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Insp Rept 50-302/88-15 on 880607-09.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Observation & Evaluation of Key Emergency & Organizational Functions & Locations During Partial Participation Exercise
	ML20151K294
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/20/1988
From:	Decker T, Sartor W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
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ML20151K292	List: ML20151K285; ML20151K294;
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	50-302-88-15, NUDOCS 8808030158
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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

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ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No.:. 50-302/88-15

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation-

3201 34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR 72

Facility Name: Crystal River 3

Inspection Conducted: June 7-9, 1988

Inspector: - dev 7 0 86

Date Signed

W. M. Sartor, Jr.g

Accompanying Personnel: G. Arthur :

P. Hcimes-Ray

Approved by: b' /d '( - //BS

T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date Signed

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

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Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and

evaluation of. key emergency and organizational functions and locations during

this partial . participation exercise (full participation by risk counties and

~ FEMA evaluated).

Results: Two exercise weaknesses were identified in the areas of properly

. classifying the emergency conditions and providing dose assessment data on a

timely basis. Notwithstanding these findings, the licensee staff demonstrated

that they would be able to satisfactorily respond to an emergency at the

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facility.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

A. Auner, Manager, Nuclear Technical Training

R. Browning, Health Physics Supervisor

S. Chapin, Radiological Emergency Planning Specialist

R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer

D. Harper, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist

B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

S. Johnson, Manager, Site Nuclear Services

L. Kelly, Manager, Nuclear Training

J. Laycock, Radiological Emergency Planning Specialist

G. Longhouser, Security Superintendent

P. McKee, Director Plant Operations ,

L. Moffott, Nuclear Safety Supervisor

S. Powell, Supervisor Quality Systems

V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance and Outages

E. Renfro, Director, Emergency Operations Facility

S. Robinson, Chemistry / Radiological Superintendent

J. Smith, Nuclear License Training Supervisor

K. Spilios, Health Services Representative

J. Stephenson, Supervisor, Radiological Emergency Planning

E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services

R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support

D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager

W. Wilgus, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

D. Worley, Nuclear Chemistry Manager

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included

engineers, operators, security force members, technicians, and office

personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Coninission

P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident inspector

T. Stetka, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Tedrow, Resident Inspector

Attended exit interview

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2. Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that

provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion

of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and

organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E

to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of

NUREG-0654.

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.The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date with

no major problems identified. Minor inconsistencies noted during the

exercise failed to detract significantly from the overall performance of

thc licensee's emergency organization.

- No violations or deviations were identified.

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3. Assignment Of Responsibility (82301)

This ' area was- observed to assure that primary responsibilities for-

emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that

adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to

10CFR-50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E 'to 10 CFR 50, and

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for

the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff

was available to respond to the simulated emergency.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to assure that the following arrangement for

requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made pursuant

to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654, namely:

(1) accomodation of selected State emergency response representatives at

the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility; and

(2) identification of organizations capable of augmenting the planned

response.

Representatives of the State of Florida and designated counties were

accommodated in the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) and

Emergency News Center (ENC). Licensee contact with offsite organizations

was prompt, effective, and consistent with the scope of the exercise.

Assistance resources from State and local agencies were available to the

licensee.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification

and an emergency action level matrix was in use by the nuclear facility

licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to

10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654,

and IE Information Notice 83-28.

The licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures provided for the

standard classification of emergencies using NUREG-0654 as it basis.

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However,- the onsite emergency response organization failed to demonstrate

proficiency in recognizing and classifying emergency conditions as listed

-in the_EAL matrix. Specifically, the exercise controllers prompted the

Site _ Area Emergency declaration when exercise participants failed to

promptly declare a SAE based on greater than 50 mR/hr at the site boundary

for greater than 30 minutes. This failure to fully meet the exercise

objective' of demonstrating an understanding of EALs and proficiency in

recognizing and classifying emergency conditions.in the TSC was noted as

an exercise weakness (Corrective action to this finding will be tracked by

IFI 50-302/88-15-01).

