IR 05000219/1987001

Insp Rept 50-219/87-01 on 870105-09.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Fire Protection Features to Ensure Ability to Achieve & Maintain Safe Shutdown in Event of Fire.One Item Re Spurious Signals Remained Unresolved

ML20211B707
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	02/10/1987
From:	Anderson C, Pullani S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211B690	List: IR 05000219/1987001 ML20211B684
References
50-219-87-01, 50-219-87-1, NUDOCS 8702190516
Download: ML20211B707 (16)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 87-01 Docket No. 50-219 License N DPR-16 Priority Category C Licensee: Docket No. 50-219

Licensee

GPU Nuclear Corporation Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Inspection Conducted: Jy1uary 5-9, 1987 Inspector: b A, 4 ~4 .a f7 j S.FyJllani,FireProtectionEngineer date o

j Also participating and contributing to the report were:

H. Thomas, Mechanical Systems Specialist, BNL K. Sullivan, Elect ical Systems Specialist, BNL J. Klevan, Fire ction Engineer, Rolf Jensen & Associat s, In Approved by: Z- o f/

C. J. @derson, Chief date Plant Systems Section, DRS

! Inspection Summary: Inspection on January 5-9, 1987 (Report No. 50-219/87-01).

i Areas Inspected: Special, announced team inspection of the licensee's efforts

to comply with the requireinents of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, J and 0, concerning fire protection features to ensure the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

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, Results: No violations were identified. One item remained unresolved at the i end of inspection (see Section 7.3.2 for details).

i 0702190516 070211 PDR ADOCK 05000219 G PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN)

• R. Ashby, Jr., Manager, Oyster Creek Projects

• A. Baig, Project Engineer

• J. Barton, Deputy Director

• G. Bush, Licensing Engineer

• F. Collado, Project Engineer

• C. Crowe, Electrical Engineer R. Davidson, Operations Training Manager

• J. DeBlasio, Manager, Support Engineering

• Fiedler, Director

• Foglia, Manager, Plant Materials

• Fuller, Operations QA Manager

• Hertz, Engineer J. Kowalski, Oyster Creek Licensing Manager

• R. Markowski, Manager, QA Program Development / Audit D. MacFarlane, Oyster Creek Site Audit Manager

• A. Rone, Plant Engineering Director

• J. Siegel, Fire Protection W. Smith, Plant Engineering Department Director

• J. Sullivan, Plant Operations Director

• K. Zimmermann, Fire Protection Coordinator 1.2 Burns & Roe (B&R)

• D. Giolino, Project Engineer /I&C Supervisor

• P. Kruse, Electrical Engineer

• R. Podesfinski, Fire Protection Engineer i 1.3 Boston Edison Company (BECo)

• R. Velez, Project Manager

• F. Wozniak, Pilgrim Station Fire Protection Manager 1.4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

W. Bateman, Senior Resident Inspector

• J. Durr, Chief Engineering Branch J. Wechselberger, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meetin . .

2. Purpose This inspection was to ascertain that the licensee is in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G,J and 0, including exemptions ap-proved by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).

3. Background 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R became effective on February 17, 1981.Section III.G of Appendix R requires that fire protection be pro-vided to ensure that one train of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shut-down remains available in the event of a fire at any location within a licensed operating facility. For hot shutdown condi-tions, one train of the systems necessary must be free of fire damage (III.G.1.a). For cold shutdown conditions, repair is allowed using in-place procedures and materials available onsite, with the provision that cold shutdown be achievable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the initiating event (III.G.l.b).Section III.G.2 lists specific options to provide adequate protection for redundant trains of equipmen If the protection required by Section III.G.2 is not provided or the sys-tems of concern are subject to damage from fire suppression activities,Section III.G.3 of the rule requires that an alternate or dedicated shut-down capability be provided which is independent of the area of concer Any alternate or dedicated system requires NRC review and approval prior to implementatio . Correspondence Correspondence between the licensee and the NRC concerning compliance with Sections III.G, J and 0 was reviewed by the inspection team in preparation for the site visit. Attachment I to this report is a listing of the cor-respondence reviewe . Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability 5.1 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown Safe shutdown of the reactor is initially performed by insertion of control rods from the control room. Insertion can also be accom-plished by tripping the reactor protection system motor generator set from outside the control roo Decay heat removal is accomplished by natural circulation of reactor coolant through one of the two isolation condensers. The heat is dissipated to the atmosphere by steam formed on the shell side of the isolation condenser which is supplied with water from the condensate storage tank or as a backup from the fire water system. Primary system pressure and cool-down rate is controlled by cycling the condensate return valve of the isolation condense J

