IR 05000219/1998099
| ML20236R845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236R841 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-98-99, NUDOCS 9807220313 | |
| Download: ML20236R845 (6) | |
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ENCLOSURE 1 SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
l OYSTER CREEK !
Report No. 50-219/98-99 BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on June 26,1998, to assess the nuclear safety performance of Oyster Creek fnr the period from December 1,1996, through June 13,1998. The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.6 (see NRC i Administrative Letter 93-20). The Board members were Charles W. Hehl (Board I Chairman), Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region I (RI), Larry E. Nicholson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Rl, and Cecil O. Thornas, Director, Project Directorate 1-3, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The Board developed this assessment for the approval of the Region i Administrato The performance ratings and the functional areas used below are described in NRC MD 8.6, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
11 PERFORMANCE ANALYSAS - OPERATIONS Overall, performance in the Operations area improved. Operato:r performance during i major planned evolutions including startups and shutdowns, plant events and transients, and day-to-day activities was excellent. Management provided strong oversight and maintained an active involvement in plant activities. Management's focus on personal accountability, enforcement of standards, and lowering of the deficiency report threshold contributed to a reduction in the personnel error rate and improved operator performanc However, there were some performance problems relative to equipment configuration control and implementation of Technical Specifications. Licensed operator training program performance was mixe Operators performed well durir'g major planned evolutions. Reactor startups were well controlled and operators effectively maneuvered the plant during the conduct of quarterly power reductions to perform main steam isolation valve testing. Further, operators responded well to plant transients, which were infrequent; responses to a main exciter fire and a decreasing condenser vacuum condition were notable examples. In both instances, operators d'd not hesitate to manually scram the reactor, demonstrating a good safety focus and an inclination not to challenge safety system Management provided strong oversight and maintained an active involvement in plant activities. For example, senior management provided effective oversight of the post-transient recovery actions following the manual scram in response to the decreasing l
condenser vacuum condition, demonstrated a goud safety 1ocus in the selection of forced j outage work scope, and provided good oversight of startup activities. Management's commitment to high standards was evident and resulted in continued improvement in operator performance and a noteworthy reduction in personnel errors since July 199 Management set, clearly articulated, and consistently enforced performance expectations
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and standards. This was evidenced by their prompt response to operator performance issues. Improvements were noted in operator communication, peer-checking techniques, and identification and documentation of problems, especially those involving adverse human performanc Operator performance relative to configuration control and implementation of the Technical Specifications was mixed. Operations personnel demonstrated a good awareness concerning plant temporary modifications and maintained the summary log accurate and up to date. In general, operators demonstrated effective control of safety-related system alignments; however, the;y failed to snaintain adequate configuration control in several instances.' For example, operations personnel failed to identify and address the full effect on the pressure suppression capability of the torus due to a'
planned maintenance activity, resulting in a configuration in which torus pressure suppression capability was degraded. In addition, some weaknesses in licensed operators knowledge of Operating License and Technical Specification requirements contributed to several configuration control problems. For instance, senior reactor operators did not demonstrate a good awareness concerning Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation while shutdown, did not demonstrate a high level of knowledge concerning fire protection program requirements governing the redundant fire ,
pump, and did not declwce the primary containment inoperable and enter the applicable ,
Technical Specification action statement in response to a primary containment integrity I concer Operators generally demonstrated good attention-to-detailin the conduct of safety-related activities. For example, control room operators noted a slight reduction in s reactor recirculation pump seal pressure, identified a core spray system flow dsplay indication discrepancy, and recognized a fault on a startup transformer voltage regulator. However,
- control room and equipment reperators did not consistently demonstrate good attention-to-detail when conducting control room panel walkdowns and in-plant equipment status checks, resulting in some minor discrepancies.
, Licensed operator training performance was mixed. A June 1997 licensed operator requalification exam effectively identified those operators that needed remediation; however, recurrent requalification exam failures appeared to indicate an ineffective long term remediation process and an associated inability to maintain proficiency in some areas. Also, licensed operators demonstrated knowledge weaknesses of requirements which contributed to configuration control issues as discussed above and in regards to identification of the Technical Specification required offsite power source The Operations area is rated Category PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE Overall performance in maintenance was characterized by strong management oversight, high quality maintenance and surveillance implementation, and continuing improvements in pleat material condition. This high level of performance resulted in good equipment reliability, minimal maintenance-induced challenges to operations, excellent werk and
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radiological controls practices, effective planning, and a strong on-line maintenance program. Personnel performance in the conduct of maintenance significantly improved over the perio Maintenance management and site supervisors provided strong oversight and control of maintenance and surveillance activities. For example, maintenance management demonstrated gooc' involvement and oversight of the exciter brush failure evaluation and the work activities needed to ensure full main exciter restoration. Maintenance personnel conducted a thorough and timely root cause analysis and implemented comprehensive corrective actions. In addition, Quality Verification supervision contributed significantly to several root cause analyses, including the exciter brush failure and an emergency service water pump surveiHance failur The surveillance test program was effective in identifying and correcting equipment problems. Surveillance activities were generally well-coordinated, controlled and planned resulting in improved equipment availability and few missed surveillance tests during the perio Main;enance personnel performance significantly improved over the period. There were some instances early in the period where personnel performance and communication problems during the conduct of maintenance and surveillance activities challenged the plant and the operators. In response, management implemented several programs to address human performance issues site wide. Maintenance management achieved additional improvements through more thorough pre-job briefings, weekly shop meetings, specialized training, capturing lessons learned, and providing clear guidance on performance expectations. Toward the end of the period, maintenance personnel typically exhibited questioning attitudes and attention-to-detail during conduct of activities. Personnel errors were significantly reduced and deficiencies were promptly identified in the formal corrective action syste Maintenance planning was generally effective in developing job orders, such as the electromatic relief valve pilot valve assembly replacements. The on-line maintenance program was strong, with appropriate levels of control established and risk insight appropriately factored into the program. The Fix-It-Now team was effective in completing maintenance, performing a large portion of the emergent work, and directly contributed to reducing the maintenance backlog. Plant systems were generally well mainteined and were effectively monitored for performance. Overall material condition of the plant was very goo j The Maintenance area is rated Category 1.
