ML20245K042
| ML20245K042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1989 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245K029 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-89-15, NUDOCS 8908180287 | |
| Download: ML20245K042 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1989015
Text
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UNITED STATES
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ll
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 -
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Report No: 50-302/89-15
Licensee: Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
Docket No: 50-302-
License No.: DPR-72
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Facility.Name: Crystal. River 3
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Inspection Conducted: June 3 - July 7, 1989
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InspectorJ:/
%gP. Holmes-RaySeniorResidentInspector
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Date Signed
Q.Gs
(WJ. Tedrow
esi nt In ector-
Date igned
Approved by:
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R. C% enjak, Secj6ffh Chief
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Dat6 Signed
DivMion of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
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Scope:
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.This routine inspection was conducted by two resident-inspectors in the areas of
plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and
Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, followup .of onsite
events, annual emergency drill, and licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours.were conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of
these tours and observations were conducted.on backshifts.
Results:
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Two violations were identified:
Failure to maintain correct battery .ei,
electrolyte level, paragraph 2.b;
Failure to adhere to plant procedures, para-
graphs 2.b(6) and 4.b(2).
A non-cited licensee identified violation is discussed in paragraph 4.b(1).
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. Anna, Supervisor Document Control
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R. Arnold, Nuclear Team Instructor
- J. Brandely, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning
- J. Campbell, Assistant Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
- M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent
- G. Cowles, Senior Nuclear Results Engineer
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- B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- S. Johnson, Manager, Site Nuclear Services
- A. Kazemfar, Supervisor Radiological Support Services
- K. Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance
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- W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- W. Nielsen, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent (Acting)
- J. Roberts, Assistant Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection
Superintendent
- W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
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- F. Sullivan, M 9ager, Plant System Engineer
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- E. Welch, Manager, Procurement Engineer
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- R. Widell, Director Nuclear Operations Site Support
- M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist.
- K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
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Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering,
maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last
paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant began this inspection period in the process of cooling down from
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the hot standby (Mode 3) condition to initiate repairs to the reactor
coolant pump (RCP-1A/1C/10) mechanical seal packages. The plant reached the
cold shutdown (Mode 5) condition at 12:30 A.M. on June 4, 1989.
Following
repairs to the pump seals, a plant heatup was commenced and the hot standby
condition reached at 4:30 A.M. on June 14. On June 16 a reactor startup was
performed and the reactor was taken critical at 11:16 A.M. followed by power
operation (Mode 1) at 12:03 P.M.
At 1:25 P.M. on June 16 a loss of offsite
power occurred which resulted in a reactor trip (see paragraph 6.b of this
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report for details on the reactor trip).
Following an investigation into
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the causes and completion of the corrective actions for the reactor trip,
another plant startup was commenced and the reactor was taken critical at
7:57 P.M. on June 17.
Power operation was resumed at 8:55 P.M. on June 17.
On June 29 the reactor was shutdown to repair an emergency diesel generator
and at 11:42 A.M. the hot standby condition was reached.
At 8:15 P.M. on
June 29 another loss of offsite power occurred due to a fault in switchyard
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breakers (see paragraph 6.c for details on this event).
Following restora-
tion of offsite power, a plant cooldown was commenced on June 30 and the
plant was placed in cold shutdown at 5:22 P.M.
After repairs were completed
to the emergency diesel generator, a reactor startup was commenced and
criticality achieved at 7:22 P.M. on July 6 followed by the resumption of
power operation at 8:15 P.M.
The plant remained in power operation for the
duration of this inspection period.
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a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
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The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Outage Shift Manager's
Log: Startup Manager's Log; Equipment Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief
Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log;
Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and
Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.
In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently
verified clearance order tagouts.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some
operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during
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backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings
were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management
activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator
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room;. auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and,
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electrical switchgear rooms.
During a tour of the battery rooms on June 21, 1989, the inspector
noticed that the electrolyte levels on several battery cells for the
"A" and "B" Station Batteries (DPBA-1A and DPBA-1B) were slightly above
the maximum level marks specified on the cells.
This observation was immediately discussed with the nuclear shift
supervisor who declared the station batteries inoperable and
implemented corrective action to reduce the electrolyte level in the
affected cells to the proper level.
From their initial investigation
into this event, the licensee believes this condition had existed since
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June.16 when a loss of. offsite' power occurred.
During the loss' of
. offsite; power, the station batteries sunplied emergency power to the
vital busses for a brief. period of timc.
