IR 05000302/1988029

Insp Rept 50-302/88-29 on 880916-1021.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts,Facility Mods & Review of Plant Review Committee

ML20196E225
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/21/1988
From:	Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196E200	List: IR 05000302/1988029 ML20196E195 ML20196E204
References
TASK-2.E.3.1, TASK-TM 50-302-88-29, NUDOCS 8812090296
Download: ML20196E225 (18)

Text

_ _ - _ _ __

jr* "Ng4 g* ' '

UNITED STATES 3, ,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11

!

o, f g* MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323

.....

Report No: 50-302/88-29 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 ,

Docket No: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 ,

Inspection Conducted: September 16 - Detober 21, 1988 Inspectors: h $- aio W H llflT$

P. Holmes-Ray?Se~iorRespentInspector Date Signed

"h>6. swh is aht/W Date Si .ed J. Tedr , eside t Ins ctor Approved by: / . .A // / 8[

R.friefjal, Sect (onChief

-

(Tate Signed

-

Division of Reactr,r Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine insrection was conducted by two resident inspectors in d.e areas of pl ant operations, security, radiologic:A controls,

! Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility

, modifications, review of Plant Review Committee activities, review of containment temperature history, nenroutine event followup, review of TMI Task Action Plan Item, and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility opera-ti on t. observe Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshifts.

4 ,

Results

Three violations wera identified: Failure to have an adequate j maintenance procedure, paragraph 2.b.(9); Failure to have two ,

operable battery chargers, paragraph 3.b.(1); Failure to properly

'

implement a plant procedure, paragraph In addition, two licensee-identified violations (LIVs) were reviewed, and are discussed in paragraphs 3.b.(2) and 3.b.(3).

i O O -

__J

- . _ ___

'

.

'

.

.

.

.

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• F. Bailey, Superintendent, Nuclear Projects  ;

"P. Bassa, Nuclear Security Specialist ,

• C. Callahan, Senior Nuclear Quality Assurance Specialist *

• J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support

• B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• A. Kazemfar, Supervisor, Radiological Support Services W. Marshall, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations

• P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

• L. Moffatt, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety i

• Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance i

• E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical / Instrumentation and Control Engineering Services

"R. Wide 11, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support

" Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist

• K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing W. Worley, Supervisor, Nuclear Chemistry Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.

. * Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the -

last paragrap . Review of Plant Operatior.s (71107)  !

t

'

'

The plant began this inspection period in power operation (Mode 1). On October 9 a plant shutdosn was commencea for a planned maintenance outage !

and the plant was taken to hot standby (Mode 3) at 5:28 On y

'

October 10, the plant reached hrt shutdown (Mode 4) at 11:30 a.m.,

followed by cold shutdown (Mode 5) at 11:03 p.m. The plant remained in Mode 5 for the remainder of this inspection period, Shift Logs and Facility Records (71707)

The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedure The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Outage Shift Manager's Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Equipment Out of Service Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily

,

. .

t

'

r . 2 Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Log In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagout No violations or deviations were identifie Facility Tours and Observations (71707)

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to observe operations and mairstenance activities in progres Some operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during backshif ts. Also, during this inspection reriod, licensee meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management activitie The facility tour sd observations encompassed tFe following areas:

security perimett - ,ence, control room, emergency diesel generator room, auxiliary b, elding, intermediate building, reactor building, battery rooms, anit electrical switchgear room During these tours, the following observations were made:

.

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation -

The following instrumentation and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operatirg parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameter No violations or deviations were identifie (2) Safety Systems Walkdown (71710) - The inspector conducted a walkdown of the Core Flood (CF) system to verify that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system operability and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions This walkdown also included portions of safety system piping that are located inside the reactor building for the Emergency Feedwater (EF), Reactor Building Spray (BS), Decay Heat Removal (DH), and Makeup and Purification (MU) system No violations or deviations were identifie (3) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control room operations were being conducted in an orderly.a.nd J

.

'

.

