ML20246E449

Insp Rept 50-302/89-11 on 890429-0602.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts,Facility Mods,Review of IE Info Notices & Followup of Onsite Events

ML20246E449
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/28/1989
From:	Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246E435	List: ML20246E430 ML20246E436 ML20246E449
References
50-302-89-11, IEIN-89-044, IEIN-89-44, NUDOCS 8907120244
Download: ML20246E449 (14)

See also: IR 05000302/1989011

Text

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,- p f.t ;,q UNITED STATES I

o 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON

h" S REGION 88

N O 101 MARIETT A STREET, N.W.

E' hf ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report No: 30-302/89-11 ]

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation

3201 34th Street, South l

! St. Petersourg, FL 33733 l

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Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DRP-72

Facility Name: Crystal River 3

Inspection Conducted: April 29 -. June 2, 1989

Inspectors: LJL AC OM L,.t. 4 l7 GleA

P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Residerit inspector Da'te Signe~d

Rdb.~ E . PM ! ,, b l*LS IB9

J. Tedro sident Ins ector ~ Da'te Signed

Approved by: _ / ./

Rf/triefijak, Section Chief

M 88 8i

Date Sfgned

Division of Reactor Project

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas

of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports

and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, review of IE

information notices, followup of onsite events, review of drawing control, and

licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were

conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observa-

tions were conducted on backshifts.

Results:

Two violations were identified: Failure to properly implement plant

procedures, paragraphs 2.a. 3.b(1), and 3.b(2); Failure to implement the

emergency plan, , paragraph 3.b(1). ,

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Two non-cited violations were identified and reviewed: Failure to properly

implement procedure for containment leak tests, paragraph 3.b.(3); Failure to

properly implement the drawing control process, paragraph 7.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services

G. Boldt,-Vice President Nuclear Production

• P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor

• R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer .

B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• J. Holton, Senior Nuclear Results Engineer ,

• A. Kazemfar, Supervisor, Radiological Support Services '

• H. Koon Assistant Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent

R. Marckese, Nuclear Engineer II -

• W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

D. McCollough, Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor

• P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance and Outages

• W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance

• J. Stephenson, Supervisor, Radiological Emergency Planning

• R. Widell, Director,' Nuclear Operations Site Support 4

• M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist

K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing '

Other licensee employees contacted included office, operation, ~

engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel. j

• Attended exit interview ,  !

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in {

paragraph 10. j

2. Review of Plant Operations (71707) i

The plant began this inspection period in the cold shutdown (Mode 5)

-condition. The outage began on February 26, 1989 to initiate repairs to j

the "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP-1A). The repair included the replace- J

ment of the pump shaft for RCP-1A, and the rebuild of all four RCP motors.

Also during this outage, substantial environmental qualification work was i

performed along with eddy current testing of the once through steam ,

generators. On June 1 a plant heatup was commenced and the plant entered  !

the hot standby (Mode 3) condition at 11:40 A.M. The plant remained in j

Mode 3 for the duration of this inspection period. Upon entering Mode 3, )

problems were experienced with the mechanical seal packages for pumps

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RCP-1A/10/10. A plant cooldown was commenced to initiate repairs to the

seal packages. ,

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a. Shift Logs and facility Records (71707)

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The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical

Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Outage Shift Manager's Log; Startup Log; .

Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment.0ut-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief

Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log;

i. Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term

Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspectors independently

verified clearance order tagouts. -

On ' May 25, 1989, during a verification of equipment clearance

1. 89-05-206 on the emergency feedwater system, the inspector noticed

that valve EFV-14 was not tagged as required by the equipment

clearance. The clearance required that the handwheel for valve

EFV-14 be red tagged in the closed position to prevent operation.

Upon verification of this clearance, the-inspector discovered that

the tag created for the handwheel of valve EFV-14 was located on the

wrong valve (EFV-33).. A review of this clearanc.e order revealed that

the clearance had been independently verified and accepted for work.

This matter was brought to the attention of licensee personnel who

immediately corrected the clearance.

