IR 05000219/1988029

Insp Rept 50-219/88-29 on 880914-15.App R Violation Re High & Low Pressure Interface During Design Basis Fire Which Could Cause Loss of Reactor Coolant Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Interviews W/Personnel & Inspector Observations

ML20205J786
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	10/22/1988
From:	Anderson C, Krasopoulos A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205J750	List: IR 05000219/1988029 ML20205J746
References
50-219-88-29, NUDOCS 8810310484
Download: ML20205J786 (4)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 88-29 ,

Docket N License No. OPR-16 Priority -

Category C Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P. O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Facility Name: Oyster Creek Inspection Conducted: September 14 - 15, 1988 NRC Personnel: C,h A.YKr sop kr1 s,N.Reactor krc.34p s !aa Engineer

/c date L!ff Approved by: (2by /o/15/If C. AndWrson, Chief PSS date Report Summary: Inspection on September 14-15, 1988 (Inspection Report No. 50-219/88-29) ,

This inspection was performed to evaluate the actions taken by the licensee to correct the non-conformances from the 10 CFR 50 Appeedf.x R requirements identified in LER 88 - 12 and documented in Inspectivs Report No. 50-219/C8-2 The non-conformances were conditions the could create a high-low pressure interface during a design basis fire and cause a loss of reactor coolan '

Results: A violation of the 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements was identified; ,

the NRC however, exercising discr(tion, will not ise.ue a violatio '

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8910310404 901024 PDR Q ADOCK v50002[9 PDL

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Details 1. Persors Contacted Licensee Employees

• F. FItzpatrick, Vice President, Director Dyster Creek

• G. W. Busck, Licensing Engineer

• J. Vendosa, Fire Protection Coordinator NRC personnel i

J. Wechselberger Sr. Resident Inspector E. Collins Resident Inspector

• 0. Lew Resident Inspector

• Denotes those who attended exit interview.

I Background The licensee on July 7,1988 determined that the control circuitry for four Electromatic Relief valves (EMRVs) did not meet the 10CFR50 l Appendix R requirements. Subsequent to this determination the licensee's l review of the concern identified that two valves of the reactor clean up system also did not reet the same requirement The requirements state that in the event of a fire the licensee must be able to shutdown the I reactor and during the postfire shutdown there shall not be a rupture of ( any reactor coolant boundar In the case of the EMRVs the licensee l determined that a fire in some plant areas has the potential of causing

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not shorts. These shorts along with a short in the pressure controller l ceuld cause a spurious actuation of the EMRVs. The srurious opening of the EMRVs is the equivalent of a rupture of the roactor coolant boundary since the reactor coolant inventory is being depleted.

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! Itr areas where a fire has the potential of causing this problen are:

l The Cortrol room, the A/S Battery room, the Change ano Monitor area, the Reactor building Elev. $1" the PG set roem, the reactor building ela , the A, 48G' svitthgear room and the LCSR room. In the esse of the reacter water clean up system it was discovered that a fire vn the Control roon or Lower cable spreading room Fas the potential of causing hot shorts in the position indicating circuitry cf the reactor clean up system valves V-16-2 and V-16-14. These shorts could prevent valve closure. Failure of the valves to close on high pressure could result in the overpressurization of the reactor cleanup system and possible rupture of the reactor coolant boundar r

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2 Event Evaluation and Follow-up of Unresolved Item 88-20-01 The inspector reviewed the following Safety Evaluation Reports: Number t 402728-009 titled "Modification of Appendix R shutdown path for reactor !

building el.51'", and number 402728-008, titled "Appendix R deviations-EMRV disable control switches and reactor cleanup system isolation valves". The inspector also reviewed the immediate as well as the lonj term corrective actions taken and planned by the licensee as described in the LER and the safety evaluation The inspector agreed with the licensee's assessment that an EMRV spurious operation as a result of a combination of a hot short and other shorts to ground although possible is a low probability event. Hwever the regulation in 10CFR50 Appendix R stipulates that there will be no rupture of the reactor coolant boundary or loss of inventory therefore the aboYe condition represents a violation of the Appendix R requirements, g Similarly the possibility that the Reactor Water Clean up system valves V-16-2 and V-16-14 could be prevented from closing by blown fuses caused by hot shorts in their position indication circuitry is a violation of the Appendix R requirements quoted above. A valve failure to ,: lose could result in the overpressurization of the Clean up system and loss of p coolant inventor The licensee steted that the reason for ti:e non conformances was design f error. To assure full compliance and prevent recurrence the licensee reviewed all other possible high low pressure interfaces. It was this ,

review that identified that a probhm existed in the Reactor water clean T up syste To correct the problems with the high low pressure interfaces the licensee did the following: The licensee installev a switch for each i EPRV in the control room to enable tM operators tr close the valvos by !

removing control power from the FNRV control circuits. The appropriate ;

safe shutd m orocedure was also revised sc the operators kno, what to -

d This liy would work in all of the t.rus listed above except for a r fire in Ret *, c Building Elev. 51'. In this fire area the Ifeensee

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postulates t at a fire could still cause the spuriou3 actuation of an !

EMR The 'ussibility that more than one EMRV could similarly bo I actuated was evaluated by the Licensee but was discounted because it was [

considered to be an extremely unlikely event since it would require t multiple hot shorts for this to occur. The Inspector agreed wit.1 this assumption. If one EMRV actuates the licensee has forty five minu4es to initiate the Core spray system and two hours to initiate the Iontainment c spray syste The Core spray will provide torus coolin ;

f The inspector reviewed the procedure titled response to fire n :

2000-ABN-3200.29 and the manual operator ictions required to shutdown tb, l plant for a fire in this are The licensee revised the shutdown !

procedure for this area to include ini+iation and line up of the core spray and containment spray systems to mitigate the effects of a l spuriously actuated EMR These actions were deemed acceptabh by the f inspector, i

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With regard to the Reactor water clean up system valve inability to close, the licensee provided electrical separation between the position >

indication circuitry and the control circuitry for both valves so that a hot short in the position indication circuit could not prevent valve closure on a high pressure isolation signa These corrective actions are acceptabl The inspector informed the licensee that a notice of violation will not be issued for these infractions on the basis of their relative safety significance and the licensee's prompt corrective action Unresolved item 88-20-01 is close .0 Unresolved Items Unresolved 1. ems are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation The resolution of an Unresolved item is discussed in Section 3 of this repor .0 Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee management representatives (see Section 1.0 for attendees) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 15, 198 ,

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that t time. The insp2ctor also confirmed witn the licensee that the report will not contain any proprietary informatio The licensee agreed that the inspection report maybe placed in the Public Document Room without prior licensee review for proprietary informatio (10 CFR 2.790). F At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspecto i i

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