IR 05000313/1987036
| ML20236W793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1987 |
| From: | Craig Harbuck, Ireland R, Jaudon J, Johnson W, Murphy M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236W787 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-87-36, 50-368-87-36, NUDOCS 8712080234 | |
| Download: ML20236W793 (10) | |
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A_P,PENDIX P
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY! COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-313/87-36-Licenses:
DPR-51 60-368/87-36 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313 50-368 Licensee:
Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 l
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 l
Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted:
October 1-31, 1987
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Inspectors:
M/b gM ff/6/g y
W. ). John Eenior Resident ^ Reactor Date '
Inspector
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!f7 C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor Inspector Da1(e
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M. E. Murphy, Reactor IIWpector, Plant Date Systems Section, Engineering Branch
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//[.fo/(7 Reviewed:
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.G RicharFE. Irel&nd, Chief, Plant Systems Date //
Section, Engineering ll Branch /
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l Approved: [/[7)/A'
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///M ff Johns 'P.~ Jaudop, Chjdf, Reactor Project Date'
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Section A, Reabtor Projects Branch 8712080234 871202 PDR ADOCK 05000313 G
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 1-31, 1987 (Report 50-313/87-36)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, and followup on previously identified items.
Results: Within the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Inspection Conducted October 1-31, 1987 (Report 50-368/87-36)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced. inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, and followup on a previously l
identified item.
Results:
Within the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted A. Armstrong, Maintenance Coordinator.
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- B.' Baker', 0perations Manager
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E.~Bickel,-Health Physics-Superintendent.
J.'Bruni, Shift' Maintenance: Supervisor.
.A. Cox,' Unit.1 Operations Superintendent-
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- M. Durst, Project Engineering Superintendent-s-
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- E. Ewing, General Manager. Technical Support B. Garrison, Operations' Technical Support L. Gulick, Unit 2.0perations Superintendent C. Halbert, Engineering Supervisor A. Hatley, MechanicalLMaintenance: Supervisor
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H. Hollis, Security Superintendent.
- *D. Howard,-Special Projects Manager-
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G. : Kendrick, Instrumentation and Controls' Superintendent
- D. Lomax, Plant _ Licensing Supervisor A. McGregor, Engineering Services Supe'rvisor
- J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager
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- P.' Michalk, Licensing Engineer V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent'
- D.:Provenche, Quality Assurance Supervisor =
- S.-Quennoz, General Manager, Plant Operations.
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P. Rehm, Mechanical Maintenance Engineering Technician
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P. Rogers, Special-Projects' Coordinator C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent C. Taylor, Unit 2 Operations Technical Support Supervisor L. Taylor, Special Projects Coordinator
- J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent R. Wewers,. Work Control Center Manager
- Present at exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)
(Closed) Violation 313/8702-01:
Failure to maintain a category "E" valve locked as required.
The NRC inspector verified that the licensee had revised Procedure 1015.01 to clarify that the independent verification of locked valve positions includes verification of proper installation of the chain and lock.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 368/8722-02:
Failure to properly install the chain and lock on a category "E" valve.
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4-p The licensee attributed this violation', :n part, to the type of chain that was used.
A new type chain has now been installed on'all of the Unit 2 category "E" val /es.
Additionally, the t.rocedure revision noted in the preceeding item hari not been issued at the time this violation was identified.
It sh;uld also help prevent recurrence of this type of
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This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8601-01:
Check valves in the steam supply lines to the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) turbine were eliminated from the design package without an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 review tu determine the existence of an'unreviewed safety question.
The licensee has installed the check valves and reincorporated them into the design change.
The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure 1062.04, Revision 0, dated June 2, 1987, "10 CFR 50.59 Review Program," for the incorporation of committed improvements'and the formal issuance of a policy statement on the application of 10 CFR 50.59.
This procedure now requires specialized training and the' specific qualification and written certification of personnel performing 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. The NRC inspector reviewed the lesson plans and training records for the personnel training completed to date.
This item is closed.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item 313/8601-03:
The post-modification testing for Battery D07 did not include certain design requirements.
