2001 CR 01-1444 One Sirens Blower Motor Did Not Operate During Monthly Test CR 01-1702 One Sirens Blower Motor Did Not Operate During Monthly Test CR 01-2938 One Siren Failed to Rotate During Monthly Test CR 01-1377 Improve Documentation of Scenarios Used in Control Room Simulator DEP Opportunities CR 01-2809 One Missed DEP Opportunity During October Drill CR 02-0040 Several Missed DEP Opportunities During Drills 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems CR 02-1527 Collective Significance Review For Fire Protection Related Condition Report CR 02-1492 Procedure Non-Compliance For Hot Work Permits CR 02-1494 Procedure Non-Compliance For Transient Combustible Permits CR 02-1498 Fire Hazard Analysis Report and Plant Configuration CR 02-1504 Fire Protection System Impairment, Fire Watch Errors CR 02-1495 Procedure Non-Compliance For Transient Combustible Permits CR 02-1501 Plant Configuration and General Floor Plans Do Not Agree CR 02-1502 Fire Protection System Impairment, Initiation Worksheet Incomplete CR 02-1497 Blocked Fire Extiguishers CR 02-1499 Fire Hose Improperly Rolled or Racked
CR 02-1493 Procedure Non-Compliance For Transient Combustibles 4OA3 Event Follow-up CR 02-1199 Limiting Condition For Operation Technical Specification 3.9.12, Storage Pool Ventilation Exceeded LER Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoints Outside of Technical 50-346/1998- Specification Allowable Values 001-01 Root Cause Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Drift 3/29/00 Analysis Report for CR 2000-662 LER Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoints Greater Than Allowable 50-346/2000- Values 002-01 CR 02-502 Main Steam Safety Valves As Found Test Results 25