IR 05000302/1988020

Insp Rept 50-302/88-20 on 880620-24.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Complex Surveillance Testing & IE Bulletin Followup

ML20154L492
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	09/07/1988
From:	Jape F, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154L472	List: IR 05000302/1988020 ML20154L468
References
50-302-88-20, GL-85-03, GL-85-3, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8809260207
Download: ML20154L492 (13)

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3* k UNITED STATES

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o * REGION ll I 101 MARIETTA ST., N \,,,,j[ ATLANTA, GEORGIA M23

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Report No.: S0-302/88-20 t j Licensee: Florida Power Corporation -

g 3201 34th Street, South l St. Petersburg, FL 33733 l

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Docket No.

50-302 License No.: DPR-72 l Facility Nar.,e: Crystal River 3 Inspection Cenducted: June 20-24, 1988 Inspector: (L m\ _

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, ,ingen

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Date Signed

! Approved by: M(/AL '

b 7hAf F. Jape, Section Chief V Date Sigr.ed  !

l Test Program Section l j Engineering Branch  ;

l Division of Reactor Safety I I

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j SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of l Complex Surn111ance Testing and IE Bulletin followup.

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Results

In Paragraph 2, a weakness was identified in the Main Steam Safety l

Valve setpoint test program involving failure to identify and record  !

l the as-found setpoint when performing the periodic testing, In I

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Paragraph 3, weaknesses were identified in the licensee's IE Bulletin f 85-03 program that involved a deficient procedure resulting in valve  !

discrepancies and failure to i:nplement the Bulletin 85-03 program j

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for other safety-related motor operated valve Strengths were [

! identified in the licensee's Bulletin 85-03 program that involved F c. agnostic testing on Bulletin valves subsequent to specific  ;

maintenance actions and the plans to perform diagnostic testing  :

during the next three refueling outages on all Bulletin valves  !

regardless of whether or not maintenance was performed to trend and  !

j] verify valve operabilit l

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8809260207 900910 l POR ADOCK 05000302  !

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REPORT DETAILS f Perc>ns Contacted -

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Licensee Employees

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• Balliet, Site Nuclear Engineering Services, Electrical / Instrumentation and Control

• Beach, Acting Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services l

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• Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services [

* Collins, Superintendent, Safety and Reliability r

• Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support t

• Floyd, Supervisor, Nuclear Document Control [

• Good, Nuclear Operations Licensing >

l * Holton, Senior Nuclear Results Engineer *

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• Maseda, Supervisor, Nuclear Engir.eer  ;

' McKee. Director Nuclear Plant Operations i

*T. Metcalf, Operations Technical Advisor l

• J. Miele, Site Nuclear Engineering Services Electrical / Instrumentation ;

] and Control  :

l *R. Murgatroyd, Superintendent, Nuclear Maintenance  !

l *V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance and Outage t

• W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance l l *R. Shires, Nuclear Project Engineer, Corporate .

j *S. Sullens, Senior Supervisor, Electrical i j *R. Thompson, Supervisor Site Nuclear Engineering Services  ;

• E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical / Instrumentation and Control  !

i Engineering Services ,

j * Widwell, Director Nuclear Operations Site Support [

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i Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included l

{ craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, technicians, and administra-

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! tive personne :

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NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Tedrow

• Attended exit interview l,

' Complex Surveillance (61701): Main Steam Safety Valve and Pressurizer i Sr.'ety Valve Setpoint Surveillance l

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j The inspector reviewed the results of Refueling Outage Six (RF0 6) Main '

1 Steam ',afety Valve (MSSV) and Pressuri:er Safety Valve (PSV) setpoint l

~! testing. Surveillance Procedure SP-650, ASME Code Safety Valve Test, and l 1 the ?SVs RF0 6 WYLE Laboratories Certification Reports were used as the i i basis for this review. The acceptP.nce criteria for MSSV and PSV setpoint ;

) testing are contained in Crystal River Unit 3 (CR3) Technical Specifi- '

. cations (TSs). Setpressures and tolerances are specified in the TSs and I

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f l Section XI of the 1974 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The licensee is committed to ANSI /ASME PTC 25.3 1966, Safety and Relief Valve Perform-ance Test Code, for testing technique CR3 has two PSVs installed on the top of the pressuri:e There is no loop seal b4 tween the pressuri:er and PSV; therefore, during normal plant ,

operation the PSV seats are exposed to sten CR3 has experiented seat :

leakage problems with the PSVs and as a result, every refueling outage !

