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Insp Rept 50-302/89-01 on 890101-27.Three Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security,Radiological Controls,Ler & Nonconforming Operations Repts,Followup on Onsite Events & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Items
	ML20235P057
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	02/16/1989
From:	Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Tedrow J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20235P030	List: ML20235P028; ML20235P045; ML20235P057;
References
	50-302-89-01, 50-302-89-1, NUDOCS 8903020085
	Download: ML20235P057 (11)
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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

n ~* REGION 11.

$g 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

9g, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No: 50-302/89-01~

Licensee: Florida' Power Corporation

3201-34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

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Docket No: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72

Facility Name: ' Crystal River 3

Inspection Conducted: January 1 - January 27, 1989

Inspectors: iML- K . h3 L cQ l ir 189

P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident' Inspector Date' Signed

kki hu K . ho lm A f m / 69

J. Tedrow sident Inspector \ Date Signed

Approved by: / .

R. Pflenjak, frection Cipff

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D6te Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope

This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas

of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports

and Nonconforming Operations Reports, follow-up on onsite events, and licensee

action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conducted

and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observations were

conducted on backshifts.

Results

Thren violations were identified: Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1, paragraph

3.b(1); Failure to promptly identify and correct adverse conditions, paragraph

3.b(2); Failure to adhere to the requirements of an operating procedure,

paragraph 4.b.

A licensee identified violation is discussed in paragraph 3.a(1).

A weakness was identified in the shift supervisor's control of startup

activities which resulted in an inadvertent actuation of the emergency feed-

water system, paragraph 4.b.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support

F. Bailey, Superintendent Nuclear Projects

K. Baker, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Assurance

G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

J. Brandely, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning

J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support

B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

K. Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance

W. Marshall, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations

P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance

W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance

R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support

M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist

W. Worley, Manager, Nuclear Chemistry

Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations,

engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.

Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the

last paragraph.

2. Review of Plant Operations (71707)

The plant began this inspection period in cold shutdown (Mode 5) to

troubleshoot and initiate repairs to a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP).

Following repairs to the pump motor lower radial bearing support bracket

and repairs to stop leakage found on three control rod drive mechanism

flanges, a plant heatup was commenced and the hot standby (Mode 3) condi-

tion reached at 2:15 a.m. on January 12. On January 15 a reactor startup

was performed and criticality achieved at 2:20 p.m. followed by the

initiation of power operation (Mode 1) at 3:30 p.m. The plant continued

in puwer operation for the remainder of this inspection period.

a. Shift Logs and Facility Records (71707)

The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical Speci-

fications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Outage Shift

Manager's Log; Equipment Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist;

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Auxiliary ' Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily

Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions

(STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.

In . addition to . these record reviews, the inspector independently .

verified clearance' order tagouts.

No violations or deviations were identified.

b; Facility Tours and Observations (71707)

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to' '

. observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted

during backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee

meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and

management activities.

The ' facility-tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator

room; auxiliary building; reactor building; intermediate building;

battery rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation

and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated

parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current

operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid

radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating

parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(2) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspector verified that operating

shift staffing was' in accordance with TS requirements and that

control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and

professional manner. In addition, the inspector observed shift

turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant

status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant informa-

tion during these turnovers.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(3) Piant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of material and

components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas through-

out the facility were observed to determine whether safety

and/or fire hazards existed.

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'No violations or deviations were identified.

(4)' Radiological Protection Program (71707) - Radiation protection

control activities.were observed to verify that these activities

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were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures,

and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observa-

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.tions included:

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Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including'

step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated

clothing;

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Area postings and controls;

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Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and

contaminated areas;

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Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and,

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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment,

protective clothing, and' respiratory equipment.

Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the

inspector. The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the

controls were adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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(5) Security Control (71707) - In the course of the monthly

activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's

physical security program. The performance of various shifts of

the. security force was observed in the conduct of daily activ-

ities to include: protected and vital area access controls;

searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge issuance

and retrieval; escorting' of visitors; patrols; and compensatory

posts. In addition, the inspector ' observed the operational

status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the

Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm

stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area

barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with

operations and maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(6) Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staffing

and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing

was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,

actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equip-

ment, and fire barriers were operable.

