IR 05000302/1998012
| ML20196H269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196H255 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-98-12, NUDOCS 9812090034 | |
| Download: ML20196H269 (20) | |
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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j.
REGION ll I
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Docket Nos:
50-302
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License Nos:
DRP-72.
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i Report No:
50-302/98-12 I
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Licensee:
Fiorida Power Corporation l
Facility:
Crystal River 3 Nuclear Plant
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Location:
8202 W. Venable St.
Crystal River, Fl. 34429-9043 l
l Dates:
October 13-16,1998 l
inspectors:
W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader l
J. Kreh, Radiation Specialist G. Salyers, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
S. Cahill, Senior Resident inspector
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L. Cohen, NRR P. Milligan, NRR (observer)
Approved by:
K. P. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch L
Division of Reactor Safety Ls-l r.
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I Enclosure
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9812090034 981201
PDR ADOCK 05000302 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-302/98-12 This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for Crystal River Unit 3. This NRC-FEMA evaluated exercise was a plume exposure pathway exercise with offsite participation by the State of Florida and local governments within the plume exposure pathway. The exercise was conducted on October 14,1998, from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. This report summarizes the observations of the five-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program in response to the simulated accident. A separate FEMA report will be issued that evaluates the performance of the State and counties.
The NRC team observed the licensee's response in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Based on the performance observed, the team concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated the ability to implement the Emergency Plan and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
Proaram Areas Evaluated and Results Scenario --The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the
integrated emergency capability of the onsite and offsite emergency organizations.
(P4.1)
Control Room Simulator --The CRS crew properly evaluated site weather information,
analyzed plant conditions and made correct and timely emergency classifications. In addition, the initial notification of the State and local authorities was made within 15 minutes of the emergency declaration. However, the simulated notification of NRC did not meet the intent of the regulations for timeliness and accuracy of content. Also, the CRS was slow in restoring power to the site once the 230 kV switchyard was re-energized. (P4.2.b.1)
Technical Support Center -- Command and control of TSC operations by the
Emergency Coordinator and the performance of the TSC staff were generally effective.
Major renovations made to the TSC during 1998 significantly enhanced the efficiency of fac;lity operations. However, status boards contained numerous missing, erroneous, and late entries. Some notification messages to offsite authorities contained errors,
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confusing information, or did not report important plant information in a timely manner.
(P4.2.b.2.a)
Technical Support Center - Accident Assessment Team (AAT) -- The AAT area did not
contain status boards to allow the AAT to function more effectively with the SPDS out of service. The AAT provided the CRS with only limited technical solutions or alternatives beyond those already known to the CRS. (P4.2.b.2.b)
Operational Support Center -- The updated facilities and electronic equipment greatly
improved the OSC's capabilities. Command and controlin the OSC were effective.
Communications between the TSC and OSC were good. Emergency repair teams were effectively formed, briefed, dispatched and tracked. Repair teams were not debriefed in the OSC following their return. Log keeping was not effective in capturing essential actions by the OSC. (P4.2.b.3)
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i Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF Director and staff were effective in providing timely emergency notifications, and other information to the State and counties. The redesigned EOF provided for greater interaction between all participants and improved viewing of the status boards. However, the status boards were not effectively maintained during the exercise. There was excellent coordination and interaction l
between licensee personnel and the State and local responders.
(P4.2.b.4.a)
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Emergency Operations Facility -- Dose Assessment -- Performance of the dose i
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assessment function was adequate. However, the magnitude of the unmonitored release was not assessed using all available data so as to better formulate PARS.
(P4.2.b.4.b)
Licensee Critique Process -- A thorough critique process was followed with a well-
prepared presentation to site management that summarized the most significant exercise observations. (P4.2.b.5)
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Report Details IV. Plant Support P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
P4.1 Exercise Scenario a.
Inspection Scoce (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's plan.
b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee submitted the scope and objectives for the biennial emergency exercise to the NRC with a letter dated July 21,1998. The exercise scenario package was submitted with a letter dated August 20,1998. A review of the package indicated that the scenario was adequi u to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations
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of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the offsite agencies for their participation in the exercise.
