ML20196B125
| ML20196B125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1988 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Stetka T, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196B084 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-88-14, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEB-88-001, IEB-88-1, IEC-81-13, NUDOCS 8806300197 | |
| Download: ML20196B125 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1988014
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UNITED STATES-
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION li
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-302/88-14
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th' Street, South
,
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
Docket No.: 50-302
License No.:
Facility Name:
Crystal River 3
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April 16 - May 11,1988
Inspection Conduct 4
Inspectors:
'M
/p/ 4/8T
T. Stetka, S
iorpesidentInspector
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Dite/ Signed
W-
awa 2n
Wh/d
J. Tedr ,Residentghspector
Datd Signed
Approved by: [.
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R.'Crienjaf,'SectioVChief
Dite Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the
areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event
Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, review of NRC Bulletins and
Circulars, offsite review committee activities, and licensee action on previous
inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility
operations observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted on
backshifts.
Results: One violation and one deviation were identified: Failure to adhere
to plant procedures, paragraphs 4.b.(1) and 4.b.(8)(a);
Failure to meet a
commitment as specified in the FSAR, paragraph 3.f.
One unresolved item * was identified involving operability of the incore
thermocouple temperature monitoring system, paragraph 5.b.
"dnresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
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8806300197 880614
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ADOCK 05000302
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- J. Alberdi, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support.
'*J. Bufe'-Carr, Nuclear _ Regulatory Specialist
- J..Colby, Manager,. Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Services
- M._ Collins, Superintendent, Nuclear Safety and Reliability
D. Cook, Nuclear Engineer
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- J. Cooper, Superintendent, Technical Support
P. Ezell, Radiochemistry and Environmental Specialist
- D. Fields, Nuclear Shift Supervisor
A. Gelston, Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services
- V. Hernandez, Supervisor, Nuclear Quality Assurance Surveillance
B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
J. -Holton, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection
- A. Kazemfer, Supervisor, Radiological Support Services
- P. McKee,. Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- T. Montgomery, Nuclear Maintenance Specialist
G. Moore, Chairman, Nuclear General Review Committee
'*R. Murgatroyd, Superintendent, Nuclear Maintenance
- S. Robinsc9., Superintendent, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation
Protection
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- V.'Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance & Outages
- W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
- R. Wittman, Superintendent, Nuclear 0peratioris
C. Woody, Nuclear Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations,
engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
ExitInterview(30703)
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
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at the conclusion of the inspection on May 11, 1988. During this meeting,
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the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they
are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violation,
deviation, and an unresolved item.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments end did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
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by the inspector during this inspection.
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 &
92701)
a.
(Closed) Violation 302/87-17-06:
Failure to' review and approve the
Inservice Inspection Program and changes to this program as required
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by TS 6.8.2.b.
Verification and implementation of the corrective actions were
completed as stated in paragraph 3 of NRC Inspection Report
50 '?2/88-01 with the exception of revising procedure AI-701, Conduct
of Inservice Inspection.-
Procedure- AI-701 was revised 'and
implemented on April 20, 1988.
The inspector reviewed the revised
procedure and considars this item complete.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 302/87-04-01:
Review the . licensee's
activities regarding preventive maintenance procedures.
As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-19, the licensee
developed a schedule to review and revise Preventive Maintenance (PM)
procedures.
The licensee has completed their review of the 55 PM
procedures and has revised 46 procedures.
All procedure revisions
were completed by April 15, 1988.
The inspector's review of the
upgrade program and a sampling review of eight procedures indicate
program completion.
It appears that this upgrade program will
minimize future implementation problems with the PM procedures,
c.
(Closed) IFI 302/87-17-04:
Review the licensee's activities to
reduce the ambiguity in procedure SP-403.
Procedure SP-403, Decay Heat Removal System Valves Automatic Closure
and Interlock Verification, was revised and implemented on March 15,
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1988.
The revised procedure appears to resolve the ambiguity
problem.
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d.
(Closed)IFI 302/86-12-01:
Review the licensee's investigations into
the pumping fai' lure of SWP-1B.
As discussed in paragraph 3 of NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-10,
the licensee had resolved the nuclear services closed cycle cooling
pump (SWP) gas binding problem through the use of a temporary venting
system.
The licensee completed installation of a permanent venting
system, which was installed in accordance with modification (MAR)
86-04-24-02 on December 28, 1987.
The inspector verified proper
installation of this system in accordance with the MAR.
