IR 05000219/1993024
| ML20058D888 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1993 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D878 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-93-24, NUDOCS 9312060083 | |
| Download: ML20058D888 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r
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REGION I
Report No.
93-24 Docket No.
50-219 License No.
DPR-16 Licensce:
GPU Nuclear Corporation 1 Upper Pond Road i
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
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Inspection Period:
September 21,1993 - November 1,1993
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Inspectors:
Steve Pindale, Resident inspector
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Dave Vito, Senior Resident Inspector i
Larry Briggs, Senior Resident Inspector
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Approved By:
- e 36hil Rogge, Sectioj/Clii6f Dite '
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[f (eactor Projects Section 4B
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Insnection Summary: This inspection report documents the safety inspections conducted during day shift and backshift hours of station activities including plant operations, maintenance, engineering, plant support, and safety assessment / quality verification. The
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Executive Summary delineates the inspection findings and conclusions.
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SUMMARY Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Report No. 93-24 Plant Operations GPUN operated the unit safely. The licensee's immediate response and subsequent followup for two events caused by failure to follow procedures were prompt and appropriate. One event, caused by a licensed operator, resulted in a plant transient while removing a reactor recirculation pump from service. The other event, caused by both radwaste and contractor maintenance personnel, resulted in a spill of contaminated liquid in the New Radwaste Building. Each of the two events was characterized as a non-cited violation. The licensee's response to minor flow changes in the reactor recirculation system were appropriate,
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l however, the actions to develop a formal preventive maintenance procedure appeared to have
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been somewhat slow. A detailed review of the control rod drive (CRD) system concluded that the system was properly aligned and functional.
l Maintenance i
The maintenance activities observed were effective in meeting the safety objectives of the maintenance program. The followup for a failed turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) system pump, related to potantially incorrectly set bearing oilers, was initially l
narrowly focused on only the TBCCW pumps; subsequent planned actions appear to be appropriate to address safety related pumps as well.
Engineering
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Onsite engineering personnel properly evaluated and implemented a new torqumg methodolow for isolation condenser valve packing glands. There was no documented support for an apparent component upgrade for the scram valve solenoids, identified during the detailed CRD system inspection; this was identified as an unresolved item.
Plant Suonort
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l Periodic inspector observation of station worker and radiological controls personnel noted i
generally good implementation of radiological controls program requirements. During the
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period, an offsite facility received a radioactively contaminated component, that was shipped as a radioactively " clean" component; a specialist inspector will review this incident during a subsequent inspection.
Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification The deviation report process was effective in identifying, documenting, and assessing plant issues and events during this inspection period.
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DETAIIS 1.0 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707,71710,93702)
1.1 Operations Summary The plant operated at or near 100% power for the entire inspection period.
1.2 Facility Tours
i The inspectors observed plant activities and conducted routine plant tours to assess equipment conditions, personnel safety hazards, procedural adherence and compliance with regulatory requirements. Tours were conducted of the following areas:
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control rocm e
intake area e
cable spreading room o
reactor building e
diesel generator building a
turbine building e
new radwaste building a
vital switchgear rooms
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e old radwaste building e
access control points e
transformer yard Control room activities were found to be well controlled and conducted in a professional i
manner. The inspectors verified operator awareness of ongoing plant activities, equipment
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status, and existing fire watches.
t 1.3 Reactor Recirculation Pump Improperly Removed From Service
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On October 23,1993, at 2:40 a.m., while removing one of the five reactor recirculation (RR) pumps from service, a plant operator performed the procedural steps out of sequence, j
which resulted in a plant transient. Control room operators were using operating procedure l
No. 301, " Nuclear Steam Supply System" to remove the "C" RR pump from operation to l
investigate a problem with the pump tachometer. The procedure instructed the operator to -
l reduce the pump speed to minimum, close the associated discharge valve, and then stop the
pump. The operator mistakenly stopped the "C" RR pump prior to closing the discharge valve, resulting in reactor power decreasing from 97% to approximately 80%, and reactor
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water level increasing from 160 inches to 169 inches. Control room operators immediately followed the actions of abnormal operating procedure No. ABN-3200.02, " Recirculation Pump Trip." The plant was automatically stabilized within several minutes, without operator action. The control room operators subsequently increased RR flow on the remaining four RR pumps to increase reactor power back to approximately 97%.
The inspector reviewed this event by interviewing plant operators and operations management, and by reviewing the operating logs and the associated deviation report. The inspector concluded that a sufficient pre-job briefing was conducted by the operating shift.
The inspector determined that the brief~mg discussed a possible scenario in which the "C" RR pump could inadvertently increase speed during the reduction to minimum speed. The
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l motor-generator (M-G) set was previously " locked-up" to prevent inadvertent speed changes due to a suspected problem with the tachometer coupling. In order to decrease the pump speed, the M-G set was unlocked, introducing the possible inadvertent speed increase scenario. The operators were cautioned that if that scenario were to occur, they should trip the RR pump, and then shut the associated discharge valve. The operator stated that the precaution was probably in the back of his mind during the evolution. The inspector concluded that was a contributing cause to this event.
During the event review, the inspector identified other contributing causes. The operator did not apparently announce his impending action (stopping the pump) to the remainder of the control room shift personnel. That action could have possibly alerted the other control operators of the out of sequence action prior to implementation. In addition, operating i
procedure No. 301 did not have specific signoffs for the described " action steps." The use of the signoffs for action steps typically results in improved step by step procedure
compliance.
Maintenance personnel subsequently completed repairs to the "C" M-G set tachometer coupling (coupling was replaced) and the RR pump was retumed to service. The unit was then returned to 100% power operation later during the morning of October 23,1993.
l The operations department implemented corrective actions in response to this event, including initiating a prompt evaluation of the event. In addition, the operations manager conducted briefing sessions with all of the onshift operating personnel. During the sessions, attention to detail was stressed. The operations manager also cautioned the operators not to become complacent in their routine operating duties while the unit continues to experience a relatively long and uneventful operating run (greater than 250 days).
The inspector concluded that the licensee responded appropriately to this event. The failure i
to comply with operating procedure 301 constitutes a violation of Technical Specification j
6.8.1, which requires that procedures be established and implemented. However, this
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incident was identified by the licensee, was of low safety si;;nificance, and the corrective j
actions were prompt and appropriate. For these reasons, this violation is not being cited as provided in NRC Enforcement Policy, Appendix C (1993) to 10 CFR Part 2.
1.4 Reactor Recirculation System Spurious Flow Changes On October 25,1993, control room operators noticed two apparently spurious changes in total reactor recirculation (RR) flow and reactor power. At 5:48 p.m., an increase in reactor power of about 6 MW, occurred. Then, at 9:34 p.m., the operators noticed a power reduction of about 7 MW,. On each occasion, the operators manually adjusted RR flow J
following the minor flow and power changes.
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Upon reviewing this event, the inspector determined that similar spurious RR flow changes had previously occurred. The most recent occurrences were on April 11,1993, and August 27,1993. On each of those occasions, the RR flow changed while the master RR flow controller was at about 80%. The controller was also at 80% on October 25,1993.
This has been a recurring, problem, and the RR control system is currently planned to be upgraded with a digital system.
Following the August 27,1993, event, the licensee's recommended followup corrective action was to develop a preventive maintenance (PM) task to periodically exercise the master RR flow control potentiometer. The inspector determined that the PM task, currently planned to be performed on a monthly basis, was first performed on October 31,1993 (via Job Order #50337), following the October 25,1993, flow / power changes. This type of activity (exercising the potentiometer) had been done in the past, in response to the previous problems.
The inspector concluded that the licensee implemented the appropriate action for the operational anomaly. However, the response actions were typically reactive to the individual occurrences, rather than proactive, until the PM activity was ultimately established and
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implemented on October 31. The inspector recognized that several other factors have historically contributed or caused the relatively minor RR flow changes, such as control room area temperature changes. The RR flow control system upgrade is scheduled to be implemented during the next refueling outage (September 1994). With consideration given to 1) the old design of the existing flow control system, 2) the difficulty in procuring qualified replacement parts, and 3) the development of a permanent resolution (controller replacement), the inspector concluded that the licensec's interim actions taken to date to prevent recurrence were appropriate, although the flow oscillations have continued to occur.
In addition, the inspector concluded that the control room operators display a high degree of sensitivity to the minor flow changes, and provide an appropriate level of monitoring of the parameter.
1.5 Radioactive Liquid Spill Inside the New Radwaste Building i
On September 2,1993, a radioactive liquid spill occurred in the New Radwaste Building (NRW). The WC-T-lC chemical waste floor drain collection tank was previously tagged out l
of service to install a tank mixer modification. In order to perform the post-maintenance test, the licensee planned to transfer 5,000 gallons of processed water from the WC-T-3A
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l chemical waste distillate sample tank to WC-T-lC. A contractor (Catalytic) supervisor was l
located inside the WC-T-lC tank. room to monitor for leaks during the transfer of water.
After approximately five to ten minutes of transferring water, radiological controls personnel notified the NRW control room that there was water on the floor of the 23 foot elevation of NRW, and the water transfer was immediately secured.
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l The radwaste operator (RWO) responded to the area and determined that the drain valve
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(WC-HV-104B) for WC-T-IC was in the open position, providing a tank drain path to the j
floor area. The valve is located outside of the tank room; therefore, the contractor supervisor inside the tank room did not identify the leak. The RWO subsequently received instructions from a radiological controls technician, dressed into the appropriate protective clothing, and closed the drain valve. The licensee determined that approximately 2,000 gallons of slightly radioactively contaminated water had spilled from the tank to the floor, and ultimately to the NRW sump system.
The contaminated area was subsequently posted and isolated by radiological controls l
personnel. The immediate general area of the spill was approximately 10,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters (dpm/100 cm ). There was one area with a maximum
contamination level of 20,000 dpm/100 cm. The licensee properly drained and
l decontaminated the affected area. No personnel contaminations occurred as a result of the
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The licensee's radwaste operations department conducted a formal critique of this event to
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determine the root cause of the spill and to develop specific corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The critique concluded that the contractor supervisor and the group radwaste shift supervisor (GRSS) failed to comply with the temporary removal and tag reposting requirements of administrative procedure No.108, " Equipment Control." In particular, WC-HV-104B was temporarily " lifted" from the system tagout, and placed in the open position on August 2,1993. However, due to an incomplete review of the tagout package, the GRSS did not recognize that the drain valve had been temporarily lifted. In addition, WC-HV-104B was previously crossed off(and initialed by the GRSS) from the component switching order, and the responsibility for that valve was transferred to the contractor supervisor.
The corrective actions taken by the licensee included disqualifying the involved personnel from performing switching and tagging activities until remedial training is completed, and meeting with all radwaste operations personnel to review the event and to discuss management expectations regarding switching and tagging responsibilities. In addition, the licensee will review administrative procedure No.108 to ensure clear and consistent guidance for radwaste operations switching and tagging activities.
The inspector reviewed this event, including the licensee's completed critique. The inspector concluded that the licensee responded to this event with appropriate concern. This failure to comply with administrative procedure 108 constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, which requires that procedures be established and implemented. However, this incident was identified by the licensee, was of low safety significance, and the corrective actions were prompt and appropriate. For these reasons, this violation is not being cited as provided in the NRC Enforcement Policy, Appendix C (1993) to 10 CFR Part.
l 1.6 Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown
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The inspector conducted a detailed walkdown of the control rod drive (CRD) systern in order to independently verify the status and operability of the system. This inspection consisted of a review of Technical Specification requirements, FSAR commitments, a full system walkdown of all accessible components, and a comparison with the as-found system
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alignment and the CRD system operating procedure specified lineup.
l The inspector concluded that the CRD system was properly aligned so that the system could satisfactorily perform its intended function. However, during the walkdown, the inspector identified several items requiring licensee review and followup. Those items included the
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following:
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several flange bolts on the suction side of both CRD pumps did not appear to meet minimum thread engagement requirements; 2)
there were some small bore piping threaded connection and valve packing leaks, however, the leaks were not identified by deficiency tags; 3)
there was evidence of oil leaks in the CRD pump room area in that there were oil
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drips and stains on horizontal runs of the core spray system piping, located on the
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elevation below the CRD pumps (through the floor grating);
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root valves, connecting tubing to each CRD pump discharge line to individual pressure gauges, were open, however, the drawings and procedure valve lineup specified them to be closed; 5)
some of the valve stem packing glands for the hydraulic control unit (HCU) scram valves were live-loaded, while others were not; and 6)
the HCU directional control valve solenoids were of two different model/ design types, although from the same vendor (ASCO).
i The inspector discussed the above items with the CRD system engineer (SE). Items 1)
through 5) were promptly resolved or evaluated and prioritized for resolution. For item 6),
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however, the SE stated that the solenoids were changed in the mid-to late-1980s. The inspector noted that the different solenoid nameplates list slightly different operating parameters, including 9 watts (new) versus 10.5 watts (old). In addition, the two different solenoids are mounted to the HCU block differently. At the close of the inspection, there did not appear to be existing paperwork to document the change, including documentation from the vendor (General Electric). No immediate operability concerns were identified.
Pending identification of engineering support and/or vendor documentation to provide the l
basis for the component change / upgrade, this item is unresolved. (UNR 50-219/93-24-01)
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2.0 MALNTENANCE (61726,62703)
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2.1 Maintenance Activities i
The inspectors observed selected maintenance activities on safety-related equipment to
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ascenain that the licensee conducted these activities in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industrird codes and standards.
The inspector observed portions of the following activities.
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l 50157 Replace No.1-3 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water Pump 49519 Lubricate / Inspect Standby Gas Treatment System Fan EF
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1-9 49077 Clean and Inspect No.1-1 Reactor Building Closed i
Cooling Water Heat Exchanger The maintenance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety
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objectives of the maintenance program.
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2.2 Balance of Plant Pump Failure Due to Insufficient Bearing Oil
On October 4,1993, the No.1-3 turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW) pump failed after the pump inboard bearing seized. The operators placed a standby TBCCW pump into service, and the 1-3 pump was valved out of service. There were no adverse effects on j
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the operation of the balance of plant components.
On October 8,1993, during a followup investigation, the licensee determined that the as-found level for the constant level oiler was low. The oiler device, which is connected via piping to the bearing oil housing, consists of an oil cup and sight glass arrangement. The oiler operates on an oil seal principle, feeding oil to the bearing housing only when the level in the housing drops low enough to break the oil seal at the end of the sight glass shank, which extends into the oil cup. The oil level is set by adjusting and locking into place, a set of two adjuster wing nuts, upon which the sight glass assembly rests. During the October 8,
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1993 inspection, the licensee found the wing nuts to be too low and not securely locked.
With the oiler in that condition (about 5/16" below normal value), the licensee determined that there was an insufficient amount of oil in the housing. Since there would be little oil dissipatcii at such a low level, the sight glass would remain essentially full. Particularly l
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noteworthy is the fact that a full sight glass does not imply that there is sufficient oil in the bearing housing; it only implies a full reservoir of oil to provide makeup when the level
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drops below the level setpoint. For this case, the licensee concluded that the oiler was set improperly (too low).
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Deviation Report (DR) associated with the pump oiler problem. The DR noted that the oilers on the remaining two TBCCW pumps were checked and were found to be slightly low (about 1/8"). They were then reset to the proper level.
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The inspector expressed concern that it was not apparent that other pumps, especially the
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safety related pumps, were not likewise checked immediately. The licensee stated that i
several safety related pump oilers were visually checked and found to be set at the proper level. In addition, a physical inspection will be done to the safety related pumps, and the individual oilers will be marked so that periodic checks can be made.
The inspector was concerned with this issue because there appeared to be some confusion l
among some station personnel regarding the relationship to actual oil level in the bearing l
housing and level in the sight glass. In addition, at the end of the inspection, the physical l
oiler inspection and marking task was still in the planning process. The inspector concluded that the licensee needed to implement this activity on a high priority. This issue was discussed with licensee management, who acknowledged the concern and stated that they would implement timely action.
2.3 Failure to Meet Core Spray System Surveillance Requirements During the recent NRC Operational Safety Team Inspection (No. 50-219/93-81) conducted at Oyster Creek, the inspectors referenced a Technical Specification (TS), No. 3.4.A, which required that action must be taken to reduce the average planar linear heat generation rate (APLHGR) to 90% or less when one of the two trains of the core spray system is inoperable.
The inspectors identified that the appropriate controls to initiate the necessary actions were not included in the associated core spray surveillance procedure. Subsequent review by the licensee identified that, on at least four occasions, one core spray system train was inoperable, however, APLHGR was not reduced to 90%, or lower.
l The licensee reported this event to the NRC via ENS as required by the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. In addition, the licensee instituted administrative controls to prevent further instances of the condition. See NRC Inspection 50-219/93-81 for further details and followup of this issue.
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3.0 ENGINEERING (40500,71707)
3.1 Packing Adjustment for Isolation Condenser Valves Over the last several months, multiple packing leaks have developed on isolation condenser valves. The licensee had historically experienced similar type problems with the six isolation condenser valves. Since August 1993, three valves developed packing leaks. The licensee's initial efforts to reduce the leakage were unsuccessful, and the required monthly testing (per Technical Specifications) appeared to worsen, and sometimes initiate the packing leakage.
However, re.ent licensee investigations and interface with the valve packing manufacturer, A. W. Chestecton, resulted in developing a different methodology for isolation condenser valve packing idjustments.
The valve packi tg material is of a graphite design. The new methodology initially increases the packing glanj nut torque from 47 ft.-lbs. to 75 ft.-lbs., in order to compress the graphite and allow it to redistribute itself within the stuffing box, and thereby stop the leak. The gland nut torque is then relaxed and returned to the 47 ft.-lbs., and the valve is subsequently stroke tested to satisfy the post-maintenance test requirement.
The licensee completed an engineering evaluation (No. 478-93) to consider the operability status of the isolation condenser valves after performing the new packing gland torque methodology. The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation and did not identify any concerns.
GPUN maintenance personnel adjusted the packing ofisolation condenser valves V-14-31, V-14-33 and V-14-34. V-14-30 had previously experienced a relatively large steam leak, and the packing adjustment did not stop the packing leak. Therefore, V-14-30 was electrically backseated to stop the leak while other plans are being considered by the licensee. (See NRC Inspection 50-219/93-81 for concerns related to electrically backseating isolation condenser valves). The process was successful in stopping / preventing packing leaks on the other three valves. There are two isolation condenser valves for which this packing adjustment technique was not yet used.
The inspector concluded that the licensee appropriately evaluated and implemented the new
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torquing technique for isolation condenser valve packing glands.
4.0 PLANT SUPPORT (71707)
4.1 Radiological Controls During entry to and exit from the radiologically controlled area (RCA), the inspectors verified that proper warning signs were posted, personnel entering were wearing proper dosimetry, personnel and materials leaving were properly monitored for radioactive contamination, and monitoring instrumcats were functional and in calibration. During i
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I periodic plant tours, the inspectors verified that posted extended Raoiation Work Permits I
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activities in the RCA and verified that personnel were complying with the requirements of applicable RWPs and that workers were aware of the radiological conditions in the area.
4.1.1 Improper Shipment of Radioactively Contaminated Component i
On October 27,1993, the licensee initiated a Deviation Report to document that a component was shipped to an offsite calibration facility, which was subsequently determined to have l
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been radioactively contaminated at a level greater than the Oyster Creek release limits. The
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component, a motor operated valve torque / thrust cell, was shipped from the station as a
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" clean" component (i.e. no radioactive contamination). However, GPUN was subsequently i
notified by the facility (ITI MOVATS) that the component was contaminated to a level of j
approximately 250 counts per minute (CPM). The highest smear count for loose surface j
contamination was approximately 8,000 disintegrations per minute per square centimeter j
2 (dpm/cm ). The Oyster Creek contamination limits are 100 CPM and 1,000 dpm/cm,
j respectively, as described in procedure 6630-ADM-4200.01, " Radiological Suneys."
The licensee subsequently requested ITI MOVATS to return the component to the site for j
funher investigation. A radiological incident report (RIR) was initiated to fdhwup and i
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evaluate this event, including a determination as to how the contaminated component was released as a clean component. The inspector determined that no radioactive shipping limits
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during a future routine radiological controls program inspection. (UNR 50-219/93-24-02)
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4.2 Security
During routine tours, the inspectors verified that access controls were in accordance with the
Security Plan, security posts were properly manned, protected area gates were locked or j
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guarded, and isolation zones were free of obstructions. The inspectors examined vital area access points and verified that they were properly locked or guarded and that access control
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was in accordance with the Security Plan.
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4.3 Emergency Preparedness f
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The inspectors reviewed GPUN's conformance with 10 CFR 50.47 regarding implementation l
of the emergency plan and procedures. In addition, the inspector reviewed licensee event l
notifications and reporting requirements per 10 CFR 50.72 and 73. On October 19, 1993, l
l the licensee conducted their annual emergency preparedness exercise. The exercise was l
evaluated by a team of NRC inspectors. See NRC Inspection Report No. 50-219/93-23 for details regarding the inspection results.
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l 5.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500,71707)
5.1 Management Review of Deviation Reports
During this inspection period, the inspector evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's i
Deviation Repon (DR) process, review, and evaluation. The DR process is described in station administrative procedure No.104, " Control of Nonconformances and Corrective
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l Action." By reviewing plant operating logs, the inspector verified that the activities or l
events that met the appropriate threshold for initiating a DR, were formally submitted as DRs. The inspector also attended the Multi-Disciplinary Review Group meetings, conducted j
each morning following the initiation of a DR, and concluded that the DRs received
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l appropriate review by the group. For the cases observed, the inspector concluded that the j
l events were properly assigned, prioritized, and evaluated for system / component operability i
concerns.
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6.0 EXIT INTERVIEWS / MEETINGS (30702,40500,71707)
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6.1 Preliminary Inspection Findings l
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l A summary of preliminary findings was provided to the senior licensee management on
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l November 5,1993. During the inspection, licensee management was periodically notified I
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i verbally of the preliminary findings by the resident inspectors. No written inspection material was provided to the licensee during the inspection. No proprietary information is l
l included in this report.
The inspection consisted of normal, backshift and deep backshift inspection; 29 of the direct
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inspection hours were performed during backshift periods, and 3.5 of the hours were deep backshift hours.
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6.2 Site Tour by NRC Management Personnel t
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On October 29,1993, the NRC Region I Director, Division of Reactor Projects, the NRR
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Licensing Project Manager, and the resident inspector toured the Oyster Creek facility.
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During the tour, several items were identified to GPUN management for resolution. Those items included insufficient lighting in specific areas of both emergency diesel generators, an l
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apparently unsupported service air system line in the reactor building, and slightly degraded material condition of equipment in the control rod drive system pump room. GPUN initiated prompt action to address each of the items. The tour personnel noted that the overall condition of the Oyster Creek plant was good.
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6.3 Attendance at Exit Meetings The resident inspectors attended exit meetings for other inspections conducted as follows:
Date Lead Inspector Subiect Renon No.
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September 24,1993 Walker Emergency Operating 50-219/93-22 Procedures i
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October 29,1993 Kaufman Operational Safety 50-219/93-81 Team Inspection October 20,1993 Lusher Emergency Preparedness 50-219/93-23 Exercise Evaluation
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At these meetings the lead inspector discussed preliminary findings with senior GPUN management.
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