ML20058A379
| ML20058A379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1993 |
| From: | Keimig R, Lusher J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058A377 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-93-23, NUDOCS 9312010060 | |
| Download: ML20058A379 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000219/1993023
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Docket / Report:
50-219/93-23
Licenses:
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Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation
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P. O. Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Inspection Dates:
October 18-20, 1993
Inspectors:
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J. Lushe Emergency @reparedness Specialist
date
J. Laugh in, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
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R. Plasse, Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point
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J. Schoppy, Resident Inspector, Salem / Hope Creek
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S. Pindale, Resident Inspector, Oyster Creek
Approved:
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kR. K imig, Cl(jef, 'melgency Preparedness
hat 5
Y -tion, Divisi
of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
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SCOPE
Annual announced inspection of the full-participation ingestion pathway emergency preparedness
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exercise.
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RESULTS
Overall, the on-site response to this exercise scenario was very good. Command and control .
was very good in all facilities. In the Simulator Control Room, excellent use of the Emergency
Operating Procedures (EOPs) was evident, and there was excellent. teamwork and group
discussion of actions to mitigate the accident.
9312010060 931112
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0
Persons Contacted
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2.0
Scenario Planning
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3.0
Exercise Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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4.0
Ac ti vities Observed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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5.0
Exercise Finding Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.0
General Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.0
Simulator Control Room (SCR) Findings
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8.0
Technical Support Center (TSC) Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9.0
Operations Support Center (OSC) Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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10.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Findings
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11.
Overall Response Timing
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12.
Licensee Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
13.
Ex i t M ee ti n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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DETAIIS
1.0
Persons Contacted
The following licensee personnel attended the exit meeting on October 20,1993.
F. Applegate, Quality Assurance Monitor
J. Barton, Vice President and Director, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
J. Bontempo, Lead Emergency Planner, Radiation Controls
G. Cropper, Operations Training Manager
S. D'Ambrosto, Media Representative
M. Davis, Maintenance Assessment Engineer
B. DeMerchant, Licensing Engineer
R. Ewart, Senior Security Supervisor
J. Frank, Plant Analysis Manager
G. Giangi, Manager, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
M. Godknecht, Plant Engineer
P. Hays, Lead Emergency Planner
D. Larsen, Lead Offsite Emergency Planner
S. Levin, Director, Operations and Maintenance
C. Mascari, Director, Nuclear Assurance
S. McAllister, Instructor IV
F. Meyer, Quality Control Engineer
B. Moroney, Nuclear Safety Compliance Committec Staff
T. Quintenz, Manager, Maintenance Assessment
E. Reilly, Staff Analyst
P. Scallon, Manager, Plant Operations
J. Sims, Operations Training Coordinator
R. Sullivan, Emergency Preparedness Manager
G. True, Supervisor, Maintenance Assessment
J. Vouglitois, Manager, Environmental Controls
C. Wilson, Operations, Group Shift Supervisor
The inspectors also interviewed and observed exercise activities performed by other licensee
personnel.
2.0
Scenario Planning
Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on June 2,1993. The scenario was
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submitted to the NRC on August 12,1993. Region I reviewers discussed scenario improvements
with the licensee's emergency preparedness (EP) staff on September 3,1993. The final scenario -
adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures, and
also demonstrated areas previously identified for further review.
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On October 18,1993, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on the revised scenario. The
licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers
would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrupting plant activities.
3.0
Exercise Scenario
The scenario included the following simulated events:
The plant is near the end of core life after prolonged operation at high power
Containment spray system I heat exchangers are out of service while heat exchangers are
being cleaned
Control rod drive pump "B" is out of service while motor bearings are being replaced
Control rod blade guides are being relocated in the fuel pool
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Employee inspecting stem leakage on isolation condenser isolation valves falls offladder
in contaminated area and injured (Unusual Event: Contaminated injured person)
While moving control rod blade guides, a Low Power Range Monitor (LPRM) is
snagged and raised near the pool surface increasing radiation levels on the refueling floor
(Alert: increased radiation levels by more than a factor of 1000)
A major earthquake occurs
Control rod drive pump "A" shaft seizes
Second control rod accumulator trouble alarm is received
A manual SCRAM is initiated and fails
Alternate Rod Injection fails to initiate automatically or manually (Site Area Emergency:
Earthquake affecting systems required for shutdown)
Standby liquid control tank ruptures, draining below pump suction
LPRM is shaken loose and falls to bottom of fuel pool'
Recirculation pump suction line breaks causing loss of coolant accident of about 5000
gpm
Drywell pressure and temperature increase
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Two drywell vacuum breakers fail open, requiring primary containment pressure control
Containment spray system valve fails closed
Containment is vented through hardened vent system and valve V-23-15 is stuck partially
open, providing a direct release path through the stack
Reactor water level drops below -30 inches for more than two minutes, (General
Emergency: failure of two barriers with potential loss of third)
Drywell pressme decreases
Manual valve on hardened vent system is closed
Radiological release is terminated
Recovery actions are initiated
The exercise is terminated
4.0
Activities Observed
The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response
Facilities (ERFs) and the actions of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff. The
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following activities were observed:
1.
Selection and use of control room procedures
2.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events
3.
Direction and coordination of emergency response
4.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies
5.
Communications /information flow, and record keeping
6.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses
7.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARS)
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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection
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Provisions for communicating information to the public
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Accident analysis and mitigation
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Accountability of personnel.
12.
Post-exercise critique by the licensec
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5.0
Exercise Finding Classifications
Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:
Exercise Streneth: a strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal
plant conditions and implement the emergency plan.
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Exercise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone,
constitute overall response inadequacy.
Area for Potential Imorovement: an aspect which did not significantly detract from the
licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for possible corrective action.
6.0
General Findings
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Activation and use of the ERO and ERFs were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan
(E Plan) and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
Overall command and control was very good in all ERFs.
The licensee used the new plant specific simulator during this exercise. The simulator was able
to model radiological data, provide information on the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), allowing response personnel to use the
equipment they would normally use during a real emergency.
Use of the simulator was an
excellent initiative.
7.0
Simulator Control Room (SCR) Findings
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No exercise strengths, weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were identified.
The Group Shift Supervisor (GSS) demonstrated good command and control throughout the
exercise. The GSS and the Group Operating Supervisor (GOS) conducted informative and
timely briefings to keep plant personnel informed and focused. The control room staff exhibited
excellent teamwork in identifying, analyzing, and mitigating simulated plant equipment failures.
The detection, classification and notification of emergency events was appropriate and timely.
Simulator program engineers functioned very well in presenting a challenging, real-time scenario
with few errant indications. The use of the simulator greatly enhanced the ability of the
operating staff to demonstrate its emergency response actions during the exercise.
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8.0
Technical Support Center (TSC) Findings
No exercise strengths, weaknesses or areas for potential improvement were identified.
The TSC was operational in 25 minutes after emergency declaration. The Emergency Director
(ED) assumed his position after a thorough turnover with the GSS and declared the TSC
activated in 44 minutes. Excellent command and control was evident in the TSC. Overall
accident assessment and classification activities in the TSC were well performed and correct.
TSC personnel provided good technical support to the SCR, Operational Support Center (OSC)
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The ED provided frequent briefings to the TSC
personnel, consistent with changing plant conditions.
Accountability was performed and
11 persons were identified as missing at 30 minutes. All personnel were accounted for at
40 minutes.
9.0
Operations Support Center (OSC) Findings
No exercise strengths, weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
The OSC was quickly staffed, and was activated and fully functional 42 minutes following the
Alert declaration. The OSC personnel demonstrated a good knowledge of their respective duties
and responsibilities. The OSC coordinator satisfactorily provided periodic plant status briefings
to the OSC staff.
Response teams dispatched from the OSC were briefed, tracked and debriefed. During the
exercise, 34 response teams were formed. All of the tasks to be conducted by the response
teams were assigned to the highest response priority (Priority 1), therefore, clearly critical tasks
did not receive immediate attention commensurate with the plant emergency. As a consequence,
teams for top priority tasks, such as obtaining chemicals for alternate poison injection or for
investigating a failed critical containment spray system valve (V-21-5) were not briefed or
dispatched in a timely or aggressive fashion.
The activities were generally well planned and developed in the OSC prior to implementation,
and the proper procedures were followed. The OSC personnel referred to plant drawings, such
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as electrical one-line and system flow drawings. The inspector observed that OSC members
referred to uncontrolled drawings while planning one of the activities, including a 1989 " print
book" and a flow diagram book that was labelled "for training purposes." The inspector
concluded that the use of uncontrolled drawings in an actual emergency would be inappropriate.
The licensee agreed.
Communications with the teams that were dispatched from the OSC were effectively maintained.
The teams that were observed by the NRC inspectors were aware of procedural provisions for
performing the assigned activities, and radiological conditions were properly monitored.
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10.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Findings
There were no exercise strengths, weaknesses, or areas for potential improvement identified.
Callout of the ERO was completed at 1703. The Emergency Support Director (ESD) arrived
at the EOF at 1741 and immediately called the ED for a plant status update. He then called ano
updated the New Jersey State Police. The ESD declared the EOF activated at 1805, after a
thorough turnover from the ED and reports from the group leaders that essential personnel were
present.
ESD command and control was good. He conducted regular briefings with group leaders for
plant status updates and decision-making, and frequently updated the facility staff via the PA
system. Communication flow was effective. The ESD often talked with the ED concerning
plant status, ensured EOF staff was updated, and kept State Police informed.
Group leaders advised the ESD on their areas of expertise. They provided updates on their areas
at the ESD briefings and responded to ESD requests for information. The ESD maintained an
Action item board in his conference room, which was updated as items were completed. He
also ensured that New Jersey State representatives in the EOF received all information they
required for decision-making.
The General Emergency (GE) declaration was correct and timely. The ESD consulted with the
ED before making that decision, announced it immediately to EOF staff, and called a group
leader briefing to discuss the Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). The PAR was to
shelter the two-mile radius, and ten miles downwind for the affected sectors (WSW, W, WNW,
NW, NNW). This took into account an anticipated wind shift, which added two sectors. The
PAR was in accordance with licensee procedures, was correct and timely, and was immediately
communicated to the State. It was also appropriately evaluated for update when the torus
hardened vent was opened to reduce drywell pressure, and stuck open, prolonging the release.
The ESD correctly chose to maintain the original PAR after a thorough discussion with his group
leaders.
The ESD properly reviewed and approved five of the seven press releases. Inspectors noted that
press releases were generally well-written; they were factual, concise, and easy to understand.
Public information representatives also provided summary " bullets" of plant status information
to the Joint Information Center as it became available. This was assessed as a good initiative.
Inspectors noted that the Plant Manager and the Vice President, Nuclear Assurance were present
in the EOF during the exercise. The Plant Manager received briefings from EOF staff as he
would during an actual emergency.
Expected actions were performed well in the EOF.
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Overall Response Timing
Unless not applicable (N.A.), the following table lists the times of significant exercise
occurrences and actions for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (Al), Site Area Emergency (SAE), and
General Emergency (GE) classifications,. These include simulated emergency occurrence,
recognition, declaration, State and local (S & L) notifications, NRC notification, ERO callout,
and ERF activation and full staffing.
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RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE
MILESTONE
Al
Occurrence
1530
1650
1750
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Recognition
1545
1653
1753
1953
Declaration
1547
1657
1753
1953'
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S & L Notifications
1551-1554
1701-1705
1759-1803
1957-2002
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NRC Notification
1557
1710
1821
2006
ERO Callout
1555-1607
1703
NA
NA
TSC Activation
NA
1728
NA
NA
TSC Fully Staffed
NA
1728
NA
NA
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OSC Activation
NA
1745
NA
NA
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OSC Fully Staffed
NA
1736
NA
NA
EOF Activation
NA
1805
NA'
NA
EOF Fully Staffed
NA
1805
NA
NA
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PAR Issued
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The above table shows that all notifications were timely.
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12.
Licensee Critique
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On October 20,1993 the NRC team attended the licensee's' exercise critique. The Supervisor
of Drills and Exercises summarized the licensee's observations. The licensee's critique was
assessed as thorough and critical, arid it identified all of the NRC inspection findings. .No
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licensee critique inadequacies were identified. The licensee's tracking system will be reviewed
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to ensure that all the exercise concerns are appropriately addressed (IFI 50-219/93-23-01).
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Exit Meeting
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The inspectors met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1.0 at the conclusion of the
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inspection to discuss the scope and findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings and stated
that they would be reviewed for appropriate corrective action.
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