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(0 pen) IFI 302/87-10-05:
Review actions for a disconnected wire from
the control switch for valve MUV-25.
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The licensee has repaired the disconnected wire and issued a Field
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Problem Report (FPR) to resolve the cause of this situation. The FPR
concluded that these wire connections could become dislodged by
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inadvertent contact during maintenance activities in areas adjacent
to the switches.
Based upon the : failure history of this type of
switch, the licensee does not believe a generic problem exists, but
will continued to track and trend these failures in the future. The
FPR also recommended that procedures SP-850, Main Control Boa'rd
Wiring -- and Housekeeping Inspection, and CP-113, Handling and
Controlling Work Requests and Work Packages, be changed to include
the requirement to verify that maintenance performed near these
switches did not inadvertently disconnect any of the wires.
This
item will
remain open pending disposition of the FPR's
recommendations.
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f.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 302/87-28-04:
Review the licensee's
evaluation of the effect of an increase in raw water system
temperature.
This issue was initially identified during an NRC Operational Safety
Team Inspection (OSTI) and reported as observation 302/87-22-02 in
NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-22.
The issue identified the fact
that the inlet cooling temperature of the seawater to the nuclear-
services seawater (RW) system was higher than the 85 degrees
Fahrenheit (F) design temperature specified in the Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) paragraph 9.5.1 and table 9-12 for the nuclear
services closed cycle cooling (SW) and decay heat closed cycle
cooling (DC) heat exchangers.
There have been a number of occasions
where the seawater cooling temperature exceeded the 85 degrees F
design temperature, with a peak observed temperature of 90.5 degrees
F.
The licensee has completed their analysis of the effect of the higher
temperatures upon the SW and DC systems.
The present analysis
results indicate that the SW and DC systems are qualified for
operation with seawater cooling temperatures up to 92
degrees F,
however this temperature is in excess of the 85 degrees F temperature
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specified in the FSAR.
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Failure to meet a commitment to the NRC as specified in FSAR
paragraph 9.5.1 and table 9-12 is considered to be a Deviation.
Deviation (302/88-14-01):
Failure to meet the 85 degrees F seawater
cooling temperature commitment as specified in FSAR paragraph 9.5.1
and table 9-12.
For record purposes, unresolved item 302/87-28-04 is closed and
further activity on this issue will be tracked in accordance with the
Deviation.
4.
Review of Plant ')perations (71707)
The plant continued in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this
inspection period.
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a.
- Shift Logs and Facility Records-(71707)
The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations personnel to verify compliance with the- Technical
Specifications (TS) and th'e licensee's administrative procedures.
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The following records were r'eviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment
Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building
Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance
Log; Work Request Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and Selected
Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.
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In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently
verified clearance order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identified,
b.-
Facility Tours and Observations (71707)
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. .Some
operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and
management activities.
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The facility tours and observations encomp(assed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room
CR); emergency diesel
generator room; auxiliary building (AB); intermediate building (IB);
battery rooms; and electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
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(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following inst'umentation
and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated
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parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current
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operational mode:
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Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid
radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating
parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
During a routine tour of the AB on May 6,1988, the inspector
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noticed that valve SWV-13, the inlet valve to the
"A" Nuclear
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Services Heat Exchanger (SWHE-1A), was in the closed position
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vice the normal open position.
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The inspector reviewed the system operating procedure OP-408,
Nuclear Services Cooling System, to~ ascertain the required
. position for valve SWV-13.
Section 5.1 of this procedure
establishes the initial conditions for system operation and
requires, in Valve Checklist I, that valve SWV-13 be'open.
Upon
notification of this finding, licensee personnel repositioned
valve SWV-13 to the open position.
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The nuclear services closed cycle cooling (SW) system supplies
cooling water to various safety related components and consists
of four heat exchangers.
The licensee nonnally operates with
one of four exchangers removed from service.
However, while
placing SWHE-1A out of service, the inlet valve vice the
correct outlet valve was closed.
The three remaining heat
exchangers were in service as required by the TS.
Failure to implement the requirements of procedure OP-408 is
contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to
be a violation.
Violation (302/88-14-02):
Failure to implement the requirements
of plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.
