IR 05000313/1987022
| ML20237K400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1987 |
| From: | Craig Harbuck, Hunter D, Johnson W, Richard Lee, Murphy M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237K350 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-87-22, 50-368-87-22, NUDOCS 8708190237 | |
| Download: ML20237K400 (12) | |
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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-313/87-22 Licenses:
DPR-51 50-368/87-22 NPF-6 Dockets:
50-313
., s 50-368 l
Licensee:
Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 l
Inspection At:
AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: July 1-31, 1987 Inspectors:
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6/6/F 7 m
W. D. Jgfrfson, Senior Resident Reactor Uate~
Inspect 5r
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l C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor Inspector Date '
Chkra w sia 61 M. E. Murphy, ReactoF Inspector Date i
lA]l Im YSl
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R. S. L Project Mariper, NRR te l
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Approved:
__D. R. lunter, Chief, Reactor Project Date.
Section B, Reactor Projects Branch j
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8708190237 B70814 ADOCK 050 g 3 DR
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted July 1-31, 1987 (Report 50-313/87-22)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection-including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identified items, followup on licensee event reports, and plant safety committee.
Results:
Within the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
l Inspection Conducted July 1-31, 1987 (Report 50-368/87-22).
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on previously identified items, followup on licensee event reports, the plant safety committee, and
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pressurizer dummy heater plug seal weld repairs.
Results: Within the seven areas inspected, two apparent violations were identified (failure to properly lock a manual valve as required, paragraph 3, and failure to perform and document a safety evaluation for operation of the containment atmosphere monitoring systems, paragraph 3).
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DETAILS J
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Persons Contacted J. Levine, Executive Director, Site Nuclear Operations B. Allen, Engineer
- B. Baker, Operations Manager P. Baker, Shift Maintenance Supervisor D.- Bennett, Mechanical Engineer H. Carpenter, I&C Supervisor A. Cox, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent M. Durst, Project Engineering Superintendent
- E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical. Support B. Garrison, Operations Technical Support
- M. Goodson, Project Engineering Supervisor L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent H. Hollis, Security Superintendent D. Howard, Special Projects Manager L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality G. Kendrick, I&C Superintendent R. Lane, Engineering Manager D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor B. McCord, Quality Control Supervisor l
J. McWilliams, Maintenance Manager B. Michalk, Mechanical Engineer j
- P. Michalk, Licensing Engineer
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- V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent l
- S. Quennor, General Manager, Plant Operations
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R. Rispoli, Fire Protection Specialist
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P. Rogers, Special Projects Coordinator J
C. Shively, Plant Engineering Superintendent C. Taylor, Unit 2 Operations Technical Support Supervisor
- J. Taylor-Brown, Quality Control Superintendent L. Taylor, Special Projects Coordinator J. Vandergrift, Training Manager
- R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager C. Zimmerman, Unit 1 Operations Technical Support Supervisor
- Present at exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including i
operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8626-02:
Makeup pump room cooler design and procedural adequacy.
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The licensee has revised Procedure 1104.02 to require operation of at least two of the three makeup pump room coolers when makeup pumps are required to be operable.
The licensee has also performed a calculation to determine the steady state temperature of the room with no coolers operating and with one or two makeup pumps operating.
This calculation
indicated that makeup pump motors would be expected to remain operable I
f even without room coolers operating.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 368/8622-02:
Failure to follow a post-maintenance' test procedure for testing a station battery charger.
The licensee has revised Procedure 2403.53 such that battery charger tests will be conducted with the battery charger disconnected from-its DC bus.
The NRC inspector reviewed the records of procedure adherence training given to electrical maintenance personnel.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 368/8615-07:
Failure to lock a valve as required by j
procedure.
The NRC inspector verified that the licensee had removed the procedural
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requirement for a lock on Valve 2BS-1016.
Additionally, it was noted that efforts were underway by the licensee to improve controls for manual valve positioning. This item is considered closed based on the correction of this specific case.
The evaluation of the longer term corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be accomplished in the followup of a similar violation discussed in paragraph 3 of this report.