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Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency capability of the onsite and offsite emergency organizations.
P4.2 Emeraency Response Facility (ERF) Observations and Critiaue
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Exercise Evaluation Scope During this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial full-participation, emergency preparedness exercise in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations (PARS), command and control, communications, and the overallimplementation of the Emergency Plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercise. Acceptance criteria are contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, site Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan implementing Procedures, and industry guidance in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1," Criteria for Preparations and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
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ERF Observations. Findinas, and Facility Critiaues b.1 Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Observations and Findinos Shortly after 7:00 a.m., the CRS crew was briefed on initial conditions by the lead exercise facilitator prior to their assuming shift responsibilities. Following the briefing and receipt of additional weather information, the Shift Supervisor recognized that an emergency action level associated with weather conditions had been reached. He promptly classified and declared the emergency as a Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE) at 7:53 a.m., and assumed the responsibilities as the Emergency Coordinator (EC). The EC effectively responded in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EM 202," Duties of the Emergency Coordinator". The EC approved the initial
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notification message to the State and local authorities which was then transmitted within 15 minutes of the emergency declaration. A CRS annunciator alarmed at 8:00 a.m. in response to scenario-induced plant failures. The CRS crew promptly recognized entry into an emergency action level for an Alert emergency classification and promptly l
declared the Alert at 8:01 a.m.
The inspectors observed good communications between the CRS crew and other emergency response staff in other emergency response facilities (ERFs). The EC demonstrated effective command and control with the CRS crew. Changing plant conditions and emergency status were included in the CRS briefings. Except as noted
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below, the inspectors observed timely action and response of all CRS functions.
The simulated initial notification of the NRC was made within one hour but should have been made in a more timely manner. Licensee procedures and 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3)
required notification of the NRC immediately after the State and county notification and within one hour of the declaration of any of the emergency classes. The NOUE was declared at 7:53 a.m. The Alert was declared at 8:01 a.m.
A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared at 8:41 a.m. State and county notification of the Alert declaration was completed at 8:14 a.m. The CRS simulated notification of the NRC at 8:43 a.m.
within 50 minutes of the NOUE declaration. By 8:43 a.m., the licensee had sequentially declared a NOUE, Alert, and SAE before notification to the NRC was made. However, although the site was in an SAE, the initial NRC notification reported that an Alert had been declared but the declaration time was given as 7:53 a.m., which was actually the i
time of the NOUE declaration. The information provided to the NRC in this first simulated notification did not accurately report the NOUE or the current SAE.
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Additionally, the declaration time reported was inconsistent with the classification reported. Therefore, the intent of the subject requirement was not met. In addition, the designated NRC communicator in the TSC redundantly notified the NRC (at 8:50 a.m.)
to report the Alert declaration because the EC was unaware that the CRS had already made the NRC notification prior to turnover.
Once the 230 kV switchyard was re-energized the CRS was slow in restoring power to the site. The CRS was one breaker away from getting power on the vital 4160V busses.
Even though core damage was beginning to occur, the CRS took approximately 20 minutes to implement four steps to close one breaker.
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Conclusions The CRS crew properly evaluated site weather information, analyzed plant conditions and made correct and timely emergency classifications. In addition, the initial notification of the State and local authorities was made within 15 minutes of the initial emergency declaration. However, the simulated notification of NRC did not meet the intent of the regulations for timeliness and accuracy of content. Also, the CRS was slow in restoring power to the site once the 230 kV switchyard was re-energized.
b.2.a Technical Support Center Observations and Findinas The order to staff the TSC, and other ERFs, was issued by means of an announcement on the public-address system (PA) at 8:01 a.m. That same announcement also reported the Alert declaration. All required TSC positions were filled by about 8:20 a.m.,
and the facility was declared operational at 8:45 a.m.
