ML20246E449
| ML20246E449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1989 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246E435 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-89-11, IEIN-89-044, IEIN-89-44, NUDOCS 8907120244 | |
| Download: ML20246E449 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1989011
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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REGION 88
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101 MARIETT A STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No:
30-302/89-11
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Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
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St. Petersourg, FL 33733
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Docket No.: 50-302
License No.: DRP-72
Facility Name: Crystal River 3
Inspection Conducted: April 29 -. June 2, 1989
4 l7 GleA
P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Residerit inspector
Da'te Signe~d
J. Tedro
sident Ins ector ~
b l*LS IB9
Rdb.~ E . PM ! ,,
Da'te Signed
Approved by: _ /
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88 8i
Rf/triefijak, Section Chief
Date Sfgned
Division of Reactor Project
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the areas
of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports
and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, review of IE
information notices, followup of onsite events, review of drawing control, and
licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were
conducted and facility operations observed.
Some of these tours and observa-
tions were conducted on backshifts.
Results:
Two violations were identified:
Failure to properly implement plant
procedures, paragraphs 2.a. 3.b(1), and 3.b(2);
Failure to implement the
emergency plan, , paragraph 3.b(1).
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Two non-cited violations were identified and reviewed:
Failure to properly
implement procedure for containment leak tests, paragraph 3.b.(3);
Failure to
properly implement the drawing control process, paragraph 7.
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S90712O244 890705
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ADOCK 05000302
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- G. Becker, Manager, Site Nuclear Engineering Services
G. Boldt,-Vice President Nuclear Production
- P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor
- R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer
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B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- J. Holton, Senior Nuclear Results Engineer
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- A. Kazemfar, Supervisor, Radiological Support Services
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- H. Koon Assistant Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
R. Marckese, Nuclear Engineer II
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- W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
D. McCollough, Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor
- P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
V. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance and Outages
- W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- J. Stephenson, Supervisor, Radiological Emergency Planning
- R. Widell, Director,' Nuclear Operations Site Support
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- M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
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Other licensee employees contacted included office, operation,
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engineering, maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
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Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in
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paragraph 10.
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2.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
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The plant began this inspection period in the cold shutdown (Mode 5)
-condition.
The outage began on February 26, 1989 to initiate repairs to
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the "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP-1A).
The repair included the replace-
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ment of the pump shaft for RCP-1A, and the rebuild of all four RCP motors.
Also during this outage, substantial environmental qualification work was
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performed along with eddy current testing of the once through steam
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generators.
On June 1 a plant heatup was commenced and the plant entered
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the hot standby (Mode 3) condition at 11:40 A.M.
The plant remained in
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Mode 3 for the duration of this inspection period. Upon entering Mode 3,
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problems were experienced with the mechanical seal packages for pumps
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RCP-1A/10/10.
A plant cooldown was commenced to initiate repairs to the
seal packages.
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a.
Shift Logs and facility Records (71707)
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The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Outage Shift Manager's Log; Startup Log; .
Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment.0ut-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief
Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log;
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Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request Log; Short Term
Instructions (STI); and Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.
In addition to these record reviews, the inspectors independently
verified clearance order tagouts.
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On ' May 25, 1989, during a verification of equipment clearance
- 89-05-206 on the emergency feedwater system, the inspector noticed
that valve EFV-14 was not tagged as required by the equipment
clearance.
The clearance required that the handwheel for valve
EFV-14 be red tagged in the closed position to prevent operation.
Upon verification of this clearance, the-inspector discovered that
the tag created for the handwheel of valve EFV-14 was located on the
wrong valve (EFV-33).. A review of this clearanc.e order revealed that
the clearance had been independently verified and accepted for work.
This matter was brought to the attention of licensee personnel who
immediately corrected the clearance.
Procedure CP-115
In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders,
section 6.4 specifies the actions required to implement an equipment
clearance and requires that items listed on the clearance order be
tagged in the position specified by the clearance.
