ML20211M445

Forwards Summary of Util Conclusions Re Outstanding Compliance Issue Re Staff Interpretation of TS SR 3.0.1,per Insp Repts 50-369/99-03 & 50-370/99-03,as Discussed with NRC During 990618 Meeting

ML20211M445
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire
Issue date:	08/30/1999
From:	Barron G DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Berkow H NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
50-369-99-03, 50-370-99-03, TAC-MA2467, TAC-MA2468, NUDOCS 9909090116
Download: ML20211M445 (20)

Text

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.pS Duke Energy Corporation j '

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McGuire Nuclear Station

' 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-9340

"' (704) 875-4800 omCE

[ (704) 873-4809 FAX L

' August 30,1999 Herbert N. Berkow Director, Directorate II --

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Response to TIA 98008 "Three-Minute-Rule" for Operability of Control Room Ventilation TIA 98008 (TAC No. MA2467 and MA2468)

I l RE: McGuire Nuclear Station Catawba Nuclear Station  !

Docket Numbers 50-369,50-370 Docket Numbers 50-413,50-414 J

Inspection Report 50-369,370 /99-03 dated June 2,1999 contained a copy of a response letter from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (ONRR) regarding TIA 98008. The Technical Interface Agreement (TIA) was a response to a question Region II Inspectors raised regarding the use of compensatory actions used at McGuire to maintain the control room ventilation system operable. This compensatory action has been referred to as the "three-minute-mle". The NRC also identified this issue as being applicable to Catawba Nuclear Station in Inspection Report 50-413,414/99-03 dated July 1,1999.

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I Duke Energy (Duke) met with NRC Staff to discuss this issue on June 18, 1999. The j meeting was useful to Duke and resulted in our further understanding of the NRC Staff position. As a result of the meeting, the only outstanding issue affecting compliance ,

involves a Staff. interpretation of Technical Specification SR 3.0.1. Duke has reviewed this matter further, taking into consideration the TIA and the June 18, 1999 meeting.

'D0( l The attached licensing position summarizes Duke's conclusions regarding this '

9909090116 990830 PDR ADOCK 05000369 G PDR 1

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- outstanding compliance issue. Other;significant issues regarding compliance were covered in the presentation material during the meeting.

Duke respectfully disagrees with the NRC' Staff s interpretation of S.R 3.0.1 and believes

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the position stated iri the meeting constitutes a new or different regulatory interpretation.

However, . Duke _ recognizes that ONRR Staff and the industry are working to develop-new tech,nical specifications to deal with the' consequences' of this interpretation on ventilation systems.' . Duke plans to revise affected ventilation Technical Specifications

~ to adopt these standards for McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations. ~However, this can not be accomplished until the standard is implemented in NUREG 1431. .

. Revision of the'affected Technical Specifications should not be considered agreement with < the asserted past non-compliance or the underlying policy question regarding, L manual actions'to meet operability requirements as interpreted by the Staff. As such, Duke believes it would be appropriate to renew implementation of the "three minute rule" for control . room. ventilation system operability prior to revision of the Technical Specifications,' Duke will contact NRC Staff prior to resuming use of the "three minute rule" at McGuire or Catawba Nuclear Station.

There was agreemen't during the June'18,1999 meeting that this was a compliance issue without safety significance. In addition, as noted above, compliance with SR 3.0.1 was the only unresolved question from that meeting. Adoption of an alternative interpretation of SR 3.0.1 will avoid processing numerous license amendments. This may also avoid processing enforcement discretion requests associated with manual compensatory actions.

Please contact Bryan Dolan (704 875 4225, bidolaneduke-enerev.com) or Mike Cash (704 875 4117, mtcash@ duke-enerev.com) for questions regarding this issue.

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H.B. Barron Site Vice President

. McGuire Nuclear Station

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'6-CC w/o Enclosure L. Plisco Region II L. Reyes Region II C. Casto _ Region II J. Zwolinski, NRR CC w/ enclosure S. Shaffer, Senior Resident Inspector McGuire F. Rinaldi, NRR Project Manager

- C Ogle, Branch Chief Region II '

W. Beckner, Director Technical Specification D. Matthews, Director NRR NRC Document Control Desk CC Duke w/o Enclosure

- Geddie l

Peele Tuckman Barron CC Duke w/ Enclosure -

B Dolan M Cash -

J Fisicaro l J Thomas G Gilbert L Nicholson L Vaughn  !

ELL Master File K Cmne

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Background

Inspection Report 50-369,370 /99-03 contained a copy of a response letter from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation regarding TIA 98008. The Technical Interface Agreement (TIA) was a response to a question Region II Inspectors raised regarding the use of compensatory actions at McGuire Nuclear Station to maintain control room ventilation systems operable. In particular, the TIA questions the use of what has been referred to as the "three-minute-rule". The TIA questions are restated here:

"1. Does the licensee need to evaluate the impact of the manual compensatory measures on the original degraded condition in its 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation?

In other words, does the licensee need to evaluate the likelihood of a new failure mechanism because the penetration seal will be manually refilled in the first three minutes of an event? l i

2. Is it permissible to use the three-minute-rule for planned breaches of the control room ventilation system or is a Technical Specifications change l needed?" l McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations' control rooms share the same physical room for Unit I and Unit 2 and as such have a common control room ventilation system (VC system). The VC system actuates automatically in response to a safety injection signal and transfers to outside air pressurization mode. In this ' mode, the system provides outside air through filter trains, creating a positive pressure in the control room. This positive pressure ensures that " contaminated air" will not be transported from the auxiliary building into the control room environment. This " pressurization" function limits post accident dose to the control room operators.

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. The design basis of the control l room ventilation system allows for a "three minute" 'l L

• period of time.where no credit is taken for control room pressurization. The dose j u

. calculations assume no pressurization exists for the first three minutes following the u ,

relevant design bases accident.

l In a June 18,1999 meeting between Duke and the NRC, a single point of potential non-compliance was identified by ONRR_ Staff. The specific' issue centered on the l interpretation' of SR 3.0.1.' . The specifics of that interpretation are discussed below as it affects the TIA. ' However, an introductory discussion on the operability determination process and application is appropriate prior to reviewing that issue.

' Duke Process for Determination of Operability i

The Duke directive for evaluating operability is Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203

' " Operability". The directive was modeled after the operability attachment to Generic

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_ Letter 91 18, Revision 1. Duke's policy regarding operability can be summarized in part, by the following description. Duke's position is that these principles are consistent with regulatory guidance used to develop the Duke policies. Additionally, Duke follows this guidance in maintaining operability of the control room ventilation system when the "three minute rule" is in use. l J

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Duke Energy's longstanding operability policy establishes some basic principles that are relevant to concerns raised in the TIA. Consistent with NRC guidelines, Duke allows for l

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SSCs to, be considered operable even if they have some loss in function or quality.

However, ' for SSCs to remain operable, a " temporary change" may be necessary for the SSC'to be capable of functioning as required to meet the design bases of the SSC.

Duke's ' process requires that this " temporary change" be evaluated under the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59 to determine.whether an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) would be

. introduced by the change. If the change would introduce a USQ, prior NRC approval 9 would be required before such a temporary change could be made to the facility. Duke's

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. policy will allow such a change to be a compensatory action. 'NSD 203 provides specific criteria for evaluating the adequacy of compensatory measures.

l Consistent with NRC guidelines, Duke's process requires.the state of operability of SSC's to be " determinate" at all times. It is required that operability be considered when 4

SSCs are in'some temporary condition. This is a requirement regardless of the origin of

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'the temporary condition. That is, operability evaluations maylbe necessary for-

" temporary conditions'.' arising from discovered conditions or from planned activities. As such, evaluating operability of SSCs is required when considering activities such as

. plant maintenance, testing or modifications.' Such evaluations may determine that the SSC is operable, but require that specific compensatory actions would be necessary.

1This operability policy does not distinguish between " temporary. conditions" that are

' discovered and " temporary conditions" existing during planned activities. What is

' relevant is that the_ equipment meets the criteria for operability as described above.

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Regulatory Guidance for Operability As established in Generic Letter 91-18 (or Inspection Manual Part 9900), demonstration of operability is a continuous process and the licensee has the obligation to demonstrate operability. Operability of certain important systems is demonstrated at a set frequency by the performance of certain surveillances. This process is embodied'in a facility's technical . specifications, and the failure to meet a surveillance requirement is a

" regulatory definition" that a structure, system or component (SSC) is inoperable. It is widely recognized that tM is only a minimal requirement for demonstrating operability at some specified frequency, for example, a monthly surveillance. A question may also arise regarding- operability of an SSC between . the performance of the routine surveillances. An operability question may be associated with a discovered condition (e.g. equipment degradation) or.a planned activity (e.g. new testing arrangement).

