IR 05000302/1999004
| ML20210G869 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210G862 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-99-04, NUDOCS 9908030221 | |
| Download: ML20210G869 (16) | |
Text
c
,
,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll
,
Docket No: 50-302 License No: DPR-72 Report No: 50-302/99-04 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation Facility: Crystal River 3 Nuclear Station
'
Location: 15760 West Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 Dates: May 23 through July 3,1999 Inspectors: J. Bartley, Acting Senior Resident inspector
, S. Sanchez, Resident inspector G. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist (Sections R1.2, R1.3, R7.1, R8.1 )
R. Reyes, Resident inspector, Turkey Point (Sections 01.1, O1.2)
S. Rudisail, Project Engineer (Section E8.1)
Approved by: A. Boland, Acting Chief, Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
~
9908030221 990727 PDR ADOCK 05000302 C PDR
'
_
. 1 i-
}
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
!
Crystal River 3 Nuclear Station i NRC Inspection Report 50-302/99-04
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, j and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection. In addition, it '
includes the results of announced inspections by a regional project engineer, a regional radiation specialist, and a resident inspector from another plan Operations
Non-licensed operators exhibited a questioning attitude when reviewing plant operation issues. The non-licensed operators were observed to be taking responsibility for housekeeping issues. On numerous occasions the non-licensed operators identified and removed miscellaneous equipment, such as unsecured ladders, which had been left behind from jobs being worked during the previous shift. (Sections 01.1 and O1.2)
- Response to a reactor coolant pump power monitor relay failure was comprehensiv Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering personnel effectively communicated and coordinated the troubleshooting and repair efforts. Operations' implementation of Technical Specifications actions was conservative. (Section 01.3)
A non-cited violation was identified for a 1995 failure to comply with Emergency Feedwater initiation and Control system Technical Specifications due to a bypassed reactor coolant pump power monitor which affected the system's operability. This condition was identified by the licensee during review of a recent reactor ~ 7l ant pump power monitor relay failure. (Section O8.1) l l
Maintenance
. Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were generally conducted in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions. Control of work to replace the white permissive light for makeup pump 1 MUP-1B was anticipatory and effective. Good command and control and effective communications, by both the operating crew and Reactor Engineering, were observed during the performance of Moderator Temperature Coefficient surveillance activitie (Sections M1.1 and E1.1)
Enaineerina
- The Year 2000 checklist, per Temporary instruction 2515/141, was completed. At the time of the inspection, the Year 2000 project was 96 percent complete for equipment and applications, and the contingency planning was about 98 percent complete. Both programs were on target to be completed by their scheduled due dates. (Section E8.1)
!
.
.
- . 2 l
Plant Suonort
.
Workers demonstrated appropriate knowledge and application of radiological control practices. Area controls and storage practicos at the radioactive material storage warehouse and tank facilities were odequate to protect public health and safety.
(Section R1.1)
,
.-
Radiological controls were implemented and maintained in accordance with the Updated l Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, license conaitions, and l 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. (Section R1.2)
!
.
.
Occupational worker doses were within regulatory limits for calendar year 1998 and for year-to-date 1999. ALARA program implementation was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and year-to-date 1999 cumulative exposure met established geal (Section R1.3)
l
.
Evaluations and corrective actions regarding inaccurate mini-purge gaseous effluent radionuclide concentrations and associated dose calculations were appropriate. Offsite doses resulting from mini-purge gaseous releases using an incorrect flow rate in final dose calculations contained small errors but were well within regulatory limits.
! (Section R7.1)
l l
l
! l
<
.
!
!
,
l I
'
-
!