Procedure CP-115 In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders,

section 6.4 specifies the actions required to implement an equipment

clearance and requires that items listed on the clearance order be

tagged in the position specified by the clearance. Failure to

properly implement the clearance for valve EFV-14 is contrary to the

requirements of CP-115 and is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1.a.

Violation (302/89-11-01): Failure to adhere to the requirements of

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plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.a.

b. Facility Tours and Observations (71707)

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted

during backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee i

meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and

management activities. ,

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The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control- room; emergency diesel generator

rooms; auxiliary building; reactor building; intermediate building;

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battery. rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.

During these tours, the following observations were made:

(1) Monitoring . Instrumentation -- The follo' wing instrumentation

and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated

parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current

operational mode:

Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid

radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating

parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(2) Safety Systems Walkdown (71710) - The inspectors conducted a

walkdown of the Decay Heat Close'd Cycle Cooling (DC) system to

verify that the lineup was in accordance with license require-

ments for system operability and that the system drawing and

procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(3) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspectors verified that operating

shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and 'that

control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and

profess.ional manner. In addition, the inspectors observed shift

turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant

status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant

information during these turnovers.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of. material and

components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas

throughout the facility were observed to determine whether

safety and/or fire hazards existed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(5) Radiological Protection Program (71707) - Radiation protection

control activities were observed to verify that these activities

were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures,

and in compliance with regulatory requirements. These

observations included: ,

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. Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including

step-off pad conditions and disposal of . contaminated

clothing..

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Area postings and controls. .

Work. activity. within radiation, . high radiation, and

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contaminated areas.

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Radiation. Control Area (RCA) exiting practices.

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~ Proper wearing 'of personnel -monitoring equipment,

protective clothing, and' respiratory equipment.

Area postings were independently veri.fied for accuracy. by the

inspector. The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work'

_ Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the

controis were adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(6) Security Control (71707). - In the course of' the monthly

activities, the inspectors included a review of the' licensee's

physical security program. The performance of various shifts of

the security force was observed in the conduct of daily

activities to include: protected and vital area access controls;

searching of personnel . packages, and vehicles; badge issuance

and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory

posts. In addition, the inspectors observed the; operational

status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the

Intrusion Detection system in the-central and secondary alarm

stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital. area '

barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with

operations and maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

.(7)- Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staffing

and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing

was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, 1

actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency

equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(8) Surveillance (61726) - Surveillance tests were observed to

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verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified i

personnel were~ conducting the tests;- tests were adequate to

verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;

and TS requirements were followed,

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The followir.g tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

- SP-157B, Meteorological System Surveillance (weekly).

- SP-340B, "B" Train ECCS Pump and Valve Operability.

- SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance.

- SP-456, Refueling Internal Equipment Response to a

ESAS. Test Signal.

- SP-457, Refueling Interval ECCS Response to a Safety

Injection Test Signal.

- SP-902, 4.160 KV ES Bus "A" Undervoltage Trip Test

and Auxiliary Relay Calibration.

During the performance of procedure SP-902 the inspector was

informed by technicians performing the test that.the breakers

for some of the equipment to be tested had not yet been placed

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in- the " test" position as required by step 8.5 since this

equipment was not yet being tested. The breakers were placed in

the test position upon reaching step 9.3.20 which required that

all the breakers be closed .in the test position. The inspector

discussed this matter with the procedure's author who was

present during the performance of the test. The intention of

the procedure was not to place the equipment in test until step

9.3.20 was reached. The inspector considers the steps specified

to place the breakers in the test position to be confusing and

heavily reliant on the skill of the craft to be performed

correctly. The procedure's author agreed with the inspector's

conment and stated that the procedure would be revised to

clarify Ge steps during the next annual rev'iew.

, Inspector Followup Item (302/89-11-02): Review the revision to  !

procedure SP-902 to clarify steps. l

(9) Maintenance Activities (62703) -

The inspector observed

maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment

clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention i

work permits, as required, were issued and being followed; i

quality control personnel were available for inspection

activities as required; and, TS requirements were being

followed.

Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the

following maintenance activities:

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Replacement of valve RWV-35 and flange in accordance with

procedures MP-122, Disassembly and Reassembly of Flanged

Conr.ections, and MP-132 Erection of Piping. l

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Inspection of valves RCV-157, RCV-158, and RCV-163 for

environmental qualification discrepancies in accordance

with prochdures MP-199D, Target Rock Valve Maintenance

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Model 80K and Model 81VV Valves Dfrect Acting Normally

Closed Solenoid Valves, CP-113A, Work R

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accordance with procedure SP-410, Valve Testing During

Refueling Outages.

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Inspection of valves CAV-3 and CAV-5 for environmental

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qualification discrepancies in accordance with procedures-

MP-402A, . Maintenance of Limitorque Valv

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Control Power and Instrumentation Cables. lices'in

. Rework of environmentally qualified transmitter spand procedure'

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accordance with modification MAR

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MP-405. "B" Station

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Troubleshoot and replace. grounded cells in

Maintenance, and MP-531, Troubleshooting

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Observed flow test and inspection of decay heat pump 18.

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Observed maintenance on raw water check valve RWV-34,

i No violations or deviations were identified.

} Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming

3.

Reports (71707)-

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Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential g

impact, to detect trends, Events thatand

weretoreported

determine whether

immediately were correcti

appeared appropriate.

reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfie -

LERs

Policy.

were reviewed in accordance with the curre

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This LER reported that portions of the Chill

(1) (0 pen) LER 89-07: This matter was

Water System were not seismically goalified.

identified by the licensee during an evaluation of Control

Complex HVAC instrument air tubing in accordance with

action associated with LER 88-13.

portions of the system which are not seismically qualified

the seismically qualified section by shutting manual isolation

operating

valves (CHV-76/77) and has revised applicableThe licensee is

procedures to maintain these valves closed.89-03-06-01) to correc  ;

presently developing a modification (MARthis des

system flow diagrams for similar problems.open

of the engineering review.

This LER reported that the main steam line

(2) (0 pen) LER 89-08: containment wall penetration

The inspector reviewed and was not

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

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verified implementation of the corrective actions as stated in

this report. The licensee has issued a supplement to this

report dated May 23, 1989. During efforts. to resolve this

matter, the licensee identified that the steam generator tube

rupture accident analysis in chapter 14.2.2.2 of the -FSAR

conflicted with the plant's emergency and abnormal procedures.

.The licensee reanalyzed the. accident consistent with plant

procedures and. determined that although a slight increase in the

offsite. dose is involved, this increase is below 1% of the 10

CFR Part 100 limits required by the NRC. The licensee plans to

revise the FSAR to reflect the new accident analysis. This LER

will remain open pending completion of the FSAR revision.

(3). (0 pen) LER 89-09: This LER reported that the low pressure

safety injection pumps (DHP-1A/1B) were unable to perform all

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their safety functions during certain small break loss of

coolant accidents. This matter was identified by the licensee

in response to NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety Related Pump

Loss. The licensee has evaluated the test data to confirm that

the pumps can operate reliably at lower flow rates and has

submitted correspondence to the NRC dated May 30, 1989, which

included a justification for plant startup and operation. This

LER will remain open pending NRC review of the correspondence.

(4) (0 pen) LER 89-10: This LER reported that electrical cable

splices associated with main feedwater pump suction valve FWV-14

were installed incorrectly a,nd did not satisfy environmental

qualification requirements. This report has been referred to

the NRC Region II Office for followup by regional inspectors and

, will remain open pending further NRC review.

(5) (0 pen) LER 89-11: This LER reported that the Circulating Water

(CW) system flooding analysis described in Section 9.5.2.3.2 of

the Final Safety ' Analysis Report (FSAR) was incorrect. The

licensee is presently re-evaluating this analysis and is

developing recommendations to prevent equipment damage during

this type of event. .In the interim, the licensee has stationed

a flood watch in the vicinity of the CW system to alert the

control room of any flooding. This LER will remain open pending

completion of the licensee's evaluation.