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Notification Methods And Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for

notification of State and local response organizations and emergency

personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup

messages to response organizations were established. This area was

further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the

populace within t% plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to

10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were

established and available for use in providing information regarding the

simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response

organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response

organization. Notification to the State of Florida and designated of fsite

organizations appeared to be made in accordance with procedures with the

following exceptions: (1) the Alert notification to the State Warning

Point was not initiated until 17 minutes after the Alert; (2) the

Emergency Coordinator did not review all notification messages; and

(3) State Notification forms for the Site Area Emergency were not

completoly filled cut (i.e. time and person notified was missing).

Corrective action to these findings will be tracked by IFI

50-302/88-15-02.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt

communications among principal response organizations and emergency

personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to

10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of

NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's

emergency facilities, the licensee and offsite agencies, and the offsite

environmental monitoring teams and the E0F. The inspectors also observed

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information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency

-organization. Emergency communications involving notification of the

State, local agencies and the NRC of all Emergency classifications

discussed above, . appeared adequate and consistent with the Radiological

Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures except as noted above.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and

equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite

consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required

by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.

The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of

plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and

offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise it was

noted by the inspector that timely and correct offsite dose projection

data was not available in the E0F. The licensee also noted in their

critique that dose assessment data was not available on a timely basis.

The NRC inspection identified these observations as a significant concern

that required early corrective action. In a brief meeting held after the

formal exit interview, the licensee committed to an increased dose

assessment training effort followed by a mini drill of the dose assessment

portion of the emergency organization. The licensee also committed to

inform the NRC of the schedule of the drill. This finding was identified

as an exercise weakness and the corrective action will be tracked by

IFI 50-302/88-15-03.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to

determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were

brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective

action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to

10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of

NUREG-0654.

A formal critique was held on June 9,1988, with exercise controllers and

evaluator,, licensee management, and NRC representatives. Findings

identified during the exercise designated for licensee corrective action

were discussed. Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed

during subsequent inspections. The licensee's critique was sufficiently

detailed and appeared to be consistent with regulatory requirements and

guidance cited above. Immediately following the exercise critique a short

meeting was held to discuss the scope of early corrective action needed to

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address -the dose assessment concerns identified in Paragraph 8 of this

report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Federal Evaluation Team Report

The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee

and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Staff) concerning the

activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by 5

separate correspondence.

11. Licensee Action On Previous Enforcement Matters (92701)

(Closed) Violation (50-302/87-36-01): Emergency Plan Implementing

Procedure EM-202 did not implement the Emergency Plan for the emergency

classification of an "all alarms lost" condition; the annotated copy of

EM-202 used during the Alert declaration on October 16, 1987, with the

"all alarms lost" condition was not retained. The inspector reviewed the

revised EM-202 and found it to-implement the Emergency Plan for the "all

alarms lost" condition; personnel interviewed by the inspector were aware

of the need to retain completed copies of emergency procedures.

12. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 9,1988, with

those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas

inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. No

dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided

to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

Item Number Description and Reference

302/88-15-01 IFI - TSC failed to demonstrate

understanding of EAL's and proficiency in

recognizing and classifying emergency

conditions.

302/88-15-02 IFI - Alert notification to State not

initiated in 15 minutes; all notification

messages not received by EC; State forms

lacked time and person notified.

302/88-15-03 IFI - Dose assessment data not available on

a timely basis.

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Attachment:

Exercise Scope, Objectives and

Listing of Events ,

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1988 ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Exercise is twofold: to test the state of

emergency prepa' redness of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3), the Florida

Power Corporation (FPC) Corporate Emergency Response Organization,

and the State and local response organizations; and to meet the

annual Exercise requirement for licensees as. defined in 10CFR50,

Appendix E.

SCOPE

The Exercise will be a "partial participation exercise." The

State's Division of Emergency Management (DEM) and Department of

Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) will participate only to

the degree necessary to test directi6n and control functions. The

State will provide a limited staff in the State's Emergency

Operations Center and at FPC's Emergency Operations Facility. The

response organizations of the risk counties will participate

fully.

The Exercise will simulate events that will initiate a minimum of

three of the four emergency classifications.

