IR 05000348/1998001
| ML20217E598 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217E575 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-98-01, 50-348-98-1, 50-364-98-01, 50-364-98-1, NUDOCS 9803310091 | |
| Download: ML20217E598 (27) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-348 and 50-364 I License Nos: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No: 50-348/98-01 and 50-364/98-01 l Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)
Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia. AL 36319 Dates: January 11 through February 21, 1998 l
Inspectors: T. Ross. Senior Resident Inspector
,J. Bartley. Resident Inspector (RI)
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R. Caldwell, RI l M. Ernstes. Operator Licensing' Examiner (Sections 05.1. 05.2. 08.1 and 08.2)
N. Merriweather Reactor Inspector (Sections l 01.3 E7.1 and E8.3 through E8.6) l l G. Kuzo. Senior Radiation Specialist (Sections i R1.1. R1.2. R7.1, and R8.1) i
' Approved by: P. Skinner. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects l'
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Enclosure 2 J 9803310091 980323 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G PDR
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l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/98-01, 50-364/98-01 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of.onsite resident inspector inspection and announced inspections by regional engineering, operator licensing, and health physic inspector Doerations e Fuel handling activities were accomplished in accordance with applicable plant procedura . The analysis and evaluation of a licensee identified non-conformanc > during new fuel receipt inspection were adequately detailed and complete (Section 01~.2).
e Plant operators )erformed well during power changes and an on-line replacement of t1e 18 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve control driver card. The Shift Supervisor's command and communications with the operators and technicians during the power reduction and card replacement were good. Troubleshooting activities to diagnose the problem with the control driver card was also goed (Section 01.3).
e The System Operators (S0s) were ex)erienced in performing their assigned functions. The 50s, observed by tie inspectors, received limited supervision and area touring requirements were not clear. The inspectors observed that the amount of time spent in some areas of the plant would be-insufficient to provide early identification of degraded plant material conditions. A NCV was identified for failing-to comply with system operator touring requirements (Section 04.1).
e The licensee's requalification program complied with the requirements and standards of plant procedures as well as the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59 for the areas inspected. The licensee developed and administered simulator examinations that effectively identified areas in need of improvement (Section 05.1).
Maintenance j e Surveillance testing of the 2A Containment Spray pump was adequately l performed and the personnel demonstrated caution while trying to !
determine source and extent of the system vibrations (Section M1.2).
Enaineerina j e Although the inspectors identified an example of an inconsistency between the draft Containment Ventilation System (CVS) Flow System Description (FSD) and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
not identified by the assessment team, the overall assessment of the CVS i and spent fuel pool systems was good. The licensee's self-initiated I Enclosure 2
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safety system assessment of the CVS and SPF systems were effective in identifying weaknesses (Section E7.1)
e ine event description. cause and corrective actions documented in LER 50-348.364/97-10 were appropriate. However, an unresolved item was identified to review the licensee's detailed engineering evaluation to assess the safety consequences (Section E8.1)
e The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for LER 50-348.364/97-13 and found that all were adequate exce)t for review of the Control Room Ventilation System Functional System Jescription (FSD) observations. An unresolved item was identified pending the inspectors review of the licensee's resolution of FSD open items (Section E8.2).
Plant Succort e Radiological controls, and area postings were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 20. Subpart J requirement However, weaknesses in the radioactive material container labeling program were noted (Section R1.1),
o Trends for radiological performance indicators were positive including a decrease in percent of contaminated floor space, personnel contamination events and intakes of radioactive material (Section R1.1).
e A violation of radiological work practices for contamination control were observed for two maintenance activities (Section R4.1).
- Licensee actions in response to SAER audit findings were thorough and appropriate but actions in response to comments regarding labeling issues were narrowly focused (Section 7.1).
e Licensee immediate corrective actions for the pre-action fire protection sprinkler system failures were prompt and conservative. However, the recent failures indicate that prior corrective actions were not effective (Section F2.3).
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l Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection Serio except for a reduction in power to 23% on February 12 to repair the 13 steam generator (SG) main feedwater regulating valve (MFRV).
Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection perio exceeding 400 days of continuous operation on January 2 I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Doerations Inspection Scone (71707)
l Following the guidance provided in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent inspections of ongoing plant operation Morning reports and Occurrence Reports (OR) were reviewed on a routine basis to assure that the licensee properly tracked, reported and resolved potential operational safety concern b. Observations and Findinas Overall control and awareness of plant conditions during the inspection period remained a strength. Inspectors observed that the Unit 1 Main Control Board (MCB) and Balance of Plant (BOP) annunciators, and the emergency power board alarm panels were frequently " blackboard." The Unit 2 BOP panels continued to have a few persistent annunciators for known equipment problems. Management efforts to maintain MCB deficiencies at very low levels continued. Most of the deficiencies involved non safety-related instrumentation or equipmen )erator attentiveness to MCB annunciator alarms and response to !
clanging plant conditions was prompt and effective. Shift staffing was 1 verified to be in compliance with procedural and Technical l Specifications (TS) requirements. Pre-shift briefings of the operating i crews by the shift supervisors (SS) provided operators with shift direction and priorities. Shift turnovers were accomplished in an orderly manne ;
Routine reactivity manipulations by the operators (i.e. boron dilutions of the reactor coolant system) were observed by the ins)ectors. The operators notified the applicable SS prior to eac1 manipulation as required by procedur Enclosure 2
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c. Conclusions
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Control Room professionalism and communications remained goo Operating crew demeanor, team work and conduct were professional and effective. 0)erator attentiveness to MCB annunciator alarms and response to clanging plant conditions were prompt. The operating crew consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing plant activitie .2 Receiot Insoection and Transfer of New Fuel into Unit 2 New Fuel Storaae a. Insoection Scooe (60705)
The inspectors observed plant operators, security guards. Health Physics technicians, and Engineering Support nuclear engineers receive. ins)ec and transfer new fuel assemblies into the Unit 2 new fuel storage (IFS)
racks per 3rocedure FNP-0-FHP-3.0. " Receipt and Storage of New Fuel."