both valves are removed and re:; laced with refurbished, setpoint tested i spare valves. During RF0 6 thc NVs were removed, two previously tested >

valves installed, and the remo'.ed valves sent to VYLE laboratories to ['

be leak tested, disassembled, inspected, repaired, setpoint tested, and seat leak checked. The as-fcund setpuint pressure was not tested for at WYLE laboratories and is therefore unknown.

l CR3 has 16 MSSV During RF0 6 all 16 MSSVs were refurbished and l

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l subsequently setpoint teste The valves were refurbished to correct i seat leakage. The as-found setpoint pressures were not tested for and 3 therefore unknown. Subsequent to refurbishment MSSVs were tested in place i with the steam generators at approximately normal operating pressure i utilizing a Dresser 1566-2 Hydroset Unit pressure assist device. In order to pass the acceptance criteria, two ecnsecutive lif ts must occur within ;

the specified toleranc !

The inspector considers that the PSV and MSSV setpoint testing meets the l requirements of Section XI; however, the following findings were noted: t I Following a reactor trip in July 1937, six MSSVs began to leak y ;

the seat. It was suspected that the valves were leaking by tha rat i because they did not properly reseat af ter lif ting in responn .o the :

reactor tri In erhr to correct the seat leakage the MSSVs were !

manually lif ted three to four times in an attempt to reseat the valve Manual lif ting of the valves did not correct the seat '

leakage problem. The next action performed to stop the seat leakage was to lift and reseat the MSSVs utili:ing the hydroset device. This technique had worked in the past because the hydroset lift device aligns the valve disk and seat when reseat,ing and results in seat tightnes The hydroset lift method stopped the seat leakage, but !

five of the six valves that were leaking were found to have setpoints [

that exceeded the 21% TS tolerance range. The setpoint results of l the six valves lifted utilizing the hydroset unit to stop seat i leakage were as follows:

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TS S t- As-Found As-Left Percent As .

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Point (psi) SetPoint SetPoint Found Exceeded No, and Tolerance _

(psi) __(psi) TS Setpoint . l i

MSV-34 1050 1% 1060 1060 +1% I 1060 1060 +1% !

HiV-35 1050 2 1% 1077 10? +2.6% !

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1067 1052 +1.6% -

MSV-36 1050 1% 1040 1055 -1.0% 1 1025 105! -2.4% ;

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MSV-33 1070 2 1% 1035 1075 -3.3% !

I 1035 1070 -3.3%

MSV-41 1070 1% 1030 1072 -3.7% !

1010 1072 -5.6N l MSV-47 1100 1% 1050 1090 -4.5% .

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1055 1090 -4.1%

t These valves were setpoint checked while attempting to stop seat I leakage, not to satisfy Section XI test frequency requirements. The :

inspector questioned the licensee why the setpoints were out of ,

TS tolerance and if the setpoints of the remaining 11 MSSVs were i considered to be suspect. One possible explanation offered by the ;

licensee was that the valves tested were leaking by the seat and this :

has some effect on the setpoint. The inspector agreed that leakage :

of steam by the seat would cause the valve to heatup. The inspector !

questioned the licensee if the setpoints on the five MSSVs that were I adjusted would change afier the leakage past the seats had stopped I and the valves cooled down. The licensee was not immediately able to answer the inspector questions concerning the status of the l MS$V This is identified as Inspector Follow up Item 83-20-01, !

Effect on setpoint when adjustments are performed on leaking MSSV l l

b. Commencing with RF0 7, scheduled for September 1939, MSSVs and PSVs i will be tested in accordance with ANSI /ASME OM-?-1931. Requirement !

for Inservice Testing of Nuclear Power plant Pressure Relief Device !

The procedure for testing safety valves per ANSI /ASME CM-1-1981 is <

very specific where past code requirements have been very general in !

natur The inspector discussed some of the changes concerning j safety valve testing that ANSI /ASME CM-1-1931 will require: ;

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(1) ANSI /ASME CM-1-1981 requires that no maintenance, adjustments, disassembly or other activity which could effect as-found set-pressure or seat tightness data be permitted prior to testin CR3 Surveillance Procedure SP-650 is used to setpoint test !

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MSSVs. This procedure performs a preliminary valve lift without

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recording lift setpressure. The pro,cedure states that the first

lif t of the safety valve is not consider 7d a factual response i

and is only intended to clear the seat and correct any vertical l misalignment iaside the valve. This information was obtained

{ from Dresser training information. The inspector considers that ,

this practice could effect the as-found setpressure and will j 4 not be allowed per ANSI /ASME OM-1-193 .