The TSC staff functioned professionally and effectively. Personnel continuously reviewed plant conditions using simulator-driven plant data displayed in real time on three large rear-projection video monitors on a wall of the command area. Command and control of TSC operations by the EC was generally effective. The EC briefed the TSC staff when conditions changed and conducted periodic round-table discussions that provided for the sharing of information among TSC personnel. Periodic PA briefings, heard throughout the TSC and in the adjacent OSC, further facilitated the flow and exchange of plant status information. Major renovations made to the TSC during 1998 significantly enhanced the efficiency of facility operations.
At 9:02 a.m., when the station blackout occurred, an update notification message to the l
State and counties would have been desirable and appropriate even though no
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classification upgrade was warranted. This significant change in plant conditions was not reported in an offsite notification message until 10:53 a.m.
Several minor performance problems were noted. Status and information boards were not updated at any regular interval following loss of plant data from the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The inspectors observed instances in which the TSC oata boards were not updated for 25 minutes. Some status boards had missing, erroneous, or late entries. Several offsite notification messages contained errors and/or confusing information which could contribute to delays and misunderstandings during an actual emergency response effort. Although the loss of the SPDS at 9:33 a.m. was a significant development, no announcement was made in the TSC to explain why it was lost and what alternative sources of plant data were available.
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Conclusions Command and control of TSC operations by the Emergency Coordinator and the
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performance of the TSC staff were generally effective. Major renovations made to the l
TSC during 1998 significantly enhanced the efficiency of facility operations. Status
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boards contained numerous missing, erroneous and late entries. Some notification messages to off site authorities contained errors, confusing information or did not report j
important plant information in a timely manner.
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b.2.b Technical Sucoort Center-Accident Assessment Team (AAT)
The SPDS computer was lost early in the simulated emergency. The AAT did not have a backup plan for systematically getting data without the SPDS computer. There was no system status board maintained in the AAT area so members were often unsure of the plant status details. Similar uncertainty also occurred when the SPDS was working.
Following the station blackout, the single phone line in the AAT area became a choke point as the lack of information flowing into TSC resulted in many requests from the TSC.
The AAT's initial focus on recovering the two Emergency Diesel Generators was appropriate. However, once the Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) occurred, the AAT did not focus on restoring power to the 230kV yard. The cause of the LOOP was unknown by the team and the status of yard was unclear. Restoration of the 230kV yard could have been pursued in parallel with the diesels and had a higher probability of success.
The AAT eventually pursued restoring 230kV power via the BEST (Back-up Engineered Safeguards Transformer) which used overhead power lines. A more appropriate success path, given the tornado that caused the LOOP, was the Offsite Engineered Safeguards Transformer which used protected underground power lines.
The AAT's diagnosis for finding the soun e of a steam leak in the Intermediate Building was not effective. The Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) were closed, but the AAT did not systematically coordinate or request data to rule out steam generator steam leakage. The CRS independently did the checks to rule out steam generator steam leakage and communicated the results to the TSC.
Conclusion l
The AAT area did not contain status boards to allow the AAT to function more effectively with the SPDS out of service. The AAT provided the CRS with only limited technical solutions or alternatives beyond those already known to the CRS.
b.3 Operational Sucoort Center Observations and Findinas The Operational Support Center (OSC) was operational 16 minutes after the PA announcement of the Alert declaration. The OSC Manager communicated effectively with the Technical Support Center (TSC) and displayed good command and control when delegating tasks to the appropriate OSC Coordinators. The OSC staff was kept well informed of changing plant conditions by OSC Manager briefings and TSC briefings j
that were monitored in the OSC.
The OSC was well equipped to support all of its designated functions. Personnel dose records and respirator qualifications were computerized. Hard copies of procedures and drawings were readily available. Also, the OSC had the ability to print them from a local computer and microfilms. A computer in the procurement area listed onsite materials and spare parts.
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s Applicable OSC procedures were implemented. Some examples were: thermal luminescent dosimeters were issued, potassium iodide was dispensed to Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), carbon dioxide and oxygen levels were monitored, and radiological controls and monitoring were established.
Nine ERTs were dispatched from the OSC. The inspectors accompanied three of the nine teams and observed that: ERTs were effectively dispatched in a timely manner, ERT authorization forms containing essential information were completed for each team, and ERTs were briefed, provided health physics coverage, given electronic alarming dosimeters, and radios for maintaining communication with the OSC. There was good communications with the OSC while the teams were in the field. However, upon returning to the OSC, the teams did not debrief as required by procedure.