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(Closed) Violation 368/8708-02:
Failure to have consistent procedures for-locking Valve 2EFW-17.
The NRC inspector verified that Procedure 2106.06 had been revised to remove the requirement that this valve be locked, making this procedure consistent with Procedure 2106.08.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 313/8622-01:
Failure to properly maintain a procedure.
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l The NRC inspector verified that the service water valve lineup had been
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revised to delete the five valves not installed in the system j
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(Procedure 1104.29, Attachment A), and that Procedure 1015.01 " Conduct of
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Operation," had been revised to require that a copy of each " Valve / Breaker Lineup Exception Sheet" be forwarded to the Operations Technical Supervisor for initiation of any required procedure changes.
This item is
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closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 368/8615-10:
Incorporation of vendor recommendations into operation of the emergency diesel generators (EDG).
The NRC inspector, through discussions with the licensee, determined that the service information letter (SIL) of November 15, 1984, was not applicable to the Unit 2 diesels regarding the recommendation for limiting no' load run time to five minutes.
This is because the SIL applied to l
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l 38TD8-1/8 model EDGs with the scavenger air blower in parallel with the turbocharger.
They are in series in the Unit 2 models.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8601-10:
Lack of documentation for post-installation calibration and functional checkout of condensate storage tank level indication transmitter.
The initial calibration and functional checkout of the condensate storage tank level indication transmitter were not adequately documented and
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i routine surveillance procedures were not developed and performed following installation.
The licensee was unable to retrieve calibration data on the initial calibration of the level' indicator transmitter; however, when the calibration of the transmitter was checked', it was found to be in speci#ication. With regard to the lack of a routine calibration procedure, it is the licensee's normal practice not to piepare these procedures until just before they are used, in this case the next refueling outage in late 1986.
The licensee has a formal mechanism for identifying the need for such procedures.
Routine calibration procedures were prepared and used during the 1986 Unit 1 refueling outage. The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure 1304.06, Revision 0, August 7, 1986, which
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j was completed on October 6, 1986.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8601-08:
Apparent failure to adequately test the emergency feedwater system discharge piping motor operated
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j valves (MOVs) under flow conditions.
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The licensee performed an emergency feedwater initiation and control l
system test at normal operating temperature and pressure to verify system
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performance as designed.
In addition, more stringent testing requirements were included in IE Bulletin (IEB) 85-03, issued just prior to the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI).
The testing required by this bulletin has been successfully completed by the licensee.
The NRC inspector reviewed completed Procedures 1403.31, Revision 2, September 2, 1986; and 1403.32, Revision 0, September 10, 1986.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8601-07:
Vendor supplied M0V design data were not adequately translated into controlling documents.
IEB 85-03 was issued by the NRC just prior to the SSFI. This bulletin i
outlined potential generic problems with valve actuator performance,
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operation, maintenance, and testing and specifically noted problems with torque switch settings.
The bulletin outlined actions to be taken by licensees to investigate and correct such problems.
The licensee established and satisfactorily conducted an IEB 85-03' program during the
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last refueling outage which was in late 1986.
The NRC inspector reviewed
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completed Procedures 1403.31, Revision 2, September 2, 1986; and 1403.32, Revision 0, September 10, 1986.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8601-02:
Lack of consideration for seismic Class I with Class II interaction.
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This item was responded to by the licensee in an AP&L letter to Mr. John Stolz dated April 11, 1986.
The licensee's position was subsequently found to be satisfactory by NRR.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's procedural requirements relative to seismic II over I design. These were found in Procedure 1032.01, Form 1032.01H which replaces ESP-202, Form 202F5 and 1032.01, Attachment 3; Civil Engineering Procedure CEQN-0002, " Civil Engineering Section Criteria for Review of Potentially Hazardous Seismic Category II Over I Situations,"
Revision 1, August 4,1986; and, Engineering Services Directive
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(ESD T-218) dated July 11, 1986, subject, " Review of Potentially Hazardous i
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Category II Over I Situations for ANO Design Changes." This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 313/8601-11:
The operability and full stroke response of Valves CS-98, CS-99, CS-261, CS-262. FW-55A, FW-55B, FW-56A, FW-56B, FW-10A/FW-61, and FW-10B/FW-62 had not been demonstrated and documented.
