ML20207N233
| ML20207N233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1988 |
| From: | Carrasco J, Chaudhary S, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207N224 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-88-25, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8810190039 | |
| Download: ML20207N233 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000219/1988025
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-219/88-25
Docket No.
50-219
License No.
Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation
P.O. Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 03731
Facility Name: Oyster Creek Generating Station
Inspection At:
Forked River, New Jersey
Inspection Conducted: August 29 - September 2, 1988
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Inspectors:
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S. K. L;naudnary, Venior Reactor Engineer
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- J. Carrasco. React [r Engineer
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Approved by: _
. Strosnider, Chief, MPS, EB, DRS
date
Inspe_ction Summary:
Routine unannounced inspection on August 29 - September 2,
1983 [ Report No. 50-219/88-25)
Arcas__ Inspected: Adequacy of licensee actions in response to NRC Bulletins
79 02 and 79-14; Follow-up inspection for items identified by NRC in this and
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other areas in previous NRC inspections.
Results:
No violations were identified.
However, deficiencies were
identified in soma pipe support and pipe support base plates. An inspection
is planned to confirm effective completion of Bulletin 79-02 and Bulletin 79-14 activities prior to restart from the upcoming 12R outage.
NRC
Bulletin 78-12 was closed.
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DETAILS
1.0 Persons Contacted
General Public Utilities-Nuclear
J. Barret, Plant Operations Director
J. Barton, Deputy Director, OC
T. Corrie, Quality Control Manager
P. Dix, Manager, Technical Support (PM)
V. Foglia, Manager, Technical Functions, OC
J. Kowalski, Licensing Manager, OC
B. J. Rogers, Licensing Engineer
T. Snider, Manager, Plsnt Maintenance
T. Quintenz, Manager, Material Assessment
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
J. Wechselberger, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Lew, Resident Inspector
E. Collins, Resident Inspector
The inspectors also contacted, and were assisted by other technical,
quality control, administrative, and craft personnel, as their work
interfaced with the scope of this inspection.
2.0 The Purpose and Scope of the Insnection
The purpose of the inspection was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness
of the implementation of the licerisee's program to inspect, analyze, and
evaluate pipe supports in the plant to meet the requirements of NRC
Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14.
The inspection focused on the installed
supports that were categorized as having a factor of safety of twenty (20)
or more and had not been examined or modified by the licensee.
The
inspector also examined some supports which were modified and upgraded
to meet the requirements. Due to the emphasis on physical examination
and measurements, minimal documentation review was performed, except for
drawings and records of visual examinations performed by the licensee in
response to NRC Bulletin 79-14.
These records were reviewed to determine
the location and identification of the selected supports for inspection.
3.0 Re- ww Criteria
>
- 1a+ ins 79-02 and 79-14 were used primarily to define inspection
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The previous NRC inspection reports were used to define
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....e commitments and any necessary followup inspection to assess
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the status of cpen items related to these bulletins.
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4.0 Verification of "As-Built" Condition of Pipe Supports
The inspector selected a sample of 20 pipe supports to verify their
actual configuration, technical adequacy of their installation, and
quality of workmanship. The support configuration was visually examined
and compared to the applicable design drawing of the selected support.
In
addition, for five selected supports the existing torque values for the
concrete expansion anchors used in the supports were verified.
The torque
was verified by a crew of maintenance mechanics and helpers provided by
the licensee using a calibrated torque wrench.
The torque verification
process also was witnessed by the licensee's QC inspector assigned to the
verification crew.
The licensee had informed the NRC that a large number of supports in the
plant were designed very conservatively; thus, indicated a large factor
of safety (20 or more) during their anaiysis and evaluation.
These supports,
therefore, were excluded from any detailed inspection or modification by
the licensee.
The inspector selected a number of supports from this group
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to determine the validity of licensee's conclusion, because, the analytical
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determination of a f actor of safety is dependent on the correct and proper
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installation of the support as designed. Additionally, some supports that
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were recently modified were included in the sample to ascertain the
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adequacy of installation.
Findings
Based on the above examinations, discussion with engineers, and review of
pertinent documents, the inspector rade the following observations.
1.
On plate 'C' of support no. 212-BP-NZ-2-Rl-84, the nut on the lower
right corner appeared to have been tightened.
This was apparent due
to the breaking of the paint covering the nut and the base plate.
This plate was not included in the group of supports needing modifi-
cation or work.
No documentation or personal recollection was
readily available to explain why or by whom work was performed on
the concrete expansion anchor.
2.
In the base plate for support no. 212-47 the inspector verified the
existing torque in the expansion anchors.
There were no records of
work on this base plate or its anchors since original installation.
Although the anchor nuts on the base plate showed existing torque to
be 23 FT-LB, one of the nuts was not in contact with the plate.
There was a gap of 1/16" between the plate and the nut.
The nut also
indicated evidence of having been tightened although no records were
available indicating when or why the tightening was perform?d.