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Primary coolant inventory is maintained by the Control Rod Drive (CRD) hydraulic pump which makes up for any leakage or shrinkage during reactor shutdown. Makeup water for the reactor vessel and the isolation condenser is not immediately required after reactor scra Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) are closed from the control room to avoid inventory loss. These valves can also be closed from out-side the control room. Reactor feedwater pumps and reactor recir-culation pumps will trip upon loss of offsite power or they will be tripped from the control room to prevent flooding of the isolation condenser on high condensate flow. These pumps can also be tripped from outside the control room. The high flow trip function is blocked upon transfer of control to the remote shutdown panel Cold shutdown conditions can be achieved and maintained by the use of the shutdown cooling system along with its support systems:

Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System and Service Water Syste For a detailed listing of systems and components used for the hot and cold safe shutdown, refer to Appendix A of the licensee's fire hazard analysi .2 Plant Fire Areas The plant is divided into several fire areas and zones as listed in Section 3. of the fire hazard analysis repor .3 Areas Where Alternate Shutdown Is Required The licensee has determined the need for alternate safe shutdown capability in the event of fire in the cable spreading room, control room, upper cable spreading room and cable bridge tunnel where re-dundant safe shutdown equipment and cabling cannot meet the require-ments of Appendix R Section III.G.2. The licensee has provided alternate safe shutdown capability independent of cabling and equip-ment in these control and cable spreading room .4 Remaining Plant Areas All other areas of the plant not required to have an alternate safe shutdown must comply with the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, unless an exemption request has been approved by the staf . Inspection Methodology The inspection team examined the licensee's capabilities for separating and protecting equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot and cold shutdown condition _ - - - ,

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This inspection sampled selected fire areas which the licensee had iden-tified as being in compliance with Section II The inspection team examined the licensee's capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown and the capability to bring the plant to cold shut-down conditions in the event of a fire in various areas of the plant. The examination included a review of selected drawings, safe shutdown pro-cedures and other documents. Drawings were reviewed to verify electrical independence from the fire areas of concern. Procedures were reviewed for general content and feasibilit The inspection team examined the licensee's fire protection features provided to maintain one train of equipment needed for safe shutdown free of fire damage. Included in the scope of this effort were fire area boundaries, including walls, floors and ceilings, and fire protection of openings such as fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seal The inspection team also examined the licensee's compliance with Section III.J, Emergency Lighting, and Section III.0, Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pum . Inspection of Protection Provided to Safe Shutdown Systems 7.1 Protection in Various Fire Areas The team reviewed the protection provided for selected safe shutdown systems and components in the following fire areas / zones for compli-ance with Appendix R,Section III.G.1, 2 and *

Reactor Building Fire Zones RB-FZ-1C, 10, 1E, IF, 1H

Office Building Fire Zones OB-FZ-4,5,6A,68,8C, 10A

Turbine Building Fire Zones TB-FZ-11B, 11D, 11E, 11F

Circulating Water Intake Strucure Fire Zone CW-FZ-14

Diesel Generator Fire Area DG-FA-17 The safe shutdown systems and components selected for inspection in the above fire areas were based on their relative importance to safety using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques (see Section 11.0 for details).

The team did not identify any unacceptable condition .2 Safe Shutdown Procedures 7.2.1 Procedure Review The team reviewed the following safe shutdown procedures:

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200-ABN-3200.30, Control Room Evacuation, Revision 1 346, Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown Panels, Revision 1

2000-ABN-3200.29, Response to Fire, Revision 5

A100-APR-3214.01, Appendix R-Containment Spray Pump Temporary cable installation, Revision 0

A100-APR-3900.01, Appendix R Repair Kit Annual Inspection, Revision 0 The scope of this review was to ascertain that shutdown could be attained in a safe and orderly manner, to determine the 'evel of difficulty involved in operating equipment, and to verify that there was no dependence on repairs for achieving hot shutdow For the purpose of the review, a repair would include installing electrical or pneumatic jumpers, wires or fuses to perform an action required for hot shutdown. For cold shutdown, repair is allowed using in place procedures and materials available onsite with the provision that cold shutdown be achievable within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> The team did not identify any unacceptable condition .2.2 Procedure Walk Throud The team walked through selected portions of procedures 2000 ABN-3200.30, Control Room Evacuation, Revision 1 and 346, Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown Panels, Revision 1, to determine by simulation that alternative safe shutdown could be implemented in an orderly and timely fashion. Five team members participated, one following the group shift supervisor, two follow-ing, individually, each of two CR0's and two, individually, following each of the two equipment operator The procedures were started from the evacuation of the control room and followed through until simulated stable hot shutdown conditions were achieved and cooldown could be started. The operators were allowed one operation in the control room (SCRAM) and a loss of offsite power was postulated. The team paid particular attention to the feasibility of each manual action, ease of access, communication and sequence of operation. Radios were used for communication. They proved acceptable with the possible exception of the Diesel Generator Building. The team indicated that the noise level in the Diesel Generator Building when the generators are running might necessitate the use of head set The licensee demonstrated the capability to achieve stable hot shut-down in a timely fashio However, the team had a concern that the EMRVs could lift as a result of a short circuit caused by a fire in the control room. The spurious opening of the EMRVs in case of a control room fire is an unresolved item as further discussed in Section 7.3.2 of the repor If the licensee's final resolution of

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this issue involves a manual action such as pulling fuses to assure that these valves remain closed, it should be reflected in the pro-cedure Except as stated above, no deficient conditions were identifie .3 Protection for Associated Circuits Appendix R,Section III.G, requires that protection be provided for asso-ciated circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation of redundant trains of systems necessary for safe shutdown. The circuits of concern are generally associated with safe shutdown circuits in one of three ways:

Common bus concern Spurious signals concern Common enclosure concern The associated circuits were evaluated by the team for common bus, spur-ious signals, and common enclosure concerns. Power, control, and instru-mentation circuits were examined for potential problem .3.1 Common Bus Concern The common bus concern is found in circuits, either safety related or non-safety related, where there is a common power source with shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concer The team examined, on a sampling basis, 4160V, 480V, 120V AC and 125V DC bus protective relay co-ordination. The team also examined, on a sampling basis, the protection for specific instrumentation, con-trols, and power circuits, including the coordination of fuses and circuit breakers. The licensee has been performing relay settings at approximately 12 to 18 month interval No unacceptable conditions were identifie .3.2 Spurious Signals Concern The spurious signals concern is made up of 2 item *

False motor, control, and instrument indications can occur such as those encountered during 1975 Browns Ferry fire. These could be caused by fire initiated grounds, short or open circuit Spurious operation of safety related or non-safety related components can occur that would adversely affect shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves).

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The team examined, on a sampling basis, the following areas to ascertain that no spurious signal concerns exist:

Current transformer secondaries High/ low pressure interface General fire instigated spurious signals No unacceptable conditions were identified except as follows:

Spurious Operation of an EMRV in the Event of a Control Room Fire In the event of a control room fire, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) makeup will be provided by CRD Hydraulic Pump B with decay heat removal provided by isolation condenser B. These functions are to be controlled and mon-itored at the remote shutdown pane The licensee's fire hazard analysis has determined that the RCS makeup will not be required for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 24 minutes based on natural circu-lation of steam from the reactor through the isolation condenser and