OSC logs did not adequately document the essential actions and communications that occurred in the OSC.
Conclusion The updated facilities and electronic equipment greatly improved the OSC's capabilities.
Command and control in the OSC were effective. Communications between the TSC and OSC were good. Emergency repair teams were effectively formed, briefed, dispatched and tracked. Repair teams were not debriefed in the OSC following their return. Log keeping was not effective in capturing essential actions by the OSC.
b.4.a Emeraency Operations Facility Observationa and Findinas The EOF was promptly staffed following the PA announcement at 8:01 a.m. and activated following a turnover briefing from the TSC. The EOF Director was in frequent communication with the TSC and provided regular and precise briefings to his staff.
The EOF was operational at 9:35 a.m. and assumed responsibilities for communicating with the offsite agencies at 10:56 a.m. Timely communications were made throughout the exercise to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and the two counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Communications with the State of Florida were enhanced by conversations between the Recovery Manager and the Authorized Representative of the State in the EOF.
The redesigned EOF had new projection status boards to display plant conditions and pertinent data. The scenario called for the loss of power to the site which made the computer displays inoperable. This required the use of the backup manual status boards for much of the exercise. The inspectors observed that the manual status boards were not reliably maintained for much of the exercise. In addition, when site power was restored, the electronic status boards and displays were not immediately restored such that they could be effectively utilized.
Conclusio_r1 l
The EOF Director and staff were effective in providing timely emergency notifications,
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and other information to the State and counties. The redesigned EOF provided for
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greater interaction between all participants and improved viewing of the status boards.
However, the status bom ds were not effectively maintained during the exercise. There
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was excellent coordination and interaction between licensee personnel and the State and local responders.
b.4.b Emeraency Operations Facility - Dose Assessment Area Observations and Findinas The radiological release to the environment during this exercise was through an unmonitored pathway, As a result, offsite dose projections were not easily made.
However, data was available to the licensee that should have been used to develop estimates of the source term and resultant dose projections for sectors downwind from 5 to 10 miles from the site that had not been evacuated. Data from onsite monitoring teams also provided indications that should have been used to better assess the magnitude of the release. Licensee dose assessment personnel discounted their dose assessment projections and relied heavily on plant conditions and direct field l
measurements to reassess protective action recommendations instead of aggressively pursuing better dose projections to complement their knowledge of plant conditions.
The approach taken was not proactive toward reassessing any needed PARS beyond l
the default PARS done originally on plarst conditions.
During the licensee critiques, a licensee evaluator also reported concerns regarding the l
assessment of the magnitude of the release. The licensee entered that issue into its corrective action program for resolution.
Conclusions l
Performance of the dose assessment function was adequate in that appropriate PARS were provided to offsite authorities that were consistent with the scenario. However, the j
magnitude of the unmonitored release was not assessed using all available data such l
that the licensee could make better dose projections that supplemented its knowledge of
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plant conditions to better formulate PARS. During a telephonic discussion between NRC l
and licensee management on November 18,1998, the licensee was informed of NRC's concerns in the dose assessment area and acknowledged the need to take corrective action.
b.5 Licensee Facility Critiaues Following the exercise, the licensee conducted facility critiques which the players
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provided their own assessment o' their performance and identified areas that needed
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improvement. The post-exercise critiques in the TSC, OSC, and EOF were observed to l
be thorough, open, and self-critical. The licensee controller / evaluator organization then
conducted detailed discussions, reviewed documentation, and conducted interviews as required to develop its critique results. On October 16,1998, the Emergency Preparedness Group provided an excellent presentation to licensee management of the
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critique results.
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Conclusion
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A thorough critique process was followed with a well-prepared management presentation that summarized the most significant exercise obsu vations.