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]' (2) Per ANSI /ASME OM-1-1981, valves that are removed and replaced with spare valves have to be tested within a specified time

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period following removal of the valv The time period is 1 dependent on whether a partial or full valve replacement was

performed, j (3) Review of the WYLE Laboratory PSVs test results indicate that ,

l bonnet temperature was approximately 178'F when setpoint testing i the valves. Per the licensee, PSV ambient temperature while the i unit is in normal operation is approximately 210'F. ANSI /ASME l CM-1-1931 requires that the ambient temperature of the operating ,

): environment shall be simulated during the setpressure test t unless a correlation between the test temperature and ambient .

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temperature on the safety valves can be establishe I

{ This is not a full list of ANSI /ASME OM-1-1981 requirements, only some of '

the major differences the licensee will encounter during RF0 7 MSSVs and j PSVs Testin [

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) No violations or deviations were identifie !

] i l 3. IE Bulletin S5-03 Followup (25573)  !

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i l (0 pen) 50-302/S5-BU-03, T2515/73, "Motor Operated Valve Common Mode *

Failures During Plant Transients due to Improper Switch Settings." The i

purpose of this bulletin is to require licensees to develop and implement a program to ensure that switch settings for High Pressure Coolant

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Injection and Evergency Feed ater System Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) :

1 subject to testing for operational readiness in accordance with 10 CFR l

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50.55a(g) are properly set, selected and maintaine Action Item a ,

required a review of the design basis for the operation of each valv !

Action Item b requires that correct switch settings be established. Item c '

, requires differential pressure testing or alternste methods to demonstrate -

eperability with the settings from Item b; Item d requires plant ,

I procedures to be provided to assure the maintenance of correct switch I settings throughout plant lif Florida Power Corporation, letter cated i Februa ry 17, 1933, provided the CR3 final response to Bulletin S5-0 '

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In order to evaluate the CR3 Bulletin 85-03 program the inspector held c discussions with the appropriate licensee personnel and reviewed the ;

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Procedure TP-15, MOVATS "As-Left" Data Acquisition MOV-27 i

i Procedure SP-370, Quarterly Cycling of Valves  !

l Maintenance Histories for Valves EFV-0014, ASV-005, ASV-2024, and EFV-0211 p i Florida Power Corporation Final Bulletin 85-03 Response for CR3 i

! contained in letter dated February 17, 1988 [,

l l Proceduro MP-402, Maintenance of "Limitorque" Valve Controls and l 1 As-found and As-Lef t Torque Switch Settings and Corresponding Thrust -

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i i f, Operation of Valves at Degraded Voltages 7 l

I The CR3 Bulletin 85-03 program identified 17 valve, eight of which ;

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are DC motor driven and the remaining seven are AC motor driven. All l

, valve operators are Linitorque SMB models that operate gate, globe j and stop check valves ranging in sizes from 2b" to 6". In order to accomplish bulletin valve diagnostic testing, Florida Power i Corporation contracted MOVATS Incorporate For future diagnostic '

testing the licensee is developing a program to qualify its own !

i personnel to perform diagnostic testing utilizing MOVATS test i

equfpren The 17 bulletin valves are divided into eight separate groups. All

, valves in each group are the same sixe, manufacturer, type, and j operate in identical pressure ranges forefilling identical function ,

j With the exception of one of the eight groups of valves, the licensee F l of fferential pressure tested one valve in each group prior to any !

repairs or switch adjustments in order to determine the as-found l

{ condition. During the dif ferential pressure testing actual system o

, flow was simulated, and design pressure was also simulated when possible. In the cases where design pressures could not be fully ,

achieved thrust values were extrapolated. During the differential !

pressure testing MOVATS test equipment was installed to establish the '

as-found opening and closing thrusts, limit switch trip points, motor !

j current and inadvertent back seatin The main cbjective of the !

differential pressure testing was to determine as-found opening and I a closing thrust values at the end of an operating cycle prior to i 1 performing maintenance on the valves, and to verify valve operability .

prior to maintenance and alteration of switch value During l differential pressure testing all valves successfully operated as ;

required. In order to determine bulletin valve design thrust values, ;

the licensee obtained thrust values from the valve vendor and from ,

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the MOVATS data bank except that the MOVATS data bank did not have !

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thrust values for valves MUV-058 and MUV-073. These thrust values !

I were compared to the thrust values obtained during the dif ferential i j pressure testing of the licensee bulletin valves. The final thrust !