Many licensees and the NRC refer to the guidance of Generic Letter 91-18 for evaluating operability in " temporary conditions". The Generic Letter attached two sections of the Inspection - Manual, " Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions" and

" Operable / Operability". Discussions related to operability could simply refer the NRC Inspection Manual " Operable / Operability" as an appropriate regulatory reference, although Generic Letter 91-18 is often cited as the authority.

The discussion-of Operability in Generic Letter 91-18 is widely used to evaluate conditions affecting operability. Licensees also refer to the Generic Letter to address corrective actions for a non-conforming or degraded conditions. Temporary conditions 4

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where operability _may be a concern may arise due to planned maintenance, testing or t

l ' modifications. Licensees have an obligation to evaluate the operability consequences y

created by those activities as well as when discovered degraded or non-conforming conditions raise operability concems.

The following passages from the NRC Inspection Manual on Operable / Operability are.

relevant:

3.1 Operability Definition

.The' Standard Technical Specifications (STS) define operable or operability' as follows: "A system, subsystem.. train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified functions, and when all .necessary' attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, t cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function (s) are l'

also capable of performing their related support function (s)."

and going funher

4.0 BACKGROUND

(Emphasis Added)

The process of ensurine overability is continuous and consists of the verification of operability by surveillances and formal determinations of overability whenever a verification or other indication calls into question the system's or component's ability to perform its specified function."

and going further (emphasis added) l , "Without any information 'to the contrary, once a component or system is established as operable, it is reasonable to assume that the component or system should continue to remairi operable, and the previously stated verifications should provide that assurance. However whenever the ability of a system or structure to vedorm its soecified function is called into auestion. overability' must be-

' determined from a detailed examination of the deficiency. " i and going further (emphasis added) 5 g

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i "The TS establish operability requirements on systems required for safe operation "and include surveillance requirements to demonstrate periodically that these systems are operable. Performance of the surveillance reauirement is usually considered to be stdficient to demonstrate operability provided that there is reasonable assurance that the system continues to conform to all anvropriate criteria in the current licensine basis (CLB). Whenever confctmance to the appropriate criteria iii the CLB is called into question, performance of the surveillance requirement alone is usually not sufficient to determin~e ' operability.

When operability verification or other processes indicate a potential deficiency or loss of quality, licensees should make a prompt deterndnation of operability and act on the results of that determination. "

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Accepted Methods of Demonstrating Operability i 1

Operability of cenain important systems is demonstrated at a set frequency by the I performance of cenain surveillances. This process is embodied in facilities' technical specifications. The failure to meet a surveillance requirement is'a " regulatory mandated" definition that an (SSC)is inoperable, even if there is reasonable assurance the SSC can l 1

perform the design bases functions . It is widely recognized that this is only a minimal requirement for demonstrating operability at some specified frequency, for example, a monthly surveillance. For temporary conditions where an SSC may be " degraded or non-conforming", a licensee must evaluate operability of the SSC. If a licensee can not reasonably conclude the SSC is operable, then the licensee must assume the SSC is inoperable and take the required actions required by technical specifications.

The NRC Inspection Manual (and NSD 203) are clear that many techniques may be used in evaluating the operability of the SSC. These techniques include but are not limited 6

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to, engineering judgment, engineering calculations,' operating experience or experiments.

L The Inspection ' Manual does not require that the licensee perform a i.

surveillance to demonstrate operability for evaluating " temporary conditions" between i

required surveillance periods. To mandate this approach would impose regulatory . 'I i

burden beyond the regulatory requirements of the facility operating license. However, if

. the licensee elects to perform the. surveillance to demonstrate operability and fails to

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satisfy the surveillance, the SSC must be considered inoperable.

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This principle. is stated in the Applicability section of Technical Specifications, specifically Specification SR 3.0.1. As noted 'above, interpretation of this specification i

is the central compliance issue regarding the "three minute rule". SR 3.0.1 states: )

i "SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the

Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR. Failure to meet a. Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the perfornunce of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO.except as provided in SR ~

3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or

. variables outside specified limits."