The licensee is making several changes to their battery surveillance program.
Specifically a Technical Specification change request will be submitted to make the AN0-1 Technical Specifications more consistent with current standard specifications and IEEE-450.
This item is open pending submittal of the Technical Specification change request.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8601-09:
Failure to follow procedures for the maintenance and testing of Emergency Feedwater Pump P7A.
Maintenance Procedure 1402.009 " Emergency Feedwater Pump Maintenance," has been completely rewritten under the new maintenance procedure writers guide.
It now specifically requires the taking of stipulated vibration readings to complete the procedure.
The procedure revision also clarifies post maintenance test requirements following delays in testing because of plant conditions.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item 313/8601-13:
This item was left open pending correction of identified errors in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR).
There were four specific errors identified in this open item.
Two of the errors were corrected by Revision 4 to the SAR:
Subsection 7.2.3.2.4 was revised to reflect the installation of the emergency feedwater initiation and control system, and Section A.7.2 was revised to show that Valves CV-2667 and CV-2617 are normally open.
The remaining two items were clarified and were not errors.
The atmospheric dump valves are no
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longer classified as seismic category I because of the installation of
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Table 1-1 of the SAPS applies'only to Cycle 1 data and is not J
updated.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 313/8601-14:
Motor operated valve maintenance procedures.
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Errcrs were identified in Maintenance Procedure 1403.160, "Limitorque Motor Operated Valve SMB-000 Maintenance," Procedure 1403.161, ' "Limi torque Motor Operated Valve SMB-00 Maintenance," Procedure 1403.71, "EIM Motor Operated Valve Maintenance," and Drawing E-195.
Plant Engineering Action Request (PEAR) 86-5357 and Drawing Work Request (DWR) 87-0010 were issued to correct Drawing E-195-2.
The drawing.was revised in February 1987.
The maintenance procedures have been rewritten and reformatted according to the licensee's guidelines for improved maintenance procedures. The identified errors have been corrected.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item 313/8601-16:
Weaknesses identified in instrumentation testing and calibration of EFW system ~ components.
The NRC inspector reviewed Procedures 1304.05, Revision 11, September 9, 1986, " Emergency Feedwater Pressure and Flow Instrumentation," 1304.98, Revision 3, October 23,.1986, "EFIC Channel A Calibration," 1304.99, Revision 3, October 23, 1986, "EFIC Channel B Calibration," 1304.145, Revision 3, September 4,1987, "EFIC Channel A Monthly Test," and 1304.146, Revision 4, September 4, 1987, 1304.147, Revision 3, September 4, 1987, and 1304.148, Revision 5,. September 30, 1987, for Channels B, C, and D respectively.
These. procedures have corrected the weaknesses noted, except for the item concerning the functional test of HS-246.
HS-246 is an Appendix 'R' disconnect switch for Valves CV-2646 and CV-2648.
This is a simple "on-off" switch that removes power from valves that are open and that fail open on loss of power.
A periodic functional test is not considered required.
This item is closed.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The NRC inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The NRC inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented. The inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of plant activities.
The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units including the Unit I reactor building to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibration.
The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions during the tour _ _,
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The NRC inspectors walked'down the accessible portions of the Unit 2
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service water system to verify operability.
The walkdown was conducted
.using Procedure 2104.29,' Attachments A, B, C, D, and E, and Drawings M-2210 and M-2261.
The-system was found to be operable, however, the following minor problems were*noted by the NRC inspectors during the-wal kdown:
The following valves were locked but were not required to be by the procedure:
25W-67,'25W-59, 2SW-59, 25W-41, 25W-42, 25W-5044, and 25W-5045.
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The following valves had no label or tag:
25W-82, 25W-83, 25W-67, 25W-105, and 2CV-1400-1.
Valve 2CV-1562-2 was labeled as the supply to Cooler 2E27A when it is actually the supply to Cooler 2VUC-20A.
The following valves appeared to need work to replace corroded packing gland nuts and bolts, and clean up surface rust:
2CV-1403-1, 2CV-1510-2, and 2CV-1513-2.