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(2) Safety Systems Walkdown (71710) -- The inspector conducted a
walkdown of the Decay Heat Removal (OH) system to verify that
the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for
system operability and that the system drawing and procedure
correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(3) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspector verified that operating
shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that
control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and
professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift
turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant
status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant
information during these turnovers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of material and
components, anc cleanliness conditions of various areas
throughout the facility were observed to determine whether
safety and/or fire hazards existed.
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The inspector noted a degradation of housekeeping in both the
"A"
and "B" decay heat pump pits.
While there apparently has
been ongoing work in these areas, the areas exhibit a general
lack of cleanliness when compared to other areas of the plant
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which also have ongoing work.
The licensee management was
notified of and acknowledged the inspector's concerns.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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(5) Radiological Protection Program (71709) - Radiation protection
control activities were observed to verify that these activities
were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
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observations included:
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Selected licensee conducted surveys;
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Entry -to' and exit from contaminated areas, including
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step-off -pad. conditions and disposal of contaminated
clothing;
Area postings and controls;
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Work activity within radiation, 'high radiation, and
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contaminated areas;
Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and
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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment,
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protective clothing, and respiratory equipment.'
Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the
inspector.
The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the
controls were adequate.
The implementation of the licensee's As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) program was reviewed to determine personnel
involvement in the objectives and goals of the program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(6) Security Control (71881)
In the course of the it.onthly
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activities, the inspector included a review of the licensee's
physical security program.
The composition of the security
organization was checked to insure that the minimum number of
guards were available and that security activities were
conducted with proper supervision.
The performance of various
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shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities to include:
protected and vital area access
controls; searching of personnel, packages, and vehicles; badge
issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and
compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspector observed the
operational status of Closed Circuit Television monitors, the
Intrusion Detection system in the central and secondary alarm
stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital area
barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with
operations and maintenance.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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(7)
Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staffing
and equiment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing
was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equirment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emerger.cy
equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identifi.ed.
(8)
Surveillance (61726) - Surveillance tests were observed to
verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified
personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to
verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;
and TS requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
-SP-181,ContainmentAirLockTest(Semiannual);
- SP-192, High Density Rack Poison Sampling;
- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;
- SP-333, Control Rod Exercises;
- SP-340A, "A" Train ECCS Pump and Valve Operability;
- SP-344A, Nuclear Services Cooling System A-Train Operability;
- SP-349B, Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-1) Monthly Operability
Demonstration;
- SP-375A, Chilled Water Pump (1A) Quarterly Operability
Demonstration; and
- PT-318, SWP-1A Power and Flow Measurements for EDG-1A KW
Loading Verification.
(a) During the observation of procedure SP-349B on April 26,
the inspector noted that the operators had initialled step
9.1.22 as complete.
Step 9.1.22 requires the operator to
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verify, after pump startup, that the emergency feedwater
turbine-driven pump bearing oil levels are within the
sightglass casing scribe marks (which indicate the maximum
and minimum oil levels).
Upon observing these oil levels
the inspector noted that the
soon after pump (startup,i.e., between the pump and the turbine)
inboard bearing
oil level was from 1/8" to 1/4" below the lower casing
scribe mark.
Licensee management was apprised of the inspector's
finding.
The improper level was verified by management
personnel and action taken to correct the situation.
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Failure to implement the requirements of step 9.1.22 of
procedure SP-349B is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1.c.
This finding is considered to be another example
of violation 302/88-14-02 discussed in paragraph 4.b.(1) of
this report.
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The inspector also noted that the oil level in the turbine
governor sight glass was high (i.e., the sight glass
appeared to be full).
According to procedure step 7.6,
this oil is supposed to drop to a point just below the oil
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level line on the sightglass when the pump is running.
This observation was discussed with the operator running
the test. The' operator responded that procedure step 9.1.34
required the governor oil level to only be detectable in
the sightglass and not to specificaliy drop down to ti.e oil
level
line; however,
the operators interpretation
conflicted with a procedural "NOTE" that was just prior to
step 9.1.34.
.The procedural "Note" reiterated the
requirements of Step 7.6.
Due to the inspector's concern over the governor oil level,
the operator contacted management personnel for resolution.
The improper level was verified by management personnel,
and action taken to correct the situation.
The inspector further noticed that.this procedure requires
that the pump turbine bearing and pump bearing oil
reservoirs be within maximum and minimum marks both before
the pump is started and while the pump is running.
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the pump is started however, these oil levels change, and
attempts to add or drain oil while the pump is running can
result in the oil levels being high or low when the pump is
secured.