, The Exercise will'be conducted in a manner that simulates actual

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emergency conditions as close.'.y as possible, ,

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Throughout the Exercise events may be scheduled such that two or

more drills may be conducted simaltaneously.

Implementation will occur via Message Cards that will be provided

to Exercise participants by Implementors. The Message Cards will

contain information that will require the participants to evaluate

conditions and initiate specific emergency responses. Incorrect

response, or failure to respond within a reasonable time, will be

corrected. The correction will be provided both as on-the-spot

training, and as a method for keeping the Exercise on schedule.

All corrections and prompts will be documented.

The Exercise will be formerly critiqued by participants and

Implementor / Evaluators. The purpose of this critique will be to

evaluate the performance of response organizations, and to

determine the degree to which exercise objectives were met.

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EXERCISE OBJECTIVES

NOTE: The information contained in the brackets ([]) after the

stated objective represents a cross reference to the

Exercise Element Matrix contained in FPC Procedure P.EP-06,

"Schedule for Radiological Emergency Plan Maintenance".

This~ Matrix is cross-referenced to elements listed in

NUREG-0654. ,

OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the understanding of Emergency Action Levels

(EALs) and proficiency in recognizing and classifying

emergency conditions. .

Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation in the Control

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Room, including recognition of ' degrading plant conditions,

evaluation of plant conditions, and recommendation of

specific corrective actions to stabilize the plant.

3. Demonstrate the ability to perform 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months emergency

notifications, as required, to the State o! Florida, local

authorities, and the Nuclear Regulatory Gummission. (E.3,

E.4, F.la, F.ic, J.7)

: 4. Demonstrate'an effective turnover of Emergency Coordinator

responsibilities between the Shif t SupervAsor and the

Director, Nuclear Plant Operations or Man-On-Call. *

ONSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE CRGANIZATION OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ("off hours")

emergency response. (A.le, K.2, N.1h]

2. Demonstrate effective implementation of EM-206, "Emergency

Plan Roster and Notification". [B.5, F.le)

3. Demonstrate site evacuation and provisions to warn all

personnel within the Owner Controlled Area. [J.1)

4. Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation capabilities

in the Technical Support Center (TSC). (B.7a]

5. Demonstrate adequate management and control of onsite

emergency response ca9 abilities.

6. Demonstrate an understanding of EALs and proficiency in

recognizing and classifying emergency conditions in the TSC.

7. Demonstrate an effective transfer of notification

responsibilities from the Emergency Coordinator to the EOF

Director when the Emergency Operations Facility is

activated.

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8. Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Emergency

Repair Team and the plant Fire Brigade.

9. Demonstrate the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring

data and coordination of those results with non-FPC agencies

at the EOF. (H.12)

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10. Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Medical

Emergency Team. [L 2) ,

11. Demonstrate the communications link to offsite medical

facilities (fixed or mobile). [F.2]

12. Demonstrate provisions and/or decision-making capability for

utilization of evacuation routes. (J.2]

CORPORATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ('Off hours")

response. [A.le, N.lb)

2. Demonstrate effective implementation of REP-02, "Activation

and Notification of the Corporate Emergency Response

Organization". [F.le]

3. Demonstrate the capability to dispatch an FPC representative -

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to principal governmental Emergency Operations Centers.

[C.2b) ,

4. Demonstrate the ability to establish command and control

authority, and the ability to maintain continuity of

authority throughout an emergency at CR-3,

5. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain appropriate

communications with State and Federal emergency management

representatives including the recommendation of protective

actions. (B.7b, F.1d]

S. Demonstrate the ability to formulate a recovery /re-entry

plan. (B.7a, H.3]

i RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES

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l 1. Demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring

and assessment in the plant and site environments. [I.7, I.9,

H.7)

2. Demonstrate effective estimation and assessment of a

(simulated) release o.1 airborne radioactivity to the

environment, including formulation of onsite/offsite

radiological dose projections. (I.3a, I.10]

.- 3. Demonstrate the ability to provide the Emergency Coordinator,

the EOF Director, or the Emergency / Recovery Director timely

and sound emergency protective action recommendations. (I.10]

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4. Demonstrate the availability and operability of emergency

supplies and equipment.