Failure to
properly implement the clearance for valve EFV-14 is contrary to the
requirements of CP-115 and is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1.a.
Violation (302/89-11-01):
Failure to adhere to the requirements of
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plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.a.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations (71707)
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some
operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
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meetings were attended by the inspectors to observe planning and
management activities.
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The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control- room; emergency diesel generator
rooms; auxiliary building; reactor building; intermediate building;
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battery. rooms; and, electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring . Instrumentation -- The follo' wing instrumentation
and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated
parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current
operational mode:
Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid
radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating
parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(2) Safety Systems Walkdown (71710) - The inspectors conducted a
walkdown of the Decay Heat Close'd Cycle Cooling (DC) system to
verify that the lineup was in accordance with license require-
ments for system operability and that the system drawing and
procedure correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(3) Shift Staffing (71707) - The inspectors verified that operating
shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and 'that
control room operations were being conducted in an orderly and
profess.ional manner.
In addition, the inspectors observed shift
turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant
status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant
information during these turnovers.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - Storage of. material and
components, and cleanliness conditions of various areas
throughout the facility were observed to determine whether
safety and/or fire hazards existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(5) Radiological Protection Program (71707) - Radiation protection
control activities were observed to verify that these activities
were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
These
observations included:
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. Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including
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step-off pad conditions and disposal of . contaminated
clothing..
Area postings and controls.
. high radiation, and
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Work. activity. within radiation,
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contaminated areas.
Radiation. Control Area (RCA) exiting practices.
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~ Proper wearing 'of personnel -monitoring equipment,
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protective clothing, and' respiratory equipment.
Area postings were independently veri.fied for accuracy. by the
inspector.
The inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work'
_ Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that the
controis were adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(6) Security Control (71707). -
In the course of' the monthly
activities, the inspectors included a review of the' licensee's
physical security program. The performance of various shifts of
the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities to include: protected and vital area access controls;
searching of personnel . packages, and vehicles; badge issuance
and retrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspectors observed the; operational
status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors, the
Intrusion Detection system in the-central and secondary alarm
stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital. area
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barrier integrity, and the security organization interface with
operations and maintenance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.(7)- Fire Protection (71707) - Fire protection activities, staffing
and equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing
was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
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actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,
emergency
equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(8) Surveillance (61726) - Surveillance tests were observed to
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verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified
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personnel were~ conducting the tests;- tests were adequate to
verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;
and TS requirements were followed,
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The followir.g tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
- SP-157B, Meteorological System Surveillance (weekly).
- SP-340B, "B" Train ECCS Pump and Valve Operability.
- SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance.
- SP-456, Refueling Internal Equipment Response to a
ESAS. Test Signal.
- SP-457, Refueling Interval ECCS Response to a Safety
Injection Test Signal.
- SP-902, 4.160 KV ES Bus "A" Undervoltage Trip Test
and Auxiliary Relay Calibration.
During the performance of procedure SP-902 the inspector was
informed by technicians performing the test that.the breakers
for some of the equipment to be tested had not yet been placed
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in- the " test" position as required by step 8.5 since this
equipment was not yet being tested. The breakers were placed in
the test position upon reaching step 9.3.20 which required that
all the breakers be closed .in the test position. The inspector
discussed this matter with the procedure's author who was
present during the performance of the test.
The intention of
the procedure was not to place the equipment in test until step
9.3.20 was reached. The inspector considers the steps specified
to place the breakers in the test position to be confusing and
heavily reliant on the skill of the craft to be performed
correctly.
The procedure's author agreed with the inspector's
conment and stated that the procedure would be revised to
clarify Ge steps during the next annual rev'iew.
Inspector Followup Item (302/89-11-02):
Review the revision to
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procedure SP-902 to clarify steps.
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(9) Maintenance Activities (62703)
The inspector observed
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maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment
clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention
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work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;
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quality control personnel were available for inspection
activities as required; and, TS requirements were being
followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
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following maintenance activities:
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Replacement of valve RWV-35 and flange in accordance with
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procedures MP-122, Disassembly and Reassembly of Flanged
Conr.ections, and MP-132 Erection of Piping.
