IR 05000313/1987038

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Insp Repts 50-313/87-38 & 50-368/87-38 on 871101-30.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety verification,maint,surveillance,10CFR21 Repts,Cold Weather Preparations & Containment Integrity
ML20237E354
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1987
From: Craig Harbuck, Jaudon J, Johnson W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237E340 List:
References
50-313-87-38, 50-368-87-38, NUDOCS 8712280287
Download: ML20237E354 (9)


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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Inspection Report:

50-313/87-38 Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/87-38 NPF-6'

Dockets: 50-313

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50-368 Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units' I and 2'

Inspection Conducted:

November 1-30, 1987 Inspectors:

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Wi D. Johnjppf,~ Senior Resident Reactor Date Inspect 6f x

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-C.C.Harbuck,fesidentReactorInspector Datd

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Approved:

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J'0T)6s P. Jaudon, j7hief,/ Reactor Project Date-

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6ection A, DivSion oY Reactor Projects

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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted November 1-30, 1987 (Report 50-313/87-38)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance,10 CFR Part 21 reports, cold weather i

preparations, and containment integrity.

Results:

Within the six areas. inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

Inspection Conducted November 1-30, 1987 (Report 50-368/87-38)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, and cold weather preparations.

Results:

Within the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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-3-DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • J. Levine, Executive Director, ANO Site Operations A. Armstrong, Maintenance Coordinator B. Baker, Operations Manager E. Bickel, Health Physics Superintendent J. Bruni, Shift Maintenance Supervicor A. Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent
  • E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical Support B. Garrison, Operations Technical Support L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent C. Halbert, Engineering Supervisor A. Hatley, Mect.anical Maintenance Supervisor H. Hollis, Security Superintendent
  • D. Howard, Special Projects Manager
  • L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor A. McGregor, Engineering Services Supervisor D. McKenney, Engineer J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager B. Michalk, Engineer
  • P. Michalk, Licensing Engineer V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent S. Quennoz, General Manager, Plant Operations P. Rogers, Special Projects Coordinator B. Scalco, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent B. Simmons, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor M. Smith, Reactor Engineering Supervisor C. Taylor, Unit 2 Operations Technical Support Supervisor L. Taylor, Special Projects Coordinator
  • J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager i

B. Williams, Engineering Supervisor i

  • Present at exit interview.

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l The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.

2.

Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators.

The NRC inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and ensured that maintenance requests had been

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-4-initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The NRC inspectors made spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented. The inspectors verified implementation of radiation

d protection controls during observation of plant activities,

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'd The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and

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excessive vibration. The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions during the tours.

The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of Unit 2 safety-related electrical distribution system to verify operability. The walkdown was conducted using Procedures 2107.02, 2107.03, and 2107.04.

While no operability problems were identified, several minor

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discrepancies were noted during this walkdown.

These discrepancies and

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inspector comments resulting from the walkdown are listed below:

The lineup procedure listed Breaker 2851-N5 as a spare, but the

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cubicle was labeled " Space Heater Breaker".

f !y Indication bulbs were burned out on four breakers.

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The labels on some breakers did not have a good description of the

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components supplied.

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"F.W." was used on some breakers to abbreviate " fire water" and on

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others to abbreviate "feedwater".

I New controlled breaker lists have been posted in the low voltage AC

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and DC panels. However, in some cases the older, handwritten lists were still in the panels. Some of these older lists were incomplete.

Tags were missing from several breakers.

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The procedural guidance on whether or not either or both

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Breakers 2B54-H3 and 2B64-D5 should be locked open was not clear.

These two breakers are the power supplies for the swing battery charger.

The procedure listing appeared to be outdated for Breakers 2001-12

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and 2001-23, although the licensee has this noted in a pending revision file.

These items were discussed in detail with licensee personnel. They indicated that the relabeling program had not yet been performed for the Unit 2 electrical distribution system. They further stated that the noted discrepancies would be corrected and the NRC inspector's comments would be considered when the breakers are relabeled. This is expected to be completed by the end of January 198,

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'ihese /q?aws and observations were conducted to verify that faciiity

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operatict.s wet pfn conformtnce with the requirements establishedtunder

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grecheical Speyificati,os.s ( th Code of Federal Regulations, and [ic.'nsee i adkinistrativt procedure 3 g

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No violations or defiatior.s were identified.