Discussion of this matter with the licensee's
engineering personnel determined that the oil level should
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be within the limits primarily during pump operation. The
licensee plans to revise procedure SP-349B to clarify the
requirements for maintaining bearing oil level.
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IFI (302/88-14-03):
Review the licensee's revision to
SP-349B to clarify the requirements for maintaining bearing
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oil levels.
(b) During the performance of SP-340A, the inspector noticed
that the pump drawings, which are provided in the procedure
to specify locations for measuring pump bearing displace-
ment and temperature, were not clear.
As a result, the technicians rely on experience to
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consistently perform these measurements at the same
reference location.
Also, further review of procedure
SP-340A identified that the maximum stroke time allowed by
the procedure for the common header makeup pump suction
valve, MUV-69, was 60 seconds.
The licensee's proposed
Inservice Testing Program specified a maximum stroke time
of 25 seconds for this valve. The inspector verified that
valve MUV-69 tested within the C5 seconds stroke time,
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These items were discussed with licensee personnel who
stated that the pump measurement locations would be
clarified and that the procedure would be revised to -
reflect the correct maximum stroke time for valve MVV-69.
IFI (302/88-14-04):
Review the licensee's clarification
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for pump measurement locations and revision to SP-340A to-
reflect correct maximum stroke. time for valve MVV-69.
(9) Maintenance Activities (62703)
The inspector observed
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maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment
clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention
work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
quality control personnel were available for inspection
activities as required; and TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
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Changeout of desiccant in triaxial peak accelographs in
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accordance with preventive maintenance (PM) control sheet
976;
Inspection for the presence of water in the exhaust
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manifold for the
"A"
accordance with PM control sheet 601;
Disassembly, inspection and reassembly of valve DFV-6 in
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accordance with procedure MP-149, Check Valve Cap Removal
and Reinstallation (Gasket Style);
Addition of packing to the
"A" nuclear services cooling
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water pump, SWP-1A, in accordance with procedure MP-121,
Pump Repacking;
Disassembly, inspection and reassembly of valve MVV-466 in
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accordance with procedures MP-111, Valve Packing Procedure
and Specifications and MP-118, Bolted and Screwed Valve
Bonnet Maintenance;
Troubleshooting of hot leg temperature indication in
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accordance with procedure SP-161A, Reactor Coolant T Hot
and T Cold Calibration; and
Inspection of the generator on Emergency Diesel Generator
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"1B" (EDG-1B) in accordance with procedure PM-123, Periodic
Electrical Checks of Emergency Diesel Generators.
While observing the inspection activities on EDG-1B in
accordance with preventive maintenance procedure PM-123, the
inspector noted the following problems with the procedure:
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Step 7.2.7 requires the generator brush pressure to be
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reset, as applicable, but does not refer to section 7.5 of
the procedure to accomplish the resetting; and
Step 7.4.4 requires the generator ground to be
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disconnected, but does not provide a step to assure the
ground is reconnected.
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The inspector noted that the personnel performing the PM
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(qualified electricians) were aware of what activities had to be
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accomplished and properly completed the PM.
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These observations were discussed with licensee representatives.
While the licensee has completed a recent upgrade of the PM
procedures, which included a walkdown of the procedures, it
appears that some validation problems may exist.
The licensee
will revalidate PM-123 and consider revalidation of other PM
procedures.
IFI (302/88-14-05):
Review the revision and revalidation of
procedure PM-123.
(10) Radioactive Waste Controls (71707) - Selected liquid and gaseous
releases were observed to verify that approved procedures were
utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, and
that required surveys were taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints (71707) - Several pipe
hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related
systems were observed to assure fluid levels were adequate
and no leakage was evident, restraint settings were appropriate,
and anchoring points were not binding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations
Reports (71707)
a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared appropriate.
Events that were reported immediately were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs 88-08 and 88-10 were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC
Enforcement Policy and are closed.
LER 88-09 was previously reviewed
and closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/88-11.
However, further
discussions addressing the licensee's comments, which are contained
in the LER transmittal letter, are warranted and are presented belcw.
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(1)
(Closed) LER 88-08:
This LER reported'that Emergency Feedwater
Initiation and Control-(EFIC) level transmitters were found-to
be out of tolerance during the performance of a routine
surveillance' procedure. The inspectors are already tracking the
licensee's activities regarding instrument drift issues as IFI
302/86-09-06, and-this item will be included.
