IR 05000416/1988023

Insp Rept 50-416/88-23 on 880924-1020.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operation Safety Verification Radiological Protection & Physical Security Verification,Maint Observation & ESF Sys Walkdown

ML20206A623
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	11/04/1988
From:	Christensen H, Dance H, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206A608	List: IR 05000416/1988023 ML20206A603
References
50-416-88-23, NUDOCS 8811150196
Download: ML20206A623 (10)

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' UNITED STATES -

'(g Keigjo . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p f REGION 11 -

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Report No.: 50-416/88-23 Licensee: . System Energy Resources, In !

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Jackson, MS 39205

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Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station i Inspection Conducted: September'24, 1988 through October 20.-1988  !

J Inspecto b\' h 8Y !

H. O. Citristensen, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed [

$ ,) l0 II)q Q (d. L. Mt.this, Resident inspector Date Signed ,

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Accompanying Pers nne : -Steven J. Vias (October 3-7,1988)

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Approved by:/ 1 M ^^ ^

d 9 I I H. C. Dahce, Section Chief Division Date Signed i j Division of Reactor Projects

t l SUMMARY j i Scope: The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the areas 1 of Operational Safety Verification, Radiological Protection and i

] Physical Security Verification, Maintenance Observatio l j Engineered Safety Feature System Walkdown, Reportable Occurrence l l

Operating Reactor Events, and Inspector Followup and Unresolved ,

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i Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were t 4 identified. One unresolved item was identified involving the need to [

j perform a written safety evaluation prion' to revising operating l J instruction for bypassing isolation logic associated with reactor ;

i water cleanup system, paragraph i e

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. G. Cesare, Director, Nuclear Licensing D. G. Cupstid, Superintendent, Technical Support

• L. F. Daughtery, Compliance Supervisor J. P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance S. M. Feith, Director, Quality Programs

• Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager R. H. McAnuity, Electrical Superintendent A. S. McCurdy, Technical Asst., Plant Operations Manager

• L.B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent J. H. Mueller, Mechanical Superintendent J. V. Parrish, Chemistry /.9adiation Control Superintendent

• J.L. Robertson, Superintendent, Plant Licensing R. F. Rogers, Manager, Special Projects S. F. Tanner, Manager, Quality Services L. G. Temple, ! & C Superintendent F. W. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support J. W. Yelverton, Manager, Plant Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, security force members, and office personne * Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialism throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . Operational Safety. Radiological Protection and Physical Security Verification (71707, 71709 and 71881)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staf The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access control This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisor .

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the inspectors were onsite, selected Engineered Safety Weekly, Feature (whenESF) systems were confirmed operabl The confirmation is made by verifying the following: Accessible valve flow path alignment power supply breaker and fuse status, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling and general condition, and instrumentation, r

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General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basi Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifi-cations, shif t turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, problem identification systems, and containment isolation. The licensee's onsite emergency response facilities were toured to determine facility readiness.

The inspectors reviewed at least one Radiation Work Permit (RWP), observed health physics management involvement and awareness of significant plant activities, and observed plant radiation controls. The inspectors verified licensee compliance with physical security manning and access control requirement Periodically the inspectors verified the adequacy of physical security detection and assessment aid No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed belo The observations included a review of the Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s) and other related documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control i MWO ME 5535 Clean P5W Side of OW Chiller Condense MWO M84481, Repair Orain and Refill Washout in :ene 24, Manhole 23.

! MWO M84347, Disassemble, Clean, Inspect and Reassemble a Unit 2 Low Pressure Stop Valve and Actuator for U,a in Unit MWO F84714, Replace 1/2" inch line per disposition of MNCR 200-8 *

No violations or deviations were identified.

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! 4. Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances i listed below. The observation included a review of the procedure for j technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual ,

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surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteri IC-1E61-M-1002, Revision 22, Containment /Drywell Differential Pressure Functional Tes IC-1E30-M-0002, Revision 2, Suppression Pool Level Narrow Range Functional Tes IC-1C71-M-0002, Revision 23, Turbine Stop Valve Trip Fluid Low Pressure ,

(RPS) Functional Tes IC-1E21-M-1002, Revision 26, Reactor Vessel High/ Low Pressure (RPS/RHR

! solation) Functional Test Channel No violations or deviations were identifie . Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

The accessible portions of the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system were walked down. The walkdown consisted of the following: Confirm that the system lineup procedure matches the plant drawing and the as-built configuration.