CHEMISTRY AND WASTE MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the ability to utilize emergency sampling

procedures and equipment in response to an accident at CR-3

(samples will be simulated)

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ENGINEERING OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the capability of ascertaining the need for, and

requisitioning, parts and components that will be used during

recovery and corrective maintenance of damaged equipment.

2. Demonstrate the ability to use and coordinate engineering

support as outlined in REP-02,

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SECURITY OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate the ability to perform accountability onsite,

within 30 minutes of a site evacuation. (J.5)

2. Demonstrate the capability of providing timely access into

the CR-3 protected area to non-FPC personnel who are part of

the accident response.

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3. Demonstrate the capability of maintaining, site security

throughout an emergency at CR-3, including the capability of

establishing and enforcing access control points.

4. Demonstrate Security escort capabilities.

5. Demonstrate security control during an in plant emergency.

INFORMATION SERVICES OBJECTIVES

1. Demonstrate timely activation of the Emergency News Center.

2. Demonstrate the ability to obtain emergency related

information. (B.7c]

3. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and distribute news

releases in a timely manner. (B.7c]

4. Demonstrate coordination of news release preparation and

release with State and County Public Information Officers.

(B.7c]

5. Demonstrate the ability to conduct news briefings for the

media. (B.7c]

6. Demonstrate the ability to respond to telephone inquiries

concerning an emergency at CR-3 and to direct these inquiries

to the proper source for resolution. (B.7c]

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1988 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE

LISTING OF EVENTS

0440 Initial conditions distributed to control room operators

0450 Control room receives a report of a fire in the Health

Physics Calibration Lab (95* elevation Control Complex). The

fire alarm is sounded and,the Fire Brigade is dispatched.

0500 The Fire Brigade arrives at the scene to discover smoke and

flames in-the area. An individual nearby reports seeing 2-3

people in the vicinity before the fire broke out. The Medical

Emergency Team is notified.

0505 The fire is still in progress, the Shift Supervisor declares

an UNUSUAL EVENT based on a fire >10 minutes in duration.

State and local authorities as well as the NRC are notified.

0510 Fire Team Leader reports that one person has been rescued and

is being attended to by the MET but does not appear to be

seriously injured. The fire is still burning and the Fire

Brigade is uncertain as to how many more people are trapped.

0525 The Fire Team Leader reports that the fire has been

extinguished. A second person has been rescued. The extent

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, of the injuries appear to be first and second degree burns on

chest and legs and smoke inhalation. The,first person

rescued suffered minor smoke inhalation only. An ambulance

is requested and dispatched. Seven Rivers hospital is

notified.

0527 A work crew that evacuated the Auxiliary Building due to the

fire left an improperly installed hoist in place in the waste

gas valve alley on 95' elev. The hoist causes a failure of a

waste gas header line resulting in a small crack and a

release of activity into the Auxiliary Building. The source

of the leak is the Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) and cannot be

isolated.

l 0527 The control room receives an alarm (RM-A3 WARNING) indicating

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increased activity in the Aux. Bldg.

f 0536 The control Room Receives an alarm (RM-A2 WARNING) indicating

' low level release to the environment below Technical

Specifications.

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! 0545 The ambulance arrives onsite and transports both victims to

Seven Rivers Hospital.

0555 The waste gas line fails completely causing a large increase

in release rate. The control room receives an RM-A2 HIGH

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w- alarm.

0559 RM-A2 reaches Technical Specification levels.

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0605 RM-A2 reaches 10 times Tech. Spec. limits, based on this the

Emergency Coordinator declares an ALERT. State, local, and

NRC authorities are notified. TSC activation begins and the

Environmental Survey Team and Dose Assessment Team prepara to

activate.

0625 The TSC is staffed and operational and the release continues

from the WGDT. ,

0630 The Emergency Coordinator receives follow-up information

concerning the accident victims. The first victim is good

condition but is being held for observation (mild smoke

inhalation), the second victim is in critical condition and

is being airlifted to Tampa Burn Center.

0635 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared based on a dose rate of

>50 mr/hr for greater than 30 minutes at the Site Boundary.