Interpretation of SR 3.0.1 i

.NRC ONRR Staff has asserted that this Technical Specification is interpreted to mean,

. paraphrasing as Duke understands the position: "if a Licensee could' not meet a surveillance in a temporary condition, ignoring *any manual compensatory actions, then 1 the SSC is inoperable." This interpretation appears to focus on the following phrase from SR 3.0.1, " whether'such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the j l

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E 1 LCO." . Duke however, can not f'md any Regulatory Guidance regarding Operability or Manual Compensatory measures documenting this interpretation. Duke also believes the plain meaning of the language in the Technical Specification offers a simpler and more

logical interpretation.

The : specification states in part,' "whether 'such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO." This phrase is in the context of a failure to meet a

" surveillance requirement". ' " Surveillance requirements" include (1) method of testing, (2) acceptance criteria and (3) frequency of testing. The specification goes on to state that failure to meet one of these requirements is a violation of the LCO. The most relevant requirement with respect to the "three minute rule" is the ability to meet the

" acceptance criteria of control room pressurization." Focusing on acceptance criteria, the phrase of interest in SR 3.0.1 could be restated as, "a failure to meet an acceptance criteria ~ of a surveillance test is a failure to meet the LCO regardless of when the measurement is taken." This is designed to cover a situation where a " surveillance test" l

is~ failed' irrespective of when the test was performed. However this does not mandate l

when a " surveillance test" is necessary beyond the prescribed surveillance frequency.  !

.~ An evaluation of surveillance " acceptance criteria" can only be performed when there is aniactual measurement or observation as appropriate. Meeting this requirement i g _ presumes that an actual surveillance measurement or observation was taken for 1 comparison to the acceptance criteria. The Staff asserted interpretation would imply that 8

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. SR. 3.0.1 means in.the relevant part, . " failed to meet or would have failed to meet j Surveillance Requirements." This is 'not consistent with the plain meaning of the language. Duke offers the following interpretation of SR 3.0.1, and respectfully submits that this is more consistent with the associated regulatory guidance and the plain meaning of the words in'the specification:

A failure .to meet an LCO exists, . if a surveillance test is conducted and acceptance: criteria are not _ met regardless of. when the measurement 'or observation was made by the licensee.

This is consistent with the apparent rationale for the requirement and the surrounding regulatory guidance.- The apparent rationale of the requirement is exploitation of the .

surveillance testing frequency stated in Technical Specifications. For example, consider.

, a case where a licensee fails to meet acceptance criteria of a Technical Specification Surveillance test. ~ But suppose the observation or measurement was obtained one day.

before the duc date of the next required surveillance. Absent SR 3.0.1, some licensees -

I could argue from a literal compliance perspective (although not prudently) that the  !

surveillance was not due yet. Therefore, the licensee could assert that this was an "information only test" and was not a Surveillance test. The licensee might further argue

. that, since the observation or measurement was not a Surveillance. there was no failure to satisfy a Surveillance requirement. Completing the argument, the licensee would assett

- that there was no failure to meet the LCO. SR 3.0.1 interpreted by Duke as described

- above, would prohibit this practice.

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Duke believes it goes beyond the language or intent of the Specification to adopt the Staff 1 (position. Further the Staff position requires the licensee to assume that a Surveillance was performed, while ignonng any existing manual actions, and postulatine what the 1

measured parameter would be m companson to the acceptance criteria. - While it is true L that licensees have an obligation to evaluate operability in this temporary condition, the methods available .- to demonstrate operability ' are flexible and include manual compensatory actions when appropriate.. ' These methods of evaluation are described in the relevant regulatory guidance, primarily the Inspection-Manual and Information Notice 97-78 (See Below).

~ As such, the Staff interpretation either conflicts with or is a new position regarding the existing regulatory guidance for operability and manual actions. In addition, the interpretation appears to be a new interpretation of SR 3.0.1. In this regard, some relevant information from the relevant Regulatory Guidance is illuminating:

Inspection Manual Part 9900 OPERABLE / OPERABILITY (emphasis added)

Determinine system. structure. or component (SSC) overability is a continuous process that cannot be avoided, and going further, performance requirements to be met for determining operability. The operability decision may be based on analysis, a test or partial test.

experience with overatine events. en2ineering iud 2 ment. or a combination of these factors takin2 into consideration eauipment functional l

reauirements. An initial determination regarding operability should be

- revised, as appropriate, as new'or additional information becomes available."

