ML20235P057
| ML20235P057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1989 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235P030 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-89-01, 50-302-89-1, NUDOCS 8903020085 | |
| Download: ML20235P057 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1989001
Text
,_
-___
.
,
f'c"?%
,
_
_
i
'a
UNITED STATES
p.
y
-
(
.g-
j-
,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'
,~*
REGION 11.
n
$g
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
9g,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report No:
50-302/89-01~
Licensee:
Florida' Power Corporation
3201-34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
' "
Docket No:
50-302
License No.: DPR-72
Facility Name: ' Crystal River 3
Inspection Conducted: January 1 - January 27, 1989
Inspectors:
iML- K . h3 L
cQ l ir 189
P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident' Inspector
Date' Signed
kki hu K . ho lm
A f m / 69
J. Tedrow
sident Inspector \\
Date Signed
Approved by:
/ .
d'
/d!d
R. Pflenjak, frection Cipff
D6te Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas
of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports
and Nonconforming Operations Reports, follow-up on onsite events, and licensee
action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were
conducted on backshifts.
Results
Thren violations were identified:
Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1, paragraph
3.b(1); Failure to promptly identify and correct adverse conditions, paragraph
3.b(2);
Failure to adhere to the requirements of an operating procedure,
paragraph 4.b.
A licensee identified violation is discussed in paragraph 3.a(1).
A weakness was identified in the shift supervisor's control of startup
activities which resulted in an inadvertent actuation of the emergency feed-
water system, paragraph 4.b.
f.$3$00b
. g2
0
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
_.
__
__
- - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ -
-
..
'
,
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
- F. Bailey, Superintendent Nuclear Projects
- K. Baker, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Assurance
- G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services
- J. Brandely, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning
- J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support
B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- K. Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance
W. Marshall, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations
- P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance
- W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
- M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
W. Worley, Manager, Nuclear Chemistry
Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations,
engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
The plant began this inspection period in cold shutdown (Mode 5) to
troubleshoot and initiate repairs to a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP).
Following repairs to the pump motor lower radial bearing support bracket
and repairs to stop leakage found on three control rod drive mechanism
flanges, a plant heatup was commenced and the hot standby (Mode 3) condi-
tion reached at 2:15 a.m. on January 12.
On January 15 a reactor startup
was performed and criticality achieved at 2:20 p.m.
followed by the
initiation of power operation (Mode 1) at 3:30 p.m.
The plant continued
in puwer operation for the remainder of this inspection period.
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records (71707)
The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Speci-
fications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Outage Shift
Manager's Log; Equipment Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist;
_ - _ _ _ _ -
_
._
.
_
.-
.-
_ _ . -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ ,
.;
,
,
-
.
w
it
2
.
Auxiliary ' Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily
Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions
(STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.
In . addition to . these record reviews, the inspector independently
.
verified clearance' order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b;
Facility Tours and Observations (71707)
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to' '
. observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some
operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and
management activities.
The ' facility-tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator
room; auxiliary building; reactor building; intermediate building;
battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation
and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated
parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current
operational mode:
Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid
radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating
parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(2) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspector verified that operating
shift staffing was' in accordance with TS requirements and that
control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and
professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift
turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant
status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant informa-
tion during these turnovers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(3) Piant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of material and
components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas through-
out the facility were observed to determine whether safety
and/or fire hazards existed.
- .
____
__ _ _ __ ___-_ _ _ ___ __- _ _- _-_____ __-_ __ _____ ___ _ _ __
.
_ - -
_ -
__
-
. - - - _ _
--
-
.f
.
)
.
,
'3
'
.t
,
'No violations or deviations were identified.
(4)' Radiological Protection Program (71707) - Radiation protection
control activities.were observed to verify that these activities
~
were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
These observa-
.tions included:
.
Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including'
-
step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated
clothing;
Area postings and controls;
-
Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and
-
contaminated areas;
Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and,
-
Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment,
-
protective clothing, and' respiratory equipment.
Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the
inspector.
The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the
controls were adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
~
(5) Security Control (71707) -
In the course of the monthly
activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's
physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of
the. security force was observed in the conduct of daily activ-
ities to include: protected and vital area access controls;
searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance
and retrieval; escorting' of visitors; patrols; and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspector ' observed the operational
status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the
Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm
stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area
barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with
operations and maintenance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(6) Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staffing
and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing
was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equip-
ment, and fire barriers were operable.
l'
i
__
_.