Revision ( Rev.) 30. Selected periods of these activities were observed by the inspectors over many different days involving several shipment b. Observations and Findinos All fuel movements observed by the inspectors were performed in a controlled manner including unloading of the shipping containers. fuel
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inspections, and transfer to the NFS racks. Appropriate procedural compliance. and documentation of the inspection and transfer, was l performed. All fuel movements were accomplished under the direct supervision of a shift foreman (SFM) who was a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO). l Two material condition problems were identified by the licensee during l fuel inspections. Small, metal hairs and/or filings were observed on !
various fuel rods and OR 98-019 was initiated. Also, a small amount of oil residue was found on the to) nozzle plate of one fuel assembly. A fuel vendor representative was arought in to conduct an independent inspection of the fuel. Based on the evaluation provided by the vendor i and the licensee's independent analysis. Safety Evaluation SECL-98-02 i Zirconium Alloy Shavings and Tubmate Detergent Residue On Fuel i Assemblies. J.M. Farley Nuclear Plant. Rev. 3. and Nonconformance Disposition Report (NDR)-116. Rev. 0 were developed. Based on the !
results of these two evaluations, the licensee concluded that the fuel .
was acceptable to use "as is." The inspectors reviewed the safety I evaluation. NDR and the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening and !
evaluations and concluded that they were adequately detailed and sufficiently supported the NDR conclusion l
l c. Conclusions Fuel handling activities were accomplished in accordance with applicable l plant procedures. The analysis and evaluation of a licensee identified '
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non-conformance during new fuel receipt inspection were adequately detailed and complet .3 Unit 1 Power Reduction due to IB SG MFRV Control Problem a. Insoection Scone (71707)
On February 11. 1998, the inspectors were informed.of a control problem with the 18 SG MFRV. The licensee stated that the operators had experienced feedwater flow spikes with the IB SG MFRV in manual and were having problems controlling 1B SG water level. The inspectors observed ;
a reactor power reduction to 30% and change out of the control driver I card in the MFRV control circuitr b. Observations and Findinos The SS informed the inspectors that at approximately 24% reactor power the MFRV would be closed and the control driver card would be replace The SS conducted a pre-job briefing on the card replacement and procedure FNP-1-IMP-21 Communication was also established between the control room operators and the Instrument and Control (I&C) 1 Technicians located at the instrument cabinet. With reactor power at 24%. the MFRV was closed. I&C replaced the MFRV control driver card, and a power increase to 100% aower was commence As power was increased, the inspectors observed t1at the MFRV was automatically controlling SG water level. The inspectors also reviewed the operators log and found that the log entries accurately described the power reduction and card change out and that it accurately reflected the current plant statu c. Conclusions Plant operators Jerformed well during power changes and on-line replacement of t1e IB SG MFRV control driver card. The SS's command and communications with the operators and I&C Technicians during the power reduction and card replacement were good. I&C troubleshooting activities to diagnose the problem with the control driver card was also goo Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 General Tours of Specific Safetv-Related Areas
' Inspection Scone (71707)
l General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors i
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equipment and structures, and to verify that safety systems were properly maintained and aligned. These general walkdowns included the accessible portions of structures, systems, and components (SSCs).
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L 4 Observations and Findinas Almost all plant areas were clear of trash and debris. Minor equipment and housekeeping problems identified by the inspectors during their routine tours were reported to the responsible SS and/or maintenance
- department for resolutio The housekeeping computer database was spot-checked by the inspectors to
' determine the type and scope of issues being documented, as well as, to review the timeliness of correcting issues. The ins)ectors found that j the database contained 252 open items. The age of t1e open items appeared to be evenly dispersed over the last 5 month I Conclusions 1 Overall material conditions for Unit 1 and Unit 2 SSCs were good. The inspectors concluded that the database was appropriately documenting minor housekeeping deficiencies which were being corrected at a reasonable rate.
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-02.2 Insoections of Safety Systems (71707)
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Inspectors verified the operability of the following selected safety systems and/or equipment:
e Unit 1 Post-LOCA Containment Vent System (CVS)
e Unit 1 High Head Safety Injection (A and B trains)
Accessible portions of the systems listed above were verified to be properly aligned. The inspectors also observed them to be adecuately maintained and in good operating condition. The inspectors dic not identify any issues that adversely affected system operability. Minor deficiencies noted were discussed with the appropriate S .3 Verification of Safety Taaaing Insoection Scooe (71707)
l The' inspectors verified that selected tagouts were implemented in accordance with procedural requirements. The inspectors reviewed and walked down selected devices tagged by the following tag orders (T0s):
e '. TO #98-0051-1, 1A Containment Spray (CS) Pump e TO #98-0141-1. Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump l e TO #97-2585-0, 1C Diesel Generator Day Tank Room Fan A l' e TO #93-1415-2. Reactor Makeup Water to Sump Pum)
j e TO #97-2171-0. Switchgear (SWGR) Room A Supply ran C l
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o TO #96-2333-0, SWGR Room B Supply Fan A-e TO #97-2085-0. B Instrument Air Compressor e TO #98-0172-0. 2A Lubrication & Cooling Booster Pumps L e TO #98-0125-1. 1A Boron Thermal Regeneration System Chiller Pumps l b. Observations and Findinas l
l The inspectors verified that devices ' identified on'the TOs were properly L tagged. The device identifications were correct, tags were .
l conspicuously placed on the devices and did not obscure control room-E panel indications. The administrative aspects of filling out the t
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tagging order forms were complete and correct. The tags placed were adequate for personnel safety and equipment protectio c. Conclusion l
The inspectors concluded that the reviewed safety tagging activities were correct and met the procedural requirements. The administrative aspects of the tagging orders were complete and accurate. -The tags 91 aced were adequate for personnel safety and equipment protectio .4 TS Limitina Conditions for Ooeration (LCO) Trackina (40500 and 71707)
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The inspectors routinely reviewe<1 the TS LC0 tracking sheets filled out by the SFM. .All tracking sheets for Units 1 and 2 reviewed by the inspectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS requirement .5 Enaineered Safeauards Feature System Walkdown a. Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors used the guidance provided in IP 71707 to perform a detailed walkdown of the accessible portions of Unit 1 and 2 Refueling
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Water Storage Tanks (RWSTs) Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks (RMWSTs) and the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs).
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that overall material condition of the ecuipment was adequate and the equi] ment appeared to be properly alignec. The tanks contained greater tlan the minimum required water volume at the proper temperature and met the appropriate chemistry requirements. The
! current surveillance procedures adequately verified the systems'
l operabilit l The Unit 1 and 2 CSTs were being modified for missile protection and the associated level instruments were disabled one at a time to allow for installation of the modification. Aparopriate LCOs were entered
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c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded the Unit 1 and 2 RWSTs. RMWSTs. and CSTs were operable and adequately maintaine Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 System Goerator Tours a. Inspection Scone (71707)
The inspectors accompanied several non-licensed system operators (S0s)
during routine plant and data logging tour b. {)bservations and Findinas During these tours. the 50s demonstrated familiarity with the plant and o)eration of equipment and conscientiously logged all required dat W1ile on station, the 50s were consistently responsive to inquiries and requests from operators in the Main Control Room (MCR). During tours with the 50s. t1e ins)ectors observed that the Shift Foremen-Operating were rarely seen in t1e plant observing or supervising S0 activitie Areas, rooms, and halls of the plant toured by the S0s during their data logging rounds received only brief and cursory observations for material condition problems. As documented in previous inspection reports, the inspectors have identified numerous instances of degraded plant material conditions not identified during S0 tours. During this inspection periond, an inspector discovered excessive leakage coming fromt he IB Containment Spray pump. Because the licensee relies on S0 tours to identify degraded plant material conditions, the inspectors concluded i that the brief amount of time spent in specific areas would be insufficient to identify all potential degraded plant material conditions in some area The 50 shift relief instructions in procedure FNP-0-AP-16. " Conduct of 0)erations - Operations Group." Rev. 27. Appendix B. Step 3.4 stated tlat oncoming S0sshall initiate a walkdown of the areas under their responsibility as soon as possible after com)1eting the relief. Based on inspectors interviews and observations. tie S0s typically toured only those areas identified on the data loggers or where directed by the MC On occassion. S0s would independently tour other areas of the plant during their shift, but not in a systematic or regular manner. Since the data loggers did not address all areas under the 50's responsibility, many areas were not routinely toured. This is a violation of the requirements of FNP-0-AP-16. Rev. 27: however, this violation is of minor safety significanc Therefore, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation is i I
identified as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-348.364/98-01-01. Failure to l Comply with System Operator Touring Requirement Enclosure 2
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! l 7 ) Conclusions The S0s were experienced and knowledgeable performing their assigned
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functions. However, the inspectors observed that the 50s received-l limited supervision. A NCV was identified for failing to comply with i system operator touring requirements. Furthermore. the inspectors also observed that the amount of time spent in some areas of.the plant would
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-be insufficient to provide early identification of degraded plant material condition Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Licensed Ooerator Reaualification Proaram Insoection Scooe (71001)
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During the period January 12 - 16, 1998, the inspectors reviewed the licensed operator requalification program to determine compliance with 10 CFR 55.59 "Requalification. " Specific areas of review included-
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observed administration of the simulator portion of the annual operating examination simulator scenario quality, documentation of results, and remediation. The inspectors also reviewed the last two years of operating history for indications of training weaknesse Observations and Findinas Review of operating history for the last two years revealed no operating !
problems or trends which were attributed to training weaknesses. NRC and licensee documentation indicated that both planned evolutions and response to unplanned transients were effectively conducted by the operators.
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The inspectors observed the administration of simulator scenarios to a crew of three staff SR0s and one shift reactor operator (RO). The licensee evaluators found the performance by the crew was adequate and i effectively identified areas in need of retraining. The licensee l evaluators-documented these areas in their written evaluations. The 1
. evaluators also discussed operators aerformance during a classroom ,
debrief, providing the operators wit 1 timely feedback on their performanc l l The simulator scenarios developed by the training staff adequately i challenged the operators in order to evaluate operator competency. The i simulator scenarios used during the observed examination week met the quantitative attribute guidance in NUREG-1021. " Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." as required by 0-TCP-17.6. " Simulator Training Evaluation / Documentation."Rev. 3. procedure The FNP-Enclosure 2 L
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simulator scenario selection process ensured that each operator had not received the same simulator scenario in the last two years. The bank of simulator scenarios used for annual evaluation was unpublished and was not used during routine operator training to preclude operator familiarization with the simulator scenario Conclusions The licensee's requalification program complied with the requirements and standards of plant procedures as well as the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59 for the areas inspected. The licensee developed and administered simulator examinations that effectively identified areas in need of improvemen .2 Plant Reference Simulator (71001)
The licensee completed a major simulator modification in May 1997 that integrated elementary drawings into the simulator operation. This modification allows the instructor to show real time system response from Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) on computer consoles on the simulator floor. Also. improvements in the simulator controls for entering malfunctions were made. These modifications have freed the instructors to allow more time interfacing with and observing student Operations Organization and Administration 06.1 Administrative Control of Ooerator Overtime (71707)
The requirements for control of operator overtime are contained in TS 6.2.2. The inspectors interviewed two shift clerks and reviewed several randomly selected operator and senior operator overtime records for the period December 1. 1997 through January 4. 1998. The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies with the control of operator overtime. The inspectors concluded that operator overtime was adequately controlled and records were thoroug Hiscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
0 (Closed) Insoector Followuo item (IFI) 50-348.364/96-09-03: Aoolication of Remedial Trainina Documentation Guidance Procedure FNP-0-TCP-17.3. " License Retraining Program Administration."
Rev.15 was modified to include guidance on the documentation of remediation of requalification examination failures. The documentation of the remediation for the two operators who failed requalification l examinations in 1997 complied with this guidanc Based on the L inspector's review, this item is close Enclosure 2 l 1
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08.2 (Closed) VIOLATION (V10) 50-348.364/97-05-01: Failure To Notify NRC Of Chance Of Licensed Ooerator Medical Status The inspectors verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated July 9.1997, were com)lete and properly implemented. Based on the inspector's review, t1is item is close II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Maintenance and Surveillance Testina Activities Insoection Scone (61726 and 62707)
Using the guidance provided in IP 61726 and IP 62707, the inspectors observed and reviewed portions of selected licensee corrective and preventive maintenance activities, and routine surveillance testing including detailed reviews of the following:
e FNP-1-STP-73.1. Rev. 4. " Hot Shutdown Panel Testing. Appendix H and N~
e WO# 97008593, 28 CCW HX Eddy Current Testing e WO# 00494248, 2B Battery Charger Clean & Inspect per FNP-2-EMP-1341.06. Rev. 5 ,
e FNP-0-STP-80.2. Rev. 39, Diesel Generator 1C Operability Test e FNP-2-STP-11.2. Rev. 21, 2B RHR Pump Quarterly Inservice Test e FNP-1-IMP-227.2, Containment Area Monitor N1D21RE0002 Channel Calibration. Rev. 7 e FNP-1-STP-22.19. Rev. 13, Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Flow Path Veri fication e FNP-2-STP-33.0A, Rev. 18 Solid State Protection System Train A Operability Test b. Observations and Findinas All observed maintenance work activities and surveillance testing were performed in accordance with work instructions. procedures, and applicable clearance controls. Safety-related maintenance and surveillance testing evolutions were properly planned $nd execute Licensee personnel demonstrated familiarity with actministrative and radiological controls, except for work accomplished on the 1A and 2B charging pumps (see Section R4.1). Surveillance tests of safety-related equipment were consistently performed in a deliberate manner in close communication with the MCR. Overall, operators. technicians, and craftsman were observed to be knowledgeable, experienced, and trained l
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p 10 Conclusions Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were generally conducted in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instruction M1 2 2A CS Pumo Flow Oscillations.
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l The inspectors reviewed OR 2-97-409, 2A Containment Spray Pump Spray Add Flow Erratic, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). TSs.
i observed the conduct of procedure FNP-2-STP-16.1. "2A Containment Spray l Pump'Ouarterly In service Test." Rev. 26 and-27. and interviewed various l operations and engineering personne Observations and Findinas L As documented in OR 2-97-409. CS pump spray addition flow was very l erratic and the CS pum) appeared to cavitate during performance of FNP-2-STP-16.1. Rev 26. T1e licensee evaluated the conditions described in the OR.and concluded that the CS pump had not cavitated and the CS pump was o)erable. Because the licensee was unable to determine the cause of l the a) normal behavior, mechanical maintenance personnel and engineering i
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support personnel observed the next regularly scheduled quarterly surveillance.
! On February 5,1998. the inspectors observed the conduct of FNP-2-STP-l 16.1. Rev 27. The same crew that performed the previous test also
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conducted this test. establishing a continuity of. observation. When the CS pump was started.-the same phenomenon areviously observed occurred.
l There was significant CS pump noise and t1e pump, piping, and stanchions L were vibrating. The vibrations were. observed to be mostly on the spray addition eductor and CS pump bypass piping. The vibration and noise L continued for approximately 10 minutes. During this time the L maintenance and engineering support personnel were attempting to l localize the source of the noise and vibrations. Only after the piping
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vibrations dam)ened significantly did the licensee take vibration data-and cocplete t1e surveillance.
[ The licensee again concluded that the pump did not cavitate and the CS L pum) was operable. However, the licensee indicated that they needed to L gatler more data. Another surveillance test was conducted on February 9. test with the CS pump and piping instrumented. During this test, the CS pump noises and spray addition flow fluctuations continued throughout
'the duration of the tes '
Based on the data obtained during the February 9. 1998 test. the licensee preliminarily concluded that the vibrations, noise. and fluctuations 'were due to the operating range of the pump during the Enclosure 2 i L
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( 11 l- surveillance test and the vibrations would not occur if the pump was l being operated at the head necessary to perform its-safety function.
l The CS Jump noise and piping vibrations were determined to have begun
after t1e licensee changed the surveillance flowpath in the 1994 time frame. However, no formal evaluation was conducted until OR 2-97-409 was issued The licensee was investigating alternate methods and flow paths to meet the surveillance requirements. This issue is identified l as IFI 50-364/98-01-02. Containment Spray Pump Testing, pending the l inspectors * review of the licensee's assessmen c. Conclusion The surveillance was adecuately performed and the personnel demonstrated caution while trying to cetermine source and extent of the system
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l III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering
- El.1 CST Missile Protection Modification a. Insoection Scooe (37551)
Ins)ectors observed installation in progress discussed modification l worc and design with the assigned Plant Modifications and Maintenance !
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Support (PMMS) engineer, and reviewed the design change packages (DCP)
97-1-9172 and 97-2-917 b. Observations and Findinas .
The ins)ectors identified two concerns with the design and installation of the ) cps. One concern was the limited protection provided to level transmitters located in close proximity to the work. This concern was addressed by Operations and no further deficiencies were identifie ;
l The inspectors also identified that there was a six inch gap between the tank foundation and the bottom of the missile barrier. One of the L design basis missiles was a three inch pipe which could pass through '
this six inch opening. The inspectors discussed this observation with PMMS management. After additional review by the licensee, a field change request was initiated to install a skirt to close the six inch
, ga These DCPs, with the field changes, were scheduled to be complete l by March 15, 1998.
l l c. Conclusions The licensee adequately modified the CST to provide missile protection barrier for all connections below twelve fee Enclosure 2
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E7- Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities E7.1 Review of Licensee Self-Assessment Activities
- a. -Insoection Scone (37550)
l The inspectors reviewed'the final report on the results of the Self-Initiated Safety System Assessment (SSSA) of the Containment Ventilation
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System (CVS) and Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) system. The inspectors also
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reviewed the draft CVS and SFP Functional System Descriptions (FSDs) and l responses to SSSA questions that were documented as part of the
! assessment process. Applicable regulatory requirements included 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, UFSAR commitments, and the licensee's Quality Assurance Program.
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i l The licensee's corporate engineering personnel performed an assessment of the CVS and SFP systems. The assessment evaluated if the systems were designed, built, tested, and operated in accordance with the draft FSDs, UFSAR and other design basis and licensing basis documents. A secondary objective of the assessment was to validate the adequacy of the draft FSDs.
l-l The assessment concluded that the systems were capable of performing ,
- their design function as described in the FSDs, however, seven l
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weaknesses were identified in the areas of procedures, design calculations, configuration management, and testing. Two strengths were
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identified for usefulness of the FSDs in identifying design information l and for accessibility to older calculation The inspectors found the assessment report was clear and concise and the
!. assessment observations were well supported. However, the inspectors identified an inconsistency between CVS FSD Section 2.1.1.1 and UFSAR l Section 6.2.2.2.2 Containment Cooling System, in describing the number i
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of containment fan cooler units that were required to be operating i during normal operation. The UFSAR stated "The Containment Cooling 1 l System consists of four containment air coolers, each with a one-third cooling capacity during normal operation." However, the CVS FSD stated !
typically four containment coolers were in operation because the actual :
heat load during normal operation was greater than originally considered I in the design of the containment cooler :
The licensee indicated that the FSDs were draft documents and that the above issue will be reviewed prior to issuance of the CVS FSD. This issue is identified as IFI 50-348.364/98-01-03. Review of Approved CVS FSD. pending review the approved FS Enclosure 2 l- . .