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maximum expected leakage from the RCS. Under these conditions ample time exists to permit the starting and loading of emergency diesel generator (EDG-2) and alignment of CRD Hydraulic Pump B to provide makeu As documented in the licensees analysis No. TDP.-350, however, a spurious open electromatic relief valve could result in excessive loss of inventory from the RCS, the depressurization of the reactor and loss of the natural flow of steam through the isolation condenser. Under this scenario, the time available to provide RCS makeup would then be reduced to approxi-mately 8 minutes. The alignment of CRD Hydraulic Pump B and starting and

loading of EDG-2 in this limited time presents a proble The five EMRVs may be manually operated by control switches located on a single panel (Panel IF/2F) in the control room and the licensee has pro-vided dual contacts in series on each switch to mitigate the possibility of a single short from occurring at the switch which would then energize a control relay resulting in the spurious opening of an EMRV. It should be noted, however, that control cabling to all five manual control switches were found to be tied in a single bundle within the control room pane Further, these switches are within close proximity to each other, approx-imately 3 to 5 inches apar Based on the circuit configuration, as described above, there remains a concern of the possibility of two shorts occuring within the control switch panel and the resulting uncontrolled blow down of the reacto The licensee is considering pulling of the circuit fuses located outside the control room (in Fire Zone 08-FZ-68) to overcome this concer This is an unresolved item pending further analysis by the licensee and its review by NRC (50-219/87-01-01).

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7.3.3 Common Enclosure Concern The common enclosure concern is found when redundant circuits are routed together in a raceway or enclosure and they are not electrically protected or when fire can destroy both circuits due to inadequate fire barrier penetration A number of circuits, selected on a sampling basis, were examined for this concer No unacceptable conditions were identifie .4 General Fire Protection Features The team examined the general fire protection features in the plant pro-vided to maintain one train of safe shutdown equipment free of fire damag Included in the scope of this effort were: fire area boundaries, including walls, floors and ceilings; fire protection of openings such as fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals; fire protection systems; and other fire protection feature No unacceptable conditions were identified. The items discussed in the following paragraphs a and b, were found acceptable based on the licensee actions discussed therei Fire Door in Sealed Fire Zone Boundary of Turbine Building The team found that a fire door in the boundary between Turbine Building Fire Zones 11F and 118, both on elevation of 3 feet 6 inches, was blocked cpen. The door is required to be kept closed because it separates two fire zones which use different safe shutdown paths. The door was blocked open because the door knob had fallen off and there would be no way to easily reopen the door if it close Alternate means of access to affected rooms is available, howeve Following further discussion with the licensee it was determined that this door was one of several under periodic fire watch surveillance now because of temporary turbine building ventilation system in-balance created by inoperable supply fans. This condition created air flow rates through the affected doorways which were sufficient to overcome the door closer unless the door was manually pulled shu The door knob fell off the indicated door as a result of such repeat-ed manual closures. The door knob was replaced while the team was on sit An outside contractor retained by the licensee is currently refurb-ishing the turbine building supply fans, and is expected to finish the work within one week. Completion of this work will restore the ventilation system balance and eliminate the need for the fire watc .. . .. .

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Based on the above licensee's action, the team found this acceptabl Floor Penetration in Sealed Fire Zone Boundary of Reactor Building l The team found that the licensee's analysis of penetration seals did not adequately describe the basis for the acceptability of penetra-tion PB-29 in the floor of Reactor Building elevation 75 feet. This penetration is approximately two feet wide by five feet long adjacent to the west wall of the Reactor Building. The north half of the opening is filled to a depth of 6 or more inches with RTV silicone foam. The south half is not sealed because personnel access by a permanent ladder is required to a platform in elevation 51 fee Elevations 75 feet and 51 feet use different safe shutdown paths in case of a fire. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a separation between these two zones to assure the availability of a hot shutdown pat The opening at the ladder is provided with two steel plates which generally close the opening but allow approximately 1.2 square feet of free opening to remai The licensee's description of penetrations, in Revision 6 of their Fire Hazards Analysis, did not account for the gap between the steel plates as a factor in the potential spread of fire between shutdown paths in these two zones. Also, the critical shutdown paths are less than 50 feet from this opening in at least one of the zone Following further discussion, the licensee modified their description of the basis for the acceptability of this penetration in its present configuration. The team reviewed the revised description and found this item acceptable because:

The steel plates cover almost the entire opening

No combustibles pass through or near the penetration (except the previously accepted cables in conduit)

Fire detection is provided in both zones in the vicinity of the penetratio *

Cable trays on elevation 51 feet are protected by automatic deluge system *

Fire loading is light to moderate in each zone

Cables for redundant shutdown paths are not close to the penetratio . Emergency Lighting 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes theret . _ _ _ - -

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The team examined the plant emergency lighting system to ascertain the licensee's compliance with the above requiremen The team did not identify any unacceptable conditions. Items a. and b.