! Identify equipment condition and items that might degrade plant

' performanc Verify that valves in the flow path are in correct positions as required by procedure by visual observation or remote position indication; that power, if required, is available to the valve; that valves are locked as appropriate; and that local and remote position indications are functiona ;

, Verify the proper breaker position at local electrical boards and indications on control boards.

The inspectors walked down the system using System Operating Instruction -

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04-1-01-E21-1, Low Pressure Core Spray System, Revision 23, and Piping and

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Instrument Diagram (P&l0) M-1087, low Pressure Core Spray System Unit 1, i

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l The operating instructions electrical lineup checksheet, attachment !!!,

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component description differed from the actual equipment label for several ,

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breakers.

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BLeaker N Component Description Breaker Label 52-1P51101 LPCS Test MOV Relay LFCS MOV Test 52-1P56111 120 Vac To Inst. Bus A CR [ Control Room]

ZS-N105/F007 Limit Switch PGCC[PowerGeneration ZS-N102/A0-F006 Limit Switch Control Circuit]

ZS-N103/A0-F006 Limit Switch Panel (1A13P601LPCS)

SV-F502/ AIR to A0-F006 52-1P56112 120 Vac to Inst. Bus A CR PGCC Panel (1H13P629LRS)

72-11A18 125 Vdc To Inst. Bus A PGCC PNL 1H13-P629 72-11B35 125 Vdc To Inst. Bus B PGCC PNL 1H13-P618 52-154127 LPCS Rm FAN Coil Unit Low Pressure Cooler Fa P11305 E21-F006 STEM LEAK 0FF S0V LC Panel (1H22-P176)

Power Suppl All valves, switches and breakers were properly positioned, with the following exception: Breakers 52-1P51130 and 52-1P51132 were tagged ope These breakers provide power to Motor Operator Valve motor heaters for four LPCS MOVS. The tags were placed on the breakers on September 17, 1986, due to a recommendotion from Nuclear Plant Engineering, PMI 86/06903, to trip all breakers feeding environmentally qualified limitor-que limit switch compartment heaters. This action was in response to IE Information Notice 86-71, Recent Identified Problems With Limitorque Motor Operators. The licensee implemented an inspection program for all

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Limitorque motor operators which include checking for wire insulation

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damage. The NRC EQ inspection, Inspection Report 50-416/87-32, determined that the licensee action on EQ IE Information Notices was adequate. The licensee is developing a Design Change Package (BYPL 88-045) to perman-ently resolve the MOV heater breaker problem. The review of the proce-

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dures that are effected by the Design Change, and the removal of the breakers from the Electrical checksheets, will be an Inspector Followup Item 416/88-23-0 All valves in the LPCS system were installed correctly and did not exhibit gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels or improper labeling. The LPCS Jockey Pump Discharge stop check valve, E21-F034, had a minor packing leak.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

The below listed event reports were reviewed to determine if the informa-tion provided met the NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or plar ed, existence of potential genaric problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions, regarding licensee identified violation The following License Event Report (LER) are close LER N Event Date Event 87-09 June 6, 1987 Reactor Scram Due to Relay Failur LER 87-09-00 was issued July 29, 1987, IFl 87-22-03 was opened waiting for clarificatio LER 87-09-01 was issued December 23, 1987, and IFl 87-22-03 was closed in Inspection Report 87-4 Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-014-00 dated October 11, 1988 addressed the September 11, 1988, Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation. NRC Inspec-tion Report 416/88-19 documented this event. In a similar event discussed in LER 88-004-01 SERI comitted to install a keylock bypass switch that bypasses the delta flow isolation signal. The keylock bypass switch is interded to be used during anticipated RWCU system operating transient This Design Change is scheduled for implementation during the third refueling outage beginning in March 1989. SERI changed the RWCU operating instructions to use the existing bypass switch when aligning RWCU to blow l down to the main condenser as corrective action for LER 87-009-01. As a l