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values that would be used for CR3 bullet n valves were based on the i

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thrust values that were obtained ouring differential pressure testing. In some instances the MOVATS thrust values exceeded the

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l thrust values obtained while differential pressure testing; however, ,

the final thrust value for the vahes was based on the licensee i i differential pressure testing result Comparison between MOVATS t l provided thrust values, differential pressure testing thrusts values, ;

and as-left thrust values are as follows:  !

I Minimum Diff Pressure As t. eft Thrust MOVATS Thrust Thrust Torque Switch Valve (1bs) (1bs) Setting (1bs) ,

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I ASV-5,204* (

1 Opening S501 4015 S100 l Closing 6783 Not Applicable 7520/7800 j

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EFV 11,14* [

! Opening 11896 11818 17900/18S30 1 Closing 20104 14440 17850/17560 !

j EFV-32,33*  !

Opening 10S84 5923 20530/21200 !

t Closing 19429 13216 21200/20600 i i

i MSV-55*,56 1 Opening Not Available 23363 17200/17S00 (Note 1) i j Closing Not Available Not Applicable 15400/15S60 l I MUV-23,24,25,*26 (

l Opening 11282 6118 13120-14560 ;

Closing 11186 2791 23500-13900 l

MUV-27' i

. Opening 4609 2!45 6700 ;

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Closing 3418 2695 6700 l s

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MUV-53,257*  !

l Opening Not Available 7377 13600/13660 (

Closing Not Available SS18 13240/13490 !

I MUV-58,73 j Oper.ing 463 Not Performed 7200/6S00 Closing 303 Not Performed 6S60/7100

1 * Denotes which valve in Group that was differential pressure tested j Note 1 - During DP test, valves were over*.hrusting into seat which ,

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Valves MUV-58 and MUV-73 were not in the MOVATS data base, nor were these [

valves differential pressure tested by the license In an accident l

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condition these valves would be required to operate under a 20 psi ;

Based on calculations the valves would require less than 1000 pounds of thrust to seat and unseat. The licensee considered that a dif ferential ;

j pressure test would have been meaningless because the spring pack preload :

I was in excess of 1000 pounds and therefore would not be visible on the !'

l MOVATS signature. The as-left torque switch settings for the valves were 1 approximately 13,000 pounds thrust which is significantly greater than the ;

l 1000 pound calculated thrust valv l 1 l

] Seven valves were differential pressure tested and ten were stroke tested l l

utilizing MOVATS test equipment with the systems depressuriced in order !

to determine the as-found condition. During the testing and suhsequent !

maintenance, all valves were determined to be operable; however, the l l following deficiencies were found: (The percentage number following the j 1 deficiency indicates the percentage of the 17 bulletin valves where the !

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j deficiency was observed.)

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?4 of Bulletin Valves .

Deficiency Where Observed j f

) Spring pack relaxation after closing 24*4 l Torque switch unbalanced 47'4 i Spring pack gap (greater than .020") IS*4 j Spring pack deformation 12*4 I

! Inadequate limit switch grease 29*4 l

! Declutch problems 24'4 l i Faulty torque switch 6'. l j Hydraulic locking 35's ;

1 Actuator body grease inadequate 24'4 !

l Actuator gear problems 12*. I Loose stem nut lotAnut 6'i [

Damaged motor lead wires 35*4 l

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Wire labeling incorrect I S*.

Torque switch set incorrect 12*.

Valve backseating 12*4 i Inadequate torque bypass 6'4 I Additional Bulletin valve deficiencies not addressed in the above list

were:

1 i l (1) A failed worn gear and two internal stellite bearings were found to l

< be absent in the actuator of MJV-53 (Valve was operational with i thtse deficiencies).  !

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(2) Valves MUV-55 and MUV-56 were found to be overthrusting into the l sea !

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l l Misalignment of the valve stem on MUV-53, resulting from the absence of !

l the stellite bearings, cau ed abnormal high loads on the worm gear which l

resulted in fatigue cracks and subsequent worm failure. In the past, the ,

J licensee had performed maintenance on the MUV-53 actuator and it is '

Q suspectad that the bearings were removed and not reinstalled at that tim I i

Following the as-found droke testing the appropriate corrective !

maintenance actions were taken, torque switch trip settings adjusted !

l to new values, torque switch bypass modifications made to place limit i i switches on separate rotors, torque switch bypass adjustments made, and j actuator )difications to prevent actuator hydraulic lock m , performe ,