l I PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEER!NG
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Performance in the Engineering area was mixed. Overall, engineering support to plant operations was good and for the most part problem resolution efforts were effectiv .
Strong use of industry experience was evident. However, weaknesses were identified l regarding the implementation of engineering programs and procedures. In addition, some i _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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4 j aspects of the motor-operated valve program remained incomplete. Also, examples were l
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identified where design basis information was not properly verified and ir corporated into )
appropriate document System engineers continued to provide generally good support to plant operations and f they were effective in problem resolution. For example, the response to s control rod drive (CRD) leak in the drywell involved good troubleshooting plans, appropriate risk considerations and effective data evaluations. Generic industry problems involving isolation condenser tube failures and containment bypass concerns were promptly evaluated. Engineering involvement in the resolution of emergency diesel generator '
problems was effective. In contrast, previous poor engineering support of a maintenance activity contributed to incorrect material being installed in an emergency service water I pum lll Performance associated with engineering programs was inconsistent. In general, I calculations and safety analyses adequately supported safety system modification Also, implementation of the maintenance rule was strong after a poor initial star .
However, closure of the motor-operated valve (MOV) program progressed slowly, as some confirmatory aspects of the program remained incomplete. Further, problems were noted in the implementation of the 10 CFR 50.69 Safety Evaluation Program in that a safety evaluation was not performed to support the use of radiologically-contaminated water for makeup to the shell side of the isolation condenser system. Similarly, no safety l evaluations were performed for the modification of a containment spray system heat
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exchanger relief valve and for the removal of the isolation condenser radiation monitor In some instances, engineers failed to comply with other procedures. For example, engineers failed to verify seismic design calculations, as required, and they failed to use applicable procedures to perform a core heat balanc Fnginee ing performance relative to maintaining the license and design bases was also mixed. A potentini seismic design conflict between plant construction and the licensing and design bases for portions of the reactor building supply ventilation system was properly evaluated. Also, engineers identified a discrepancy between the input voltage assumed for the degraded voltage relay setpoint in a design basis calculation, and the actual response capability of the voltage regulators feeding the startup transformer However, some old design activity problems, where engineers failed to translate design bases information into appropriate documents, were revealed during this period. One example resulted in both CRD pumps faiiing to automatically operate, as required, follow lng a reactor scram. Another example, identified by the NRC, involvsd the f ailure to verify or check the adequacy of the design voltage for the automatic depressurization system (ADS) electromatic relief ve.ves, resulting in several ADS valves being inoperabl The Engineering t rea is rated Category I i
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5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT Overall performance in the plant support functional area continued to be goo Significant improvements were made in radiological exposure control and radiological waste handling practices Problems occurred however, in the radiological effluents control program. The plant security organization continued to perform well, and generally good performance was noted in the fire protection and emergency preparedness functional area The radiation protection program was generally wellimplemented. Occupational i exposures were the lowest since the commencement of reactor operation. Effective radioactive waste reduction and radioactive source control were observed. In contrast, poor procedures and practices were observed relative to radwactive waste handling, I transport, and release of equipment for unrestricted us I Performance problems were observed in the radiological effluent control progra Radiation monitoring system calibration methods and techniques were not always consistent with commonly-accepted practices and proceduras. Procedures were not established to verify and validate in-plant air balance in accordance with the described design bases. A licensee-identified problem involving the isolation condenser that resulted in low-level tritium vapor release was not effectively resolved in a timely manne Potentially-contaminated soil was retrieved after it was inadvertently released. In contrast, the radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring program was effectively established, implemented, and maintained. Good quality assurance programs were established and implemented relative to chemistry laboratory measurements and analysi The plant security program was effectively conducted in accordance with the security plan. The security program was enhanced with upgrades to facility plant protection equipment and personnel training and qualification. Good programs were in place for self-identifying and resolving problems and program weaknesses. Corrective actions were promptly established and implemented to resolve program deficiencie Performance in emergency preparedness was mixed. Qualification of emergency responders was generally maintained, although the process for ensuring qualified responders were assigned to the rosters was weak. Corrective actions to problems were inconsistent. For example, problems ;dentified during the biennial exercise, such as tumover of the offsite notification functien, were not aggressively pursued, while problems identified during an off-hours call out were promptly addresse Performance in fire protection was generally good. Fire barrier deficiencies were identified and effectively evaluated as evidenced by the correction of a conduit with inadequate fire barrier protection. Operators were knowledgeable regarding operation of the control room fire suppression system, yet failed to minimize fire protection system
! risk associated with removing a diesel-driven fire pump from service.
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The Plant Support ares is rated Category J
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