(6) (Closed) LER 89-12: This LER reported inadequate temperature

rated solenoid valves for containment isolation valves

CIV-34/35/40/41. This matter was identified by the licensee

during the implementation of corrective action associated with

LER 89-01. The inspector has reviewed and verified the

corrective actions as stated in this report.

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(7) (0 pen)LER89-13: This LER reported an inadvertent start of the

emergency diesel generators.due to a degraded voltage condition

on the engineered safeguards buses. This event was previously

discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-08. The licensee

has attributed the cause for this event to be the overloading of

the fossil unit startup transformer which resulted in' the .

? degraded bus condition. . The licensee,has developed administra-

tive controls to limit the loading on the fossil unit startup

transformer and has installed a modification to provide an alarm

in the nuclear unit's control room which will identify when this

transformer is overloaded. The licensee is also evaluating the

impact of a sequential occurrence of an engineered safeguards

actuation followed by a degraded voltage condition and will

issue a supplement to this report. This LER will remain open

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pending issuance of the supplemental report.

(8) (Closed) LER 89-14: This LER reported improperly set radiation

monitor trip setpoints. This matter was discussed previously in

NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-08 and is the subject of a

violation (302/89-08-04). The LER will be closed and further

action tracked by the violation.

(9) (Closed) LER 89-15: This LER reported that an air operated

containment isolation valve did not have a seismically supported

solenoid valve (MUV-253-SV). This matter was identified by the

licensee during the implementation of corrective action

associated with LER 89-01. The inspector has reviewed and

verified the corrective actions as statsd in this report.

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(10)(Closed)LER88-14: This LER reported excessive temperatures in

escrgency feedwater system piping. This report was previously

discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-01. The licensee

has implemented leakage criteria for the check valves in

procedure SP-604, FWV-43/44 Leak Test.

(11)'(Closed) LER 89-01: This LER reported that solenoid air valves

for several containment isolation valves were undersized. This

matter was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Reports

50-302/89-03 and 50-302/89-01 and was the subject of a violation

(302/89-01-01). The licensee has also submitted a supplemental

report dated March 6,1989, on this subject. Currently the

licensee has completed a field verification and engineering

evaluation of all safety related solenoids. This effort has

identified the problems reported by LERs 89-12 and 89-15. The

inspector reviewed and verified the licensee's corrective action

for the deficiencies found.

(12) (Closed) L,ER 88-18: This LER reported the failure to

incorporate a TS revision into the applicable procedure prior to

its performance. This matter was previously discussed in NRC

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Inspection Report 50-302/88-31. The licensee has revised

procedures AI-400A, Description and General Administration of

Plant Procedures, and AI-4000, Revising Procedures, to require

timely incorporation of TS changes. The licensee has also

started requesting grace periods for implementation of TS

changes upon issuance.

(13) (0 pen) LER 88-23: This LER reported a discrepancy in the

emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters and was

previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/88-34. The

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licensee has completed the corrective action stated in this

report and in correspondence to the NRC dated January 12, 1989,

committed to provide independent power supplies for these

heaters. The licensee plans to install this modification during

the next refueling outage presently scheduled for March 1990.

The NRC issued a safety evaluation dated November 22, 1988 which

concluded that operation with the existing design until the

refueling outage is acceptable. The LER will remain open

, pending completion of plant modifications,

b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to

verify the following: TS are complied with, corrective actions as

identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been

accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as required by TS.

All NCORs

ment Policy.were re' viewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforce-

(1) NCOR 89-105 reported the loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

. inventory due to an improper valve lineup. On May 7 at

approximately 2:31 A.M. control room operators noticed an

unusual increase in the reactor building sump level. The RCS  ;,

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was in the process of being filled and vented in accordance with  !

operating procedure OP-301, Filling and Venting Reactor Coolant  !

System. Plant operators immediately began investigating the

cause for the inventory loss and by 3:26 A.M. had identified and

isolated the source of leakage. The licensee found pressurizer

drain valves (RCV-1 and RCV-2) in the open position instead of

closed as required.