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Inspection of valves RCV-157, RCV-158, and RCV-163 for
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environmental qualification discrepancies in accordance
with prochdures MP-199D, Target Rock Valve Maintenance
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Model 80K and Model 81VV Valves Dfrect Acting Normally
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Closed Solenoid Valves, CP-113A, Work R
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accordance with procedure SP-410, Valve Testing During
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Inspection of valves CAV-3 and CAV-5 for environmental
Refueling Outages.
qualification discrepancies in accordance with procedures-
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MP-402A, . Maintenance of Limitorque Valv
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Control Power and Instrumentation Cables. lices'in
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. Rework of environmentally qualified transmitter spand procedure'
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89-05-03-01
accordance with modification MAR
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Troubleshoot and replace. grounded cells in
"B" Station
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Maintenance, and MP-531, Troubleshooting
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Observed flow test and inspection of decay heat pump 18.
Observed maintenance on raw water check valve RWV-34,
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming
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Reports (71707)-
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential g
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether correcti
a.
Events that were reported immediately were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfie
appeared appropriate.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the curre
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Policy.
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This LER reported that portions of the Chill
(0 pen) LER 89-07:
This matter was
Water System were not seismically goalified.
(1)
identified by the licensee during an evaluation of Control
Complex HVAC instrument air tubing in accordance with
action associated with LER 88-13.
portions of the system which are not seismically qualified
the seismically qualified section by shutting manual isolation
operating
valves (CHV-76/77) and has revised applicableThe licensee is
procedures to maintain these valves closed.89-03-06-01) to correc
presently developing a modification (MARthis des
system flow diagrams for similar problems.ope
of the engineering review.
This LER reported that the main steam line
(0 pen) LER 89-08: containment wall penetration was not
(2)
The inspector reviewed and
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
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verified implementation of the corrective actions as stated in
this report.
The licensee has issued a supplement to this
report dated May 23, 1989.
During efforts. to resolve this
matter, the licensee identified that the steam generator tube
rupture accident analysis in chapter 14.2.2.2 of the -FSAR
conflicted with the plant's emergency and abnormal procedures.
.The licensee reanalyzed the. accident consistent with plant
procedures and. determined that although a slight increase in the
offsite. dose is involved, this increase is below 1% of the 10 CFR Part 100 limits required by the NRC. The licensee plans to
revise the FSAR to reflect the new accident analysis. This LER
will remain open pending completion of the FSAR revision.
(3). (0 pen) LER 89-09:
This LER reported that the low pressure
safety injection pumps (DHP-1A/1B) were unable to perform all
their safety functions during certain small break loss of
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coolant accidents.
This matter was identified by the licensee
in response to NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety Related Pump
Loss.
The licensee has evaluated the test data to confirm that
the pumps can operate reliably at lower flow rates and has
submitted correspondence to the NRC dated May 30, 1989, which
included a justification for plant startup and operation. This
LER will remain open pending NRC review of the correspondence.
(4)
(0 pen) LER 89-10:
This LER reported that electrical cable
splices associated with main feedwater pump suction valve FWV-14
were installed incorrectly a,nd did not satisfy environmental
qualification requirements.
This report has been referred to
the NRC Region II Office for followup by regional inspectors and
will remain open pending further NRC review.
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(5)
(0 pen) LER 89-11:
This LER reported that the Circulating Water
(CW) system flooding analysis described in Section 9.5.2.3.2 of
the Final Safety ' Analysis Report (FSAR) was incorrect.
The
licensee is presently re-evaluating this analysis and is
developing recommendations to prevent equipment damage during
this type of event. .In the interim, the licensee has stationed
a flood watch in the vicinity of the CW system to alert the
control room of any flooding. This LER will remain open pending
completion of the licensee's evaluation.