State, local, and NRC authorities are notified and the EOF is

activated.

0645 WGDT pressure continues to decrease due to the leak thus

decreasing radioactive release rate through the plant vent

(RM-A2) to the environment.

0654 A Heater Drain Limit Switch shorts causing a reactor trip.

The turbine fails to trip and is tripped locally.

0657 The transient (Reactor Trip) causes a small break reactor

coolant system leak of 30 gpm in the Reactor Building.

0706 The control room receives a Reactor Building Sump alarm.

0715 RM-A2 is at normal levels (< Tech. Spec.) and WGDT pressure is

O psi thus terminating the release to the environment. The

RCS leak in the Reactor Building is now at ~48 gpm.

0720 The Control Room receives an RM-A6 (GAS) WARNING alarm

indicatingincreased activity in the Reactor Building

Atmosphere. The decision is made to initiate plant cooldown

procedures. Preliminary steps are started to prepare for

cooldown (OP-209).

0733 Control Rod Group 1 (safeties) withdrawn, Plant cooldown is

started per (OP-103B)

0736 The Control Room receives an RM-A6 (GAS) HIGH alarm, activity

in the Reactor Building continues to increase.

0737 The RCS leak continues in the Reactor Building. RB Pressure

is at 1 psig, the Reactor Building sump is full, and plant

cooldown rate is 74 degrees per hour.

0801 The crack in the cold leg of the RCS inside the Reactor

Building 'significantly degrades causing a large leak into the

Reactor Building. The Engineered Safeguards System is

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0803 RB pressure is at 28 psig, RB temperature is at 237 degrees,

and the Containment High Range Monitor (RM-G29) reads 40

R/hr. Building spray is initiated and one pump fails due to a

failed Building Spray Valve (BSV-3). The Emergency Repair

Team is dispatched to the Auxiliary Building to investigate.

High RB pressure and operation of the Building Spray System

causes a failure of the penetration seal for the supply line

for RB Spray Ring No. 2 (l'ocated in quadrant 3, 106'elev., 8"

pipe). This causes the elevated RB activity to be released

into the Auxiliary Building.

0806 Control Room receives an RM-A2 HIGH alarm due to penetration

failure. Activity is again released to the environment.

0814 Reactor Building pressure is at 43 psig, RB temperature is at

317 degrees, and the Containment High Radiation Monitor reads

20,000 R/hr and is increasing.

0820 The Containment High Radiation Monitor peaks at 40,000 R/hr.

The release into the Auxiliary Building and the environment

also peaks at this time.

0829 A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared based on the RB conditions

listed above. The following Protective Action Recommendations

are given to.offsite authorities

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IVACUATE 0-5 MILES, 380 DEGREES

EVACUATE 5-10 MILES, SECTORS B,C,&D

SHELTER 5-10 MILES, ALL REMAINING 9ECTORS

0845 The Emergency Coordinator receives an update on the injury

victim. He is in stable but guarded condition at the Tampa

Burn Center.

The wind begins shifting from out of the WSW (230 degrees) to

out of the west (260-270 degrees) prompting a change in

Protective Action Recommendations.

EVACUATE 0-5 MILES, 360 DEGREES

EVACUATE 5-10 MILES, SECTORS B,C,D,E,&F

SHELTER 5-10 MILES, ALL REMAINING SECTORS

0.900 The Environmental Survey Team / Dose Assessment reports

>2 Rem /hr Child Thyroid at 3 miles.

0915 The Emergency Repair Team completes repairs on BSV-3 allowing

operation of the second Building Spray Pump, Reactor Building

pressure decreases at a faster rate. As RB pressure decreases

the release rate decreases.

l 1000 RM-A2 begins trending downward at a faster rate reducing the

environmental release.

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1020 RB pressure is at 7 psi. The penetration seal holds at this

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reduced pressure thus terminating the radioactive release

through the Auxiliary Building.

1030 RM-A2 is at normal levels (< Tech. Spec.) indicating the

release tp tne environment is terminated.

1100 The' plant is stable and recovery efforts begin.

1130 The Exercise is terminated.

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ML20151K294

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