IR 05000334/1986001

Insp Rept 50-334/86-01 on 860101-31.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previous Insp Findings, Plant Operations,Housekeeping,Fire Protection,Radiological Controls,Physical Security & ESF Verification

ML20153D457
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	02/18/1986
From:	Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153D439	List: IR 05000334/1986001 ML20153D435
References
50-334-86-01, 50-334-86-1, NUDOCS 8602240153
Download: ML20153D457 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0WtISSION

REGION I

l Report N /86-01 i Docket N i Licensee: Duquesne Light Company l One Oxford Center

301 Grant Street l Pittsburgh, PA 15279 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 Location: Shippingport, Pennsylvania l Dates: January 1 - 31, 1986 Inspector: W. M. Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector l A A. Asar , Resident Inspector Approved by: . .

h 6L. E. TripM Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A T!8[

Date Inspection Summary: Inspection No.' 50-334/86-01 on January 1 - 31, 198 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the' resident inspectors (67 hours7.75463e-4 days <br />0.0186 hours <br />1.107804e-4 weeks <br />2.54935e-5 months <br />) of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, plant operations, housekeeping, fire protection, radiological controls, physical security, engineered safety fea-tares verification, maintenance activities, surveillance testing, river water ex-pansion joint deformation, auxiliary feed water pump operability, and review of l licensee event reports.

Results: No violations were identifie Potentially significant items identified were gas accumulation in the charging pump suction line from the VCT (aiscussed in Detail 4.b(4)), and river water discharge header expansion joint daformation (discussed in Detail 8).

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8602240153 860218 PDR ADOCK 05000334 0 PDR

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS-y ' Persons' Contacted........ ........................................... 1D

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. Plant Status......................................................... 1

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l Followup on Outstanding Items........................................ If ;

3- Plant; Operations..................................................... 3- ,

' Genera 1......................................................... '3 l Operations...................................................... 4-

' Plant Security / Physical Protection.............................. :7 Rad i a ti on ' Co ntro l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

- Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection.......................... 8

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- Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Verification......... .............. 8 s

. Maintenance Activities............................................... 8- S u rve i l l a nce Te s ti ng. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '9-j River Water Expansion Joi nt Defo rmation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 t

i . . Auxi l i ary Feed Pump Operabi l i ty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4-

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1 Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . Exit Interview....................................................... 12

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DETAILS Persons' Contacted

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.A J. J. Carey, Vice President, Nuclear. Group R. J. Druga,' Manager, Technical Services T. D. Jones,.-General Manager; Nuclear Operations W. S.-Lacey, Plant Manager; .

J. D. Sieber, General Manager, Nuclear Services __ .

N. R. Tonet, . General Manager, Nuclear _ Engr. . & Constr. Unit .

The inspector also contacted'other licensee employees and contractors during this inspectio , Plant Status The plant' operated at full power throughout the' inspection period with the ,

exception of three instances-(discussed.in'section 4.b)'where minor power..- ,

reductions were necessar : Followup On Outstanding Items The NRC Outstanding Items (01)= List.was reviewed with cognizant licensee per-sonnel. .-Items selected by the inspector ware subsequently. reviewed through discussions with~ licensee _ parsonnel, documentation . reviews and field inspec-tion to determine whether licensee. actions-specified 'in the 01's had been .'

satisfactorily completed. The overall' status of proviously identified in--

spection findings were reviewed,Jand planned and completed: licensee actions were discussed for'those' items reported below:

(Closed) Violation (85-22-01): Unauthorized operation of Unit 1/2-boundary isolation valves resulting in an unplanned release _of radioactivity from BR-TK- This item was previously reviewed.in NRC ~ Inspection Reports 334/85-22, 85-24 and 85-27, and remained open pending_ installation.of specially designed '

clamping devices on Unit 1/2 isolation ball valves by. January 31, 198 Fabrication and installation of these devices has:been completed in al timely manner and the inspectors had no'further concerns. This= item is' close '