c. Conclusions Although the inspectors identified an example of an inconsistency between the draft CVS FSD and UFSAR not identified by the assessment team, the overall assessment of the CVS and SFP systems was good. The licensee's self-initiated safety system assessment of the CVS and SFP systems were effective in identifying weaknesse E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E (Closed) LER 50-348. 50-364/97-10. Motor-Ocerated Valve (MOV)
local / Remote Control Circuit Wirina Discrenancies The inspectors reviewed this LER and discussed it with responsible l management. Corrective actions to rewire the affected MOVs were l verified by reviewing the Work Orders (W0s) which corrected the discrepancies. The W0s were adequately detailed and complet The event description, cause and corrective actions documented in the LER were appropriate. However, SNC did not adequately evaluate the safety consequences. After additional investigation, and discussions with the inspectors, the licensee concluded that a detailed engineering evaluation would be necessary. Consequently, Request for Engineering i Assistance (REA) 98-1683 was issued to the corporate office with a due l date of March CFR 50.73(b)(3) requires the licensee to fully assess the safety consequences of an event. The licensee's failure to perform an adequate safety evaluation will be identified as Unresolved Item (URI) 50 348,364/98-01-04, Inadequate Safety Assessment For Miswired Hot Shutdown Panel MOVs, pending the inspectors review of the detailed engineering evaluation. This LER is closed based on opening of the UR E8.2 (Closed) LER 50-348. 50-364/97-13. Doeratina Outside the Desian Basis Due to Control Room Exhaust Isolation Damoers Not Closed The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for this LER and found that all were com)1eted. However, one of the corrective actions was to review a Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) FSD tracking list which identified deficiencies between the FSD. UFSAR and as-built syste During the licensee's review, two conditions adverse to quality which had been identified as previously closed had been closed without implementing the appropriate recommendations to resolve the condition The inspectors reviewed this corrective action and found that the conditions described in Open Items CRV-010 and CRV-019 had been l previously identified. Open Item CRV-010 was identified in Engineering l Study (ES) 91-1929 and REA 95-0817. Open Item CRV-019 was documented as resolved in letter NEL 96-0069. Implementation of the recommendations was assigned to FNP 3ersonnel. However, the licensee determined that l the recommendations lad not been implemented. The conditions described Enclosure 2 l l
l I
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i in Open Items CRV-010 and CRV-019 ap) eared to be conditions adverse to qualit No OR had been initiated w1en the conditions were initially identi fied. Instead, the licensee tracked these issues in an informal
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database. This issue is identified as URI 50-348, 364/98-01-05. Failure -l to Track and Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality. pending the inspectors review of the licensee's documentation concerning Open Items CRV-010.and CRV-019. i l During this review, the inspectors also questioned the adequacy of CRVS system testing. A 1988 system test identified that the allowed-opening size in the control room boundary while maintaining control room
' pressure was 21.21 square inches at a flowrate of 450 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm), and 0.125 inches water gauge (w.g.) back pressure. However, CRVS system testing was done to ensure a flow of 300 1 10% scfm at 0.0 inches w.g. back 3ressure. These conditions appear to be nonconservative in maintaining t1e minimum control room pressure with a 21.21 square inch opening. Until the inspectors can review the licensee's evaluation regarding this testing, this issue is identified as IFI 50-348. 364/98-01-06. Control Room Ventilation Testin Based.on opening the URI and IFI. this LER is close E8.3 (Closed) URI'50-348 364/97-201-09: Tornado Missile Soectra This URI involved the susceptibility of the safety-related emergency l diesel generators and the station blackout diesel generator exhaust ;
silencers for both units to non-horizontal tornado generated missile l Based on NRC review as documented in a memorandum dated December 1 I 1997, the staff concluded that, while non-horizontal tornado generated l missiles were part of FNP's design and licensing basis, the EDG exhaust j silencers were adequately protecte ;
l E8.4 (Closed) IFI 50-348.364/97-201-16: Calculation Discrenancies i i
During the March 1997 NRC design inspection, discrepancies were .i identified in Sections 2.1. 2.3. 2.4. and 2.5 of Calculation SC-96-1211- !
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002. CCW Heat Exchanger Maintenance Repairs. Rev. The ins)ectors reviewed Rev. 2 of the calculation and verified that all of t1e i discrepancies noted in NRC Report 97-201 associated with this item had i been satisfactorily corrected. The licensee had also issued an As-Built I Notice 98-01177 to update and revise the vendor seismic calculation
! U405165 to document the cumulative affects of increased weight to the L Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers resulting from the modi fications, t
Enclosure 2 l l
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E8.5 (Closed) VIO 50-348.364/97-11-06: Inadeouate Corrective Action To Resolve Differences Between CCW System P&lDs And 00eratina Procedures The inspectors verified that the corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated December 17, 1997 were implemented and complat E8.6 (Ocen) URI 50-348.364/97-201-12: Stress Analysis Temperature The licensee's architect engineer initiated Deficiency Notice 97-001 to document a design deficiency involving incorrect dimensions and a non-conservative temperature utilized in the CCW piping stress calculations. A Root Cause Evaluation Team (RCET) determined that the root cause for the non-conservative temperature used in the CCW pipe stress calculations was the result of a lack of communications between Bechtel Mechanical Group and Plant Design Stress Group when Safety System Self Assessments were conducted on the CCW syste Based on the RCET recommendations, the licensee reviewed the stress calculations for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR). SFP. and portions of the Service Water (SW) systems. The stress calculations for the RHR and SW systems were found to be acceptable. However. 10 of 13 SFP system stress calculations were found to use non-conservative temperature data. The licensee indicated that a root cause evaluation would also be performed to determine the cause for the use of non-conservative temperatures in the SFP stress calculations. Based on the results of the root cause analysis, further corrective actions may be identified. The licensee indicated that those SFP stress calculations that used non-conservative temperature data as inputs were being revised to reflect the correct temperature input This item will remain open pending review of the results of the licensee's root cause evaluation and any additional corrective action IV. Plant Sucoort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Radioloaical Controls (83750) Inspection Scone Using the guidance provided in IP 83750, the inspectors reviewed radiological controls associated with ongoing Unit 1 and Unit 2 routine operations.