-
. _ _ _
__ -_- __
t
~
4
,
~
1
-.
,
1
4
-)
.
.
i
I
No violations or_ deviations were' identified.
1
(7) Surveillance (61726) - Surveillance tests were. observed to
j
veri fy that- approved procedures were ~ being used; qualified
-
personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to
verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;
and TS requirements were followed.-
-
l
The following tests'were observed and/or data reviewed:
- SP-102,
Control Rod Drop Time Tests;
- SP-317,. RC System Water Inventory Balance;
- SP-358C, Operations ES Monthly Automatic Actuation
Logic Functional Test #3;
- SP-390,
Startup Surveillance Log;
- SP-422,
RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance;
- SP-430, Containment Air Locks Seal Leakage Test;
and,
- SP-435, Valve Testing During Cold Shutdown.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(8) Maintenance Activities (62703)
The inspector observed
-
maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clear-
ances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work
permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality
control personnel were available for inspection activities as
required; and, TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
Replacement of the solenoid valve for MSV-130 in accordance
-
with modification. MAR 89-01-02-01;
Preventive maintenance on the integrated control system in
-
accordance with procedure PM-170A, Pre-Operational Check of
the Integrated Control System;
Continuity checks on emergency feedwater initiation and
-
control bypass pushbuttons; and,
-
Repsck of the steam driven emergency feedwater pump (EFP .
in accordance with procedure MP-121, Pump Repacking.
No violations or deviations were identified.
_ _ _ - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ . _ - - _ _ _ - _ _
-
n;
i
.
..
-
,
i
5
3.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations
-Reports (71707)
a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TSs were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement
Policy.
(1) (0 pen) LER 88-26:
This LER reported the failure to sample a-
radioactive liquid waste tank prior to releasing the contents to
the environment.
Licensee personnel discovered this situation
during the performance of the release and took appropriate
action to terminate the release within 15 minutes of starting.
No ' regulatory limits were exceeded during this event.
The
licensee attributes the cause for this event to be-a valve stuck
on its backseat with no valve position indication available.
This lead operators to believe that the valve was closed as
required by the release procedure.
This matter is considered to
be a licensee identified violation in which appropriate correc-
tive action was taken to prevent recurrence.
The LER will
remain open pending an evaluation by the licensee to provide
this valve and similar valves with the means of verifying valve
position.
(2) (0 pen) LER 88-27 and LER 88-28:
These LERs reported deficient
environmental qualification ratings for plant equipment near an
auxiliary steam line in the auxiliary building and in several
safety related valve motor operators.
These reports have been
referred to the NRC Region II Office.for followup by specialist
inspectors and will remain open pending NRC review.
(3) (Closed) LER 88-06:
This LER reported a reactor trip and
feedwater transient and was previously discussed in NRC Inspec-
tion Report 50-302/88-11.
The licensee has issued supplement 2
to this report dated Deccmber 13, 1988.
The inspector has
reviewed and verified the corrective actions as stated in'this
supplement.
(4) (0 pen) LER 88-14:
This LER reported excessive temperatures in
Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system piping.
This report remained
open for reasons discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/
88-24.
The licensee has issued supplement 1 to this report
dated January 23, 1989 and has issued correspondence dated
September 28, October 12, and October 21, 1989 on this subject.
The licensee has completed the following corrective action:
-
Valves EFV-18 and EFV-33 have been repaired and valves
EFV-43 and EFV-44 have been replaced by plant modification
MAR 88-07-11-01/02;
!
. _ - _ _ _ _ -
_ - - - - _ _ _
_ _ _ _ - _ _
.
-
. . -
,
,
6
An analysis has been performed to upgrade the EFW system
-
piping to higher allowable temperatures;
.,
A leakage criteria of 612 ml/hr has been developed-for the
-
EFW containment isolation check valves.
This criteria will
be implemented in applicable inservice testing surveillance
procedures; and,
-
An analysis of water hammer effects concluded that although
water hammer loads could be induced during some operations
of the EFW system, the EFW system was not operated under
these conditions.
An inspection of pipe hangers and
supports also showed no damage.
This LER remains open pending implementation of the leakage
criteria in applicable surveillance procedures.
b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
verify the following:
TS are complied with, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS.
All NCORs were reviewed in accordar,
with the current NRC
s
NCOR 89-05 was written on January
7,
1989 to document the
inoperability of two containment isolation valves due to undersized
ASCO solenoid valves.