Report Details Summary of Plant Status I
The plant began the inspection period at full rated thermal power and remained at that level until June 4, when power was lowered to 85% to repair a leak on the D circulating water condenser j outlet bo.1 The plant was restored to 100% power on June {
l I. Operations j j
01 Conduct of Operations l 0 Routine Conduct of Operations Reviews (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors performed routine reviews of plant j operations which included plant tours, shift turnovers, log reviews, response to emergent i problems, implementation and interpretation of Technical Specifications (TS), daily meetings, and control room observations. The inspectors noted operator response to annunciator alarms and equipment status was prompt. The operating crew consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing plant activitie ,
Operations shift tumover meetings were well conducted and thorough. Good communications and interactions were observed throughout the meetings. A questioning attitude was noted on the part of non-licensed operators (NLOs) reviewing plant operation issue .2 Buildina Operator Tours (71707)
The inspectors observed several NLOs perform their plant tours as the Primary Plant Operator. The NLOs identified deficiencies and communicated them to the control roo Throughout the tours, NLOs were consistently looking for equipment discrepanc:as. On l several occasions, the inspectors questioned the NLOs on the status of various plant equipment, specifically on tagged equipment. The NLOs were well versed in the status
,
of the out-of-service equipment and in the overall plant status. In addition, the NLOs were observed to be taking responsibility for housekeeping issues. The inspectors noted
'
l on numerous occasions that NLOs identified and removed miscellaneous equipment, l such as unsecured ladders, which had been left behind from jobs being worked during the previous shif .3 Response to Reactor Coolant Pumo Power Monitor Relav Failure Inspection Scope (71707. 92700)
The inspectors observed the licensee's response to a Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitor (RCPPM) relay failure. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluations and TS determination .
,
'
b. Observations and Findinas , j On May 24, the licensee identified a failure on RCPPM Cabinet 1, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1C module, while performing Surveillance Procedure (SP)-110A, "A" Channel Reactor Protection System Functional Testing. The licensee entered TS 3.3.1, Action C, which required tripping the RCPPM within four hours if one or more RCPPMs for one RCP were inoperable. At shift turnover, Operations personnel discussed the TS requirements to trip the RCPPM, the expected indications when the RCCPM was tripped, and what TS actions would be required if the expected response did not occur. Initial assessments indicated that the RCPPM output relay from the "C" RCP to the "B" Reactor Protection System (RPS) channel was the failed componen RCPPM-3A was tripped to comply with TS 3.3.1, Action C, within the TS allowed action time. The response of the RPS confirmed the initial assessment was accurate. The failed output relay did not input an RCP 1C trip signal into RPS Channel B when RCPPM-3A was tripped. Operations personnel evaluated the response of the RPS and
, determined that tripping RCPPM-3A did not meet the intent of TS because it did not input
!
a tripped signal into RPS Channel B. The licensee declared RPS Channel B inoperable, entered TS 3.3.1, Condition A and tripped the channel.
!
During discussions on whether to place RPS Channel B in trip or bypass, and while reviewing the electrical diagrams for the RPS RCP Monitor Subassembly, Operations 1 and Engineering personnelidentified that the RCPPM failure could affect the Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) system. Afar further research, Operations and Engineering determined that the failed relay did impact EFIC and entered TS 3.3.11, Condition A. EFIC Channel B was pieced in the " Loss of RCPs" trip condition to comply I with TS 3.3.11, Action The inspectors independently developed a time line of events and TS actions and l concluded that the appropriate TS action statements were entered and that no TS l required action times were exceeded. However, the inspectors determined that Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering personnel were slow to identify the RCPPM-3A failed relay's impact on EFIC. This was due to a general lack of understanding of the RCPPM system's interface with EFIC. The inspectors reviewed the TS bases and the lesson plans for RPS and EFIC and determined that the RCPPM to ,
EFIC interface was not clearly explained. The licensee attributed the cause to j inadequate development of the EFIC instrumentation specification when EFlC was installed, in that it inappropriately credited the signal from the RCPPMs in the RPS !
specification. - 1 l
Due to the lack of clarity of the TS and the level of understanding of the relationship i i
between the RCPPMs and EFIC, the licensee reviewed the maintenance history of the RCPPMs to determine if there were any past TS implications. The licensee's review i identified one instance in 1995 where the required actions of TS 3.3.11 for EFIC were not taken when an RCPPM was placed in bypass. Licensee Event rieport (LER) i
'
50-302/99-03-00 was submitted to report the 1995 event. 'The LER, safety significance, and enforcement aspects of this issue are addressed in Section 0 .
