IR 05000443/1986055

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Insp Rept 50-443/86-55 on 861117-21.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Occupational Radiological Controls Program & Previously Identified Items
ML20207K788
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1986
From: Mcfadden J, Shanbaky M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207K768 List:
References
50-443-86-55, NUDOCS 8701090521
Download: ML20207K788 (9)


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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-55

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Docket N *

License No. CPPR-135 Priority -

Category B i Licensee: Public Service of New Hampshire P. O. Box 700 i

Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874

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Facility Name: Seabrook Power Station, Unit 1 i

Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire Inspection Conducted: November 17-21, 1986 Inspectors: /7?e. k1 N & /2-3D <WP

, . McFadden, Radiation Specialist date

'I Approved by: S.L.N d h M. Shanbaky, Chief, FadiliAies 12k 3lI GG i date

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Radiation Protection Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on November 17-21, 1986 (Inspection Report Number 50-443/86-55)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced preoperational inspection of the status both of the occupational radiological controls program and of previously-identified items. One regionally-based inspector was onsite for this inspection.

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Results: No violations were identified.

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DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted i

During the course of this preoperational inspection, the following personnel were contacted or interviewe .1 Licensee Personnel H. Anderson, Radwaste Utilities Department Supervisor

  • Cash, HP Supervisor, Operations
* DiProfio, Assistant Station Manager

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S. Dodge, HP Supervisor, Support

  • J. Grillo, Assistant Operations Manager
  • D. Kochman, Health Physicist, NSG
* Leland, Chemistry and HP Manager
P. Neault, HP Supervisor, Dosimetry
  • D. Perkins, Licensing Engineer
  • T. Pucko, Senior Licensing Engineer i

R. Sterritt. ALARA Health Physicist, Operations

  • W. Temple, Licensing Coordinator
  • R. Thurlow, Health Physicist, Dosimetry
  • ' Attended the exit interview on November 21, 198 l Additional licensee personnel were contacted or interviewed during this inspection.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel Attending the Exit Interview D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector

2.0 Purpose

The purpose of this preoperational inspection was to review both the

! status of previously-identified items and the status of the occupational

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radiological controls progra .0 Status of Previously-Identified Items Prior to this inspection, there were twenty-one previously-identified items remaining open in the occupational-radiological-controls area. Due to the licensee's responsiveness and attention to these items, demonstrated by the preparation of formal evaluation packages for sixteen

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of the items, a large fraction of these' items were examined and closed during this inspection.

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4 3.1 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-16-02):

Data to support the adequacy of beta-dose-assessment methodology was to be developed. The Itcensee produced documentation to stow that irradiations of TLDs, using Sr-90/Y-90, TL-204, and Pm-147, had been performed to yield a series of correction factors vs. beta

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energies. These data points (correction factors) were used to i determine a function which allows the calculation of correction factors from dosimeter readings down to the Pm-147 energy. This function has been incorporated into the beta gamma algorithm which I is documented in the controlled document, " Technical Basis for the

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Seabrook Station Personnel Thermoluminescence Dosimetry Program,"

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dated September 1986. Based on these findings, this item is close '

3.2 (Closed): Follow-up Item (50-443/86-25-05): The licensee planned to perform an evaluation of the appropriateness of the location for the

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air-sampling line for the containment-air monitor (No. 6526). The

results of the evaluation were reviewed during this inspection.
Helium was released at a controlled rate into the reactor-coolant-s cump-B cubicle. This cubicle is located on the opposite side of the j containment building from the inlet to the sampling line for. the RM-6526 monitor. The helium release rate in the cubicle and the

helium concentration at the RM-6526 skid were monitored. During the

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releases, five of the six containment-air-handling fans were running

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(two separate combinations). The CRDM fans were not running. The licensee stated that the fact that the CRDM fans were not running during the releases resulted in a conservative test since the CRDM fans would have caused faster and more complete mixing. The test documentation indicated that transport of the tracer gas from a

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. distant potential coolant leakage point to the air-sampling line and detector skid occurred quickly and that the concentration indications were in general agreement with calculated values during the release

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periods. Based on these findings, this item is closed.

I 3.3 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-01):

The approved version of the documentation of responsibilities and interfaces between health physics and the radwaste group is to be-

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placed in the maintenance manual. During this inspection, the approved version, "Radwaste/ Utilities Department Organization and

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Interfaces," dated August 21, 1986, was available in the Agreements l section of Chapter Four of the Maintenance Management Manua Based on this finding, this item is close .4 { Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-02)

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The licensee should document its criteria for certifying a person as

' an " individual qualified in radiation protection procedures," who can be responsible for providing positive control over the activities d

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of other individuals in a "high radiation area." The point at issue was whether an individual, not a radiation protection technician but who had successfully completed licensee training entitled "Supplemen-tal Radiation Worker Training," was certified as previously state Licensee procedure, RP3.1 (Revision 4), " Radiation Protection Train-ing Requirements" has been revised to address this point. This pro-cedure now states that "a radiation worke.a who receives and success-fully completes the supplemental radiation worker training module is considered qualified in radiation procedures as they apply for entry to high radiation and locked high radiation areas to the extent that the individual controls his/her own entry and exposure; this indivi-dual is not qualified in radiation protection procedures to provide continuous surveillance over other worker activitios in these areas."

Based on this finding, this item is close .5 (Closed; Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-03):

An approved training manual, " Contracted HP Tech Training," should be available for implementation before contracted HP technicians are utilized. A draft of this manual was available during a previous inspection. During this inspection, an approved training manual was available for review. Based on this finding, this item is close ,

3.6 (Closed; Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-04):

A mechanism for ensuring timely review of revised procedures by radiation protection technicians was not documented. An approved Health Physics Department Instruction (HPDI) was available during this inspection and addressed this ite Instruction No. HP-A-002,"

Health Physics Department Dccument Review," provides that controlled documents be reviewed by all concerned within a specified time period and that this review be documentec by signature and date on sign-off sheets. Selective sign-off sheets were reviewed by the inspector, and it appeared that the HPDI was being implemente Based on these findings, this item is close .7 (Closed): Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-06):

The licensee should identify hood / local exhausts servicing activities-with potential for generating airborne radioactivity and test for adcquate face / capture velocities. The licensee stated that such hoods / local exhausts had been identified. These included six radiochemical fume hoods (three in the primary chemistry labora -

tory and three in the secondary chemistry laboratory), a radio-chemical fume enclosure at the primary chemistry sampling station, and four exhausts (two welding booths and two local exhausts) in the maintenance shop. Test results for the six hoods were reviewed by l the inspector, and it was noted that t.hese had been evaluated annu- l ally since 1982. The enclosure at the primary chemistry sampling station has not yet been finished and flow-balanced. The licensee l

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intend' * avaluate this enclosure. A ventilation survey of the four exhaus the maintenance shop was performed in September 198 The inspector reviewed the results of this ventilation survey. The licensee stated that modifications to the maintenence shop exhaust systems would be necessary if activities with significant potential for generating airborne radioactivity are contemplated. Based on these findings, this item is close .8 [ Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-07):

An approved procedure for use of portable ventilation equipment was not available. During this inspection, an approved Procedure N H00960.06, " Radiological Guidelines for Use of Containments and Air Handling Equipment," was available. The inspector reviewed this procedure and noted that it contained a prerequisite to check for an acceptable magnehelic gauge reading, that it required air samples at the blower exhaust upon initial startup and daily while in use, and that it supplied an air-sample-result action limi Based on these findings, this item is close .9 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-08):

An approved procedure for use of supplied-breathing-air equipment was not available. During this inspection, an approved Procedure No. HD0965.07, " Air Supplied Respiratory Protection Equipment and Distribution System," was available. This procedure was reviewed by the inspector and appeared adequate. Based on these findings, this item is close .10 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-09):

An approved procedure for testing supplied-breathing-air quality and for recording test results was not availabl During this inspec-tion, an approved Procedure No. HD0965.08, " Breathing Air Certifi-cation," was available. This procedure was reviewed by the inspector and appeared adequate. The actual testing is performed by a contrac-tor who provides a permanent record of results for the limiting characteristics for Grade D air (ANSI Z86.1-1973). Based on these findings, this item is close .11 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-10):

A documented method to track and detect increased concentrations of pure beta emitters was not availabl During this inspection, an approved Procedure No. HD0958.10, " Monitoring for Pure Beta Emit-ters," was available. This procedure was reviewed by the inspector and appeared adequate. Quarterly analyses of reactor coolant and rad waste streams performed by the chemistry group will be collected by HP and the activity of pure beta-emitting radionuclides will be tracked. This procedure will be implemented upon initial critica-lity. Based on these findings, this item is close .