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No violations or_ deviations were' identified.

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(7) Surveillance (61726) - Surveillance tests were. observed to j

veri fy that- approved procedures were ~ being used; qualified -

personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to

verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;

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and TS requirements were followed.-

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The following tests'were observed and/or data reviewed:

- SP-102, Control Rod Drop Time Tests;

- SP-317,. RC System Water Inventory Balance;

- SP-358C, Operations ES Monthly Automatic Actuation

Logic Functional Test #3;

- SP-390, Startup Surveillance Log;

- SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance;

- SP-430, Containment Air Locks Seal Leakage Test;

and,

- SP-435, Valve Testing During Cold Shutdown.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(8) Maintenance Activities (62703) -

The inspector observed

maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clear-

ances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention work

permits, as required, were issued and being followed; quality

control personnel were available for inspection activities as

required; and, TS requirements were being followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the

following maintenance activities:

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Replacement of the solenoid valve for MSV-130 in accordance

with modification. MAR 89-01-02-01;

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Preventive maintenance on the integrated control system in

accordance with procedure PM-170A, Pre-Operational Check of

the Integrated Control System;

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Continuity checks on emergency feedwater initiation and

control bypass pushbuttons; and,

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Repsck of the steam driven emergency feedwater pump (EFP .

in accordance with procedure MP-121, Pump Repacking.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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3. Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations

-Reports (71707)

a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic

impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions

appeared appropriate. Events that were reported immediately were

reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TSs were satisfied.

LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement

Policy.

(1) (0 pen) LER 88-26: This LER reported the failure to sample a-

radioactive liquid waste tank prior to releasing the contents to

the environment. Licensee personnel discovered this situation

during the performance of the release and took appropriate

action to terminate the release within 15 minutes of starting.

No ' regulatory limits were exceeded during this event. The

licensee attributes the cause for this event to be-a valve stuck

on its backseat with no valve position indication available.

This lead operators to believe that the valve was closed as

required by the release procedure. This matter is considered to

be a licensee identified violation in which appropriate correc-

tive action was taken to prevent recurrence. The LER will

remain open pending an evaluation by the licensee to provide

this valve and similar valves with the means of verifying valve

position.

(2) (0 pen) LER 88-27 and LER 88-28: These LERs reported deficient

environmental qualification ratings for plant equipment near an

auxiliary steam line in the auxiliary building and in several

safety related valve motor operators. These reports have been

referred to the NRC Region II Office.for followup by specialist

inspectors and will remain open pending NRC review.

(3) (Closed) LER 88-06: This LER reported a reactor trip and

feedwater transient and was previously discussed in NRC Inspec-

tion Report 50-302/88-11. The licensee has issued supplement 2

to this report dated Deccmber 13, 1988. The inspector has

reviewed and verified the corrective actions as stated in'this

supplement.

(4) (0 pen) LER 88-14: This LER reported excessive temperatures in

Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system piping. This report remained

open for reasons discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/

88-24. The licensee has issued supplement 1 to this report

dated January 23, 1989 and has issued correspondence dated

September 28, October 12, and October 21, 1989 on this subject.

The licensee has completed the following corrective action:

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Valves EFV-18 and EFV-33 have been repaired and valves

EFV-43 and EFV-44 have been replaced by plant modification

MAR 88-07-11-01/02;

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An analysis has been performed to upgrade the EFW system

piping to higher allowable temperatures;

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A leakage criteria of 612 ml/hr has been developed-for the

EFW containment isolation check valves. This criteria will

be implemented in applicable inservice testing surveillance

procedures; and,

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An analysis of water hammer effects concluded that although

water hammer loads could be induced during some operations

of the EFW system, the EFW system was not operated under

these conditions. An inspection of pipe hangers and

supports also showed no damage.

This LER remains open pending implementation of the leakage

criteria in applicable surveillance procedures.

b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to

verify the following: TS are complied with, corrective actions as

identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been

accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as required by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed in accordar, s with the current NRC

Enforcement Policy.

