ML20059F625
| ML20059F625 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1993 |
| From: | Conte R, Walker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059F613 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-93-22, NUDOCS 9311050018 | |
| Download: ML20059F625 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000219/1993022
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
REPORT NO:
93-22
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FACILITY DOCKET NO: 50-219
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FACILITY LICENSE NO: DPR-16
LICENSEE:
GPU Nuclear Corporation
P. O. Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731
FACILITY:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
INSPECTION AT:
Forked River, New Jersey
INSPECTION DATES:
September 20-24,1993
INSPECTORS:
D. Florek, Senior Operations Engineer
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LEAD INSPECTOR:
/T'. WalkkSenior' Operations Engineer
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BWR Section, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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APPROVED BY:
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' Richard J. Conte,[hief
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.BWR Section, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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9311050018 931029
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Inspection Summarv (50-219/93-22J:
This was a special announced inspection of the Oyster Creek Emergency Operating
Procedure (EOP) program and other open issues. The objectives of the inspection were to:
(1) address the open items associated with the EOPs and nonlicensed operator (NLO) training
identified in Inspection Report No. 50-219/92-02; (2) to review the licensee's actions in
response to violations associated with the recirculation loop isolation event identified in
Inspection Report No. 50-219/91-29; and (3) to review an unresolved item related to reactor
water level instrumentation mismatch identified in Inspection Report 50-219/92-18.
The licensee has significantly improved the program for development, implementation, and
maintenance of the EOPs and support procedures. They have developed complete and
detailed procedures for control of the EOP program. The EOP Committee and initiatives
that they have undertaken indicate strong management involvement in the program and
commitment to maintenance of high quality procedures. No significant problems were
identified with the EOPs or the verification and validation that was performed on the latest
revisions; however, some potential shortcomings were identified with the licensee's practices.
The operators performed well on the EOP simulator exercises and no technical concerns
were identified with the EOPs. The inspector questioned whether the procedures and
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training provided to the operators could be improved to provide more timely implementation
of radiation release mitigation actions. A formal procedure for NLO on-the-job training has
been developed and is being implemented. Training is provided to the NLOs on tasks that
they are responsible for during emergencies. The unresolved items related to the EOP
program and NLO training are closed (Paragraphs 2.0,3.0, and 4.0).
The licensee is making an ongoing effort to improve procedure compliance with training,
focus on human performance, and a procedure upgrade program. The licensee clarified the
procedural guidance for conducting a plant cooldown with the MSIVs closed by developing a
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new procedure and revising system operating procedures. These procedures are adequate;
however, the inspector was concerned that there were still some aspects of the procedures
that could cause confusion. There were no concerns with the licensee's review of the event
and specific corrective actions; however, no corrective actions were taken to improve the
process for tracking internal corrective actions and commitments to preclude conditions
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adverse to quality (Paragraph 5.0).
The licensee completed the actions recommended by General Electric SIL No. 470 to address
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the mismatch in reactor water level instruments. The unresolved item related to completiori
of these actions is closed (Paragraph 6.0).
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DETAILS
1.0
INTRODUCTION
During an Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) followup inspection in January 1992,
NRC inspectors determined that the licensee's programmatic approach for development,
implementation, and maintenance of the EOPs was weak. The inspectors also noted
deficiencies in the nonlicensed operator (NLO) training program. Similar deficiencies had
been noted in two previous EOP inspections. The results of the January 1992 inspection
were documented in Inspection Report No. 50-219/92-02. The licensee responded to these
items in a letter dated April 24,1992, and indicated improvements that had been made or-
were planned for the EOP program and NLO training. Many of the licensee's actions were
dependent on the plant-specific simulator, which was not available for use onsite until early
1993. A meeting was held at the NRC Region I office on May 5,1993, to discuss the status
of the EOP program. The licensee indicated that the improvements and corrective actions
had been implemented. One of the purposes of this inspection was to address the unresolved
items identified in the January 1992 EOP inspection related to the EOP program and NLO
training. An additional objective of this inspection was to evaluate the technical adequacy of
the EOPs and the operators' ability to use the EOPs in a dynamic setting on the plant-specific
simulator.
A followup inspection of a recirc loop discharge valve isolation event in September 1991
identified violations of NRC requirements and an unresolved item related to correcting
problems prior to plant restart. The results of the inspection were documented in Inspection
Report No. 50-219/91-29. The licensee was asked to address the repetitive nature of the
recirculation loop isolation event and the repetitive nonadherence to facility procedures. The
licensee responded in a letter dated January 31,1992, and indicated that personnel error was
the dominant cause in the three recirculation loop isolation events with procedural problems
as a contributing cause. The licensee cited a continuing effort to reduce the frequency of
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procedural noncompliance and had a differing viewpoint on several of the procedure
noncompliances noted by the NRC. A meeting was held in the NRC Region I office on
March 23,1992, to discuss the licensee's position. As a result of the meeting, the NRC
retracted one violation and portions of another violation. One of the purposes of this
inspectior was to review the licensee's actions in response to the remaining violations related
to the recuc loop isolation event and to review the unresolved item related to review of the
event.
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During an inspection in August 1992, an NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to
industry information related to reactor water level instrumentation. The review focused on
the site specific problem of the B GEMAC reactor water level indicator reading 5 to 10
inches higher than other reactor water level instruments. An unresolved item was identified
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related to the licensee's response to General Electric (GE) Information Letter, SIL No. 470.
The results of the inspection were documented in Inspection Report No. 50-219/92-18. One
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of the purposes of this inspection was to review the licensee's actions on GE SIL 470 to
resolve the unresolved item related to reactor water level instrumentation mismatch identified
in Inspection Report No. 219/92-18.
2.0
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES PROGRAM
Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for EOP program control and for
verification and validation (V&V) of EOP program documents. The EOP program and the
V&V process were discussed with licensee personnel responsible for the activities, including
a human factors specialist. The results of the V&V for the two latest revisions to the EOPs
were reviewed along with selected EOP flowcharts, EOP support procedures, and portions of-
the Plant Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTGs) and differences documentation.
Findings
Closed (219/92-02-02): The programmatic approach taken to develoo. implement. and
maintain high ouality EOPs and sunoort nrocedures is weak.
During the EOP inspection in January 1992, the NRC inspectors noted that the V&V
program requirements and EOP Writers' Guide had not been approved by plant management
and that a formal V&V of all EOP flowcharts and support procedures had not been
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completed. They also noted that previously-identified procedure deficiencies had not been
corrected. Plant modifications were not evaluated using a programmatic approach for impact
on the EOPs, and a multidiscipline team approach was not clearly defined in development of
EOP program documents.
At the time of the September 1993 inspection, the licensee had approved procedures for EOP
program control, for verification and validation of EOP program documents, and an EOP
Writers' Guide that applies to flowchart and text procedures. The EOP program control'and
V&V procedures are very detailed and complete. They clearly define the responsibilities and
requirements for maintenance of the EOP program documents. The definitions provided in
the procedures were noted as a particular strength.
The licensee has established an EOP Committee to oversee the administration of the EOP
Program. The committee is chaired by the EOP Coordinator and includes representatives
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from Operations, Engineering, Training, Human Engineering, and Safety Analysis / Plant
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Control. The committee also interfaces with Quality Assurance, Emergency Preparedness,
and Licensing. The responsibilities of the EOP_ Committee are defined in the EOP program
control procedure and include: (1) evaluating operational concerns for impact on the EOPs;
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(2) maintenance of the EOP Program documents; (3) approval of change requests and
resolutions of EOP Program discrepancies; and (4) ensuring that the EOPs are technically
correct, correctly written, and can be used during emergency conditions. The EOP
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Committee provides a team approach for control of the EOP program. Additionally, the
procedures for verification and validation specify a multidisciplined team for conducting
V&V.
The EOP Coordinator is responsible far coordinating the activities of the EOP Committee,
all requests for change to the EOP Program, and all changes to the EOP program documents.
Logs are used to track EOP change requests, performance of verifications and validations,
and discrepancies identified during V&V. The inspector was concerned that the procedure
for resolving verification discrepancies specified that the completion date be documented
when the corrective action was initiated rather than when the action was completed. The
EOP Coordinator uses an informal tracking system, the EOP Action Item List, to track all
outstanding EOP actions including actions identified as a result of V&V. Additionally, the
documentation for the V&V that was performed for a revision to the EOPs following the 14R
outage had not been closed out because some action items were outstanding. Items on the
EOP Action item List are assigned a priority and responsibility for completion. However,
because the list is an informal tracking system, there are no specifications for assigning
priority or assuring accountability. Only seven of the thirty-seven items on the list at the
time of the inspection had due dates specified.
At the time of this inspection, the verification for the latest revision to the EOP flowcharts
and support procedures had not been completed. Validation was completed prior to
implementation of the revised procedures, but the verification was delayed because the
revisions to the PSTGs were not complete. The EOP program control procedure requires
that technical changes to the EOPs be evaluated against and incorporated into the PSTGs
prior to changing the EOPs. Changes to the PSTGs can only be postponed for expedited
EOP changes. Review of selected EOPs, support procedures, and the PSTGs did not
indicate any significant discrepancies that would have been identified during verification.
However, if technical problems are identified during the verification process, another
procedure revision could be required. Licensee representatives understood the inspector's
concern with implementation of revised procedures prior to completion of the V&V process
and agreed to review the practice.
The EOP Coordinator is responsible for determining the V&V requirements for changes to
EOP program documents. The V&V procedures provide specific instructions for
determining the V&V requirements; however, the scope of verification for minor revisions is
at the discretion of the EOP Coordinator, and there is no independent review of the EOP
Coordinator's decisions. The inspector identified three changes from the latest revision to
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the EOPs that the EOP Coordinator had determined did not require verification that appeared
to need verification. For example, the wording of a step in EMG-3200.01B, "RPV Control
with ATWS," was changed from " boron injection is required" to " boron is being injected"
due to a request from the licensed operators. The EOP Coordinator determined that this was
a minor revision to reword for clarity that did not require verification. However, the two
phrases do not necessarily have the same meaning in all situations, which could result in an
incorrect action.
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The EOP program control procedure requires that plant modifications potentially affecting
the mitigation strategy for emergencies be evaluated against the PSTOs and BWR Owners
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Group (BWROG) Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) prior to incorporation into the
EOPs. Currently, the licensee relies on using knowledgeable personnel to review plant
modifications for impact on the EOPs. However, a revision to the modification process will
be implemented in the near future that incorporates review for impact on the EOPs into the
beginning of the rnodincation process. They are also developing a li',t of systems and
components that don't affect the EOPs that should help to streamline the modification
evaluation process.
The licensee is working on a number of initiatives to improve their EOP program. Some of
these include technical upgrade of the documentation of their deviations from the BWROG
EPGs and EOP calculations, development of a plant specific bases document similar to
Appendix B of the BWROG EPGs, development of a PSTG to EOP crossreference
document, and performance of a general verincation on all the EOP support procedures. All
of these initiatives are being tracked on the EOP Action Item List.
Conclusion
The licensee has significantly improved their program for development, implementation, and
maintenance of the EOPs and support procedures. They have developed complete and
detailed procedures for control of the EOP program and performance of V&V. The EOP
Committee and initiatives that they have undertaken indicate strong management involvement
in the program and commitment to maintenance of high quality procedures. No signincant
problems were identined with the EOPs or the V&V that was performed on the latest
revisions; however, some potential shortcomings were identified with the licensee's practices.
Implementation of revised procedures prior to completion of V&V could result in technically
incorrect procedures. Lack of independent review of EOP Coordinator decisions for V&V
requirements could allow incomplete verification or validation. Informal tracking of EOP
program action items does not assure accountability for completion of items and appropriate
prioritization of action items. These potential shortcomings did not have a negative impact
on the quality of the latest revisions to the EOPs; therefore, the unresolved item related to
the weaknesses in the EOP program is closed (219/92-02-02).
3.0
W '1ULATOR EXERCISES
Two operating crews participated in three dynamic exercises using the plant-specific
simulator. The purpose of the simulator exercises was to evaluate whether the EOPs could
be used effectively and ef6ciently in the plant in an emergency. The scenarios were
designed solely to test the procedures and the training provided to the operators. Discussions
were held with the operators and the EOP Coordinator following the scenarios.
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Findines
Overall, the operators had no difnculty using the procedures, and no technical problems were
identified in the EOPs. However, a number of problems were noted associated with a
scenario that exercised EMG-3200.ll, " Secondary Containment Control," and EMG-
3200.12, " Radioactivity Release Control." During the scenario, the Scram Discharge
Volume (SDV) failed to isolate following a reactor scram with fuel failure, resulting in a leak
in secondary containment. Additionally, an unisolable Isolation Condenser (IC) tube leak
caused an offsite release. The following problems were noted:
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Both crews had difficulty resetting the scram signal to isolate the SDV. Neither crew
referred to the abnormal procedure that could have provided assistance in resetting the
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EMG-3200.12 is entered with an offsite release rate above the ALERT Emergency
Action Level (EAL) classification. Field readings and dose projection information are
required to make an EAL classification. Both crews identified the tube leak and
failure of the IC to isolate, but were slow to initiate action to evaluate the significance
of the offsite release. This appeared to be due to focusing their attention on isolation
of the SDV. Additionally, neither crew used the information that the IC vent
radiation monitor high level alarms were annunciating to assist in the evaluation of the
significance of the offsite release.
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EMG-3200.12 contains a " wait" step that directs the SRO to wait until the actual or
projected offsite dose approaches or exceeds the dose that requires a GENERA'L
EMERGENCY (GE) classification prior to emergency depressurization (ED) of the
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RPV. One of the SROs did not take action to ED when given dose information
approaching the GE level. In followup discussions, he indicated that he read the step
as wait until the dose exceeds the GE level.
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One of the radiation monitors and some of the temperature indications needed for
implementation of EMG-3200.ll are not available on SPDS. Therefore, operators
must obtain the information from back panels. The licensee has developed laminated
forms to keep track of this information, but these forms were not used consistently
during the simulator exercises. The licensee is considering modifications to SPDS to
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improve monitoring capabilities for secondary containment.
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implementation of EMG-3200.12. The inspectors questioned whether this monitor
covered any areas that were not covered by other radiation monitors and, if so, why it
was not included in the EOP.
The plant-specific simulator was capable of modeling all of the conditions required for the
simulator exercises that tested almost all legs of the EOPs. The simulator operators' ability
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to use the machine allowed two of the exercises to be used on two crews because validation
time was minimized. Time compression was used to transition between two of the exercises
and the use of a previously developed initial condition allowed for evaluation of a complex
exercise in a dynamic setting. No simulator fidelity problems were noted during the
exercises.
Conclusion
With the exception of timeliness in response to the offsite release, the operators performed
well using the procedures. The inspectors questioned whether the procedures and training
provided to the operators could be improved to provide more timely implementation of
radiation release mitigation actions. There were no other significant problems identified with
the EOPs. The operators demonstrated that the EOPs could be used in an emergency and the
SROs had a thorough understanding of the procedures. The simulator had the capability to
model all of the conditions requested by the NRC, and no simulator modeling problems were
noted.
4.0
NONLICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING
S&QLM
The inspector reviewed the procedure for nonlicensed operator on-the-job (OJT) training, the
job performance measures (JPMs) used in NLO training, and an EOP lesson plan used in
NLO training. The inspector also discussed the NLO training program with training
personnel, the Operations Training Coordinator, and a nonlicensed operator.
Findings
Closed (219/92-02-Olh Programmatic weakness in the implementation of the systems
approach to trainine for nonlicensed operators.
During an EOP followup inspection in January 1992, the NRC inspectors noted that the
licensee had failed to develop and implement a formal OJT program and formal EOP training
for NLOs.
At the time of this inspection, the training department had developec a formal procedure for
NLO OJT and was in the process of revising the equipment operator (EO) qualification card.
The NLOs are trained and evaluated with JPMs. NLOs are trained on all in-plant tasks that
ROs are trained on with the exception of tasks that require reactivity manipulations. These
tasks include all of the in-plant tasks required to support the EOPs. TSe only tasks that are
not included in the training are frequent evolutions for radwaste operators. Periodically,
NLOs participate in simulator training on the EOPs by walking through the procedures with
instructors in tre control booth during EOP scenarios.
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The EOP program control procedure does not require training for NLOs on applicable EOP
revisions. Licensee representatives indicated that this was an oversight and would be
corrected.
Conclusion
A formal procedure for NLO OJT has been developed and is being implemented. Training is
provided to the NLOs on tasks that they are responsible for during emergencies. The
unresolved item related to NLO training is closed based on the actions taken by the licensee
(219/92-02-01).
5.0
RECIRC LOOP DISCHARGE VALVE ISOLATION EVENT
Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions taken in response to two violations
of NRC requirements during a recirculation loop discharge valve isolation event in
August 1991. This review included a review of procedures and event review documentation.
The inspector also discussed the procedures and the event with licensee personnel.
Findings
Closed (219/91-29-04): Failure to take adequate corrective actions to preclude the repetition
nf a significant condition adverse to quality.
Following the recirc loop isolation event, an NRC inspector noted that the licensee had failed
to revise plant procedures to address possible difficulties in achieving cold shutdown with the
MSIVs closed and recirculation pumps off. Additionally, the licensee had not updated
placards in the control room following a Technical Specification amendment associated with
the recirc pump discharge valves. The licensee developed Procedure 203.4, " Plant
Cooldown Following Reactor Scram," to provide direction for cooldown with the main
condenser available or unavailable (MSIVs closed). Procedure 305, " Shutdown Cooling
System Operation," and Procedure 307, " Isolation Condenser System," were also revised to
clarify the direction for operating the shutdown cooling (SDC) system and the ICs during a
plant cooldown. The placards in the control room have been revised to be consistent with
the Technical Specification and procedural requirements for recirc discharge valve operation.
The violation for failure to take adequate corrective actions is closed based on the actions
taken by the licensee (219/91-29-04).
ClasnLL219/91-29-02): Failure to adhere to multiple ooerating and administrative
procedures in clostire of all five recirculation discharge valves.
The licensee determined that confusing procedural guidance was a contributing factor in the
failure to adhere to procedures. Procedure 203.4 was developed and Procedures 305 and 307
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were revised to clarify the direction for cooldown with the MSIVs closed. Discussions with
operations personnel and a licensed operator indicated that the procedures could be followed;
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however, the inspector was concerned that there were still some aspects of the procedures
that could cause confusion. Procedure 203.4 was intended to coordinate the use of
Procedures 305 and 307, but it is not the controlling procedure for the entire cooldown. For
example, 203.4 directs actions for control of RPV water level while using the ICs, but
direction for RPV water level control is transferred to 305 when SDC is placed in service.
Coordination of actions between multiple procedures could result in missed or incorrect
actions. For example, an SRO indicated that he would not have referred to Procedure 307
after placing SDC in service and isolating the ICs. As a result, he would have missed the
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direction in 307 to cycle the IC vent valves to maintain the ICs within 50 psig of reactor
pressure. Additionally, several inconsistencies were noted between the three procedures,
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The violation for failure to adhere to procedures is closed based on the licensee's ongoing
actions to improve procedure compliance and the observation that the procedures for
cooldown with the MSIVs closed could be followed by plant personnel (219/91-29-02). The
clarity of the procedures will continue to be evaluated during future routine inspections.
Procedure 305 was recently revised to provide specific direction for SDC system operation to
prevent temperature stratification and maintain circulation within the core. The inspector
was concerned that Procedure 2000-OPS-3024.27, " Shutdown Cooling System - Diagnostic
and Restoration Actions," does not provide clear guidance for restoration of shutdown
cooling if SDC is lost based on the revised requirements for maintaining core circulation.
Procedure 2000-OPS-3024.27 directs actions based on the adequacy of SDC and circulation
flow. It is not clear what is considered adequate flow based on the revised requirements.
L.icensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's observations.
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Closed (219/91-29-03t Adequacy of the cost-transient review crocess to take corrective
actions orior to restarl.
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In 1991, an NRC inspector noted that the licensee's Post-Transient Review (PTR) did not
evaluate problems noted during a plant cooldown following the reactor scram and isolation
event. However, a critique of the recirc loop isolation event performed by the operations
department determined the root cause of the event and identified that incomplete procedural
guidance was a contributing factor to the problems encountered during the cooldown. No
written guidance was provided to the operators prior to restart of the plant; however, the
operators were briefed on the recire loop isolation event, informed of the procedure
problems, and directed to consult with operations management prior to placing shutdown
cooling in service in the event of a plant cooldown with an MSIV closure. This verbal
guidance was provided in a memorandum to operations personnel after the NRC raised the
concern that no written guidance had been provided. The unresolved item related to the
adequacy of the post-transient review process is closed based on the observation that the
critique process adequately evaluated the event and identified corrective actions prior to
restart (219/91-29-03).