(2)
(Closed) LER 88-10:
This LER reported that a radiation monitor
trip setpoint was above the limit required by the TS.
To
preclude recurrence of this event the licensee has revised their
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual and the procedures used to
establish the radioactive release monitor trip setpoints. This
matter is considered to be a .'censee identified violation in-
which appropriate corrective action was taken to prevent
recurrence.
(3)
(Closed) LER 88-09:
In the transmittal letter to LER 88-09,
dated April 14, 1988, the licensee provided an assessment of the
notification requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.
LER 88-09 repcrted an event involving the discovery of previous
operation of the plant outside the design basis.
The licensee
evaluated the notification requirements and concluded that
"events of this type are not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 when
discovered significantly after their occurrence and potential
impact to the plant."
While the NRC agrees with the
determination of notification for the event reported in LER
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88-09, the NRC will evaluate each event on its own merits to
determine its appropriate notification requirement.
b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
verify the following:
TS are complied with, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or ere being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS.
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All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC
NCOR 88-65 reported the apparent nonconformance with FSAR paragraphs
1.3.2.5 and 7.3.3.2.1, which specifies that all the incore thermo-
couple temperatures are automatically printed out upon a reactor
trip.
Since the incore thermocouple temperature recorders have been
inoperable for some time (present indications are that they have been
inoperable since at least January 28,1987), it appears that the FSAR
commitment was not being met.
The licensee is presently gathering
information to determine if other backup systems may have been
available to meet this commitment.
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' Unresolved Item (302/88-14-06):
Provide information for NRC review
regarding operability of the incore thermocouple temperature
monitoring system as described in FSAR paragraphs 1.3.2.5 and
7.3.3.2.1.
6.
Review of NRC Bulletins (BU) and CircularsL(CI) (92703)
The following BU's and CI were reviewed:
Bulletin 85-03, Motor-0perated Valve Common Mode Failures During
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Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings;
Bulletin 88-01, Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breakers; and
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Circular 81-13, Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit for Safeguard
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Service Valve Motors.
As the result of these reviews, the status of these items is cs follows:
a)
As requested by action item e
of Bulletin 85-03, the licensee
identified the selected safety-related valves, the valves' maximum
differential pressures, and the licensee's program to assure valve
operability in their letter dated May 13, 1986.
Review of this
response indicated the need for additional information, which was
requested in NRC Region II letter dated August 18 1987.
Review of the licensee's September 17 and 25, 1987 responses to this
request for additional information indicates that the licensee's
selection of the applicable safety-related valves and the valves
maximum differential pressures meets the requirements of the
bulletin.
The licensee's program to assure - valve operability
requested by action item e. of the bulletin is acceptable.
On February 17, 1988, the licensee submitted a report requested in
item f. of this bulletin.
Paragraph VI of the licensee's report
stated that procedure MP-402 would be revised.
This bulletin will
remain open pending revisions to MP-402, and pending NRC review of
the completed program,
b)
In a letter dated February 23, 1988, the licensee responded to the
actions requested in Bulletin 88-01. The response letter stated that
the licensee did not use any of the circuit breakers discussed in the
bulletin.
Action on this item is considered to be complete and this
bulletin is closed.
c)
The inspector's review of the licensee's activities with respect to
Circular 81-13 indicates that these activities have not been
completed. The status of this circular is as follows:
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Item 1 is not complete in that only 17 valves have been checked
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for torque switch bypass circuit installation. Approximately 60
valves remain to be checked.
The licensee has an ongoing
program, in accordance with modification (MAR) 87-03-13-02. to
check the remaining valves.
Item 2 is complete.
The licensee has verified that the
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electrical drawings correctly reflect the electrical bypass
circuits.
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Item 3 completion is dependent upon completion of item 1.
To
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date, no valves have been found with missing bypass circuitry.
Item 4 is not complete in that the licensee is still reviewing
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its controls to assure that the bypass circuitry remains intact.
The licensee has committed to complete the actions requested by this
Circular.
This Circular will remain open pending completion of all
actions.
7.
ReviewofOffsiteReviewCommitteeActivities(40701)
The inspector attended a meeting and reviewed the activities of the
licensee's offsite review committee, the Nuclear General Review Committee
(NGRC).
This review included a determination that TS requirements were
being met with regard to the following:
Committee quorum;
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Committee composition with respect to disciplines and expertise;
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Qualification of committee members; and
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Review activities of the committee.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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