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Although leakage from the service water supply to Room Cooler 2VUC-1A had been identified, no effort had been made to collect the leakage to keep it off equipment below. The NRC inspector concluded that
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this was an example of poor housekeeping.
The licensee was informed of these discrepancies and corrective action was
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initiated. The NRC inspector concluded that the service water system remained operable despite the minor problems delineated above.
The NRC inspectors made the following observations during tours of the auxiliary buildings and the Unit I reactor building:
Tools and equipment apparently left over from a completed job were
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left on the floor by Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump 2P60B.
The licensee was informed and the area was cleaned up.
The discharge test gage for Sodium Hydroxide Pump 2P139A had a
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leaking connection fitting.
The licensee was informed and a job request issued.
Valve SS-1814A, a vent isolation valve on the pressurizer steam space
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sample line, inside the reactor building, had a packing leak.
Job Order 743124 was performed to tighten the packing.
Instrument Rack 2 on the 354 foot elevation of the reactor building
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had a seismic support deficiency.
Two anchor bolts and the associated base plate were pulled from the wall and the concrete had i
been broken.
The licensee wrote Report of Abnormal Conditions (RAC) 1-87-193 and repaired the support under Job Order 743233.
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Valve CV-2419, the isolation control valve from Core Flood Tank T2B
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to the reactor coolant system, had a packing gland leak.
The licensee had'already-identified this and it was subsequently repaired under Job Order 742974.
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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility.
operations.were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required j
surveillance testing on Emergency Fesdwater Pump 2P7B (Procedure 21)6.06)
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and verified that testing was performed in accordance with proceci.re, that t
test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that test
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results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the l-test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were l
properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The NRC inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test q
activities
Unit 2 emergency diesel generator A (Procedure 2104.36, i
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h Supplement 2).
Two minor problems were noted during this test:
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cable support for the jacket water coolers was loose, and a smoke
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detector near the exhaust manifold alarmed.
The NRC inspector informed the licensee of these observations.
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l Moderator temperature coefficient measurement at power i
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(Procedure 2302.09)
i Turbine driven EFW Pump 2P7A monthly and quarterly tests i
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(Procedure 2106.06).
During the quarterly test the pump tripped on j
overspeed.. The quarterly test includes feeding both steam generators
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one at a time.
The trip occurred as the flow isolation control valve
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to the "B" steam generator was closed.
Attempts to relatch the j
turbine driver overspeed trip mechanism failed because the emergency
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tappet was bent.
The pump was declared inoperable and Unit 2 entered
a 72-hour limiting condition for operation action statement.
Comments on the licensee's repair of the overspeed trip mechanism are included in paragraph 5.
Post repair testing of Emergency Feedwater Pump 2P7A and performance
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of monthly and quarterly tests (Procedure 2106.06).
It was observed that a rapid flow reduction, which occurs when flow to a steam i
generator is isolated, results in a momentary increase in the speed l
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Lof-the' pump by> se'veral hundred revolutions per minute. ~ Review of the licensee's investigation of this problem by the NRC inspectors for determination;of the root cause of the overspeed trip'is designated-
.an open item for tracking' purposes (368/8736-01).
Monthlyl est of Emergency Feedwater Pump P7A:(Procedure 1106.06,_
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Supplement:II)J-Reactor, coolant system leak rate determination (Procedure 1103.13,
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Attachment A).
- No. violations or'dev e k ns were identified.
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5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities.of. safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that' they were conducted in accordance with-approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes.
or standards; and in conformance with Technical ~ Specifications.
The following items were. considered during.this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components'or systems were removed from service,< approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work,._
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activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as. applicable,. functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior
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toireturning components or s,vstems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by ' qualified personnel,:
parts and materials used were properly certified, radiological' controls
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wereLimplemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.-
Work requests were reviewed to determine status'of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were ' observed:
Temporary Modification 87-2-013 installation.
This modification
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removed a false alarm indication for the pressurizer surge line temperature monitor (Job Order 741660).
Setpoint adjustment on main steam safety valve (MSSV) PSV-2693 (Job
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Order 739590, Procedure 1306.017).