Procedure OP-301, Valve Checklist 1, specifies that valves RCV-1

and RCV-2 be in the closed position for filling and venting the

RCS. This valve lineup had been performed and independently

verified by licensee personnel on May 3. Failure to establish

and maintain the drain valves in the closed position is contrary l

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to the requirements of procedure OP-301 and is considered to be

another example of the violation discussed in paragraph 2.a of

this report.

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Duringthe

event, subsequent interviews with

inspector determined: op(erators

1) the on shift during this

leak rate was

approximately 24 gallons per minute which is in excess of the

one GPM unidentified RCS leakrate requiring declaration of an

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Unusual Event, (2) the Man-on-Call was called and concurred with

the Shift Supervisor that a Notice of Unusual Event (NUE) was

not necessary, (3) the Director of Nuclear Plant Operations was

called, went to the Control Room, and stated that if the source

of the leak was not discovered in a reasonable time, or for any

other reason, the process was not under control he would declare

an Unusual Event. The source of the leakage (RCV-1 & RCV-2 not

shut) was found and the valves closed in about 55 minutes. No

NUE was declared.

- This failure to declare an Unusual Event when the leak rate

trigger was exceeded is considered ~ to be a violation of the

Radiological Emergency Plan and EM-202.

Violation (302/89-11-03): Failure to declare an NUE.

(2) NCOR 89-119 reported that on May 24, an inadvertent isolation of

the reactor building purge system occurred due to an isolation

signal from radiation monitor RMA-1. During a routine weekly

changeout of filters associated with this monitor, a high sample

flowrate condition occurred as expected but the radiation

monitor was not properly bypassed to prevent the purge

isolation. This event is very similar to an event which

occurred on March 8,1989 dis' cussed in NRC Inspection Report

50-302/89-06 (Unresolved Item *302/89-06-03). The licensee's

corrective action for the previous event included increased

supervision of technicians working on the radiation monitors.

Procedure CH-348, Sampling at the Reactor Building Purge Duct

Gas Monitor RMA-1, controls the sampling and filter changeout

activities for monitor RMA-1 and requires in section 4 that the

monitor's trip interlock be bypassed. Failure to properly

bypass the monitor's trip interlock is contrary to the require-

ments of procedure CH-348 and is considered to be another

example of the violation discussed in paragraph 2.a of this

report.

(3) NCOR 89-75 reported that test flanges were installed at three

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locations in the Chemical Addition and Sampling (CA) system and

at three locations in the Demineralized Water (DW) system versus

the required blank flanges. The test flanges had been plugged

and thereby functioned as blank flanges. Procedure SP-179,

Containment Leakage Tests, was signed off indicating the blank

• Unresolved' items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or

deviations.

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l flanges were installed. The licensee took prompt corrective

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action to remove the test flanges and install blank flanges.

This matter is considered to be a licensee identified non-cited

violation (NCV) because the criteria specified in Section V.G.

of the Enforcement policy were satisfied.

Non-cited Violation (302/89-11-04): Failure to pronerly

implement procedure SP-179.

4. Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)

Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the

changes.were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that

the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and

approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met

acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner,

and that appropriate drawings and facility. procedures were revised as

necessary.

This review included selected observations of modifications

and/or-testing in progress.

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iindification MAR 88-06-17-01, Modification to AHF-17,18 and 19 A and B Fan

Dampers was reviewed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Review of IE Information Notices-(IEN) (92701)

The inspectors reviewed the licensu 's activities associated with IEN

89-44, Hydrogen Storage on the Roof of the Control Room, in accordance

with a request for information from the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation dated May 2, 1989. Upon reviewing the FSAR section 9.9 for ,

information on this subject, the inspectors noticed conflicting

information between section 9.9 and Table 9-19 of the FSAR. Section 9.9

states that the hydrogen storage area is located approximately 450 feet

south of the Auxiliary Building (AB) whereas Table 9-19 specifies 240 feet

south of the AB. Further, section 9.9 states that the nitrogen storage

is also located with the hydrogen storage. This information is ineccurate

as the nitrogen storage has been moved adjacent to the east side of the

turbine building. The inspector discussed these discrepancies with

licensee personnel who stated that the FSAR would be revised to correct

the conflicting information.