result of the RWCU isolation discussed in LER 88-014-00 the system operating instruction was revised again to bypass all the isolation logic using the existing keylock bypass switches during anticipated RWCU system operating transients, such as switching from the post-pump to pre-pump mod Several discussions have been held by NRC and SERI on previous RWCU isolations. A safety evaluation by the licensee to bypass the RWCU isolation was not performed per 10 CFR 50.59 p.*ior to the procedure was being revised to bypass all the isolation logic using the existing keylock bypass switch. The inspector feels that a written safety evaluation per 10 CFR 50.59 should h6ve been performed prior to revising the procedur pending further evaluation by the resident inspectors this item will be identified as Unresolved Item 416/88-23-02.*

• Fnresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation _ _ _ _ _

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No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Operating Reactor Events (93702)

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor event The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective actio The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriat On September 28, 1988 at approximately 5:50 p.m. during performance of procedure 06-IC-1E31-M-1001, Revision 27, Reactor Water Cleanup High Room and High Differential Room Temperature (RWCU Isolation) Functional Test, the RWCU system isolated. The I&C surveillance procedure called for the RWCU isolation bypass switch to be place to bypass. Instead the operator placed the RHR isolation bypass switch to bypass, both switches are located on panel P642 and are clearly labelled. The bypass switches are separated by RCIC bypass switch in the following sequence: RWCU, RCIC and RH Incident Report 88-9-12 documented this inciden On October 10, 1988 at approximately 10:58 a.m. the High Pressure Core Spray Systee (HPCS) automatically initiated and injected into the reactor vessel. The division 3 diesel generator auto started when the HPCS pump started as design. The operating shift, in responding to the increasing reactor vessel water level, secured the HPCS pump and manually reduced feedwater flow. Reactor vessel water level had increased to approximately 53 inches. RPS channel B tripped on high level at this point, which resulted in a 1/2 scram. The RPS trip setpoint for high reactor vessel level is 53.5 inches. When the operating shift secured the HPCS pump and reduced feedwater flow the reactor vessel water level rapidly decreased to approximately -10 inches within 10 second The reactor scrammed due to water level transients. The operator restored reactor vessel water level by use of feedwater and manual initiation of RCIC. Investigation by the licensee of the HPCS initiation determined the cause to be attributed to radio keying in the vicinity of the reactor vessel water level transmit-ters B21-N073C and B21-N073G. During the time of the HPCS injection operators were performing a Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) subloop swa The HPUs are located inside containment next to the level transmitter instrument rack. The operator was standing next to the HPU skid ottemp-ting to communicate with control room operators. When the operator keyed his radio several times it setup interference with the B21-N073C and B21-N073G transmitters. This interference caused the transmitter signal to spike low thereby causing water level indication to be low enough to initiate HPCS pump. The HPCS injection and feedwater transient led to a level transient which produced a high level trip on RPS B and a low level trip on RPS This incident was documented in Incident Report 88-10-0 No violations or deviations were identifie l

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8. Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items (92701)

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-13-08. Required SDG fuel oil Tank levels. The inspector reviewed documentation provided by the licensee and did not find that the item was resolved. There remains a discrepancy between various documents pertaining to the minimum oil levels required for the DG day tanks levels and storage tanks levels for all three division MINIMUM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS CONTROL ROOM SURVEILLANCE DG TANK LI "ROUND SHEET" * PROCEDURE T.S.+++

DG 11 Cay Tank A R607A 23" 12** 220 GAL DG 12 Day Tank B R607B 23" 12** 220 GAL i DG 13 Storage Tank R600 5.9' 5.3*** 39,000 GAL r

• Control Room "Round Sheets" , Pages 4 and 5 of 9, Panels 864 and 87 ** Surveillance Procedure 06-0P-1P75-M-0001, -C002, Sections 5.1.22  :

(DG11,DG12)

• • • Alarm Response Instruction 04-1-02-1H13-P870-5A-E1, Page 1 to 2

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+++ Technical Specification, Section 3.8. Pending Clarification of the above discrepancies this item will be remain 1 open.

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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-01-03. Resolution of labeling problems caused by adding a power source suffix to valve numbers. The first item involved the licensee revising 50! 04-5-01-Z51-1, adding Section 3.9, which requires a guard to close any control room doors, if a guard is posted due to problemt, immediately upon orders from the control i room upon a Control Room Isolation Signal. The second part involved missing and incorrect labeling of 3 valve switches on the Division 1 Reactor Shutdown Panel. The licensee has installed and corrected the labels as required. The problem pertaining to the labeling problems have been a recurring problem. The inspector revsewed the licensee review of this problem and documented in AECM 88/0024 and 00R 88/0007 This entire item is considered close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-17-01. Discrepancies during

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walkdown of CGCS. Item A involved a discrepancies between 501 04-1-01-i E61-1, Combustible Gas Control System, Revision 19. Valve and Switch Lineups which indicated that E61-F009, F010, F012. F013, F056 and F057

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should be open, but during containment purge they should be closed, per AECM 87/003 Revision 20 of the S01 has changed all six valves to indicate the valve position to be closed. Itsn B involved vab<e positions for valves E61-F001A, F001B, F002A, F002B, F004A and F004B were not indicated in the above 501. Revision 20, of the 501, paragraph 4.1. now requires verification of the above valves. Valve E61-F5980 had its label corrected, valves E61-F025, F059, F027, FX026 and FX027 had labels added, and control switch panel 1H13-P842 had a label made for E61-F01 Also, P&lD M-1091, Revision 20 corrected the reference to the "Containment Cooling System" to indicate the proper reference as Pal 0 M-1100B. This entire item is considered close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-18-01. Discrepancies noted in walkdown of control room HVA Item A, involved P&!D M-0049 not indicating that 12 valves are normally closed by use of the letter 'c'

next to the valve. P&l0 M-0030A Revision 16, note 11, indicates that this notation is no longer required and c.ould be shown for information onl Item B, involves location of service valves Z51-F024A&B shown on P&l0 M-0049. This inspector reviewed the P&ID and location of the valves which are actually on the compressor housing flange on the suctiori line, and has determined that the P&lD are schematically correct and that no action is necessary, item C involved water being found in Control Building, Elevation 189', Room N040C, chlorine detector room. The licensee issued MWO73683 on 7/22/8 It was found that rain water was passing thru a penetration. The licensee repaired the penetration and work was completed 8/4/87. The inspector walked the entire Elevation 189' and found no further leaks. Item 0 involved an error for component F012. System Operating Instruction 04-S-01-251-1, Revir, ion 23, Attachment 111, page 2/2 was found to be incorrect. The error was corrected in Revision 24, to properly indicate the proper number. This entire item is considered close (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/88-19-04 Determination of A Part 21 for Adapter vane crack on Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator. SERI letter (AECM-88/0190) dated September 30, 1988 notified Region II office of a Reportable Deficiency at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Unit 1. The deficiency concerns Division 2 Liesel Generator left bank intercooler tube leak This deficiency was detenwined to be reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 21 for GGNS Unit 1. The evaluation for Unit 2 will be finali:ed upon resumption of normal construction activitie . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 21, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by l

the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no concent on the

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fol,owing inspection findings:

416/88-23-01, Inspector Followup Item, Review procedures effected by the MOV heater breaker design change.

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416/88-23-02, Unresolved item, Determination of the need for a written safety evaluation per 10 CFR 50.c? prior to revising the operating instruction for bypassing all the isolation logic using the keylock bypass switch during anticipated transient on RWC . Acronyms and initialisms

!&C - Instrumentation and Control ESF - Engineering Safety Feature RWP -

Radiation Work Permit MWO - Maintenance Work Order PSW - Plaat Service Water MNCR - Material Nonconformance Report LPCS - Low Pressure Core Spray P&l0 - Piping and Instrument Diagram LER - Licensee Event Report RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup SERI - System Energy Resource incorporation NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission RCIC - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling HPCS - High Pressure Core Spray HPV - Hydraulic Power Unit RDS - Reactor Protection System QDR - Quality Deficiency Report DG - Diesel Generator 501 - System Operating Instruction TCN - Temporary Change Notice PDS - Pressure Differential Switch

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