,

'

.

professional manne In addition, the inspector observed shif t turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant infor-mation during these turnover No violations or deviations were identifie (4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether <

safety and/or fire hazards existe No violations or deviations were identifie (5) Radiological Protection Program (71707) - Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirement These observations included:

-

Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

-

Area postings and controls;

-

Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and contaminated areas;

-

Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and

-

Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipmen Area costings were independently verified for accuracy by the inspector. The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Werk Permits (RWDs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the controls were adequat The inspector noticed improvement in the access to several plant areas. The licensee's decontamination ef forts hue signift-cantly increased personnel access to the spent fuel floor and the miscellaneous waste evaporator roo The significant reduction in the size of contaminated areas throughout the plant has a positive effect on plant operation as well as reducing exposure and potential contamination of personne No violations or deviations were identifie (6) Security Control (71707) -

In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital area access controls; w ]

s

+ .

,

• *

,

ll ,

'

~4 searching of- personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance and. retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory post In addition, the inspector observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with operations and maintenanc No violations or deviations were identifie (7) Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staf fing and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operabl No violations or deviations were identifie (8) Surveillance (61726) -

Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approvad procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;

-

and TS requirements were followe The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

- SP-146, EFIC Monthly Functioaal Test;

- SP-157A, Meteorological System Surveillance (Daily);

- SP-181, Containment Air Lock Test (Semiannual);

- SP-317, RC Systcc Wator Inventory Balance;

- SP-341, Monthly Containment Integrity Check;

- SP-422, RC System Heatur and Cooldown Surveillance;

!

- SP-972, Station Batteries Inspection and Battery

- Charger Load Test; and

- SP-523, Station Batteries Service Test.

! No violations or deviations were identifie (9) Maintenance Activities (62703) -

The inspector' t observed maintenance activitier to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as required; and TS requirements were being followe Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the i following maintenance activities:

-w.

,

I l

.

ri

!

,

, i

. .

. 5

..

-

Troubleshoot bypassed alarm for Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) Channel "C" in accordance with procedure MP-531, Troublesnooting Plant Equipment;

-

Troubleshoot ground on non-nuclear instrumentation system in accordance with procedure MP-531;

-

Replace.r ain valve DCV-181 in accordance with procedures MP-l';. W.1ve Packirig Procedure . and Specifications, and MP- H yelve Packing Specifications;

-

Presentivt, maintenance to check alignment on the "B" Makeup Pump (ho -1B) in accordance with procedure MP-126, Make';p Pump Maintenance;

-

Hydrostatic test of feedwater check valve FWV-44 in accordance with procedure MP-137, System Hydrostatic 9 Pressure Testing;

- Installation of new seal ring in emergency feedwater check i valve EFV-18 in accordance with procedure MP-120, Main-tenance of Pressure Seal Gate Globe and Swing Check Valves; and

' - Replace hotleg Resistance Temperature Detector (RTO)

(RC-4A-TE3/4) in accordance with procedures MP-101, Installation of Reactor Coolant Thermowells; MP-101A, T-Hot

RTD Confidence Checks; SP-110, Reactor Protective System

. Functional Testing; and SP-112 Calibration of the Reactor

! Protection Syste l During the review of the work package associated with the i replacement of the hotleg RTO, the inspector discovered that the j RTO's thermowell had also been replace The thermowel' is

placed into a fitting (boss) on the RCS piping and is held in

place by a retaining nut. A Flexatalic gasket is used between j the thermowell and boss, which serves as the RCS pressure

boundry.

i The work request for this job (WR#105494) was reviewed to I determine the post maintenance testing required for the

! thermowell replacer,ent, the WR riferenced four orocedures to be

,

used while parferuing this work. Mr.intenance procedure MP-101 l was applicable for the replacement of the thermowell, and i section 8 of tnis procedure specified the required post main-tenance testin Although this procedure addressed the electrical testing associated with a RTO replacement, no system leakage test was specified fur the replaced thermowell. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI requires a system leakage test be performed for a reassembled mechanical join The inspector discussed this apparent discrepancy with licensee personnel to determine if the required testing was specified in another procedure or documen Licensee personnel were unable to produce documentation requiring a system leakage tes . .

.