(6)
(Closed) LER 89-12:
This LER reported inadequate temperature
rated solenoid valves for containment isolation valves
CIV-34/35/40/41.
This matter was identified by the licensee
during the implementation of corrective action associated with
LER 89-01.
The inspector has reviewed and verified the
corrective actions as stated in this report.
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(7) (0 pen)LER89-13: This LER reported an inadvertent start of the
emergency diesel generators.due to a degraded voltage condition
on the engineered safeguards buses.
This event was previously
discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-08.
The licensee
has attributed the cause for this event to be the overloading of
the fossil unit startup transformer which resulted in' the .
? degraded bus condition. . The licensee,has developed administra-
tive controls to limit the loading on the fossil unit startup
transformer and has installed a modification to provide an alarm
in the nuclear unit's control room which will identify when this
transformer is overloaded.
The licensee is also evaluating the
impact of a sequential occurrence of an engineered safeguards
actuation followed by a degraded voltage condition and will
issue a supplement to this report.
This LER will remain open
pending issuance of the supplemental report.
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(8)
(Closed) LER 89-14:
This LER reported improperly set radiation
monitor trip setpoints.
This matter was discussed previously in
NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-08 and is the subject of a
violation (302/89-08-04).
The LER will be closed and further
action tracked by the violation.
(9)
(Closed) LER 89-15:
This LER reported that an air operated
containment isolation valve did not have a seismically supported
solenoid valve (MUV-253-SV). This matter was identified by the
licensee during the implementation of corrective action
associated with LER 89-01.
The inspector has reviewed and
verified the corrective actions as statsd in this report.
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(10)(Closed)LER88-14: This LER reported excessive temperatures in
escrgency feedwater system piping.
This report was previously
discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-01.
The licensee
has implemented leakage criteria for the check valves in
procedure SP-604, FWV-43/44 Leak Test.
(11)'(Closed) LER 89-01:
This LER reported that solenoid air valves
for several containment isolation valves were undersized. This
matter was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Reports
50-302/89-03 and 50-302/89-01 and was the subject of a violation
(302/89-01-01).
The licensee has also submitted a supplemental
report dated March 6,1989, on this subject.
Currently the
licensee has completed a field verification and engineering
evaluation of all safety related solenoids.
This effort has
identified the problems reported by LERs 89-12 and 89-15.
The
inspector reviewed and verified the licensee's corrective action
for the deficiencies found.
(12) (Closed) L,ER 88-18:
This LER reported the failure to
incorporate a TS revision into the applicable procedure prior to
its performance.
This matter was previously discussed in NRC
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Inspection Report 50-302/88-31.
The licensee has revised
procedures AI-400A, Description and General Administration of
Plant Procedures, and AI-4000, Revising Procedures, to require
timely incorporation of TS changes.
The licensee has also
started requesting grace periods for implementation of TS
changes upon issuance.
(13) (0 pen) LER 88-23:
This LER reported a discrepancy in the
emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters and was
previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/88-34.
The
licensee has completed the corrective action stated in this
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report and in correspondence to the NRC dated January 12, 1989,
committed to provide independent power supplies for these
heaters. The licensee plans to install this modification during
the next refueling outage presently scheduled for March 1990.
The NRC issued a safety evaluation dated November 22, 1988 which
concluded that operation with the existing design until the
refueling outage is acceptable.
The LER will remain open
pending completion of plant modifications,
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b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
verify the following:
TS are complied with, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS.
All NCORs were re' viewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforce-
ment Policy.
(1) NCOR 89-105 reported the loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
. inventory due to an improper valve lineup.
On May 7 at
approximately 2:31 A.M. control room operators noticed an
unusual increase in the reactor building sump level.
The RCS
was in the process of being filled and vented in accordance with
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operating procedure OP-301, Filling and Venting Reactor Coolant
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System.
Plant operators immediately began investigating the
cause for the inventory loss and by 3:26 A.M. had identified and
isolated the source of leakage.