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Monthly Surveillanha Obsermtion (Units 1 arid 2)

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The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required test fg.r l

leak inspection on the Unit 1 reactor coolant system and veriMed that tie

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test was performed in accordar;ce with an \\pproved procedure, that test

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j results conformed with Tel;nnical Specifications and procedtre

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.r requirements, that test resMts were reviest by personnel other thaq the t

t individudi directing tee test, and'cfat any deMciencies identifiec durkg

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tha, test 1.eare properly revieued and> resolved by appropriate managev;nt

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personnel,

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The (RC ikspector al.so witnessed portior.s of the following tesc

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Sta up cilsnnel calibrati6n'(Procedure 2304.146)

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Escape hatcl( sen.kennial barrei. leak test (Job Order 742632,

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Procedure 2304.22)

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PlotprotNtionsystemcnannelAmonthlytest(Procedure 2304.37, Job Order 743111)

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., - Excore Auclear instrume6tation channel-B 'e3t (Procedure 2304.101,

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c D cJob Order,743593)

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Eraergency Feedwater Pump P7A mohthly test (Procedure 1106.06)a

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v (j Emergency feedwater initiation and control system channel'B mobt'hly I

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,tes t (Proe.edure 1304.146, Job Order 7.4r 87)

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Low Pressure Safety Injecticr. Pump 2P60B monthly test

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(Procedure 2104 40,<SupplemenO 2)

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Monthly Maytenaire Observation (Units 1 and 2)

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Station maty. tem erie activities; /for safety-relate'd systems and c'capnnents

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listed below' were cbserved in order to ascertain whether they were

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cunducted it! accordance with approved procedures, % ulatory Guides, and i

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industry codes or standa-ds, and in conformance with Technical s

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The following items were considered duridg this, review: the limiting

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conditions for operation were not while compor.ets or systems were removed

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from service, approvals were obthined prfdr td initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures uti were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning. components or systems to service quality control records were maintaint sctivities were accomplished,by qualified personnel, parts and materials hsed were properly certifud, radio 161eal controls

were implemented, cod fire prevention controls were implemented.

t Work requests were reviewed to determind status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority is assigned to safety related equipmer.t maintenance

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which may affect system performance;

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l The following maintenance activities were observed'.

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Tcrque bonnet bolts on Valve CV-2692, a Main Steam Isolation Valve,

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(Job Cider 744058).

Installation of time delay relay for VEF-38B, penetration Room

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Ventihiion Fan, (Job Order 744089, Design Change Package 87-1119)

Penetration room ventilation system oper/Aility testing following

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completion of Design Change Package 87-1119

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Rep 1x2 fire pump dierel engine cooling water'(Job Order 744613)

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New fuel receipt inspection for Unit 2

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Repair of Main Steam Isolation Vahe CV.?692 actuator (Job

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Orders 744054, 743929; Work Plan 1408.006)

TheNRCinspectoralsoreviewedthe,completedhpborderpackageforJob Grder 744117.

This job involved replacement R the 8 steam' generator lower primary inspection hole cover on Unit 31

During the course of cuxiliary building tours,- the NRC inspector noted Ethat the number of scaffolds near safety-related equipt.ent< appeared to be excessive.

Scaffolding was in place over or near dwo makeup pumps in Unit 1, two charging pumps in Unit 2, and over many safety-related system pipes in the Unit 2 upper and lower south piping penetration rooms.

One, scaffcid next to motor control center 2D26 in the Unit 2 north electridt equipment room was still in place even though its associated maintenance T

work had been suspended.

This was discucsed with the shift operations supervisor.

Shortly thereafter the scaffold was removed, as the work which it supported was'not to be continued untf) the next refueling outage.

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Prompted by these observations, the NRC inspectof reviewe M icensee Prc.cedure 1000.13, " Control of Maintenance," Revision 26, t;pproved November 12, 1987.