"

.

~

!

The post maintenance testing specified by procedure MP-101 is deemed to be deficient, and consequently this procedure is considered to be inadequat Failure to have an adequate procedure for the performance of maintenance is contrary to TS , 6.8.1.a and is considered to be a violatio !

, Violation (302/88-29-01): Failure to have an adequate post

maintenance procedure for the replacement of a hotleg RT i (10) Radioactive Waste Controls (71707) - Solid waste compacting hnd selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to v' '

,':-

that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate rutea u approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.

No violations or deviations were identifie ;

.

l Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations l Reports (71707)

t Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic

impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions

appeared appropriate. Events that were reported im.iediately were revi;;eed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfie * LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.

I (1) (Closed) LER 87-11: This LER reported a reactc 7 trip, which j occurred as a result of a failure of a reactor coolant pump ,

i power monitor. As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/

j 88-01, the licansee was evaluating the testing performed on a ,

turbir,e trip lockout relay. This evaluation concluded that the

< refueling interval testing and the testing of these relays ;

i during plant startup are satisfactor l (2) (Closed) LER 88-01: This LER reported two actuations of the '

L energency feedwa *.o r system, as ini ti s *ily discussed in NRC Inspection Repore 50-302/88-01. The following corrective l actions have been completed:  ;

- Preventive maintenance procedures have been developed for ,

'

the integrated control system;

- An Operational Study Book entry was made to alert operators;

- Procedure SP-102, Control Rod Drop Time Tests, has been revised (revision 18. dated July 15, 1988) to require the ;

turbine bypass valves be placed in manual and to include a caution note; and  !

-

The main feedwater control valves have been added to the l plant's non-safety related equipment reliability progra !

.

l

.

(3) (Closed) LER 87-07: This LER reported an apparent design discrepancy ir. the Engineered Safeguards (ES) 480 volt degraded voltsge protection relay This LER was left open in NRC Inspection P.eport 50-302/87-16. The licensee has installed modification MAR 87-02-01-01, 480 volt ES Bus Undervoltage Initiation ', ES 4160 volt SLURS, which will strip loads off the 480 volt ES busses when a degraded voltage condition is sense This LER also concerned the load distributions on the ES busse This matter wcs readdressed in LER 87-19 and was the subject of a violation in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-41 (Violation 87-41-01). Further action concerning the load distributions is being tracked by the violatio (4) (0 pen) LER 88-16: This LER reported the failure to cons' der High Energy Line dreak (HELB) analysis during the plant modification process. This matter was also discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/88-26 and in correspondence to the NRC dated September 27, 198 Since the licensee's corrective actions for this situation are ongoing, this LER will remain ope (5) (Closed) LER 87-20: This LER reported the failure to meet the seawater cooling temperature commitment as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This matter is also the subject of Deviation 302/88-14-01 which is discussed in paragraph 9.b of this repor Further action associated with this event will be tracked by the deviatio (6) (0 pen) LER 88-17: This LER reported the failure to perform post maintenance testing for containment isolation check valves FWV-43 and FWV-44. The licensee's torrective actions associated with this event will include: a) writ.ing a procedure to test these valves prior to returning th m to service following maintenance, and b) condecting cn evduation to determire if other containment isolation check valves are being properly teste This LER will remain open pending completion of this corrective action, The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to verify the following: TS are ccmplied with, corrective actions as identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are reported as required by T All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforce-ment Polic _ _ ~

.

,

(1) NCOR 88-114 reported the improper alignment of the "B" Station Battery chargers. The "B" battery has two 125 volt D.C. banks (P-PN and PN-N) which together supply emergency power to the "B" train of the 125/250 volt D.C. system. The "B" battery has three battery chargers (DPBC-1B/10/1F) which normally supply the connected D.C. loads and keep the battery banks fully charge Battery charger DPBC-1B normally services bank PN-N and charger DPBC-10 normally serves bank P-PN, Charger DPBC-1F has the capability to supply either bank and is used as a replacement when maintenance is performed on the other charger At approxi.nately 7:40 on September 17, 1988, charger DPBC-1B was removed from service by an equipment clearance (clearance #88-09-71) for surveillance testing and preventive maintenance. Battely charger DPBC-1F was placed in service but aligned so that it was supplying the same bank c, DPBC-10 (bank P-PN). This resulted in bank PN-N having no charger available and subsequent discharge of the battery bank to supply the normal D.C. system load The licensee discovered this situation upon restoration of DPBC-1B to service following completion of the surveillance testing at approximately 3:23 a.m. on September 18, 1988. Battery bank PN-N had been without a charger and in a discharge mode of operation for approximately