This NCOR also documented the deportability of
this condition.
Valves MSV-130 and MSV-148 are the outside contain-
. !
ment isolation valves for the Once Through Steam' Generator (OTSG)
blowdown lines.
These lines are isolated by manual isolation valves
I
inside containment prior to power operations.
NCOR 89-07 was written on January 11, 1989 to document two more
inoperable containment isolation valves due to undersized ASCO
solenoids.
CAV-6 and CAV-7 are the outside containment isolation
valves for the OTSG sample lines.
The inboard, motor operated,
isolation valves are normally closed during power operations.
The
condition of CAV-6/7 was discovered as part of the corrective action
initiated by NCOR 89-05.
NCOR 89-03 was written on January 5,1989 to document the evaluation
of a Field Problem Report (FPR) written on November 8, 1988.
The FPR
stated that the MSV-130 and 148 solenoids were improperly sized and
that inadvertent valve opening could occur.
The NCOR was evaluated
as non reportable due to the plant being in Mode 5 and therefore
these valves were a Mode 4 restraint.
- - - - - - - _ _ - _ - _
_ _ _ _ _ _
l
-
.
.
7
FPR T-88-0105 was written November 8,1988 and clearly stated the
undersized condition for the solenoids on MSV-130 and 148.
This FPR
was evaluated on Novenaber 16, 1988 as having no regulatory or safety
issues.
This evaluation was made by an engineering supervisor.
To
summarize:
The licensee recognized and documented that two contain-
l
ment isolation valves had improper solenoid valves and could inadver-
l
tently open and no action to report or correct this condition was
taken until 60 days later.
Also, on May 13, 1988 NRC Information
l
Notice 88-24 was issued to inform licensees of the possibility., and
possible consequences of undersized ASCO solenoid valves.
Generic Letter 88-14 was issued on August 8,1988 to require the licensee to
verify that the design of the entire instrument air system is in
accordance with its intended function.
The 88-24 Notice and Generic
Letter (88-14) were turned over to the licensee's Instrument Air Task
Force (IATF) on November 28, 1988 for action.
The IATF was formed on
September 16, 1988 in response to industry concerns on instrument air
system problems.
The events discribed above are considered to be in violation of:
(1) Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.1 which requires the
containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.6-1 to be
operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
MSV-130/148 and CAV 6/7
are included in Table 3.6-1.
Violation (302/89-01-01):
Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1 requiring
containment isolation valves be operable.
(2) 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI which states that
measures shall be established to assure that conditions
adverse to quality, such as. . . , defective material and
equipment and non conformances are promptly identified and
corrected.
Violation (302/89-01-02):
Failure to assure that conditions adverse
to quality are promptly identified and corrected.
4.
Follow-up of Onsite Events (93702)
a.
At 6:38 a.m. on January 18, with the plant operating at approximately
75% power, problems were experienced with the "A" Reactor Coolant
Pump (RCP-1A).
Indications of low reactor coolant system flow and a
significant reduction in the pump motor's load current prompted
operators to secure the pump which resulted in an automatic plant
runback to approximately 65% power.
All plant systems responded as
designed and the plant was stabilized at 65% power.
The licensee's initial analysis of this event indicate that a planer
,
separation has occurred between the pump / motor coupling and the
I
impeller.
A similar event occurred in January 1986 when the RCP-1A
shaft failed (see NRC Inspection Reports 50-302/85-44, 86-03, 86-07,
I
_
__
__
_ - -
-
-
-
a
E
.
-
-
..
4
't.
8
86-08, 86-09 and LER 86-01 for more information on the previous
event).
Corrective action associated with the previous event
included replacing all of the reactor coolant pump shafts.
The licensee presently plans to continue operation with three reactor
coolant pumps and has submitted a justification for continued opera-
tion dated January 27, 1989.
An outage is scheduled for approxi-
mately February 23 to affect repairs to the pump.
The licensee is
closely monitoring the vibration indications of the three remaining
RCPs.
b.
At 4:36 a.m.
on January 15 an Emergency Feedwater Initiation and
Control (EFIC) system actuation occurred.
A plant heatup was in
progress in accordance with operating procedure OP-202, Plant Heatup,
which directed that a main feedwater pump be started in accordance
with procedure OP-605, Feedwater System.
The startup procedure for
the main feedwater pump requires that the pump be latched, brought up
to speed and then tripped to verify proper operation.