(0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (85-22-07): Review of dosimetry issue and site specific radiation' worker training for_ visiting NRC inspectors.- This item ,

was previously addressed in NRC' Inspection: Reports'334/85-21 and 85-22. 'The licensee has developed guidelines to: aid _inlthe timely, access of NRC inspe ~3 tors to' radiologically controlled areas. _The guidelines. provide for station indoctrination, dosimetry issue; respirator: issue:and site s'pecific instruc -  :

tion. The inspector reviewed the guidelines and found no: inadequacies; how-ever, this item will remain open until revised exposure history forms.fo'r NRC-inspectors and' detailed instructions for site: specific. instructions are formulated and made available in the dosimetry' issue boot t wy = < , - - -e--w- -,..--r,E e -, e.~e v ,-f-r--,,,-ee , ,ye s y.e, m +-er+e-+.-, c g -y e, y w G~wy- --e,,he.,,,.c, .-,h,,w-..,+-e+e-y y., .wy -. w,v.,e . -+tt

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. (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (85-24-04): Review of corrected gaseous' waste -- ';

-dose' calculation package'and verify that previously reported values are up .

, dated in the next, semi-annual report. The-inspector ~ reviewed the calculation- '

package with corrections and the Radfation Safety: Committee Meeting minutes-relevant to this item. The necessary corrections were made and the-licensee: ,

i is sending the revised dose values to-NRC. No inadequacies lwere; identified; this, item is_ closed.

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. (Closed) Inspector Follow Item'(85-27-05): Verification that the heat trace-

!' panels alarm light bulb covers are in the correct configuration and update .

of the OM chapter tables. The licensee verified that' all of the alarm-light i bulb covers are in their proper. positions. I_t was determined that.the' dis-crepancies'between-0M Chap _ter 45, Table 45-3 and the current pla_nt configura-

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. tion 'of panel ANN-QS-01 were> due to oversight of necessary panel configuration' ,

changes in the OM chapter table after a design change was perfoimed-~on the l

-Quench Spray: System several years ago. Since.then the DCP process-has been

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restructured to -incorporate _ all necessary procedure and OM chapter changes. .

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The licensee is making the necessary corrections ~ to 0M Chapter 45,. Table.45- ~!

! The inspector had no further' concerns and this is close .

I (0 pen) IFI (85-22-05): Review licensee evaluation of. fire damper progra !

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DLC issued a special report dated October' 31,1985,l relating to the ' inoperable j fire rated assemblies that were. identified during a QA~ audit and the appro-

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priate short term and long term corrective actions. It was-noted, at'that a time, that qualified three hour = fire rated' dampers had been ordered on ar.-

expedited bases and shipment was expected to support installation no later

. than January 15, 1985, barring unforeseen problem Thel licensee has since.

j learned that-shipment will not be.made by the-manufacturer untiliat-least.the-first week in February. In the interim, the: inspector verified that the lic-i ensee was conducting one hour' fire tours _of the.affected area'as directed by l- their technical specifications. This item remains open~pending installation

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j and testing of those fire barrier '

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(Closed) IFI (85-17-08): Incorporate special operating' order for return of .;

4KV and 480 Volt breakers to operation in'0perating'Manua1' Administrative  ;

Procedures. The action for ensuring the'4KV breakers were properly racke !

, back onto the bus was previously reviewed and found to be acceptable. ~0M j Chapter 37, 480 Volt Station Service ~$ystem, was revised on January 28,L1986, i to provide similar checks. This-item is closed.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item-(84-18-02): ' Review actions for analyzing repetitive l

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equipment failures for generic applications. This-item was last updated:in I i

i IR 334/85-17 and left open pending establishment of a formal program in 198 The testing and plant performance group'has: developed Administrative' Procedure J l 9.2, Maintenance Trending Program, to address'this. item. Beaver Valley in -

tends to use the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System--(NPRDS)'as the main.