-

20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> The licensee has subsequently performed an analysis to determine if the B battery would have been capable of performing its design function after a 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> discharge. The results of this anslysis indicate that the battery could still supply the emergency 0.C. load TS 3.8.2 3 requires that the "B" Station Battery and two 50*4 capacity chargers be operable. Action statement b of this Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires that if one charger is inoperable, then tne charger must be returned to cperable status within two hours or the plant must be shut down to hot sundoy within the next G hours anc; in cold shutdown within its following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Operation outside of the TS LCO, where the appropriate action statement was not satisfied within the timo allotted, is c3nsidered to be a violation of TS 3.8. Although this matter was identified by the licensee, it is not considered to be a licensee identified violation because it does not meet the criteria specified in 10 CFR 2, Appendix Violation (302/88-29-02): Failure to have two operable battery chargers to supply the "B" Station Batter (2) NCOR 88-116 reported that effluent monitor setpoints for a liquid radioactive release were set improperly. This matter was identified by the licensee during a review of the completed

i

.

'

.

'

liquid release documentation. Although the monitor warning and alarm setpoints were set much higher than required, a review of the post release activity recorder showed that required setpoints and release limits would not have been exceeded. The licensee's corrective actions associated with this event will include revising procedure SP-736, Liquid Radwaste Release (Batch Mode) Surveillance Program, to provide a checklist for verification that all major procedural steps have been completed, and to review this event and procedure revision with each technician. This matter is considered to be a licensee identified violation in which appropriate corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence. Accomplishment of the licensee's corrective action will be tracked by an inspector followup ite IFI (302/88-29-03): Review the completion of the licensee's corrective action for an improper radiation monitor setpoint during a liquid releas (3) NCOR 88-121 reported that the high power reacter trip setpoint was not adjusted to <5% as required, but was placed at a higher setpoint when the Reactor protection System (RPS) was placed in shutdown bypas This situation had existed for approximately six hours, and was identified by licensee personnel while the plant was in the hot shutdown (Mode 3) condition. The high power trip setpoint is reduced to <5% during plant cooldown t )

limit any positive reactivity excursions which may occu The licensee attributed the cause of this event to inadequate communication between the shif t supervisor and the instrumen-tation and control technician who reset the trip setpoint to the wrong valu The licensee plans to revise procedure SP-113, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Calibratior., to require the shift supervisor to specify the high power trip setpoint desired. The licensee will also review this event with operations and maintenance personnel and will clarify the depth of detail required of the shift supervisor regarding maintenance activitie This event is considered to be a licenset identified violation in which adequate corrective action was taken to prevont recurrenc Accomplishment of the licensee's corrective action will be tracked by an inspector followup ite IFI (302/88-29-04): Review the licensee's completion of corrective action for placing the RPS in shutdown bypass without resetting the high power reactor trip setpoin m

.

, .

-

.

'

. 10 Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37700)

Insta11ation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary. This review included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progres The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or associated testing observed:

-

MAR 88-07-11-01, Replace FWV-43, and back leakage test performed in accordance with procedure TP#1; and

- MAR 88-06-16-01 Environmental Upgrade of Terminal Box Termination . Review of Plant Review Committee (PRC) Activities (40700)

The inspector attended the plant's onsite safety committee (PRC) meetings to observe committee activities and verify adherence to technical specifications requirement No violations or deviations were identifie . Information of High Temperature Inside Containment /Drywell in PWR and BWR Plants - Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/98(71701)