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3.12 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-12):

A computer program and/or technical basis document to make back calculations from bioassay results to the time of intake was not available. During this inspection, an approved Procedure N HD0961.29, " Internal Dosimetry Assessment," was available. This procedure was reviewed by the inspector and appeared to be of high quality and addressed the item concerning the method of back-calculating from in vivo results to MPC-hours at time of intake. In addition, Procedure No. HD0961.28, " Internal Dostmetry Quality Assurance Program," states that a review of the correlatiun between in vitro, in vivo, and air- samples is made using . regulatory-accepted models and techniques (ICRP-2) when a potential acute intake in excess of 40 MPC-hours could have occurred. Additionally, Procedure No. H00961.21, " Conduct and Evaluation of Bioassay," provides for comparison of MPC-hours assigned from air sample %esults and MPC-hours calculated from bioassay result Based on these findings, this item is close .13 { Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-13):

An in vitro bioassay program and quality assurance program for same were not available. During this inspection, an approved Procedure No. HD0961.28, " Internal Dosimetry Quality Assurance Program," was available. This procedure described the in vitro monitoring program and its associated quality assurance provisions. An outside labora-tory has been selected for performance of in vitro analyses. The licensee performed a QA audit of the laboratory service in September 1986 and intends to perform an audit on an annual basis. Based on these findings, this item is close .14 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-14):

Use and calibration procedures for portal monitors were not available. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed approved Procedures Nos. HD0955.07 and HD0963.07, entitled " Operation of the Gamma-10 Portal Monitor" and " Calibration of the Gamma-10 Portal Monitor," respectively. The most recent calibration records were also reviewe No inadequacies were identified. Based on these findings, this item is close .15 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-15):

Use and calibration procedures for standup friskers were not available. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed approved Procedures Nos. HD0955.11 and HD0963.06, entitled " Operation of the IPM-7 Personnel Contamination Monitor" and " Calibration of the IPM-7 Personnel Contamination Monitor," respectively. The most recent calibration records were also reviewed. No inadequacies were identifie Based on these findings this item is close _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _

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3.16 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-16):

Some calibration procedures for RDMS Area Monitors for modes other than mode six were not available. During this inspection, the licensee reported that all RDMS calibration procedures, for monitors listed in Attachment 1 (RDMS monitors with in plant HP applications)

to NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/86-25, had been developed and approved. Selected procedures were reviewed by the inspector and appeared adequate. Based on these findings, this item is close .17 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-17):

Licensee's HP turnover review of the RDMS was not yet complete During this inspection, the four packages comprising this review were available and were examined by the inspector. Deficiencies, when identified by the licensee , were evaluated, and corrective actions were specified. Based on these findings, this item is close .18 (Closed); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-18):

The licensee intends to evaluate their alternate noble gas sampling technique after startup. This evaluation should be completed before employing this alternate technique as the method of choice. During this inspection, the inspector reviewed a revised Procedure N HD0958.01, Airborne Activity Survey Requirements." Section 8.3,

" Noble Gas Sampling," lists two standard noble gas sampling tech-niques to be used. No inadequacies were noted. Additionally, the licensee has no firm plans for use of other techniques. Based on these findings, this item is close .19 (0 pen); Follow-up Item 50-443/86-25-02):

During NRC Inspection No. 86-25, an unbarricaded access point to a proposed locked high radiation area (HRA) was noted by the inspecto The licensee stated that an internal review had already recognized this situation (PDT degassifier area) and that it would be corrected before this area became a locked high HRA. During Inspection N , a licensee intra company business memo was reviewed by the inspector. This memo, entitled " Locked High Radiation Area Controls" dated June 24, 1986, identified deficiencies with existing access control provisions for each area which would meet the criteria de-fining a locked HR Remedial recommendations and milestones were also documented. During this inspection, the licensee stated that numerous design change requests had been submitted and that others were in preparation. The implementation and timing of changes to locked HRAs will be reviewed in a future inspectio .

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3.20 (0 pen); Follow-up Item (50-443/86-39-11):

During NRC Inspection No. 86-39, the extent or routine air sampling at startup was identified as an item requiring review when the actual air sampling occurred. During this inspection, a licensee memo, " Routine Air Sampling During Initial Start-Up" dated November 1986, which identified the proposed initial air sampling locations, was reviewed by the inspecto The actual air sampling at startup, the air sampling re-sults, and resultant routine air sampling program will be reviewed in a future inspectio .0 Occupational Radiological Controls Program The status of the licensee's occupational radiological controls program was reviewed against criteria contained in:

10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation

Seabrook Station Technical Specifications

Seabrook Station Radiation Protection Program Manual

Seabrook Station Final Safety Analysis Report The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined by:

selective review of records and other documentation

tours of the containment, primary auxiliary, and radwaste buildings discussions with licensee personnel In the area of organization and management controls, the following items were reviewed or noted. There have been no personnel changes in the Health Physics Department at the managerial or supervisory level. The department is still nearly fully staffe The Radiation Safety Committee has met three times so far in 1986. The minutes of two meetings (N on March 11, 1986 and No. 86-02 on June 11,1986) were reviewe The items, identified in the agendas for these meetings, included:

a) safety evaluations performed, b) radiological occurrence reports (RORs), c) status of identified ALARA design deficiencies, and d) ALARA recommendations. Also, the RORs which had been generated through September for 1986 (22), were reviewed. The inspector noted that procedures had been undergoing revisions to keep them up-to-date based on results of field testing and other refinement i As regards external and internal exposure control, the following areas were reviewed or noted. Inactive RWP Nos. 86-20 through 86-27 were reviewed. Packages for each contained variously the RWP, an RWP review sheet (to record weekly review by HP supervisory personnel, the sign-in

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sheet /s, a SRPD detail sheet (generated from computerized records), and a RWP review history (also generated from computerized records). RWP N covered the installation of the primary start-up sources into fuel assemblies in the fuel storage building. RWP No. 86-27 dealt with moving new fuel assemblies from the fuel storage building to the containment building where they were loaded into the reactor core. These activities were started in and completed by the end of October. The exposure status report (ESR) of November 20, 1986 listed the whole-body cumulative ex-posure for the current quarter to date to be 0.155 person-rem. Surveys records for various RWPs were also reviewed. For the airborne surveys, associated " daily instrument checks" were also inspected. Several paper-work errors, which were not associated with significant airborne radio-activity situations, were note These included failure to default to the lower limit of detection (LLD) value for an airborne radioactivity con-centration (air sample No. 19) and recording an incorrect % MPC value (air sample Nos. 19, 30, and 34). These errors indicate a need for more atten-tion to detail in record-keeping by technicians and closer review of records by supervisory personnel. It was also noted that Procedure N .02, " Control and Calibration of HP Instrumentation and Equipment,"

did not specify the background counting time to be used in determining the LLD. During the work with the start-up sources and with fuel movement for initial core load, the licensee identified a future need for a process for tracking daily individual neutron exposure doses when neutron dose rates are significant. This item will be reviewed in a future inspection. Cur-rent / active RWPs were observed to be posted opposite the main radiological access control point. An alternate access control point outside the en-trance to containment is available. The inspector also noted that the licensee had an approved Procedure No. HD0 960.07, " Shield Survey," pre-pared for the conduct of radiation surveys during start-up and power escalatio In the area of equipment, the licensee reported that MSA amplifiers for full-face respirators and throat-activated mikes for air-supplied hoods were now available to provide communicction capability, that R0-7s were also now available to .'ulfill the FSAR commitment for high-range-ion-chamber-detection capability, and that two additional continuous air monitors had been obtaine During the course of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were identifie .0 Exit Interview The inspector met with the personnel denoted in section 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 21, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed at that time.

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