engineering' data base from which.such failures can be' monitored for safety-j related systems and specific component types. The intent'is to maintain this

data base current so that reviews ~can be;done on a periodic basis and in re-L

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,sponse to NRC, Westinghouse and;INPO bulletins'for equipment failures at othe facilities. The licensee's' action appears satisfactory and this' item is;

closed.

i (Closed) Unresolved Item (85-24-05): Charging pump discharge check-valve CH-  :

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21 te be disassembled and' inspected during the next refueling outage. This

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• item was initially-opened afterLa seal injection flow anomaly ~was observed' t

.when switching. operating charging pumps. The.. licensee at-that; time hypothe -

. . sized that the operating charging pump discharge check valve had failed to: '

p . properly seat. Since.then, other operating events as discussed in Detail:

' 4.b.(4) of this inspection report indicate-that the problem is probably due

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toJga'. s accumulation in'the charging pump suctionLline.as opposed.to.a. dis-3 - charge check valve malfunction. .This item.is, therefore, closed.

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i j a .- General I- Inspection tours of the plant' areas listed below were-conducted during both day land night shifts with respect to. Technical Specification (TS)

compliance, housekeeping and cleanliness, fire protection, radiation l

d control, physical security'and plant protection,-operational and main-tenance administrative controls.

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Control Room

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Primary Auxiliary Building i -- Turbine Building Service Building

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Main Intake Structure

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Main Steam Valve Room ,

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Purge Duct Room

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East / West Cable Vaults

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Emergency Diesel' Generator Rooms

-- Containment Building

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Penetration Area:

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Safeguards Areas ~

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2 Various Switchgear-Rooms / Cable Spreading Room

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Protected Areas '

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1 Acceptance criteria for the above areas' included the following:

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Technical Specifications:(TS)

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BVPS Operating Manual. (OM), Chapter 48, Conduct of Operations -

OM 1.48.5, Section D,.Jumpersfand Lifted Leads

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OM Chapter 55A, Periodic Checks', Operating Surveillance Tests

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8VPS Maintenance Manual (M), Chapter 1,' Conduct of Maintenance-l c

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. - . 10 CFR 50.54(k), Control Room Manning _ Requirements l

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BVPS Site / Station Administrative Procedures-(SAP)

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BVPS Physical Security Plan-(PSP)

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Inspector Judgement: '

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Except as listed below,- the ' inspector had.no comment '

4: _ Operations .

The inspector toured the Control RoomL regularly _ to verify compliance with NRC requirements.and facility technical. specifications (TS). Direct ob-servations of instrumentation, recorder: traces: and control panels:were-made-for. items important to safety. Included in the reviews'were the rod pesition indicators, nuclear. instrumentation systems, radiation' monitors; containment pressure and' temperature parameters, onsite/offsite emergencyc ,

power sources, availability of, reactor: protection systems _and proper ~

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alignment of. engineered safety feature systems. Where an abnormal con- .;

dition existed (such as out-of-service. equipment), adherence-to appro-

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priate TS action statements was independently verified. Also, various operation logs and records,-including completed surveillance-tests, equipment clearance permits in progress, status board maintenance and r temporary operating procedures were' reviewed ~on.a sampling basis for compliance with technical specifications'and th'se o administrative con-trols listed in paragraph 4a.-

During the course of the inspection, discussions were conducted with operators concerning reasons for selected annunciators and knowledge of'- '

recent changes to procedures, facility configuration and plant condition The-inspector verified adherence to. approved procedures for ongoing ac-tivities obsarved. Shift turnovers were witnessed and staffing require-

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ments confire d. Except where noted below, inspector comments or ques-  :

tions resultilg from these daily reviews were acceptably resolved by- l licensee personne ,

(1) Safety Injection Accumulator 1A pressure indicator P-SI-923 failed -!

on January 1, 1986. A low. pressure alarm on IA SI. accumulator was  :

received in the control room and' operators observed that'P-SI-923-and its redundant pressure indicator P-SI-921 differe Nitrogen was added to the accumulator to increase pressure about i 20 psi in' efforts'to determine which indicator was incorrect.- P- '

SI-921 responded as expected'and.P-SI-923' remained low. .P-SI-923 was declared out-of-service:and a Maintenance Work Request was is-sued. Power Supply PQ-923 to P-SI-923 was found to have failed an'd '

was replaced. P-SI-923 indications' subsequently. returned to norma (2) A manual _ turbine runback to 95% power was initiated on January 1,_

1986,. at 9:30 a.m. ' in response' to ' decreasing heater drain' tank leve D The running heater' drain tank pump hadautomatically tripped due to

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, j the low level and. operators were unable to' restart it. iThis?is~an- '

immediate operating concern because-a low main feedwater-pump suc--

, - tion pressure:and subsequent pump trip will: quickly;occuruif left! "

e uncorrected. :Within-about two minutes,; operators found'a' quarter '

, inch airiline ' separated from its compressor nut on~ the tank level control valve (LCV-SD-1068). A temporary patch was:used until~a l' new air line could be-installed. iShortly.thereafter, the unit was

. increased to-100% power without even ~ ,

t j (3) Main-Steam Radiation Monitor RM-MS M00A was declared inoperable'on  ;

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. January 9, 1986,'due-to incorrect meter: readings when in the cali-  :

bration mode. Troubleshooting was performed-under MSP-43.62. .RM-" 1 MS-100A monitors. atmospheric. steam ldumpivalve and code. safety relief' ,

valve discharge from the-steam generator relief headers. : Alternate;

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f preplanned monitcring was provided.- A. bad discriminator board andi failed detector were . identified and ' replaced. > The failures were

! considered normal end of life failures; -RM-MS-100A wasLplaced backi  !

y in service on January 22, 1986. ;The licensee issued a special re-s i port dated January 21, 1986, in accordance with.TS 3.3.3.1. The -

inspectors had no further-concern ~

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(4) During this inspection period, there were several instances of low

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reactor coolant-pump seal injection flow. The11icensee-identified

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three unusual ~ conditions on the CVCS system that could have-contri-

buted to this problem. First, it has been! postulated that RV-CH-383, '

} Regenerative Heat Exchanger Tube Side Relief Valve, has;been lifting  :

{ periodically causing the seal injection flow perturbation. -Though j

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no changes in pressurizer relief tank parameters were' observed, the  ;

} valve is scheduled for maintenance and testing during the next re-  :

j fueling outage (May, 1986).. Secondly, charging flow control valve ,q

FCV-CH-122 is known to sometimes have an erratic response which

could cause sudden flow changes. Finally, the. licensee has experi- l

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enced at an increasing interval, a buildup of gases in the chargin l pump suction header. This problem-is of'particular concern since gases in the charging pump suction lines could cause one or more i pumps to be inoperabl Two charging pumps are: required to b ~

i- operable per TS 3.5.2 as they also serve as the High Head Safety j- Injection Pump t

! In an effort to identify the cause of the: flow interruptions, the.

I licensee closely monitored key parametersiupon receipt.of the~10w .

l flow alarms and periodically vented the charging pump suction lin v ia CH-312 to determine the extent-of' gas buildup. The licensee-believes that variations in VCT1 overpressure (when_-less than 30' 'l I psig) have allowed'the~ gases to leave ~ solution',and: accumulate in l

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the charging pump suction line. '~An ~ attempt to ' reduce this accumu-1ation is being made by maintaining a' constant VCT overpressure and revising procedure OM 1.7.4.A.N,JReturning'A' Charging Pump To Ser-

vice Following Mechanical Maintenance,.to require a lower VCT pres- -

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' sure when venting so that-all offthe gases-will befremoved. The s

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. 6 licensee is considering a design change to permanently hook up the CH-312 discharge to the sample sink for ease of operation. Deter-mination of the actual cause and elimination of frequent gaseous accumulations in the charging pump suction line which result in low seal injection flow alarms will be Inspector Follow Item (86-01-01).