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1 The stated methods for ' determining that an SSC is operable may be based on " test or L

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panial test, experience with operating events, engineering judgement, or a combination i

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of these factors taking into consideration functional requirements". This does not state L . that a hypothesized surveillance test is a method or the only method of demonstrating 7

L operability.

The Inspection Manual provides significant detail regarding the use of manual actions for maintaining the operability of equipment. The Inspection Manual includes specific l

l criteria for evaluating the adequacy of such manual actions (emphasis added):

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" Automatic action is frequently provided as a design feature specific to each safety system to ensure that the specified. functions of the system will be accomplished. Limiting safety system settings for nuclear reactors are defined in 10 CFR Pan 50.36, " Technical Specifications," as settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions.

Where a limiting safety system setting is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be so chosen that automatic protective action will correct the abnomial situation before a safety limit is

' exceeded. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to take credit for manual action in place of automatic action for protection of safety limits to consider equipment j operable.

1 L For any other situation in.which substitution of manual' action for automatic action may be acceptable, the licensee's determination of operability with regard to the use of manual action must focus on the physical differences between I automatic and manual action and the ability of the manual action to accomplish the specified function. The ohysical differences to be considered include. but are not limited to. the ability to recognize input signals for action ready access to or l

recognition of setooints, desien nuances that may complicate subscauent manual operation such as auto-reset. repositionine on temperature or pressure. timine l

reauired for automatic action. etc.. minimum mannme reauirements. and .

emergency operation orocedures written for the automatic mode of operation.

The licensee should have written orocedures in olace and trainine accomolished l

'on those orocedures before substitution of any manual action for the loss of an automatic action. The assignment of a . dedicated operator for manual action is

not acceptable without written procedures and a full consideration of all L pertinent differences. The consideration of manual action in remote areas also must include the ability and timing in getting to the area, training of personnel to L

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[ accomplish the task, and occupational hazards to be incurred such as radiation, j -

. temperature, chemical, sound, or visibility hazards. One reasonable test of the mliability and effectiveness.of manual action may be the approval of manual

! . action for the same function at a similar plant."

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l There is no criteria for evaluating manual compensatory action in this guidance that

reflects the Staff interpretation of SR 3.0.1.

l The NRC.has recently provided similar specific regulatory guidance on crediting of Operator Actions in Information Notice 97-78 (Creditine Operator Action in Place of l

~ Automatic Actions and Modifications of Operator Actions. Includine Response Times).

The Information Notice recommends the.following criteria for evaluating a manual action: (1) existence of harsh environment, (2) ingress or egress paths, (3) procedural guidance to accomplish the steps, (4) any training or qualification to accomplish the steps, (5) additional suppon personnel to carry out step, (6) instrumentation and (7) the risk significance of the proposed operator action. As outlined in the June 18, 1999 meeting, NSD 203 has criteria' essentially identical as Information Notice 97-78 for b evaluating the adequacy of manual actions.

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- The Information Notice also specifies that adding some operator actions are inappropriate because of " errors that could have potential for increasing the consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety, or create a new accident or i

L malfunction of a different type or reducing the margin of safety." These criteria are i-

. simply a restatement of criteria contained within 10 CFR 50.59 for determining whether i l

the introduction of the manual action constitutes an Unreviewed Safety Question.

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Generic Letter. 91-18, Rev.1, states "If an interim compensatory action is taken to address the condition and involves a procedure change or temporary modification, a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation should be conducted and may result in a safety evaluation. The intent is to determine whether the compensatory action itself (not the degraded condition) l impacts other aspects of the facility described in the SAR.

L Duke believes that adoption of the position the Staff described on June 18,1999 would l

l constitute a new or different regulatory interpretation of operability guidance, manual

. comperisatory action guidance and SR 3.0.1 to. This is based on the following basic principles: (1) there is a plain meaning interpretation of SR 3.0.1 contrary to the asserted Staff position which is consistent with the rationale of the requirement, (2) the Staff position is not reflected in the relevant regulatory documents regarding operability, (3) the Staff' position is. not reflected in the regulatory documents regarding manual l l

compensatory actions and (4) the Staff position goes beyond what is necessary to support i

the apparent rational of the Technical Specification requirement.