This event wn similar to an. event which occurred 'on February 1; 1989
(Licensee Event Report LER 89-04) when- the licensee identified this
same condition on the station batteries ad the fossil Unit 1 and 2
batteries.- The licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence of
- .this situation consisted of revising-surveillance procedures to prevent
overfilling of the battery cells.
The licensee has also'contac.ted the
' battery manufacturer who stated that slightly increased ' electrolyte
levels . above the maximum level mark would not adversely effect the
operation or capabilities of the batteries.
Although a slightly increased electrolyte level in the battery cell
does not apparently adversely affect the capabilities of the station
battery, Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2.3 requires that both
station batteries be operable and specifies in surveillance requirement 4.8.2.3.2.b.3 that 'the electrolyte level of each connected cell be
between the minimum and maximum level indication marks for the' battery.
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to be considered operable.'
Failure to maintain the correct cell
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electrolyte levels in the station batteries rendered both batteries
inoperable and is considered to be a violation of TS 3.8.2.3.
Violation (302/89-15-01):
Failure to maintain 'the correct cell
electrolyte levels in the station batteries which rendered both
batteries inoperable.
The inspectors also observed conditions in the following areas:
-(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation and/or
indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were
in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:
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Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation
monitors;' electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters;-
and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(2) Shift Staffing
The inspector verified that operating. shift staffing was in
accordance with TS requirements and that control room . operations
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were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various
occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational
problems, and other pertinent plant information during these
turnovers.
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A review of the licensee's requalification program .for licensed
operators was performed to ensure that operators who fail to
requalify are removed from licensed duties.
Procedures TDP-203,
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Licensed Operator Requalification Training-Program, and TDP-113,
. Remedial Training Programs, were.-reviewed.
These procedures
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require the training' supervisor t'o verbally notify .the Operations .
Superintendent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> that a licensed operator has failed
to requalify and that the operator be removed from licensed
duti es . ..
.-Following .this _ notification,- the Operations
Superintendent informs the individual and the Nuclear Shift
Supervisor (NSS) who m'akes an' appropriate entry into the NSS. log
book.
The . verbal notification is subsequently followed by. a written
description of required-: remedial training which - specifies -
limitations on' work activities 'which the individual is allowed' to
perform.
These limitations include the removal of the individual
from the performance of licensed duties.
No violations or deviations.were identified.
(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions
Storage of material'and components and cleanliness conditions of
various areas throughout the-facility were observed to determine
whether safety and/or. fire. hazards existed.
During plant tours, degraded cleanliness conditions were observed
in the
"B" Decay Heat Pit and the Sodium Hydroxide Tank Room.
These conditions were discussed with licensee personnel who took
immediate action to clean up the areas.-
No violations or deviations were identified.
(4) Radiological Protection Program
Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify
that these activities were in conformance with the. facility
policies .and procedures, and in compliance with ~ regulatory
requirements. These observations _ included:
Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-off'
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pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;
Area postings and controls;
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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and
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contaminated areas;
Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and,
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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective
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clothing, and respiratory equipment.
Area postings were independently. verified for accuracy by the-
inspector.
The . inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work
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Permits (RWPs) to verify. that the RWP was current and that the
controls were adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(5) Security Centrol
In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a
review of the licensee's physical security program.
The
performance of various shifts of the security force was observed
in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital
area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and
vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors;
patrols; and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector
observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and
secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and
vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization
interface with operations and maintenance.
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During the loss of offsite power event which occurred on June 29,
a security alert was declared.
This event was reviewed by a NRC
Security Specialist and is discussed in more detail in NRC
Inspection Report 50-302/89-16.
(6) Fire Protection
Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed
to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire
alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting
equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
During a review of the Nuclear Operator (NO) logs on June 22, the
inspector verified fire brigade team member qualifications
utilizing the licensee's computerized qualification list dated
June 15.
The inspector noted that one individual, of the four
listed in the N0 log as fire brigade team members during June 18
through June 22, was not listed on the computerized list.
This
finding was discussed with licensee training personnel who
confirmed that the individual's fire brigade qualification had
expired May 31.
Administrative procedure AI-2205, Administration of CR-3 Fire
Brigade Organization, Section 4.3 requires that the fire brigade
team be composed of four qualified fire brigade team members.
Failure to have four qualified fire team members on the plant's
fire brigade is contrary to the requirements of procedure Al-2205
and is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1.f.