In a related incident, the charging pump suction header was vented by CH-312 on January 9, 1986, without incident per OM 1.7.4.' However, CH-312 was not recapped tightly enough, thus allowing gas to pass into the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) atmosphere. Con-tinuous Air Monitors (CAMS) in the PAB and Safeguards Building slowly increased from normal readings of 500 cpm to a maximum of 6000 cpm. Access to these areas was restricted while operations personnel searched for the lea No additional radiological pro-tection or personnel monitoring measures were require It was not until three days later that CH-312 was identified as having a loose cap, because initial searches had been for a liquid leak. Once CH-312 cap was tightened, area radiation levels returned to norma During this period, no change was noted in monitored release The gas' consisted of Xenon and Rubidium and there were no personnel contaminations or internal uptakes. The highest activity was lo-cated in the blender cubicle and ranged from 8E-10 micro Ci/ml to 2E-9 micro Ci/ml./ml. There was no unmonitored release to the environmen (5) On January 18, 1985, control room operators observed that protection channel loop C delta T indication was drifting up. This continued until January 19, 1986, at 12:30 p.m., when the channel had drifted to 105% and the annunciator for overpower delta T runback / rod stop

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alarmed. At 12:45 p.m. , Loop C Delta T-T Average was declared in-operable when it drifted to 112% exceeding the allowable 9% differ-ence between channels. The associated bistables were tripped as required by TS 3.3.1.1. The plant commenced a nower reduction to 90% in order to avoid other possible channel trips. Investigation revealed that the low level amplifier for T-hot was unreliable; however, no spare amplifiers were immediately available for replace-ment. On January 21, 1986, the amplifier was replaced and the unit returned to full power. The licensee is aware of several past in-stances where a shortage of electronic spare parts caused delays in repairing instrumentation. Inspector Follow Item (85-20-03)

exists for review of licensee action on spare parts level (6) The unit power was again reduced to 98% on January 29, 1986, at 12:10 p.m. for recalibration of Power Range Indicator NI-42. The lower detector ammeter zero setpoint had drifted upward. The am-meter was calibrated and the plant returned for full power that same day. Over the next few days, it was determined that the lower am-meter zero setpoint had again drifted up. On January 31, 1986, the ammeter circuit board was replaced and indications remained norma _-

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. During review of Emergency-Planning Procedures. the inspector iden--

tified a discrepancy in Table 9-1, Action Level Criteria for Classi-~

fication of. Emergency Conditions matrix,.and referenced tabs relat-ing to Ohio. River water levels. According to the matrix,'an' alert '

is defined as when the river is between 705; feet and 735 feet;-a:

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site emergency is: defined as when the river.is above 735 fee However,;according to. TAB'23, which;is referenced by the matrix, .

'an alert is when-the river'is between 705 feet and 730' feet an site area' emergency.is-when the river;is'above 730 feet. The lic-ensee indicated that the matrix contains?the correct information:

and TA8 23-will be revised. The revision'of the! incorrect river.- ;

water' levels in'TA8 23 of EPP Implementing Procedures will be In-spector Follow Item (86-01-02).' -

c. Plant Security / Physical Protection-

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Implementation of the' Physical Security Plan was observed in the areas listed in Paragraph 3a above with regard to the following:

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Protected area ba.rriers were not degraded;

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Isolation zones were clear; ,

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Persons and packages were checked prior to allowing entry into the Protected Area; ,

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Vehicles.were properly searched and vehicle access to the Protected Area was in accordance with approved procedures;..