NCOR 89-05 was written on January 7, 1989 to document the

inoperability of two containment isolation valves due to undersized

ASCO solenoid valves. This NCOR also documented the deportability of

this condition. Valves MSV-130 and MSV-148 are the outside contain- .!

ment isolation valves for the Once Through Steam' Generator (OTSG)

blowdown lines. These lines are isolated by manualI

isolation valves

inside containment prior to power operations.

NCOR 89-07 was written on January 11, 1989 to document two more

inoperable containment isolation valves due to undersized ASCO

solenoids. CAV-6 and CAV-7 are the outside containment isolation

valves for the OTSG sample lines. The inboard, motor operated,

isolation valves are normally closed during power operations. The

condition of CAV-6/7 was discovered as part of the corrective action

initiated by NCOR 89-05.

NCOR 89-03 was written on January 5,1989 to document the evaluation

of a Field Problem Report (FPR) written on November 8, 1988. The FPR

stated that the MSV-130 and 148 solenoids were improperly sized and

that inadvertent valve opening could occur. The NCOR was evaluated

as non reportable due to the plant being in Mode 5 and therefore

these valves were a Mode 4 restraint.

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FPR T-88-0105 was written November 8,1988 and clearly stated the

undersized condition for the solenoids on MSV-130 and 148. This FPR

was evaluated on Novenaber 16, 1988 as having no regulatory or safety

issues. This evaluation was made by an engineering supervisor. To

summarize: The licensee recognized and documented that two contain-

l ment isolation valves had improper solenoid valves and could inadver-

l tently open and no action to report or correct this condition was

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taken until 60 days later. Also, on May 13, 1988 NRC Information

Notice 88-24 was issued to inform licensees of the possibility., and

possible consequences of undersized ASCO solenoid valves. Generic

Letter 88-14 was issued on August 8,1988 to require the licensee to

verify that the design of the entire instrument air system is in

accordance with its intended function. The 88-24 Notice and Generic

Letter (88-14) were turned over to the licensee's Instrument Air Task

Force (IATF) on November 28, 1988 for action. The IATF was formed on

September 16, 1988 in response to industry concerns on instrument air

system problems.

The events discribed above are considered to be in violation of:

(1) Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.1 which requires the

containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.6-1 to be

operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. MSV-130/148 and CAV 6/7

are included in Table 3.6-1.

Violation (302/89-01-01): Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1 requiring

containment isolation valves be operable.

(2) 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI which states that

measures shall be established to assure that conditions

adverse to quality, such as. . . , defective material and

equipment and non conformances are promptly identified and

corrected.

Violation (302/89-01-02): Failure to assure that conditions adverse

to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

4. Follow-up of Onsite Events (93702)

a. At 6:38 a.m. on January 18, with the plant operating at approximately

75% power, problems were experienced with the "A" Reactor Coolant

Pump (RCP-1A). Indications of low reactor coolant system flow and a

significant reduction in the pump motor's load current prompted

operators to secure the pump which resulted in an automatic plant

runback to approximately 65% power. All plant systems responded as

designed and the plant was stabilized at 65% power.

The licensee's initial analysis of this event indicate that a planer ,

separation has occurred between the pump / motor coupling and the I

impeller. A similar event occurred in January 1986 when the RCP-1A

shaft failed (see NRC Inspection Reports 50-302/85-44, 86-03, 86-07,

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86-08, 86-09 and LER 86-01 for more information on the previous

event). Corrective action associated with the previous event

included replacing all of the reactor coolant pump shafts.

The licensee presently plans to continue operation with three reactor

coolant pumps and has submitted a justification for continued opera-

tion dated January 27, 1989. An outage is scheduled for approxi-

mately February 23 to affect repairs to the pump. The licensee is

closely monitoring the vibration indications of the three remaining

RCPs.

b. At 4:36 a.m. on January 15 an Emergency Feedwater Initiation and

Control (EFIC) system actuation occurred. A plant heatup was in

progress in accordance with operating procedure OP-202, Plant Heatup,

which directed that a main feedwater pump be started in accordance

with procedure OP-605, Feedwater System. The startup procedure for

the main feedwater pump requires that the pump be latched, brought up

to speed and then tripped to verify proper operation. After latching

the pump, plant operators continued on with the heatup procedure

which required that shutdown bypass be removed from each Reactor

Protection System (RPS) channel. This action, in conjunction with

the subsequent tripping of the latched main feedwater pump, satisfied

the actuation logic of the EFIC system.

