ML20057C304
| ML20057C304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1993 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Morgan M, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057C300 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-19, 50-364-93-19, NUDOCS 9309280197 | |
| Download: ML20057C304 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1993019
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:I , UNITED STATES / tar ftFog% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J* - - * ,e REGloN 11 2 7' 8 101 MAR!ETTA sTMET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323-0193 j ' ' ' rr; s % /
- Rdport Nos.: 50-348/93-19 and 50-364/93-19
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 30 - August 30, 1993 Inspectors:
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ME 9[[3 3 Michael 4. Morgan, Acting Senipf Resid(nt inspector Date Siijned Y f I/ Y ]i YI N Michael A( Scott, Re'sident Insgrec)dr / Date Signed ~ Accompa ing Perso el: T. M. Ross, Senior Project Manager, NRR 5!f 3 Approved by: le hf .th a Floyd S. Cantfell, Chief Dat'e Si'gned Readtor Projdcts Section IB Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: ? This routine, resident inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, maintenance, surveillance, follow-up of facility events and an evaluation of licensee self-assessment. Deep backshifts were performed August 17 and 24, 1993. Results: On August 18, 1993, during surveillance testing, operations personnel observed a low suction pressure condition on the Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Extensive testing did not identify the cause, paragraph 3.a. A systems operator during the filling of a pump room sump, operated an engineered safety feature valve without permission from the shift supervisor. A non-cited violation was issued for this event, paragraph 3.b. On August 5, > a systems operator and shift foreman, during switch-over operations of component cooling water headers, erroneously isolated water to the miscellaneous header. A violation was issued for this event, paragraph 3.c. On August 19, during performance of load testing activities, a 75-ton boom crane contacted a non-safety related 12 Killovolt power line outside the protected area, paragraph 4.b. On August 11, the inspectors attended a 9309280197 93o933 PDR ADDCK 05000348 G pyg - - _ __. ---
' r . ? ~ meeting of the plant operations review ccmmittee, paragraph 6. Also on August 11, the inspectors observed plant personnel and a vendor representative unloading new fuel assemblies, paragraph 7. Licensee action was taken on previous inspection findings, paragraph 8. One violation and one non-cited violation were identified. Results of this inspection indicate that actions by management, operations, maintenance and ' other site personnel were adequate. i a t , 5 k 1 )
f , REPORT DETAILS , 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. Bayne, Supervisor, Safety Audit and Engincaring Review . C. Buck, Technical Manager R. Coleman, Modification Manager P. Crone, Superintendent, Operations Support L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager
- R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant
- W. Jaasma, Senior Engineer, Safety Audit and Engineering Review
. M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste
- C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager
- J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
J. Powell, Unit Supervisor - Plant Operations
- L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager ,
- Attended the exit interview
Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations, security, maintenance, I&C and office personnel. On August 30, 1993, M. A. Scott reported to Farley as Resident
Inspector. From August 9 to August 13, T. Ross, Senior Project Manager, NRR, assisted the resident inspectors. Acronyms and initializations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph. 2. Plant Status ! a. Units 1 and 2 Status , , Units 1 & 2 operated at full power during reporting period. b. NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections
I During the week of August 23, Region II security personnel conducted a routine inspection of FNP site. (Report 50-348, - 364/93-20).
During the week of August 16, Region Il personnel from the i Division of Reactor Safety conducted the initial phase of an ' operational performance inspection of the FNP's service water , system. I 1 , , . , .
F 2 3. Operational Safety Verification (71707) The inspectors conducted routine tours to verify license requirements are being met. Tours included review of site documentation, interviews with plant personnel and an on-going evaluation of licensee self- assessment. a. Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) Low Suction Pressure Event - Unit 2 On August 18, during post-maintenance performance of surveillance test, STP-22.16, operations personnel observed a low suction pressure condition on the Unit 2 TDAFWP. Concurrently, security and operations personnel heard metallic noises in the area of the Unit 2 condensate storage tank (CST). The TDAFWP was immediately secured and the FNP personnel investigated system components for ! cause. On August 19, a FNP management meeting was held to develop an event investigation plan. TDAFWP suction components / valves were
disassembled. Radiography of system piping and other valves was
also performed. On August 20, the CST bladder was cut open and ' divers conducted a visual inspection of the inside of the tank. No problems were found in the tank. The pump suction and suction line components were vented and the pump was run for about three minutes. The low TDAFWP suction pressure anomaly did not reappear. FNP management decided to further examine the system using fiber optics. Nothing unusual was observed. At about 9:00 a.m., a - conference call was held between FNP, SNC, NRR, and Region II personnel to discuss the event and FNP's plan. FNP theorized that the metallic sounds heard in the vicinity of the CST were due to thermal expansion / contraction of the tank ano piping upon recirculation of " cooler" liquid through hot piping. After discussions with the Region II and NRR staff, the licensee decided to rerun STP-22.16 and also surveillance STP-22.19, which used the TDAFW pump to feed directly to the steam generators. The TDAFWP was run for about 85 minutes and the motor-driven AFW pumps were also tested. Personnel were stationed in the area of the CST. The surveillance tests were satisfactory and no unusual sounds were noted near the CST. On August 21, with the pump secured, the pump suction piping pressure transmitter sensing lines were vented in an attempt to reproduce the original low suction pressure; however, the problem did not reappear. The CST bladder was repaired, system components were inspected and restored to operable conditions and the TDAFWP and overall system was declared operable. The pump and associated system equip $ent are scheduled to be inspected in the upcoming September - October Unit 2 refueling outage.
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. 3 ' b. Unauthorized and Inappropriate Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System Drain Valve Operation - Unit 2 On July 21, a systems operator (50), during filling operations of the turbine-driven AFW (TDAFW) pump room sump, operated an ESF valve without first obtaining proper authorization from the unit ' shift supervisor (See Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-17 paragraph 3.b.) This item was identified as unresolved item 50-364/93-17-01, Unauthorized AFW system drain valve operation. This UNR is now identified as a non-cited violation (NCV) 50-364/93-19-01. The AFW system remained operable throughout the incident. This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy. This item is closed. c. Erroneous Isolation of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Miscellaneous Header - Unit 2 On August 5, with Unit 2 at power during " switch-over" operations from the "A" train CCW header to the "B" train CCW header, a plant 50 and a licensed shift foreman (SFO), erroneously isolated CCW to the miscellaneous CCW header. Their action resulted in the control room receiving a " low CCW flow to the RCP heat exchanger" alarm and indications that RCS letdown (L/D) flow was being , diverted around the RCS L/D demineralizers. Automatic bypassing of the demineralizers occurs when higher-than-expected (-130 degrees F) outlet temperatures are experienced from the L/D heat exchanger. Isolation of this header also isolated CCW to the RCP seal packages, and the gross failed fuel monitor and sampling system heat exchangers. Upon receiving directions from control room operators, the S0 immediately restored cooling from the "A" train CCW supply by reopening the "A" train valves. Control room personnel verified that CCW flow had been reestablished. Event duration was about 75 seconds. In accordance with the procedure, SOP-23.0B, the following steps are required to be performance and independently verified. The "B" train CCW supply header cross-connect valves, "Q2Pl7V009A" & "Q2Pl7V009B", are required to be opened prior to the closing of the "A" train CCW supply header cross-connect valves, "Q2Pl7V009C" & "Q2Pl7V0090". Both the 50 and SFO failed to follow the procedural steps contained in SOP-23.08. Instead, the 50 erroneously verified open, the "2A" & "2B" CCW pump suction valves, "Q2Pl7V109A" & "Q2Pl7V109B". The resident inspectors, during follow-up activities performed for this event, determined that the personnel involved failed to properly identify valves prior to their operation. Both the S0 and SF0 misread the attached valve identification (ID) numbers, (i.e., they attempted to
r , i j 4 j identify valves by simply reading the last three identifiers - the "09A" and "09B" designations - rather than the whole valve ID , number). Both operators failed to correctly read posted CCW valve ID numbers and as a result the S0 failed to properly perform the action steps contained in the written and approved CCW system j operating procedure. The SF0 failed to properly identify all valves to be operated prior to their operation by the S0. The SFO also failed to coordinate these local CCW valve realignment activities. As part of the licensee's immediate corrective actions, both operators were " counseled", the specifics of self- , verification techniques were discussed, other operations personnel ' were notified of the event " specifics" and a formal " root cause" analysis, was begun. Further enhancements to the CCW operating procedure are being considered. FNP continues to emphasize self-
verification techniques to their operations personnel. This includes a check of the whole valve ID number. At the time of the event, FNP personnel were in the process of hanging tags as part of an improved labeling program. These "new" labels include the noun name of the component, clearer ID numbers, universal coding and a color coding for the appropriate unit, (i.e.; yellow bordering for Unit 1; g_reen for Unit 2). FNP management was also evaluating various methods for better identification of chain-operated valves. The isolation of the Unit 2 miscellaneous CCW header is an example of personnel error and operators failing to thoroughly and accurately follow established procedural action steps. This event is a violation, (NOV) 50-364/93-19-02, Erroneous CCW valve operation due to a failure to adhere to approved written procedures. No other violations or deviations were identified in this area. Results i of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel < conducted other assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures. 4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) . The inspectors reviewed various FNP preventative / corrective maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, vendor technical manuals, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements. a. Portions of the following activities were observed / reviewed: a MWR-253215; Unit 2 Containment spray pump room sump pump - verify I and reset overload adjustment The inspector reviewed documentation fo: the associated adjustment efforts and noted that a proper release of the component was i i ! l . . . .
. 5 obtained from the SS. The inspector noted that the pump overload was properly adjusted from the previous 100 percent condition to a desired 115 percent to allow for pump room ambient conditions. Work performed appeared to be satisfactory and in accordance with guidance contained in the MW1 and the sump pump technical manual. ' s MWR-274500; Sr:rvice water to the Unit 2 TDAFWP isolation valve - perform radiogr' phy on the valve. The inspector reviewed th tWR and the associated test set-up. The RT was performed on v valve body to determine if any of the internals had been damaged. The RT was difficult to read and management decided to discoatinue RT efforts and reexamine the AFW lines with fiber optic equipment. Work performed was satisfactory ' and in accordance with directions contained in the package; , however, results of the RT were inconclusive. (Paragraph 3 a.) b. 75-Ton Crane Contacts the Warehouse 12KV Electrical Feeder Line
On August 19, during performance of load testing activities for the 75-ton crane main and auxiliary hoists, the crane's boom contacted a 12XV power line. The boom was immediately moved and load testing activities were halted. No personnel were injured and the event did not involve the FNP main power block / grid lines or associated system electrical transmission lines. Burn marks i were evident on the crane boom jib line, at the point of the arc. The neutral wire of the 12KV warehouse feeder lines was frayed but not broken. The weights used for testing are at different locations. While the crane was being backed into position for testing, the boom was lifted in order to avoid a dump truck that was in its path. As the crane continued to be moved into the testing area / position, the boom came into contact with the power lines. The associated power line fuses " blew", consequently reenergizing of the power lines was not possible. Causes of the problem included, a lack of a required spotter / flagman and appropriate, approved precautions not being followed by the crane operator. FNP/SNC management, health / safety and maintenance personnel are presently investigating this industrial safety incident and a report will be written. SNC management considers this to be a significant incident. Immediate corrective actions have included,1) personnel discipline, 2) stressing of the FNP guidelines / procedures for crane operation to appropriate FNP personnel ad 3) presentations of this incident at site safety meetings. The inspectors will provide updates of this incident in a future report. No violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the maintenance area indicate that ) both operations and maintenance personnel conducted other assigned i activities in accordance with applicable procedures. - . _ . _ _ . l
F , 6 5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety- related systems and components, in order to verify that such activities were performed in accordance with facility procedures and NRC regulatory and licensee technical specification requirements. The following surveillance activities were observed / reviewed: a 1-STP-1.0 Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance Requirements 2-STP-1.0 Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 The inspectors routinely observed operator activities while parameters were monitored, documented, and evaluated. a 2-STP-22.16; Turbine-Driven AFW (TDAFW) Pump Inservice Test The inspectors observed,1) pump start-up, 2) pump flows using the small recirculation discharge piping, 3) combination discharge flows using both the small and larger recirculation discharge pathways, 4) pump RPMs and 5) TDAFW pump suction pressures and flows. The inservice test was satisfactory and conducted in accordance with the approved plant procedure. (Paragraph 3 a.) a 2-STP-22.19; Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Normal Flow Path Verification
' The inspectors observed, 1) start-up of the TDAFW pump and the motor driven pumps, 2) required flows to the appropriate steam generators and 3) restoration of normal system alignment / configuration. Testing flows to the steam generators did not cause a plant transient. Flow path verification and operability was determined to be satisfactory and in accordance with the approved plant procedure. (Paragraph 3 a.) No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the surveillance area indicate that personnel conducted , assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures. i 6. Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500) i The inspectors attended a meeting of the PORC on August 11. The meeting ) was chaired by the General Manager - Nuclear Plant and a quorum was present as required by Technical Specification 6.5.1. Members were prepared for the discussions, had knowledge of the issues, and discussion among the PORC members was uninhibited and encouraged by the chairiran of the committee. The licensee's self-assessment program, specifically PORC activities, are adequate and no violations or deviations were identified. 7. Transfer and Visual Inspection of New fuel - Unit 2 (60705) !
r v . . ' 7 On August 11, the inspectors observed activities of FNP personnel (i.e., operations, health physics and reactor engineering), and a vendor fuels representative, in the process of unloading, inspecting, and transferring new fuel assemblies from their shipping containers to the , storage racks. The assemblies had been recently shipped from the vendor i for the upcoming refueling outage. This evolution was conducted in accordance with the FNP fuel handling procedure FHP-3.0, " Receipt and Storage of New Fuel." Site personnel accomplished their duties in a deliberate and methodical manner in accordance with FHP-3.0 and without > incident. Radiological surveys and swipes of each new assembly were < performed, along with thorough visual inspections using the criteria / guidance contained in Attachment "B" of the procedure. No anomalous mechanical conditions were identified. , 8. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92700) , a. (Closed) Unit 2 URI 50-364/93-17-01, Unauthorized AFW system drain valve operation. The operator was disciplined for his conduct. The drain valve was immediately closed and the affected pump room areas were cleaned. An incident report and root cause study was prepared by the licensee and the event was discussed with operations personnel. This aspect of operating safety-related equipment without proper authorization, continues to be emphasized in the licensee's S0 training program. This item is closed. b. (Closed) Unit 1 NOV 50-348/91-17-01, Unit I turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump not fully operable when plant mode changes were conducted. The violation was caused by procedural inadequacy and personnel error by the SS. The procedure did not have the appropriate sign-off provisions and the SS failed to ensure the proper LC0 status sheet was generated. A civil penalty was assessed by the NRC. As indicated in your Reply to the Notice ' of Violation, dated October 14, 1991, the SS was reprimanded and all plant procedures were reviewed for cases where a group, other than the primary performing group, was required to perform a procedural step. All procedures found to exhibit this " inconsistency" were evaluated for specific secondary group sign- off provisions. New procedures are written to include guidance , and specific sign-offs for both primary and secondary group signatures. This item is closed. l c. (Closed) Unit 1 NOV 50-348/91-17-02, Shift supervisor did not conduct required audits of locked valve and key checkout sheets on ' Unit 1. This violation was caused by personnel error in that a locked valve audit was not performed weekly. The performance of the locked valve and key checkout log audits by the shift j ' supervisors was emphasized and is a part of their training. This item is closed, i 4 . - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - w "
r . . 8 9.' Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on September 1, with the facility manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee was informed that the item discussed in paragraph 8 were closed. ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 50-364/93-19-01 (NCV) Unauthorized AFW system drain valve operation 50-364/93-19-02 (NOV) Erroneous CCW valve operation i due to a failure to adhere to approved written procedures. 10. Acronyms and Abbreviations , AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater AP - Administrative Procedure CCW - Component Cooling Water CST - Condensate Storage Tank D/G - Emergency Diesel Generator DRP - Division of Reactor Projects Engineered Safety Features ESF - FHP - Fuel Handling Procedure FNP - Farley Nuclear Plant HP - Health Physics 10 - Identification Instrumentation and Controls I&C - KV - Kilovolts Limiting Condition for Operation LCO - MDAFW - Motor-Driven Auxiliary feedwater M0V - Motor-0perated Valve MWR - Maintenance Work Request NCV - Non-cited Violation NOV - Notice of Violation PORC - Plant Operations Review Committee RCP - Reactor Coolant Pump RCS - Reactor Coolant System RPM - Revolutions Per Minute RT - Radiography Test SF0 - Shift Foreman Operating S/G - Steam Generator SNC - Southern Nuclear Operating Company SO Systems Operator - SS Shift Supervisor - SNC - Southern Nuclear Operating Company
_ . . ' 9 ' STAR - "Stop", "Think", "Act", " Review" STP - Surveillance Test Procedure SWS - Service Water System TDAFWP- Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump , h t }}