V. Monaaement Meetinas
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X1 Exit Meeting
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The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to licensee management on October 16,1998. The summary indicated the exercisa was fully satisfactory. On l
November 18,1998, an additional telephone conversation was held between NRC and l
licensee management to discuss the dose assessment function. At that time, the NRC
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discussed some additional negative observations not originally reported during the October 16,1998, exit meeting.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Becker, Operations
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J. Cowan, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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S. Garry, Dose Assessment *
B. Grazio, Director Regulatory Affairs
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G. Halnon, Director Quality Programs M. Harris, Site Communications
G. Hebb, Operations J. Holden,' Director Site Operations
M. Kelley, Operations M. Laycock, Emergency Preparedness M. Marano, Director Business Support B. McLaughlin, Compliance B. Nielsen, Training C. Pardee, Director Plant Operations W. Pike, Manager Compliance D. Porter, Operations J. Stephenson, Manager, Emergency Planning *
R. Thurow, Director Training S. Bernhoft, Director, Nuc; ear Regulatory Affairs *
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- Participated in a November 18,1998, teleconference with NRC.
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
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IP 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors Attachment (10 pages):
Exercise Scope, Objectives,
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j Time Line, and Narrative Summary
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1998 ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE
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PURPQSf, The purpose of the 1998 Annual - Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)
Exercise is twofold:
(1) to test the state of emergency preparedness of Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and (2) to meet the annual exercise requirement of the onsite emergency plan for licensees as defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
SCOPE A Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region 2 evaluation team will assess FPC emergency response.
The Exercise will be a " Partial Participation Exercise" for the State and local response organizations.
Participants include the Florida Division of Emergency Management, the Florida Department of Health -
Bureau of Radiation Control, and Citrus and Levy Counties'
Emergency Management organizations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will evaluate the response of offsite agencies.
The Exercise will use CR-3's site-specific Simulator in its dynamic mode as the Control Room.
The Simulator communications systems will be connected to plant and outside systems.
Simulator data will be electronically displayed in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Hard copy data sheets are available as a contingency should the Simulator fail during the Exercise.
Information not generated by the Simulator will be provided to Exercise participants by Controllers via Message Cards. The Message Cards will contain scenario information which the participants will use to evaluate conditions and initiate specific emergency responses.
Controller prompts may be necessary to keep the Exercise on schedule. All prompts will be documented by the Controllers.
The following required drills will be conducted as part of this Exercise:
Two (2) Radiological Monitoring / Health Physics drills (onsite Radiation Monitoring Team and offsite Radiation Monitoring Team).
Sampling Team Drill.
The Exercise will be formally critiqued by participants and Controllers.
The purpose of this critique will be to evaluate the performance of response organizations, to determine the degree to which Exercise objectives were met, and to present the findings to FPC management and federal evaluators.
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1998 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
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The overall objective of the Exercise is to demonstrate the ability of Florida
'i Power Corporation's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program to protect the health and safety of the general public and personnel on the Crystal River Energy Complex.
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NOTE:
Bold numbers represent NUREG-0654 elements.
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GENERAL OBJECTIVES:
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Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize FPC emergency response personnel and to activate FPC emergency response centers in a timely manner.
(B.5, F.le)
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Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of FPC to support the state of Florida and local
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authorities in emergency response activities within the plume exposure
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pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
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4.
Demonstrate that Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA's) observed in the 1997 Exercise have been corrected.
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t OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES (Simulator Control Roon0:
1.
Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation in the Control Room, including recognition and evaluation of degrading plant conditions, and recommendation of specific corrective actions to stabilize the plant.
2.
Demonstrate a proficiency in recognizing and classifying emergency conditions.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to perform emergency notifications, as required, I
to the state of Florida, local authorities (including appropriate
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protective action recommendations), and the NRC.
(E.3, E.4, E.6, F.lc)
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Demonstrate an effective turnover of Emergency Coordinator l
responsibilities between the Shift Supervisor and the. Director, Nuclear
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Plant Operations or the TSC Emergency Coordinator i
ON-SITE (TSC/OSO EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION OBJECTIVES:
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Demonstrate effective implementation of EM-206, " Emergency Plan Roster
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Demonstrate a proficiency in recognizing and classifying emergency
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conditions in the TSC.
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3.