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Following these actions the Bulletin valves were streke testri with MOVATS test equipment while the systems were depressurited to veriff proper valve l

operation and switch settings, e T

One of the major problems found during MOVATS testire of the Bulletin ,

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i valves was hydraulic locking of the Belleville spr W, packs. This is not a new problem fcr CR3, previous modifications were made to solve this l

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J proble Six of the 17 Bulletin valves tested exhibited hydraulic l locking. A new modification was implemented for the Bulletin valves to !

i prevent hydraulic locking from reoccurring. The modification machined two (

t slots,150 degrees apart, at each end of the spring pack thrust limiting l

! sleeve to allow grease to flow through the spring pack assembly and ;

j relieve to the grease reliefs. Hydraulic locking was experienced in eoth !

opening and closing direction; however, it was more prevalent in the open (

l direction. During disassembly of the spring pack on valves that hydraulic ;

J locking occurred, grease was found inside and outside the Belleville !

I washer If hydraulic lock is caused from restriction of grease from (

l outside of the Belleville washers into adjacent areas, the modification l rade to solve the problem will work. If hydraulic lock is caused from i restriction of flow of grease f rom inside the Belleville washers, the l modification will not solve the hydraulic lock problen. For the next ;

three refueling outages Bulletin valves will be stroke tested and ;

monitored for hydraulic lock. If hydraulic lock occurs in the future, one j

of the solutions under study is to place star washers in-between the '

l Belleville washers in order to aid the flow of grease from between the !

j washers. During a walkdown of CR3 bulletin valves the inspector noted a i j previous modification riade to MOVs to solve hydraulic lock problems which i'

, involved installation of tubing from t,he spring pack area to the actuator

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body. Fydraulic lock is still some. hat of a mystery to the iteensee and i j will be conttored for in the future, a In Babcock and Wilcox Report N e ber 32-110233-01 operation of CR3 Bu11eti !

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valves at $% degraded voltage was deurnined to be satisfactor The j

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inspector reviewed the report and verified that AC and DC motor driven i

) actuators provided adequate thrust at degraded voltages, i i I I '

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t Inspector Findings: }

Procedure MP-402 has been the maintenance proceduce utilized by '

OR3 over the years to perform maintenance on Limitcraue operator The licensee is in the process of rewriting this procedure and until f the rewrite is complete if a Limitorque operator requires maintenance ,

a special . procedure is written to accomplish the maintenance. Many J of CR3 Bulletin valve deficiencies can be attributed to deficiencies ;

with MP-402. The following examples illustrate this finding: l

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(1) Forty-seven percent of the actuator torque switches were not l balanced. MP-402 did not provide instructions to balance torque i switches or acknowledge that balancing was tequired, f i

(2) Twelve percent of the Bulletin valves were found to be back i seating and six percent of the Bulletins had torque bypass !

switches set incorrectl {

These problems are associated with incorrect limit switch !

adjustment MP-402 provided instructions on what the limit switch setting was required to be but did not give instructions !

on how to set the limit switches. The procedure did not specify j to count handwbeel turns after removing handwheel free play or j to measure stem movement as the method to set limit switches, t In addition, the procedure did not require checking for valve l backseating folic-ing switch adjustmen l (3) Twenty four percent of the actuators had inadequate body greas l MP-402 provided instructions to disassemble and clean actuators ;

but did not mention lubrication requirements during the reassembly of the actuator, ,

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(4) During review of MP-402, the inspector noted shat IE Information [

Notices associated with MOVs were not addressed. For Emaeple IE g Information Notice 86-34 discusses the need to place the valve r in the mid position when installing valve to actuator fastener If the valve is shut when torquing thJse fasteners the torque ,

is transferred to the valve seat via the valve disk and stem, i resulting in loose fasteners when the valve is opene In [

addition to not specifying valve position. MP-402 did not !

specify torque values for valve to actuator fasteners. The ;

Bulletin valves are seismic qualified and a torque value ;

should be specified. Another example of an Inforeation Notice i not incorporated into MP-402 is IE Information Notice S6-2 !