Violation (302/89-15-02):
Failure to properly implement plant
procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.
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This violation is similar to a violation cited in NRC Inspection
Report 50-302/88-01
(Violation 302/88-01-01 example C).
Apparently the licensee's corrective action was not sufficient to
prevent recurrence of this nonconformance.
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(7). Radioactive Waste Controls
Selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that
approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release
approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Review of Maintenance (62703) and Surveillance (61726) Activities
Surveillance tests were observed by the inspector to verify that approved
procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests;
tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment
was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
- SP-168, Radiation Monitoring Flow Rate
Instrumentation Calibration;
- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;
- SP-321, Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and
Power Availability Verification;
- SP-417, Refueling Interval Integrated Plant Response
to Engineered Safeguards Actuation;
- SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance;
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and,
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- SP-435, Valve Testing During Cold Shutdown.
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In addition, the inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that
correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire
prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as
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required; and, TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following
maintenance activities:
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Rebuild and static pressure test of reactor coolant pump mechanical
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seals in accordance with procedure MP-166, RC Pump Seal Package
Refurbishment and Testing;
Troubleshooting of Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) level indicators
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DH-7-LI, DH-37-LI in accordance with procedures MP-531, Troubleshooting
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Plant Equipment, SP-111, Valve Lineup Verification for Critical
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Instrumentation, and SP-162, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
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Calibration;
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Troubleshooting and replacement of BWST level switch DH-11-LS in
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accordance with procedure MP-531, PM-231, Calibration of Level Switches
Replacement of BWST level switch DH-19-LS in accordance with
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modification MAR 89-03-11-01 and procedure SP-111;
Replacement of motor for motor operated valve MSV-55 in accordance with
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procedures MP-402C, Maintenance of Limitorque Valve Operators Type
SMB-0 thru SMB-4, SMB-4T, SMB-5, SB-0 thru SB-4, and HBC Units, and
MP-405, Installing Repairing and Terminating Control Power and
Instrumentation Cables;
Troubleshooting of vital bus transfer switch VBXS-1A in accordance with
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procedures MP-531, PM-130, Static Inverters, and post maintenance
testing in accordance with procedure SP-455, Functional Test of Vital
Bus Redundant Transformers and Static Transfer Switches;
Troubleshooting of a failed lockout relay (86B/ESA) for the
"A"
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Engineered Safeguards bus in accordance with procedure MP-531;
Troubleshooting the failure of the
"C" Reactor Building Cooling Fan
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(AHF-1C) to start in accordance with procedure MP-531;
Removal of electrolyte from the
"A"
and
"B" station batteries
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(DPBA-1A/DPBA-1B);
Troubleshooting loss of crankcase vacuum for the "B" Emergency Diesel
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Generator (EDG-1B) in accordance with procedure MP-531; and,
Replace piston, firing pressure test and run in test on EDG-1B in
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accordance with Colt Industries, Fairbank Morse Engine Technical
Manual.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations
Reports (71707)
a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied. LERs
were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.
(1)
(Closed) LER 88-13:
This LER reported that the control room
ventilation (HVAC) control air tubing did not meet seismic
requirements.
This report was previously discussed in NRC
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Inspection Report 50-302/88-18.
The licensee has issued a
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supplement dated February 20, 1989.
The supplemental report
stated that similar problems were identified on the Decay Heat
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Closed Cycle Cooling (DC), Spent Fuel Cooling (SF) and Emergency
Diesel Generator (EDG) ventilation systems.
The licensee has completed modifications to the above systems to;
correct the identified problems. .The temporary modification has
been installed on the EDG room ventilation dampers (MAR
T89-01-20-01) to keep.these dampers open until a modification can
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be completed to seismically support the control air tubing (MAR
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89-01-20-02).
(2)
(0 pen)lLER 88-17:
This LER reported the failure to perform post
maintenance testing for containment isolation check valves FWV-43
and FWV-44.
This report was previously discussed in NRC
Inspection Report 50-302/88-29.
The licensee has written
procedures SP-604, FWV-43, FWV-44 Leak Test, and SP-435, Valve
Testing During Cold Shutdown, to perform this post maintenance
testing but has not completed an evaluation to determine if other
containment isolation check valves are being properly tested..
This LER remains open pending completion of the evaluation. .
(3)
(0 pen) LER 88-19: This LER reported the misalignment of a battery
charger
This report was previously discussed in NRC Inspection
Report 50-302/88-31 and the licensee has issued a ' supplemental
report dated October 31, 1988. The licensee has revised procedure
CP-115. In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders, to
allow only qualified operators to hang clearances and has reviewed
this event with operations personnel.
The labels on the charger
power supply switches have been changed to more clearly. identify
their function. The licensee is presently evaluating the'setpoint.
for an alarm to alert operators when the station battery is
supplying the load.
This LER will remain open pending completion
of the evaluation.
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(4)
(0 pen) LER 88-20: This LER reported that a safety related snubber
was found inoperable. This report was previously discussed in NRC-
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Inspection Report 50-302/88-34. . The licensee. has revised
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procedure MP-120, Maintenance of Pressure Seal Gate Globe 'and
Swing Check Valves, to track the removal and replacement of
interferences.
An analysis has been performed of the affected-
piping which concluded that the piping would maintain its pressure
and structural integrity. in the case of' a seismic- event.
Other
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maintenance procedures will be - reviewed to ' detect similar
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deficiencies.
This LER will remain open pending the review of
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other maintenance procedures for similar deficiencies. .
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(5) .(0 pen) LER 88-22:
This LER reported the inadvertent isolation of
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the Decay Heat Removal -' system.
This event was previously-
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discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/88-34.
Although the
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licensee has revised the necessary operating procedures OP-209,
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Plant Cooldown, OP-202, Plant Heatup, and OP-404, Decay Heat
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Removal System, to reflect the new isolation pressure setpoint for
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. this: system, the' following -~ corrective action -. remains to be
accomplished:
A~ review of the automatic' closure circuitry will be. conducted
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to determine any practical.. methods of reducing instrument
error; and,
An evaluation 'of the need lfor an alarm to alert operators
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that pressure 'is approaching the automatic L . isolation-
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setpoint.
This .LER will remain open pending completion of corrective action..
b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) .to
verify the following:
TS are. complied with, corrective : actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent ' reviews ' have been
accomplished or are being pursued .for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as. required by TS.
All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement
Policy.
(1) NCOR 89-121 reported that a fire service waterivalve (FSV-76) was
found .in the incorrect closed position.
This was a redundant
flow path with no. loss -of normal system Lfunction._ The licensee
identified this situation during the performance of- a monthly;
surveillance procedureL(SP-367. Fire Service Valve Alignment and
Operability ' Check) which checks the f position of these valves.
The licensee took immediate actionato return the valve to the
correct open position. This matter is considered to be a licensee
identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV)..
NCV (302/89-15-03): ~ Failure to maintain a fire service water
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valve in the correct position as required by procedure SP-367.
(2)' NCOR 89-140 reported excessive reactor cool' ant pump seal leakage.
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On June 11, 1989' during a fill and vent of the. reactor. coolant .
system,' the licensee identified that the seal' leakage associated
with reactor coolant pump RCP-1C was approximately 1.25 gallons
per minute.
No seal leakage should be evident.
Upon discovering
this condition, the licensee suspended the plant startup and
investigated the cause for this . situation.
From. post seal
installation job critiques, the. licensee discovered that the
maintenance procedure (MP-165, RC Pump Seal Cartridge Removal and-
Replacement) for performance of the reactor coolant' pump seal
package installation was not' adhered to. Although step 7.2.24 of
procedure MP-165,_ which requires that the adjusting cap for the
seal be positioned against the pump half coupling, had been signed
off as completed on June 10, the licensee's inspection revealed
that this step had in actuality not been performed..
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Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure MP-165 is
contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be
a violation.
This violation is considered to be another example
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of the violat 4n discussed in paragraph 2.b(6) of this report.
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Although this riatter was identified by the licensee, it is being
cited as a violation due to the self-disclosing nature of the
event.
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5.
Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37828)
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Installation .of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the
changes were reviewed and approved in'accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the
changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved
procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria
or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate
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drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary.
This review
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included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
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The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or
associated testing observed:
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MAR 89-01-19-01, Evaluation and Modification to Miscellaneous Safety
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Related Air Handling Systems;
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MAR T89-01-20-01, Temporary Modification to EDG AH System;
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MAR 88-06-17-01, Modification to AHF-17, 18 and 19 A and B Fan Dampers,
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and test procedures TP-1 and TP-2;
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MAR 87-07-23-03, Control Complex Ventilation Damper Upgrade, and test
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procedure TP-1B;
MAR 88-07-06-01, Gag CHV-56, 57, 58 and 59 in Position, and test
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procedure TP-1A; and,
MAR 89-01-26-02, EDG HVAC Modifications.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup of Onsite Events (93702)
a.