This revision changed the existing contra'is on the use

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Scaffolding is now categorized into three types:

30-day, outage, and unlimited.

Each type is required to be labeled with a specially marked colored tag.. Scaffolding ~ erected during power _ operations in the vicinity of operating equipment or safety-related equipment is normally designated as 30-day scaffolding.

Such scaffolds must be-evaluated from an operational.and safety standpoint prior to erection.

Further evaluation is required to allow the scaffold to remain beyond 30 days.

The licensee's work control center monitors the status of all scaffolding and coordinates its erection and' removal.

Coordination of the evaluation to extend the time of insta11ation'is also done by the work-control center.

The NRC inspector discussed.the following concerns with the licensee regarding the control, of scaffolding:

An engineering evaluation is required prior to erecting a scaffold

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only if it will be. attached to piping, pipe. hangers, conduit, or cable trays associated with engineered safety features (ESF) systems.

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The NRC inspector expressed a concern that scaffolding in close proximity to ESF equipment;does not. require an engineering evaluation.

For example,. scaffold built above a. makeup /high pressure

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injection pump in Unit 1 would be a seismic Class 2 over Class 1 concern.

Although the 30-day category for scaffolding:is apparently designed

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to limit the time that scaffolding is in place, it appears that it may become the minimum time limit.

This could allow a scaffold to remain in place several weeks after it is no longer needed.

The licensee had developed a scaffold control program in response _to Violations 368/8615-08 and 368/8627-02.

The concerns expressed above are-being evaluated by the licensee in assessing the effectiveness of his scaffold control program.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Part 21 Reports (Units 1.and 2)

During review of 10 CFR Part 21 reports submitted by manufacturers, suppliers, and reactor licensees, NRC personnel identified certain reports which could be applicable at ANO.

The NRC inspector provided copies of, these reports to the licensee.

The reports provided are listed below.

It is expected that the licensee will review'these reports to determine-whether they are appl.icable to equipment at ANO.

Part 21 Reports Provided to Licensee Number Originator Date Subject 87-042 Basler Electric 04/29/87 Cracking of o rings87-051 SOR, Inc.

04/27/87 Gas bubble in-SOR

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-8-switches causing increased deadband 87-055 Sacramento Municipal 04/29/87 Decay heat pump Utility District NPSH curve discrepancy 87-065 Public Service Company 06/05/87 Diesel air start motor of Colorado

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Cold We_ather Preparations (Units 1 and 2)

The NRC inspector reviewed the current implementation status of the licensee's program of protective measures to ensure that systems and components susceptible to freezing in cold weather are adequately protected.

Procedure 1307.37, " Plant Freeze Protection Testing'," was completed under Job Order 532763 in October 1987.

Job requests for correction of 18 discrepancies were prepared based on the results of this testing. During this inspection period, Procedure 1307.37 was being revised to include the space heaters and heat tracing associated with the new condensate storage tank.

Visual inspections of Unit 1 and Unit 2 piping insulation was performed in August and September 1987. These inspections were performed using Job Orders 737716 and 738346 and Procedures 1306.018 and 2306.011. A total of 15 job requests were initiated to correct identified discrepancies.

The NRC inspector noted that certain important freeze protection systems were checked frequently during cold weather by the operations department.

These checks were documented on Operations Logs 1015.03A-18 and 1015.03B-14.

The NRC inspector concluded that the licensee had established and implemented a program to ensure that important plant equipment was protected from freeze damage.

No violations or deviations were identified..

7.

Containment Integrity (Unit 11 The purpose of this inspection was to verify that containment integrity was established prior to heatup.. The NRC inspector locally inspected a sample of 20 containment penetrations in the upper south piping penetration room. For each penetration, the NRC inspector verified that isolation valves were positioned as required. The NRC inspector also

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checked that test connections, vents, and drains were isolated.

Caps were noted to be installed as required. The NRC inspector reviewed the records of the licensee's preheatup. containment penetration walkdown.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Exit Interview The NRC senior resident inspector met with.Mr. J. M. Levine, Executive-Director, ANO Site Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of the inspection.

At this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.

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