The licensee found pressurizer
drain valves (RCV-1 and RCV-2) in the open position instead of
closed as required.
Procedure OP-301, Valve Checklist 1, specifies that valves RCV-1
and RCV-2 be in the closed position for filling and venting the
RCS.
This valve lineup had been performed and independently
verified by licensee personnel on May 3.
Failure to establish
and maintain the drain valves in the closed position is contrary
to the requirements of procedure OP-301 and is considered to be
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another example of the violation discussed in paragraph 2.a of
this report.
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During subsequent interviews with op(erators on shift during this
event, the inspector determined:
1) the leak rate was
approximately 24 gallons per minute which is in excess of the
one GPM unidentified RCS leakrate requiring declaration of an
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Unusual Event, (2) the Man-on-Call was called and concurred with
the Shift Supervisor that a Notice of Unusual Event (NUE) was
not necessary, (3) the Director of Nuclear Plant Operations was
called, went to the Control Room, and stated that if the source
of the leak was not discovered in a reasonable time, or for any
other reason, the process was not under control he would declare
an Unusual Event.
The source of the leakage (RCV-1 & RCV-2 not
shut) was found and the valves closed in about 55 minutes. No
NUE was declared.
This failure to declare an Unusual Event when the leak rate
trigger was exceeded is considered ~ to be a violation of the
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Radiological Emergency Plan and EM-202.
Violation (302/89-11-03):
Failure to declare an NUE.
(2) NCOR 89-119 reported that on May 24, an inadvertent isolation of
the reactor building purge system occurred due to an isolation
signal from radiation monitor RMA-1.
During a routine weekly
changeout of filters associated with this monitor, a high sample
flowrate condition occurred as expected but the radiation
monitor was not properly bypassed to prevent the purge
isolation.
This event is very similar to an event which
occurred on March 8,1989 dis' cussed in NRC Inspection Report
50-302/89-06 (Unresolved Item *302/89-06-03).
The licensee's
corrective action for the previous event included increased
supervision of technicians working on the radiation monitors.
Procedure CH-348, Sampling at the Reactor Building Purge Duct
Gas Monitor RMA-1, controls the sampling and filter changeout
activities for monitor RMA-1 and requires in section 4 that the
monitor's trip interlock be bypassed.
Failure to properly
bypass the monitor's trip interlock is contrary to the require-
ments of procedure CH-348 and is considered to be another
example of the violation discussed in paragraph 2.a of this
report.
(3) NCOR 89-75 reported that test flanges were installed at three
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locations in the Chemical Addition and Sampling (CA) system and
at three locations in the Demineralized Water (DW) system versus
the required blank flanges.
The test flanges had been plugged
and thereby functioned as blank flanges.
Procedure SP-179,
Containment Leakage Tests, was signed off indicating the blank
- Unresolved' items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations.
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flanges were installed.
The licensee took prompt corrective
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action to remove the test flanges and install blank flanges.
This matter is considered to be a licensee identified non-cited
violation (NCV) because the criteria specified in Section V.G.
of the Enforcement policy were satisfied.
Non-cited Violation (302/89-11-04):
Failure to pronerly
implement procedure SP-179.
4.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the
changes.were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that
the changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and
approved procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met
acceptance criteria or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner,
and that appropriate drawings and facility. procedures were revised as
necessary.
This review included selected observations of modifications
and/or-testing in progress.
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iindification MAR 88-06-17-01, Modification to AHF-17,18 and 19 A and B Fan
Dampers was reviewed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Review of IE Information Notices-(IEN) (92701)
The inspectors reviewed the licensu 's activities associated with IEN
89-44, Hydrogen Storage on the Roof of the Control Room, in accordance
with a request for information from the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation dated May 2, 1989.
Upon reviewing the FSAR section 9.9 for
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information on this subject, the inspectors noticed conflicting
information between section 9.9 and Table 9-19 of the FSAR.