At 11:25 A.M. on June 6 the licensee declared an Unusual Event when a
tornado was sited near the plant.
No plant damage resulted from this
event and the . ;sual Event was exited at 11:45 A.M.
b.
At 1:25 P.M. on June 16 a reactor trip from approximately 12% power
occurred.
This trip occurred from a loss of offsite power supplied to
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the Unit 3 startup transformer.
The loss of offsite power event and
reactor trip will be discussed in more detail in a separate report (NRC
Inspection Report 50-302/89-17). At 1:30 P.M. the licensee implemented
the enurgency plan and declared an Alert due to a sustained loss of
offsite power (15 minutes).
Upon restoration of offsite power, the
emergency plan was exited at 5:35 P.M.
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c.
At 3:15 A.M. on June 29 an Unusual Event was declared when a plant
shutdown required by the TS was commenced to affect repairs to the "B"
At 8:15 P.M., with the plant in the hot
standby condition, another loss of offsite power occurred. This event
occurred during a lightning strike which resulted in a fault in the 230
KV switch yard which isolated the Unit 3 startup transformer.
Plant equipment operated as designed and at approximately 8:25 P.M. the
alternate source of offsite power was utilized to provide power to the
"B" Engineered Safeguards busses.
At 9:37 P.M. offsite power was
restored to the Unit 3 startup transformer and by 10:07 P.M. all plant
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loads were being supplied of f this transformer. The inspector arrived
in the control room shortly after the event be0an and verified stable
plant conditions and proper implementation of 'he licensee's emergency
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plan and compliance with the TS.
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7.
Annual Emergency Drill
On June 21, 1989, the annual emergency drill was conducted by the licensee
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to verify the effectiveness of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and
implementing procedures.
In addition to the licensee, the participants in
the drill included the State of Florida, Citrus and Levy Counties, and the
NRC.
The drill was observed by a number of personnel, including the NRC.
Details of tne drill, including the results of the critiques held on June
25, 1989 are discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-12.
8.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 & 92701)
a.
(Closed) Violation 302/89-01-01, Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1
requiring containment isolation valves be operable.
The inspector reviewed and verii-led implementation of the corrective
actions stated in FPC response letter dated March 14, 1989.
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b.
(Closed) Violation 302/89-01-02, Failure to assure that conditions
adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
The inspector reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective
actions stated in FPC response letter dated May 10, 1989,
c.
(Closed) Violation 302/89-01-03, Failure to adhere to the requirements
of procedure OP-202.
The inspector reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective
actions stated in FPC response letter dated May 10, 1989.
d.
(Closed) IFI 302/88-31-03:
Review the licensee's completion of
em0rgency feedwater check valve (FWV-43/44) modifications and
completion of procedure changes to incorporate spectacle flanges.
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The licensee has completed modifications MAR 88-07-11-01/02 to install
the new type of check valves and has revised procedure OP-605,
Feedwater System. Valve Checklist I to incorporate the spectacle
.
Although the licensee has not 'yet completely closed the
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modification packages, the inspector considers the majority of the
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modification process complete and this matter is considered closed.
. . .
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at
the conclusion of the inspection on July 7, 1989. During this meeting, the
inspector sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are
detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violations.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number
Description and Reference
..
50-302/89-15-01
Violation - Failure to maintain the correct cell
electrolyte levels in the station batteries which
rendered both batteries inoperable.
50-302/89-15-02
Violation - Failure to properly
implement plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.
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50-302/89-15-03
NCV - Failure to maintain a fire service
water valve in the correct position as required by
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procedure SP-367.
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10. Acronyms and Abbreviations
BW;T - Borated Water Storage Tank
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CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
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CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations
- Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling
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HVAC - Control Room Ventilation
LER
- Licensee Event Report
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- Modification Approval Record
NCOR - Nonconforming Operation Report
- Non-Cited Violation
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NO
- Nuclear Operator
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NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Nuclear Shift Supervisor
- Preventive Maintenance
- Radiation Control Area
- Radiation Work Permit
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SF
- Spent Fuel Cooling
- Surveillance Procedure
- Short Term Instruction
TS
- Technical Specification
- Violation
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