The inspectors discussed the RCPPM relay failure mode with the system engineer. The relay has an electronic timing circuit which failed to time out and de-energize the rela The relay's contacts were not binding mechanically. Although the failed relay did not input a trip signal into RPS when the RCPPM module was tripped, the system engineer l determined that it would have performed its required function on loss of power to the RCPPM cabinet. The relay would not have performed its required function for a normal loss of the RCP due to a RCP trip or other failure mode which would affect RCP powe ' Conclusions The licensee's overall response to a RCPPM relay failure was comprehensiv Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering personnel effectively communicated and coordinated the troubleshooting and repair efforts. Operations' implementation of TS actions was conservativ O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 General Tours and Inspections of Safety Systems (71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to observe the physical condition of plant equipment and structures. The inspectors verified the operability of selected, risk significant safety systems and equipment, including auxiliary feedwater, emergency diesel generators, and vital 250 volt direct current batteries. The systems were verified to be properly aligned and maintaine Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
08.1 (Closed) LER 50-302/99-03-00: Inadequate Development of instrumentation Specification Leads to Operation Prohibited by improved Technical Specifications. The licensee determined that TS 3.3.11, EFIC Instrumentation, was applicable when the RCPPMs were placed in bypass. This was identified by the licensee's staff while responding to the RCPPM relay failure discussed in Section O1.3 of this report. The
'
inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and determined that they were adequate. The inspectors also concluded that the corrective action to update the TS Bases will also address the generallack of understanding of the RCPPM to EFIC interface, discussed in Section 0 TS 3.3.11 requires four EFIC instrumentation channels for each function in Table 3.3.11-1 to be operable. Table 3.3.11-1, item 1.d, is RCP status. TS 3.3.11, Action A.1 requires that for the EFIC functions listed in Table 3.3.11-1, with one channel inoperable, the channel be placed in bypass or trip in one hour. RCPPM operability is specifically addressed in TS 3.3.1, Condition C, and TS 3.0.6 allows recognition of the supported system EFIC operability without entering the Conditions and Required Actions of the supported system specifications (3.3.11). However, TS 3.0.6 does not apply after the four-hour period allowed by TS 3.3.1, Condition C, expires. Contrary to this, on September 2,1995, with the unit in Mode 1, the RCPPM Channel 1 for RCP-1D was bypassed without also placing the affected EFIC channel in trip or bypass because i , . __
',-
-
l
operators did not recognize that RCPPMs affected EFIC operability. The plant remained in this condition until the plant was shutdown on October 14,199 The failure to place the affected EFIC channel in the tripped condition was of low safety significance. Coincident with a single failure of the other RCP-1D RCPPM, EFIC would not have (1) automatically initiated due to the loss of all reactor coolant pumps; and (2) automatically fed the steam generators (SG) to the natural circulation cooldown setpoint. However, for the time period in question the alternate RCPPM was in service and could have provided the necessary signal on loss of all four RCPs. The EFIC initiation on loss of all RCPs is a backup start signal and is not taken credit for in the accident analysis, and during the period other EFIC initiators remained operable. The failure of EFIC to automatically feed SGs to the natural circulation setpoint would also be J
recognized by the operators who monitor SG levels per the Emergency Operating Procedure This licensee identified Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and will be referenced as NCV 50-302/99-04-01, Failure to Recognize RCPPM Effects on EFIC Operability. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Precursor Card S9-1793. This LER is close '
l lI. Maintenance
.M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Routine Observations Inspection Scooe (61726. 62707)
The inspectors observed and reviewed portions of selected licensee corrective and preventive maintenance activities, and routine surveillance testing which included the following:
= Surveillance Procedure (SP)-333, Control Rod Exercise, Revision 27
- SP-108, Reattor Trip Module and Control Rod Drive Trip Functional Test, Revision 10
- SP-3408, DHP-1 A, BSP-1 A, and Valve Surveillance, Revision 40
= SP-324, Containment inspection, Revision 39
- Work Request (WR) 359378, SFRS-1 Rupture Disk Replacement
- WR 359525, Replace White Permissive Light on MUP-18 "A" Side Control Switch Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed the licensee's preparation for and initiation of WR 359525, to replace the Main Control Board (MCB) white permissive light for makeup pump MUP-1 The inspectors determined that the licensee's control of this work was an example of l
!