, below were found acceptable based on the licensee actions discussed therein, Emergency Lighting Exterior Access Path Adjacent to Machine Shop The team found that the illumination of the designated operator travel path in the vicinity of the northwest corner of the machine shop (outside the plant) by the installed emergency lighting unit would be obstructed by an office trailer, based on the observed location and orientation of the lamp heads.

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Discussions with the licensee indicated that GPUN Human Factors Engineering had evaluated all paths under actual emergency lighting and determined that the illumination levels were adequate. In this location, it appeared that the lamp head had become disoriented since that evaluatio The licensee promptly reoriented and secured the lamp head in posi-tion while the inspection team was on site. Based on the above licensee's actions, the team found this item acceptable, Emergency Lighting Outside Emergency Diesel Generator Building The team found that the card key reader on the emergency diesel generator building door illuminated by installed emergency lighting was inoperative and would not unlock the door. There are two other entry doors to the building, and their card key readers operate properly, but these doors are not covered by emergency lighting units. Discussions with the licensee indicated that the diesel generator room entry doors can be unlocked with a conventional key which is carried by the opeators. Therefore, the current malfunction of the card key reader would not impede access to the building during periods of emergency lightin Based on the licensee's procedures, the team found this item acceptabl . Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump 19 CFR 50, Appendix R,Section III.0, requires that the reactor coolant pump shall be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation. As the Oyster Creek containment is inerted during normal operations, the above requirement does not apply to this plant. Therefore, no inspection was conducted in this area.

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10. Quality Assurance During the course of the inspection, the team reviewed several drawings, the fire hazard analysis, fire protection modification packages, proce-dures and other fire protection documents. The scope of review included verification of their technical adequacy, appropriate reviews, design and procurement controls, and other Quality Assurance requirements for the licensee's fire protection progra The team did not identify any unacceptable condition . Use of PRA Technique for the Inspection The safe shutdown systems (SSSs) and components were selected for inspec-tion of their fire protection features, based on their relative importance to safety using PRA techniques as opposed to a random sampling basis (see Section 7.1 of this report). If there exists a plant specific PRA or related studies such as Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) or Reactor Safety Study Methodology Application Program (RSSMAP), their results could be used in the selection process. Although a plant specific PRA study sponsored by the utility exists for the Oyster Creek plant, it is not docketed and was not available at the site for the team's revie The licensee indicated that the study is incomplet In the absence of these types of plant specific studies, generic infor-mation on the relative importance of PWR and BWR systems based on a study of 15 published PRAs could be used for this purpose, with lesser precision (see NUREG-1050, PRA Reference Document, September 1984, Section B.3.2).

The relative importance of BWR systems considering dominant accident sequences from the 15 PRAs is reproduced in Attachment 2 to this repor Comparing the systems in Attachment 2 to their functionally equivalent SSSs discussed in Section 5. of this report, the following SSSs were selected for this inspection, based on their relative importance:

Service Water System

Main Steam System (MSIVs and other isolation Valves)

Reactor Service System

CRD Hydraulic System

Isolation Condenser System

Core Spray System

Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRVs)

Emergency Diesel Generators and Onsite AC Power Systems In addition, some of the other SSSs such as Process Monitoring Instru-mentations were also inspected because of their importance in the event of a fir . .

12. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters for which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, violaions, or deviation An unresolved item is discussed in Section 7. Conclusions The findings of this inspection are summarized in Attachment No vio-lations were identified. One item pertaining to the spurious operations of EMRVs remained unresolved at the end of inspection (Section 7.3.2).