The information requested concerning the measurement of containment temperatures was obtained from the licensee and forwarded to the NRC Region II Office. TI 2515/98 is close . Norroutine Event Followup (93702)

On October 14, 1998, with the plant in Mode 5, precedure SP-132, Engineered Safeguards (ES) Channel Calibration, was baing performe It was planned to calibrate RCS pressure transmittert RC-3A-PT4 and RC-38-PT3, and procedure SP-132 is written to complete calibration of one instrument string before starting the next. The limits and Precauticns section of this procedure, step 3.5.11, states that only one ES channel RC pressure transmitter string (RC-3A-PT3, RC-3A-PT4, RC-3B-PT3) may be calibrated at any one time. SP-132, steps 4.1.1.1 thru 4.1.1.20 contain the calibration steps for the transmitter In step 4.1.1.6, SP-132 may be exited and SP-135A, B or C, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) Response Time Test, may be performed. SP-132 is then returned to and completed through step 4.1.1.20 for a pressure transmitter. Step 4.1.1.20 returns one to step 4.1.1.1 for calibration of the next channe The technician did not complete the first channel prior to starting the second. The result was the completion of ESAS logic and an inadvertent ES actuatio j

___ - - ____

'

.

.

-

.

. 11 Violation (302/88-29-05): Failure to properly implement procedure SP-132, NUREG 0737 - TMI Task Action Plan Item Review (92701)

The licensee has recently identified a discrepancy concerning TMI Task Action Plan Item II.E.3.1, Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heater During a review of power supply requirements .or pressurizer heaters, the licensee discovered that the FSAR describes two redundant emergency power sources for these heaters. Current plant design has only one emergency power source for the heater This TMI item das initially closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/80-24 and a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) was issued by the NRC on May 5,1980, which included a de;cription of the licensee's actiort on this item. The SER determined that the licensee's action on this item was sufficien However this determination was based on two redundant emergency power sources for the heaters being availabl The licensee has submitted correspondence dated October 21, 1988 concerning this event, and the NRC is reviewing this correspondence. This item will be reopened pending NRC evaluation of the licensee's submitta . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 &

92701) (Closed) IFI 302/88-16-06: Review the licensee's activities to clarify requirements to provide independent verification for equipment clearance The licensee has revised procedure CP-115, In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders (revision 63 dated August 23, 1988) to clarify these requirement The procedure now requires that all valves which are repositioned and are outside of the clearance

' oundary be tagged. This action will ensure that the position of c

valves outside of the clearance boundary will be independently vartfied. Tne orocedure further requires an independent verification of the position of all valves inside of an equipment clearance boundary on restoration, even though the valves may not be tagge Together these requirements should be sufficient to provide for correct equipment configuration during and following restoration from equipment clearances, (0pon) Deviation 302/88-14-01: Failure to meet the seawater cooling temperature commitment as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

In conjunction with LER 87-20 and correspondence to the NRC dated May 9 and June 10, 1988, the licensee is performing the following corrective actions:

.. . . _ -

.

,

, .;

'

. 12

,

-

A thermal analysis yas performed to justify plant operation with higher seawater coaing temperatures. This analysis concluded ;!

that a seawater temperature of 95 degrees Fahrenheit (F) would result in maximum Nuclear Services Closed Cycle . Cooling Water (SW) and Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water (DC) system ;

temperatures of 110 F and 115 F respectively. The licensee has i verified with equipment manufacturers tnat equipment which these l systems serve would operate satisfactory under these conditions; '

!

-

The licensee has submitted a change to the TS (TSCR #158 dated i i August 25,1988) requesting the maximum seawater temperature be increased to 95 F;

-

Tests have been conducted to verify that the service water heat ;

exchangers perform within the thermal analysis (SWHE Performance l Testing, SP 88-003); [

-

The FSAR will be updated by July 29, 1989, to reflect the results of the thermal analysis; and

-

A modification will be performed on the Control Complex Chillers to increase their reliability under increased SW system temperature This modification will be installed by t

-

February 3, 198 l i

During a review of the thermal analysis, the inspector noticed that !