l w
r ,
,
I i
active oversight by operations. The work request addressed the removal of three fuses that provided direct current (DC) power to selected MCB indications. An operator on shift independently verified which MCB indications would be lost due to pulling the fuses and specifically located each indicator on the MCB. After the electricians pulled the first two fuses, the operators immediately noted that they did not lose the expected indications. The operators then informed the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) and walked down the MCBs to identify what indications were lost. Tha NSS directed the electricians to reinstall the fuses and secure the work. Operations and Maintenance personnel quickly identifkHf that the problem was due to a discrepancy on the electrical diagram used to plan the work and that the fuses that were pulled did not result in entry into any Technical Specification condition. The licensee initiated a Precursor Card (PC) 99-2048 to address the discrepanc During a reactor building (RB) entry on June 15,1999, the inspectors noticed black l debris on the 119-foot elevation floor directly below the air intake screen for air handling
'
fan AHF-3A. Upon exiting the RB, the licensee indicated that the debris observed by the inspectors, most likely originated from the work on AHF-3A after replacement of its motor was completed a few weeks prior. The inspectors and the licensee determined that the debris was not a sump clogging concern due to the nature of the material. However, the inspectors noted that none of the groups that entered the RB had identified the debri The licensee indicated that the cleanup of the black debris would be addressed during the next RB entry, Conclusions All observed maintenance work activities and surveillance testing were performed in accordance with work instructions, procedures, and applicable clearance controls. The licensee's control of work to replace the white permissive light for makeup pump MUP-1B was anticipatory and effectiv . Enoineerina l
E1 Conduct of Engineering E Moderator Temoerature Coefficient Determination (37551)
On' June 9,199J,'the inspectors observed the performance of surveillance procedure (SP)-101, Moderator Temperature Coefficient [MTC) Determination at 300 PPM [ parts per million] Boron. , This procedure was performed shortly after the plant reached a rated thermal power all rods out equilibrium boron concentration equivalent to 300 ppm boro The on-shift operating crew displayed good command and control and effectively utilized ,
- three-way communication throughout the evolution. Reactor Engineering supervision presence was noted throughout the evolution with good and frequent communication with the on-shift operating cre r
.
.
After Reactor Engineering evaluated the surveillance data, a determination was made that the MTC at the end-of-cycle (EOC) would exceed the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) lower limit value. The current core condition and MTC were determined to be acceptable. The current lower limit was established during the COLR analysis for Cycle 11 performed in March 1996. After further evaluation, the licensee determined that some conservatism for the MTC lower limit was built-in and could be re-evaluated to determine a new lower limit. In addition, as a result of the re-analysis of the main steam line break accident during the design basis outage, additional margin for the MTC lower i
limit was also availabh. Because of this built-in conservatism and additional margin, a l
new limit was established and has been issued as Revision 2 of the COLR (F96-0001).
The inspectors determined that the licensee's analysis and revised MTC at EOC were i
adequate and reasonable.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues E8.1 Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness Proaram Review (Tl 2515/141):
The staff conducted an abbreviated review of Y2K activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/141, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." The review addressed aspects of Y2K management planning, documentation, implementation planr.ing, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, notification activities, and contingency planning. The reviewer used NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the primary references for this review.
l During the review, the licensee stated that the Y2K Readiness Project activities were l 96 percent complete for equipment and software applications, and contingency planning l was approximately 98 percent complete. Both programs were on target to be completed by their scheduled due date Conclusions regarding the Y2K readiness of the facility are not included in this repor The results of this review will be combined with the results of reviews of other licensees in a summary report to be. issued by July 31,199 IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Conduct of Radioloaical Protection Controls (71750)
The inspectors made frequent tours of Radiological Control Areas (RCA), observed work activities in progress, and discussed procedural requirements. Plant personnel observed working demonstre.ed appropriate knowledge and application of radiological control practices. Health physics technicians (HPT) generally provided positive control and support of work activities in the RCAs. The inspectors accompanied an HPT during a monthly routine survey of the radioactive material storage warehouse and tank facilitie :
l
.
.
)
)
l
Area controls and storage practices were observed to be adequate to protect public health and safety, and survey results indicated 10 CFR Part 20 limits were not being exceeded. The inspectors identified some minor deficiencies which were provided to the licensee for correctio R1.2 Conduct of Radioloaical Protection Controls (83750. 84750. 86750) OqMion Scooe During tours of the RCA, the inspector observed routine work activitics in progress, discussed procedural and Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements with workers, and verified selected radiation survey results. Radiological controls and housekeeping practices in selected RCA locations including the auxiliary building, spent fuel pool, and outside solid radioactive waste and material dorage areas were observed. Personal dosimetry use, area postings, container labels, ncuseke7 ping, and contro!s for high radiation areas and locked-high radiation areas were reviewed and evaluate Implementation of radiation protection activities were compared against applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), TS, license conditions, and 10 CFR Part 2 Observations and Findinas Workers were knowledgeable of radiological conditions and RWP requirement l Postings and container labels were maintained in accordance with the associated access l controls or radiological conditions. High radiation areas and locked-high radiation areas i were controlled appropriately. Excluding facility areas undergoing maintenance activities l at the time of the inspection, housekeeping practices and contamination controls within l the auxiliary building and radioactive waste storage areas were acceptable, with RCA
,
unrestricted areas maintained radiologically clean and uncluttered.