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With the addition of the new seismic condensate storage tank,
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l Valves CS-98, CS-99, CS-261, and CS-262 are no longer in the primary
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flowpath for EFW and will be deleted from the inservice testing (IST)
program.
The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure 1106.06, Revision 31, April 10,1987,
" Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation," to verify that Valves FW-55A, FW-55B, FW-56A, FW-56B, FW-10A, and FW-10B had been incorporated for flow verification and documentation.
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There is no available indication to measure flow through check Valves FW-61 and FW-62. The licensee has committed to install the necessary instrumentation during the next refueling outage.
This item is i
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l (Closed) Open Item 313/8601-15:
Eighteen-month test requirements were not incorporated into surveillance test procedure.
The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure 1105.05, Revision 12, March 25, 1987,
" Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control" to verify that the EFIC vector logic valve command and main steam line isolation signal l
surveillance requirements had been incorporated. This item is closed.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The NRC inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The NRC inspectors made j
I spot checks to verify that the physical security plan was being implemented. The inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls during observation of plant activities, f
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The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant equipment conditions, inclading potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibration.
The NRC inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness conditions during the tours.
e The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit I reactor building spray system using Procedure 1104.05, Attachment "A",
and Drawings M-232, M-236, and M-233, to verify operability.
No problems were noted. The NRC inspector discussed one item of concern with the licensee.
This item had to do with making system valve lineups, which contain locked Category "E" valves, consistent with the Category "E" valve lineups of Procedures 1102.01 and 2102.01 (Plant Preheatup and Precritical Checklist)
by indicating the locked status.
Procedure kl04.05, Attachment "A", had numerous locked Category "E" valves but did not specify that they must be locked.
The licensee stated that efforts were already in progress to achieve consistency in indicating locked status of Category "E" valves wherever they appear in system valve lineups.
During a tour of the Unit 2
"B" engineered safety features pump room on July 22, 1987, the NRC inspector found that normally locked Manual Valve 2SI-11B was closed as required but that the padlock and chain were not installed properly. The padlock was attached to a broken link of the
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chain which enabled removal of the padlock and chain without use of the
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key. Manual Valve 2SI-118 is the discharge cross connect isolation valve
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between High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pumps 2P89B and 2P89C.
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was required to be locked closed by Procedure 2102.01, " Plant Preheatup and Precritical Checklist," because HPSI Pump 2P89C was aligned to supply
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the "A" HPSI header. The NRC inspector notified the Shift Operations l
Supervisor who immediately directed that the lock and chain be properly
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installed.
Failure to properly lock Valve 2S1-118 is an apparent violation.
(368/8722-02)
The NRC inspector concluded that corrective actions to prevent recurrence j
taken by the licensee for previous similar violations had not been adequate or timely. This was based on the following:
Valve 2SI-118 was found unlocked once before in December 1985 as
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described in Violation 368/8528-02.
Valve MU-23 was found unlocked as described in Violation 313/8702-01.
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Corrective action to prevent recurrence committed to in the
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March 1987 violation response included a revision to Procedure 1015.01, " Conduct of Operation." This revision was to require that proper padlock and chain installation be physically verified concurrently with valve position verification. This revision was not issued until July 30, 1987.
Valve 2SI-11B was found unlocked the second time during the monthly
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Category "E" valve lineup position verification.
It had been
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verified by an operator prior to the NRC inspector finding it unlocked on July 22, 1987. Had the procedure revision described above been completed sooner, this apparent oversight might have been prevented.
The NRC inspector discussed the timeliness of this procedure revision with the licensee.
It was noted that no specific completion date had been committed to by the licensee in their response of March 25, 1987. The
licensee was told that where possible, a specific date for completion of i
actions to prevent future violations should be documented in their written l
response to a Notice of Violation.