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Security access controls to Vital' Areas'were being maintained'and that persons-in Vital Areas were properly authorized;- '

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Security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security per-sonnel were alert and knowledgeable regarding position requirements, and that written procedures were available;'and F l

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Adequate lighting was maintaine No discrepancies were observed during the inspection perio Radiation Controls i

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Radiation controls, including posting of radiation areas, the conditions !

of step-off pads, disposal _of protective-clothing, completion of Radi- ,

ation Work Permits, compliance with the conditions of the Radiation Work Permits, personnel monitoring devices lbeing worn, cleanliness of work areas, radiation control' job coverage,tarea monitor operability l(portable-and permanent),-area monitor calibration-and personnel frisking proce '

dures were observed on a sampling basis.-

No discrepancies.were observed during the inspection perio l

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. 8 Plant Housekeeping and Fire Protection Plant housekeeping conditions including general cleanliness conditions and control of material to prevent fire hazards'were observed in areas'

listed in Paragraph 4a. Maintenance of fire barriers, fire barrier penetrations, and verification of posted fire watches in these areas'were also observed.

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No discrepancies were observed during the inspection period'.

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5. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Verification

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The operability of the River Water and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems were veri-fied during the week of January 27, 1986, by performing walkdowns of access-ible portions that included the following as appropriate: System lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built con-figuratio Equipment conditions were observed for items which might degrade perfor-manc Hangers and supports were operabl The interior of breakers, electrical and instrumentation cabinets were inspected for debris, loose material, jumpers, et Instrumentation was properly valved in and functioning; and had current calibration date Valves were verified to be in the proper position with power available.

i Valve locking nechanisms were checked, where required.

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No deficiencies were identified other than as discussed in Detail . Maintenance Activities The inspectors observed portions of selected maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that those activities were being con-ducted in accordance with approved procedures, technical specifications and appropriate industrial codes and standards. The' inspectors conducted record reviews and direct observations to determine that:

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Those activities did not violate a limiting condition for operation.

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Redundant components were operabl Required administrative approvals and tagouts had been obtained prior to initiating wor Approved procedures were used or the activity was within the." skills of-the trade."

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The work was performed by qualified personne ,

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The procedures used were adequate to control the activity.: #

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Replacement.. parts and materials were properly certified.

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Radiological controls were properly implemented when'necessary.

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Ignition / fire prevention controls.wereLappropriate for the activit ' --

[ QC hold points were est'abl_ished where required and. observe "

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Equipment was properly-tested before being returned to servic "

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An independent verification was conducted to verify that the equipment

{ was. properly returned to servic Y ,

Preventive maintenance.on the B river water pump and motor was periodica11y

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reviewed. This spare. pump ~is due to be returned to service by thelend of-

February, 1986. No concerns were identifie ;

Surveillance Testing i*

To. ascertain that surveillance of safety-related systems or componentsLis !

being conducted in.accordance with license requirements, the inspector'ob--

j served portions of selected tests to verify. that:

i The surveillance test procedure conforms to technical specification re-j quirement i

Required administrative approvals and tagouts are'obtained before initi- '

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Testing is being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with

an approved test procedur i  !

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i Required test instrumentation is calibrate :

.!- LCOs are me L The test data are accurate and complete. Selected test result data was i

}: independently reviewed to verify accurac .i i Independently verify the system was properly returned-to servic .

Test.results meet technical specification requirements and test discre-pancies are rectifie ~

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I The surveillance test was completed at the required frequenc . . ..

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. 10 The following in progress tests were witnessed by the inspector: '