l l Observations and Findinas High and locked high radiation area controls were verified to be implemented in accordance with TS requirements. Postings for radiologically controlled areas (RCAs) were proper and in accordance Enclosure 2 l
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with procedures. TSs or 10 CFR 20 Subpart J requirements. Contamination and radiation surveys were conducted in accordance with appropriate requirements. Radiation and contamination survey results met
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established regulatory and procedural limits. Controls for irradiated materials stored within.the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SFPs were appropriat From discussions with workers and direct observation of~ork w activitie ~ the inspectors verified that employees understood and implemented established Radiological Work Permits (RWP) control Although the majority of containers holding licensed material were labeled in accordance r!9 5 10 CFR 20.1904 requirements. the inspectors identified several examples of poor labeling practices which decreased the program's effectiveness. For example, inconsistencies among labels i placed on containers were noted in the Low-Level Radiological Waste (LLRW) building. including a box unnecessarily labeled as a
" radiologically restricted area" and a " Caution Radioactive Matecial" label affixed to a clean vacuum cleaner. The inspectors also noted that for some drums of radioactive waste stored within the LLRW building shield booths, the labels were' partially obscured to individuals entering the enclosure. The inspectors noted that, although 10 CFR 20.1904 requires labels with the approariate information to be clearly visible, these labels were partially oascured due to the orientation of the drums. In addition, on January 26. 1998, the inspectors identified anroximately six boxes containing licensed materials stored within the L_RW building where fading reduced the legibility of the required label I information. The inspectors noted that this issue was similar to a <
comment documented in Safety Audit Engineering Review (SAER) Report l Number (No.-) 97-RWM/31 dated January 15, 1998. Excluding labels of !
containers maintained within the LLRW building shield booths, the identified labeling issues were addressed and corrected as of January 30. 1998. Licensee representatives stated that this program area would be reviewed to improve the effectiveness of the radioactive ;
material container labels. The inspectors identified this issue as IFI i 50-348. 364/98-01-07. Review Licensee Actions to Improve Radioactive Material Container Label Effectivenes Excluding dose expenditure, positive trends were observed for most m: 3erformance indicators for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997. Dose expenditure for Y<1997 was identified at approximately 277 person-rem which exceeded the original projected dose expenditure of 240 person-rem. Extensive unplanned steam generator maintenance activities during the Unit 1 ,
Refueling Outage Cycle 14 resulted in a dose expenditure of I approximately. 246 person-rem. For FY 1997 approximately 16 ors for
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contamination events (persons having general contamination levels equal to or greater than 5000 disintegrations aer minute (dpm) per probe area and speck' activity equal to or greater t1an 100.000 dpm per probe area)
were processed, and 217 Radiation Worker Practice Observations (RWP0s).
(general contaminations greater than 1000 dpm but less than 5000 dpm per probe area or specks with activity less than 10.000 dpm) were identified. These figures compared favorably to 1996 when 38 ors and Enclosure 2
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221 RWP0s were identified. All deep and shallow external exposures were within regulatory limits. One individual received a skin exposure of 10 7 rem as a result'of a hot particle, which required updating of
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exposure record Two individuals had intakes: however. the assigned internal exposures were significantly below regulatory limit Licensee data indicated a continued decrease in the amount of contaminated , floor space, with less than five 3ercent of the accessible RCA considered contaminated floor space. _icensee representatives stated that l decontamination efforts were ongoing to further reduce the amount of contaminated floor space, Conclusions Radiological controls, and area postings were maintained in accordance with TS and 10 CFR 20. Subpart J requirements. However, weaknesses in the radioactive material container labeling program were note Trends for radiological performance indicators were positive including a decrease in percent of contaminated floor space personnel contamination events, and intakes of radioactive materia R1.2 Internal Exoosure (83750) Insoection Scooe
-The respiratory protection program was reviewed against requirements specified in 10 CFR 20.1703. The review verified training. medical qualification and fit testing of licensed operators and evaluated the readiness of selected respiratory protection equipmen Observations and Findinas Fit tests, medical qualifications and training were current for the licensed operators reviewed. Protective equipment, e.g. self-contained breathing apparatus, was appropriately maintained. As applicable, operators maintained corrective lens for us c. Conclusions Respiratory protection training fit tests, medical qualifications. and equipment status met 10 CFR 20.1703 requirement R2 Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls Facilities and Equipment
R2.1 RCA. Units 1 and 2 (71750)
Overall cleanliness of the RCA remained good. Plant personnel observed l working in the RCA generally demonstrated appropriate knowledge and application of radiological control practices, with an exception Enclosure 2 l
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identified in Section R4.1 of this report. Health physics technicians generally provided positive control and support of work activities in the RCA.
R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiological Protection R4.1 Conduct of Work In Contaminated Areas a. Insoection Scone (62707 and 71750)
The inspectors observed ongoing maintenance activities to verify adequate radiological work practice b. Observations and Findinos On February 3. 1998, inspectors observed routine preventative maintenance tasks on the 1A charging pump. Both the overhead platform and the pump skid were identified as radiologically contaminated area Although the maintenance personnel used standard labcoat dress out as allowed by the applicable RWPs. the inspectors observed that they had considerable difficulty adhering to required radiological contamination control practices during the conduct of their work. The inspectors observed the following:
a) After completing the work, maintenance personnel exited the contaminated area while still fully dressed out, removed the shoe covers, then walked out of the 1A charging pump room and across the hall to continue remval of protective clothin Procedure FNP-0-M-001 " Health Pn;, sics Manual ." Revs.13 and 14 required complete removal of protective clothing before leaving the contaminated are b) During the course of the maintenance work, maintenance personnel frequently entered the posted contaminated area and then exited onto the uncontaminated floor space around the pump skid. Tools and equipment were used on the contaminated pump and then laid on the step-off pad (SOP) next to the skid. until they were later bagge c) Due to the vigorous and sometimes contorted nature of the work, the use of standard labcoat dressout was not appropriate to provide adequate protection from surface contamination. In this instance, a routine survey of the maintenance personal clothing found no contaminatio The inspectors' observations were discussed with the Health Physics manager and acting Maintenance Manage The HP manager promptly contacted the planning supervisor to ensure that HP would be notified to expand the contaminated area boundaries for any future work in the Enclosure 2
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charging aump rooms. On February 19, 1998, after further discussions with the iP. manager, the-licensee initiated OR 98-1000.
On February 24, 1998. the inspectors observed additional poor contamination control practices during maintenance on the 2B charging Jum For this maintenance activity. HP had moved the contaminated area l ]oundary to the door of the charging pump room alleviating some of the observations during 1A charging pump maintenance as discussed abov The maintenance personnel observed were in standard labcoat dress-ou When they completed the work in the contaminated area, they only removed the' rubber overshoes prior to stepping onto the SOP. This was' contrary to contamination control practices and training which direct that the protective clothing (PC's) be removed inside the contaminated area. The inspectors immediately pointed out this error to the workers and to the HP technician present. The HP technician surveyed the S0P and verified that it was not contaminated. The inspectors discussed this additional example of violation of radiological worker practices with licensee managemen Failure to follow required radiological practices of FNP-0-M-001. Health Physics Manual. Revs.13 and 14, is identified as VIO 50-348.364/98-01-08. Failure To Adequately Implement Contamination Control Practices During Maintenance.
i c. Conclusions A violation of radiological work practices for contamination control was observed for two maintenance activities, i R7 Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities R7.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (83750. 84750) Insoection Scooe SAER reports issued from January 1996 through January 1998 associated with Health Physics. Chemistry, and Radwaste processing and packaging i
program activities as required by TS 6.5.2.1 were reviewed and discussed with licensee representative Licensee corrective action reports for selected comments and Audit Finding Report (AFR) issues were reviewed and discusse Program activities were evaluated against applicable SAER procedures and TS detail b. Observations and Findinas
- The SAER audits met TS required frequencies and addressed Offsite Dose
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Calculation Manual. Effluent. Health Physics. ALARA Chemistry and
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Radwaste program areas. Identified AFR issues were both compliance- l
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Enclosure 2
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l based and performance-base Licensee corrective actions for followup l of selected AFR issues were thorough and appropriat The inspectors noted concerns regarding the extent of licensee actions
, in response to one comment identified in SAER Report No. RWM/M31 dated
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January 15, 1998.- The identified comment item, illegible radioactive
- material tags on several containers and a trailer located on the east
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side of the auxiliary building, was similar to the labeling issue detailed in Paragraph RI.1 of.this report. Responsible personnel ,
indicated that the-item was identified to the Radiation Control staff in October of 199 In response to the comment, radiation control l
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personnel immediately upgraded the labeling, but only for the specific tags identified in the audit report. The inspectors noted that radioactive material container labels within the LLRW building were not included in any licensee corrective actions. As of January 30, 1998, no additional systematic review of the labeling program was conducted nor L was a written response formulated.
- - c. Conclusions
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l SAER audits of Health Physics. Chemistry and Radwaste Processing L programs were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and TS i requirements.
L Licensee actions in response to SAER audit findings were thorough and l appropriate but actions in response to comments regarding labeling L issues were narrowly focused.
l R8 Miscellaneous RP&C Issues (83750, 84750)
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R (Closed) IFI 50-348. 364/97-10-07: Review Licensee Actions to Imorove Maintenance of Hazardous Material (HazMat) Trainino and Test Records.
l The inspectors reviewed and verified licensee actions documented in SAER Response No. 1467 dated December 12. 1997. Actions included issuance of i l
a Training Advisory Notice (TAN) dated October 1.1997, requesting !
submittal of documentation to the training department to verify l l certification of completion and testing of offsite and onsite vendor !
course Procedures FNP-0-TCP-50.0 "FNP Controlled Functional Position l
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! Qualification Recuirements." Rev. 24. FNP-0-TCP-23.0. "Farley Nuclear i
Plant Hazardous kaste and Hazardous Material Training Program." Rev. and FNP-0-RCP-811-. " Shipment of Radioactive Material." Rev. 20, were '
revised to provide more guidance. Changes also were made to accurately i reflect the HazMat training frequency of 49 CFR 172 and to describe job l classifications to be trained under Chemistry and Environmental Module ;
50505. " Hazardous Waste Training" and General Employee Training Module ,
G-516. " Hazardous Material / Waste Handler." Based on the inspectors l review and verification of completed licensee actions. this item is l close !
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I Enclosure 2
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures (71750)
Using the guidance provided in IP 71750, the inspectors verified that
)ortions of site security program plans were being properly implemente )isabled vital area doors were properly manned and controlled. Security personnel activities observed during the inspection period were performed well. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plan F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F2.1 Fire Protection Main Pinino Leaks (71750)
On January 28. 1998, the inspectors toured the Fire Pump House and the-
)lant grounds outside the Protected Area where the fire main aiping was L Juried. The inspectors noticed that the fire main system joccey pump had a discharge flowrate of about 70 - 75 gallons per minute (gpn).
However, as documented in ES 92-2357. Fire Protection System Pressure.
l dated December 23. 1992, the licensee had meacured the normal long-term leakage rate to be about 7 gpm. The substantial increase in jockey pump discharge flowrate was indicative of gross fire main piping leakag j
The inspectors identified six specific areas of potential leakage. Of these, the licensee was aware of two areas and was actively working to repair one of them. The following additional areas were noted: a)
Southeast corner of the 2B Cooling Tower (CT): b) Southwest corner of the 2B CT: c) Southeast corner of the Fire Pump House: d) East side of 3 the IB CT: and e) South end between 1A and 1B cts. Several of these
, areas were quite large with standing water an inch or two deep
! indicating significant leakage from the fire mai Only one area appeared to have a possible above ground source of water; the rest appeared to be the result of underground fire main leakag ,
The inspectors discussed the status of fire main piping leakage with the
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Maintenance Manager and responsible fire protection personnel. In order
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to followup on any future corrective action plans and conditions of fire main integrity, this issue is identified as IFI 50-348. 364/98-01-0 Excessive Underground Fire Main Leakag F2.2 Fire Main Ruoture (71750)
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On February 18, 1998. the fire main ruptured at the hydrant at the northwest corner of the 1A cooling tower due to the isolation valve separating from the header. Both the motor driven and #1 diesel driven fire pumps started on low header pressure. Due to the large size of the rupture. 8.000 to 11.000 gpm, the fire suppression water system level dropped below the required minimum rendering the system inoperable. It remained inoperable for approximately one hour until level was restore Enclosure 2
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l The inspectors verified the licensee's initial corrective actions and
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verified that they performed the appropriate compensatory actions of the Fire Protection Plan (FPP).
F2.3 Pre-Action Sorinkler System Failures Insoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors observed the licensee's response and immediate corrective actions for fire protection clapper valve failures. This issue was previously identified as IFI 50-348, 364/96-02-03 and was closed in IR 50-348, 364/97-14 due to apparent correction of the failure Observations and Findinas On February 17. 1998, the licensee commenced testing the Unit 1 pre-action sprinkler systems using 3rocedure FNP-1-FSP-422. " Pre-Action S)rinkler - Annual.~ Rev 5. T1e first system tested.1A-112. failed w1en the multimatic valve did not trip electrically or manually. The licensee had to partially disassemble the valve to make it trip. The licensee left the valve in the tripped position, suspended testing, and notified the vendo With a vendor representative on site, the licensee resumed testing on I
February 19, 1998. The licensee selected a sample of six fire j suppression systems based on suspicions that the failures were related to leaving the clapper tripped for an extended period and then resetting it without replacing the diaphragm. The six systems chosen had been trip)ed for an average of 30 days and then reset without replacing the diaparagm. The first system tested.1A-136. failed to trip electrically or manuall Based on the high initial failure rate, the licensee immediately established hourly fire watches in all areas per the FPP and
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systematically tripped the clappers in all areas that would require a continuous fire watch. The inspectors verified that the licensee's actions were consistent with the FPP and observed the performance of the fire watches. By February 20. 1998, the licensee had tripped a total of 49 clappers, which included all systems in safety related areas. of which 9 failed to trip properly. Of the nine that failed, five failed to trip electrically or manually. One of the cla)per valves that failed to trip electrically or manually was shipped to tie vendor for analysi The licensee planned to leave most of the clappers tripped until receipt of further information from the vendo The inspectors followed the licensee's response to the failures ;
including examination of the failed clapper components, observation of 1 I tripping the clappers on February 19, 1998, verification of the pro >er i'
compensatory actions per the FPP. and observations of the fire watcle The recent failures of the clapper valves is identified as URI 50-34 ,
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364/98-01-10, Pre-Action Sprinkler System Failures, pending further review of the licensee's investigation, c. Conclusions i Licensee immediate corrective actions were prompt and conservativ However, the recent failures indicate that prior corrective actions were
! not effective.
t F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues (71750)
F (Closed) VIO 50-348. 364/97-12-02: Failor.e_to Correctly Translate ADolicable Desian Inout Reauirements for Kaowool ERFBS Into the Installation Procedure The licensee denied VIO 50-348, 364/97-12-02 and provided additional supporting data in a letter dated October 24, 1997. The NRC reviewed the additional information and concluded that a violation did not occu By letter dated December 17, 1997, the licensee was informed the violation would be withdraw V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas X1 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee o)erating its facility in a manner i contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections j discussed in this re) ort, the inspectors reviewed the applicable {
portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameter j l
X2 Exit Meeting Summary I
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on February 27. 1998, after the end of the inspection perio The licensee acknowledged the findings presente ,
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
l Enclosure 2 l
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED j Licensee-l l R. Badham. Supervisor SAER P. Crone. Engineering upport Performance Supervisor
! T. Esteve. Planning & ontrol Supervisor i R. Fucich. ES Manager i S. Fulmer Plant Training and Emergency Preparations Manager '
S. Gates. Administration Manager
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D. Grissette. Operations Manager R. Hill General Manager
- D. Jones. Configuration Management Manager
- T. Livingston. Chemistry Superintendent
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l R. Martin Maintenance Team Leader C. McCoy, Vice President - Vogtle M. Mitchell. HP Superintendent C. Nesbitt, Assistant General Manager. Plant Support W.- Oldfield Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor M. Stinson.. Assistant General Manager. Operations G. Waymire Technical Support Manager ,
G.~ Wilson SNC Corporate Senior Enginee I R. Winkler. Engineering Group Supervisor PMMS i l
< EC J. Zimmerman. NRR Project Manage ;
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37550: Engineering
,n IP 37551: Onsite Engineering i L IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In Identifying Resolving, and Preventing Problenis .
IP 60705: Preparation For Refueling !
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71001: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation l IP'71707: P1 ant Operations !
l IP 71750: Plant Support Activities l IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 84750: Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
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IP 92901:. Followup - Plant Operations l IP 92903: Followup - Engineering i
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Enclosure 2 i
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I 25-L ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
- hpa Item Number Descriotion and Reference a Ooened IFI 50-364/98-01-02 Containment Spray Pump Testing (Section'M1.2)
IFI 50-348,364/98-01-03 Review approved CVS FSD. (Section E7.1)
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URI 50-348.364/98-01-04 Inadequate Safety Assessment for Miswired HSDP MOVs-(Section E8.1)
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URI 50-348,364/98-01-05- Failure to Track and Correct Conditions Adverse l -to Quality (Section E8.2)
IFI 50-348,364/98-01-06 Control Room Ventilation Testing (Section E8.2)
IFI .50-348.364/98-01-07 Review Licensee Actions to Improve Radioactive l Material Container Label Effectiveness (Section R1.1).
VIO 50-348,364/98-01-08 Failure to Adequately Implement Contamination I Control Practices During Maintenance (Section i
R4.1)
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-IFI 50-348, 364/98-01-09 Excessive Underground Fire Main Leakage (Section
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F2.1)
URI 50-348, 364/98-01-10 Pre-Action Sprinkler System Failures (Section F2.3)
Closed NCV 50-348,364/98-01-01 Failure to Comply with System Operator Touring Requirements (Section 04.1)
l IFI 50-348,364/96-09-03 Application of Remedial Training Documentation
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Guidance (Section 08.1).
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VIO 50-348.364/97-05-01 Failure To Notify NRC Of Change Of Licensed l Operator Medical Status (Section 08.2).
LER 50-348, 50-364/97-10 Motor-0perated Valve Local / Remote Control l Circuit Wiring Discrepancies (See Section E8.1)
LER 50-348, 50-364/97-13 ' Operating Outside the Design Basis Due to Control Room Exhaust Isolation Dampers Not j Closed (Section E8.2)
Enclosure 2
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URI 50-348.364/97-201-09 Tornado Missile Spectra (Section E8.3)
IFI 50-348.364/97-201-16 Calculation Discrepancies (Section E8.4)
VIO 50-348.364/97-11-06 Inadequate Corrective Action to Resolve Differences Between CCW System P& ids and Operating Procedures (Section E8.5)
IFI 50-348.364/97-10-07 Review Licensee Actions to Improve Maintenance of Hazmat Training and Test Records (Section R8.1). 1
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VIO 50-348.364/97-012-02 Failure to Correctly Translate A)plicable Design '
Input Requirements for Kaowool ERFBS into the Installation Procedures (Section F8.1)
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Discussed URI 50-348.364/97-201-12 Stress Analysis Temperature (Section E8.6)
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l Enclosure 2