This Infernation Notice discusses the need to ensure that the !

motor pinion gear is not installed in the reverse direction, I and states that installation of the pinion gear in the reverse !

direction is an easy mistake to make and results in actuator j failur :

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Tht inspector discussed the need to incorporate into the revised j edition of MP-402 the discrepancies discovered during perform- l ance of the Bulletin 85-03 program and the need to incorporate  ;

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problems identified by IE Information Notice l i

j TP-15 performed dif ferential pressure MOVATS testing on MUV-27,  !

j In this procedure MUV-27 stroke time was measured using local  !

j positiun indicating light The stroke time was not being i i performed to satisfy Inservice Test requirements, but was being

performed +o provide general dat In some instances measuring .

a valves' stroke time using local indication, light to light,  ;

does not comply with Section XI. The Code requires the time -

interval from initiation of the actuating signal to the end i of the actuating cycle be time In order to determine if I l stroke timing of valves was done by measuring local indication  !

j lights, the irspector reviewed Surveillance Procedure SP-370,  !

Quarterly Cycling of Valves. The purpose of this procedure is  ;

j to measure power operated valves stroke time per Section XI of  ;

a the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Cod Step 7.3 of SP-370 '

J states, "Valve stroke time should be recorded from a remote  !

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I operating station using indicator lights."

questioned control room operators who perform stroke time The inspector

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j testing and observed actual performance of stroke time testing l i for five valves. Despite the instruction in SP-370 to time .

light to light, the practice at CR3 is to time actuation of i g

control switch to closed light indication with a calibrated l

stopwatch, While observing stroke time testing for five valves, [

j the inspector noted that simultaneously with placing the valve c control switch in the closed position the valve position indication lights indicated the intermediate positio For the !

q five valves tested there was no significant difference between i 1 stroke timing using light to licht and switch actuation to ,

ligh The inspector discussed with the licensee the need to  !

change SP-370 to reflect CR3 practice far stroke timing valves and that stroke timing utilizing light to light indication is {

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I acceptable only when switch actuation is instantaneous with

) obtaining valve intermediate indication, and the closed indica-i tion light is instantaneous with eno of valve stroke, The I inspector also noted that SP-370 was not the only procedure t. hat j

] covered stroke timing of valves, j CR3 has identified 17 Bulletin S5-03 valves. As discussed in this repo.'t while performing bulletin action items for these valves, numerous deficiencies were foun The valves were determined te be operable at the time, but without the correc-1 tive maintenance performed subsequent to this special testing

{ future operability of the valves would have been questionable.

{ CR3 has 63 other safety-related MOVs. The inspector questioned i

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! the licensee if the deficiencies discovered in the 17 bulletin [

l valves could exist in the other 63 safety-related valves. The t i licensee has recognized this situation and is developing a t

! program to tske the appropriate corrective action, however no !

) formal program has hen developed or implemented.

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l The licensee has issued Inter Office Correspondence dated i

February 22, 1988 and June 13, 1988, to provide guidelines for l'

j MOVATS testing of bulletin valves subsequent to maintenance.

J The inspector reviewed these guicelines and considers them j acceptable. These guidelines also recognize that MP 402 is

! lacking in technical adequacy for perforr.ing work on MOVs and is f j

not to be used until revised, j i r IEB 85-03, Action item e, j i As requested by Action It.m e. of Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve {

) Commt Mode Failures Duri,g Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch 5 J Settings," the licensee identified the selected safety-related valves, the i valves' maximum dif ferential pressures and the licensee's program to i assure valve operability in their letter dated May 13, 198 Review of j this response indicated the need for additional information which was requested in a Region !! letter dated August 18, 1987, to FPC.

l Review of the licensee's September 17 and 25, 1987, responses to the  !

request for additional information, indicates that the licensee's l j selection of the applicable safety-related valves to be addressed and the t

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valves' maximum dif ferential pressures meets the requirements of the bullet.in and that the program to assure vabe operability requested by Action Item e. of the bulletin is now acceptable.

l With the exceptian of MP-402 the inspector considers that the licensee l 1 program to implement Bulletin 85-03 to be acceptable. ." rior to final

) acceptance of Bulletin 85-03 the following must be completed:

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Revision of MP-402 and subsequent Region !! review of the revision, I

j NRR review of the final response required by Action Item f. of the g

Bulleti On February 17,19SS, the licensee provided this final t j response and this response is presently undergoing review by NR !

l

] Eight of the 17 Bulletin valve actuators are DC motor drive i motor failure in Limitorque MOV actuators with cortinuously energized ,

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shunt fields may be susceptible to surge voltages induced in the '

, short fiel6 winding when energized has been identified as a  !

i occurrence at other utilities. The licensee has been notified of i this prob ~lem and is determining if this is applicable to CR ;

I No violations or deviations were identifie }

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i l Exit Interview I i  ;

I The inspection scope and result > were summarized on June 24, 1988, with {

-l those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas i

! inspected anJ discussed in detat) the inspection result !

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