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3.
The supports in the torus room and CR0 room had the nuts on the
concrete anchors tack welded to the base plate and the bolt was cut
flush with the top of the nut. Also, the grout under the plate was
excessive (over 2") in thickness.
There was not evidence, documented
or visual, that the existence or absence of levelling nut under the
plate had been verified.
The drawings for similar support in QC file
indicated no requirement of tack weld and a grout thickness of one
inch.
The tack welding and cutting of anchor bolts makes it difficult
to verify the length of the installed anchor bolt and impossible to
check the torque valves of the installed anchor bolts.
4.
Two supports in the Liquid Poison Sy . tem which had been modified
recently, were examined for conformance to design configuration and
existing torque in the anchors.
The inspector observed that one of
the new "Ram-set" bolts installed in one support appeared to show an
imbediment depth of only 11/16". Another bolt in the other support
indicated an existing torqua value of 11Ft-LB.
The initially
required installatiot ,orque was 20 Ft-LB.
This indicates an
uncommonly large loss of approximately 45*. of the torque in less than
a year due to relaxation or possibly deficient original installation.
5.
A previous NRC inspection (IR 85-14) identified that hot and cold
hanger settings on spring can hangers and supports were not verifi-
able due to paint over the indicator plate.
The inspector observed
that similar conditions existed on the three spring hangers selected
during this inspection. Although, on two of the three spring cans
hot settings could be guessed, they were not sufficiently clear to
accurately establish the setting with reasonable confidence.
5.0 Drawing Systems
In the course of reviewing drawings for support configurations, the
inspector made some general observations about the licensee's plant design
drawing system.
The observations are as follows:
1.
Several dif ferent isometric drawings are available, and are used by
different groups on site.
The inspector had considerable difficulty
in establishing which of the drawings were the current applicable
drawing for selected systems. Also, the system used to identify
support. is different on the various drawings.
For example, there
are original Burns and Roe drawings, Bergen-Patterson support draw-
ings, General Physics drawings, and in some cases drawings by other
organizations without a unified system of support identification.
The licensee has tabulated a cross-reference chart and is currently
trying to establish a unified support numbering system, but the
system is not widely available or used by dif ferent organizations
on-site.,
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2.
New modifications to the systems are documented on a new drawing
series which is not clearly referenced in the applicable master
drawing of the system, making it cumbersome and difficult to
establish the current "as-built" configuration of the system.
The above observations by the inspector were brought to the attention of
the licensee management for their evaluation.
6.0 Status of Open Items
Following items remain open.
These items are related to Bulletins 79-02
and 79-14.
(0 pen)
yiolation, 85-14-01:
Activities performed for IE Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 were not covered by documented procedures.
(0 pen)
Unresolved Itet, 85-14-02: The licensee could not retrieve
inspection checklist, marked-up drawings, and/or other field
inspection documentation during the NRC inspection.
(0 pen)
Deviation, 85-14-03:
Five of twelve seismic Category I systems
were not tested for anchor bolt acceptability
(0 pen)
Deviation, 85-14-04.:
No specific design documents applicable
to the seismic evaluations of safety-related piping were
available.
(0 pen)
Unresolved Item, 85-14-05: Adequacy of the baseplate and bolt
evaluation for support NC-Z-HZ1 could not be determined.
(0 pen)
Unresolved Items, 85-14-06: A verification of engineering
disposition for calculation number 8.31.208 was not available.
(0 pen)
Unresolved Item, 85-14-07: No documentation was available to
verify the conservatism of the seismic span tables.
(0 pen)
Unr3 solved Item, 86-14-08:
Pipe support analyses of supnorts
with"Trictional loads did not include these loads in the
support calculation.
(0 pen)
Unresolved Item,_8_5-14-09:
This item pertained to many
deficiencies found in "as-installed" configurations of pipe
supports.
In response to NRC letter of November 7,1985, the licensee had com.nitted
to resolve the above open items by the end of 11R outage; however, the
schedule was extended to 12R outage currently scheduled for October 14,
1988.
A NRC inspection has been planned to verify the resolution of the
above open items during 12R outage before the start of cycle 13.
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(Closed) NRC Bulletin 78-12:
This bulletin pertained to the use of
atypical weld material in reactor vessel welds.
The licensee's NSSS supplier (GE) and reactor vessel supplier (CE)
investigated the possibility of atypical weld material use in the
reactor vessel of Oyster Creek.
~he vendor certified to the
licensee that no atypical materi&ls had been used in weldments in
the reactor vessel.
This item is closed.
7.0 Management Meetings
Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of D.e
inspection at the entrance interview on August 30, 1938.
The fi' dings of
the inspection were discussed with licensee reprace.otatives during the
course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the
September 2,1988 exit interview (see paragraph I for attendees).
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the
licensee by the inspector.
The licensee did not indicate that proprietary
information was involved within the scope of this inspection.
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