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Duke's use of Manual Compensatory Action on the VC System

. Duke has established a longstanding practice using the "three minute rule" to maintain

. operability 'of the VC system in certain temporary conditions. Typically, the "three minute" rule has been used when a control room door is blocked open, for example, with temporary cables during maintenance work. In such as situation, Duke has adopted the following approach to maintain operability of the VC system while in this temporary 13

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condition. An indiddual operator :n the control roam " horseshoe area" is designated to notify an individual at the " blocked door" if a safety injection signal is received. The individual at the door has procedural guidance to restore the door closed within three minutes. Another situation discussed in the TIA regarding use of the three-minute-rule is where cables are being pulled through temporary holes in the vemiiution barrier wall.

In these cases, a dedicated individual is in place to re-establish the ventilation barrier in the wall in the event of an accident. As previously discussed, the design basis of the VC system includes a three minute period where no credit is take for control room pressurization.

Duke has implemented this practice in conformance with the criteria outlined in NSD 203. The manual compensatory action is not prohibited under criteria described in the regulatory guidance in that it (1) does not involve automatic actuation of any RPS or ESF equipment and (2) does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. Additionally the manual compensatory action has been evaluated against the specific criteria of NSD 203(same as IN 97-78). Summarizing some of these points with respect to the manual compensatory actions: (1) procedures are used and the steps are easily accomplished within "three minutes", (2) the individuals are not faced with a harsh environment given the location of the control room, (3) correctly closing a door is an activity which if it fails on the first try can easily be recovered from, and (4) given the simplicity of the operation, the fact that a fission product barrier is not affected, and that the activity can easily be completed within three minutes, there is no risk significance associated with the manual action

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f l ~As such, application of the three minute rule has ~ maintained the VC system fully l operable, in a temporary condition with compensatory actions, and Duke does not enter any ACTION statement. Duke Energy believes this practice is consistent with the operability guidance regarding " temporary conditions" between surveillances. Manual r.

compensatory actions following the Duke process would be compliant with regulatory requirements when used in other applications.

Nuclear Safety Persnective Regarding nuclear safety, Duke Energy believes the current practice of maintaining operability with, compensatory actions is preferable or equivalent to the solution offered by the St'.ff in the TIA. The TIA recommends as a solution to the asserted non-compliance that Duke adopt a revision to Technical Specifications modeled after an industry model currently under development. This model is in TSTF 287 referred to by the NRC Staff in the TIA. ' Duke has reviewed the TSTF and has found that such a change would accomplish the fol:owing basic results.

J The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) would be modif;ed by a note which would allow for the "VC system pressure boundary" to be maintained operable under  !

l administrative controls. These administrative controls would involve a dedicated individual to re-establish the boundary " rapidly". As such, this Technical Specification i l

would find that the LCO system would be satisfied and the system would be operable with the pressure boundary breached so long as compensatory actions exist to rapidly 15 p.

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. restore the boundary. This is consistent LiDuke Energy's cunent practice of using the o L "three-minute-rule" to maintain the systern opersw Going through a series of license amendments to place in Technical Specifications a practice already in place seems to be -

of questionable value.

The model specification also includes a 24-hour condition for the pressure boundary to be inoperable when not under administrative controls. This is less restrictive than the current technical specification requirements,' which 'would ' require entry into TS 3.0.3 until the system could be restored.to operable status.

Conclusion Duke believes'that use of manual compensatory actions under the controls ofintemal directives to maintain operability is consistent with all regulatory requirements. These administrative controls have been followed in implementation of the 3 minute rule for control room ventilation. Duke respectfully believes the Staff should review the interpretation of SR 3.0.1 offered by Duke above and restated below: .

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A failure to meet an LCO exists, if a surveillance test is conducted and  :

acceptance criteria are not met regardless of when the measurement or observation was made by the licensee.  !

For the reasons herein, Duke respectfully submits- that the NRC position communicated to Duke on June 18,1999 regarding SR 3.0.1 is a new or different regulatory position.

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.50.109 before requiring license amendments as proposed in the TIA response. Further, 4

• Duke's piactice has no adverse effect on Nuclear Safety. Specifically, the practice

- involves rigorous controls to maintain equipment operable in temporary situations where the."three minute rule" is in place.

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