Before and after use calibration of test gages used for MSSV set
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point adjustments (Job Order 741369).
r Motor operated valve actuator testing system (M0 VATS) test of
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Valve CV-2620, the emergency feedwater (EFW) isolation to the "B" once through steam generator from EFW Pump P7A (Job Order 741781, Procedure 1403.032).
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- Filtration of fuel oil in Unit 1 diesel fuel storage tanks (Job
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Unit 1 emergency diesel generator "A"nleak repair and gasket
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-replacement on oil pan inspection covers (Job Order 729569).
i Replacement of Reactor' Building Pressure Transmitter PT-2402, an
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input-to the reactor protection system (Job Order 741594).
q Replacement of reactor building cooler chiiled water flow I
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transmitters (Design Change Package 87-1095).
O The NRC inspector performed followup inspections and observed portions of the licensee's actions to repair the overspeed trip mechanism on the turbine. driver of EFW Pump 2P7A. (Job Order 743049) The NRC-inspector found that replacement'of-the emergency ball-tappet in the trip device was-
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done without the use of a written procedure.
However,.through discussions
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with the licensee, it was determined that this activity had been C
j adequately controlled. -This was based upon the following. points.
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properly with respect to the flywheel weight did not exactly j
correspond to the method described in the Terry Turbine technical i
manual, its validity had been verified with a vendor technical
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-representative.
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i During the installation, the licensee engineer who had contacted the i
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vendor,' directed the mechanics performing the work.
i The' subsequent overspeed trip testing of the turbine (uncoupled.from
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the pump) was successful.,
Based on these points, the NRC inspector concluded that no violation of- ~
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NRC requirements had occurred in that the work was controlled.
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the NRC. inspector discussed the following concerns with the licensee.
j Since the method used to install the tapp'et had not been in the form l
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of a written procedure with sign-offs for individual steps, the use
of this method was not documented.
The licensee committed to place a
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description of the actual method used with the job order package.
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A similar problem with trip mechanism had been corrected in
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November 1986, when a bent tappet had prevented relatching of.the trip device.
At that time, existing Work Plan 1402.96, modified by a temporary change governing the tappet replacement, had been.followed.
' In that case, a method from the vendor technical manual had been followed verbatim.
The NRC inspector questioned why this work plan
was not used.
The licensee stated that the work plan had not been i
used this time because work plans are only meant for one time use and
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the method of installation would have required extensive disassembly of the outboard bearing end of the turbine.
It was further stated l
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that this work plan, along with the tappet installation of the latest repair, were in the process of being incorporated into permanent procedures.
No quality control (QC) coverage was required in the job order
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= package. The NRC inspector stated that QC coverage might have been appropriate, since the installation of the tappet hinged upon.
achieving proper clearance between the tappet ball and the flywheel weight.
Apparently, no root cause analysis was done when the tappet'was found
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bent and then replaced in November 1986. Once the tappet is installed, the excess threaded length of the tappet must be cut off to preclude interference with a part called the emergency head lever when an overspeed trip occurs.
In the past, too much excess length was left. This apparently resulted in the striking of the top of the tappet by the lever causing it to bend when the turbine was tripped manually or on overspeed. The tappet is now cut off to provide adequate clearance from the lever.
The NRC inspector stated that the use of verbal instructions for an
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infrequently performed and fairly technical corrective maintenance activity was poor practice. The licensee stated that in the future, for similar situations, written instructions would be provided if at all possible given the constraints of time and considering the complexity of the maintenance to be performed.
The NRC inspectors did not determine if these five concerns represented problems in other maintenance jobs. Accordingly, these are considered to be an unresolved item pending additional review by the NRC inspectors (368/8736-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Unresolved Item
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An unresolved item is one about which more information is required in
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order to determine if it is a violation, a deviation, or an acceptable item. One unresolved item is discussed in paragraph 5 of this report.
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Exit Interview l
The NRC inspectors met with Mr. S. M. Quennoz, General Manager, Plant j
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Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of inspection.
L At this meeting, the inspectors summarizeo the scope of the inspection and I
the findings.
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