! I l Conclusions Radiological controls were implemented and maintained in accordance with UFSAR, TS, license conditions, and 10 CFR Part 20 requirement R1.3 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Procram implementation (83750) Inspection Scope-Selected occupational worker exposures, site cumulative dose expenditures, and proposed ALARA program initiatives were reviewed and discussed. ALARA planning activities for selected high dose expenditure tasks to be conducted during the upcoming Refueling Cycle 11 outage (RFO11) were reviewed and discusse Program activities were evaluated against applicable sections of 10 CFR Part 20, TS, and approved procedure . 7 '
.;
l 8 Observations and Findinas For calendar year 1998 (CY98) and year-to-date 1999 (YTD99), all individual occupational worker exposures were within established administrative and regulatory limit The three-year average (1096 -1998) cumulative dose upenditure for the site was approximately 184 person rem (3-year average) compared to the three-year industry average of approximately 120 person-rem per Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). For CY99, a dose expenditure goal of 175 person-rem, with 125 person rem budgeted for outage activities was established. T'3e inspectors verified that previous work packages and lessons learned were incorporated into the ALARA planning and dose-budgeting process. As of June 2,1999, the expenditure of approximately 7.897 person-rem, with j 3.911 person-rem attributed to routine on-line activitim and 3.983 person-rem attributed '
to pre-cutage work, was within the estimated total dose budget of 20 rem. Review and discussion of doses for selected on-going tasks, e.g., Low Pressure Injectien/High Pressure injection work, RCA painting, and reactor coolant system inspection at power, verified that dose expenditures were within established goal )
ALARA initiatives implemented or planned for RFO11 included initiation of chemically induced shutdown crud burst evolution followed by extended cleanup to reduce source term, continued improvement in remote personnel monitoring, and improved work planning and controls. Other proposed ALARA initiatives for future outages included cobalt reduction efforts, installation of permanent shielding; and an improved design review processes for installation of temporary shieldin Conclusig.02 Occupational worker doses were within regulatory limits for CY98 and YTD99. ALARA
_
program implementation was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and )
YTD99 cumulative expoue met established goal R7 Quality Assurance in RP & C Activities '84750) l
R7.1l ~ Qualification of Mini-ourae Gaseous Radioactive Material ) Insoection Scope
- The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions regarding an effluent release procedural error which resulted in use of an incorrect flow i rate for calculating post-release radionuclide quantities and resultant offsite doses from mini-purge release . Rese were compared against TS,10 CFR Part 20 and Offsite Dose Calculation ;
Manual (ODCM) requirement '
l
[' l
f .
,-
9 . Observations and Findinos l
The licensee documented the identif;ed concern and preliminary findings in l PC 3-C99-1565. From review and discussion of mini-putge pre-release methodology, which included use of the maximum reactor building volume available for release, the
! inspectors verified that the no offsite dose limits were exceeded. This pre-release
! methodology assured + Sat regulatory limits would not be exceeded during any planned release. However, use of the incorrect flow rate for the final post-release calculations resulted in inaccurate dose assessments. For approximately 23 mini-purge releases conducted since 1989 which were re-evaluated by the licensee, use of the proper flow rate resulted in a minor increase, on the order of a fraction of a millirem, in offsite air, total body and maximum organ doses, relative to the previously reported doses. During l c3cussions, licensee representatives verified that no additional procedures, including emergency operating procedures, were affected by use of the improper flow rate meter, The licensee will report the corrected doses to the NR I Conclusions l Ongoing licensee evaluations and corrective actions regarding inaccurate mini-purge
- gaseous effluent radionuclide concentrations and associated dose calculations were
'
appropriate. Offsite doses resultina from mini-purge gaseous releases using an {
,
i incorrect flow rate in final dose calculations contained small errors but were well Nithin regulatory limits.
l R Miscellaneous Radiation Protection and Chemistry issues (86750)
!