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No concerns were noted with the licensee's review of the recirc loop isolation event and the
specific corrective actions taken; however, the inspector noted that no specific actions were
taken to address the failure to complete an identified corrective action prior to the event. It
was not apparent that any improvements had been made to the process for tracking internal
corrective actions and commitments that would ensure that actions are completed. The
inspector identified an example that demonstrated that the licensee's processes for tracking
actions may not assure that corrective actions designed to preclude conditions adverse to
quality are completed. One of the recommendations from the Independent Offsite Safety
Review Group (IOSRG) following the recire loop isolation event was to provide a training
scenario on a full isolation shutdown following a plant scram. This recommendation was
accepted, but then was closed without being completed because of the delays in obtaining the
plant-specific simulator.
Conclusion
The licensee is making an ongoing effort to improve procedure compliance with training,
focus on human performance, and a procedure upgrade program. The licensee clarified the
procedural guidance for conducting a plant cooldown with the MSIVs closed by developing a
new procedure and revising system operating procedures. These procedures are adequate;
however, the inspector was concerned that there were still some aspects of the procedures
that could cause confusion. There were no concerns with the licensee's review of the event
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and specific corrective actions; however, no corrective actions were taken to improve the
process for tracking intemal corrective actions and commitments to preclude conditions
adverse to quality.
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6.0
REACTOR WATER LEVEL, INSTRUMENTATION
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions taken to address previous NRC concerns
related to the licensee's response to GE SIL 470 for " Reactor Water Level Mismatches."
This review included a review of a memorandum documenting licensee actions and
discussions with licensee personnel concerning the reactor water level instrumentation
mismatch.
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Closed (219/92-18-Olk Incomplete response to GE SIL 470. " Reactor Water Level
Mismatches."
During a previous inspection of reactor water level instrumentation issues, an NRC inspector
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noted that the licensee did not measure the slope from the reference leg steam condensing
chamber to the reactor vessel penetration or take into account the effect of RPV expansion on
the reference leg slope during plant heatup. During the last refueling outage, the licensee
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measured the slope of the cold reference leg reactor water level instrumentation and verified
that the slope is in compliance with the recommendations of GE SIL 470 with and without
thermal expansion. The licensee also verified that the thermocouple bracket on the B
GEMAC sensing line does not interfere with condensing chamber movement. The
unresolved item related to the licensee's response to GE SIL 470 is closed based on these
actions (219/92-18-01).
The licensee has concluded that the level instrument mismatch is due to the relative
difference in the location of the referenced leg nozzles to the corresponding main steam
nozzles. The licensee has no additional plans to evaluate the niismatch between the B
GEMAC level instrument and other water level instruments. They have accounted for the
mismatch in the digital feedwater control modification planned for the next refueling outage
and the mismatch is modeled in the plant-specific simulator. When the modification
addressing the noncondensible gas effects on level instrumentation modification is completed,
the licensee will reevaluate the condition if their explanation for the condition proves to be
incorrect.
Conclusion
The licensee completed the actions recommended by GE SIL 470 to address the mismatch in
reactor water level instruments. The licensec has evaluated the condition and has determined
an explanation for the cause of the mismatch. The mismatch does not appear to have any
adverse effect on operator performance and is modeled in the simulator.
7.0
EXIT MEETING
Management was informed of the purpose and scope of the inspection at the entrance
interview on September 20,1903. The findings of the inspection were summarized at the
exit meeting on September 24,1993. Licensee representatives were informed that the
unresolved items and violations related to the EOPs, recirc loop isolation event, and reactor
water level instrumentation would be closed. The concerns related to the radioactivity
release EOP were discussed and licensee representatives committed to review the areas of
concern.
Persons contacted and attendecs at the exii meeting are listed below:
GPU Nuclear Corporation
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S. Levin, Director, Operations and Maintenance
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P. Scallon, Manager, Plant Operations
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C. Gaydos, Supervisor, Operations Support Engineering
W. Behrle, Director, Plant Engineering
M. Godknecht, Plant Engineering
T. Corcoran, Plant Operations Engineer
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GPU Nuclear Corocration (Cont'd.)
G. Jaffa, Human Factors Specialist
J. Kowalski, Manager, Plant Training
G. Cropper, Operations Training Manager
H. Tritt, Lead Instructor, Operations Training
J. Sims, Operations Training Coordinator
B. DeMerchant, Licensing Engineer
T. Sensue, Licensing Engineer
J. Rogers, Licensing Engineer
The inspectors also held discussions with training instructors and licensed and
nonlicensed operators during the inspection.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
D. Vito, Senior Resident Inspector
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S. Pindale, Resident Inspector
Denotes those present for the exit meeting on September 24,1993.
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