Dem,onstrate the ability to perform emergency notif? cations, as required, to the state of Florida, local authorities (including appropriate protective action recommendations), and the NRC.
(E.3, E.4, E.6, F.1c)
4.
Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation capabilities in'the TSC.
(B.7a)
5.
Demonstrate site (Protected Area) evacuation and provisions to warn all personnel within the Owner-Controlled Area.
(F.le, 3.1)
6.
Demonstrate adequate management and control of on-site emergency response capabilities.
7.
Demonstrate an effective transfer of notification responsibilities from the Emergency Coordinator to the EOF Di rector when the EOF is ope rational.
8.
Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Emergency Repair Tear.
9.
Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Emergency Medical Technician (s).
(F.2 L.2)
10.
Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Emergency Sample Team (samples will be simulated). (I.2)
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Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Radiation Monitoring Team.
(H.7, I.7, I.9)
12.
Demonstrate provisions and decision-making capability for utilization of evacuation routes.
(3.2)
13.
Demonstrate the capability to acquire data from off-site meteorological
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facilities.
(H. 6. *
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) STAFF OBJECTIVES:
1.
Demonstrate effective implementation of REP-02,
" Activation and l
Notification of the Corporate Emergency Support Organization."
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Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain appropriate l
communications (during normal business hours) with State and Federal
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Emergency Management representatives, including the recommendation of protective actions.
(B.7b, E.4, E.6, I.10, J.7)
3.
Demonstrate plans and procedures for re-entry and recovery.
(M.1, M.3)
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4.
Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation capabilities in the EOF,
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l RADI0 LOGICAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES:
1.
Demonstrate the ability to control radiological exposure to emergency workers and Energy Complex Personnel.
(K.1)
2.
Demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring and ~ assessment in the plant and site environs.
(H.7, I.7, I.9)
3.
Demonstrate effective estimation and assessment of a (simulated) release of airborne radioactivity to the environment.
(I.3a, I.10)
4.
Demonstrate the ability to provide the Emergency Coordinator and the EOF Director with timely and sound emergency protective
' action recommendations based on assessment of radiological conditions.
5.
Demonstrate the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and coordination of those results with non-FPC agencies at the EOF.
(F.1d, H.12)
6.
Demonstrate the availability and operability of emergency supplies and equipment.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES:
1.
Demonstrate the capability of maintaining on-site security throughout an emergency at CR-3, including the capability of establishing and enforcing access control points.
2.
Demonstrate the capability to verify outlying areas in the Energy Complex have assembled / evacuated and to maintain EOF security.
CORPORATE RELATIONS OBJECTIVES:
1.
Demonstrate timely activation of the ENC.
(Es. 5)
2.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain emergency-related information.
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3.
Demonstrate the ability to disseminate timely, accurate, and appropriate emergency information.
(B.7c)
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1998 RERP EXEReitE TIMELINE 0700
. Iaitial Conditions / Crew brisfiss in simuistor Control Room and shop 2
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. Tornado sited r. orth of 500 KV switchyard i
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. UNU$uAL EVENT (tornado sited); tornado strikes switchyard; Rx trip
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0800
. Tornado strikes Protected Area
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- ALERT (tornado st s Protected Area)
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l 0900
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. SPD5 lost in T5C and EOF; SITE AREA EMERCENCY (580 >13 minutes)
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- Pressurizer surge line fails (>10,000 ppm)
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1000
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Steamline Penetration failure; EOF operational
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-. CENERAL EMERGENCY (loss of two FP barriers udth potential loss of third; core salt likely)
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HPI initiated; thermal shock to fuel
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1100
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Canal level peaks at 97 feet
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l 1200
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i Environmental Survey Vehicle stalls i
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1400
- Exercise Terminated
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1500
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1998 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE NARRATIVE SLMMRY u s.~, nonn.
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SHIFT TURNOVER 1.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
a.
Time in core life - 300 EFPD b.
Reactor power and power history - Plant has been operating at 100%
Power for 9 days since starting up after a seven day outage to replace seals in RCP-1A.
Previous to the outage the plant had
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operated at 100% power for 95 days.
c.