R8.1 (Closed) Inspector Followuo item (IFI) 50-302/98-11-04: Compare Actual to Estimated Scaling Factors for Mixed Resin Shipment. The status of the licensee's actions regarding the accuracy of concentration values for hard-to-measure radionuclides in a June 1998 radioactive resin waste shipment were reviewed and discussed. The inspectors verified that the issue was tracked under PC 3-C99-1804 pending receipt of the vendor final results expected by the end of July 1999. This item is close V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 6,1999. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from '
the license !
-
'
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensees i S. Bernhoft, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs J. Cowan, Vice President, Nuclear Operations R. Davis, Assistant Plant Director, Operations
. R. Grazio, Director, Nuclear Site and Business Support G. Halnon, Director, Nuclear Quality Programs J. Holden, Vice President and Director, Site Nuclear Operations '-
C. Pardee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations D. Roderick, Director, Nuclear Engineering & Projects M. Schiavoni, Assistant Plant Director, Maintenance T. Taylor, Director, Nuclear Operations Training NR G. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist, Region ll (June 7-11,1999)
R. Reyes, Resident inspector, Turkey Point (June 7-11,1999)
S. Rudisail, Project Engineer, Region 11 (June 7-10,1999)
,
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations I IP 62707: Conduct of Maintenance
!
IP 71707: Plant Operations a
, IP 71750: Plant Support Activities )
l lP 83750: Occupation Radiation Exposure ( IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring I i IP 86750: Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Material
! IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor L Facilities Tl 2515/141: Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants l
, ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
- i
Opened l l
50-302/99-04-01 NCV Failure to Recognize RCPPM Effects on EFIC Operabilit ,
(Sect lon 08.1) .
!
i o
..
,
,--
,
.
l
Closed
I 50-302/99-04-01 NCV Failure to Recognize RCPPM Effects on EFIC Operability, (Section C8.1)
l 50-302/99-03-00 LER Inadequate Development of Instrumentation Specification Leads to Operation Prohibited by Improved Technical Specification (Section O8.1)
50-302/98-11-04 IFl Compare Actual to Estimated Scaling Factors for Mixed Resin Shipment. (Section R8.1)
,
l l
i
.
l
.
l
~
.
I l
FPC 3 Distribut}on w/ encl:
L. Plisco, Ril A. Boland, Ril I S. Ninh, Ril L. Wiens, NRR P. Steiner, Ril PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6745 N. Tallahassee Road Crystal River, FL 34428 l
I l
l
,
l
.
l
!
a _J Y OFFICE Ril;DRP RII:DRP Ril;DRL M R DRP R!l:DRl[,g' Ril:DR5 Ril:DRS g
& ir 08 " M E M// i FF ME -7 J- Jh- bi Edanchef 'g 3Rpisail
'
tReyes Vg GKuzo KLandyy OXTE 7/j]/99 7/ /99 7/7lg (7 7Q //99 7/feK 7/M/99 7@ 'g COPY? YE5 NO YE5 NO YES ( NU) YES NO YES / NO ) YES (NO) YES [NO)
"
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAM: G:\ CRYSTAL \ REPORTS \990 $$leepVitKS @rks4Wurde. . %'$
,
.
.
07-26-1999 09:38AM FROM US tRC FARLEY TO 1404i 24515 P.01
~
IJonsman Bel 1 ley - vvu4.wpd ynge og s
l i
- FPC i Distribution w/ encl
L Plisco, Ril
,
,
A. Boland, Ril
! S. Ninh, Ril L. Wens, NRR P. Steiner, Rll -
UBLIC
! NRC ident inspector U.S.Nu er Regulatory Commission 6745 N. Tal asee Road Crystal Rivei, 34428 l
/
/
/
s' )
, l l
l
\
f l
-
I l
N
\
N I /
'N
,/ \
/
s
/
RE:DRP MN:DRP Rit:DRP RE:DRP Rit:DRS RH:DR8 OFFICE Rit:DRPs SIONATURE g NAaIE sNinh JBergey SSenchor SRudleell RReyes GKuro m ndh 71 199 Tl 19 9 7f 199 7/
DATE 7/ 19 9 71 % 7/ 199 NO YEs NO YE8 NU YES COPY? YES YES( (40 ) YEs YEs
"'" '
OPPICIAL RECORD COPY mi P'MnCRYsTALWivvusW904.wpd
!
TOTAL P.01