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During a plant tour on July 23, 1987, the NRC inspector observed that hoses were connected to test connection points on the Unit 2 containment atmosphere monitoring systems (CAMS) discharge lines. The hoses were run from the CAMS units to nearby ventilation exhaust ducts. Operations personnel stated that this arrangement was used to discharge the sampled containment air to the auxiliary building ventilation system rather than using the normal flowpath which would return this air to the containment building. The purpose of this lineup was to reduce containment building pressure.
The NRC inspector found that there was no CAMS operating procedure, but Procedure 2104.33 included a system description and Procedure 2104.44
included a valve lineup attachment.
Section 5.2.7.1.1 of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) states that the sample is returned to the l
containment. The NRC inspector found that the system was being operated l
in a mode other than that described in the SAR, but the licensee could provide no written safety evaluation for the operating mode and the evaluation requirements of the temporary modification procedure (1000.28)
had not been performed. After notification by the NRC inspector, the licensee disconnected the hoses and returned the CAMS units to a normal operating lineup. The licensee's failure to perform and document the evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59 prior to making a temporary operating mode change to the CAMS using hoses is an apparent violation.
(368/8722-01)
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During a plant tour on July 13, 1987, the NRC inspector found that most of the 16 nuts and bolts connecting the I-beams supporting Seismic Support 2 EBB-1-H2 were loose. This support is classified as Seismic Category I and is located on Unit 2 main steam piping just upstream of the south main steam isolation valve.
It is shown on Drawing H-12-102, Sheets 1 and 2.
The associated structural steel is shown on Drawings C-2280, Sheet 2 and C-2279, Sheet 1.
The unit was in cold shutdown at the time this discrepancy was identified.
Licensee personnel wrote Report of Abnormal Conditions '.RAC) 2-87-100 and tightened the nuts prior to heatup. The licensee's failure to maintain this seismic support in its design configuration is an apparent violation. This violation will be treated as an addition &l example of Violation 368/8708-01. The licensee's June 15, 1987, response to this violation stated that an isometric drawing update project, including field walkdowns and support
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inspections was being developed. This response also stated that a periodic safety system walkdown program was being developed. The licensee's letter of July 15, 1987, in response to Violation 313/8715-01
stated that more details on these programs will be provided following
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development of the detailed work plans.
This information is expected to
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be available by September 30, 1987. The licensee should ensure that these
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programs are developed such that they would detect the type of bolting discrepancy described above.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
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operations were in conformance'with the requirements established under l
Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and' administrative procedures.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required quarterly.
surveillance testing on Decay Heat Pump P348 (Procedure 1104.04, Supplement 2) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed
with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that test l
results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were l
properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
l The NRC inspector also witnessed portions of the following test
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l activities:
l Steam driven emergency feedwater pump test (Procedure 1106.06,
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Supplement 2)
Charging pump monthly test (Procedure 2104.02, Supplement 1)
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Emergency diesel generator monthly test (Procedure 1104.36,
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Supplement 2)
Torque wrench calibration (Job Order 727567, Procedure 1303.130)
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Emergency diesel generator monthly test (Procedure 2104.36,
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Supplement 1)
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Smoke detector operability check (Procedure 2307.12, Job
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Order 736252)
Decay heat removal system train "B" leak rate determination and
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integrity inspection (Procedure 1305.11)
Semi-annual test of Unit 2 Hydrogen Recombiner 2M55A
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(Procedure 2104.44, Supplement 1)
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l Emergency diesel generator monthly test (Procedure 1104.36,
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Supplement 2) (This was a repeat test.)
.The NRC inspector suggested that the licensee review the wording of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generator test procedures. These procedures require that the engines be run unloaded for "at least ten minutes" before securing the engines. Notes elsewhere in the procedures require that unloaded run time be minimized.
Solenoid Valve SV-2663 stuck open following the test on the steam driven emergency feedwater pump on July 7,1987. This kept the turbine running at about 900 RPM after shutdown. A job order was initiated for corrective maintenance on the valve.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
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Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
l The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting j
l conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
'i from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected l
as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior l
to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.