Boron concentration - 1096 ppm d.
Xenon - Equilibrium e.
RCS activity - 4.5E-3 pCi/cc D. E. I-131 2.
Action requirements in effect:
ITS 3.8.1.c ECDG-1B, SP-321 was completed at 0700.
3.
Clearances in effect:
EDG-1B Tagged out at 0100 to repair seal leak on retirc pump. Also coolant is being changed from Nalco to antifreeze.
DJP-4 Tagged out to repair a 3 gpm mechanical seal leak.
4.
Significant plant problems / abnormalities:
A weather system in the gulf is producing strong, sustained north-westerly winds which coupled with approaching high tide (1200), has raised the water level in the Intake Canal to 92 feet at 0700. A coastal flood warning (3-4 feet above normal high tide) and a severe thunderstorm warning have been issued and a tornado watch is in effect until 1100.
EM-220 Violent Weather preparations for flood warning have been compl eted.
5.
Evolutions / maintenance for the on-coming shift:
Electricians are investigating possible sources of ground "B" Batt CND (5K).
SP-9078 FT "B" ES bus ECDG-1B jacket coolant change PM-126 Electrical check of CRDs 6.
Units 1, 2, and 5 status: On-line
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Unit 4 status: Off-line
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SCENARIO DESCRIPTION i
NOTE: Participant interaction with the Simulator may slightly alter the timing of certain operational events. The times listed are an approximation and will be used should the Simulator fail.
0700 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Initial conditions and ground rules are presented to the operating crew in the Simulator Control Room and participants in the shops.
0750 TORNADO SIGHTED: Security reports a tornado has been sighted NNW of the plant and is moving south. The Operations crew should make an announcement directing plant personnel to seek cover and possibly will warn fossil plants. An UNUSUAL EVENT is declared based on a tornado visible from the Protected Area.
Operators may notify the SWPT to issue a public warning.
0756 TORNADO STRIKES 500 KV SWITCMYARD: The tornado hits the 500 KV switchyard causing extensive damage. The reactor trips due to load rejection and operators enter E0P-02.
Unit 5 also trips.
0800 TORNADO STRIKES PROTECTEI' AREA: The tornado moves slowly south across l
the Protected Area with the following results:
Protected area fence is damaged and the microwave motion detectors
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on the north berm are lost.
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Damage to the auxiliary transformer and all three step-up
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transformers.
Offsite power is still available from the 230 KV,
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SAP-1E is overturned but there are no air breaches.
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The 12 KV line to SAPS-1C/1D is lost.
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An electric cart parked on the berm knocks Fire Pump House #6 off
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its slab and ruptures a water line.
Windows are blown out in the Nuclear Administration Bld;, Rusty
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Bldg, Turbine Bldg, and the Ready Warehouse. There are some minor cuts from flying glass. One person in the P.eady Warehouse breakroom is seriously injured.
l Some exterior siding is poiled away on the Spent Fuel Floor and
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Maintenance shop offices.
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A sealand container of contaminated scaffold boards is picked up
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and dropped on the exhaust stack on ECDG-1A crimping the pipe.
j Large amounts of debris on the berm including radwaste containers
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overturned.
There is fuel leaking from the Diesel Air Compressor fuel tank.
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0805 TORNADO REPORTS: The Simulator. Control Room receives a report from personnel in the Rusty Bldg that the tornado struck the site.
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0810 ALERT: An Alert is declared' based on a tornado striking the Protected-Area. Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center staffing is initiated and in-shop accountability begins.
0820 INJURY REPORT: The Simulator Control Room receives a report that a person has been found unconcious in the Ready Warehouse breakroom and that an ambulance is required.
0900 STATION 8 LACK 0UT: Due to grid instabilities, the 230KV yard is lost resulting in a loss of offsite power.
EDG-1A starts but udll not ' exceed
700 rpm due to exce..ive back pressure created by the crimped exhaust
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stack. A station blackout now exists. The TSC diesel starts.
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0910 TSC DPERATIONAL: The TSC is required to be operational by this time (or
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60 minutes from the Alert _ declaration), however, it will probably occur soo"er.
