IR 05000413/1989019
| ML20247A178 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1989 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909120057 | |
| Download: ML20247A178 (88) | |
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! g m 2 9 1989 L Dock 6t Nos. 50-413, 50-414 License Nos. NPF-35, NPF-S2 Duke Power Company ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department -
422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your Catawba' facilit The issues d'scussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System.
l A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are-enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement actio In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
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Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures l will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roo Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact u
Sincerely, wcd Do '
OQ A m( C b C. E h Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator
,i Enclosures:
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' List of Attendees ' Enforcement Conference Summary Enforcement Conference followup Meeting Summary Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989 l Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989 l
cc w/encls:
T. B. Owen, Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire l State of South Carolina bec w/encls: (See page 2) * ;g 8909120057 890829 L I " *** %? **'
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Duke Power Company 2 AUG 2 S 1989 bec w/encis:
K. N. Jabbour, NRR NRC Resident Inspector '
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ENCLOSURE 1 l
LIST OF ATTENDEES I
July 20, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission L M. L. Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator l P. K. Grimes. Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W. Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Dirertor, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief DRP M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, CRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel F. Jape Section Chief. DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief NRR J. Leuhman, Dffice of Enforcement Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, ISE Group Manager, Catawba
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H. J. Lee, Design Engineering l
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Enclosure 1 2 LIST OF ATTENDEES August 15, 1989 l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor _ Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordina^ ion Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
l M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief, DRP 1 K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
! M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke Power Company T. L Owen, ' Station Manager, Catawba R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering F. N. Mack, Jr., Project Manager, Catawbc R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent, Catawba J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent, Catawba W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba l J. Kammer, Test Engineer, Catawba l
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ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY On July 20, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company (DPC) met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Getrgia, to discuss inoperability of-both . trains of' the Reactor Vessel' Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) Upper
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Railge lon Catawba. Unit ?.
Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RII Deputy Regional Administrato DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. T. B. Owen, Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that contrary to1what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted
= June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had beeri violated. He also
~ stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the Catawba . supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system
' description, sequence ~of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety significance, summary and concluding remark A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were centered ' around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and supervisory. personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy ~of the post maintenance test perforn.e Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their conclusions. - Duke . reiterated that they had identified the inoperability, immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly to the NRC, and issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were'not recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural
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steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications, and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personne Also, with-regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this event were not significan The URC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective actions.
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ENCLOSURE 3 ,
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the -
enforcement conierence held on July 20. The purpose of the meetirg was to discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS inoperability on Unit 2.
l Following opening remarks by B. Grimes, NRC RII Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC gave two presentations (Enclosure 5). The first presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation included a - discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT progra The second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a summar Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to explain how they reached their conclusions on safety significanc The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding
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questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a sun. mary l
of the event and managements expectations, the venting of the RVLIS line following reconaection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement conferenc _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -
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NUCLEA3 REOULATORY COMMIS$10N
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-j 101 MARIETTA ET RE.ET, . ATl.ANTA, GEOMGI A 30323 4 .
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AUG 2 9193g Docket Nos. 50-41*i,53-414 5-
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Duke Power Ccmpany i ATTN: Mr. A B. Tucker, Vice President I
<Nur, lear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 2824 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-413/89-19 AND 50-414/89-19)
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on July.20, 1989, and the Enforcement Conference followup meeting held on August 15, 1989. These meetings concerned activities authorized for your Catawba facilit The issu'es discussed at the conference and the followup meeting related to inoperability of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Syste A list of attendees, meeting summaries, and a copy of your handouts are
, enclosed. We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the-appropriate enforcement actio lIn accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
- Title 10 Code-of Federal Regulations, a copy. of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please conta'ct u
Sincerely, pm l
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Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator Enclosures:
1 1.' -List of Attendees 2.- Enforcement Conference Sumary l Enforcement Conference Followup Meeting Sumary Handout (s) dated July 20, 1989 Handout (s) dated August 15, 1989 cc w/encls: i T. B. Owen', Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - McGuire State of South Carolina 3
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ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES July.20, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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M., Ernst. Deputy Regional Administrator B.'K. Grimes,' Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W.'Hehl, Deputy Director, Division of Rerctor Projects (DRP)
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
.G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
W. T. Orders, Senior. Residerat Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B.-R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel'
F. Jape, Section Chief, DRS B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L., Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcemen Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Prodcttion Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance
'R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Mam qer, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering l
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g. [ 4 ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES July 20, 1989
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission M. L. Ernst Deputy Regional Administrator B. K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator C. W. Hehl,. Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R.'Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, DRP
.M. B. Shymiock, Section Chief, DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
W. T. Orders Senior Resident' Inspector, Catawba, DRP M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspectcr. Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP R. J. Goddard, Regional Counsel F. Jape, Section Chief. DRS B. Uryc, Enforcemer,t Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR
- J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke Power Company H. B. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production Department T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba P. G. Leroy, Catawba Support Engineer, Compliance R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba J. M. Stackley, I&E Group Manager, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering
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" Enclosure 1
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LIST OF ATTENDEES l August 15, 1989 l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B..K. Grimes, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator A. F._Gibson, Director. Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS)'
A. R. Herdt, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
M. B. Shym1ock, Section Chief, DRP K. N. Jabbour, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
M. S. Lesser, Resident Inspector, Catawba, DRP B. R. Bonser, Project Engineer, DRP F. Jape; Section Chief, DRS 8. Uryc,' Enforcement Coordinator, EICS L. Phillips, Section Chief, NRR J. Leuhman, Office of Enforcement Duke' Power Company T. B. Owen, Station Manager, Catawba 1R. M. Glover, Compliance Engineer, Catawba W. R. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent, Catawba H. J. Lee, Design Engineering
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F. N. Mack, Jr., . Project Manager, Cstawba R. N. Casler, Operations Superintendent,' Catawba J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent. Catawba W. F. Beaver, Performance Manager, Catawba .
J. Kamrter, Test Engineer, Catawba i
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ENCLOSURE 2 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY On July 20, 1989, representatives from Dui e '"w4 e Company (DPC) met with the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Geor s:a, .o discuss inoperability of both trains of the Reactor Vessel Level Ins .vi+ ;tation System (RVLIS) Upper Range on Catawba Unit Following opening remarks by M. Ernst, NRC RI! Deputy Regional Administrator, DPC gave a presentation (Enclosure 4) on the RVLIS inoperability. -T. B. Owen, Catawba Station Manager, introduced DPCs presentation by stating that Duke had identified the RVLIS problem, reported it promptly to the NRC, and that contrary to what was stated in a courtesy Licensee Event Report submitted June 26, 1989, the RVLIS Technical Specification had been violated. He also stated that DPC felt the root cause of the problem was the failure of the
Catawba supervisor to use qualified personnel in the task of restoring RVLIS and that a contributing factor had been the poor direction and guidance given in N/A'ing procedure steps. The presentation that followed covered a system description, sequence of events, root cause/ corrective actions, safety significance, summary and concluding remark A significant number of NRC questions and discussion during the conference were centered around the supervisory error, qualifications of maintenance and supervisory personnel, how the error of assigning an unqualified maintenance worker to the job occurred, and the adequacy of the post maintenance test performe Duke ended the meeting by giving their corrective actions and stating their conclusion Duke reiterated that they had identified - the inaperability, immediately taken corrective actions, communicated the situation promptly. to the NRC, ano issued a courtesy LER before all the facts were fully known. They also stated that they believed the contributing factors to this event were not recurring. That is the surveillance problems resulting from N/A'ing procedural steps, assignment of unqualified personnel to tasks requiring qualifications, and performance of post-maintenance testing by unqualified personnel. Also, with regard to safety significance, Duke felt the safety ramifications of this event were not significan The NRC closed the meeting by stating that it had served to enhance Region II's understanding of the issues and DPC's corrective action _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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I ENCLOSURE 3 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP MEETING On August 15, 1989, representatives from Duke Power Company met with' the NRC in the Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, for a followup meeting to the enforcement conference held on July 20. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss in greater depth subjects which DPC felt would enhance the NRCs understanding of the significance and circumstances surrounding the RVLIS inoperability on Unit Following opening remarks by Administrator, DPC gave two presentations Grines, NRC RII Acting)
(Enclosure S . Deputy The Regional first presentation covered Post Modification Testing (PMT). The PMT presentation includedt a discussion of the Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) process, a description of the System Expert program, and a description of the PMT progsa The 'second presentation covered the safety significance of the RVLIS inoperability, outstanding questions from the enforcement conference, and a summar Duke opened by stating that they had violated the RVLIS Technical Specification (TS) and that RVLIS was important to safety; however, they did not consider it as significant as some other systems in TS. DPC went on to explain how.they reached their conclusions on safety significanc The safety significance discussion was followed by answering outstanding questions from the enforcement conference. This presentation covered a summary of the event and managements expectations, the veiccing of the RVLIS line following reconnection, and supervisor qualifications. Duke ended the meeting by reiterating their conclusions which they had stated at the enforcement conference.
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ENCt.05URE 4 Enforcement Conference Agenda Duke Power' Company Catawba Nuclear Station 10:30 AM, July 20, 1989 Atlanta, Georgia Both Trains of-. Upper Range RVLIS Isolated Introduction T. Owen Station Manager System Description J. M. Stackley Sequence of Events I&E Group Manager Root Cause/ W. R. McCollum Corrective Actions Maintenance Sup .
-Safety Significance H. J. Lee Design Engineering I
Summary T. Owen Station Manager l
l Concluding Remarks H. B. Tucker Vice President Nuclear Production
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CATAWSA NUCIJ.AR STATION ENCLOSURE 1 PROCEDURE $IGN-Of7 SNEE7 Pase 6 of 6
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INITIAL /DATE
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" APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS SHALL BE INDEPENDENTLY CHECKED AETER THE INSTRUMENTS ARE VALVED IN OR OTHERWISE RESTORED TO NORMAL OPERATING CONFIGURATION TO VERIFY THAT THE INSTRUMENTATION AGREES WITH CORRECT PLANT CONDITIONS. THIS WILL VERIFY THAT THE INSTRUMENT / LOOP IS PROPERLY RESTORED."
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RVLIS Upper Range is not needed to. mitigate an Inadequate Core Cooling event (NUREG 0737,. Supplement.1)
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RVLIS Upper Range-does.not meet the " split" criteria of the Technical Specification Improvement Program
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OUKE POWER COMP ANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STAT 1ON RVLiS ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE FOLLOWUP AUGUST 15- 1989 OVERVIEW T. 'B. OWEN SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
- OPERATOR PERSPECTIVE AbD OPTIONS R. N. C'ASLER
- RVLIS DES!GN BASIS & TECH SPEC. PLAftJING H J LEE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS W. R. McCOLLUM
- EVENT SLMAARY Ato MAtuGENOJT EXPECTATIONS
- VENTING RVLIS LibE FOL1.OWING RECortECTION
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l NUREG-0737 ITEM II.F.2 REQUIREMENTS i e LR RVLIS INDICATES STAGNANT BOILOFF WHILE DHR RVLIS INDICATES HIGH VOID FRACTION PUMPED FLOW e BOTH RANGES COVER THE FULL RANGE FROM NORMAL OPERATION J (ZERO VOID FRACTION) TO COMPLETE CORE UNC0VERY e LR RVLIS DOES NOT ERR 0NE0USLY INDICATE ICC BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF AN UNRELATED PHENOMENON, E.G., VOIDING IN THE REACTOR VESSEL UPPER HEAD DURING A NATURAL CIRCULATION DEPRESSURIZATION WITH SUBC00 LED LOOP FLOW
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e BOTH RANGES GIVE ADVANCED WARNING 0F THE APPROACH OF ICC IN THAT V0IDING IS INDICATED ON EACH RANGE WELL BEFORE REACHING A VOID FRACTION INDICATIVE OF C,0RE UNC0VERY
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPLIT CRITERIA e INSTALLED INSTRUMENTATION THAT IS USED TO DETECT, AND INDICATE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, A SIGNIFICANT ABNORMAL DEGRADATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE B0UNDARY OR; e A PROCESS VARIABLE THAT IS AN INITIAL CONDITION OF A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT'(DBA) OR TRANSIENT ANALYSES THAT EITHER ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER OR:
e A STRUCTURE, SYSTEM OR COMPONENT THAT IS PART OF THE PRIMARY SUCCESS PATH AND WHICH FUNCTIONS OR ACTUATES TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT OR TRANSIENT THAT EITHER ASSUMES THE FAILURE OF OR PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE INTEGRITY OF A i . FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER,
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CASE I - VOID EXISTS AND RVLIS INDICATES NO V0ID A. POSSIBLE DELAYED OPERATOR AWARENESS OF VOID B. OPERATORS ARE TRAINED ON HOW PARAMETERS REACT WHEN A VOID EXISTS 1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE ABNORMAL NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS SUBC00 LING-MARGIN DECREASING / ALARM C. LOWER RANGE RVLIS INSTRUMENTS WILL ALERT OPERATOR PRIOR TO CORE UNC0VERY - CSF WILL DIRECT OPERATOR TO PROPER RECOVERY PROCEDURE D. UPPER RANGE RVLIS IS NOT AN INPUT TO THE ICC CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION NOR IS IT USED IN THE INADEQUATE OR DEGRADED CORE COOLING EP's
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F CASE II - VOID DOES NOT EXIST AND RVLIS INDICATES A VOID
, 'POTENTIALLY LEAD TO UNNECESSARY STEPS TO REMOVE THE VOID AFTER A SHORT TIME, THE OPERATOR WOULD REALIZE UPPER RANGE RVLIS INDICATION IS UNRELIABLE
' PRESSURIZER LEVEL RESPONSE UPPER RANGE RVLIS NO RESPONSE SUBC00 LING MARGIN MONITOR RESPONSE NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS RESPONSE COULD DELAY POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION UNTIL OPERATOR DETERMINES A VOID DOES NOT EXIST - NOT A SAFETY J
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EXPECTATION e Post-MAINTENANCE TESTING WILL BE SUFFICIENT IN SCOPE TO VERIFY OPERABILITY OF COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS PRIOR TO RETURN TO SERVICE e PMT WILL BE STRENGTHENED TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC
' CRITERIA FOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES e PMT HAS NOT BEEN A RE-CURRING PROBLEM IN I&E
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION i
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Rick Mack Projects Manager l
Purpose:
Discuss the Nuclear Station Modification l (NSM) process with special emphasis on Post !
Modification Testin ;
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION i'NSM)
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PROCESS Origination Design Planning Implementation I
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION l',NSM)
PROCESS Origination
- problem identified at any level in the station, General Office, or Design Engineering
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- reviewed for need, benefit / cost, alternatives, regulatory commitment
- compared with other problems to determine l greatest benefit l
o approved by Station Manager l l
- NSM request to Design Engineering w/ interface ]
Activities form {
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%3mmm INTERFACE ACTIVITIES REQUEST 1. NSM # Rev.#
2. Scope Meeting Required O Yes O No O Review problem to be resolved (reasons for irMTs'ui).
O Revew options available to resolve problem including similar completed modification O Review nuclear safety aspects of modificatb O Review QA aspects of modificatio O Review design options to reduce personnel exposur O Revew potential operability or maintainability concem O Revewconstructabdityconcem O Post,TMrs'si testing requirement O Other 3. Pre-Design Survey Required O Yes O No Area of Station to be surveyed O Walk down for potential interferences with existing equiprcent (constructability).
O Wak down to optimize equipment locations (operability and maintainability).
O Wak down to confirm as budt configuration O Wak down to optimize ALARA desg O Wak down to mnmize personnel safety phii O Wak down to minimize nuclear security problem O Specal considerations for post-modficaton testin O Other 4. Conceptuel Client /CMD Revew Needed (20% to 40% Desgned) O Yes ONo Reviewis needed of: O Post-irMTG'hi testing equirenents O Operabdity O Design enwy for intender! rnoGificaSon O MainP'~bility O ALARAdesgn O Constructabdity O Safetycoskiere^hs O Other -_
Spec 4c design nwiewis requested of drawing . Detailed Clont/CMD Review Needed (60% to 80% Desgned) O Yes O No i Revewis needed of: O Post,TMTG^& testingrequirements
' O Operabdity O ALARA design O Maintanabilrty O Safety corr.Jderations O Constructability O Other Specific design review is requested of drawing . CMD Contact 7. Completed by: Date:
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM)
PROCESS Design
- Initial scope review
- designers, originator, affected station groups
discuss Post Modification Testing (PMT) expected
- develop draft PMT Plan a detail design performed
- provide instrumentation needed for PMT
- for design basis change or when documetita-tion of dealgn basis is unclear, specify !
S test o')}setives
- test acceptanca criteria {
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- Final Scope Document j
- PMTAC summary l
- functional description of mo I
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PMT PLAN l
l l O DRAFT PMT Plan O FINAL PMT Plan Rev * Paos of I1 l NSM #/ Exempt Change #
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Part #
Unit #
I2 BRIEF NSM DESCRIPTION l
l I3 NSTALLATON TESTS Type of Test Documentation Performed by
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM)
PROCESS Planning
- Planning Meeting
- discuss system / plant impact during instsilation, Isola-tion requirements (e.g. %' train vs. 'B' train, etc.) and PMT requirement with all affected station groups
- finalize PMT Plan
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write implementation procedure (TN)
- controlling procedure
- all parts of mod included
- !solations and effect on plant l
- PMT & responsibility for performing
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PMT Summary Letter discussing thought process and conclu.slons reached on determin-ing appropriate Post Mod Testing
review and approve TN
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l CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM) 4 PROCESS
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Implementation
- follow TN
- perform PMT as directed
- review documentation of PMT results prior to return to service l
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s CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATION (NSM,'l !
PROCESS Summary a definite, structured process during Design and planning stages to identify PMT
- appropriate station and Design Engineering groups are involved in determining PMT
- controlled process for performing PMT and determining that results are satisfactor l
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION SYSTEM EXPERT DEFINrnON A System Expert is "an individual with an engineering degree or a strong demonstrable technical background who is
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assigned the responsibility of maintaining expertise in a designated plant system (s)
and/or area (s).
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION :
SYSTEM EXPERT PURPOSE The purpose of the System Expert Program is to maximize the performance, avaliability, I and reliability of station systems and the station as a whol l l
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System Expert Qualifications '
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Four year engineering or physical science degree or a strong l demonstrable technical background At least one year nuclear power plant experience Exemplary knowledge of systems assigned Training
- Systems
- Components
- Technical Specifications
- Design Basis
- Operational Understanding
- Codes l
- Case Studies
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4 ' i Catawba Nuclear Station i System Expert Program Systems i
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Steam Generator Browdown Recycle System Ice Condenser Refdgeration System Auxiliary Feedwater System Safety injection System Main Condenser Containment Spray System Feedwater dystem Chemical & Volume Control System Condensate Syrtem Containment Penetration Valve Inj Water System Trace Heating System Condenser Circu! sting Water System Loose Parts Monitoring (Unit) Fire Protection System
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Radiation Monitoring (Unit) Conventional Low Press Service Water System incore Instrumentation Nuclear Service Water System Out of-Core Instrumentation Exterior Fire Protection System Diesel Load Sequencing System Main Steam Supply to Auxiliary Equipment Diese! ControlSystem Main Steam Bypass to Condenser Refueling Water System Main Steam Heater Drain System Main Steam Vent to Atmosphere Containment Personnel Air Lock System Auxiliary Ventilation System Containment leak Testing System Control Room Area HVAC System Operator Aid Computer System Annulus Ventilation System Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Fuel PoolVentilation System Transient Monitoring System Instrument AirSystem IWP/IVN Containment Purge Component Cooling System Containment Air Return & Hydrogen Skimmer System Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System Reactor Generator Stator Cooling Water System Fuel Recirculated Cooling Water System Special Nuclear Materials Reactor Coolant System Appendix J Residual Heat Removal System
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i Catawba Nuclear Station System Expert l Responsibilities
- Detail System Understanding -
- Scheduling
- System Walkdown
- System Monitoring
- Reliability Review
- Operating Experience Program
- ALARA .
- Problem Resolver
- Information Review
- Modification Review L_____________-------_--____-----__--__------------_--- - - - - . - - - .- - - - - _ - - - - -
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Catawba Nuclear Station System Expert Program Development
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August Work Plan September Modifications October Design Basis, Technical Documentation December Information Review
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Catawba Nuclear Station Idystem Expert Skills in Perspective '
Systerns Understanding . 66%
Component Understanding 33 %
Tech Spec Understanding 90%
Code Understanding 85 %
Design Basis Understanding 50 %
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Catawba Nuclear Station NSM Program System ExpertInvolvement SPR SE counsels superintendent NSM approval l
Scope meeting PMT Plan 30 days after scope document Planning meeting Commitment meeting l PMT summary letter TN approval l
Retest Activities I
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July 12,1989 -
INTRASTATION LETTER CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION TO: T. B. Owen SUBJECT: Catawba Nuclear St:. tion
. NSM CN-11045, Rev. 0 & NSM CN-20432, Rev. O Keywords: NSM Retest I
The above referenced NSM's will modify the VP System controls such that all isolation val-ves can be electrically sealed closed during Modes 1 through 4 without the use of a TSM to remove power. The modification also provides for a time delay bypass of the high relative humidity isolation and trip function during startup of the VP Syste The functional that will be conducted as part ofimplementation procedures TNIA10450001A & 02A, and TN2A04320001A & 02A fully demonstrate the adequacy of the NSM to meet its intended purpose. The ability of the time delay relay to allow start of VP with a simulated high humidity for the required time intervalis tested along with the ability to start without a high humidity. In addition the new " BLOCK /CLOSE" function is verified to isolate all VP valves when placed in the required position. As an added as-surance that the required safety function of the affected circuits is not adversely altered, al-though the functional does test all such circuits, Performance will conduct IrTI(2)A420041C upon completion of the modi 5 cation prior to return to service. This is re-quired by the applicable TN Therefore, the proposed NSM implementation plan including functional and retests as out-lined above fully challenge the modification to function in both normal and design basis condition C
.X Z. Ldaylor Test Engineer For Approval:
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\ .F.Bea f
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f Perfromance Manager j
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Program Introduction Post Modification Testing Philosophy l
Case Studies Summary
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy
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Historical Perspective i
Post Modification Testing Standard Testing Limitation Considerations Summary of Changes in Philosophy
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy i
Historical Perspective
- Performed Code Required Retests,IWP/IWV
- Performed Post Modification Testing on Modifica- ;
tions which changed a Design Basis or created a new ;
Design Basis j
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- Assumed thatInstallationVerifications sufficient for ensuring Design Basis not affected by Modification
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Example - VX Modification I
- An HED modification which relocated test circuit controls from the Control Room to a panel in the Auxiliary Buildin I
- No Chapter 15 Design Basis were affected by this modificatio * Assumed. that installation verifications ensured I proper wirin j l
- A Post Mod Test was performed however to ensure i that the test switches still worked NOT to verify t design basis were intac ,
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy
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Testi.ng to Ensure Design Basis Intact
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- Design Basis - Definition
- Individual System Design Basis as specified in FSAR
- Scope of Post Modification Testing
- Fully challenge design basis in accident mode l configuration
- System Expert Responsibilities '
Example - VX Modification
- This philosophy would require the performance of the Auxiliary Safeguards Test to ensure that the Chapter 15 Design Basis was not affected by this wor j l
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Tasting Philosophy Testing to Ensure Design Intent Met and Functionally Operable
- Design. Intent - Definition
- Those design requirements over and beyond FSAR Chapter 15 requirements
- Scope
- Each modification is to have its design intent fully challenged to ensure that the modifica-tion performs as intended by design and that the modification was properly installed
- System Expert Responsibilities
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Examples
- ForVX Modification the performance of the VX peri-odic test would now be require * Proper CheckValve Operation
- InterlockVerification
- FlowTests
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Catawba Nuclear Station
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Post Modification Testing Philosophy Testing Limitation Consid.erations
- Risk to Station Equipment
- Impact to Station Operation
- Cost of Performing Test Deviation Documentation
- Any deviation from performing the most conservative testing to verify Design Basis or design intent is to be documented in the Post Modification Testing Sum-mary Letter to Station Man'agement
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.8 Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Philosophy Summary of Significant Changes
- Focused Responsibility - System Expert is now responsible for approval of Post Modification Test-ing Program for each modification
- FSAR Chapter 15 Design Basis will be verified intact after modification if work performed could have af-fected them
- No Credit taken for Installation Verifications
- All modifications will be verified to have met design intent and that the system is functionally operable after the modification l
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Catawba Nuclear Station l Case Study 1 S/G PORV Modification Reason for Modification )
Description of Modification i S/G PORV Design Basis
- Main Steam Isolation Signal l
- Manual Open for S/G Tube Rupture Event Post Modification Testing ;
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- RVV- No Differential l l
- Manual Open - Normal DP, Operator DP Adjusted Summary i i
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i Catawba Nuclear Station Case Study 1 l S/G PORV Modification
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Case Study 1 S/G PORV Modification
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Catawba Nuclear Station 1 l Case Study 2 Nuclear Service Water Pond Swap Logic
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Reason for Modification Description of Modification .
Swap Logic Design Basi l Post Modification Testing
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Summary
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Catawba Nuclear Station ,
Case Study 3 l 2NS 12B Cable Ground Reason for Modification i Description of Modification I
2NS 12B Design Basis Post Modification Testing Summary
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- Critical Path Test
- Design Basis Verified not Affected ,
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Program Summary
- Intent of Post Modification Testing Program
- Verify any affected Design Basis is Intact after Modification work is complete
- Verify each modification functions as in-tended by design and the system is functional-Iy operable after modification is complete
- Ensure Station Management is aware of any Post Modification Test which does not fully challenge the design basis or intent of the modificatio * System ExpertInvolvement
- The System Expert is responsible for the Post Modification Testing of his assigned systems
- Station Commitment
- Station Resources
- Critical Path Schedule Time i
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Summary I
l NSM Process Structured
- Specific Stages for Post Modification Testing Deter-mination
- Involvement from Station and Design Engineering Personnel
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Responsibility
- Defined Responsibility - System Expert
- Logical Placement of Responsibility
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post M' modification Testing Summary Current Philosophy
- Test to ensure FSAR Chapter 15 Design Basis Intact
- No Credit for installation verifications toward final operability ,
- Test to ensure modification meets design intent and that the system is operationally functional (Beyond Chapter 15 requirements) {
Previous Philosophy
- Tests to ensure Design Basis intact were required to ,
be conducted only if Design B' asis changed
- Took credit for installation verifications toward sys- l tem operability
- Testing Criteria to ensure system operationally func-tional was not clearly defined beyond code testing l
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Catawba Nuclear Station Post Modification Testing Agenda August 15,1989 Opening Comments Tony Owen NSM Process Rick Mack System Expert Presentation Bill Beaver PMT Philosophy / Case Studies Jim Kammer Summary JeffForbes
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