Section 9.9
states that the hydrogen storage area is located approximately 450 feet
south of the Auxiliary Building (AB) whereas Table 9-19 specifies 240 feet
south of the AB.
Further, section 9.9 states that the nitrogen storage
is also located with the hydrogen storage. This information is ineccurate
as the nitrogen storage has been moved adjacent to the east side of the
turbine building.
The inspector discussed these discrepancies with
licensee personnel who stated that the FSAR would be revised to correct
the conflicting information.
Inspector Followup Item (302/89-11-05):
Review the revision to section
9.9 of the FSAR regarding hydrogen and nitrogen storage.
6.-
Followup of Onsite Events (93702)
On May 29 at approximately 5:10 A.M. the licensee discovered that the
emergency feedwater piping penetration had exceeded its design
temperature. This matter was reviewed by NRC regional inspectors and will
be discussed in more detail in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-14.
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7.
Followup of Review of Drawing Control (RAI 88-01) (37700)
302-673 sheet 4
During the review of Control Room' drawings, flow diagram
of 4, Nitrogen, Hydrogen and Carbon Dioxide Flow Diagram,-was found to
have been revised .to the wrong. revision of a MAR. ' The piping modification
was normally isolated during plant operation and. therefore was not a-
Thel licensee reviewed the closecut of the MAR and
significant- error.
,
found that the MAR had originally been issued as a temporary MAR .then
Each iteration was closed out
upgraded to permanent then revised twice.
The licensee reviewed the
separately and resulted in the drawing error.
status of other temporary MARS which became permanent and found that of
5,053. MARS issued since plant startup, 39 temporary MARS - were made
Six of the 39 involved Flow Diagram changes and only the one.
permanent..
was made in error. The licensee revised the 302-673 sheet 4 to correctly
This matter is considered to be a non-cited
show the modifications.
violation because the criteria specified in Section V.A of the Enforcement
.
Policy were satisfied.
Non-cited Violation- (302/89-11-06):
Failure to properly implement NEP
271.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 &
~
8.
92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 302/88-14-06: Provide information regarding
a.
the operability of the incore thermocouple temperature monitoring
system.
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This item was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/
The licensee has issued revision 11 to the FSAR and has
88-29.
corrected sections .1.3.2.5 and 7.3.3.2.1 to more accurately describe
!
.the systems in use.
b.
(Closed) IFI 302/88-24-01:
Review the licensee's revision to the
moderator dilution accident analysis in the FSAR.
i
The licensee has revised paragraph 14.1.2.4 of the FSAR to reflect
The
the plant ' modifications to prevent this type of accident.
licensee has included the old analysis, however, for historical
purposes.
9.
ExitInterview(30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
During this meeting,
.at the. conclusion of the inspection on June 5, 1989.
the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they
c
are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violations,
NCVs and inspector followup items (IFIs).
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The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did
not identify as. proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number
Description and Reference
50-302/89-11-01
Violation - Failure to adhere to the
requirements of plant procedures as required by
50-302/89-11-03
Violation - Failure to declare an NUE.
.
50-302/89-11-04
NCV - Failure to properly implement
procedure SP-179.
50-302/89-11-06
NCV - Failure to properly implement
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NEP-271.
50-302/89-11-02
IFI - Review the revision to procedure
SP-902 to clarify steps.
50-302/89-11-05
IFI - Review the revision to section 9.9
of the FSAR regarding hydrogen ' and nitrogen
storage.
10. Acronyms and Abbreviations
'
- Auxiliary Building
CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations
CA
- Chemical Addition and Sampling System
,
CW .
- Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System
- Demineralized Water System
. Final Safety Analysis Report
IEN
- IE Information Notices
IFI
- Inspector Followup Item
LER
- Licensee Event Report
MAR.
- Modification Approval Record
NCOR - Nonconforming Operation Report
NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Notice of Unusual Event
RCA.
- Radiation Control Area
- Radiation Work Permit
- Surveillance Procedure
- Short Term Instruction
TS
- Technical Specification
- Unresolved Item
- Violation
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