the assumed cooling water alignment for the "A" Makeup Pump (MVP-1A) ;

was not in accordance with the normal system lineup. Pump MVP-1A is normally aligned to receive cooling water from the SW system while the analysis assumed this cooling to be from the DC system. When i this matter was brought to the attention of licensee personnel, the ;

thermal analysis was reanalyzed for the correct cooling alignment for L MVP-1A. Tha reanalysis showed little deviation from the original analysis and the results of the neiginal analysis remained vali ,

The licenst.e plans to submit a change to the TSCR to include these corrections to the thermal analysis t'y November 1,1988. This item will remain open pending revision to the FSAR, completion of the ,

control comple.t f. hiller modification and submission of the correc-tions for the thermsl analysi ,

(c) (Closed) IFl 302/87-34-04: Review the licensee's engineering i evaluation to dttermine if continued use of fuel handling equipment j with a low water pH is degrading the equipmen l The licensee has completed the engineering evaluation and has concluded that all components in contact with the low pH water are ;

Witable for this environmen ;

!

(d) (Closed) IFI 302/87-16-03: Review the licensee's progress to replace !

the toxic gas instrumentation with more reliable instrumentatio l

. . ,

ll

}

.

-

,

The licensee has installed modification MAR 87-07-23-01 to replace the monitors with more responsive and reliable unit (e) (Closed) IFI 302/88-14-03: Review the licensee's revision to procedure SP-3498, Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-2) Monthly Operability Demonstration, to clarify the requirements for main-taining bearing oil level The licensee has revised procedure SP-3498 (revision 5 dated August 23, 1988) to specify the correct bearing oil levels to be maintained during pump operation and shutdow (f) (Closect) IFI 302/88-16-03: Review the revision to procedures SP-375A, Chill Water Pump (IA) Quarterly Operability Demonstration, and SP-3758, Chill Water Pump (IB) Quarterly Operability Demonstra-tion, to take bearing vibration and temperature measurements on the motor bearing closest to the pum Tne licensee has revised procedures SP-375A/B (revisions 3 dated August 16,1988) to take the above measurement (g) (Closed) IFI 302/88-16-04: Review the licensee's activities to develop a procedure for use of flow measuring devices in the Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater (RW) system and periodic ultrasonic testing of RW system pipin The licensee has issued procedure MP-211, Installation of Diamond II Annubar & Eagle Eye Flow Meters, to provide instructions for installing and removing these devices. The procedure also specifies several precautions to prevent future damage to the measuring devices or system piping. The licensee has written a work request to inspect the RW system piping during the next refueling outage to determine if

! repit. cement or re*1 ping is necessar In the interim, the licensee is periodically pr.r'orming ultrasor.ic examinations of this piping every three months to detect increased corrosio (h) (Closed) U.1 resolved Item 302/87-30-01: Review procedure change

practices to assure that change practices a e adequate.

i This item was expanded in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-34 to include problems identified in the improper use of immediate temporary change The licensee has completed the following corrective actions:

-

Procedure AI-400C, Revising Procedures, has been issued and requires that all pages and paragraph numbers which were revised be included in the Procedure Review Record (PRR). This requirement will direct the reviewers to the appropriate changes;

.

i

.

'

W

'

. .

,

s -

.

(?

-

Procedure AI-4000, Origination and Processing of Immediate Temporary Changes (ITC), has been issued to clarify the use and implementation of these types of changes; and

-

A letter has been sent and reviewed by all shift supervisors advising them of proper ITC us (1) (0 pen) IFI 302/86-09-01: Reti:c the licensee's activities to replace the local tachometers on tha emergency diesel generator This item was discussed further in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/