All EFIC components operated as designed and the system was secured

following the establishment of main feedwater.

Step 5.5.14 of procedure OP-202 includes a caution note that states

if at least one main feedwater pump is not latched prior to removing

RPS channels from shutdown bypass, an EFIC actuation may occur. The

inspectors discussed this event with the operating personnel. Both

the shift supervisor and the experienced operator performing the

plant heatup were aware of the caution note but failed to ensure a

main feedwater pump remained latched. Failure of the shift super-

visor to adequately control plant heatup activities is considered to

be a weakness which plant management should address. Failure to

adhere to the requirements of procedure OP-202 is contrary to the

requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be a violation.

Violation (302/89-01-03): Failure to adhere to the requirements of

OP-202 which resulted in an EFIC actuation.

5. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 &

92701)

a. (Closed) Violation 302/88-18-02, Failure to provide adequate

corrective actions to prevent exceeding the design temperature of

emergency feedwater piping. The inspector reviewed and verified

implementation of the corrective actions stated in the FPC response

letter dated September 16, 1988.

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b. (Closed) IFI 302/88-06-02, Review the licensee's investigation into

similar causes for failure of control rod drive breakers to reclose.

-The licensee has performed preventive maintenance on the trip

circuitry and a failure analysis has been performed on the suspect

breaker (#AC-1B) by the breaker manufacturer. The failure has been

determined to be the result of an improperly adjusted trip latch.

Although the licensee's procedure for performing preventive mainte-

nance on these breakers includes a check of this adjustment, the

licensee believes that the adjustment was performed incorrectly in

the field.

c. (Closed) IFI 302/87-19-03, Review the licensee's corrective action

associated with the loss of multiple radiation monitors and opening i

of a reactor trip breaker. '

The licensee has determined that the cau?.,e for this event was that

the equipment was not wired per plant drawings. The wiring defi-

ciency has been corrected and insulation added to prevent the possi-

bility (>f short circuits.

d. (Closed) IFI 302/88-29-03, Review the completion of the licensee's

corrective action for an improperly set radiation monitor.

The 1icensee has revised procedure SP-736, Liquid Radwaste (Batch

Mode) Surveillance Program, to provide a checklist for verification

that all major procedural steps have been completed and has reviewed

this event with each technician.

e. (Closed) IFI 302/88-18-03, Review the revisions to the Technical

Specifications (TS) and surveillance procedures to reflect the

correct containment leakage test pressure.

The licensee has submitted a TS change request (TSCR #163 dated

November 28, 1988) and has revised the applicable surveillance

procedures to reflect a containment leakage test pressure of 53.3

psig.

f. (Closed) IFI 302/88-11-02, Review the licensee's activities to

calibrate instrument MU-24-FI-2 and add this instrument to the safety

listing and routine calibration programs.

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The licensee has calibrated this instrument and has added the j

instrument to the safety listing and routine calibration program. l

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6. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on January 27, 1989. During this

meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection ,

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as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the

violations.

l The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed

by the inspectors during this inspection.

Item Number Description and Reference

50-302/89-01-01 Violation - Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1

requiring containment isolation valves be

operable.

50-302/89-01-02 Violation - Failure to assure that conditions

adverse to quality are promptly identified and

corrected. _

50-302/89-01-03 Violation - Failure to adhere to the requirements

of OP-202 which resulted in an EFIC actuation.

50-302/89-LIV 13 LIV - Failure to sample a liquid radioactive

waste tank prior to release.

7. Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCTV - Closed Circuit Television

CFR -

Code of Federal Regulations !

EFIC - Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System

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EFW - Emergency Feedwater System

FPR -

Field Problem Report

IATF -

Instrument Air Task Force

, LER - Licensee Event Report

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MAR - Modification Approval Record

NCOR -

Nonconforming Operation Report

NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OTSG -

Once Through Steam Generator j

RCA -

Radiation Control Area i

RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump

RPS - Reactor Protection System

RWP - Radiation Work Permit

SP -

Surveillance Procedure

STI - Short Term Instruction

TS - Technical Specification

VIO - Violation

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ML20235P057

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