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Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to
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ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
Pressurizer dummy heater plug seal weld and inspection activities as
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discussed in paragraph 6 Packing adjustment on Unit 2 charging pump (Job Order (J0) 737524)
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Inspection of shaft of HPSI Pump 2P89A (JO 732682)
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Containment Spray Pump 2P35B casing vent line flange repair
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(JO736873)
Reactor Coolant Pump 2P320 seal pressure monitor repair
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(JO737440)
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Excore nuclear instrumentation indication for Channel
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(JO73748, Procedure 2304.106)
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HPSI Pump 2P89A assembly - torquing of casing bolts (JO 724283, i
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Procedure 2402.36)
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i No violations or deviations were identified..
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6.
Pressurizer Dummy Heater Plug Seal Weld Repair (Unit 2)
The unit was shut down on July 6, 1987, due to an identified leak of two to three drops per minute from the seal weld on the pressurizer dummy heater plug at Location Y-4.
During the outage the licensee removed the 20 seal welds (five heaters and fifteen dummy plugs) installed by i
Combustion Engineering in May 1987.
Licensee welders installed dummy plugs in the 20 locations.
The NRC inspector observed welding, weld
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cleaning, visual inspection by quality control (QC) persor nel, and dye penetrant examination by contractor personnel for several af the seal welds. QC coverage of these activities was observed to be extensive.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Plant Safety Committee (Units 1 and 2)
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The purpose of this part of the ins)ection was to review the licensee's j
compliance with its commitments wit 1 respect to the composition, duties, l
and responsibilities of the Plant Safety Committee (PSC) and to determine if the PSC is properly fulfilling its function.
The NRC inspector reviewed Station Administrative Procedure 1000.02, Revision 11, relating to PSC operation, the PSC meeting minutes for the period from May 1986 through April 1987, and documents submitted for the
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July 15, 1987, PSC meeting.
In addition, the NRC inspector attended the l
PSC meeting held on July 15, 1987.
l Based on this review, the NRC inspector considered that the licensee's program in the area of the PSC operation is in conformance with the i
licensee's commitments.
The composition, duties, and responsibilities of the PSC comply with the applicable provisions of the Technical Specifications of ANO Units 1 and 2.
The review indicates that the PSC routinely reviews reportable events, investigates violations of the Technical Specifications, and reviews proposed changes to the Technical Specifications. Additionally, the PSC reviews proposed changes to plant procedures, plans, programs, and systems or equipment that could affect nuclear safety. The PSC meets weekly and the PSC review appeared to be more technical in nature than purely programmatic or administrative in nature.
At the conclusion of this part of the inspection, the NRC inspector discussed his conclusions and observations with the cognizant licensee i
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personnel. The NRC inspector stated that the effectiveness of the PSC could be enhanced if doccants submitted for PSC review were carefully screened for completeness. Iwong tb documents submitted. for the July 15, 1987, meeting, the NRC inspector noted that several documents were not adequately prepared (they were subsequently-returned for additional work by the PSC), some documents were
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resubmitted ~following additional work after a previous PSC review, and some documents were submitted to correct errors =in approved documents that were identified subsequent to the previous PSC review.
Review of documents. lacking completeness appeared to consume an appreciable amount of the PSC discussion time, decreasing the-effectiveness of.the PSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Event Reports (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector noted that supplemental reports for several licensee event reports (LERs) were overdue. The LERs and the original supplemental l
report expected submittal dates are listed below:
LER Expected Submission Date
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313/8501 08/01/85 l
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313/8601 01/07/87 368/8415 08/31/84~
368/8418 11/15/84 368/8422 05/15/85 368/8502 08/30/85 368/8507 09/16/85-368/8603 08/01/86
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368/8612 01/30/87-368/8614 01/30/87 Failure to submit a supplemental report by the expected date is not a
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violation, but the licensee was requested.to submit the report supplements l
within a reasonable time period to facilitate closure of--the associated l
l LERs.
I 9.
Exit Interview
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The NRC inspectors met with Mr.'E. C. Ewing, Acting Executive Director, Site Nuclear Operations and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of the inspection. At this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.
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