87-04. New tachometers have been received by the licensee and tachometer EG-28-SM on the "A" diesel has been replaced. Subsequent operation with this new tachometer is satisfactory. The licensee has issued WR#103336 to replace EG-29-SM on the "B" emergency diese This item will remain open pending completion of WR#10333 (j) (Closed) Violation 302/88-18-01: Failure to properly evaluate and report excessive temperatures in the emergency feedwater pipin The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the correc-tive actions stated in the FPC response letter dated September 16, 198 (k) - (Closed) Violation 302/88-16-01: Failure to perform a channel calibration of the containment hydrogen analyzer The NRC has accepted the licensee's denial of this violation as stated in the FPC response letter dated August 8, 198 The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective actions stated in this lette (1) (Closed) Violation 302/88-16-02: Failure to adhere to the require-ments of procedure CH-101, Determination of Boron, Mannitol Complex Titration Metho The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective actions stated in +.ho FPC response letter dated August 8, 198 (m) (Closed) Violatien 302/88-16-05: Failure to provide adequate corrective actions to prevent exceeding the maximum release rate for a liquid radwaste releas The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective actions stated in the FPC response letter dated August 8, 198 (n) (Closed) Violation 302/88-01-03: Failure to have seismic monitoring instrumentation with measurement ranges specified by the TS.-

.,

.

. .

.

. 15 The inspector reviewed and verified the implementation of the corrective actions stated in the FPC response letter dated April 7, 198 (o) (Closed) IFI 302/87-34-07: Review the installation of the replace-ment seismic monitor and evaluation of a different desig The licensee has determined that the cause for the frequent failures of this instrumentation was due to the hot environment in which these instruments are located. The licensee has subsequently replaced the accelographs with a high temperature model which should be suitable for this environmen (p) (0 pen) Unresolved Item 302/88-11.-06: Provide information regarding the operability of the incore thermocouple temperature monitoring syste The licensee has verified that other backup systems were available to provide the incore temperature information. The Reactor Coolant Inventory Tracking System (RCITS) provides recorders to continuously indicate and trend 16 incore thermocouple temperatures. In addition, the licensee's Recall System and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) can also provide temperature data. The licensee plans to revise the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to more accurately describe the systems in us This item will remain open pending revision to the FSA . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on October 21, 198 During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and firidings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violation The liceasee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Item Number Description and Reference 50-302/88-29-01 Violatioe - Failure to have an adequate main-tenance p.*o e t:-- for the replacement of a hotleg Ri /88-29-02 Violation - Cailure to have two operable battery chargers to supply the "B" St:stion Battery, 50-302/88-29-03 IFI - Review the completion of the licensee's corrective action for an improper radiation monitor setpoint during a liquid releas ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

>

.

,

. .

'

,

50-302/88-29-04 IFI -

Review the licensee's completion of corrective action for placing the RPS in shutdown bypass without resetting the high power reactor trip setpoin /88-29-05 Violation -

Failure to properly implement procedure SP-13 /88-LIV 10 LIV - Failure to have a proper radiation monitor setpoint for a liquid releas /88-LIV 11 LIV - Failure to reset the high flux reactor trip setpoint prior to placing the RPS in shutdown

'

bypas . Acronyms and Abbreviations ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers BS - Reactor Building Spray CCTV - Closed Circuit Television CF - Core Flood CFR - Code of Federal Regulations DC - Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water 6 DH - Decay Heat Removal EF - Emergency Feedwater EFIC - Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control ES - Engineered Safeguards ESAS - Engineered Safeguards Actuation System F - Fahrenheit FPC - Florida Power Cornoration FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report HELB - High Energy Line Break IFI - Inspector Followup Item ITC - Immediate Temporary Change LCO - L;.?it'ng Condition for Operation LER - Licensee Event Report ,

LIV - Licensee Identified Violation MAR - Modification Approval Record MU - Mikeup and Purification NCOR - Nonconfor.T.ing Operation Report NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission PM - Preventive Maintenance l PRC - Plant Review Committee PRR - Procedure Review Record RC - Reactor Coolant RCA - Radiation Control Area RCITS - Reactor Coolant Inventory Tracking System l RPS - Reactor Protection System RTO - Resistance Temperature Detector

'

.

.

. .

, 17 RW - Decay Heat Seawater RWP - Radiation Work Permit SP - Surveillance Procedure SPDS - Safety Parameter Display System STI - Short Term Instruction SW - Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water TI - Temporary Instruction TS - Tachnical Specification UNR - Unresolved Item VIO - Violation WR - Work Request

.

Y a