IR 05000219/1987018
| ML20214H958 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1987 |
| From: | Blough A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214H949 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-87-18-MM, CAL-87-05, CAL-87-5, NUDOCS 8705270558 | |
| Download: ML20214H958 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-219/87-18 Docket No.
50-219 l
License No.
DPR-16 Priority Category
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Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Meeting At:
NRC Region I Office, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania Meeting Conducted: May 11, 1987 NRC Personnel:
See Meeting Report Details Approved By:
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, R. BToughrChief, Reactor Projects Date Section 1A, DRP Meeting Summary:
A special NRC-requested meeting was held on May 11, 1987.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss licensee actions in response to (1) Confirmatory Action Letter 87-05, dated May 8,1987, related to the April 24, 1987, containment vacuum breaker event; and (2) a problem of water hammer in Core Spray test lines during system testing. More detailed followup of these issues will be documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-219/87-13 and 87-16.
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DETAILS l
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Meeting Attendees
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GPU Nuclear Corporation G. Busch, Licensing Engineer, Oyster Creek (OC)
R. Fenti, Manager, QA Mod / Ops, OC P. Fiedler, Director, OC R. Keaten, Director, Quality Assurance D. Slear, Plant Systems Director, Technical Functions J. Thorpe, Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs P. Wells, Safety Review Engineer R. Whitesel, Nuclear Safety Assessment Director State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection D. Scott, Chief, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering USNRC - Region I W. H. Bateman, Senior Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek W. H. Baunack, Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
A. R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A, DRP S. J. Collins, Deputy Director, DRP W. V. Johnston, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
W. F. Kane, Director, DRP K. A. Manoly, Lead Reactor Engineer, DRS S. Shankman, Acting Lead Reactor Engineer (Examiner), DRP J. R. Strosnider, Chief, Materials and Processes Section, DRS J. F. Wechselberger, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek t
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Dt_scussion
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The meeting was held at NRC Region I request (1) to accomplish the brief-
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ings requested by Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 87-05, and (2) to dis-cuss licensee evaluation and correction of a problem involving water ham-l mer in the Core Spray System test lines during routine surveillance tests.
2.1 CAL 87-05 -- Violation of Primary _ Containment Due to Blocked Open VacuumBreakersonApril 24, 1987 CAL 87-05 (Attachment I) relates to licensee corrective actions in response to the April 24,1987 ovent, the licensee's investigation thereof, and the related NRC Region I special inspection (50-219/
87-16).
After completion of the NRC special inspection on May 6,1987, the licensee had submitted a letter (Attachment II),
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dated May 7,1987, describing his corrective actions. These included a number of actions to be completed before restart from the outage which began April 24.
The CAL, dated May 8,1987, accepted the licensee's May 7 letter and confirmed certain clarifications and i
additions that had been verbally agreed to by the licensee and Region I.
At the May 11 meeting, the licensee briefed NRC Region I management on the CAL items.
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The licensee indicated that he had completed a safety review and a management review of all open temporary variations (i.e., temporary modifications).
This effort resulted in the following:
Forty-two new safety evaluations were written.
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Nearly all temporary variations had text additions and/or
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clarifications.
Six variations were removed.
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Of the six temporary variations removed:
Two involved test instruments on the air ejectors. These were
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removed due to questions related to prevention of offgas hydrogen ignition.
Two involved tygon tubing used for isolation condenser secondary
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level indication.
These were removed due to their being inac-curate when the condenser is operating and slightly pressurized.
Two involved keylock bypass of mechanical vacuum pumps. These
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were removed due to concerns about hydrogen control and lack of a proper vent path.
The licensee indicated that he also has a group under the Plant
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Operations Director, which has been in place for about four months,
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attempting to eliminate temporary variations, through actions such as either removing them or processing them as permanent modifications where appropriate.
NRC Region I will review these efforts in a future inspection.
The licensee described his investigation into potential technical problems with his containment ventilation system and vacuum breakers.
These issues have been resolved and the equipment has been confirmed operable.
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The licensee briefed NRC Region I on his re-review of his August 1986 and January 1987 temporary variation and safety review assessments.
These re-reviews, in conjunction with the licensee's short-term corrective actions, confirmed to the licensee's satisfaction that his program is adequate for restart.
Because the August 1986 assessment involved a Quality Assurance Systems Evaluation wherein "recommenda-tions" were made which might more appropriately have been classified as " findings", the licensee took the initiative to re-review similar reports at Oyster Creek. A similar re-review has also been initiated at TMI-1.
The Region I staff concluded that the licensee has satisfied CAL 87-05 and has taken a reasonably comprehensive set of short-term corrective actions regarding the April 24 event.
(The licensee was informed of these Region I conclusions by telephone call on May 12).
2.2 Core Spray Water Hammer The licensee described his approach to (1) preventing future Core Spray water hammers and (2) evaluition of current operability of Core Spray System piping and supports. These issues will be documented in more detati in NRC Inspection 50-219/87-13, but are summarized below:
(1) The licensee's interin measure to prevent water hammers for the remainder of Cycle II is to allow only manual operation of the test valve, which is normally motor-operated. Manual operation results in a very gradual introduction of flow into the test lines, thereby avoiding water hammer.
The licensee hopes to develop and implement, during the next refueling outage, a permanent solution.
(2) Although the licensee has performed inspections, evaluations and repairs sufficient to prove Core Spray System operability, these efforts led GPUN to concerns regarding the adequacy of past installation and inspection of support base plates in other systems. At the time of the meeting, the acceptability of five base plates was still under licensee evaluation. NRC Region I requested to be informed of the results of these evaluations and to receive a copy of the licensee safety evaluations when completed.
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Conclusion NRC Region I management thanked the licensee for the presentations and discussions, which gave NRC Region I a better understanding of the licensee's actions for the subject issues.
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