IR 05000309/1985016

Insp Rept 50-309/85-16 on 850701-0818.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Control Room,Radiation Protection, Physical Security,Fire Protection,Operating Records,Maint & TMI Action Plan Items

ML20135G530
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	09/12/1985
From:	Elsasser T, Holden C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135G524	List: IR 05000309/1985016 ML20135G523
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 50-309-85-16, NUDOCS 8509190353
Download: ML20135G530 (10)

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i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

1 Docket / Report: 50-309/85-16 License: DPR-36 i Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Dates: July 1 - A

/ st 8, 1985

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Submitted: , . < h- - -> / C H61 den e ' esident Inspector Dats

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Approved: f// d5 T. C. Elsasiayf Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C Date

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Summary: Inspection on July 1 - Auoust 18, 1985 (Report No. 50-309/85-16)

l Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection (115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br />) of the control room, ac-cessible parts of plant structures, plant operations, radiation protection, physi-

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cal security, fire protection, plant operating records, maintenance, surveillance, radioactive effluent sampling program, open items, TMI Action Plan items, and re-ports to the NR No violations were found, t

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8509190353 850913 PDR ADOCK 05000309 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with various licensee personnel, including reactor operators, maintenance and surveillance technicians and the licensee's management staf . Summary of Facility Activities The plant continued cold leg temperature coastdown operations for this in-spection period. On July 1, 1985, the plant tripped from 95 percent powe The trip was caused by improper maintenance of a feed flow recorder by In-strument and Control technicians. The reactor was taken critical on July 2, 1985 and continued power operations. Plant power was reduced to 75 percent on August 2, 1985 for turbine valve testin The plant was shutdown on August 16, 1985, for the cycle 9 refueling. The re-fueling is anticipated to take approximately seven week . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findin2s (Closed) Followup item (IFI 309/85-06-02) Spacing between fuel rack tubes in the spent fuel pool. The corrective action for this item involved drilling holes in the spent fuel rack tubes to allow the water in the spent fuel pool to fill the air space and provide the necessary flux trap. The licensee had an analysis of the spent fuel tubes conducted. This analysis, " Summary of Maine Yankee Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis", dated July 18, 1985, con-cluded that all fuel currently onsite can be stored in the spent fuel poo Special administrative controls were removed. This item is close (Closed) Followup item (IFI 309/82-19-10) Licensee to correct slow containment purge valves prior to any online purge. The licensee replaced the solenoid operator for the purge bypass valve and conducted a time test prior to purge operations following cycle 8 operations. This item is close . Review of Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation throughout the reporting period. Except as noted below, conditions were found to be in compliance with the following licensee documents:

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Maine Yankee Technical Specifications

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Maine Yankee Technical Data Book

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Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program

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Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program

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Maine Yankee Tagging Rules

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Administrative and Operating Procedures i

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a. Instrumentation Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirement No unacceptable conditions in process instrumentation were identified, b. Annunciator Alarms The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged. These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. Operator re-sponse was verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms, Revision During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equip-ment associated with various alarm No unacceptable conditions were identifie c. Shift Manning

, The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the operating requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number and type of license Control room and shift manning were observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.5 d. Radiation Protection Controls Radiation Protection control areas were inspected. Radiation Work Per-mits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was inspecte Proper posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas was re-viewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate

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personnel monitoring device There were no unacceptable conditions identifie On August 6, 1985, the licensee conducted repairs to the refueling ma-chine upender in the spent fuel pool utilizing divers to remove and re-place hydraulic cylinders and limit switches. The inspector reviewed the radiation surveys with the Radiological Controls Section Head and dis-cussed the control of the divers activities. The general area dose rates were 100 mrem. in the area the diver would be working with much higher dose rates in the nearby area. The diver was brought to the surface after one hour to check self reading dosimeters and compare the actual dose with the expected dose rates. The diver was then allowed to continue the dive for two more hours. The plant made special arrangements to have TLD reading capability onsite so the actual exposure would be available im-mediately after the first dive and prior to subsequent dive I l

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The exposure for the one dive completed on August 6 was 69 mrem. whole body dose. This compared favorably with the general area dose rates (the diver was working on top of the upender instead of next to it to reduce his exposure). The inspector had no further questions.

' Plant Housekeeping Controls i

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Storage of material and components was observed with respect to preven-

, tion of fire and safety hazards. Plant housekeeping was evaluated with

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respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.

! There were no unacceptable conditions identified.

i i Fire Protection / Prevention The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipmen Combustible materials were being controlled and were not

_ found near vital areas. Selected cable penetrations were examined and d

fire barriers were found intac Cable trays were clear of debri No

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abnormal conditions were identifie i Control of Equipment

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During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control

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was examine Equipment conditions were consistent with information in 1 plant control logs.

i Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)

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The inspector attended Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings

{ on July 30 and August 2,1985. Technical specification 5.5 requirements q for required member attendance were verified. The inspector had no fur-r ther comments.

j Unscheduled Plant Trip

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On July 1, 1985, at 2:24 p.m. the plant tripped from approximately 95

} percent power. The cause of the trip was attributed to an I&C technician i error while troubleshooting a problem with the steam generator feed flow recorder. The steam driven feed pump tripped on low suction pressure /

, overspeed causing the main turbine and the reactor to trip. The electric

driven feed pump which was aligned for automatic initiation failed to start upon the loss of the steam driven pump. The other electric driven feed pump was manually started. An investigation into the cause of the i failure of the feed pump to auto start was inconclusiv ,

! The reactor was taken critical at 7:40 a.m. on July 2. The inspector had i no further questions.

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m. Boron Concentration for the Safety In.iection Pumps On July 10, 1985, the licensee sampled the suction header for the high j pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps after conducting the normal sur-

veillance required pump runs. The boron concentration was 1106 ppm in-

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stead of the required 1720 ppm. The HPSI header was declared inoperable j and the remedial action of Technical Specifications were performed. The 1 licensee flushed the suction header and resampled. The boron concentra-tion was returned to normal at 2:37 p.m. on July 10.

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The licensee instituted a program of weekly sampling of the suction line.

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It is speculated that the check valve on the suction side of the pump is leakin Since the boron concentration of the primary system is ap-proximately zero, the leakage dilutes the boron concentration in the i suction header. These check valves will be closely examined during the l upcoming outage and corrective action taken as necessary. The licensee

also chose to consider the suction line for the HPSI pumps as an exten-

, sion of the refueling water storage. tank (RWST). The Technical Specifi-

cations for the RWST require that the concentration of boron for this 300,000 gallon tank be maintained between 1720 and 1900 ppm. The section of pipe that sees the change in boron concentration because of the leak-

. age past the check valves is only a small percentage of the total RWST volume. Section 3.7 cf the Technical Specifications requires that the concentration of boron in the RWST be restored to within 10 percent within four hours and to the required value within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The suction lines for the HPSI pumps were sampled on July 18 and the

, boron concentration was 1164 ppm. The lines were flushed and the boron

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concentration restored within two hours. The suction lines were again sampled on July 17 and the "A" header was found to have a boron concen-tration of 1554 ppm. The header was flushed until the concentration reached a minimum of 1720 approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> later. The inspector 4 continued to monitor the results of the HPSI boron concentration samp-

ling and the corrective action throughout the remainder of the cycle, Shift Review

, The inspector reviewed the requirements for reactivation of an operator's license following an inactive period of four months. This topic was re-viewed with Operations and Training Department staff.' Items discussed included how an operator familiarizes himself with changes in procedures,

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administration and plant hardware and the use of parallel watches. The j review answered several questions on the topic.

I The inspector reviewed the upcoming outage crew rotation schedule with the Operations Department Head and discussed the affect of control room modifications on the operation of the plant. The main control board will be altered to install human factors modifications. This necessitates cutting out sections of the control board and replacing the panels with l

redesigned indication and control functional layout. Additionally, the

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control room overhead will be modified to improve the seismic resistance of the suspended ceiling. There was mutual concern over the interference that these two jobs could pose to the operators as they conduct the shJtdown and refueling of the plant. The inspector will continue to monitor this area throughout the outag On August 8, 1985, while reviewing the circumstances surrounding the discovery of misrositioned steam generator pressure transmitter root valves, the inspector identified the drain valves on the pressure trans-mitters as containment integrity valves. When questioned, the operators agreed that the valves were a boundary for containment as defined by 10 CFR 5 The shift issued a tagging order to control the drain valve position and reviewed other systems for similar valves. The problem with the mispositioned steam generator pressure transmitter root valves is discussed in detail in Inspection Report 50-309/85-1 The plant controlled the root valves through Instrument & Control (I&C)

calibration procedures. These procedures required the I&C technicians, who are responsible for the operation of the valves, to correctly line up the transmitter at the conclusion of a calibratio The inspector discussed this subject with plant management. Even though these valves were controlled by I&C procedures, they were not designated as containment integrity valves. During normal calibration, the " con-tainment boundary" is shifted to the instrument isolation valve while the calibration tester is attached to the drain valve and the drain valve is opened. The inspector discussed the need to perform maintenance (cali-bration) on these transmitters as well as the need to maintain contain-ment integrity. The licensee agreed that additional controls over these instrument drain valves are necessary. The inspector will review the implementation of these corrective actions. (IFI 309/85-16-01).

5. Observations of Pbisical Security:

The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and backshift hours, that selected aspects of the security plan were in accordance with the regulatory requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures, as noted belo I Physical Security Plan

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Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full time member of the security organization, with authority to direct physical security actions, was present as require Manning of all three shifts was observed to be as require ,

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I Physical Barriers  ;

Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of the isolation zone [

was performed. Observations of truck and car searches were mad '

't Access Control

} Observations of the following items were made:

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Identification, authorization and badging

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Escorting 1 --

Searches

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Communications

! The inspector reviewed a variety of special precautions which the secur-

ity department had taken to accommodate the scheduled outage workloa ; These special precautions dealt with the compensatory measures the se- '

curity department was employing. No deficiencies were identifie . Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

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The inspector reviewed the following LER's to verify that the details were '

clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector had previously verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifi-j cations and did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. No discrepancies were identifie '

LER N Subject

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85-01 Unlocked ECCS Valve

, 85-02 Manual Reactor Trip on Condenser Differential Pressure

85-03 Plant Trip during Instrument Replacement

85-04 Startup Rate Trip during Reactor Shutdown i 85-05 1.ack of Administrative Controls on Containment Integrity Valves

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85-06 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling System Deficiency 85-07 Plant. Trip while Repairing a Feedwater Flow Recorder 85-08 Valve Stem Failures on. Hydrogen Analyzer Isolation Valves i

~ Surveillance Testing The inspector observed parts of tests to assess performance in accordance with

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approved procedures and LCO's, test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolution. The following tests were

, reviewed: Emeroency Diesel Generator monthly surveillance test, procedure 3.1.4 and RTD Response Time Testing.

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8 Post Accident Purce Valve Repair On July 5,1985, while performing a second verification of valve position following a surveillance test, the valve stems were sheared on the inlet valves to the containment atmosphere hydrogen analyzers (PAP-23 and 24). The plant has two installed hydrogen analyzers, a COMSIP and a Bendix. Each in-strument measures the hydrogen concentration in containment. The Bendix in-strument is isolated by valve PAP-24 and meets the requirements of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for hydrogen sampling of containment. Valve PAP-23 isolates the COMSIP hydrogen detector which was installed to meet the requirements for NUREG 0737. The surveillance test, Monthly Test of Contain-ment Purge, procedure 3.1.12, does not require the operation of the inlet valves (PAP-23 and 24) but does require the verification that they are shut following the surveillance. The hydrogen analyzers are designed to be manually placed in service when neede The inlet valves to the analyzer are operated from the auxiliary feed pump room. A reach rod extends through the floor to provide sufficient shielding for the operator in the event of an accident. When the operator attempted to check shut the inlet isolation valves for the hydrogen analyzers (PAP-23, 24),

the valve stems sheared. Technical Specification 3.9 requires that at least one hydrogen analyzer be operable for accident mitigation. With both hydrogen analyzers out of service the plant had 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to repair one of the analyzers or be in hot shutdown within the next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> The licensee determined that the valve stems were not repairable since the plant does not have a procedure for welding series 400 stainless steel. The Plant Shift Supervisor tagged the hydrogen sampling system to ensure that the system remained isolated. The outlet valves from the containment were tagged shut, PAP-1,2 and The licensee incorrectly defined PAP-23 and 24 as remotely operated contain-ment integrity valves. This determination was based on the location of the valves in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) and the installed reach rods which permit operation of the valves from the Auxiliary Feed Pump Room. The reach rods are installed because of the predicted radiation levels in the piping during accident conditions. The concrete floor of the Auxiliary Feed Pump Room provides the necessary shielding. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in section 5.1.2, Containment Isolation, uses the term remotely con-trolled power-operated isolation valves. These valves are considered to be air or motor operated valves that can be controlled from the control room and have indication in the control room. PAP-23 and 24 do not meet this cri-teri Technical Specification 3.11 addresses the rebounding of automatic and remote operated isolation valve It does not address rebounding manual valves for maintenance. Because the licensee incorrectly identified the PAP valves as remotely operable, the isolation criterft of section 3.11 was incorrectly ap-plied for maintenance of PAP-24.

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Valve PAP-24 was selected for repair since it was more accessible than PAP-2 At 7:39 p.m. on July 5, PAP-24 was cut out and replaced. One manual valve was used to isolate the repair work from containment. When the relief crew ar-rived at 11:00 p.m. they questioned the use of a single manual valve. PAP-24 had the root pass weld completed at this point. The licensee completed the repair of PAP-24 and tested the valv The licensee contacted the Region I Office of the NRC before conducting repair work on PAP-23. The Regional Office agreed that the repair of PAP-23 was pru-dent and that Technical Specifications should be changed to address the use of manual valves for repair boundarie While the determination that the PAP valves in question were remotely operated valves was incorrect, there was no impact upon containment integrity since the other manual isolation valves were locked and tagged shut. These locked shut manual valves provided the same level of protection as deenergized auto-matic valves. The licensee is pursuing changes to the Technical Specifications to address these concerns and to provide clear guidance to the operator The inspector had no further question . Licensee Action on NUREG 0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident The NRC's Region I Office has inspection responsibility for selected action plan items. These items have been broken down into numbered descriptions (enclosure 1 to NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Items). The in-spector reviewed selected aspects of the licensee's commitments to NUREG 0737 items. The inspector reviewed the listing of NUREG 0737 open items with a licensee representative to determine the status of these items. Selected in-spection reports were also reviewed to determine the extent of previous re-views. The inspector also selected various modifications to compare the as-built system to the licensee's commitment to NUREG 0737 items. The inspector will continue to pursue this effor . Seismic Design of the Service Water System On August 2, 1985, the licensee was informed by Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) that they had discovered a problem with the seismic design of the ser-vice water system. The service water system is used to provide cooling water to the component cooling water heat exchangers, the emergency core cooling heat exchangers for the residual heat removal system and the emergency diesel generators. Using a number of conservatisms, the analysis showed that the ex-pansion joints for the north and south headers would have a quarter inch more movement in a seismic event than allowed by the manufacture On August 6,1985, YAEC provided additional information which showed that the system would actually meet the seismic design criteria. This additional in-formation took credit for both the installed splash shield and the existing pipe supports (previous analysis used one or the other but not both of these factors). The licensee also initiated a design change package to provide ad-

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ditional support to this system during the upcoming outage. The Plant Opera-tions Review Committee conducted a review and determined that the service water system was operable. The inspector will follow the licensee's corrective action on this item (IFI 309/85-16-02).

11. Exit Interview Meetings were periodically held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.