Four items identified during the inspection were found acceptable by the team based on the discussions and commitments described in this repor The details of the acceptable items are discussed in various sections of this report as listed Attachment The licensee actions and commitments are also discused in these section . Exit Interview The inspection team met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection on January 9,1987. The team leader summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that tim The team leader and the licensee discussed the contents of this inspection report to ascertain that it did not contain any proprietary informatio The licensee agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public document Room without prior licensee review for proprietary information (10 CFR 2.790).

At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the tea , .

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ATTACHMENT 1 Correspondence and Documents Reviewed TITLE DATE LETTER FRDM P.B. FIEDLER (GPU) TO D.M. CRUTCHFIELD (NRC) 7/11/84 LETTER FROM D.M. CRUTCHFIELD(NRC) TO P.B. FIEDLER(GPU) 8/23/84 (SUBJ.: SCHEDULAR EXEMPTION)

LETTER FROM P.B. FIEDLER(GPU) TO J.A. ZOLINSKI(NRC) 7/12/85 LETTER FROM J.A. ZOLINSKI(NRD) TO P.B. FIEDLER(GPU) 3/24/86 (SUBJ.: APPENDIX R EXEMPTIONS AND POST FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY)

OYSTER CREEK FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT AND APPENDIX R 10/3/86 SECTION III.G SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION REV.5 and YSTER CREEK FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REPORT RE /3/86 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION " ELECTRICAL 11/21/86 LOAD INTERRUPTING DEVICE COORDINATION STUDY" REV.)

OYSTER CREEK PROCEDURE NO. 2000-ABN-3200.29 " RESPONSE 12/11/86 TO FIRE" REV. 5 OYSTER CREEK PROCEDURE NO. A100-APR 3730.01 " APPENDIX 12/4/86 R - DE-TERMINATION OF 1A2/182 BUS TIE CABLES" REV 0 OYSTER CREEK PROCEDURE NO. A100-APR 3531.01 " APPENDIX 12/4/86 R - TEMPORARY POWER FOR EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-3" RE OYSTER CREEK PROCEDURE NO. A100-APR-3411.01 " APPENDIX 12/4/86 R - TEMPORARY EMRV POWER (NR1080 AND NR108E)"RE OYSTER CREEK PROCEDURE NO. A100-APR-3411.02 " APPENDIX 12/4/86 R - TEMPORARY EMRV CONTROL AND INDICATION (NR108E)" RE OYSTER CREEK PROCEDURE NO A100-APR-3411.03 " APPENDIX 12/4/86 R - TEMPORARY EMRV CONTROL AND INDICATION (NR1080)" RE OYSTER CREEK PROCEDURE NO. A100-APR-3214.01 " APPENDIX 12/4/86 R - CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TEMPORARY CABLE INSTALLATION"

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Figure B Relettve leportance of BWR Systeme Coneideting Doelnent Accident Sequences itot 15 PRAE nrws Ausillery feedwater systee MPet Nigt procente feelteelettee ersten Pet Powet eeevotelee afstee DC Diteet cutteet power MPts M6gh peessute lejeet tee syetes esas Ceetelement epter lejeetten systen sus Servles wetet erstes energency Ac Seefgemer et powet emes teelesel.heet.teeovel erstes ers teettet.pteteettee erstee PoeV Power.epeteted tellet velve LPet t.ew.ptessuse teetteeletten syetes s.r t s t ptesente lejeettee erstes tono ate te defloodi Sus 4P Cetteleseet egep nect alen.ptseeeeg ' leleetLee eretes spel Lew.pteesere lejeettee erstee era.vnt.ve set tsellet vetoe aos ties oretes acte e seelles erstee tact bow.ptesente to otter erstee

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ATTACHMENT 3 Summary of Inspection Findings For details Item N Description refer to Section 1. Violations None 2. Unresnived Items Spurious Operations of an EMRV 7. (87-01-01) in the Event of a Control Room Fire , Acceptable Items 1. Fire Door in sealed Fire Zone Boundary of Turbine Building. . Floor Penetration in Sealed Fire Zone Boundary of Reactor Building . Emergency Lighting in Exterior Access Path Adjacent to

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Machine Shop . Emergency Lighting outside Emergency Diesel Generator Building !

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