0913 [0R WHEN PPO PERFORMS ACTION.] LOSS OF SPDS: The Primary Plant Operator-(PPO)
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deenergizes Vital Bus 7 and the E Inverter (per direction from the Simualtor Control Room) causing the loss of SPDS inputs to the TSC and
EOF.
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l 0915 SITE AREA EMERGENCY: A Site Area Emergency is declared based on the loss
of offsite power and onsite power for >15 minutes-Protected Area
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evacuation and accountability is initiated. - EOF i seffing is initiated.
The Intake Canal is at 93.5'.
0925 EDG REPAIR HAM: Emergency repair teams may be dispatched from the OSC to both emergency diesel generators in an effort to restore power as i
quickly as possible to the ES buses.
i 0945 LOCA: The pressurizer surge line fails allowing an Reactor Coolanat System (RCS) leak of >10,000 gpm.
Radiation levels and pressure in the Reactor Building begin to increase.
Protected Area accountability is completed.
0955 ;fGH R8 PRESSURE: Containment pressure is about 23 psig.
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1015 PENETRATION FAILURE: After penetration cooling is lost due to the LOOP, a steam line penetration fails causing a loss of containment integrity i
and allowing a release to the Intermediate Building and to the i
environment. RM-G9 and RM-Gs 25 and 28 begin to increase due to
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background activity in the area.
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i EOF OPERATIONAL: The EOF is required to be operational by this time (or 60 minutes from the Site Area Emergency).
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1025 GENERAL EMERGENCY: When the less of RCS and containment is confirmed, a General Emergency is declared based on loss of two of three fission product barriers with a potential for losing the third. (The declaration may be made based on core melt likely.) Minimum protective action recommendations are made:
EVACUATE 0-5 MILES 360 DEGREES
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1030 0FFSITE POWER RESTORED: Offsite power is restored. There is sufficient capacity to carry mitigating loads.
1037 ES BUSES ENERGIZED: ES buses are reenergized.
1043 SUPERHEAT: The first train.of HPI is reestablished.
However, the' cold water collapses voids and reduces pressure creating superheat conditions
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and damaging fuel.
RMs-G 9, 14, 16, 17, 18, 25, 28, 29, 30 increase.
i 1045 PAR AD]USTMENT: Once core damage is confirmed Protective Action Recommendations may be adjusted.
The Intake Canal is at 95'.
1050 INJURY REPORT: A report is received from Seven Rivers Hospital on the status of the injured person.
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1055 TDRNADO WATCH EXTENSION: The State Warning Point reports that the i
t National Weather Services has extended the toronado watch until 1300.
l 1100 SATURATION RETURN: RCS is restored to saturated conditions.
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1100 BUILDING SPRAY: The TSC may request that Building Spray be started to reduce source term (if not aircady running).
1130 CANAL LEVEL PEAKS: The Intake Canal level peaks at 95.75'.
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1135 LPI SOURCE: LPI suction is transferred from the BWST to the RB Sump.
1145 KI REQUEST: Citrus County Representative 8 EOF reque;ts additional KI and dosimeters.
l 1225 FUNNEL CLOUD: A funnel cloud has been spotted just west of Units 1&2 l
moving south. It does not touch down and dissipates after two minutes.
1230 SFP LEVEL ALARM: Due to damage to SF-1-LT Spent Fuel Pool level transmitter, a low-level alarm is received in the Simulator Control Room.
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a 1240 CITRUS COUNTY REQUESTS: Citrus County Representative @ EOF requests
specific meteorological parameters and a FPC high clearance vehicle for l
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flood area evacuations.
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1245 SFP LEVEL REPAIR TEAM: An ERT is dispatched from the OSC to the Spent
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1300 SFP ERT REPORT: The ERT repor ts that the Spent Fuel pool level is
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1300 RELIEF SHIFTS REQUEST: The EOF and TSC will be asked to plan for relief
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shift to include contacting the individual and providing a list to the l
Emergency Coordinator and EOF Director.
1430 TERMINATION: The Exercise is terminated.
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