After latching
the pump, plant operators continued on with the heatup procedure
which required that shutdown bypass be removed from each Reactor
Protection System (RPS) channel.
This action, in conjunction with
the subsequent tripping of the latched main feedwater pump, satisfied
the actuation logic of the EFIC system.
All EFIC components operated as designed and the system was secured
following the establishment of main feedwater.
Step 5.5.14 of procedure OP-202 includes a caution note that states
if at least one main feedwater pump is not latched prior to removing
RPS channels from shutdown bypass, an EFIC actuation may occur. The
inspectors discussed this event with the operating personnel.
Both
the shift supervisor and the experienced operator performing the
plant heatup were aware of the caution note but failed to ensure a
main feedwater pump remained latched.
Failure of the shift super-
visor to adequately control plant heatup activities is considered to
be a weakness which plant management should address.
Failure to
adhere to the requirements of procedure OP-202 is contrary to the
requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be a violation.
Violation (302/89-01-03):
Failure to adhere to the requirements of
OP-202 which resulted in an EFIC actuation.
5.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 &
92701)
a.
(Closed) Violation 302/88-18-02, Failure to provide adequate
corrective actions to prevent exceeding the design temperature of
emergency feedwater piping.
The inspector reviewed and verified
implementation of the corrective actions stated in the FPC response
letter dated September 16, 1988.
1
.
_
. _ - _ _ _ _ _
..
'
-
.
.
9
b.
(Closed) IFI 302/88-06-02, Review the licensee's investigation into
similar causes for failure of control rod drive breakers to reclose.
-The licensee has performed preventive maintenance on the trip
circuitry and a failure analysis has been performed on the suspect
breaker (#AC-1B) by the breaker manufacturer.
The failure has been
determined to be the result of an improperly adjusted trip latch.
Although the licensee's procedure for performing preventive mainte-
nance on these breakers includes a check of this adjustment, the
licensee believes that the adjustment was performed incorrectly in
the field.
c.
(Closed) IFI 302/87-19-03, Review the licensee's corrective action
associated with the loss of multiple radiation monitors and opening
i
of a reactor trip breaker.
'
The licensee has determined that the cau?.,e for this event was that
the equipment was not wired per plant drawings.
The wiring defi-
ciency has been corrected and insulation added to prevent the possi-
bility (>f short circuits.
d.
(Closed) IFI 302/88-29-03, Review the completion of the licensee's
corrective action for an improperly set radiation monitor.
The 1icensee has revised procedure SP-736, Liquid Radwaste (Batch
Mode) Surveillance Program, to provide a checklist for verification
that all major procedural steps have been completed and has reviewed
this event with each technician.
e.
(Closed) IFI 302/88-18-03, Review the revisions to the Technical
Specifications (TS) and surveillance procedures to reflect the
correct containment leakage test pressure.
The licensee has submitted a TS change request (TSCR #163 dated
November 28, 1988) and has revised the applicable surveillance
procedures to reflect a containment leakage test pressure of 53.3
psig.
f.
(Closed) IFI 302/88-11-02, Review the licensee's activities to
calibrate instrument MU-24-FI-2 and add this instrument to the safety
listing and routine calibration programs.
1
The licensee has calibrated this instrument and has added the
j
instrument to the safety listing and routine calibration program.
6.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on January 27, 1989.
During this
meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection
,
1
__. _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ .
_ . _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ___-_ _- - ____ _ _ - -___--_ -
..
,
- - .
..
O
10
'
as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the
violations.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did
l
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number
Description and Reference
50-302/89-01-01
Violation - Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1
requiring containment isolation valves be
50-302/89-01-02
Violation - Failure to assure that conditions
adverse to quality are promptly identified and
corrected.
_
50-302/89-01-03
Violation - Failure to adhere to the requirements
of OP-202 which resulted in an EFIC actuation.
50-302/89-LIV 13
LIV - Failure to sample a liquid radioactive
waste tank prior to release.
7.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
!
-
EFIC - Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System
'
Field Problem Report
-
Instrument Air Task Force
IATF
-
LER
- Licensee Event Report
,
'
- Modification Approval Record
Nonconforming Operation Report
NCOR
-
NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Once Through Steam Generator
-
j
Radiation Control Area
i
-
- Reactor Coolant Pump
- Radiation Work Permit
Surveillance Procedure
-
- Short Term Instruction
TS
- Technical Specification
- Violation
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _