IR 05000413/1989006
| ML20248E174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1989 |
| From: | Belisle G, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248E166 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-89-06, 50-414-89-06, NUDOCS 8904120149 | |
| Download: ML20248E174 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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REGloN 11 '
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W[
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t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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-. Report Nos.:
50-413/89-06 and 50-414/89-06 Licensee:
Duke Power Company
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'422 South Church. Street Charlotte', NC 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.:
NPF-35'and NPF-52 Facility Name:
Catawba 1 and 2-Inspection Conducted:
February 28 - March 3,1989
~ Inspector:
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J. J. Lenah/no'
-Date Signed
= 3[11M Approved by:
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C G. A. Belisle, Chie'f~ '
Date/ Sighed Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY
' Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was.in the areas of the snubber surveillance program, main steam and pressurizer-relief valve testing,. surveillance of the standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP) dam and ' controlling procedures for reactor cavity seal installation activities.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The. licensee's program for testing relief valves and inspecting the NSW dam comply with NRC requirements.
However, a. weakness was j
identified in the licensee's handling of a request to amend snubber -
i Technical Specifications (TS) in that they did not follow established procedures to obtain approvals for changes prior to incorporating l
changes into their. program - Paragraph 7.
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8904120149E890329
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PDR -ADOCK 05000413
g PDC
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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- W. Anfin, Mechanical Maintenance Support Engineer l
- C. Cauthen, Snubber Engineer
- T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent J. Gilreath, Mechanical Engineer
- V. King, Technical Specialist, Compliance
. J. Lynch, Associate Engineer, Mechanical Maintenance S.-Mays, Associate Engineer, Mechanical Maintenance Other_ licensee employees contacted during.this inspection included two engineers, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- W. T. Orders
- Attended exit interview 2.
Snubber Surveillance Program, Units 1 and 2 (70370)
The inspector examined procedures and quality records related to the snubber -surveillance program.
Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector are specified in TS 3/4.7.8.
a.
Review of Snubber Surveillance Frocedures The inspector examined the following procedures which control snubber surveillance activities:
(1) MP/0/A/7650/85, Visual Inspection of Snubbers and Corrective Maintenance (2) MP/0/A/7650/86, Functional Testing of Mechanical Snubbers (3) MP/0/A/7650/9, Post Transient Piping and Hanger Inspection (4) MP/0/B/7650/113, Set-up and Daily Calibration of Testor II (5) MP/0/A/7650/114, Testing for Larger Bore Hydraulic Snubbers with Testor II l
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Review of Quality Records The inspector - reviewed quality. records documenting surveillance inspections ~ performed on Unit 1 ~ and 2 '. mechanical snubbers.
The following records were examined:
(1). Visual inspection results performed on' Un'it 2 inaccessible snubbers-in February 1988.
(2) Functional testing results performed on Unit 1 snubbers in December 1988.
The inspector verified that functional tests -
were performed on snubbers installed in locations where snubbers
'had previously failed (i.e. tests performed in November' -
December 1987 during End of Cycle 2 refueling outage).
'(3)' Functional testing results performed on Unit 2 snubbers. in January - February 1988.
In the initial sample of 37 Unit 2 snubbers, three PSA size 1/2 snubbers failed the functional test.
The licensee selected an additional sample for 54 snubbers for testing per the requirements-of TS 4.7.8.e.2 and TS figure 4.7-1.
An additional four PSA size 1/2 snubbers in the new sample failed the functional test. The licensee then concluded that.the model PSA size 1/2 functional test failures were the result of a generic problem associated with-the PSA size 1/2'
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snubbers.and performed functional tests on all Unit 2 PSA size 1/2 snubbers. Approximately 36 of the Unit 2 PSA size 1/2 snubbers failed the functional test.
This was similar to the problem identified while testing the Unit 1 ' snubbers during November - December 1987, when 75 of the approximately 600 Unit 1 PSA size 1/2 snubbers failed the functional test. The snubbers, which failed functional testing, were replaced. with new snubbers.
The snubber functional test failures were documented on Problem Investigation Reports 1-C88-0120 and 2-C88-0336.
Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
3.
Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Dam (61701)
The inspector performed a visual inspection of the SNSWP dam and examined reports documenting SNSWP dam inspections performed by the licensee's
design engineers. Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector appear in
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TS 3/4.7.5, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 1.8,. and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.127. During inspection of the dam, the inspector verified that abnormal degradation or erosion of the structure had not occurred, and noted that there was no evidence of seepage through the
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embankment. The inspector also noted that riprap slope protection was in
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good condition, and that small amount of vegetation growing on the slopes i
was being controlled using herbicide.
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The inspector-examined procedure PT/0/A/4400/04, Standby Nuclear Service l
Water Pond Dam -Periodic Inspection. This procedure _ specifies the' annual
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SNSWP dam-inspection required by TS 3/4.7.5.C, and contains requirements for-reading the groundwater elevation by-measuring. the level -in
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piezameters every three months..The inspector examined the comp 1eted procedureLdocumenting the annual inspections completed during the periods from June 1984 through April 1988.
The inspector also examined the groundwater-(piezometer) data recorded in 1986 and 1987.
The completed procedure was supplemented by a detailed inspection report prepared by the
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licensee's' Civil Design Engineering group in accordance with RG l'.127.
The inspector examined these reports and noted that only a few minor deficiencies had been observed during the inspections.
The deficiencies were corrected during routine. maintenance operations. Abnormal conditions were not observed during the groundwater data review.
Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
4.
Surveillance of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves Units 1 and 2 (61701)
-The inspector. examined surveillance test results performed on the pressurizer safety relief valves.
Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector was in TS 3/4.4.2 and 4.0.5.
Testing of the pressurizer code safety relief valve was performed at the' Wyle Laboratories, Huntsville,
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I Alabama, test facility. The test results were documented in the following Wyle Test Reports:
a.
Report dated October 1, 1986, results of tests performed on valve numbers BS-02865, 02866, and 02867 at end of Unit 1 Cycle 1.
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Report dated November 23, 1987, results of test performed on valve '
i numbers BS-02868 and BS-02872 at end of Unit 1 Cycle 2 (3).
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Report dated February 22, 1988, results of tests performed on valve number B502866 and BS02869 at end of Unit 2 Cycle 1.
Test results indicated that all valves were operable with a lift setting of 2485 psig 1 percent with the exception of tests performed on valve number BS-02866 in 1986 and 1988. The initial test performed on this relief valve in 1986 indicated a setpoint of 2532 psig.
A test anomaly report was written by Wyle to document this problem.
However, the average of ten test runs performed on this valve following the initial 1986 test resulted in an average setpoint of approximately 2500 psig, which is within the acceptance range.
This valve was maintained as a spare during Unit 1 Cycle 2 and Unit 2 Cycle 1 and was reinstalled in Unit I for the start of the third cycle. However, due to a seat leak it was removed and retested in February 1988. The setpoint value was 2540 psig. This valve was refurbished and adjusted to a 2488 psig setpoint valve.
I Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
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5.
Testing of Main Steam Code Safety Valves, Units 1 and 2 (61701)
The inspector examined the test procedure and surveillance results for tests performed on the main steam code safety relief valves. Acceptance
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criteria utilized by the inspector was in TS 3/4.7.1 and 4.0.5.
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inspector examined procedure MP/0/A/7150/72, Main Steam Safety Valve l
Setpoint Test.
The procedure covers testing requirements, including
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prerequisites, detailed test instructions, special test equipment, test i
acceptance criteria, and test data sheets.
The inspector examined test results for tests conducted on Unit 1 main steam relief valves at the end of Cycle 1, November 1986, at the end of Cycle 2, October 1987, at end at Cycle 3, November 1988, and for Unit 2 valves tested at the end of I
Cycle 1, February 1988. Several valves were found during the testing with setpoints slightly outside of the range specified in TS Table 3.7-2.
These valves were adjusted and retested to verify compliance with the TS setpoints. All 20 valves were tested or Unit 1 in 1986 and 1988 and on Unit 2 in.1988 due to the minor setpoint discrepancies.
I Within the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.
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6.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
a.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 414/87-16-01:
Complete Test Procedures TP/2/A/2650/06 and TP/2/A/2100/01 by May 31, 1987. Photo copies of the completed test procedures were reviewed in the Region II office.
The missing initials, dates, and signoffs identified in the inspection were in place.
b.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 413/88-04-01:
Requirements for Functional l
Testing of Snubbers.
The inspector discussed the licensee's TS interpretation with appropriate engineers and plant management.
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inspector informed the licensee that there is no clear guidance
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pertaining to the licensee's method of failure analysis and grouping of snubber functional test failures.
Although the licensee had discussed their interpretation with the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on November 10, 1987, and submitted a TS amendment request on April 15, 1988, which incorporates the licensee's interpretation i
into the snubber TS (In a letter, dated September 26, 1988, NRR l
informed the licensee that this TS amendment change is still under i
review),
the inspector informed the licensee that this TS interpretation cannot be used to amend the current TS requirements t
until the TS is formerly amended. This item will remain open pending
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further review by NRC, Region II, and acceptance of the licensee's TS
amendment by NRR.
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Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 3,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
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Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not-received from the licensee,
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The inspector discussed the
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TS 4.7.8 and the fact that it conflicted, in part, with the current TS.
The licensee stated that they would obtain formal acceptance of this TS interpretation from the NRC Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation prior to using the snubber failure mode grouping contained in by the interpretation.
The current TS does not recognize failure mode grouping.
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