MSP 11.22, Safety Injection Accumulator Tank 1A Pressure Loop P-SI-923, Janu-ary 2, 198 OST 1.13.8, Containment Depressurization System MOV Exercise -. Train A, Janu-ary 8, 198 OST 1.13.1, Quench Spray Pump 1A Test, January 10, 198 OST 1.13.4, 1B Recirculation Pump Dry Test, January 13, 198 OST 1.30.2, Reactor Plant River Water Pump 1A Test, January 29, 198 OST 1.30.4, Reactor Plant River Water System Valve Test for "A" Header, Janu-ary 29, 198 MSP 2.04, NI-42 Power Range Monitor Quarterly Calibration, January 25, 198 No concerns were identified by the inspector . River Water Expansion Joint Deformation On January 2, 1986, the licensee discovered a rubber expansion joint in the Reactor Plant River Water System (RWS) discharge header to the circulating water pumps was deformed; it appears to have partially collapsed as if the system had drawn a vacuu The expansion joint is not easily visible being located in a corner of the Safeguards Building basement. . There are several similar expansion joints in the River Water. System but they are in areas where changes in their condition would be readily noticeable. .The inspector did not observe any deficiencies with them. The licensee has issued Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 86-01, Emergency Isolation of River Water Discharge Header. The purpose of this TOP is to provide'an alternate discharge flow path for RWS in the event the expansion joint deteriorates to the point of obstructing flow or rupturing. The objective of the TOP is to reroute the RWS flow path such that the river water pumps discharge to the "A" header which will then flow through the B component cooling heat exchanger and then in reverse flow through the C component heat exchanger.- The "B" river water header flow would also be reversed to allow a discharge fath to the auxiliary intake structure. This would bypass the affected portion of the RW However, these actions would also eliminate the redundancy designed into the RWS and would place the plant in TS 3.7.4.1. action statement which requires two operable subsystems of RWS. Two subsystems must be restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant must be placed in Hot Standby. TOP 86-01 adequately as-sures that operators are aware of this time limi The condition of the expansion joint is monitored by the licensee at least once per shift and accessible similar joints have been inspected for deforma- 1 tion. An emergency patch will be placed on the expansion joint in the near

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future. During the upcoming refueling outage (May, 1986), the expansion joint will be replaced and the licensee will investigate the cause of the deforma-tion. Replacement of the expansion joint and detern.ination of the cause of deformation will be Inspector Follow Item (86-01-03). Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Conditions resulting in less than intended auxiliary feedwater (AFW) being delivered to the steam generators have been identified at on.e Westinghouse (W) plant as described in W Technical Bulletin NSD-TB 84-06, Reduced Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rates. W recommended that the licensee review procedures used to verify the AFW flow rates measured to ensure consistency with the pressure conditions specified in design criteria and correct any deficiencies in AFW flow rates. Westinghouse design criteria for minimum AFW conditions is that AFW flow must be introduced against a steam generator pressure corresponding to the lowest safety valve setting plus 3% accumulation (1108 psig at BVPS-1).

The licensee performed a preliminary evaluation and determined that current field data on the motor driven AFW pumps and the as-built system resistances indicate that FW-P-3B capability of delivering the required 350 gpm to two steam generators appears margina A more detailed investigation has commenced to substantiate these results, consisting of TOP 86-03, FW-P-3B Operability Data Collection. The objective of the TOP is to collect FW-P-3B operating data while discharging into the main feedwater system to aid in determination of pump operability. The licensee plans to perform this TOP during Hot Standby conditions. Data will be taken after five minutes of pump operation and with the pump feeding two and three steam generators. The inspector noted that FW-P-3B has met the technical specification surveillance test require-ments that demonstrate a discharge pressure of greater than 1155 psig on recirculation flow. Observation of data collection and review of results in determination of FW-P-3B operability is Inspector Follow Item (86-01-04).'

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10. Inoffice Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported,. including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector deter-mined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed:

LER 85-20 - Out of Specification Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Rate Trip Setting NRC Inspection Report 334/85-27, detail 8.b, discussed this item initiall Additional information provided in the text of the LER indicated that a review of the rod drop test times at Beaver Valley, showed that the longest recorded rod drop time to dash pot is 1.44 seconds. The analysis presented in the Westinghouse technical bulletin showed no violation of plant safety analysis

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parameters provided the rod drop times to the dash pot are less that seconds. It can, therefore, be concluded that the plant safety analysis as-sumptions have always been. me . Exit Interview Meetings were held with senior facility management periodically during the

course of this inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A i

summary of inspection findings was further discussed with the licensee at the l conclusion of the report period.

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