Inspector Followup Item (302/89-11-05): Review the revision to section

9.9 of the FSAR regarding hydrogen and nitrogen storage.

6.- Followup of Onsite Events (93702)

On May 29 at approximately 5:10 A.M. the licensee discovered that the

emergency feedwater piping penetration had exceeded its design

temperature. This matter was reviewed by NRC regional inspectors and will

be discussed in more detail in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-14.

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7. Followup of Review of Drawing Control (RAI 88-01) (37700)

During the review of Control Room' drawings, flow diagram 302-673 sheet 4

of 4, Nitrogen, Hydrogen and Carbon Dioxide Flow Diagram,-was found to

have been revised .to the wrong. revision of a MAR. ' The piping modification

was normally isolated during plant operation and. therefore was not a-

,

significant- error. Thel licensee reviewed the closecut of the MAR and

found that the MAR had originally been issued as a temporary MAR .then

upgraded to permanent then revised twice. Each iteration was closed out

separately and resulted in the drawing error. The licensee reviewed the

status of other temporary MARS which became permanent and found that of

5,053. MARS issued since plant startup, 39 temporary MARS - were made

permanent.. Six of the 39 involved Flow Diagram changes and only the one.

was made in error. The licensee revised the 302-673 sheet 4 to correctly

show the modifications. This matter is considered to be a non-cited

violation because the criteria specified in Section V.A of the Enforcement

.

Policy were satisfied.

Failure to properly implement NEP

Non-cited Violation- (302/89-11-06):

271.

~

8. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 &

92701)

a. (Closed) Unresolved Item 302/88-14-06: Provide information regarding

the operability of the incore thermocouple temperature monitoring

system.

This item was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/

l

88-29. The licensee has issued revision 11 to the FSAR and has

!

corrected sections .1.3.2.5 and 7.3.3.2.1 to more accurately describe

.the systems in use.

b. (Closed) IFI 302/88-24-01: Review the licensee's revision to the

moderator dilution accident analysis in the FSAR.

i

The licensee has revised paragraph 14.1.2.4 of the FSAR to reflect

the plant ' modifications to prevent this type of accident. The

licensee has included the old analysis, however, for historical

purposes.

9. ExitInterview(30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

.at the. conclusion of the inspection on June 5, 1989. During this meeting,

c

the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they

are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violations,

.

NCVs and inspector followup items (IFIs).

- - - _ _ . _ -

_ - _ - _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ - _ _ .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

___-_-_-_ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.; ..

.

,

.13

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did

not identify as. proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed

by the inspectors during this inspection.

Item Number Description and Reference

50-302/89-11-01 Violation - Failure to adhere to the

requirements of plant procedures as required by

TS 6.8.1.a.

50-302/89-11-03 Violation - Failure to declare an NUE. .

50-302/89-11-04 NCV - Failure to properly implement

procedure SP-179.

50-302/89-11-06 NCV - Failure to properly implement -

NEP-271.

50-302/89-11-02 IFI - Review the revision to procedure

SP-902 to clarify steps.

50-302/89-11-05 IFI - Review the revision to section 9.9

of the FSAR regarding hydrogen ' and nitrogen

storage.

10. Acronyms and Abbreviations

'

AB - Auxiliary Building

CCTV - Closed Circuit Television

CFR - Code of Federal Regulations

- Chemical Addition and Sampling System

,

CA

CW . - Circulating Water System

DC - Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System

DW - Demineralized Water System

FSAR . Final Safety Analysis Report

IEN - IE Information Notices

IFI - Inspector Followup Item

LER - Licensee Event Report

MAR. - Modification Approval Record

NCOR - Nonconforming Operation Report

NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NUE - Notice of Unusual Event

RCA. - Radiation Control Area

RCS - Reactor Coolant System

RWP - Radiation Work Permit

SP - Surveillance Procedure

STI - Short Term Instruction

TS - Technical Specification

UNR - Unresolved Item

VIO - Violation

.

_ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - _ _